echegaray v. secretary of justice 301 scra 96

7/25/2015 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATEDVOLUME301

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96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDEchegaray vs. Secretary of Justice

G.R. No. 132601. January 19, 1999.*

LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OFJUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.

Courts Judgments The rule on finality of judgment cannotdivest the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforcethe same judgmentthe finality of a judgment does not mean thatthe Court has lost all its powers over the case.Contrary to thesubmission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality ofjudgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to executeand enforce the same judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiasonsynthesized the well established jurisprudence on this issue asfollows: x x x the finality of a judgment does not mean that theCourt has lost all its powers over the case. By the finality of thejudgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modifyor alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final thecourt retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is adifference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute itsjudgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.The former continues even after the judgment has become finalfor the purpose of enforcement of judgment the latter terminateswhen the judgment becomes final. x x x For after the judgmenthas become final facts and circumstances may transpire whichcan render the execution unjust or impossible.

Same Same Criminal Law Death Penalty Notwithstandingthe order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the dateset or at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, evenin sentences of death.In truth, the argument of the SolicitorGeneral has long been rejected by this Court. As aptly pointed outby the petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocablyruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance,viz.: This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in variousdecisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in



criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and theperiod for reopening the same has elapsed, the court cannotchange or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . .When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returnedthereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has beenaffirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the properorder. But it does not follow from this cessation of

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* EN BANC.

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Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice

functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending ofthe cause that the judicial authority terminates by having thenpassed completely to the Executive. The particulars of theexecution itself, which are certainly not always included in thejudgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely underthe control of the judicial authority, while the executive has nopower over the person of the convict except to provide for carryingout of the penalty and to pardon. Getting down to the solution ofthe question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of acapital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis thatpostponement of the date can be requested. There can be nodispute on this point. It is a wellknown principle thatnotwithstanding the order of execution and the executory naturethereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor canbe postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common lawthis postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) by commandof the King (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court and (3) bymandate of the law.

Same Same Same Same The power to control the executionof its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdictionsuperveningevents may change the circumstance of the parties and compelcourts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to preventunfairness.The power to control the execution of its decision isan essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of



substantial subtraction for our Constitution vests the entirety ofjudicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts asmay be established by law. To be sure, the most important part ofa litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of executionof decisions where supervening events may change thecircumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene andadjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It isbecause of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that courtshave been conceded the inherent and necessary power of controlof its processes and orders to make them conformable to law andjustice.

Same Same Same Same What the Supreme Courttemporarily restrained is the execution of its own Decision to give itreasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening eventsin Congress as alleged by petitionerit did not restrain theeffectivity of a law enacted by Congress.Section 6 of Rule 135provides that when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court orjudicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other meansnecessary to carry it into

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98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


effect may be employed by such court or officer and if theprocedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is notspecifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitableprocess or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appearsconformable to the spirit of said law or rules. It bears repeatingthat what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of itsown Decision to give it reasonable time to check its fairness inlight of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner.The Court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrainthe effectivity of a law enacted by Congress.

Same Same RuleMaking Powers Pleadings and Practice Itshould be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading,practice and procedure was granted by the Constitution to theSupreme Court to enhance its independence.The moredisquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondentsthat this Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution ofpetitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the



judiciary. Since the implant of republicanism in our soil, ourcourts have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their finaldecisions. In accord with this unquestioned jurisdiction, thisCourt promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice andprocedure which, among others, spelled out the rules on executionof judgments. These rules are all predicated on the assumptionthat courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental power tocontrol and supervise the process of execution of their decisions.Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and effects of judgmentsin civil cases. Rule 120 governs judgments in criminal cases. Itshould be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading,practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to thisCourt to enhance its independence, for in the words of JusticeIsagani Cruz without independence and integrity, courts will losethat popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigoras champions of justice.

Same Same Same Same The 1987 Constitution took awaythe power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rulesconcerning pleading, practice and procedure.The rule makingpower of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first timewas given the power to promulgate rules concerning theprotection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Courtwas also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules ofprocedure of special courts and quasijudicial bodies. But mostimportantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power ofCongress to repeal, alter, or supplement

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rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, thepower to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure isno longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with theExecutive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is tostrengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge,as public respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction tocontrol the process of execution of its decisions, a power concededto it and which it has exercised since time immemorial.

Same Same Constitutional Law President PardoningPower Separation of Powers The constitutional provision which is



the source of the pardoning power of the President cannot beinterpreted as denying the power of courts to control theenforcement of their decisions after their finality An accused whohas been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateralrights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts.The text and tone of this provision will not yield to theinterpretation suggested by the public respondents. The provisionis simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves,commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures afterconviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for thePresident to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority ofall the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannotbe interpreted as denying the power of courts to control theenforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, anaccused who has been convicted by final judgment still possessescollateral rights and these rights can be claimed in theappropriate courts.

Same Same Same Same Same Same The powers of theExecutive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of adeath convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason thatthere is no higher right than the right to life.The powers of theExecutive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of adeath convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason thatthere is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in variousStates in the United States, laws have even been enactedexpressly granting courts the power to suspend execution ofconvicts and their constitutionality has been upheld overarguments that they infringe upon the power of the President togrant reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to contendthat only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accusedafter his final conviction is to violate the principle of coequal andcoordinate powers of the three branches of our government.

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Same Same Death Penalty Mob Mentality When the debatedeteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that wound,when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is thespecial duty of the Supreme Court to assure that the guarantees ofthe Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold.In 1922, the famous



Clarence Darrow predicted that x x x the question of capitalpunishment has been the subject of endless discussion and willprobably never be settled so long as men believe in punishment.In our clime and time when heinous crimes continue to beunchecked, the debate on the legal and moral predicates of capitalpunishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalismbecause of the unfaltering faith of the pro and antideathpartisans on the right and righteousness of their postulates. To besure, any debate, even if it is no more than an exchange ofepithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the debatedeteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that wound,when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it isthe especial duty of this Court to assure that the guarantees ofthe Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennanreminds us x x x it is the very purpose of the Constitutionandparticularly the Bill of Rightsto declare certain valuestranscendent, beyond the reach of temporary political majorities.

Same Same Same Same Rule of Law Man has yet to inventa better hatchery of justice than the courts, a hatchery wherejustice will bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason tobe blown away by the winds of ragethe flame of the rule of lawcannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which isthe mother of unfairness.Man has yet to invent a betterhatchery of justice than the courts. It is a hatchery where justicewill bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to beblown away by the winds of rage. The flame of the rule of lawcannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which isthe mother of unfairness. The business of courts in renderingjustice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only whenthey can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated bysociety.

VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:

Criminal Law Penalties Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as itprescribes the death penalty, falls short of the strict norm set forthby the Constitution.Let me state at the outset that I havehumbly maintained that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as itprescribes the

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death penalty, falls short of the strict norm set forth by theConstitution. I and some of my brethren on the Court, who holdsimilarly, have consistently expressed this stand in theaffirmance by the Court of death sentences imposed by RegionalTrial Courts.

Courts Judgments The rule of immutability of final andexecutory judgments admits of settled exceptionsconcededly, theCourt may suspend the execution of a final judgment when itbecomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or whensupervening events warrant it.The doctrine has almostinvariably been that after a decision becomes final and executory,nothing else is further done except to see to its compliance sincefor the Court to adopt otherwise would be to put no end tolitigations. The rule notwithstanding, the Court retains controlover the case until the full satisfaction of the final judgmentconformably with established legal processes. Hence, the Courthas taken cognizance of the petition assailing before it the use oflethal injection by the State to carry out the death sentence. Inany event, jurisprudence teaches that the rule of immutability offinal and executory judgments admits of settled exceptions.Concededly, the Court may, for instance, suspend the execution ofa final judgment when it becomes imperative in the higher interestof justice or when supervening events warrant it. Certainly, thisextraordinary relief cannot be denied any man, whatever mightbe his station, whose right to life is the issue at stake.

PANGANIBAN, J., Separate Opinion:

Criminal Law Penalties Republic Act 7659 isunconstitutional insofar as some parts thereof prescribing thecapital penalty fail to comply with the requirements ofheinousness and compelling reasons prescribed by theConstitution.I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the DeathPenalty Law) is unconstitutional insofar as some parts thereofprescribing the capital penalty fail to comply with therequirements of heinousness and compelling reasonsprescribed by the Constitution of the Philippines. This I haverepeatedly stated in my Dissenting Opinions in various deathcases decided by the Court, as well as during the Courtsdeliberation on this matter on January 4, 1999. For easyreference, I hereby attach a copy of my Dissent promulgated onFebruary 7, 1997. Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift the



(1)

(2)

TRO, because to do so would mean the upholding andenforcement of a law (or the relevant portions thereof) which, Isubmit with all due respect, is unconstitutional and thereforelegally

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nonexistent. I also reiterate that, in my humble opinion, RA 8177(the Lethal Injection Law) is likewise unconstitutional since itmerely prescribes the manner in which RA 7659 (the DeathPenalty Law) is to be implemented.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of theSupreme Court.

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.Theodore O. Te for petitioner.Adviento, Mallonga, Adviento Law Offices for private

complainant Rodessa Baby R. Echegaray.

R E S O L U T I O N

PUNO, J.:

For resolution are public respondents Urgent Motion forReconsideration of the Resolution of this Court datedJanuary 4, 1999 temporarily restraining the execution ofpetitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion forReconsideration. It is the submission of public respondentsthat:

The Decision in this case having become final andexecutory, its execution enters the exclusive ambitof authority of the executive authority. Theissuance of the TRO may be construed as trenchingon that sphere of executive authorityThe issuance of the temporary restraining order x xx creates dangerous precedent as there will neverbe an end to litigation because there is always a



(3)

(4)

(5)

a.

b.

c.

possibility that Congress may repeal a lawCongress had earlier deliberated extensively on thedeath penalty bill. To be certain, whatever questionmay now be raised on the Death Penalty Lawbefore the present Congress within the 6monthperiod given by this Honorable Court had in allprobability been fully debated upon x x xUnder the time honored maxim lex futuro, judexpraeterito, the law looks forward while the judgelooks at the past, x x x

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the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO hastranscended its power of judicial reviewAt this moment, certain circumstances/superveningevents transpired to the effect that the repeal ormodification of the law imposing death penalty hasbecome nil, to wit:

The public pronouncement of President Estradathat he will veto any law imposing the deathpenalty involving heinous crimesThe resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., thatthey are against the repeal of the lawThe fact that Senator Rocos resolution to repeal thelaw only bears his signature and that of SenatorPimentel.

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion forReconsideration, public respondents attached a copy ofHouse Resolution No. 629 introduced by CongressmanGolez entitled Resolution expressing the sense of theHouse of Representatives to reject any move to reviewRepublic Act No. 7659 which provided for the reimpositionof death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary andthe Executive Department of the position of the House ofRepresentatives on this matter, and urging the Presidentto exhaust all means under the law to immediatelyimplement the death penalty law. The Resolution was



concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113) congressmen.In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1)

the stay order x x x is within the scope of judicial powerand duty and does not trench on executive powers nor oncongressional prerogatives (2) the exercise by this Court ofits power to stay execution was reasonable (3) the Courtdid not lose jurisdiction to address incidental mattersinvolved or arising from the petition (4) public respondentsare estopped from challenging the Courts jurisdiction and(5) there is no certainty that the law on capital punishmentwill not be repealed or modified until Congress convenesand considers all the various resolutions and bills filedbefore it.

Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that theinstant motions concern matters that are not incidents inG.R. No.

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117472, where the death penalty was imposed on petitioneron automatic review of his conviction by this Court. Theinstant motions were filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601,where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (LethalInjection Law) and its implementing rules and regulationswas assailed by petitioner. For this reason, the Court in itsResolution of January 4, 1999 merely noted the Motion toSet Aside of Rodessa Baby R. Echegaray dated January 7,1999 and Entry of Appearance of her counsel datedJanuary 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing tointervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that theinterest of the State is properly represented by the SolicitorGeneral.

We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by thepublic respondents.

I

First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of thepublic respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction overthe case at bar and hence can no longer restrain theexecution of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents



are invoking the rule that final judgments can no longer bealtered in accord with the principle that it is just asimportant that there should be a place to end as thereshould be a place to begin litigation.

