drafting stock purchase agreements: price, reps...
TRANSCRIPT
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Presenting a live 90-minute webinar with interactive Q&A
Drafting Stock Purchase Agreements: Price,
Reps, Warranties, Indemnification, Taxes,
Securities Laws and More
Today’s faculty features:
1pm Eastern | 12pm Central | 11am Mountain | 10am Pacific
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 2016
Allen Sparkman, Partner, Sparkman & Foote, Denver and Houston
Neal A. Jacobs, Managing Attorney and Principal, Jacobs Law Group, Philadelphia
Matthew A. Cole, Corporate Department Chair, Jacobs Law Group, Philadelphia
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Key Provisions in
Stock Purchase Agreements
Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs
Jacobs Law Group, PC
Strafford CLE Webinar-February 4, 2016
Drafting Stock Purchase Agreements
Key Provisions in Stock Purchase
Agreements
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC
A. Purchase Price
B. Representations and Warranties
C. Indemnification
D. Miscellaneous Key Provisions
6
Purchase Price – How calculated
Defining the amount of the purchase price:
1. Stated Purchase Price Amount: i.e., • $11,000,000
• $1.0 MM escrowed at signing to be released at
closing.
• $8.0 MM at closing.
• Or other staged releases
• $2.0 MM held in escrow to be released 2 years from
closing
• Subject to any set off or indemnity claims
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 7
Purchase Price – How calculated
2. Stated Purchase Price Amount with adjustments
for balance sheet items (working capital
adjustments): • Preliminary Purchase price established as of signing.
• Anticipated account balances as of the anticipated closing
date.
• Typically focused on working capital account balances
• Preliminary Purchase Price will be adjusted at closing
based on the actual closing date account balances.
• Risks are allocated to Seller
• Price paid may go up or down depending on whether
projected account balances are hit on the closing date
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 8
Purchase Price – How calculated
Defining the amount of the purchase price:
3. Stated Purchase Price Amount based on last
audited statements:
• Pricing locked-in on signing.
• Buyer has risk of leakage, losses in account
balances reflected as of closing date.
• Buyer has the benefit of income and cash flow
from the date of signing.
4. Stated Amount with adjustment for performance
based earn-outs
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 9
Purchase Price – How calculated
4. Stated Amount with adjustment for performance
based Earn-outs. • Earn-Out creates a variable purchase price component
• Only paid if various performance metrics are met
• Seller is given incentive to ensure the success of the Buyer’s acquisition
and operation of the acquired entity.
• Accounting terminology can be key:
• The Metrics -- Financial versus Non-Financial
•Financial:
•EBITDA
•Gross Revenue
•Net Revenue
•Net Income
•Gross Profit
•Net Profit
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC
Accounting Terminology:
•Cash Accounting
•Accrual
•Accounting
•Tax Accounting
•GAAP
•Other
•Income recognition
formulas
10
Purchase Price – How calculated
4. Earn-outs (Cont’d). Metrics (Cont’d):
Non-Financial:
•Product Development
•Prototype to Beta
•Beta to Commercial
•Regulatory approval
•FDA
•FCC
•EPA
•Etc.
•Expansion to New Territories
•Quality Measures
•Other Measures (opening of mine, start of production, etc.)
• Earn Outs are typically about 20% of the overall Purchase Price.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 11
Purchase Price – What Type of
Consideration?
1. Cash
2. Promissory Note
3. Buyer Stock
4. Combination of two or more of the above
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 12
Purchase Price – Cash
•“Cash in Hand is the Noblest Work of God” Anonymous Lawyer:
•“Show me the money” Rod Tidwell to Jerry Maguire”
Jerry Maguire 1996
•Sellers typically want cash. •Seller is immediately giving up control and wants an immediate
compensatory amount in exchange for doing so.
•Typically require the buyer to pay by wire transfer or
cashiers/bank/certified check. •Note that wire transfers in the late afternoon, on Fridays and on the last or first business
day of the month sometimes do not arrive that day. This should be considered when
scheduling a closing.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 13
Purchase Price – Promissory Note
• Why a promissory note? • Sometimes a note is used due to tight credit markets
• Difficulty in obtaining acquisition financing
• Buyer may have cash flow issues,
• Possible need for funds above the escrow to use for anticipated indemnity claims
(set off against the installment payments under the promissory note).
• Considerations: • Existing bank debt
• Acquisition financing
• Subordination
• Personal guaranties
• Percentage of deal locked up in Promissory Note
• Acceleration provisions
• Is note negotiable or non-negotiable
• Pledges of collateral, assets and/or stock
• Default terms
• Enforcement rights. Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs
Law Group, PC 14
Purchase Price – Promissory Note
(Cont’d.)
• Default and enforcement can prevent unique challenges:
• If a default in payment, does the seller have the right to
step back in as an owner; a right to manage the
company; impact on company, employees and creditors.
• Guaranties by individuals or parent entities that are
owners of the buyer may be requested as well.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 15
Purchase Price – Buyer Stock or
Other Equity Securities
• The buyer’s use of stock for all or part of the purchase
price usually only occurs if the buyer is a public
company.
• With public company stock as deal currency, the seller
has a ready means of determining value and liquidity
because of the ability to sell the shares on the open
market.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 16
Purchase Price – Buyer Stock or
Other Equity Securities (Cont’d.)
• There are many complexities to using buyer stock as part
of the purchase price for both buyer and seller,
particularly complying with securities laws and
determining what type of liquidity the buyer is willing to
provide the seller for the shares. For example, if the
buyer is not willing to register the shares with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the seller may not
be able to sell the shares quickly even though the buyer
has a public market for its shares generally.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 17
Combinations of Purchase Price
Consideration
• The most often seen combination for sales of privately-held
businesses is a combination of cash and promissory note. The
blend (and interest rate on the purchase price balance) may
be heavily negotiated, though common “down payments” at
closing on the purchase price are in the 10-30% range.
• For sellers to public companies, there may be a strong incentive
to avoid a purchase price solely in buyer stock. The reasons
for this range from:
• Uncertainty about the future stock price;
• Desire to diversify economic interest and reduce risk;
• To simply not wanting to be an investor in someone else’s business.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 18
Earn-outs
The Contingent Purchase Price
• An “earn-out” refers to contingent post-closing purchase price payments that are made if various targets are met by the acquired business.
• Buyers favor earn-outs. Sellers generally do not (or at least should strongly consider not accepting an earn-out unless they are in control of:
• means of achieving the earn-out post closing, for example:
• Sales;
• Production and delivery of product or service;
• Regulatory approval of product or service; and
• Company competitive offerings.
• the accounting policies and procedures used to track the achievement of the earn-out.
• Gross Revenue;
• Cost of Goods sold;
• SG &A;
• EBITDA; and
• Other financial metrics.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 19
Earn-outs –
The Contingent Purchase Price
• Whether a Seller should accept an earn-out depends on the
level of control post closing and the obligation on the Buyer to achieve the earn-out.
Reasonable efforts;
Reasonable commercial efforts;
Commercially reasonable efforts;
Diligent efforts;
Commercially reasonable and diligent efforts;
Good faith efforts;
Commercially reasonable best efforts;
Every effort; and
Best Efforts.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 20
Earn-outs – Why Have They Become More Popular in Recent
Years?
• Multi-decade trend towards transactions in the internet economy and/or service economy where businesses may not have significant track record of profits.
• These types of transactions may lead to a widening “Valuation Gap” between buyers and sellers.
• The wider the gap, between the parties’ views on value, the more likely the parties will head towards an earn-out as a gap filler.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 21
The Valuation Gap and Earn-outs
• Earn-outs seem to be a way for buyers and sellers to avoid the
difficult negotiations required to reach final agreement on a
purchase price. Avoidance comes at its own price: the
likelihood that disputes between seller and buyer will occur
later, post-closing.
