education, civilization, and music

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Education, Civilization, and Music Carson Holloway S hould education civilize? I wish to offer a Platonic answer to this question. I will surprise no one by claiming that the answer, according to Plato's Republic, is yes: education should civilize. It is surprising, however, to suggest that for Plato the proper education in music is crucial to civilization, to the civilizing of the human soul. In what follows I will outline the Republic's ac- count of the civilizing education in music, explain why such an education seems so foreign to the modern mind, and make the case for its contemporary rel- evance despite its strangeness to us. I. In its ordinary meaning, to civilize is to prepare someone for decent, peace- able, and mannerly living with others. This meaning is implied by the literal sense of the term's apparent Latin root. Civilization has something to do with civilis, with the things relating to the citizen, the civis. It is a process of prepara- tion for citizenship, for living with one's fellow citizens according to the laws, written and unwritten, of the political community. The term also has a loftier, though perhaps related, meaning: to refine the mind by fostering a rational attachment to elevated things that are properly loved for their own sake. Plato's Republic suggests that the proper education in music is essential to the process of civilization in both of these senses. This concern first emerges in the Republic's account of the guardian class of the city in speech, those who fight for the city and enforce its laws. As warriors they will have to be spirited. Yet this creates the problematic possibility that they will be savage, both with each other and with the other members of the city. It is necessary, therefore, to combine their spiritedness with gentleness--to civilize them. This tempering of the guardians' spiritedness is brought about by an educa- tion in poetry and music. Exposure to beautiful stories about civilized men tends to have a civilizing effect. For Plato's Socrates, however, it is not so much the stories of the good city's poetry as the psychological and emotional power of music--understood as rhythm and harmony--that is fundamental to the civilization of the guardians. Thus Socrates claims that the rearing in music is "most sovereign" because of rhythm and harmony's power "vigorously [to] lay hold of the soul. ''~ Rhythm and harmony, the Republic suggests, are imitative. That is, they depict the various passions and states of character. Thus Socrates Carson Holloway teaches political philosophy and constitutional law at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. His All Shook Up: Music, Passion, and Politics was released by Spence Publishing in 2001. 85

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Page 1: Education, civilization, and music

Education, Civilization, and Music Carson Holloway

S hou ld educa t ion civilize? I wish to offer a Platonic answer to this ques t ion. I will surprise no one by claiming that the answer, accord ing to Plato's

Republic, is yes: educa t ion should civilize. It is surprising, however, to suggest that for Plato the p r o p e r educa t ion in music is crucial to civilization, to the civilizing of the h u m a n soul. In what follows I will out l ine the Republic's ac- coun t of the civilizing educat ion in music, explain why such an educa t ion seems so fore ign to the m o d e r n mind, and make the case for its c o n t e m p o r a r y rel- evance despi te its s t rangeness to us.

I.

In its o rd inary meaning, to civilize is to p repa re s o m e o n e for decent , peace- able, and manner ly living with others. This mean ing is impl ied by the literal sense of the term's appa ren t Latin root. Civilization has some th ing to do with civilis, with the things relating to the citizen, the civis. It is a process o f prepara- tion for citizenship, for living with one ' s fellow citizens accord ing to the laws, writ ten and unwrit ten, o f the political communi ty . The term also has a loftier, t hough perhaps related, meaning: to refine the mind by foster ing a rational a t t achmen t to elevated things that are proper ly loved for their own sake.

Plato's Republic suggests that the p r o p e r educa t ion in music is essential to the process of civilization in bo th of these senses. This conce rn first emerges in the Republic's accoun t of the guardian class of the city in speech, those who fight for the city and enforce its laws. As warriors they will have to be spirited. Yet this creates the p rob lemat ic possibility that they will be savage, bo th with each o the r and with the o the r m e m b e r s of the city. It is necessary, therefore , to comb ine their spir i tedness with gen t l ene s s - - t o civilize them.

This t emper ing of the guardians ' spir i tedness is b r o u g h t a b o u t by an educa- tion in poe t ry and music. Exposure to beaut i ful stories abou t civilized m e n tends to have a civilizing effect. For Plato's Socrates, however, it is no t so m u c h the stories of the good city's poe t ry as the psychological and emot iona l power of m u s i c - - u n d e r s t o o d as rhythm and h a r m o n y - - t h a t is f undamen ta l to the civilization of the guardians. Thus Socrates claims that the rear ing in music is "most sovereign" because of rhythm and ha rmony ' s power "vigorously [to] lay ho ld of the soul. ''~ Rhy thm and harmony, the Republic suggests, are imitative. Tha t is, they depic t the various passions and states of character. Thus Socrates

Carson Holloway teaches political philosophy and constitutional law at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. His All Shook Up: Music, Passion, and Politics was released by Spence Publishing in 2001.

