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Egypt at the crossroads. Egypt's future:three scenariosWahid Abdul-Majid aa Consultant, Al-Ahram Centre for Strategic Studies & Member ofEgypt's Constitution's CommitteePublished online: 17 Jan 2013.

To cite this article: Wahid Abdul-Majid (2013) Egypt at the crossroads. Egypt's future: threescenarios, Contemporary Arab Affairs, 6:1, 17-27, DOI: 10.1080/17550912.2012.754136

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17550912.2012.754136

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Egypt at the crossroads. Egypt’s future: three scenarios

Wahid Abdul-Majid*

Consultant, Al-Ahram Centre for Strategic Studies & Member of Egypt’s Constitution’sCommittee

Egypt is undergoing dramatic changes and the shifts in its politics are wide ranging,touching upon almost the whole political system, which also includes theaspirations of the Egyptian people at this point. The hopes and fears of theEgyptian people have been high and subject to competing forces and agendas.There are many scenarios that reflect the dynamism that have characterized theEgyptian revolution and its aftermath. Furthermore, the fear barrier has beenovercome and a larger segment of Egypt’s society has become acquainted withthe principle of political participation, especially when today’s electronic age hasprovided the youth with the tools that enable that participation. This article seeksto explain the interaction of the dynamics that have been at play since the fall ofthe Hosni Mubarak regime and it provides an analysis of their positions. Threepossible scenarios are provided, while an attempt at defining the newly emergingparadigm in Egyptian politics is explained.

Keywords: socio-political dilemmas; religious politics; secular forces; Egyptianpolitical parties; political crisis; constitution; prolonged transition; semi-stability

Introduction

The recent events in Egypt and the political upheaval that occurred in early 2011 havebrought unprecedented chaos along with the sudden end of the Hosni Mubarak regime.This dramatic collapse of the previous Egyptian political system, as well as there-designing of the political space related thereto, has established new dynamics inthe Egyptian socio-political system, thus creating a completely new political paradigmtherein. This emerging paradigm is currently aggravating the already chronic socio-political dilemmas in Egypt, due to its instability, and placing significant pressure onall Egyptian political players. One of the main new dimensions in this regard is theunprecedented political role that the Muslim Brotherhood Party is now playing. TheMuslim Brotherhood was denied a role in the past. Furthermore, it is currently beingsupported by the radical Salafi parties and groups that have been known in the pastfor their militancy and radical approach. This in itself is a major political developmentin Egypt, one which affects not only Egypt’s future, but also that of the MuslimBrotherhood Party.

The juxtaposition of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis in one religious bloc,vis-à-vis the secular political parties and their bloc, is in itself one facet of the new par-ameters at this point in time, and not to be taken lightly. The battle between secularismand otherwise is at the forefront at the moment, and the political space in Egypt isforming and reforming accordingly, and thus reshaping its political identity. That iden-tity was already significantly affected by the breakdown of Egypt’s social contract and

© 2013 The Centre for Arab Unity Studies

*Email: wwmagead@yahoo.com

Contemporary Arab Affairs, 2013Vol. 6, No. 1, 17–27, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17550912.2012.754136

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challenged by the previous Anwar Sadat–Mubarak era agreements with Israel that wereimposed by the United States. The Muslim Brotherhood is required to strike a balancewithin these inherited and emerging factors in Egypt in order to stabilize the politicalscene therein. The determining factor in this respect, for both the Muslim Brotherhoodas well as the other political parties in Egypt, is the relationship between the MuslimBrotherhood and the military, especially after the Muslim Brotherhood, having suc-ceeded in the presidential elections, attempted at one point to remove the Army fromthe political scene. The military, however, remains a significant political player inthe new and unstable political landscape in Egypt, and one determinant of Egypt’sfuture. Egypt today remains in a transitional phase despite the end of the Mubarakregime approximately nineteen months ago.

The conundrums abound and are not limited to what is turning out to be a lengthytransitional stage, but also to the ambiguity related thereto. This is particularly so giventhat part of this very ambiguity is related to specific deviations inherent in the previousregimes’ policies and practices, as well as the errors committed by the military, rep-resented by its ‘Supreme Council of the Armed Forces’, and the violations it committedduring the period between 11 February 2011 and 1 July 2012. This stage in the tran-sition ended with Dr Mohammed Mursi of the Muslim Brotherhood officially becom-ing President on 12 August 2012, thus removing the military from power. An in-depthanalysis of the current situation in Egypt requires insight and an understanding ofEgypt’s background.