• The Delaware Chancery Court has noted in a relatively recent
case that “since value is frequently debatable and the
causes of underperformance equally so, an earn-out often
converts today’s disagreement over price into tomorrow’s
litigation over the outcome.” Airborne Health, Inc. v. Squid
Soap, LP, 984 A.2d 126, 132 (Del. Ch. 2009).
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 22
Stock Purchase Agreement
Representations and Warranties
1. The meanings of the terms “representation” and
“warranty”
2. Who is making the representations and warranties?
3. What purpose do representations and warranties serve?
4. Some Representations and Warranties with Significant
Liability Exposure
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 23
Do “Representation” and “Warranty”
have the same meaning?
• Typically, stock purchase agreements refer to
“representations and warranties” interchangeably.
Sometimes, this is not a good practice as described below.
• However, there are some differences that are useful when
drafting buyer disclaimers and non-reliance provisions.
These provisions are usually requested by the seller, who
wants to limit the universe of representations and
warranties on which the buyer may claim reliance in
entering into the deal.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 24
The meaning of “Representation”
A statement from a party about certain facts regarding
the business or events that have occurred with respect to
a business as of a certain date. Usually, the date is the
signing of the stock purchase agreement and,
additionally, the date of a later closing.
Remember a representation is a statement of “a fact”.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 25
The meaning of “Warranty”
• This is essentially a guaranty regarding certain characteristics relevant to the business, such as regarding title to assets.
• The use of the term “warranty” in the business sale context is somewhat different, however, than the more commonly understood meaning of the term, such as a warranty of good working condition for an appliance for 1 year from the date of purchase.
• This is because a warranty in the business sale context, like a representation, is typically as of a certain date, and not typically a guaranty of a set of facts or characteristics over a period of time.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 26
Who makes the representations and
warranties?
• The seller provides many representations (and warranties) in a stock purchase agreement. The buyer provides relatively few, which is logical as the buyer needs to confirm many different facts regarding the existing business whether the parties structure the purchase as an asset sale or stock sale.
• If a significant portion of the purchase price is being paid by promissory note, the seller may ask the buyer for more representations and warranties than is customary in order to determine the financial soundness of the buyer in its role as a debtor to the seller.
• The concern here may be the solvency of the buyer and
• Potential claims for fraudulent conveyances or preferences
• Representations and warranties typically serve different purposes for the buyer and seller.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 27
The Purpose of Representations and
Warranties in Stock Purchase Agreements –
Buyer Perspective
• Negotiating the representations and warranties in a purchase agreement is part of the due diligence process for the buyer.
• Depending on the type of business, a buyer will want to review financial statements, accounts receivable and payable records, key customer and supplier contracts, tax returns and many other documents to form an opinion on whether the business is profitable and not burdened by major liabilities.
• As a supplement to this investigation, the buyer may want to ask for very broad representations and warranties about the seller’s business.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 28
The Purpose of Representations and
Warranties in Stock Purchase Agreements –
Seller Perspective
• The representations and warranties that a seller can obtain from a buyer are usually limited. The selling shareholders often not only own but also work actively in closely-held businesses, so the due diligence necessary or even desirable regarding the buyer will not be extensive.
• The typical representations a buyer may be willing to provide include that the buyer is validly formed and in good standing, the buyer has the power and authority to enter into the transaction, the buyer does not need another person’s consent to enter into the transaction, and that entering into the transaction will not cause the buyer to violate any agreement, judgment or governmental order.
• The seller will also provide these representations to the buyer, and will also provide numerous additional representations.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 29
Liability Issues for Some Key
Representations and Warranties
• Some Representations and Warranties in Stock Purchase Agreements that tend to have significant liability associated with them include:
i. Title to Shares
ii. Due Authorization
iii. Taxes
iv. Environmental
v. Employee Benefits
• We are focusing on seller representations and warranties because the seller makes far more representations and warranties to the buyer, and has far greater exposure if they are false, than does the buyer.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 30
Liability Issues for Some Key
Representations and Warranties (Cont'd.)
• Note that, unlike in an asset purchase agreement, some of these representations concern the corporation’s operations (Taxes, Environmental, and Employee Benefits) and others concern the state of facts about the shareholders themselves (Title to Shares, Due Authorization).
• One cannot take a “one-size-fits-all” approach to which representations and warranties may cause the most liability for sellers because some of those listed above do not even apply to all sellers.
• For example, a seller that is a multi-office executive search firm may have little likely exposure for environmental representations if the seller does not own the real property where its offices are located.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 31
Limiting Liability for Representations
and Warranties
There are many different ways for a seller to attempt to limit his liability for various representations and warranties. Below is a brief list of some of these techniques:
i. Knowledge Qualifiers - “To the knowledge of the selling shareholder, after reasonable inquiry . . . .”
ii. Materiality Qualifiers – These concern eliminating selling shareholder liability for representations and warranties that may be breached for reasons that are immaterial, e.g., a reasonably prudent buyer would not think that the breach was significant enough to require renegotiation of the price or other economic terms of the stock purchase.
iii. Quantitative Qualifiers – These set a bright line standard for whether a selling stockholder has breached a representation or warranty.
iv. Deductibles, Baskets, and Caps under Indemnification Provisions- discussed briefly below.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 32
Indemnification in Stock Purchase
Agreements
1. A Sample Basic Indemnification Provision
2. Indemnification Procedures
3. Introduction to Escrows and Set-Offs- Further Buyer
Protections
4. Introduction to Baskets and Caps- Limiting Seller
Indemnification Liability
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 33
A Sample Basic Indemnification By
Seller Provision
• “If Selling Shareholder breaches (or in the event any third
party alleges facts that, if true, would mean that Selling
Shareholder has breached) his representations,
warranties, and covenants contained in this Agreement,
Selling Shareholder will indemnify, hold harmless and
defend each Buyer Party from and against any Adverse
Consequences that any Buyer Party may suffer resulting
from, arising out of or caused by the breach or the
alleged breach.”
• We will now briefly analyze each of the highlighted terms
in this provision.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 34
Seller: the Likely Indemnitor
• Many agreements contain mutual indemnification
obligations, but the limited number of representations and
covenants of the buyer make the indemnification
obligation of the buyer far less valuable to the seller than
the indemnification obligations owed by the seller to the
buyer.
• Indemnification in stock purchase agreements usually is
concerned with breaches by the seller of its
representations, warranties, and covenants to the buyer.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 35
Selling Shareholders’ Representations,
Warranties and Covenants –
A Potentially Large Universe
• While there may seem to be a small universe of representations and warranties for which a selling stockholder could have liability (title to shares, due authorization, a few others), that often is far from the case in many stock purchase transactions.’
• A buyer often wants to understand the nature of the business underlying the stock being sold. Consequently, even if there is management other than the shareholders themselves, the shareholder will be asked to make representations and warranties about the business of the corporation itself.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 36
Selling Shareholders’ Representations,
Warranties and Covenants –
A Potentially Large Universe (Cont'd.)
• If the selling shareholders have significant bargaining power,
they may be able to avoid this. However, it is more likely that
the selling shareholders will be “on the hook” for many of the
representations about contracts, taxes, intellectual property
and other matters that would typically be the responsibility of
the corporation itself in an asset sale.
• Because of these circumstances, a selling shareholder’s
indemnification burden may be significantly greater than at
first glance would appear to be the case.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 37
Selling Shareholders’ Representations,
Warranties and Covenants –
The Materiality Scrape
Very pro-Buyer:
A Materiality Scrape provision excludes and disregards all materiality qualifiers contained in sellers reps and warranties.
Renders materiality a nullity.
Thus any violation is a breach.
Example: “For purposes of this Article 12 [indemnification article], any inaccuracy in or breach of any representation or warranty made by the Seller in this Agreement shall be determined without regard to any materiality, Material Adverse Effect or other similar qualification contained in or otherwise applicable to such representation and warranty.”
