effective institutions for presidential science advice

TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING AND SOCIAL CHANGE 9, 331-341 (1976) 337

Effective Institutions for Presidential Science Advice*

EDWARD J. BURGER, JR.

ABSTRACT

The Presidential science advisory apparatus has traditionally enjoyed two principal functions-

judgements about organization and expenditures for scientific research and advice about large

Government decisions and programs where scientific and technical components were prominent. The

latter category-science for policy-making-is by far the most important. However, in practice, this

function, which resembles explicit planning, is very difficult to sustain against the tide of political

uneasiness.

Author’s Note: The following ideas have been nurtured by several years expen’ence in the Office of the President’s Science Adviser. In developing

these ideas, I have borrowed heavily upon some thoughts which were

developed by one of my predecessors, Dr. Nicholas Golovin. Dr. Golovin S views were contained in an unpublished manuscript which had provoked

informal thought and attention in an earlier day. I am pleased to acknowl-

edge some of his ideas.

Additional note (added in proof). On May 11, 1976, the Congress enacted the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and

Priorities Act of 1976, (P.L. 94-282), which gave a statutory basis for the

Presidential science advisory apparatus. This new law encourages but does

not assure the factoring of scientific judgement and understanding in decision-making for domestic issues. The newly established Office of

Science and Technology Policy in the Executive Office will be a testing ground for some of the ideas expressed in this paper.

With his proclamation contained in Reorganization Plan Number One in January 1973,

former President Nixon indirectly provoked anew public and professional discussion

EDWARD J. BURGER, JR., M.D., Sc.D., was with the Office of the President’s Science Adviser, Science and Technology Policy Office, Washington, D.C. From 1969 to 1973, Dr. Burger was a member of the staff of the Office of Science and Technology in the Executive Office of the President. Prior to that time, he was a member of the faculty of the Harvard University School of Public Health

and an Associate in Science and Public Policy in the Kennedy School of Public Administration at Harvard. He is presently a member of the faculty of the Georgetown University Medical Center in

Washington, D.C.

*The ideas expressed in this paper are those of the author’s and do not necessarily represent the

view of the U.S. Government.

0 American Elsevier Publishing Company, Inc., 1976

338 EDWARD J. BURGER, JR.

about the role of scientific advice to the Federal Government-especially to the White House. The Reorganization Plan rearranged the institutional devices which had been in place since 1962 and which were designed to provide for “independent” advice on science and technology and coordination of Federal scientific activities. The political and professional reaction did not come until long after the announcement of the reorganization and the fact of the rearrangement. However, in recent months, there has been an increasing amount of professional and public comment on the “exile” of scientists from the White House [l] . Public Affairs groups of professional societies have proffered a variety of points of view concerning the place of science and scientists in national and governmental affairs. The National Academy of Sciences in June of last year delivered a report on how and to what extent science and scientists should be used in Presidential policy-making

]21. Much of this discussion to date has concerned itself with questions of access of

policy-makers to good scientific advice (or of scientists to policy-makers) and has turned around questions of proper or useful institutional relationships. There are mainly two categories of activities which Science Advisers and their staffs have engaged in over their history. These are usually identified by students of the subject as policy-making for science and science for policy-making. The two are often confounded and, to some extent, interrelated. It is only to the latter that I would like to direct a few observations- the useful addition of advice from scientists and engineers and the application of scientific and systematic methods to the process of decision-making and priority setting within the Federal Government. Policy-making and priority-setting in a general sense imply analysis and planning. This author is perplexed by the agonizing paradox of both the consuming need to engage in the orderly and systematic process of decision-making and of projecting needs and the seeming impossibility of providing for decision-making. The case seems to be particularly strong for groups outside the governmental structure to engage in research and analysis whose results can both inform public debate and assist policy-makers in shaping decisions.