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speaks of wailing and lamenting modes, and modes appropriate to drunken- ness (both of which he disapproves), as well as modes depicting reasonable- ness and courage (both of which he approves).

Music does not merely depict states of character, however. It actively im- presses them upon the soul. As is said in the Laws, "the imitation in songs" can "make the soul feel passions. ''2 This is true of all the arts. Hence Socrates' concern that the young, through "grazing" on works of art that have a "licen- tious, illiberal, and graceless" appearance will unknowingly create some great evil in their souls, and his concomitant hope that those sur rounded by grace- ful images will be led to a likeness and friendship with reason. Of all artistic images, however, music has the greatest power, through its grace or graceless- ness, to foster a good or bad disposition in the soul. Rhythm and harmony, Socrates contends, "most of all insinuate themselves into the inmost part of the soul and most vigorously lay hold of it in bringing grace with them; and they make a man most graceful if he is correctly reared, if not, the opposite. ''~

The "graceful" character fostered by the music of the Republic, it turns out, is characterized chiefly by a kind of moderation. Indeed, on the most general level, Socrates' approach to music is to banish whatever savors of excessive passion and to retain whatever communicates a repose of the desires and hence the command of reason in the soul. Thus he sums up his approach by saying that it eschews the music of Marsyas, the Dionysian reveler, for that of Apollo, the god of truth and light (399e).

In what sense does this musical education civilize? The Republic's account suggests two answers. In the first place, Plato's Socrates indicates that the ma- ture human being formed by such an education is prepared for citizenship in a decent and orderly regime. Those who receive a proper rearing in rhythm and harmony, those whose tastes are formed by graceful music, have the right likes and dislikes. They praise the noble and blame and hate the ugly. Thus the Republic's musical education produces "gentlemen," those who are attracted to virtue and repelled by vice, and who therefore are capable of being just voluntarily (402a).

A good rearing in music, again, fosters moderation. A lack of such rear- ing--or, perhaps worse, a rearing in wildly passionate music--fosters immod- eration. On Plato's account of the soul and the city, however, immoderat ion is the source of injustice and civic discord. Book IX's account of the unjust meth- ods adopted by the tyrannical soul in its pursuit of unlimited gratification makes this clear. Conflict is the inevitable result of having a community of such people, each seeking to gratify himself at the expense of the rest. Such citizens lead lives dedicated to feeding and copulating, and "for the sake of these things, they kick and butt with horns and hoofs of iron, killing each other because they are insatiable"(586a-b). Indeed, such human beings are not citizens at a l l - -and therefore not civilized--because their preoccupation with their own

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gain makes impossible any principled concern for the common good, the things of the city.

Nor, on Plato's account, is there a convenient non-musical solution to the barbarism arising from immoderat ion. At first sight it seems that law can re- place musically-formed character. If gent lemen do not require law because of their habitual love of virtue, then perhaps non-gent lemen can be restrained by the power of law. This solution proves illusory, however. Non-musical, vi- cious citizens try to contain the conflicts caused by their injustice by "continu- ally setting down.. .rules and correcting them, thinking they'll get ahold of what's best." But trying to restrain by laws men who cannot restrain them- selves is, Socrates says, "like cutting off the heads of a Hydra": it is "useless and accomplishes nothing," other than "to make their illness more complicated and bigger" (425e-426a).

Plato's account points, moreover, to another sense in which a musical for- mation in moderat ion civilizes, the second sense of civilization ment ioned before: the fostering of a rational attraction to elevated things loved for their own sake. For according to the Republic, the proper rearing in music prepares the soul for philosophy. It civilizes not only by making us fit to be citizens of a decent earthly regime, but also by equipping us to be citizens of the cosmos, love-struck contemplators of the beautiful order of the whole. Thus Socrates remarks that the philosophic part of the soul is "awakened" and "trained" and has its "perceptions purified" through partaking of music, while, conversely, one who neglects "music and philosophy" becomes a "misologist," a hater of reason, and "unmusical" (41 ld ).

The Republic suggests two ways in which the rearing in music prepares the soul for philosophy. First, philosophy requires a certain moderation. Socrates compares the desires of the body to "leaden weights" which turn the vision of the soul downward and away from the things that truly are, the objects of philosophic investigation and contemplation (519a-b). Yet, as we have seen, music can quiet such desires, desires that distract reason from its true voca- tion. Moreover, and more positively, music can foster in the soul an attraction to the truth that philosophy seeks. The graceful music of the best city presents the soul with a kind of intelligible and beautiful order, and, by its grace and the natural pleasure that accompanies it, such music fosters a lasting taste for such beautiful order. Yet this ultimately is the object of philosophic longing, according to the Republic:. The philosopher, Socrates says, keeps company "with the divine and orderly," the beautiful order of the cosmos (500c-d). Indeed, the kinship between the intelligible order of music and the natural order of the universe is indicated by Plato's poetic depiction of the cosmos as a set of revolving whorls r idden by sirens emitting pitches that combine to form a single harmony (617b).