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 38
Indemnification for a Contract Party’s
Acts – a Necessity?
• One issue to consider is whether a seller should be required to indemnify the buyer against claims the buyer has against the seller itself (as opposed to buyer indemnification rights for third party claims involving a seller’s breach of representations/warranties or covenants).
• This argument is that the buyer has a contract claim against the seller for breaches of the contract, so why do they also need indemnification? While there may be some sound principles in a seller making this point, most buyers will reject it and want the comfort of indemnification.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 39
What does “to indemnify” mean?
A leading commentator on drafting contracts, Kenneth
Adams, has cited a Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition:
1. “To reimburse (another) for a loss suffered because of
a third party’s or one’s own act or default. . . . “
Adams, Kenneth A. A Manual of Style for Contract
Drafting, 2nd ed., Section 12.131.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 40
Do not forget “Defend”
(if you are the indemnitee)
• Most indemnification provisions contain the introductory clause “Seller hereby
indemnifies, holds harmless and will defend” or some variation of these words.
• The “defend” magic word is very important, because it is shorthand that the buyer will
not only be reimbursed for losses from a seller breach of its
representations/covenants, but also that the seller will defend the buyer against
litigation.
• As Kenneth Adams notes, however, it is best to provide for this in more detail in a
provision regarding defense procedures so what was intended by the parties is as
clear as possible: “[y]ou’d be better off omitting it [the word ‘defend’] and instead
addressing in the provisions governing indemnification procedures how defense of
nonparty claims is to be handled.” Adams at Section 12.147.
• Despite Adams’ suggestion, we would not advise removing the word “defend” from
the introductory clause as, even if it seems redundant when a detailed indemnification
procedure exists in the agreement, it unambiguously signals to anyone trying to
interpret the indemnification provision what was intended by the parties at the
beginning of the indemnification section.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 41
“Buyer Party” Term
• Attorneys need to think carefully about who is entitled to
indemnification.
• A Buyer will argue for anyone potentially related to
Buyer having the right to be indemnified for Seller’s
breaches and the consequences flowing from the breach.
• The Seller needs to consider how much including everyone
in the Buyer’s world could potentially significantly increase
not only total indemnification exposure, but the number of
indemnification claims that may be made.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 42
“Adverse Consequences” Term
• This is an exceptionally buyer-favorable definition because it
covers all aspects of loss or damage, including attorney’s fees,
that the Buyer Parties may incur in connection with a Seller
breach.
• Sellers may want to try to place some limits on the breadth of
this definition, or at least consider this definition’s expansive
coverage, in light of any baskets or caps that Seller is able to
negotiate (as discussed below) to limit Seller’s overall
indemnification liability.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 43
Drafting Indemnification Procedures
• As noted above, this provision covers the defense of
indemnification claims by the indemnitor (the Seller for our
discussion).
• These procedures can involve a fair amount of negotiation,
including how quickly indemnification claims must be made to
the Seller, who chooses counsel for the related legal work, who
pays for counsel (again, it is best to be clear that the Seller is
required to defend the Buyer Parties), and rights of the Seller
to settle different types of claims (monetary, equitable,
contract versus tort, for example).
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 44
Set-Offs of Purchase Price
Promissory Notes
• As is common, a Buyer will pay a portion of the purchase price
in a promissory note. One way for the buyer to quickly be
“reimbursed” for an indemnification claim and related
expenses is to permit the buyer a right of set off under that
note. This would reduce the balance of the purchase price
(and the accruing interest) that Buyer must pay Seller.
• Sellers often resist this because, while it is not money out of
pocket, it may encourage Buyer indemnification claims because
it is such an easy remedy for Buyer to use.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 45
Escrows of a Portion of the
Purchase Price
• This is another heavily negotiated concept. Particularly for
potentially large liabilities discovered in due diligence such as taxes
and environmental matters, a Buyer may insist that a portion of the
purchase price be escrowed for a period of time.
• The Seller will resist this, especially if it is for a large percentage of
the total purchase price and for a lengthy time period. One way to
mitigate the harshness of an escrow is for it to “burn-off” and be
paid the Seller in installments, either after certain events occur or
based on the lapse of time periods.
• One issue both parties must carefully consider is who will serve as
escrow agent. It has become less desirable for the attorneys for one
party to serve as escrow agent than it has in the past, so a true third
party, such as a bank, may need to be retained.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 46
Baskets and Caps- Limiting Seller
Liability
• A “basket” refers to the threshold dollar value of
indemnification claims that must be made before a Buyer can
actually obtain payment (or set-off) from Seller.
• The purpose of baskets is to prevent Buyers from making
repeated claim for a few thousand dollars that need to be
addressed, a time-consuming and possibly costly process for
Seller. In effect, the amount below the “basket” threshold is a
deductible.
• For example, if Buyer is purchasing a Selling Shareholder’s
stock for $2,000,000, the parties may agree to an
indemnification “basket” that Buyer may not submit
indemnification claims to Seller unless they total in excess of
$75,000. Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 47
Baskets and Caps- Limiting Seller
Liability (Cont’d.)
• Once the Buyer exceeds this threshold, the parties will need to
provide for whether the Buyer’s claims are from the first dollar or
whether the $75,000 is a true deductible, meaning that the Buyer
can only make indemnification claims, and be paid for them, for
amounts exceeding $75,000.
• The parties may negotiate different baskets and deductibles
depending on the type of claim. (e.g., tax versus employee benefits)
• A cap is another tool by which Seller’s limit their indemnification
liability. This allows the Seller to have a pre-determined maximum
liability amount for all indemnification claims, third party or direct,
of Buyer. There may be multiple caps or even sub-caps, depending
on the type of indemnification claim made.
Copyright 2016, Matthew A. Cole and Neal A. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Group, PC 48
Stafford Webinar
February 4, 2016
Drafting Stock Purchase Agreements
Allen Sparkman
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP
1616 17th St., Ste. 564 P.O. Box 609
Denver, CO 80202 Houston, TX 77204
303.396.0230 (voice) 713.401.2922 (voice)
303.748.8173 (cell) 713.859.7957 (cell)
1.720.600.6771 (fax) 1.218.783.6986 (fax)
[email protected] www.sparkmanfoote.com
Stock Purchase Agreements—Representations
and Warranties—Sandbagging
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 50
Assume Seller represents that Seller has $10,000,000 of
product in inventory. In the course of due diligence, Buyer
learns that Seller’s inventory is actually only $8,000,000.
Will Buyer nevertheless be permitted to recover on a claim
that Seller has breached this representation?
Stock Purchase Agreements—Representations
and Warranties—Sandbagging
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 51
This will depend on whether their agreement
contains or does not contain an anti-sand-
bagging provision and what law applies.
Stock Purchase Agreements—Representations
and Warranties—Sandbagging
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 52
The Private Target Mergers and Acquisitions
Deal Points Study (M&A Committee, ABA
BLS) reports that 41% of the deals it
reviewed included a provision permitting
sandbagging, that 10% included a
prohibition and that 49% were silent.
Stock Purchase Agreements—Representations
and Warranties—Sandbagging
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 53
If the agreement is silent, the law of some states, e.g.,
Colorado, would say that Buyer could not recover because,
knowing before closing of Seller’s misrepresentation, Buyer
could not have relied on Janie’s representation. Associates
of San Lazaro v. San Lazaro Park Properties, 864 P.2nd
111 (Colo. 1993) (Buyer discovered inaccuracies due to its
own independent investigation after signing and
consequently did not rely on the seller’s information at
closing and thus waived its warranty claim).
