Educar en el s XXI. UIMP 2013. Does School Autonomy Make Sense Everywhere? 

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<ul><li> 1. ifo Institut Does School Autonomy Make Sense Everywhere?Sense Everywhere? Panel Estimates from PISA Eric Hanushek, Susanne Link and Ludger WWoessmann Education Conference 1 07 2013 SantanderEducation Conference, 1.07.2013, Santander </li></ul><p> 2. ifo Institut M ti tiMotivation Importance of human capital investment for development Uncertainty about institutional design questions Substantial variation in autonomy reforms internationally reflectsSubstantial variation in autonomy reforms internationally reflects fundamental tension Better understanding of schools' capacity and students' needs C fli ti i ti l k i l l d i i ki it th t t i t i i Conflicting incentives, lack in local decision making capacity, threat to maintaining common standards E i ti id i dExisting evidence mixed Positive effects for EU countries (Barankay and Lockwood, 2007; Clark, 2009) Mixed results for developing countries (e.g. Patrinos, 2011), but positive results inp g ( g ) p developing countries for non-poor municipalities (Galiani et al., 2008) or for autonomy programs that also raise accountability (e.g. Jimenez and Sawada,1999) 3. ifo Institut ThiThis paper: Idea: heterogeneous effects of autonomy Interaction ith e istence of acco ntabilit s stem (Woessmann 2005) Interaction with existence of accountability system (Woessmann, 2005) Reduces opportunistic behavior Interaction with level of development of a country and its schools Strong instit tions as a pre req isite Strong institutions as a pre-requisite Investigate autonomy effect in different decision-making areas Methodology: Cross-country panel analyses allows to exploit international variation while controlling for time-invariant country heterogeneities Results: Impact of local autonomy varies with a countries level of economic andImpact of local autonomy varies with a countries level of economic and educational development Countries that lack strong institutions are hurt by decentralised decision-making Benefits enhanced by accountability measuresBenefits enhanced by accountability measures 4. ifo Institut DataData 5. ifo Institut D tData Building a PISA panel database Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) Conducted in 2000/02 2003 2006 and 2009 by the OECD Conducted in 2000/02, 2003, 2006, and 2009 by the OECD Merge cross-sectional data of four PISA assessment cycles Keep all countries that participated in at least three waves 1,042,995 students in 42 countries Detailed background informationg Information on student achievement Information on students backgrounds and schools Information on academic personnel and b dget a tonom Information on academic, personnel and budget autonomy Information on country-level information such as level of development 6. ifo Institut Development and student achievement in 2000Development and student achievement in 2000 7. ifo Institut School autonomy over courses and hiringy g 8. ifo Institut Performance on the PISA Math Tests, 2000-2009, 9. ifo Institut EstimationEstimation 10. ifo Institut E i i l ti tiEmpirical estimation Education production function with interaction term 1 2cti ct ct c F cti S cti C ct c t ctiT I I D F S C Cross-country panel analysis Eliminate selection bias from sorting of students into autonomous schools by l iti t l l i ti tiexploiting country-level variation over time Eliminate time-invariant cultural, institutional or population influences by including country fixed-effects no unobserved time-varying country factors that are correlated with pattern of local autonomy Control for individual and school variables at country-level Control partially for country factors such as expenditure and enrollment Perform robust and sensitivity checksy 11. ifo Institut ResultsResults 12. ifo Institut Panel Estimation with Country Fixed EffectsPanel Estimation with Country Fixed-Effects E ti ti lt D t il t ff t t diff t l l f GDP itEstimation result Details on autonomy effect at different levels of GDP per capita GDP p.c. at which autonomy effect switches sign Effect in country with minimum GDP p.c. Effect in country with maximum GDP p.c. (1) (2) (3) (4) Academic-content autonomy -34.018*** 19,555 -55.205*** 52.754*** (12 211) (14 471) (16 670)(12.211) (14.471) (16.670) Academic-content autonomy x Initial GDP p.c. 2.944*** (0.590) R2 0.385 Personnel autonomy -17.968 13,413 -41.854** 79.861*** (14.071) (19.201) (28.647)( ) ( ) ( ) Personnel autonomy x Initial GDP per capita 3.319*** (1.106) R2 0.384 Budget autonomy -6.347 11,449 -19.576 47.833** (9.363) (13.282) (20.221) ** Budget autonomy x Initial GDP per capita 1.838** (0.796) R2 0.384 Notes: Each panel presents results of a separate regression. Dependent variable: PISA math test score. Least squares regression weighted by students sampling probability, including country (and year) fixed effects. School autonomy measured as country average. In the main estimation, initial GDP per capita is cen- t