Background

There are various key elements to be considered when describing Egypt’s socio-econ-omic and political background, and in order to avoid any confusion on the subject, fourmain factors are delineated here for consideration, as follows.

The Muslim Brotherhood Party: its crisis and its political success

The Muslim Brotherhood and its political track have proven a major force when speak-ing of Egypt and its political landscape in the contemporary era. The Brotherhood’sattainment of its current position of authority is a surprising development in itself, par-ticularly given that Egypt’s political trajectory has been mainly secular and developedspecifically through denying the Brotherhood a legitimate role hitherto, leading to amajor schism at the heart of the Egyptian political trajectory vis-à-vis the MuslimBrotherhood and its political programme. Having won the elections the Muslim Broth-erhood has made broad political participation and the inclusion of all major politicalplayers, both secular and religious, in its administration, its official position. Thereare many dimensions to the Brotherhood’s political ambitions which are indicativeof its recently adopted position on a participatory political framework, such as itsabstention from presenting a candidate in the first presidential campaign. That decisionproved to be prudent with regard to political inclusiveness, and encouraged other Egyp-tian political parties and individuals from various backgrounds to cooperate with theMuslim Brotherhood and its nascent ‘Freedom and Justice’ Party, established in May2011. It was thence also a factor in winning votes for the party in the parliamentaryelections held between October and November 2011, gaining it 213 seats out of atotal of 508 thanks to the confidence-building measures pursued by the Brotherhood.

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Thereafter, however, the Muslim Brotherhood retreated from its preliminary pos-ition and decided to participate in the presidential elections, leading to a major shiftin the political scene, which caused unprecedented confusion. The explanation forthis reversal remains to be clarified, and it is still not clear whether the shift in the Broth-erhood’s position was planned or merely a reaction to the errors that were committed bythe Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and its grip on parliament, which turned outto be predominantly religious in nature. The military’s power over parliament led to apolitical crisis that reached its peak when it attempted to dissolve parliament comple-tely. At that stage, the ‘Nour’ Party, the ‘Construction and Development’ Party, andthe ‘Salafi’ parties held no more than 120 seats between them. That being the case,at this point in time, an objective Egyptian president, especially one from theMuslim Brotherhood’s party, would provide for establishing a political balance and ademocratic governing system in Egypt.

It would also provide for a positive political platform to be established, conducive toa participatory approach, and support the various political groups in addressing theissues related to the socio-economic crisis in Egypt resulting from the policiesimplemented by the governments of both Mubarak and Sadat. The Muslim Brother-hood’s decision to enter the presidential elections, and the success of its candidateMursi, led to its winning power and marginalizing the military’s political role. Afteran initial round, the two leading contenders in the elections were the Muslim Brother-hood’s candidate and that of the previous Sadat–Mubarak governments. The successthat the Muslim Brotherhood Party won in the elections was basically due to fearsrelated to the possibility of the former President Mubarak and/or his supportersreturn to power, and thus the emergence of additional political support for theBrotherhood and its candidate. The support of groups that are not originally fromthe Brotherhood’s political grassroots base for the Muslim Brotherhood’s representa-tive – Mursi – led to his call for a participatory political approach.

Yet Mursi presided over the establishment of a traditionally bureaucratic govern-ment, consisting partially of employees from the previous Mubarak government, inaddition to five Brotherhood members (from the Freedom and Justice Party). Thus,the resulting cabinet lacked diversity, since most of the team was from the religiouspolitical parties, none of whom represent the independent, moderate, liberal, nationalistor leftist political segments in the Egyptian political base. Having said this, it is also thecase that this was the first time in Egypt’s history that the Muslim Brotherhood Partyemerged from its political cul-de-sac, thus transforming its political image – a signifi-cant indicator in Egypt’s current political setup.

The Salafi parties

The Salafi parties drew rapt attention when, as of 25 January 2011, they diverted fromtheir traditionally dormant political state and entered the political scene by establishingnumerous political groups, the biggest of which is the ‘Nour’ Party. These religiousparties also include the ‘Asala’ Party, the ‘Fadila’ Party, in addition to the ‘Constructionand Development’ Party, which was established by the religious ‘Islamist’ bloc. TheConstruction and Development Party, in particular, is known for its militant back-ground, but it has recently repositioned and reformed its dogma accordingly. Thiswas not the only new development in the Salafis’ standing. The sudden politicalsuccess that they have achieved has led to them swiftly becoming the second mostpowerful political party in Egypt, after the Muslim Brotherhood Party, as per the

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parliamentary election results of October–November 2011. This factor has added a newdimension and determining element in the continuing transitional and unstable period.The basic indicators, however, show that these Salafi groups are unable to maintaintheir electoral success due to their weak political background and to the recent differ-ences that have developed among these various Salafi groups themselves.