1 To start with, the

Court is not changing even a comma of its final Decision. Itis appropriate to examine with precision the metes andbounds of the Decision of this Court that became final.These metes and bounds are clearly spelled out in theEntry of Judgment in this case, viz.:

ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered inthe aboveentitled case was filed in this Office, the dispositivepart of which reads as follows:

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1 Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 US 165, 172 59 S. Ct. 134, 138 83 L. ed. 104[1938].

f

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WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks todeclare the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as unconstitutionalbut GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules andRegulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, whichare hereby declared INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic ActNo. 7659 and (b) Section 19 fails to provide for review and approval ofthe Lethal Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiablymakes the manual confidential, hence unavailable to interested partiesincluding the accused/convict and counsel. Respondents are herebyenjoined from enforcing and implementing Republic Act No. 8177 untilthe aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations toImplement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately amended, revisedand/or corrected in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

and that the same has, on November 6, 1998 become final andexecutory and is hereby recorded in the Book of Entries of



Judgment.Manila, Philippines.

Clerk of Court By: (SGD) TERESITA G. DIMAISIP

Acting Chief Judicial Records Office

The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment,the Secretary of Justice, the Honorable Serafin Cuevas,filed with this Court on October 21, 1998 a Compliancewhere he submitted the Amended Rules and Regulationsimplementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with ourDecision. On October 28, 1998, Secretary Cuevas submitteda Manifestation informing the Court that he has caused thepublication of the said Amended Rules and Regulations asrequired by the Administrative Code. It is crystalline thatthe Decision of this Court that became final and unalterablemandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not unconstitutional(2) that Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations toImplement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid and (3) R.A. No. 8177cannot be enforced and implemented until Sections 17 and19 of the Rules and Regu

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lations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is alsodaylight clear that this Decision was not altered a whit bythis Court. Contrary to the submission of the SolicitorGeneral, the rule on finality of judgment cannot divest thisCourt of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the samejudgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized thewell established jurisprudence on this issue as follows:

2

x x xthe finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has

lost all its powers nor the case. By the finality of the judgment,what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alterthe same. Even after the judgment has become final the courtretains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.

3

There is adifference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute itsjudgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.



The former continues even after the judgment has become final forthe purpose of enforcement of judgment the latter terminates whenthe judgment becomes final.

4

x x x For after the judgment hasbecome final facts and circumstances may transpire which canrender the execution unjust or impossible.

5

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2 Philippine Courts and their Jurisdiction, p. 13, 1998 ed.3 Citing Miranda v. Tiangco, 96 Phil. 526 Santos v. Acuna, 100 Phil.

230 American Insurance Co. v. US Lines Co., 63 SCRA 325 Republic v.Reyes, 71 SCRA 426 Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Reyes, 71 SCRA 655Agricultural and Industrial Marketing, Inc. v. CA, 118 SCRA 49 Vasco v.CA, 81 SCRA 712 Mindanao Portland Cement Corp. v. Laquihan, 120SCRA 930.

4 Ibid. at pp. 1214 citing Miranda v. Tiangco, 96 Phil. 526 Santos v.Acuna, 63 O.G. 358 Gabaya v. Hon. R. Mendoza, 113 SCRA 400 BuenoIndustrial and Development Corp. v. Encaje, 104 SCRA 388.

5 Ibid., pp. 1415 citing Molina v. dela Riva, 8 Phil. 569 Behn Meyer &Co. v. McMicking, 11 Phil. 276 Warmer Barnes & Co. v. Jaucian, 13 Phil.4 Espiritu v. Crossfield, 14 Phil. 588 Mata v. Lichauco, 36 Phil. 809 Dela Costa v. Cleofas, 67 Phil. 686 Omar v. Jose, 77 Phil. 703 City ofButuan v. Ortiz, 113 Phil. 636 De los Santos v. Rodriguez, 22 SCRA 551City of Cebu v. Mendoza, 66 SCRA 174.

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In truth, the argument of the Solicitor General has longbeen rejected by this Court. As aptly pointed out by thepetitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocablyruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of FirstInstance,

6 viz.:

This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in variousdecisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that incriminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and theperiod for reopening the same has elapsed, the court cannotchange or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . .When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returnedthereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has beenaffirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper



order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on thepart of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that thejudicial authority terminates by having then passed completely tothe Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which arecertainly not always included in the judgment and writ ofexecution, in any event are absolutely under the control of thejudicial authority, while the executive has no power over theperson of the convict except to provide for carrying out of thepenalty and to pardon.

Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar,which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must beaccepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can berequested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a wellknownprinciple that notwithstanding the order of execution and theexecutory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, thedate therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Underthe common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways:(1) by command of the King (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of thecourt and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state thisprinciple of the common law to render impossible that assertion inabsolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jailthe trial court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts thatshow the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by directionof the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of theexecution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rulethat after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of orderingthe execution . . . and its part is ended, if however a circumstancearises that ought to delay the execution, and there

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6 29 Phil. 267 (1915), p. 270.

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is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order apostponement. Then the question arises as to whom theapplication for postponing the execution ought to be addressedwhile the circumstances is under investigation and as to who hasjurisdiction to make the investigation.

The power to control the execution of its decision is an



essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject ofsubstantial subtraction for our Constitution

7 vests the

entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in suchlower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, themost important part of a litigation, whether civil orcriminal, is the process of execution of decisions wheresupervening events may change the circumstance of theparties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rightsof the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of theseunforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have beenconceded the inherent and necessary power of control of itsprocesses and orders to make them conformable to law andjustice.

8 For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides

that when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court orjudicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and othermeans necessary to carry it into effect may be employed bysuch court or officer and if the procedure to be followed inthe exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointedout by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode ofproceeding may be adopted which appears conformable tothe spirit of said law or rules. It bears repeating that whatthe Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its ownDecision to give it reasonable time to check its fairness inlight of supervening events in Congress as alleged bypetitioner. The Court, contrary to popular misimpression,did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted byCongress.

The more disquieting dimension of the submission of thepublic respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction torestrain the execution of petitioner is that it can diminishthe independence of the judiciary. Since the implant ofrepubli

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7 Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.8 Section 5(f), Rule 135.

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canism in our soil, our courts have been conceded thejurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord with



this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgatedrules concerning pleading, practice and procedure which,among others, spelled out the rules on execution ofjudgments. These rules are all predicated on the assumptionthat courts have the inherent, necessary and incidentalpower to control and supervise the process of execution oftheir decisions. Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction andeffects of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 governsjudgments in criminal cases. It should be stressed that thepower to promulgate rules of pleading, practice andprocedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court toenhance its independence, for in the words of JusticeIsagani Cruz without independence and integrity, courtswill lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenanceof their vigor as champions of justice.

9 Hence, our

Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Courtfor it enhances its independence. Under the 1935Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rulesconcerning pleading, practice and procedure was grantedbut it appeared to be coexistent with legislative power for itwas subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter orsupplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:

Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgaterules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall beuniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws onpleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes,and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of theSupreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shallhave the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerningpleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to thepractice of law in the Philippines.