d t $8000 ( d i $1000) th t th i ff t h th ff t f t t t i t ith GDP it i 2000 f $8000tered at $8000 (measured in $1000), so that the main effect shows the effect of autonomy on test scores in a country with a GDP per capita in 2000 of $8000. Maximum GDP p.c. refers to Norway. Sample: student-level observations in PISA waves 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009. Sample size in each specification: 1,042,995 students, 42 countries, 155 country-by-wave observations. Control variables include: student gender, age, parental occupation, parental education, books at home, immigration status, language spoken at home; school location, school size, share of fully certified teachers at school, shortage of math teach- ers, private vs. public school management, share of government funding at school; countrys GDP per capita, country fixed effects, year fixed effects; and im- putation dummies. Complete model of the first specification displayed in Table A1. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level in pa- h Si ifi l l *** 1 ** 5 * 10rentheses. Significance level: 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent. 13. ifo Institut Panel Estimation with Country Fixed EffectsPanel Estimation with Country Fixed-Effects Notes: Effect of academic-content autonomy (scaled 0-1) on PISA math test score (scaled with std. dev. 100) depending on initial GDP per capita (in 2000), estimated in a panel model of PISA testsdev. 100) depending on initial GDP per capita (in 2000), estimated in a panel model of PISA tests 200009. Example countries illustrate initial level of GDP per capita. See Table 4 in Hanushek et al (2011) for details. Source: Own depiction based on Hanushek et al (2011). 14. ifo Institut Extended Model: Including Central Exit Exams (1) (2) Academic-content autonomy -48.511** -48.645** (19.363) (19.921) Academic-content autonomy x Central exit exams (CEE) 32.750** 32.931* (14.374) (16.382) A d i i i l G i 3 141*** 3 168*** Academic-content autonomy x Initial GDP per capita 3.141*** 3.168*** (0.563) (0.938) Academic-content autonomy x CEE x Initial GDP per capita -0.042 (1.161) R2 0.380 0.380 Personnel autonomy 28 555* 19 300Personnel autonomy -28.555 -19.300 (14.574) (17.994) Personnel autonomy x Central exit exams (CEE) 18.310 5.755 (21.815) (27.312) Personnel autonomy x Initial GDP per capita 3.446*** 0.897 (1 057) (2 149)(1.057) (2.149) Personnel autonomy x CEE x Initial GDP per capita 3.493 (2.545) R2 0.379 0.379 Notes: Each panel-by-column presents results of a separate regression. Dependent variable: PISA math test score. Least squares regression weighted by stu- d t li b bilit i l di t ( d ) fi d ff t S h l t d t I iti l GDP it i t d tdents sampling probability, including country (and year) fixed effects. School autonomy measured as country average. Initial GDP per capita is centered at $8000 (measured in $1000), so that the main effect shows the effect of autonomy on test scores in a country with a GDP per capita in 2000 of $8000. Sample: student-level observations in PISA waves 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009. Sample size in each specification: 1,028,970 students, 41 countries, 152 country-by- wave observations. Control variables include: student gender, age, parental occupation, parental education, books at home, immigration status, language spo- ken at home; school location, school size, share of fully certified teachers at school, shortage of math teachers, private vs. public school management, share of government funding at school; countrys GDP per capita, country fixed effects, year fixed effects; and imputation dummies. Robust standard errors adjusted f l i h l l i h Si ifi l l *** 1 ** 5 * 10for clustering at the country level in parentheses. Significance level: 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent. 15. ifo Institut Alternative measure of development level: Initial levelAlternative measure of development level: Initial level of student achievement Measure of initial achievement: Average PISA score Dummy for average PISA score above 400 points 500 points (1) (2) (3) (4) Academic-content autonomy -63.257*** -60.480*** -85.567*** -32.530** y (14.544) (13.773) (19.203) (14.818) Academic-content autonomy x Initial achievement 0.744*** 0.601*** 74.590*** 73.258*** (0.076) (0.089) (16.739) (12.443) Academic-content autonomy x Initial GDP per capita 1.193** (0.535) 2 R2 0.386 0.386 0.385 0.385 Personnel autonomy -32.691* -29.342 -51.538 -14.953 (17.660) (18.356) (31.462) (12.657) Personnel autonomy x Initial achievement 0.654*** 0.372 63.266* 82.534*** (0.216) (0.292) (32.166) (24.584) Personnel autonomy x Initial GDP per capita 1 991Personnel autonomy x Initial GDP per capita 1.991 (1.406) R2 0.384 0.384 0.384 0.384 Notes: Each panel-by-column presents results of a separate regression. Dependent variable: PISA math test score. Least squares regression weighted by stu- dents sampling probability, including country (and year) fixed effects. School autonomy measured as country average. In the first