The expected disenchantment with the Salafi parties, however, may not lead to themlosing their place as the second most powerful political grouping in the current Egyp-tian political landscape, unless one of the recently established moderate, liberal andleftist political parties takes over. This possibility remains unlikely at this point intime, although the long-term prospects could change in this respect. It is most signifi-cant, therefore, that the Salafi groups continue to follow the Muslim Brotherhood Partyduring this stage in the transition, and in order to understand what this means it isnecessary to examine the relationship between these two different religious and conser-vative groups. The relationship seems complicated due to the religious dimension thatthey have in common. However, the Salafis may not accept a secondary role.

One of the biggest challenges that the Nour Party faces in particular, as well as theother Salafis in general, is the powerful leading role that the Muslim Brotherhood Partyplays, which explains the position that the Nour Party and the majority of the Salafistook during the presidential elections when they refused to support the Brotherhood’scandidate, Mursi, and announced their support for his opponent from a splinter group:Dr Abdul-Munim Abu al-Futouh. The complications related to these particular politicalrifts are multifaceted.

One of the developments and complications in this regard, for example, was themarginalization of the Nour Party and the Salafis from the scene by the main Brother-hood candidate, Mursi, himself. President Mursi sidetracked the Salafis from the politi-cal process related to establishing his cabinet and allowed them only a secondary roleconcerning the official deliberations related to the appointment of Hisham Qandeel asChief of Cabinet.

In addition, President Mursi acquiesced in Al Azhar’s request for a Salafi-freecabinet to be formed and did not support the appointment of Dr Mohammed Yusrifrom the Salafi group as Minister of Endowment. However, President Mursi attemptedto pacify the Salafis by appointing the head of the Nour Party, Dr Imad Abdul-Ghafour,as his Assistant along with three other candidates: the first from the Muslim Brother-hood, the second a Christian, and the third a woman, an academic with Islamist orien-tations. These appointments were not significant but they reflected an attempt by theMuslim Brotherhood to establish an amiable and cooperative relationship with theSalafis and to decrease the schism between itself and the other religious groupswhich are ideologically different. In any case, the political position that the Salafiswill establish towards the Brotherhood in future will have an impact on Egyptiansocio-political dynamics and the future of the political scene as a whole.

The moderate, the liberal and the leftist political parties: the manifestations oftheir political crisis

This grouping consists of the moderate, the liberal and the leftists, that is all those thatare not part of the religious bloc, in addition to the groups from the previous Mubarakregime. This group as a whole is the second major one in the current bipolar politicalspectrum in Egypt, which basically took shape after the events of 2011. The polarity inthis regard reached its peak when the dramatic but limited constitutional reforms were

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introduced on 19 March 2011. The grouping includes political parties that also have areligious dimension in their background, but one which is of a cultural nature, and notpart of its political framework, such as the ‘Wasat’ Party, the ‘Masr al-Qawiyya’ Party,established by the supporters of Abdul-Munim Abu al-Futouh, in addition to splintergroups of the Muslim Brotherhood Party such as the ‘Al-Tayar al-Masry’ Party, the‘Masr’ Party and other small parties such as ‘Al-Islah wa al-Nahdah’. The array ofall these political groups signifies the instability in the current Egyptian political struc-ture. Furthermore, there are many liberal, leftist and nationalist parties in the mix, suchas the ‘Wafd’ Party, the ‘Al-Masriyeen al-Ahrar’ Party, the ‘Al-Masry al-Demuqrati waal-Ijtima’i’ Party and the ‘Al-Tajaamu’ Party (which four parties joined forces in thelatest parliamentary elections and formed the ‘Al-Kutla al-Masriya’ Party).