David Beckler, the long-time Executive Officer of the Federal science advisory apparatus, observed recently that “. . _ an assessment of the role of a White House science and technology mechanism must begin with an examination of the broader framework of the White House-Executive Oftice organization for assisting the President in formulating national policies and programs.“[3] In this, he is without doubt correct. The implication is that the sorting out among priorities and the choices among competing national desires requires an explicit effort and that no real device exists within the Government to guide that process. Policies and programs of environmental quality, energy and the economy, for example, converge on such questions as competing uses of land. Prices of food domestically, interests of farmers and the U.S. position in terms of international balance of payments appear to be in conflict. The process of meeting these challenges-and the myriad of others like them-would seem to require what is usually termed objective analysis and consideration in a broad sense of the several options available. Further, because of the size of the investments implicated by each decision and the long anticipatory “lead” time necessary to realize a product or a program after making a decision, some element of projecting or forecasting is clearly desirable. In brief, all of this can be considered a form of analysis and planning for decision-making.

The logic of this notion seems irrefutable on the surface. The nation and its government do need planning and reconciliation among competitive national issues. There is a place for systematic and scholarly analysis for policy-making. Further, there are very large

EFFECTIVE INSTITUTIONS FOR PRESIDENTIAL SCIENCE ADVICE 339

and probably increasing numbers of instances where policy issues have sizable technological components and, therefore, deserve “expert” advice and assistance. Yet, regardless of

how compelling the case seems for a planning and analysis function, with few exceptions, the pluralistic form of our democratic government does not readily accommodate such a function within the case. The exceptions are those instances in which the electorate has been effectively galvanized toward a single goal (such as winning a war or overcoming a depression) or where a single, large national project has the general consent of the nation (such as the manned-space program).

The Report of the National Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress observed in 1966:

We are concerned with /low we decide what to choose. Congress has asked us: ‘How can human

and community needs bc met?’ But there is a prior question: ‘How can they be more readily

recognized and agreed upon?’

What concerns us is that we have no such ready means for agreement, that such decisions arc

often made piecemeal with no relation to each other, that vested interests are often able to obtain

unjust shares, and that few mechanisms are available which allow us to see the range of alternatives

and thus enable us to choose with a comprehension of the consequences of our choices. [4]

The Commission saw the strengthening and making more orderly the processes of forecasting and analysis for decision-making in an increasingly technological and complex society as major, or even imperative challenges. However, even as they recommended the

use of systems analysis as an aid to planning, the Commission members recognized the basic strengths of government as a reflection of public desires:

The basic decisions on policy, of course, are made by the President and the Congress operating

within the framework of constitutional processes and individual liberties as interpreted by the

courts. And this system has been the political mainstay of a free society. Our concern is to

strengthen this system at a time when social and technological change begins to confront us so

directly and when we need some means of assessing the consequences of such changes in a

comprehensive way. [4]

There have, of course, been many such admonitions to apply the skills of systems analysis and operations research to the effecting of governmental planning for domestic policies and programs. The perceived success of Planning, Programming and Budgeting (PPB) in the Department of Defense in the early 1960’s was followed by an abortive translation into domestic agencies beginning in 1965. More recently, a good deal of attention has been focused on the application of mathematical modeling techniques both to simulate and to project for large complex domestic issues. Yet, with whatever success any of these instruments have enjoyed in practice and all of the logic of the general notion of analysis and planning notwithstanding, these instruments have not been adopted. More important, perhaps, is the fact that the general notions of analysis and planning continues to be basically incompatible with the effecting of traditional democratic government.

Why is it that planning and the systematic establishment of priorities, the explicit statement of objectives and the analytic sorting of alternative pathways to those goals are received with essentially no enthusiasm? Charles Lindbloom was perhaps the one most clearly identified as critic of the use of Planning, Programming and Budgeting (PPB) in political decision-making. PPB, as advocated by one of the major spokesmen, former Budget Bureau Director, Charles Schultze, claimed as its utility:

(1) Careful identification of goals and activities in governmental activity. (2) Analysis of output of a given program in terms of its objectives.