Stock Purchase Agreements—Representations
and Warranties—Sandbagging
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 54
Delaware courts hold that the warranties and
representations in a purchase and sale agreement serve
an important risk allocation function and that, accordingly, a
seller’s breach of its representations and warranties
constitutes a breach of contract and does not require the
buyer to demonstrate reliance. Universal Enterprise
Group, L.P. v. Duncan Petroleum Corporation, (Case No.
4948-VCL, Del. Ch. 2013).
Stock Purchase Agreements—Representations
and Warranties—Sandbagging
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 55
State law treatment of sandbagging claims depends on
whether the state treats breach of a representation or
warranty as a tort or as a breach of contract. See generally,
Charles K. Whitehead, “Sandbagging: Default Rules and
Acquisition Agreements”, 36 Del. J. Corp. L. 1081 (2011).
Tax Benefitting Claims
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 56
Buyers should resist seller requests to
“tax-benefit” any claims paid by the
seller to the Buyer.
Tax Benefitting Claims
A common ploy by Sellers is to assert that if the Seller has to pay a claim made
by the Buyer, the Seller’s payment should be reduced by the tax benefit the
Buyer receives from the payment. The Private Target Mergers and
Acquisitions Deal Points Study (hereafter, “Deal Points Study”) reports that
52% of deals provided for a reduction in the Seller’s liability for the tax benefit
to the Buyer. Moreover, according to the Deal Points Study, 44% of deals
included an express requirement that the Buyer mitigate losses. A mitigation
requirement may well include an obligation to maximize tax benefits. A
representative purchase and sale agreement contained this simple provision:
“For purposes of this Agreement, any determination of Losses shall be reduced
by any Tax Benefits actually received by the Indemnified Party.” An obligation
on the part of the Buyer to take tax benefits into account raises several
questions.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 57
Tax Benefitting Claims
The Seller’s tax benefit argument is basically that it is unfair to the Seller to
allow the Buyer to receive a gross indemnification payment and also to be able
to enjoy the tax benefit arising from the circumstances upon which the Buyer’s
indemnification claims are based. For example, if the Seller has represented
that there are no closing date liabilities other than those disclosed, but it is later
discovered that there was an undisclosed pre-closing payable of $1,000, the
Buyer would have a breach of representation claim for $1,000, If the Seller
paid the Buyer a $1,000 indemnification payment because of this claim, the
Seller argues that the Buyer could also claim an expense deduction on its
income tax return with respect to this pre-closing liability that would save the
Buyer (at the 35% rate) $350 of federal income tax.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 58
Tax Benefitting Claims
The problems include that the Buyer most likely will not be able to deduct its
payment but, instead, will have to include it as a capital cost of purchasing the
Seller’s assets or equity. There are some provisions in the regulations under
IRC § 461 that appear to allow a buyer to deduct a liability where the target
sells buyer a trade or business and, as part of the sale, buyer “expressly
assumes” a liability described in IRC § 461(h), but it appears unlikely that a
buyer would be considered to have “expressly assumed” the liability it pays
because of the seller’s misrepresentation. Another significant problem is what
happens if a dispute arises between the Buyer and Seller with respect to
whether the Buyer realized a tax benefit and, if so, how much. Will the Seller
be permitted to examine the Buyer’s income tax returns? Will the Seller be
able to require the Buyer to take a position on its tax return that may
disadvantage the Buyer in some way?
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 59
Overview of Tax Considerations
A fundamental issue is whether the parties wish to structure the transaction as
one that will be wholly or partially tax-free:
Acquisition for all cash or partly cash and debt will be taxable. Sellers ordinarily will have long-term capital gain except for recapture items.
Buyer will obtain cost basis in stock or assets acquired.
Special considerations if stock of S corporation is acquired.
Acquisition for Buyer’s stock may be tax-free.
Incorporation on eve of acquisition to attempt to have tax-free treatment.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 60
Overview of Tax Considerations
Taxable acquisition Buyer will ordinarily want to acquire assets
Tax basis in assets rather than acquired stock
Avoidance of seller liabilities
Seller of course will ordinarily prefer sale of stock.
Combination of taxable acquisition and tax-free incorporation As an inducement to senior owners/management, the buyer may arrange an opportunity for
such persons to participate in the formation of an affiliate of the buyer in a transaction that is
intended to be tax-free under IRC § 351.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 61
Tax-Free Reorganizations
Of the 8 different types of tax-free reorganizations (Section 368 of the Internal Revenue Code), the most common are:
Type A reorganization (incl. statutory direct merger or consolidation; forward and triangular mergers)
Type B reorganization (stock-for-stock acquisition)
Type C reorganization (stock-for-assets acquisition)
Type D divisive reorganization (spin-offs, split-offs, and split-ups)
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 62
TAX-FREE REORGANIZATIONS
Four conditions must be met:
Continuity of ownership interest (usually satisfied if
purchase price at least 50% acquirer stock) (may
be as low as 40% in some circumstances)
Continuity of business enterprise (“substantially all
requirement” usually satisfied if buyer acquires at
least 70% and 90% of FMV of target gross and net
assets)
Valid business purpose (other than tax avoidance)
Step transaction doctrine (must not be part of larger
plan that would have resulted in a taxable
transaction)
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 63
Type A Reorganization
To qualify as a Type A reorganization, transaction must be a statutory merger or consolidation; forward or reverse triangular merger
No limits on composition of purchase price (except in reverse triangular merger)
No requirement to use acquirer voting stock (except in reverse triangular merger)
At least 50% of the purchase price must be in acquirer stock
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 64
Type A Reorganization (cont.)
Advantages:
Acquirer can issue non-voting stock to target shareholders without diluting its control over the combined companies
Acquirer may choose not to acquire all of the target’s assets
Allows use of more cash in purchase price than Types B and C reorganizations
Disadvantages:
Acquirer assumes all undisclosed liabilities
Requires acquirer shareholder approval if new shares are to be issued or number of new shares exceeds 20% of the firm’s shares traded on public exchanges.
Limitations of asset dispositions within two years of closing
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 65
Purpose: To ensure that subsidiary mergers do not resemble sales, making them taxable events
Continuity of interests: A substantial portion of the purchase price must consist of acquirer stock to ensure target firm shareholders have a significant ownership position in the combined companies
Continuity of business enterprise: The buyer must either continue the acquired firm’s “historic business enterprise” or buy “substantially all” of the target’s “historic business assets” in the combined companies. Continued involvement intended to demonstrate long-term commitment by acquiring company to the target.
1These principles are intended to discourage acquirers from buying a target in a tax free transaction and immediately selling the target’s assets, which would reflect the acquirer’s higher basis in the assets possibly avoiding any tax liability when sold.
Continuity of Interests and Business Enterprise Principles1
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 66
Direct Statutory Merger (“A”
Reorganization)
Acquiring Firm
Target Firm (
(assets and liabilities merged
with acquirer)
Target Shareholders
(Receive voting or
nonvoting acquirer stock
in exchange for target stock
and boot)
Assets &
Liabilities
Acquirer Stock &
Boot
Target Stock
Contracts may need to be assigned or transferred. Under some state laws, e.g. C.R.S § 7-90-204, a merger does
not constitute a conveyance, transfer, or assigment. Remaining target assets/liabilities assumed by acquirer;
acquirer & target shareholder approval required in most states; dissenting shareholders may have appraisal rights.