_________________

9 Philippine Political Law, p. 225, 1993 ed.

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The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as



it may appear on its surface. In In re Cunanan10 Congress

in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the SupremeCourt regarding admission to the practice of law, enactedthe Bar Flunkers Act of 1953

11 which considered as a

passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinationsafter July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952bar examinations. This Court struck down the law asunconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno heldthat x x x the disputed law is not a legislation it is ajudgmenta judgment promulgated by this Court duringthe aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concernedand although this Court certainly can revoke thesejudgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no lesscertain that only this Court, and not the legislative norexecutive department, that may do so. Any attempt on thepart of these departments would be a clear usurpation ofits function, as is the case with the law in question.

12 The

venerable jurist further ruled: It is obvious, therefore, thatthe ultimate power to grant license for the practice of lawbelongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed byCongress on the matter is of permissive character, or asother authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditionsfor the license. By its ruling, this Court qualified theabsolutist tone of the power of Congress to repeal, alter orsupplement the rules concerning pleading, practice andprocedure, and the admission to the practice of law in thePhilippines.

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was notchanged by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973Constitution reiterated the power of this Court topromulgate rules concerning pleading, practice andprocedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may berepealed, altered or supplemented by the BatasangPambansa x x x. More completely, Section 5(5) of itsArticle X provided:

________________

10 94 Phil. 534 (1954), pp. 550, 555.11 R.A. No. 372.12 94 Phil. 550, p. 551.

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x x xx x xx x xSec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

x x xx x xx x x(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in

all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of theBar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by theBatasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified andinexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall beuniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,or modify substantive rights.

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution furtherstrengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving toit the additional power to promulgate rules governing theintegration of the Bar.

13

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger andmore independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced therule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), ArticleVIII provides:

x x xx x xx x xSection 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following

powers:x x xx x xx x x

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement ofconstitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, theadmission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistanceto the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified andinexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall beuniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts andquasijudicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by theSupreme Court.

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13 See In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, January 9, 1973,49 SCRA 22.

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The rule making power of this Court was expanded. ThisCourt for the first time was given the power to promulgaterules concerning the protection and enforcement ofconstitutional rights. The Court was also granted for thefirst time the power to disapprove rules of procedure ofspecial courts and quasijudicial bodies. But mostimportantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power ofCongress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerningpleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power topromulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is nolonger shared by this Court with Congress, more so withthe Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987Constitution is to strengthen the independence of thejudiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do,that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process ofexecution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and whichit has exercised since time immemorial.

To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondentsto assail the jurisdiction of this Court to control andsupervise the implementation of its decision in the case atbar. As aforestated, our Decision became final andexecutory on November 6, 1998. The records reveal thatafter November 6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998, no lessthan the Secretary of Justice recognized the jurisdiction ofthis Court by filing a Manifestation and Urgent Motion tocompel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A.Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him x xx a certified true copy of the Warrant of Execution datedNovember 17, 1998 bearing the designated execution day ofdeath convict Leo Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal orannounce the contents thereof, particularly the executiondate fixed by such trial court to the public when requested.The relevant portions of the Manifestation and UrgentMotion filed by the Secretary of Justice beseeching thisCourt to provide the appropriate relief state:

x x xx x xx x x5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferradas

Manifestation however, herein respondent is submitting theinstant Manifestation and Motion (a) to stress, inter alia, that thenondisclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondentof

113




vital information necessary for the exercise of his statutorypowers, as well as renders nugatory the constitutional guaranteethat recognizes the peoples right to information of public concern,and (b) to ask this Honorable Court to provide the appropriaterelief.

6. The nondisclosure of the date of execution deprives hereinrespondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of hispower of supervision and control over the Bureau of Correctionspursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV of the AdministrativeCode of 1987, in relation to Title III, Book IV of suchAdministrative Code, insofar as the enforcement of Republic ActNo. 8177 and the Amended Rules and Regulations to ImplementRepublic Act No. 8177 is concerned and for the discharge of themandate of seeing to it that laws and rules relative to theexecution of sentence are faithfully observed.

7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal theinformation about the precise day of execution limits the exerciseby the President of executive clemency powers pursuant toSection 19, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987Philippine Constitution and Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code,as amended, which provides that the death sentence shall becarried out without prejudice to the exercise by the President ofhis executive clemency powers at all times. (Italics supplied) Forinstance, the President cannot grant reprieve, i.e., postpone theexecution of a sentence to a day certain (People v. Vera, 65 Phil.56, 110 [1937]) in the absence of a precise date to reckon with.The exercise of such clemency power, at this time, might evenwork to the prejudice of the convict and defeat the purpose of theConstitution and the applicable statute as when the date ofexecution set by the President would be earlier than thatdesignated by the court.

8. Moreover, the deliberate nondisclosure of information aboutthe date of execution to herein respondent and the public violatesSection 7, Article III (Bill of Rights) and Section 28, Article II(Declaration of Principles and State Policies) of the 1987Philippine Constitution which read:

SEC. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of publicconcern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documentsand papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as wellas to government research data used as basis for policy development,shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be



provided by law.

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SEC. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the Stateadopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all itstransactions involving public interest.

9. The right to information provision is selfexecuting. It suppliesthe rules by means of which the right to information may beenjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, 167[1972]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty toafford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamentalright therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon theratification of the Constitution without need for any ancillary actof the Legislature (Id., at p. 165). What may be provided for by theLegislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon theaccess to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent withthe declared State policy of full public disclosure of alltransactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec.28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whateverlimitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and theduty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceableby virtue of the adoption of the New Charter. (Decision of theSupreme Court En Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,150 SCRA 530, 534535 [1987]).

The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal thedate of execution of petitioner Echegaray was filed by hiscounsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998. Heinvoked his clients right to due process and the publicsright to information. The Solicitor General, as counsel forpublic respondents, did not oppose petitioners motion on theground that this Court has no more jurisdiction over theprocess of execution of Echegaray. This Court granted therelief prayed for by the Secretary of Justice and by thecounsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of December 15,1998. There was not a whimper of protest from the publicrespondents and they are now estopped from contendingthat this Court has lost its jurisdiction to grant said relief.The jurisdiction of this Court does not depend on theconvenience of litigants.



II

Second. We likewise reject the public respondentscontention that the decision in this case having becomefinal and

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executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit ofauthority of the executive department x x x. By granting theTRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprievewhich is an executive function.