(3) Measurement of total program costs for not one but several years into the future. (4) Formulation of objectives and progress extending beyond a single year of the

annual budget submission. (5) Analysis of alternatives to find the most effective means of establishing objectives. (6) Establishment of analytic procedures as a systematic part of the budget review. [5]

Lindbloom maintained that there was an important and inherent conflict between the traditional, advocacy-related, consensus formulation of public decisions and the analytic and studied attempt to make objectives explicit and to analyze alternative means of reaching them. It was Lindbloom’s contention that the integrity and efficiency of consensus-building and decisions through advocacy (which he maintained was the only way to reach “good” decisions) was threatened precisely by encouraging debate on objectives. Goals, in his view, should not receive specific attention as such attention renders consensus more difficult to reach [6, 7, 81. Schultze’s reply to this point was to

support the public advocacy process but to point out that the roles of both the public advocates and the public administrators would be strengthened by information and evaluation. Participants of the political process should consider characteristics of a particular program but do it in an informed manner [5].

Schultze offered this admonition in 1968 stating that the urgency of the situation was forced by the large increase in domestic government programs. He pointed out that the Federal budget for civilian programs had risen from less than 1% of the GNP in the 1920’s to 5% after World War 11 and to nearly 10% in 1968. Now, 8 years later, if national health insurance were to be enacted in which financing would come from general or special tax revenues, the Federal involvement in health alone would probably constitute close to 10% of the GNP.

The important point is that PPB did not survive as an instrument of public decision- making for domestic governmental programs; nor is there any other vehicle or established methodology for assisting public administrators (including the President) to formulate national policies and programs.

Perhaps the main obstacle is the apparent shift of power which would be implied by an explicit planning effort. According to Neustadt, the effective influence of a President accrues from three sources; they are: 1) the bargaining advantage inherent in his job with which he persuades other men to enact his expectations by what their own responsibili- ties require them to do; 2) the expectations of those other men regarding his ability and will to use the various advantages they think he has; and, 3) the estimates of those men as to how the President’s public views him and how the public would view them if they follow his bidding [9].

It may be assumed (or Congress would assume) that if the President were to establish an effective and adequately staffed “Office of Analysis and Planning”, that he would pose a threat to the existing balance of power in at least two ways. First, by arming himself with the necessary resources to reach systematic conclusions about national goals and priorities, he would thereby increase his share of influence and leverage over decisions over that exercised by the Congress and by outside interest groups. Secondly, it may be expected that the President would deliberately use these augmented resources in various ways, not only for the performance of their substantive functions, but for increasing the “effectiveness” of his leadership and for magnifying his bargaining influence relative to all others having a voice in national management. In the litany of Neustadt’s “separate institutions sharing powers”, [5] the P resident’s share of power would be increased relative to that wielded by others.


A partial refutation to this general notion was the establishment last year of the Office of Technology Assessment in the Congress and, in an earlier era, the Congressional Research Service, It may be predicted that if either of these institutions were to become truly effective as instruments of political leverage, counter moves would in time be “raised up”.

A second and more important reason is the fact that politically-driven administrators at all levels of government do not find it to their advantage to engage in explicit planning for policy-making. They find it incompatible with the rewards of their office to engage an analytic and planning exercise in close proximity to their office. Those few elements of planning and analysis which do exist are characteristically and carefully kept at arms length from the policy-maker himself. A chief administrator of a Federal agency is rewarded (and protected) principally by his constituency and by the corresponding tie to a Committee of the Congress. This fact effectively narrows his options and scope of activity. Thus, the head of the Environmental Protection Agency or of the Food and Drug Administration will not find it to his advantage to consider at length the economic consequences of regulatory moves contemplated by his agency. Instead he will find it to his disadvantage in terms of his response from Congress to periodically engage in broadly-based or “balanced” decision-making. Similarly, a Secretary of Agriculture will generally appear to decide in favor of the well-being of the farmer even though a particular decision may not offer an “optimum” solution for the nation as a whole.