two columns, the initial PISA i t d t 400 ( t d d d i ti b l th OECD ) th t th i ff t h th ff t f t t t iaverage PISA score is centered at 400 (one standard deviation below the OECD mean), so that the main effect shows the effect of autonomy on test scores in a country that in 2000 performed at a level one standard deviation below the OECD mean. Sample: student-level observations in PISA waves 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009. Sample size in each specification: 1,042,995 students, 42 countries, 155 country-by-wave observations. Control variables include: student gender, age, parental occupation, parental education, books at home, immigration status, language spoken at home; school location, school size, share of fully certified teachers at school, shortage of math teachers, private vs. public school management, share of government funding at school; countrys GDP per capi- ta, country fixed effects, year fixed effects; and imputation dummies. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level in parentheses. Sig- ifi l l *** 1 ** 5 * 10nificance level: 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent. 16. ifo Institut RobustnessRobustness 17. ifo Institut R b t IRobustness I: Results robust to different GDP measures and controls, exclusion of school controls different sub samples and subjectsschool controls, different sub-samples and subjects Results robust to the inclusion of annual expenditure per student inp p lower secondary education and enrollment rates R lt i t t h i lt ti t Results consistent when using an alternative autonomy measure (expert assessment of legislated policy, EAG) Results consistent when excluding private schools 18. ifo Institut Robustness IIRobustness II Poor initial achievement or development does not induce the b d t fobserved autonomy reforms Heterogeneity exclusive to autonomy measure: Interaction of GDP pcHeterogeneity exclusive to autonomy measure: Interaction of GDP pc with other education policy measures not significant Potential channels such as democracy, governance effectiveness or individualism interact positively with autonomy. However, GDP per capita dominatesp 19. ifo Institut ConclusionConclusion Exploit within-country changes in autonomy over time in a panel analysis with country (and time) fixed effects Central finding: autonomy reforms improve student achievement in developed countries, but undermine it in developing countries Indication that local decision-making works better when there is also external accountability that limits any opportunistic behavior of schools Broader implications for the generalizability of findings across countries and education systems Results suggest that autonomy was slightly bad for Spain UNLESS complemented by an examination system 20. ifo Institut Thank you for your attention! 21. ifo Institut BACKUPBACKUP 22. ifo Institut Conventional estimatesConventional estimates Autonomy measured at level: School School Country Country Country fixed effects: No Yes No YesCountry fixed effects: No Yes No Yes Country-by-year fixed effects No No No Yes No No (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Academic-content autonomy 20.713*** 13.539* -1.387 -4.792** 0.269 47.201*** 37.114** -20.556 (6.181) (7.455) (2.106) (2.171) (2.459) (11.257) (14.076) (12.627) Academic-content autonomy x Initial GDP p c 0 771* 0 438*** 0.009 0 908Academic content autonomy x Initial GDP p.c. 0.771 0.438 0.009 0.908 (0.455) (0.137) (0.193) (0.616) R2 0.312 0.315 0.384 0.384 0.392 0.319 0.321 0.384 Personnel autonomy 9.640 10.479 0.844 2.383 3.298 24.701* 24.913* -0.180 (7.015) (7.586) (3.483) (4.983) (5.182) (13.492) (13.313) (11.708) Personnel autonomy x Initial GDP per capita -0.103 -0.199 -0.343 -0.024 (0.535) (0.404) (0.405) (1.055) R2 0.310 0.310 0.384 0.384 0.392 0.312 0.312 0.384 Budget autonomy 7.549* 5.411 2.350 2.366 3.657* 32.987 31.239 -7.163 (4.248) (4.694) (1.536) (1.771) (1.869) (25.976) (25.228) (10.162) Budget autonomy x Initial GDP per capita 0.493 -0.003 -0.115 1.127* (0 132)(0.336) (0.132) (0.132) (0.631) R2 0.310 0.310 0.384 0.384 0.392 0.311 0.313 0.384 Notes: Each column-by-panel presents results of a separate regression. Dependent variable: PISA math test score. Least squares regression weighted by stu- dents sampling probability. In columns 2 and 4, initial GDP per capita is centered at $8000 (measured in $1000), so that the main effect shows the effect of autonomy on test scores in a country with a GDP per capita in 2000 of $8000. Sample: student-level observations in PISA waves 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009 S l i i h ifi ti 1 042 995 t d t 42 t i 155 t b b ti C t l i bl i l d t d t d2009. Sample size in each specification: 1,042,995 students, 42 countries, 155 country-by-wave observations. Control variables include: student gender, age, parental occupation, parental education, books at home, immigration status, language spoken at home; school location, school size, share of fully certified teachers at school, shortage of math t...</p>