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II.

This Platonic unde r s t and ing of educa t ion as civilization is increasingly alien to the m o d e r n mind. Hardly any c o n t e m p o r a r y educa t i on - -p r imary , second- ary, or univers i ty--seeks to civilize souls as Plato under s t ands that project. Ac- cord ing to the Republic, a proper ly educa ted soul desires goodness and t ru th for their own sakes. A musically civilized h u m a n be ing is in love with moral i ty and phi losophy because of thei r beauty. In contrast , most m o d e r n educa t ion is p r eoccup ied with utility. It offers intel lectual "skills" or "tools" which are no t to be exercised for the sake of their own i n h e r e n t goodness but with a view to achieving some o the r - -u sua l ly mate r i a l - -ends .

What is the cause of this m o d e r n reject ion of the Platonic account of educa- tion? We may be t e m p t e d to b lame the smal l -mindedness of administrators , many of w h o m are no t themselves scholars, or of the business leaders who wield such inf luence on govern ing boards. "What do such vulgarians know of liberal educat ion, educa t ion that is free in the sense of being free f rom neces- sity, that does not desire knowledge for what can be d o n e with it but simply loves it for itself?." While such an explanat ion may gratify the scholar 's sense o f intel lectual and moral superiority, it is no t adequate . Rather, accord ing to Tocqueville, the m o d e r n decay o f civilizing educa t ion results no t f rom the defects o f part icular groups, but f rom the m o d e r n social state itseit, no t f rom the vulgarity of certain kinds o f people, but f rom the vulgarity o f democracy.

The democra t ic social state is characterized, Tocqueville contends, by "equal- ity of condit ions," that is, by the absence of a he red i t a ry aristocratic class se- cure in its wealth and status. O n c e the law of p r imogen i tu re is abolished, great for tunes are divided into smaller ones insufficient to sustain their possessors. The result is a middle-class nat ion, a na t ion of people obl iged to work. In an aristocracy, political and cultural power are wielded by, and therefore the tone of society is set by, leisured men. A democracy, on the o the r hand, is ru led by necessi tous men , m e n c o n c e r n e d with utility. Indeed , Tocqueville con tends that material ism is one of the democra t i c man 's d o m i n a n t passions. Aristoc- racy suppresses materialism by making nobles take physical comforts for granted and by making peasants despair of enjoying them, f iee ing the affections of both to at tach themselves to o the r things--pol i t ics and cul ture in the case of nobles, piety and the next life in the case of the people. By its aboli t ion of a he red i t a ry social hierarchy, however, democracy bo th liberates the people ' s longing for physical well-being and destroys the wealthy's security in their well- being. It creates, again, midd l ing fortunes, e n o u g h for most people to get a taste for comfor t , bu t no t e n o u g h to satisfy that taste. But it is precisely such condi t ions that foster an obsession with physical well-being. The soul is most agitated, accord ing to Tocqueville, no t by the easy possession of comforts but by thei r imper fec t possession and the fear of losing t h e m ?

Democracy ' s uti l i tarian and materialistic spirit, moreover , inf luences its unde r s t and ing of the goods at which a Platonic educa t ion aims: moral and

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intellectual virtue. It goes wi thout saying that Plato would not simply endorse the charac te r o f the he red i t a ry aristocrat as Tocqueville describes it. Never- theless, that aristocrat at least naturally approximates the charac te r of the Pla- tonic g e n t l e m a n p r o d u c e d by the p r o p e r r e a r i n g in music. Aris tocrats , Tocqueville notes, speak incessantly of the beauty of virtue, saying little or no th ing about its utility. Because of their disdain for what is mere ly useful, they have a natural admira t ion for the phi losophic pursui t of t ru th for its own sake. Democrats , on the o the r hand, habitually justify moral i ty in terms of its non-mora l benefits. Thus Tocqueville remarks that the most c o m m o n , and most persuasive, morali ty within democracy is based on "the doc t r ine of self- interest proper ly unders tood ," or the not ion that he lp ing others will in the long run r e d o u n d to one 's own material benefit . 5 Similarly, theoret ical sci- e n c e - t h a t is, contemplative science, science that simply seeks insight into the nature of things--is neglected by democracy, which instead excels at technology, or the use of knowledge for the sake of physical well-being and convenience. 6

III.