No asset write-up. Target’s tax attributes transfer to acquirer but are limited by Section 382 and 383 of Internal
Revenue Code (IRC). SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 67
Statutory Consolidation (“A” Reorganization)
Company A
(Contributes assets &
liabilities to Newco)
Company B
(Contributes assets &
Liabilities to Newco)
Company A
Shareholders
Company B
Shareholders
New Company
(Newco)
Assets/Liabilities
Newco Stock
Comment same as Slide 20.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 68
Forward Triangular Merger (“A” Reorganization)
Acquiring Company
Subsidiary (Shell created by parent and funded by parent’s cash or stock)
Target Firm (Merges assets
and liabilities with the parent’s wholly-owned
subsidiary)
Target Shareholders (Receive voting or nonvoting stock held by parent’s wholly
owned subsidiary in exchange for target stock)
Parent’s Stock & Boot
Target Assets and Liabilities
Subsidiary’s Stock
Parent’s Stock/Cash
“Substantially all” and “continuity of interests” requirements apply. Flexible form of payment. Avoids transfer taxes and may insulate parent from target liabilities and eliminate acquirer shareholder approval unless required by stock exchange or new shares issued exceed 20% of acquirer’s outstanding shares. No asset writeup. Target tax attributes transfer but subject to limitation. Target shareholder approval required. However, as target eliminated, nontransferable assets and contracts may be lost.
Target Stock
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 69
Reverse Triangular Merger (“A” Reorganization)
Acquiring Company
Subsidiary (Shell created by parent and funded by
parent’s voting stock merged into target firm)
Target Firm (Receives assets and liabilities of acquiring
firm’s wholly owned subsidiary)
Target Shareholders (Receive parent’s voting stock
held by parent’s wholly owned subsidiary in
exchange for target stock)
Parent’s Stock & Boot
Subsidiary’s Assets and Liabilities
Subsidiary’s Stock
Parent’s Voting Stock
Target survives as acquirer subsidiary. Target tax attributes and intellectual property and contracts transfer automatically; may insulate acquirer from target
liabilities and avoid acquirer shareholder approval. At least 80% of purchase price must be in acquirer voting shares. No asset writeup. Acquirer must buy
“substantially all” of the FMV of the target’s assets and target tax attributes transfer subject to limitation.
Target Stock
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 70
Type “B” Stock for Stock Reorganization
To qualify as a Type B Reorganization, acquirer must use only
voting stock to purchase at least 80% of the target’s voting stock and at least 80% of the target’s non-voting stock
Cash may be paid in lieu of fractional shares
Acquirer may pay expenses of target if creditor paid directly.
Used mainly as an alternative to a merger or consolidation
Advantages:
Target may be maintained as an independent operating subsidiary or merged into the parent
Stock may be purchased over a 12 month period allowing for a phasing of the transaction (i.e., “creeping acquisition”)
Disadvantages:
Lack of flexibility in determining composition of purchase price
Potential dilution of acquirer’s current shareholders’ ownership interest
May have minority shareholders if all target shareholders do not tender their shares
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 71
Type “B” Stock for Stock Reorganization
Acquiring Firm
(Exchanges voting
shares for at least 80%
of target voting & non-
Voting shares”)
Target Shareholders
Wholly-Owned
Shell Subsidiary
Target Firm
(Merged into acquiring
firm’s subsidiary)
Target Stock
Acquirer Voting Stock
(No Boot)
Buyer need not acquire 100% of target shares, shares may be required over time, and may insulate acquirer from
target liabilities. May insulate parent from target’s liabilities and tax attributes transfer subject to limitation. Suitable
for target shareholders with large capital gains and therefore willing to accept acquirer shares to avoid capital
gains taxes triggered in a stock for cash sale.
Target Assets
and Liabilities
Shell
Stock
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 72
Type “C” Stock for Assets Reorganization
To qualify as a Type C reorganization, acquirer must purchase 70% and 90% of the fair market value of the target’s gross and net assets, respectively.
The acquirer must use only voting stock
Boot cannot exceed 20% of FMV of target’s pre-transaction assets (value of any assumed liabilities deducted from boot)1
The target must dissolve following closing and distribute the acquirer’s stock to the target’s shareholders for their canceled target stock
Advantages:
Acquirer need not assume any undisclosed liabilities
Acquirer can purchase selected assets
Disadvantages:
Technically more difficult than a merger because all of the assets must be conveyed
Transfer taxes must be paid
Need to obtain consents to assignment on contracts
Requirement to use only voting stock potentially resulting in dilution of the acquirer shareholders’ ownership interest
1Value of assumed liabilities viewed as part of purchase price.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 73
Type “C” Stock for Assets
Reorganization Acquiring Firm
(Exchanges voting shares
for at least 80% of FMV of
Target assets)
Target Firm
(Liquidates and transfers
Acquiring Firm shares and
any remaining assets
to shareholders)
Target Shareholders
Acquirer Voting
Stock & Boot
Target Assets
Acquirer Voting
Stock & Boot
Enables buyer to be selective in choosing assets and any liabilities, if at all, it chooses to assume. Avoids
transfer taxes, requires consents to assignment, and potentially dilutive to acquirer shareholders. No asset
writeup. Tax attributes transfer to acquirer subject to limitation.
Target
Cancelled
Stock
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 74
Type D Divisive Reorganizations
Type D Divisive Reorganizations apply to spin-offs, split-ups, and
split-offs
Spin-Off: Stock in a new company is distributed to the original
company’s shareholders according to some pre-determined formula.
Both the parent and the entity to be spun-off must have been in
business for at least five years prior to the spin-off.
Split-off: A portion of the original company is separated from the
parent, and shareholders in the original company may exchange
their shares for shares in the new entity. No new firm created.
Split-up: The original company ceases to exist, and one or more
new companies are formed from the original business as original
shareholders exchange their shares for shares in the new
companies.
For these reorganizations to qualify as tax-free, the distribution of
shares must not be for the purpose of tax avoidance. SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 75
Implications of Tax Considerations for Deal Structuring
In taxable transactions, target generally demands a higher purchase price
Higher purchase price often impacts form of payment as buyer tries to maintain PV of transaction by deferring some of purchase price
Buyer may avoid EPS dilution by buying target stock or assets using a non-equity form of payment in a taxable transaction
If buyer wants to preserve cash and obtain target’s tax credits, buyer may use its stock to purchase target stock in a non-taxable transaction
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 76
Purpose: To ensure that subsidiary mergers do not resemble sales, making them taxable events
Continuity of interests: A substantial portion of the purchase price must consist of acquirer stock to ensure target firm shareholders have a significant ownership position in the combined companies
Continuity of business enterprise: The buyer must either continue the acquired firm’s “historic business enterprise” or buy “substantially all” of the target’s “historic business assets” in the combined companies. Continued involvement intended to demonstrate long-term commitment by acquiring company to the target.
1These principles are intended to discourage acquirers from buying a target in a tax free transaction and immediately selling the target’s assets, which would
reflect the acquirer’s higher basis in the assets possibly avoiding any tax liability when sold.