In the first approximation, it appears entirely logical to look ahead and project trends, changes, national needs, future costs, future implications of policies and programs, etc. Yet, all logic notwithstanding, the occupation of planning the future is very difficult in the setting of government policy-making. A great deal of anecdotal attention and lip service is paid to this aspect. The NAS report on scientific advice for policy-making

declared that “ . . . the need is for interaction between the President’s scientific counsel- lors and fellow planning or management instruments within the White House.” [2] Almost every official statement as well as advocate document dealing with the science advisory mechanism to the Presidency has urged or assumed this role of forward planning

and anticipation [IO, 1 l] .

In fact, such planning is at times actively shunned by the political process. Don Price, in commenting on the short-lived fate of President Roosevelt’s Science Advisory Board between 1933 and 1935, reminded us that “, . . Congress put an end to such nonsense as planning by abolishing the Board.” [12] The process of looking into the future, if done with any care and rigor and if the data and the methods of projecting are valid, inevitably raises red flags or threatening signals for some part of the electorate. The implied threat is that of rearrangement of some part of national life with seemingly favorable impactions on some segments and unfavorable effects on others. If the nation is to take seriously a desire for relative independence from foreign sources of petroleum, it may be obliged to dig more deeply into its own resources-off-shore and on-shore. An explicit policy to augment the production of agricultural products could have implications for population shifts, transportation needs, and industries which compete with agriculture for land.

In each case, a perceptive electorate or its representatives will see certain threatening possibilities to long-term growth or continued and stable well-being. In some cases, merely having it known that a “plan” or analysis is being considered makes it uncomfortable for an administrator as he becomes suspect or the target of criticism from his political adversaries. One of the accommodations to the phenomenon has been to maintain the terms of such planning activities secret. Another more common route is to

342 EDWARD _I. BURGER, JR.

simply not engage in the exercise at all and to keep planning far away from “the house”. In my opinion, this is one of the most discouraging routes. In spite of the imperative for long-range (or even short-range) planning due to the size, complexity and tremendous technological character of national programs, along with the large impacts and expenditures they imply, planning of this sort is not a luxury which the “system” has encouraged or permitted. The exceptions to this pattern, as mentioned previously, have been instances of war, national security, depression and the national space program for which consensus was not needed or was easily available.

This phenomenon is not new nor is it confined to the Executive Office of the President. An interesting and reasonably well-documented illustration can be found in the economic research for planning and policy-making in the Department of Agriculture. The Bureau of Agricultural Economics had been created in 1922 and was, in a way, the predecessor of the present Economic Research Service. The Bureau was designed explicitly to bring the skills and activities of academic economists and demographers to bear on serious financial problems facing American farmers. The challenge was one of engaging economists and their research in behalf of real problems. Research activities which were clearly identified with real problems in the eyes of the public and the Congress were most readily supportable in budgetary terms. The Bureau of Agricultural Economics was placed administratively so that it reported to the Secretary of Agriculture and was expected to aid directly in policy-making, planning and problem-solving. However, the work under- taken and the particular choices suggested for Government action by the Bureau proved so politically unpalatable to Congress a number of pressure groups that the Executive Branch was obliged eventually to abolish the function. The first head of the Bureau was forced to resign when a plan which he supported and towards which he directed research became politically unacceptable. Later research was broadened to consider social consequences of various agricultural policies (including a number of racial and labor questions). At one point in the 1940’s, the Bureau, in fulfilling its planning role, foresaw difficulties in maintaining a traditional dependence on cotton and sketched out a gradual and economically logical “Conversion Program for the Cotton South”.