14 Public respondents cite as

their authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VIIof the Constitution which reads:

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in thisConstitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations,and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction byfinal judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnestywith the concurrence of a majority of all the members of theCongress.

The text and tone of this provision will not yield to theinterpretation suggested by the public respondents. Theprovision is simply the source of power of the President togrant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remitfines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. Italso provides the authority for the President to grantamnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all themembers of the Congress. The provision, however, cannotbe interpreted as denying the power of courts to control theenforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth,an accused who has been convicted by final judgment stillpossesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimedin the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict whobecomes insane after his final conviction cannot beexecuted while in a state of insanity.

15 As observed by

Antieau, today, it is generally assumed that due process oflaw will prevent the government from executing the deathsentence upon a person who is insane at the time ofexecution.

16 The suspension of such a death sentence is

undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a



usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though itseffect is the

__________________

14 See pp. 34 of Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.15 See Article 79 of the Revised Penal Code.16 Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. I, p. 409, 1969 ed., citing Caritativo

v. California, 357 US 549, 21 L ed. 2d 1531, 78 S. Ct. 1263 [1958].

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samethe temporary suspension of the execution of thedeath convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied thatCongress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducingthe penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of suchan amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. Butby no stretch of the imagination can the exercise byCongress of its plenary power to amend laws be consideredas a violation of the power of the President to commutefinal sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive,the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a deathconvict do not exclude each other for the simple reason thatthere is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, invarious States in the United States, laws have even beenenacted expressly granting courts the power to suspendexecution of convicts and their constitutionality has beenupheld over arguments that they infringe upon the powerof the President to grant reprieves. For the publicrespondents therefore to contend that only the Executivecan protect the right to life of an accused after his finalconviction is to violate the principle of coequal andcoordinate powers of the three branches of our government.

III

Third. The Courts resolution temporarily restraining theexecution of petitioner must be put in its proper perspectiveas it has been grievously distorted especially by those whomake a living by vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his VeryUrgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on December 28, 1998



at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked several grounds, viz.: (1)that his execution has been set on January 4, the firstworking day of 1999 (b) that members of Congress hadeither sought for his executive clemency and/or review orrepeal of the law authorizing capital punishment (b.1) thatSenator Aquilino Pimentels resolution asking thatclemency be granted to the petitioner and that capitalpunishment be reviewed has been concurred by thirteen(13) other senators (b.2) Senate President Marcelo Fernanand Senator Miriam S. Defensor Santiago have publiclydeclared they would seek a review of the death penalty law(b.3) Senator Raul Roco has also sought

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the repeal of capital punishment and (b.4) CongressmanSalacnib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35) othercongressmen are demanding review of the same law.

When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court wasalready in its traditional recess and would only resumesession on January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief JusticeHilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session onJanuary 4, 1999

17 at 10 a.m. to deliberate on petitioners

Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five (5) hours toresolve petitioners motion as he was due to be executed at3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult problem ofresolving whether petitioners allegations about the movesin Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law aremere speculations or not. To the Courts majority, therewere good reasons why the Court should not immediatelydismiss petitioners allegations as mere speculations andsurmises. They noted that petitioners allegations weremade in a pleading under oath and were widely publicizedin the print and broadcast media. It was also of judicialnotice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress and has noless than one hundred thirty (130) new members whoseviews on capital punishment are still unexpressed. Thepresent Congress is therefore different from the Congressthat enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) andthe Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, theCourts minority felt that petitioners allegations lackedclear factual bases. There was hardly a time to verify



a.

petitioners allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m.And verification from Congress was impossible as Congresswas not in session. Given these constraints, the Courtsmajority did not rush to judgment but took an extremelycautious stance by temporarily restraining the execution ofpetitioner. The suspension was temporaryuntil June 15,1999, coeval with the constitutional duration of the presentregular session of Congress, unless it sooner becomescertain that no repeal or modification

______________

17 December 30 and 31, 1998 were declared holidays. January 1, 1999was an official holiday. January 2 was a Saturday and January 3 was aSunday.

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of the law is going to be made. The extreme caution takenby the Court was compelled, among others, by the fear thatany error of the Court in not stopping the execution of thepetitioner will preclude any further relief for all rights stopat the graveyard. As life was at stake, the Court refused toconstitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some partisans.The Courts majority felt it needed the certainty that thelegislature will not change the circumstance of petitioneras alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law andequitable considerations demand no less before allowingthe State to take the life of one of its citizens.

The temporary restraining order of this Court hasproduced its desired result, i.e., the crystallization of theissue whether Congress is disposed to review capitalpunishment. The public respondents, thru the SolicitorGeneral, cite posterior events that negate beyond doubt thepossibility that Congress will repeal or amend the deathpenalty law. He names these supervening events as follows:

x x x

The public pronouncement of President Estrada that hewill veto any law repealing the death penalty involvingheinous crimes



b.The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they areagainst the repeal of the lawc. The fact that Senator Rocos resolution to repeal the lawonly bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel.

18

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion forReconsideration, the Solicitor General cited HouseResolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golezentitled Resolution expressing the sense of the House ofRepresentatives to reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659which provided for the reimposition of death penalty,notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the ExecutiveDepartment of the position of the

________________

18 Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of public respondents, p. 8.

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House of Representatives on this matter and urging thePresident to exhaust all means under the law toimmediately implement the death penalty law. The Golezresolution was signed by 113 congressmen as of January11, 1999. In a marathon session yesterday that extendedup to 3 oclock in the morning, the House ofRepresentatives with minor amendments formally adoptedthe Golez resolution by an overwhelming vote. HouseResolution No. 25 expressed the sentiment that the Housex x x does not desire at this time to review Republic Act7659. In addition, the President has stated that he will notrequest Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in view ofthe prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In light ofthese developments, the Courts TRO should now be liftedas it has served its legal and humanitarian purpose.

A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrowpredicted that x x x the question of capital punishmenthas been the subject of endless discussion and willprobably never be settled so long as men believe inpunishment.

19 In our clime and time when heinous crimes

continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal andmoral predicates of capital punishment has been



regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of theunfaltering faith of the pro and antideath partisans on theright and righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, anydebate, even if it is no more than an exchange of epithets ishealthy in a democracy. But when the debate deteriorates todiscord due to the overuse of words that wound, when angerthreatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is theespecial duty of this Court to assure that the guarantees ofthe Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As JusticeBrennan reminds us x x x it is the very purpose of theConstitutionand particularly the Bill of Rightstodeclare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach oftemporary political majorities.