Continuity of Interests and Business Enterprise Principles1
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 77
Acquiring (Transferee)
Corporation
No gain/loss recognized when it receives
assets in tax-free reorganization
Carryover basis of qualifying property
Gain recognized lesser of gain realized or
FMV of nonqualified property received
Carryover holding period
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 78
Shareholders & Security
Holders
(1 of 2)
No gain/loss on stock or securities
received if exchanged solely for stock or
securities as part of reorganization plan
Gain recognized lesser of gain realized or
cash plus FMV of other property received
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 79
Shareholders & Security
Holders
(2 of 2)
Basis of stocks & securities received
Adjusted basis in stocks & securities given
up
+ Gain recognized on the exchange
- Money & FMV of other property received
= Basis of nonrecognition property received
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 80
Divisive Reorganizations
Part of corporation’s assets transferred to
a second corporation which is owned by
either the original corporation or its
shareholders
Divisive D reorganizations
Split-off
Spin-off
Split-up
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 81
Split-off
Corporation transfers assets to a
controlled subsidiary in exchange for
subsidiary’s stock
Subsidiary’s stock then transferred to one
or more shareholders in exchange for
parent corporation stock
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 82
Spin-off
Corporation transfers assets to subsidiary
in exchange for subsidiary’s stock
Parent distributes subsidiary’s stock to all
parent shareholders on a pro rata basis
Parent receives nothing in exchange for
distribution of subsidiary stock
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 83
Split-up
Existing corporation transfers all assets to
two or more new controlled subsidiaries in
exchange for subsidiaries’ stock
Parent distributes all stock of each
subsidiary to existing shareholders in
exchange for all outstanding parent stock
and liquidates
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 84
Judicial Restrictions on
Reorganizations (1 of 2)
If judicial restrictions are not met,
reorganization loses its tax-free status
Continuity of proprietary interest
Old owners must continue ownership
Continuity of business enterprise
Old assets must be used in new business
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 85
Judicial Restrictions on
Reorganizations (2 of 2)
Business purpose
Valid business purpose for transaction
Step transaction doctrine
IRS may collapse series of independent
transactions if all part of same plan
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 86
Tax Attributes
Tax attributes follow assets
NOLs, capital losses, E&P, general business
credit, inventory methods
Acquiring corporation obtains control of
both assets & attributes in A, C, and
acquisitive D reorganizations
Asset ownership does not change in B
reorganizations
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 87
Limitation on Use of Tax
Attributes (1 of 2)
§§382 & 269 prevent assets or stock
purchases if primary purpose is obtaining
loss carryovers
§§382 & 269 also prevent a loss
corporation from purchasing a profitable
corporation if primary purpose is using its
existing losses
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 88
Limitation on Use of Tax
Attributes (2 of 2)
§383 restricts tax credit and capital loss carryovers if
§382 applies
Restrictions similar to NOLs
§384 prevents pre-acquisition losses of either acquiring
or target corporation (loss corporation) from offsetting
built-in gain recognized during 5 yrs after acquisition by
another corporation (gain corporation).
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 89
Incorporation on Eve of
Acquisition ( 1 of 22)
Only corporations may engage in tax-free
reorganizations under IRC § 368.
A target LLC may want to incorporate to
be able to engage in a tax-free
reorganization.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 90
Incorporation on Eve of
Acquisition ( 2 of 22) Incorporation of an LLC ordinarily will be
tax-free under IRC § 351.
IRC § 351 requires, inter alia, that “[n]o
gain or loss shall be recognized if property
is transferred to a corporation by one or
more persons solely in exchange for stock
in such corporation and immediately after
the exchange such person or persons are
in control . . . of the corporation.” SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 91
Incorporation on Eve of
Acquisition ( 3 of 22)
Section 351 defines “control” as the
ownership of stock possessing at least 80
percent of the total combined voting power
of all classes of stock entitled to vote and
at least 80 percent of the total number of
shares of all other classes of stock of the
corporation.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 92
Incorporation on Eve of
Acquisition ( 4 of 22)
Incorporations on the eve of a stock swap or initial
offering may raise questions under the step-transaction
doctrine regarding whether the incorporators had control
“immediately after” the incorporation. If an LLC converts
to a corporation, it will be treated for federal income tax
purposes as a transfer of all the assets of the LLC to the
corporation in exchange for the stock of the corporation,
followed by liquidation of the LLC and distribution of the
stock to its members.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 93
Incorporation on Eve of
Acquisition ( 5 of 22)
If the members of an LLC enter into a
stock exchange agreement with another
corporation after converting the LLC to a
corporation, the IRS may seek to treat the
transaction as a taxable exchange of the
acquirer’s stock for LLC interests by
invoking the step transaction or substance
over form doctrines.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 94
Incorporation on Eve of
Acquisition ( 6 of 22)
In such a case, the IRS would assert that
the LLC members did not actually acquire
control of the corporation formed by
converting the LLC to a corporation, but
rather never had control because they
received the stock of the resulting
corporation as part of a pre-conceived
plan to transfer the stock in the stock
exchange with the public acquiring
corporation. SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 95
Incorporation on Eve of
Acquisition ( 7 of 22)
S. Klien on the Square, Inc. v. Comm’r, 188 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 824 (1951); Hazeltine Corp. v. Comm’r, 89
F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1937); Intermountain Lumber Co. v. Comm’r, 65
T.C. 1025 (1976); Rev. Rul. 1979-194, 1979-1 C.B. 145; Rev. Rul.
1979-70, 1979-1 C.B. 144; Rev. Rul. 1970-522, 1970-2 C.B. 81; see
also, e.g., Abegg v. Comm’r, 429 F.2d 1209; King Enters., Inc. v.
Comm’r, 418 F.2d 511 (Ct. Cl. 1969); McDonald’s Rests. of Illinois,
Inc. v. Comm’r, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982); Rev. Rul. 2001-26,
2001-1 C.B. 1297 (all applying step transaction principles to a series
of events taking place over several months).
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 96
Incorporation on Eve of
Acquisition ( 8 of 22)
The regulations under § 368 take seriously
the business-purpose requirement. Treas.
Reg. § 1.368-1(b) states that the
reorganization provisions are concerned
with “readjustments of corporate structures
. . . required by business exigencies.”
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 97
Incorporation on Eve of
Acquisition ( 9 of 22)
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(c) provides that a
scheme that involves an abrupt departure
from normal reorganization procedure in
connection with a transaction on which the
imposition of a tax is imminent is not a
plan of reorganization.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 98
Incorporation on Eve of
Acquisition ( 10 of 22)
This would include a transaction where the
corporate reorganization was considered a
disguise for concealing its real character,
where the object and accomplishment is
the consummation of a preconceived plan
having no business or corporate purpose
other than tax avoidance.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 99
Incorporation on Eve of
Acquisition ( 11 of 22)
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(g), which
states that the transactions must be
“undertaken for reasons germane to the
continuance of the business of a
corporation,” and that the statute
“contemplates genuine corporate
reorganizations which are designed to
effect a readjustment of continuing
interests under modified corporate forms.”
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 100
Incorporation on Eve of
Acquisition ( 12 of 22)
To make an LLC reorganization as a corporation
work, the conversion to the corporate form must
be done before an agreement is reached about
the sale; the corporation’s existence should be
at least somewhat “old and cold.” The
conversion of the partnership or LLC to a
corporation should not be completed on the eve
of entering into the stock exchange agreement.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 101
Incorporation on Eve of
Acquisition ( 13 of 22)
In Weikel v. Commissioner, 51 TCM 432
(1986), a taxpayer transferred a patent he
owned personally to a newly formed
corporation, Dispersalloy, Inc., and then
four months later entered into an
Agreement and Plan of Reorganization for
a share-for-share exchange (similar to a
type B reorganization).
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 102
Incorporation on Eve of
Acquisition ( 14 of 22)
The Tax Court held that the taxpayer had
a substantial business purpose for the
formation of Dispersalloy, Inc. and the
transfer of his patent to it in September
1973. In this case, the taxpayer was in
negotiations with Johnson & Johnson at
the time of formation of his corporation. He
was also talking to other potential
acquirers at the time. SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 103
Incorporation on Eve of
Acquisition ( 15 of 22)
Perhaps most importantly for the
determination of a “business purpose,” the
taxpayer’s attorney had advised him that
he should incorporate whether or not he
did a deal with Johnson & Johnson since:
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 104
Incorporation on Eve of
Acquisition ( 16 of 22)
It was clear that any acquirer would want
to structure an acquisition of the
taxpayer’s business so that it could be
treated as a pooling of interests; and
It made sense to incorporate because the
taxpayer’s business was beginning to
generate profits.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 105
Incorporation on Eve of
Acquisition ( 17 of 22)
In objecting to the non-recognition of gain
on the appreciated asset (the patent), the
IRS relied on West Coast Marketing Corp. v.
Commissioner, 46 T.C. 32 (1966), and Rev.