The fact that the Government would even contemplate the possibility of ultimate conversion from cotton and would look into the broad social implications of its programs aroused the organized ire of agricultural pressure groups and drew condemnation from certain members of Congress. The Bureau was prohibited from conducting social surveys and agricultural planning. Thus, on several occasions, research administrators who accepted the challenge to deal explicitly with real problems and to assist in the matters of policy-making and planning found themselves severely attacked. In fact, their negative rewards seemed to bear a direct relationship to the quality of their effort. The better the quality and the fuller the research effort for agricultural policies, the greater the political penalties were ultimately visited upon the administrators. Economic research received its greatest support at times when agriculture and farmers were undergoing the most stress and change. One other problem which arose was an ever-present conflict between policies aimed at benefiting the farmer and those directed toward a broader, “national interest”. (This, of course, implies that the two are not necessarily the same). During the course of the history of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, those administrators who stood aside from their current problems made little impact. Those who devoted the research efforts of the Department to “safe” areas, isolated from programs and policies, had little influence on its policies or programs.

The development of a source of data and a strong and competent analytic capacity in


close proximity to policy-makers inevitably proved threatening to others who would like to control the “information”. Thus, it was in the interest of advocate or pressure groups,

in the sense of preserving their bargaining power, to keep the Government relatively

uninformed. In 1953, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics was abolished and its functions were

distributed to other sections of the Department of Agriculture. Eight years later, a new Economic Research Service was created in Agriculture but was purposely placed two steps removed from the Secretary of Agriculture. In 1964, upon his resignation as Director of Agricultural Economics, Willard Cochrane contended that the Economic Research Service had no Congressional backing for its appropriations since it enjoyed no constituency, Many Congressmen would oppose it unless its research results turned out “right” and its fate would inevitably be uncertain without the very strong backing of a Secretary of Agriculture [ 131.

Thus, the major problem is not the technical hurdle of predicting futures, but instead the challenge, above all, is to make the products of analysis and forecasting politically palatable. The experience to date shows that as the processes of systematic analysis and prediction become better and better, they become correspondingly less and less politi-

cally attractive. The principal question raised concerning a science advisory mechanism in the White

House (or elsewhere) is one of how large program and policy decisions in the domestic arena are to be sorted out and to what extent can any administration afford the systematic tools of analysis and assessment. S.32, a bill which passed the Senate in its last session, called for the establishment of a Council of Advisers on Science and Technology in the Executive Office of the President. This bill declared the Council to be in the national interest, to strengthen the functions of analysis in planning and policy-making. According to the bill, the Council would serve as a source of “ . . . technological analysis and judgment for the President. . .” [14].

It is interesting to note that other parts of the Western industrialized world are taking this question very seriously (although the pattern of accommodation is by no means a common one). The need for special assessment of public policies and public programs (including those displaying technological elements) is very evident in various parts of Europe, most prominently expressed in France. The viewpoint that continued support for the doing of science must ultimately await a systematic and thorough assessment of technological programs and policies has been expressed [ 151 .

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has begun an inquiry

into the processes by which government policies are formulated and carried out and an evaluation of the existing governmental structures for planning. At the heart of this inquiry is the seeming conflict between the traditional patterns of political negotiation or

bargaining (especially in the more open of the democratic governments) and the felt need to analyze and plan ahead. The Secretariat’s background paper for this inquiry adlnits of

this conflict:

Future studies may . . . implicitly question established views and practices and act as a catalyst

to evolving the new concepts and policies required to tackle the changing problems such as inflation, for example, of modern industrialized societies. They may therefore have major political

repercussions where they result in radically different pcrspectivcs from those held by the govcrn-

ment. Where they arc carried out within the government itself they may therefore be stifled, and

for this reason a government may choose to encourage independent, critical planning activities in

universities or elsewhere as a ncccssary, though perhaps painful, means of improving the quality of policy-making. [ 161


The idealist views the analytic component as important in informing and focusing the political debate and negotiation which takes place. The cynic, who sees explicit articula-

tion of goals as counter-productive in a real political setting to the achievement of successful and resolved negotiation between contending parties, still sees advantages in having the parties themselves fully informed. As Charles Schultze noted, “While it is often strategically and tactically important for the participants in the bargaining process to conceal their objectives from their adversaries, it hardly behooves them to conceal them from themselves.” [S]