If a Platonic civilizing educa t ion is so fundamenta l ly alien to the spirit o f m o d e r n democracy, if it in fact savors of aristocracy, should we the re fore aban- don such educa t ion as a mere vestige of an unjust past that we have proper ly rejected and happily surpassed? I don ' t th ink so. Jus t because some th ing is alien to democracy does not m e a n that it canno t be useful to democracy. In- deed, non-democra t i c principles may be useful precisely because democracy is not self-sufficient. It may be, as Tocqueville h imself suggests, that democ- racy, despite its evident benefits, nevertheless has some dangerous and dehu- manizing tendencies that are in n e e d of cor rec t ion by cer tain non-democra t i c principles. To embrace such an unders tand ing , one need not be an anti-demo- cratic ideologue; one need only follow Tocqueville in resisting the tempta t ion to be a democra t i c ideologue.

The Republic presents the musical civilization of the soul no t as an artificial imposit ion on, but instead as a fulf i l lment of, h u m a n nature. It is par t of a tu rn ing of the soul toward the things for which it truly longs. Music does not lend to virtue and phi losophy a beauty that they do not by na ture possess. Rather it is the soul's first in t roduct ion to that beauty. Reason desires the grace- ful o rde r of virtue and truth, and music provides the soul with a pre-rational, but palpable and powerful, in t imat ion of that order. Moreover, reason is, on Plato's unders tand ing , the most authori tat ive e l em en t in ou r nature. It, m o r e than anything else in us, is our t rue self; h e n c e its satisfaction is ul t imately the good of the ent i re soul. Thus music's quie t ing o f the lower passions does not mere ly constrain the soul, but instead allows its other, m o r e worthy desires to come to the fore.

On this view, democracy is somewhat problematic . It is unques t ionably a l i be ra t ion - - f rom un th ink ing accep tance of tradit ion, f rom c o n f i n e m e n t to

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the social status of one ' s parents , above all f rom be ing ru led by others wi thout one ' s consent . Yet this l iberat ion is pu rchased at the price of a certain distor- t ion of the soul. The rise of democra t i c mater ial ism and uti l i tarianism is, in the language of the Republic, a tu rn ing of the soul away f rom the things that are to the things that come to be and cease to be, f rom be ing to becoming , f rom things that are beautiful to b e h o l d to things merely pleasant to consume.

Moreover, having a n a t u r e - - a n essence that exists i n d e p e n d e n t o f the hab- its fos tered by prevail ing social c o n d i t i o n s - - t h e soul must exper i ence its dis- tor t ion as somehow painful and frustrating. Democra t ic man may love physical well-being above all things, bu t democra t i c man is still man, and man shall no t live by b read alone. Democra t ic material ism is, on Plato's account , simply the popular iza t ion of the soul o f the tyrant who lives for the sake of his desires. Yet that life is unsatisfying even to the one who pursues it mos t vigorously. The tyrant 's soul, Socrates says, is full o f suffering because it is full o f a noisy "crowd" o f desires that "cry out" for satisfaction. At the same t ime it is "full o f confu- sion and regret" because it least does "what it wan t s - - speak ing of the soul as a whole. ''7 That is, the tyrant may suppress, bu t canno t extinguish, his reason, and he consequen t ly canno t escape the painful self-knowledge that he lives for and is ru led by the worst e lements in his nature.

This Platonic unde r s t and ing informs Tocquevil le 's a ccoun t of democracy. Most Americans, he observes, are g loomy and uneasy even in the midst o f u n p r e c e d e n t e d prosperity. This is a natural result o f democra t i c materialism. Men who love physical comfor ts above all things will o f necessity spend their lives despera te ly seeking short-cuts to pleasures, the t ime for which they know is cont inual ly r u n n i n g out. A few Americans, on the o the r hand, give them- selves to bizarre and somet imes dange rous religious enthusiasms. This is the opposi te , bu t equally predictable , o u t c o m e of democra t i c materialism. Starve the soul, and you risk driving it into a spiritual binge. 8

In conclusion, m o d e r n d e m o c r a c y - - u n t e m p e r e d by p r e - m o d e r n and non- democra t i c pr inciples--wil l make most o f us u n h a p p y and drive a few of us crazy. That is why Plato's unders tand ing of educat ion as a civilizing in t roduct ion to the beaut i ful and nob le is still relevant despi te be ing foreign to us.

N o t e s 1. Republic, 401d-e. All references to The Republic are to Allan Bloom's translation (New

York: Basic Books, 1968). 2. See 812c of The Laws, trans. Thomas Pangle (NewYork: Basic Books, 1980). 3. Republic, 401b-e. Ensuing references to Bloom's translation will be cited in the text. 4. See Democracy in America, Volume II, Part II, Chapter 10. 5. Democracy in America, Volume II, Part II, Chapter 8. 6. Democracy in America, Volume II, Part I, Chapter 10. 7. Republic, op. cit., 573e, 577e. 8. Democracy in America, Volume II, Part II, Chapters 12 and 13.