Rul. 1970-140, 1970-1 C.B. 73. The court in
Weikel distinguished West Coast Marketing
on the grounds that:
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 106
Incorporation on Eve of
Acquisition ( 18 of 22)
1) The taxpayer in West Coast Marketing
transferred real estate to a new
corporation solely to facilitate a transfer to
an unrelated corporation;
2) All of the detail of the transfer to the
acquiring corporation had been agreed on
at the time of the transfer; and
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 107
Incorporation on Eve of
Acquisition ( 19 of 22)
3) The taxpayer’s corporation was
liquidated soon after the acquisition.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 108
Incorporation on Eve of
Acquisition ( 20 of 22)
Likewise, the court distinguished Rev. Rul.
1970-140 on the basis that the taxpayer in
the ruling had already agreed to transfer
the stock of the new corporation before the
taxpayer incorporated it and transferred
property to it. In both cases, the new
corporation was not “old and cold” before
the transaction was finalized.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 109
Incorporation on Eve of
Acquisition ( 21 of 22)
Weikel illustrates the importance of
establishing a business purpose for the
incorporation of the LLC apart from the
potential acquisition and incorporating the
LLC before there is a binding agreement
to dispose of the shares received by the
members.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 110
Incorporation on Eve of
Acquisition ( 22 of 22)
Interestingly, in a case arising out of the
same transaction that was held in
abeyance pending the decision in Weikel,
Johnson & Johnson argued that its
acquisition of Dispersalloy should be
treated as a taxable purchase. Johnson &
Johnson wanted a cost basis.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 111
Corporate Inversions The basic concept of an inversion is a
transaction in which a United States parent
becomes a subsidiary of a new foreign
parent corporation (“NFP”).
If done alone under NFP, it is a “self-inversion”
If done in connection with a target (typically
foreign), it is a combination migration
transaction
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 112
Corporate Inversions
Inversions offer four main areas of
potential tax benefits: Future foreign expansion under NFP outside of U.S. tax “net.”
Tax efficient leverage on the group’s U.S. operations.
Restructuring of foreign legacy operations owned by the U.S.
group.
Better access to offshore cash for NFP dividends, share
buybacks, etc.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 113
Corporate Inversions
The IRS issued regulations under IRC §
367 in the mid 1990’s that require in self-
inversions and other combination
transactions that the U.S. shareholders of
the U.S. parent recognize gain (but not
loss) on the exchange of their U.S. parent
stock for stock of NFP.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 114
Corporate Inversions
In 2004, Congress added section 7874 to
the IRC to limit inversion transactions
(mostly self inversions) not at the
shareholder level with a tax (although
those rules were retained) but at the NFP
level (and sometimes at the U.S. parent
level.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 115
Corporate Inversions
Section 7874’s main weapon is to treat the
NFP as a domestic corporation for all U.S.
tax purposes if three conditions are met:
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 116
Corporate Inversions
The three conditions are: A foreign corporation acquires substantially all of the
assets or stock of a domestic corporation or
partnership;
Former equity holders of the U. S. company own
more than 80% of the NFP; and
The overall group, tested after the deal, does not
have “substantial business activities in the country
where the NFP is incorporated.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 117
Corporate Inversions
If the above three conditions are met except that former
equity owners of the U.S. company own 60% or more
but less than 80% of the stock of the NFP, an excise tax
is imposed on the untaxed value of officers’ and
directors’ stock-based compensation, and limits are
placed on the use of the U.S. company’s tax attributes
with respect to transactions with the NFP and other
related foreign corporations.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 118
Corporate Inversions-IRC §
7874 Example
Canadian Newcorp, publically traded on
Toronto stock exchange, acquires all of
the membership interests of a domestic
LLC taxed as a partnership.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 119
Corporate Inversions-IRC §
7874 Example
Canadian Newcorp, as a result of section
7874 is treated as a U.S. corporation for
all purposes of U.S. taxation.
But is still a Canadian corporation as far
as Revenue Canada is concerned.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 120
Corporate Inversions-IRC §
7874 Example
Canadian shareholders who receive
dividends from Newcorp are taxable in
U.S.
Revenue Canada views them as having
received dividends from a Canadian
corporation.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 121
Corporate Inversions-IRC §
7874 Example
Unclear of effect on this of U.S.-Canada
income tax treaty.
Shareholders may have to rely on foreign
tax credits to be made whole.
SPARKMAN + FOOTE LLP 122
Securities Law Issues in
Stock Purchase
Transactions
Matthew A. Cole
Jacobs Law Group, PC
Strafford CLE Webinar-February 4, 2016
Drafting Stock Purchase Agreements
Sales of 100% of a Corporation’s Stock
are Securities Offerings…? Yes.
Copyright 2016, Matthew Cole, Jacobs Law Group, PC
• If you are selling some or all of the stock you own in a
corporation, you are engaging in a securities offering.
• The United States Supreme Court in Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985) ruled that a sale of a business
structured as a stock purchase involved the sale of a security
under federal securities law.
• Note that in an asset sale, this issue does not arise.
124
Other Equity Sales and the
Securities Laws
Copyright 2016, Matthew Cole, Jacobs Law Group, PC
While the courts and regulators have sometimes held that
other types of equity interests, such as membership interests in
limited liability companies, are not “securities” under federal
or state law, it is prudent to treat all equity sales of a
business as securities offerings.
125
Consequences for Sellers and
Buyers
Copyright 2016, Matthew Cole, Jacobs Law Group, PC
• Unless there is an applicable exemption from registration,
securities offerings and sales must be registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission and possibly state regulators, a costly,
time-consuming process.
• Sellers need to conduct some due diligence regarding their
buyers.
• Sellers may want to obtain various securities exemption-related
representations and warranties from buyers to qualify for
particular exemptions.
126
Consequences for Sellers and
Buyers (Con’t.)
Copyright 2016, Matthew Cole, Jacobs Law Group, PC
• If the buyer is a private equity fund or other institutional purchaser, it is much
easier to handle this issue because the financial strength of the buyer will often
determine whether various securities registration exemptions apply.
•There may also be added complications if the purchaser is not an accredited
investor (someone who meets certain minimum income or asset (other than
primary home) requirements). The available securities exemptions may be
limited or less certain to apply if the purchaser is not an accredited investor.
• If the sale of the business is a securities offering, the sale is subject to the anti-
fraud rules of the federal and state securities laws, such as Rule 10b-5. These
concern whether the seller has disclosed all material information that would be
of interest to an investor regarding the stock and the underlying business being
sold.
127
Copyright 2016, Matthew Cole, Jacobs Law Group, PC
• Attorneys are often surprised to learn that a purchase price
promissory note is a security.
• Purchase price promissory notes may seem different from a
bond or other debt securities because they often are secured
notes, the collateral being the stock sold, and thus do not “feel”
like securities.
• However, , promissory notes generally are securities. This is
because the Securities Act of 1933, which regulates the offer
and sale of securities in the United States, includes the term
“notes” in its laundry list of “securities.”
Are Purchase Price Notes
Securities? Generally, Yes.
128
Copyright 2016, Matthew Cole, Jacobs Law Group, PC
• A United States Supreme Court case, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S.
56 (1990), provides that notes are presumed to be securities unless
they meet one of four factors in a “family resemblance test.”
• The application of the test centers on whether the note seems more
like an investment or is more similar to non-investment commercial
instruments. For example, home mortgage notes and notes made by
small business borrowers secured by the business’ assets are not
securities.
• There are gray areas here that may be difficult to analyze, so careful
consideration is necessary regarding the nature of the purchase price
promissory note.
The Supreme Court on Notes as
Securities
129
Copyright 2016, Matthew Cole, Jacobs Law Group, PC
Purchase Price Notes as Securities
• The note offering may raise more securities law compliance issues than the
stock sale itself raises.
• One reason for this is the nature of the seller versus the buyer. A single
buyer, even an individual, who is purchasing all stock of a corporation may
be more likely to qualify for various accredited investor-related exemptions
than a group of sellers.