Thus, at this writing, a measurable number of industrialized countries have developed operating institutional devices designed to aid the processes of policy-making through systematic planning and analysis. The Netherlands, in 1973, established the Scientific Council for Government Policy. A Secretariat for Future Studies was established in the Cabinet Office in Sweden in 1973. This group is less concerned with assessment of current government policies and more preoccupied with a period of time in the future beyond the concern of most of the Administration. Nevertheless, the Secretariat has access to top-level decision-makers and is close to the process of government. The Central Policy Review Staff was established in Great Britain in 1970 to serve the Cabinet and the Government as a whole with analytic and planning activities for programs and policies. Importantly, the staffs products and advice to the Government are almost always given

confidentially. The Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the Treasury Board in 1970

advanced the notion of small, policy-oriented, ministries of state designated to engage in policy planning aimed toward a more “rational” process of government. It was reasoned that by marshaling information and the products of research and by fostering the use of certain analytic tools, the government could replace or at least balance the traditional sources of bargained or brokered power in Cabinet affairs. In brief, it was assumed that the acquisition and organization of knowledge were synonymous with political power. (The enabling legislation was weakened somewhat through compromise during its passage precisely because it represented a threat to the traditional distribution of political power.)

Two ministries of state were established in 1971-one for urban affairs and the other for science and technology. The choice of the latter reflected a strong faith in the tools of scientific planning (systems analysis) in aiding governing policy-making. It also reflected an intense debate that had been going on over a science advisory mechanism [ 171. The Ministry (which has no operating functions) is designed to assist the Prime Minister and the Treasury Board in policy-making and program decisions.

Interestingly, as the Ministry is conceived, great effort has been taken to separate the science advocate role from the advice for policy-making role. The academic scientific community has not been aggressively brought into the chambers of the Ministry and the traditional and prestigious instrument for outside advice, the Science Council of Canada, has been moved a further distance from the Prime Minister and his Privy Council.’

Success of this Canadian experiment is not yet clear. The Ministry has had three different ministers since its inception in 1971. The articulation of policies and the coordination of activities across traditional government sectors remains difficult in the face of established lines of jurisdiction and power. Finally, the expectations of the

1 Perhaps in a way symptomatic of this alienation, the Science Council of Canada has recently

published a critical review of the Ministry of State for Science and Technology [ 181.


usefulness and level of development of the tools of analysis have not been matched in practice. Nevertheless, a most recent review urges continued optimism.

What possibly can be done? What is different about the present era which may make the achievement of practical solutions a reality? It may be that there has been some maturing of public attitudes. Public acceptance of explicit statements of goals and, at times, uncomfortable or undesirable attributes of political action. The admonition of urgency has been applied so often that it has surely lost its importance. Yet, is it possible that such factors as complexity, transience and falsely raised public expectations for policies of the past have truly made the present era an urgent one for governments?

The late Nicholas Golovin of the Office of Science and Technology contemplated this subject in a manuscript some years ago which, unfortunately, was not published before his death [19]. He concluded that:

American society urgently requires the invention of a new organizational mechanism to collect,

interpret and analyze information, define potential problems and needs, develop pertinent alterna-

tive action plans . . , systematically and in real time, evaluate the results of established pro-

grams, . . . and keep the government, the business community and the public . . . informed. . [I91

At the same time he noted the conflict:

A mechanism possessing the magnitude of resources and the continuity of life probably required

by the scope, persistence and controversial nature of the issues with which it would be con-

cerncddat any level of government-would not be accepted by the people generally and by the

business community particularly as part of the existing branches of government. . . . [ 191

Golovin foresaw the need to create a new institution which would possess the necessary analytic capabilities but in a way which would provoke a “ . _ . minimum of disturbance to the existing balance of powers in the institutional structure”. [19] Golovin’s criteria for the new institutional arrangement were that it be located outside the existing governmental structure and that it be relatively powerless.