Another party has also recently been established: the ‘al-Dastour’ Party, led by theformer head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Dr Mohammed al-Baradai. In addition, other smaller parties have also been established such as the‘Karama’ Party, the ‘al-Nassery’ Party, the ‘al-Adel’ Party, the ‘al-Tahaluf al-Sha’abial-Demuqrati’ Party, among others, all of which reflect the disintegration of the old pol-itical system. This grouping also includes specific political players, which had a majorpolitical role in driving the events of 25 January, such as the ‘Kifaya’ Party and the‘Harakat 6th April’ Party, in addition to certain youth groups as well. These particularpolitical parties represent a new dimension in the Egyptian political sphere, and they areall currently attempting to re-design the Egyptian political space in their interest byestablishing various political alliances among themselves.

It is worth mentioning at this point that none of these recently developed parties canbe considered as a major player in the current Egyptian political arena, which is a deter-mining factor in the alliances built in this regard. These nascent alliances can be ident-ified in three basic sets as follows:

. An alliance which includes the secular parties that identify Islam as part of theircultural identity. This group aims to include some of the aforementioned liberalparties, especially the al-Adel Party, the Harakat 6th April Party and the ‘HarakatMisruna’ Party, among others.

. The Al-Tayar al-Sha’abi Party, led by the former presidential candidate HamdeenSabahy, and its allies. Sabahy and his party have established a political alliancewith the ‘Karama’ and ‘Kifaya’ parties, among others.

. The ‘Kutla Misriya’ Party, which includes the ‘al-Misriyeen al-Ahrar’ Party, the‘al-Misry al-Demuqraty al-Ijtima’i’ Party and the ‘al-Tajamu’, as well as otherparties.

These recently formed political alliances in Egypt will remain fluid for quite some timeand at least until the ‘al-Dastour’ Party, which was established on 29 August 2012,announces its political position. All these various fledgling parties and groupingslack the capacity to form solid and viable political platforms. In addition, they allbasically suffer from internal politicization and conflict, which is an endemic phenom-enon in Egypt’s socio-political base. In this regard, these nascent political parties andgroupings do not follow the necessary confidence-building measures required, and arebetting on the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to create the balance neededwith the religious parties.

President Mursi’s success, therefore, in removing the Supreme Council of theArmed Forces from the political scene was a major drawback for these new parties

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and movements in this respect. In any case, at the moment they lack the capacity toinfluence the overall direction of Egypt’s future, though some of these parties mayplay a greater role hereafter if they succeed in creating a more solid political alliance.

Egypt’s new constitution

One of the most daunting challenges that Egypt faces at the moment is the drafting andagreement of a new constitution in the face of the various schisms in Egypt’s politicalsystem. The difficulties constitute a further source of destabilization, adding to Egypt’sdeep political crisis. One of the main factors that delayed the new constitution wasrelated to blockages in the formation of the Constitutional Committee itself. Thisvery factor led to a major conflict. Under the provisions of the temporary constitutionalarrangements, the 100-member committee was to be elected through the two legislativebodies: the Parliament and the Islamic Council (Shura). The Muslim Brotherhood andthe Salafis, the majority on both bodies, were accused of overruling the other partiesand imposing their own religious political programmes.

This political battle blocked the first constitutional committee, elected on 12 April2012, from performing its functions, and it was dissolved according to a legal decisionthat declared the unsuitability of its inception in the first place. Further negotiationsbetween the religious parties and the other political parties required to establish anew committee were then delayed for two months. Once the negotiations were under-way and the attempt to establish a constitutional committee was ongoing, further pro-blems arose leading to the withdrawal of some of the liberal and leftist members fromthe process. Eventually, a committee was finally established on 24 June 2012.

However, the conflicts and the differences continued even after the establishment ofthe second committee, and one of the main issues that the various political bodiesattempted to address was the subject of secularism and the classic formula of separationbetween State and Church. Furthermore, the parties also undertook the establishment ofbasic provisions relating to other issues such as human rights, which has proven to beproblematic, especially given that such contentious issues have historically been disre-garded in Egypt ever since the nineteenth-century government of Mohammed Ali.

Given the importance of the matters in contention, it is clear why the role of thiscommittee has proved so significant, especially since the setbacks in establishing thiscommittee provided the religious parties with additional power. This was evidentonce the president drew on his presidential prerogatives, which he himself establishedin his presidential announcement, to force the pace of drafting the constitution and put itto a referendum. The process proved especially divisive, with the liberal and leftistparties objecting to both the content of the constitution and the powers used by thepresident to drive it through.

Egypt’s political future

There are various scenarios that could be taken into consideration when attempting topredict Egypt’s political future within this context.