20 Man has yet to invent a

better hatchery of justice than the courts. It is a hatcherywhere justice will bloom only when we can prevent

_____________

19 Darrow, Crime: Its Cause and Treatment, p. 166 (1922).20 Eisler, A Justice For All, p. 268.

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the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of rage.The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage,especially the rage of the mob which is the mother ofunfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is tobe fair and they can pass their litmus test only when theycan be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated bysociety.

21

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the publicrespondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration andSupplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsiderationand lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued in itsResolution of January 4, 1999.

The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon.Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,Branch 104) to set anew the date for execution of theconvict/petitioner in accordance with applicable provisionsof law and the Rules of Court, without further delay.

SO ORDERED.



Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima andPardo, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., Please see Separate Opinion.Panganiban, J., Please see Separate Opinion.Buena and GonzagaReyes, JJ., No part.

________________

21 Where personal liberty is involved, a democratic society employs adifferent arithmetic and insists that it is less important to reach anunshakable decision than to do justice. Pollack, Proposals to CurtailHabeas Corpus for State Prisoners: Collateral Attack on the Great Writ.66 Yale LJ 50, 65 (1956).

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SEPARATE OPINION

VITUG, J.:

Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintainedthat Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes thedeath penalty, falls short of the strict norm set forth by theConstitution. I and some of my brethren on the Court, whohold similarly, have consistently expressed this stand inthe affirmance by the Court of death sentences imposed byRegional Trial Courts.

In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolvedto issue in the abovenumbered petition a temporaryrestraining order (TRO) because, among other things, ofwhat had been stated to be indications that Congress wouldreexamine the death penalty law. It was principally out ofrespect and comity to a coequal branch of the government,i.e., to reasonably allow it that opportunity if truly minded,that motivated the Court to grant, after deliberation, alimited time for the purpose.

The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing theTRO, thereby reconsider its judgment convicting theaccused or recall the imposition of the death penalty.



The doctrine has almost invariably been that after adecision becomes final and executory, nothing else isfurther done except to see to its compliance since for theCourt to adopt otherwise would be to put no end tolitigations. The rule notwithstanding, the Court retainscontrol over the case until the full satisfaction of the finaljudgment conformably with established legal processes.Hence, the Court has taken cognizance of the petitionassailing before it the use of lethal injection by the State tocarry out the death sentence. In any event, jurisprudenceteaches that the rule of immutability of final and executoryjudgments admits of settled exceptions. Concededly, theCourt may, for instance, suspend the execution of a finaljudgment when it becomes imperative in the higher

122


interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.1Certainly, this extraordinary relief cannot be denied anyman, whatever might be his station, whose right to life isthe issue at stake. The pronouncement in Director ofPrisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite,

2 should be

instructive. Thus

This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in variousdecisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that incriminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and theperiod for reopening the same has elapsed, the court can notchange or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated,functus est officio suo, according to the classical phrase. When incases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto forexecution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, itperforms a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But itdoes not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of thecourt with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicialauthority terminates by having then passed completely to theexecutive. The particulars of the execution itself, which arecertainly not always included in the judgment and writ ofexecution, in any event are absolutely under the control of thejudicial authority, while the executive has no power over the personof the convict except to provide for carrying out the penalty and topardon.



Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar,which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must beaccepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can berequested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a wellknown principle that, notwithstanding the order of execution andthe executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time,the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death.Under the common law this postponement can be ordered in threeways: (1) by command of the King (2) by discretion (arbitrio) ofthe court and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to statethis principle of the common law to render impossible theassertion in absolute terms that after the convict has once beenplaced in jail the trial court can

______________

1 Candelaria vs. Caizares, 4 SCRA 738 Philippine Veterans Bank vs.Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 645 Lipana vs. Development Bank ofRizal, 154 SCRA 257 Lee vs. De Guzman, 187 SCRA 276 Bachrach Corporationvs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128349, 25 September 1998.

2 29 Phil. 267.

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not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need forpostponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it isacknowledged that even after the date of the execution has beenfixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after the Court ofFirst Instance has performed its ministerial duty of ordering theexecution, functus est officio suo, and its part is ended, if howevera circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, there is animperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order apostponement. x x x.

In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the properexecution of its final judgment, the power of the Presidentto grant pardon, commutation or reprieve, and theprerogative of Congress to repeal or modify the law thatcould benefit the convicted accused are not essentiallypreclusive of one another nor constitutionally incompatibleand may each be exercised within their respective spheresand confines. Thus, the stay of execution issued by the



Court would not prevent either the President fromexercising his pardoning power or Congress from enactinga measure that may be advantageous to the adjudgedoffender.

The TRO of this Court has provided that it shall be liftedeven before its expiry date of 15 June 1999, coeval with theduration of the present regular session of Congress, if itsooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of thelaw is going to be made. The Urgent Motion forReconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor Generalstates that as of the moment, certaincircumstances/supervening events (have) transpired to theeffect that the repeal or modification of the law imposingdeath penalty has become nil x x x. If, indeed, it would befutile to yet expect any chance for a timely

3 reexamination

by Congress of the death penalty law, then I can appreciatewhy the majority of the Justices on the Court feel rightlybound even now to lift the TRO.

I am hopeful, nevertheless, that Congress will in timefind its way clear to undertaking a most thorough anddispassionate reexamination of the law not so much for itsquestioned wisdom as for the need to have a second look atthe conditions

________________

3 At least for Mr. Echegaray.

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sine qua non prescribed by the Constitution in theimposition of the death penalty. In People vs. Masalihit,

4 in

urging, with all due respect, Congress to consider a promptreexamination of the death penalty law, I have said:

The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty lies, inthe initial instance, with the lawmaking authority, the Congressof the Philippines, subject to the conditions that the Constitutionitself has set forth viz.: (1) That there must be compelling reasonsto justify the imposition of the death penalty and (2) That thecapital offense must involve a heinous crime. It appears that thefundamental law did not contemplate a simple reimposition of the



death penalty to offenses theretofore already provided in theRevised Penal Code or, let alone, just because of it. The termcompelling reasons would indicate to me that there must first be amarked change in the milieu from that which has prevailed at thetime of adoption of the 1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to thatwhich exists at the enactment of the statute prescribing the deathpenalty, upon the other hand, that would make it distinctivelyinexorable to allow the reimposition of the death penalty. Mostimportantly, the circumstances that would characterize theheinous nature of the crime and make it so exceptionally offensiveas to warrant the death penalty must be spelled out with greatclarity in the law, albeit without necessarily precluding the Courtfrom exercising its power of judicial review given thecircumstances of each case. To venture, in the case of murder, thecrime would become heinous within the Constitutional concept,when, to exemplify, the victim is unnecessarily subjected to apainful and excruciating death or, in the crime of rape, when theoffended party is callously humiliated or even brutally killed bythe accused. The indiscriminate imposition of the death penaltycould somehow constrain courts to apply, perhaps withoutconsciously meaning to, stringent standards for conviction, not toounlikely beyond what might normally be required in criminalcases, that can, in fact, result in undue exculpation of offenders tothe great prejudice of victims and society.