There is some question as to whether a relatively open, democratic government as we know it is compatible with the tasks proposed in this paper and performed within the government itself. The Office of Technology Assessment in the Congress is an attempt of just that sort. The proposals of the past few years for an Institute for Environmental Analysis [20] or for an Institute for Congress [21] reflect a view which favors the establishment of extra-government entities to assist from the outside the tasks of government planning and policy-making.

Golovin judged that some analytic functions could be assisted by universities, ad hoc commissions and other nongovernmental entities. However, he was convinced that to do the job, a new, “fourth branch” of government termed by him an “Evaluative Branch” was necessary [19] . He saw this new entity as purposely divorced from the mainstream of government, principally concerned with long-range issues. It would provide the data, the analyses and the alternatives which would “catalyze” the relations between the public, the business community, and the executive, legislative and judicial branches.

Unfortunately there was an uncertain patron for the output of the Evaluative Branch. There seemed to be nothing that would guarantee that its output and advice would be anything but ignored if these appeared politically undesirable in the short-term.

At the present writing, the prospects of engaging science advice and scientific methods for police-making within the Executive Branch of the Government do not seem particularly favorable. The traditional incentives appear to militate against such an outcome and


the very nature of the political system seems to assure a continuation of that pattern of incentives. Emerging structures in governments of other industrialized nations are important to consider and should be studied carefully. Yet, one finds evidence of continued incompatibility of traditional functions of democratic government and those of rational

analytic and anticipatory study for policy-making. A recent commentary on the Central Policy Review Staff in Great Britain is revealing on this subject:

The Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) is potentially the most important single innovation in

the organization of British Government in recent times. At the same time, its long term survival is

in doubt. . . . One great fear is that CPRS may eventually turn into a Prime Minister’s Department

which would increase his power relative to [that of the Civil Service departments]. .[22]

Further, the recent moves toward more openness in government, while undeniably desirable in their own right, can be expected to further exacerbate this dilemma. Those who point to the successes of the British Central Policy Research Staff and the Canadian Ministry of State for Science and Technology have placed great stress on the fact that these organizations do their business and offer their advice out of the public’s view. The reasoning in this case turns simply around the desire to preserve the largest number of political opportunities and maneuvering room of the chief executive. This seeming conflict between orderly analysis and public access is a real one and has now been commented upon by others contemplating the science advisory apparatus [23].

If government is to be allowed the luxury of honest and full exploration of policy alternatives, there must be a different public view and attitude which would brook at times seemingly undesirable or unexpected choices for the public’s futures. That attitude does not seem to be at hand as of yet.

In the opinion of this writer, the major tasks of analysis and study for policy-making for domestic matters may eventually have to be performed not within but outside the structures of government. If this conclusion is a valid one, the implications for universities and for free-standing research groups are obviously very large. Such a conclusion calls for the marshaling of the best intellectual resources into private or quasi-public aggregations created precisely for the purpose of thoughtfully “nudging the system”.

The products of such independent think tanks, if they are to be successful, cannot be confined to solid academic study and analysis alone. As shapers of policy debate, they must be provided with the tools and the incentives to actively engage in informing the public discourse. (Leaving aside any comment on the substance of the analysis, the presentation in 1973 of the Limits to Growth study in Washington represented an example of actively informing the public discussion.) Most recently, the provision of two major and comprehensive reports on energy policy alternatives from private organizations [24, 251 greatly aided and sharpened the political debate and influenced the Federal Government’s own Project Independence Blueprint.

In conclusion, it appears likely that we will need several organizations engaged in research for policy alternatives. This will raise severe challenges of public accountability and credibility, adequate and stable sources of funding and freedom from political influence. I don’t believe that we have yet discovered the appropriate vehicle for analysis (including science advice) for policy-making, but the subject is too important to leave to conventional alternatives.