The first scenario: The Muslim Brotherhood’s political success and stability

This scenario is related to the success the Muslim Brotherhood has already achievedand may achieve. The success that the Brotherhood achieved ahead of the constitutional

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referendum can be summarized in three stages: the parliamentary elections; the presi-dential elections; and the reversal of the Army’s role in the political space that it hadsuddenly effected in early 2011 – a fact that does not mean, however, that the militarydoes not currently continue to play a military role. The ground was thus laid for ascenario consisting of the following components or factors:

. The success of the Brotherhood and its government began in early 2012 in thespecific steps taken towards reviving the stagnant economic sector in Egypt,and attracting foreign investment, especially from the Arab Gulf countries,such as Qatar, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In addition, the Broth-erhood government addressed both unemployment and social security concernsby reducing governmental subsidies for energy and food commodities inaccordance with one of the specific conditions imposed by the IMF. Thesesteps provided the Brotherhood government with leeway partially to improvethe conditions under which approximately half the Egyptian people suffer, aswell as mobilize Egyptian society as a whole through such steps that developsupport for the Muslim Brotherhood and their political party.

. The representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood and all those that support it in theConstitutional Committee took balanced political positions and supported thecivil society in their efforts towards devising a solid constitutional frameworkwith regard to the subject of a secular state. For example, when the Salafisinsisted on according Al Azhar a role and making it the sole point of referenceon religious issues in the government, the Muslim Brotherhood refused and pre-vented this. The adoption of this political position by the Brotherhood is a posi-tive indicator and if followed by further similar steps can provide for morepolitical success for the Muslim Brotherhood, and diffuse the political conflictsderiving from the sudden and dramatic political shift in Egypt, thus providingfor democratic and institutionalized performance by all the players in the Egyp-tian government.

. The extent of the Muslim Brotherhood’s success is also directly connected towhether or not it wins the prospective parliamentary elections, which are sched-uled to take place under the new constitution. It may prove to be difficult for theBrotherhood to achieve an absolute majority in the elections (50 + 1), unlessthe president and his government achieve significant achievements during thecoming few months. Failing this, the Brotherhood may only win a simple plur-ality, which is more seats than any other party, and be forced to establish alliancesto establish their political programme. Egypt’s future image depends basically onthe Muslim Brotherhood’s performance in this regard, and whether or not it winsthe majority it needs. The Brotherhood’s own image is also directly connected tothis specific factor and whether or not it chooses to adopt a predominantly reli-gious agenda and profile or a nationalist one. In the event that is does not wina majority, this could depend on the nature of the political alliances it maydevelop and whether it chooses to establish a bloc with the Salafis, or it estab-lishes a political bloc with the moderate and liberal parties.

It is worth noting at this point that the nature of the political alliance that emanatesfrom the next elections may not be decided upon by the Muslim Brotherhood alone.The other parties may demand a different framework that does not confine them to alimited, Islamic and supposedly pluralistic role if it accepts to join forces with the

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Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood, however, may have a final say in the formof government that it establishes and on the level of participation it allows for thevarious parties, be they religious (Islamic) or otherwise. Till now the Muslim Brother-hood has been implementing its programme unilaterally, and only allowing for partialparticipation by all other parties in the decision-making process. No single party,however, can bear the heavy burden that Egypt is shouldering at the moment,singlehandedly.

If it continues in this vein, then the Brotherhood would sooner or later find itselffacing the same dilemmas that the previous Mubarak government suffered from. There-fore, it is only wise to establish a positive relationship with the other political playersand allow for a full participatory role to be played by them, and have them assist thegovernment in addressing the socio-political and economic malaises that Egypt hasbeen suffering from for quite some time, such as the chronic corruption that pervadesboth the Egyptian public sector and the civil society.

It remains to be seen whether the Brotherhood approaches the issues facing thecountry with the political maturity required, or simply provides for the aesthetics thatwould merely allow it to achieve a popular success. It is unlikely that any changewill take place in Egypt’s foreign policy for the time being and within the boundariesof this specific scenario, since there is no significant national participation that providesfor mobilizing the Egyptian people’s potential capacity to that effect. This is particu-larly so given that there is no compelling reason to believe that there is any onegroup, Muslim Brotherhood or otherwise, that sets public service as its priority.