Today, I reiterate the above view and until the exactingstandards of the Constitution are clearly met as so hereinabove expressed, I will have to disagree, most respectfully,

_________________

4 G.R. No. 124329, 14 December 1998.

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with my colleagues in the majority who continue to holdthe presently structured Republic Act No. 7659 to be inaccord with the Constitution, an issue that is fundamental,constant and inextricably linked to the imposition eachtime of the death penalty and, like the instant petition, tothe legal incidents pertinent thereto.

Accordingly, I vote against the lifting of the restraining



order of the Court even as I, like everyone else, however,must respect and be held bound by the ruling of themajority.

SEPARATE OPINION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

I agree with the Courts Resolution that, without doubt,this Court has jurisdiction to issue the disputed TemporaryRestraining Order (TRO) on January 4, 1999. I will notrepeat its wellreasoned disquisition. I write only to explainmy vote in the context of the larger issue of the deathpenalty.

Since the solicitor general has demonstrated thatCongress will not repeal or amend RA 7659 during itscurrent session which ends on June 15, 1999 and that, inany event, the President will veto any such repeal oramendment, the TRO should by its own terms be deemedlifted now. However, my objections to the imposition of thedeath penalty transcend the TRO and permeate itsjuridical essence.

I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death PenaltyLaw) is unconstitutional insofar as some parts thereofprescribing the capital penalty fail to comply with therequirements of heinousness and compelling reasonsprescribed by the Constitution of the Philippines.

** This I

have repeatedly stated in my Dissenting Opinions invarious death cases decided by the Court, as well as duringthe Courts deliberation on this matter on January 4, 1999.For easy reference, I hereby attach a copy of my Dissentpromulgated on February 7, 1997.

______________

** I have further explained my unflinching position on this matter inmy recent book Battles in the Supreme Court, particularly on pages 58 to84.

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Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift the TRO, because todo so would mean the upholding and enforcement of a law(or the relevant portions thereof) which, I submit with alldue respect, is unconstitutional and therefore legallynonexistent. I also reiterate that, in my humble opinion,RA 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is likewiseunconstitutional since it merely prescribes the manner inwhich RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is to beimplemented.

Having said that, I stress, however, that I defer to therule of law and will abide by the ruling of the Court thatboth RA 7659 and RA 8177 are constitutional and that thedeath penalty should, by majority vote, be implemented bymeans of lethal injection.

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I vote to deny thesolicitor generals Motion for Reconsideration.

Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration

SEPARATE OPINION

Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional

In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration1 dated

August 22, 1996 filed by his newlyretained counsel,2 the

accused raises for the first time a very crucial ground forhis defense: that Republic Act No. 7659, the law reimposingthe death penalty, is unconstitutional. In the Brief and(original)

____________

1 It is called Supplemental because there was a (main) Motion forReconsideration filed by the previous counsel of the accused, which thisCourt already denied.

2 The Anti Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal AssistanceGroupPablito V. Sanidad, Jose Manuel I. Diokno, Arno V. Sanidad,Efren Moncupa, Eduardo R. Abaya and Ma. Victoria I. Dioknofiled itsNotice of Appearance dated August 22, 1996 only on August 23, 1996,after the Per Curiam Decision of this Court was promulgated on June 25,1996.



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Motion for Reconsideration filed by his previous counsel,3

this transcendental issue was not brought up. Hence, itwas not passed upon by this Court in its Decision affirmingthe trial courts sentence of death.

4

The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty

Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall deathpenalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involvingheinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any deathpenalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.(Italics supplied)

The second and third sentences of the above provision arenew and had not been written in the 1935, 1973 or even inthe 1986 Freedom Constitution. They proscribe theimposition

5

__________________

3 Atty. Julian R. Vitug, Jr.4 The bulk of jurisprudence precludes raising an issue for the first time

only on appeal. See, for instance, Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Courtof Appeals, 249 SCRA 303, October 13, 1995 Manila Bay ClubCorporation vs. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 715, July 11, 1995 Securitiesand Exchange Commission vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 738, July 21,1995. However, the Court resolved to tackle the question ofconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 in this case, anticipating thatthe same question would be raised anyway in many other subsequentinstances. The Court resolved to determine and dispose of the issue onceand for all, at the first opportunity. To let the issue pass unresolved justbecause it was raised after the promulgation of the decision affirmingconviction may result in grave injustice.

5 In People vs. Muoz, 170 SCRA 107, February 9, 1989 the Court,prior to the enactment and effectivity of RA 7659, ruled by a vote of 96 (J.Cruz, ponente, C.J. Fernan, JJ. Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Gancayco,



Padilla, Bidin, GrioAquino and Medialdea, concurring) that the deathpenalty was not abolished but only prohibited from being imposed. But seealso the persuasive Dissenting

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of the death penalty unless for compelling reasonsinvolving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it, andreduced any death penalty already imposed to reclusionperpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (itbars the future imposition of the penalty) and a retroactiveone (it reduces imposed capital sentences to the lesserpenalty of imprisonment).

This twofold aspect is significant. It stresses that theConstitution did not merely suspend the imposition of thedeath penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from thestatute books. The automatic commutation or reduction toreclusion perpetua of any death penalty extant as of theeffectivity of the Constitution clearly recognizes that, whilethe conviction of an accused for a capital crime remains,death as a penalty ceased to exist in our penal laws andthus may no longer be carried out. This is the clear intentof the framers of our Constitution. As Comm. Bernasexclaimed,

6 (t)he majority voted for the constitutional

abolition of the death penalty.