References

1. Downgrading Science, editorial, New York Times (February 7, 1973); Greenberg, D. S., Science’s Latest Invention: A ‘Crisis that Doesn’t Exist’, Washington Post (July 14, 1974); Is there a White


House Science Office in Ford’s Future?, Science and Government Report (September 1, 1974);

Mr. Ford and Science Policy, Science (August 21, 1974). 2. Science and Technology in Presidential Policy-making (a proposal), Report of the ad hoc Com-

mittee on Science and Technology, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C. (June, 1974).

3. Beckler, D. Z., The Precarious Life of Scicncc in the White House, Daedalus 103, 115-I 34 (1974).

4. Technology and the American Economy, Report of the National Commission on Technology,

Automation, and Economic Progress, Washington, D.C. (February, 1966).

5. Schultze, C. L., The Politics and Economies of’ Public Spending, The Brookings Institution,

Washington, D.C., 1968.

6. Lindbloom, C. B., The Science of “Muddling Through”, Public Admirzistration Review 19, 79-88 (1959).

7. Lindbloom, C. B., Decision-Making in Taxation and Expenditures, in Universities-National Bureau

Committee for Economics Research, Public Finances: Needs, Sources, and Utilization, Princeton,

N.J., 1961.

8. Brayboake, D., and Lindbloom, C. B., A Strategy for Decision, The Free Press of Cicncoe,

Collier-Macmillan, London, 1963.

9. Neustadt, R. E., Presidential Power, John Wiley, New York, 1962.

10. Science and Technology: Tools for Progress, Report of the President’s Task Force on Science

Policy, The White House, Washington, D.C. (April, 1970).

11. Report of the Science and Technology Policy Panel of the President’s Science Advisory Committee

(unpublished), Washington, D.C. (September, 1971).

12. Price, D. K., Money and Influence: The Links of Science to Public Policy, Daedehs 103, 97-l 13

(1974).

13. Economic Research in the Dcpartmcnt of Agriculture, History Branch, Economic and Statistical

Analysis Division, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture (July 12, 1972).

14. S.32, National Science Policy and Priorities for Science and Technology Act of 1974 (October 7,

1974). 15. Solomon, J. J., L’avcnir de la science, La Reckerckc No. 50, 919-926 (November, 1974).

16. Experimental Project on Innovation in the Procedures and Structures of Government, An Outline

Analysis of Planning Activities in Government, Organization of Economic Cooperation and

Development, Paris (October 24, 1974).

17. Senate of Canada, A Science Policy for Canada, Ottawa, Queen’s Printer, Information Canada,

Volume 1 (1970), Volume 2 (1972), Volume 3 (1973).

18. Aucoin, P., and French, R., Science Council of Canada, Knowledge, Power and Public Policy,

Background Study No. 31, Ottawa, Ontario (November, 1974). 19. Golovin, N. E., The “Evaluative Function” in Government (unpublished manuscript) (October 25,

1968).

20. Institutions for Effective Management of the Environment, Report of the Environmental Study

Group of the Environmental Studies Board, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.

(1970). 21. The Institute for Congress, A Five-Year Experiment, A proposal for the establishment of a private

organization dedicated to systematic analyses of public issues and programs for the Congress

(1973). 22. Mencher, A., Recent Developments in British Science Policy-U.S. House of Reprcsentativcs,

Federal Policy, Plans, and Organization for Science and Technology, Part II, Hearings before the

Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

(1974). 23. Skolnikoff, E. B., and Brooks, H., Science Advice in the White House-Continuation of a Debate,

Science 187,35-41 (1975).

24. A Time to Choose-America’s Energy Future, Final Report by Energy Policy Project of the Ford

Foundation, Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1974.

25. Achieving Energy Independence, Committee for Economic Development, New York (December,

1974).

Received 3 November I9 75

effective institutions for presidential science advice

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