The government in charge will always rely on support from the Arab Gulf countries,the United States and Europe, as did Mubarak’s government before it. Minor changes,however, are expected to take place, and have in fact begun to do so since the demise ofthe previous regime, especially with regard to the Egyptian–Israeli relationship and theadministration of both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, but substantial changes havenot yet been made. It is not expected, therefore, within this scenario, that Egypt will beable either to regain its traditional stature locally, regionally or internationally or to playthe role it used to, as recently requested by some of the Arab countries.

The second scenario: A prolonged transitional phase or semi-stability

This scenario depends on whether or not the current Egyptian President MohammedMursi and his Muslim Brotherhood government succeed in the manner depictedabove. If not, then it would be safe to say that another major political crisis in Egyptcould occur. This specific scenario rests of the following parameters or factors:

. The policies that President Mursi adopts – and depending on the results of thecoming parliamentary elections – give priority to reviving the stagnanteconomy rather than the social security issue in Egypt. This will be a challengingpath to follow and will require creating a balance between the appropriate econ-omic mechanisms needed to rectify the economic crisis in Egypt, which includessupporting local investment, in a manner that does not aggravate the social secur-ity crisis.

. An increase in the social security crisis, and a weak attempt to rectify it by pro-viding additional support for the unofficial services sector (philanthropy), whichis basically provided for by the Muslim Brotherhood itself in Egypt. The Salafigroups may join in this approach. This specific factor is deeply dependent on

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what happens to the governmental subsidies in both the energy and the food com-modities sectors. However, the IMF insists on decreasing these subsidies, amatter which will be additionally described in the third scenario below. It isalso expected that a subsidizing policy for energy and food commodities, anda decrease in their prices as per IMF guidelines, would have a significant influ-ence on the economy and provide the rectification required. This specific possi-bility is also related to the third scenario concerning a potential crisis that couldlead to further deeper problems.

. This scenario is also bound by the parliamentary elections, and the results theMuslim Brotherhood achieve under the new constitution, as per the first scenario.In contrast to the Brotherhood’s performance in the 2011–12 parliamentary elec-tions, in which it won a majority and gained control over parliament as a wholeas well as its subsidiary committees, its presidential candidate was only able tosecure half the votes expected due to the Brotherhood’s weak performance inthe parliament.

In addition, the Brotherhood did not win the second round of presidentialelections easily notwithstanding the smooth campaigning process and the weakopponent that was from the Mubarak camp. This factor in particular must betaken into consideration when addressing future parliamentary elections. TheBrotherhood’s impact on government, through the influence of its five ministersor the other bureaucratic ministers who have cooperated with them, is in theMuslim Brotherhood’s favour and should have a positive effect on the parliamen-tary elections and the results thereof. Yet, if the Brotherhood wins fewer seats inthe next parliament than it had in the first (disbanded) one, then its performancewill naturally be affected and become weaker, thus its attempt to develop a stablepolitical platform will be affected accordingly. A factor that could lead to theBrotherhood losing control over government and its performance, though notenough to create a void between it and the president, is described in full in thecoming third scenario.

. The emergence of a suitable opponent from the moderate, liberal and leftistcamps capable of building positive political alliances that can compete withthe Muslim Brotherhood. This specific possibility would minimize the Brother-hood’s monopoly over government and its cooperation with the Salafis, andallow for a more national participatory platform capable of addressing thevarious structural weaknesses and dilemmas in Egypt, and relieve Egypt of itspseudo-democratic system accordingly. If the current Egyptian governmentdoes not achieve the stability required to effect the major change needed in itsforeign policy, as mentioned in the first scenario, then the current shift inEgypt’s political landscape will remain unstable and for quite some time.

The third scenario: a major extended and open-ended crisis

Egypt is currently experiencing destabilizing factors related to the unprecedented trans-formation in its institutionalized political practices, which is a cause for great concern.President Mursi’s socioeconomic performance, however, does not seem to differ fromthe past, except when addressing the issue of chronic corruption. The deep level of cor-ruption that Egypt has been suffering from for decades was exacerbated by Mubarak’spolicies and his control over government, but it did not start with him. Corruption in

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Egypt, in other words, is historic and due in the first place to an elitist socio-economicframework. It remains to be seen how President Mursi fairs with regard to combatingcorruption, but even then the chronic social crisis emanating from there is the mainchallenge in this respect and could lead to a political crisis within the parameters ofthis scenario. There are two main factors that are related to the chronic social crisis,which can be described briefly as the government’s failure to deliver the reformsexpected, and the deterioration of the living conditions of additional social segments,especially from the middle class.