_____________

Opinion of Mme. Justice Ameurfina MelencioHerrera (joined by JJ.Narvasa, Paras, Sarmiento, Cortes and Regalado) who contended that theConstitution totally abolished the death penalty and removed it from thestatute books. People vs. Muoz reversed the earlier abolition doctrineuniformly held in People vs. Gavarra, 155 SCRA 327, October 30, 1987,(per C.J. Yap) People vs. Masangkay, 155 SCRA 113, October 27, 1987,(per J. MelencioHerrera) and People vs. Atencio, 156 SCRA 242,December 10, 1987 (per C.J. Narvasa). It is time that these cases arerevisited by this Court.

6 This quote is taken from I Record of the Constitutional Commission,p. 676 (July 17, 1986) as follows:

Fr. Bernas:

x x xx x xx x x



My recollection on this is that there was a division in the Committee not onwhether the death penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on whether theabolition should be done by the Constitutionin which case it cannot be restoredby the legislatureor left to the legislature. The majority voted for theconstitutional abolition of the death penalty. And the reason is that capitalpunishment is inhuman for the convict and his family who are traumatized by thewaiting, even if it is

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Citing this and other similar pronouncements of thedistinguished Concom delegate, Mme. Justice AmeurfinaMelencioHerrera emphasized,

7 It is thus clear that when

Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the nonimposition of the death penalty, what he had in mind wasthe total abolition and removal from the statute books ofthe death penalty. This became the intent of the framers ofthe Constitution when they approved the provision andmade it a part of the Bill of Rights. With such abolition asa premise, restoration thereof becomes an exception to aconstitutional mandate. Being an exception and thus inderogation of the Constitution, it must then be strictlyconstrued against the State and liberally in favor of thepeople.

8 In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no presumption of

constitutionality.

The Constitution Strictly Limits CongressionalPrerogative to Prescribe Death

To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectivelyremoved the death penalty from the then existing statutesbut (2) authorized Congress to restore it at some futuretime to enable or empower courts to reimpose it oncondition that it (Congress)

9 finds compelling reasons,

involving heinous

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never carried out. There is no evidence that the death penalty deterreddeadly criminals, hence, life should not be destroyed just in the hope thatother lives might be saved. Assuming mastery over the life of another man



(1)

(2)

is just too presumptuous for any man. The fact that the death penalty asan institution has been there from time immemorial should not deter usfrom reviewing it. Human life is more valuable than an institutionintended precisely to serve human life. So basically, this is the summaryof the reasons which were presented in support of the constitutionalabolition of the death penalty. (italics supplied)

7 Dissenting Opinion in People vs. Muoz, supra, p. 129.8 Thus in People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, September 4, 1986, we held

that a statute which allows an exception to a constitutional right (againstwarrantless arrests) should be strictly construed.

9 In his scholarly Memorandum, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. as amicuscuriae in People vs. Pedro V. Malabago (G.R. No. 115686,

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crimes. The language of the Constitution is emphatic(even if awkward

10): the authority of Congress to provide

for it is not absolute. Rather, it is strictly limited:

by compelling reasons that may arise after theConstitution became effective andto crimes which Congress should identify or defineor characterize as heinous.

The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress theburden of determining the existence of compellingreasons and of defining what crimes are heinous before itcould exercise its lawmaking prerogative to restore thedeath penalty. For claritys sake, may I emphasize thatCongress, by law, prescribes the death penalty on certaincrimes and courts, by their decisions, impose it onindividual offenders found guilty beyond reasonable doubtof committing said crimes.

In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congressenacted RA 7659

11 to provide for it (the death penalty) (1)

by

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December 2, 1996), vigorously argues that RA 7659 has validly restoredthe death penalty which may now be imposed provided that theprosecution proves, and the court is convinced, that (a) the accused is



guilty of a crime designated by RA 7659 as capital, (b) whose commissionis accompanied by aggravating circumstances as defined by Arts. 14 and15 of the Revised Penal Code, (c) the accompanying aggravatingcircumstance must be one which can be characterized by the court asmaking the crime heinous, and (d) that the execution of the offender isdemanded by compelling reasons related to the offense. In other words,according to him, it is the courtsnot Congressthat have theresponsibility of determining the heinousness of a crime and thecompelling reason for its imposition upon a particular offender, dependingon the facts of each case. I cannot however subscribe to this view. TheConstitution clearly identifies Congress as the sovereign entity which isgiven the onus of fulfilling these two constitutional limitations.

10 People vs. Muoz, supra, p. 121.11 Which became effective on December 31, 1993, per People vs. Burgos,

234 SCRA 555, 569, July 29, 1994 People vs. Godoy, 250

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amending certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code12

(2) by incorporating a new article therein13 and (3) by

amending certain special laws.14

But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elementsof the crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the speciallaws. It merely made the penalty more severe. Neither didits provisions (other than the preamble, which was cast ingeneral terms) discuss or justify the reasons for the moresevere sanction, either collectively for all the offenses orindividually for each of them.

Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and themethod by which the death penalty had been imposed untilFebruary 2, 1987, when the Constitution took effect asfollows: (1) a person is convicted of a capital offense and (2)the commission of which was accompanied by aggravatingcircumstances not outweighed by mitigating circumstances.

The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, didCongress exceed the limited authority granted it by theConstitution? More legally put: In reviving the deathpenalty, did Congress act with grave abuse of discretion orin excess of the very limited power or jurisdiction conferredon it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I respectfully submit,is YES.



Heinous Crimes

To repeat, while the Constitution limited the power ofCongress to prescribe the death penalty ONLY to heinous

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SCRA 676, December 6, 1995 People vs. Albert, 251 SCRA 136,December 11, 1995.

12 Art. 114Treason Art. 123Qualified Piracy Art. 246ParricideArt. 248Murder Art. 255Infanticide Art. 267Kidnapping andSerious Illegal Detention Art. 294Robbery with violence against orintimidation of persons Art. 320Destructive Arson Art. 335Rape.

13 Art. 211A on Qualified Bribery.14 Section 2, RA 7080Plunder Secs. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II of

RA 6425Prohibited Drugs Secs. 14, 14A and 15 of Article III of said RA6425Carnapping.

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crimes, it did not define or characterize the meaning ofheinous. Neither did Congress. As already stated, RA7659 itself merely selected some existing crimes for whichit prescribed death as an applicable penalty. It did not givea standard or a characterization by which courts may beable to appreciate the heinousness of a crime. I concedethat Congress was only too well aware of itsconstitutionally limited power. In deference thereto, itincluded a paragraph in the preambular or whereasclauses of RA 7659, as follows:

WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act areheinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which,by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness,atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to thecommon standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,civilized and ordered society.

In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearlyan insufficient definition

echegaray v. secretary of justice 301 scra 96

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