The Muslim Brotherhood does differ, however, from the previous Mubarak regimewhen it comes to the policies it adopts concerning the private sector, investment, a freemarket policy and implementation of IMF guidelines. It is worth noting that the IMFguidelines related to poverty have exacerbated poverty levels and not solved thecrisis as expected. It is these very policies that led to the revolution in the ‘ArabSpring’ in the first place, and not just the 25th January revolution. However, PresidentMursi and the Brotherhood have not had enough time to prove that their political pro-gramme differs from the past or that it intends to implement a system that provides fortransparency, equal opportunities and combating nepotism. Furthermore, there arecertain businessmen in Egypt who belong to the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafiparties and play a major role therein.

This brief description of Egypt’s current unstable state of affairs is exacerbated bythe fact that there are structural problems in its socio-economic system, which the gov-ernment ignores and attempts to simplify or ignore by describing it as a symptom ofEgypt’s large deficit and social security problems. This problem could become fargreater if the Muslim Brotherhood does not draw a clear line separating the state’seconomy and the policies required to secure a sound Egyptian economic strategy, onthe one hand, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s own economic activities and services,on the other.

Even if the Brotherhood proved capable of separating its own party services and thestate’s economy, it could still face the danger of falling into the pitfall of applyingsocio-economic policies similar to those during the previous Mubarak and Sadatregimes, and create a crisis with regard to the poorer social segments of Egyptiansociety, as well as the middle class. If this happens it could lead President Mursi toapply oppressive methods to secure his power, resembling the previous regimes evenfurther. This specific scenario depends on the reductions the government introducesto subsidies in the energy and food commodities sectors in accordance with an agree-ment with the IMF for a loan in this regard. It is worth noting that the officials respon-sible for the economic policies in the Muslim Brotherhood Party consider that Egyptneeds 20 billion Egyptian pounds (US$3.5 billion) to activate Egypt’s stagnanteconomy and solve its chronic economic crisis.

It seems at this point that the current government does not object to the kind of con-ditions that the previous Janzoury government accepted from the IMF and its guidelinesfor a decrease in energy and food subsidies, as well as resuming, for example, the pri-vatization policies. Furthermore, a dramatic increase in gasoline, fuel and diesel pricesis also expected – a factor that would deepen the supply and demand drivers in thecountry, and thus further aggravate the socio-economic crisis accordingly. The scopeof the socio-economic crisis will depend on the policies the current Egyptian presidentadopts, the government’s capacity to face the challenges related to the energy sectoraccordingly, and whether or not it can create the balance required between supplyand demand for the poorer classes by providing coupons for these impoverished

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social segments. Notwithstanding, the significance of the timing of this specific energycrisis is still not known. If it begins at the same time as the parliamentary elections thenit would have a direct effect on the results – a factor that concerns all players be theymoderate, liberal, leftist or Salafis in this regard.

Summary

Egypt is undergoing dramatic changes and the shifts in its political tectonic plates arerearranging its political system, which includes the aspirations of the Egyptian people atthis point as well. The participatory campaign that has taken place so far has raised boththe hopes and the fears of the Egyptian people, since this participatory approach maynot lead to the realization of their aspirations as expected. It is safe to say, therefore,that the first scenario seems to be the most favourable at this point in time, as comparedwith the third scenario, unless and until the political scene improves. Furthermore, thefear barrier has been overcome and a larger segment of Egypt’s society has becomeacquainted with the principle of political participation, especially when today’selectronic age has provided the youth with the tools that enable that participation.

The events of 25 January 2011 are not to be taken lightly, and the reasons are par-tially related to the parliamentary elections and the corruption committed by PresidentMubarak’s government. The current structural factors concerning Egypt’s new politicalsystem, including the Muslim Brotherhood’s success, however, may lead to the sameresults as those in the past. The determining factor in this regard is the relationshipbetween the Muslim Brotherhood and the military, especially since the military con-tinues to maintain a significant level of power in the Egyptian political scene. Thevarious political programmes, secular and religious, remain in contention amongmost of the political players, including Dr Abdul-Munim Abu al-Futouh, HamdeenSabahy, Hisham Bastaweesy, Khaled Ali and Abu al-Izzy al-Hareery. This factor isa major challenge and it remains to be seen which party will be able to strike thebalance required to stabilize Egypt at this critical juncture in its history.

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