• If there are multiple individual sellers of stock, some of those sellers may own
a small portion of the outstanding stock and may not have the financial
qualifications to be sophisticated investors.
• An adult grandchild who inherited a few percent of the stock in a closely
held corporation or an employee of the seller would be simple examples of
sellers who might not qualify as accredited investors.
130
Copyright 2016, Matthew Cole, Jacobs Law Group, PC
Purchase Price Notes as Securities
(Con’t.)
• Unless there is an applicable exemption from registration, securities
offerings and sales must be registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission and possibly state regulators, a costly, time-
consuming process.
• Buyers need to conduct some due diligence regarding their sellers for
these reasons.
• Buyers may also want to obtain representations and warranties from
sellers regarding whether they are accredited investors as well as on
other securities law-related matters. The existence of non-accredited
investor can result in difficulties in finding appropriate securities law
exemption.
131
Paying Brokers or Finders Fees in a
Stock Sale
Copyright 2016, Matthew Cole, Jacobs Law Group, PC
• Securities regulators have historically treated a finder’s fee or
other payment tied to the sale of stock as an impermissible finder’s
fee.
• To be eligible to receive these fees, a finder would have needed
to register as a broker-dealer or affiliate with one under
applicable securities laws.
• This, however, is not only the finder’s problem. A buyer might be
able to have a stock sale unwound because of the involvement of
a finder not registered as a broker dealer.
• This issue does not arise in an asset sale.
132
Limited SEC Relief for M&A
Finders
Copyright 2016, Matthew Cole, Jacobs Law Group, PC
• A few years ago, the SEC issued a no-action letter (interpretive guidance that
is only applicable to the person who requested the letter but is often used as
persuasive authority) relaxing its position that all finders involved in stock sales
need to register as broker-dealers. M&A Brokers, 2014 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 92
(Jan. 31, 2014, revised Feb. 4, 2014).
• The finder does not need to register if a number of criteria are met, including:
The finder must not have any authority to bind any parties in the
transaction
Following the transaction, the buyer must control and actively operate
the business purchased through the stock sale
The finder must not take possession of funds or securities involved in the
transaction
The finder must not provide financing for the transaction or assist in
forming any buyer group involved in the transaction.
133
Drafting Mistakes in
Stock Purchase
Agreements
Matthew A. Cole
Jacobs Law Group, PC
Strafford CLE Webinar-February 4, 2016
Drafting Stock Purchase Agreements
(Some) Drafting Mistakes in Stock
Purchase Agreements
Copyright 2016, Matthew Cole, Jacobs Law Group, PC
• Many drafting mistakes are the same as those that tend to occur in
commercial contracts generally.
• “Boilerplate” and “Miscellaneous” sections of stock purchase
agreements should be read more carefully than they generally are.
For example, if you have a somewhat outdated notice provision in
your stock purchase agreement, e.g., one that does not provide for
at least fax, and more preferably, email notices and communications,
you need to consider whether that is appropriate for your type of
deal.
• Likewise, consider the strong financial impact that some provisions
often appearing in the “miscellaneous” section, such as “loser pays”
and poorly drafted arbitration clauses may have on your client in a
stock purchase transaction.
135
Providing for venue in a jurisdiction
differing from the governing law
Copyright 2016, Matthew Cole, Jacobs Law Group, PC
While occasionally parties may have a reason for having different
state governing law and state jurisdiction, it is not typically a good
“compromise” to provide for Delaware governing law and a venue
in New York or California. This is because one does not usually
want a court in a particular state ruling on any other law than that
with which it is most familiar.
136
Not obtaining representations and
warranties about the business itself
Copyright 2016, Matthew Cole, Jacobs Law Group, PC
When purchasing 100% of the outstanding equity securities of an
entity, a buyer should not merely be concerned with
representations and warranties about the securities sold. Because
the buyer is indirectly purchasing the entire business,
representations and warranties regarding the entity itself, such as
its material contracts, financial statements, intellectual property,
compliance with laws, and other common representations and
warranties in an asset purchase agreement are equally valuable
for a buyer in a stock purchase transaction.
137
Failing to define accounting
terminology carefully
Copyright 2016, Matthew Cole, Jacobs Law Group, PC
Buyers and sellers may want to consider consulting with an
accountant to define properly various accounting terms, such as
“revenue,” “net income” and the like. Consider, for example,
whether these terms should be as defined in GAAP, or Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles.
138
Including Vague Earn-Out Provisions
Copyright 2016, Matthew Cole, Jacobs Law Group, PC
• Earn-out provisions are difficult to draft. Trying to control how a
business operates after you, the seller, are no longer the
business owner and often not involved in the business post-
closing will be met with strong resistance from the purchaser of
your shares.
• However, not having sufficient control procedures in the stock
purchase agreement may mean that the selling shareholder will
never be able to be certain whether earn-out milestones have
been met or whether a buyer has been able to manipulate the
business’ finances to avoid paying the selling shareholder an
earned earn-out.
139
The date as of which representations
and warranties are being made
Copyright 2016, Matthew Cole, Jacobs Law Group, PC
If the stock purchase transaction is one in which the agreement is
signed and the closing is some days (or even months later), both
parties need to consider as of which date the representations and
warranties should be made. Most Buyers will want to the
representations and warranties to be true as of both the contract
signing and closing date. Sometimes, stock purchase agreements
do not provide for this.
140
The survival of some or all
representations and warranties
• Even if the drafters of the stock purchase agreement are
careful to provide that the representations and warranties must
be true as of the signing as well as later closing date,
problems may arise for Buyers who do not carefully consider
what representations and warranties should “survive” the
closing date.
• Providing for survival allows the Buyer to discover and make a
claim of breach even if the Buyer discovers post-closing (but
before the expiration of the survival period) that a Seller
representation or warranty was untrue as of the closing date
(or even the signing date).
141 Copyright 2016, Matthew Cole, Jacobs Law Group, PC
The survival of some or all
representations and warranties (Con’t.)
• A basic contract law principle is that post-closing discovery of
representations and warranty breaches by a Buyer are not
actionable unless provisions have been inserted for the
representations and warranties to “survive” the closing date.
• Some parties will heavily negotiate which representations and
warranties survive and for how long.
142 Copyright 2016, Matthew Cole, Jacobs Law Group, PC
The survival of some or all
representations and warranties (Con’t.)
• As noted above, Buyers may request longer survival period for
the Seller representations and warranties that, if breached,
will be more costly to the Buyer.
• Defective title to stock, taxes, environmental matters, employee
benefits, and finder’s fees are some examples of those more
serious representations and warranties.
143 Copyright 2016, Matthew Cole, Jacobs Law Group, PC
Permitting Terms of the Agreement
to be Disclosed
• Most parties to a stock purchase agreement enter into a
confidentiality agreement that with respect to the Seller’s
information and, sometimes, Buyer information that will be
disclosed to the Seller (such as regarding a Buyer’s financial
state).
• Some attorneys do not focus, however, on protecting the
confidentiality of the deal itself. The business the Buyer has just
effectively purchased may be harmed if a disgruntled Seller
can disclose sensitive details about the purchase price and
other deal terms.
• Seller and Buyer should consider mutual non-disclosure
covenants to avoid this problem.
144 Copyright 2016, Matthew Cole, Jacobs Law Group, PC
Not Preventing Operational Changes
Between Signing and Closing
• How a business is operated post-signing but pre-closing is
critical.
• Not obtaining covenants from the Sellers that they will cause
the entity they own to operate the business in the normal course
consistent during the period between signing and closing may
lead to unwelcome surprises for the Buyer who now owns a
business that is not nearly as robust as the Buyer thought it was
purchasing.
145 Copyright 2016, Matthew Cole, Jacobs Law Group, PC
Failing to Obtain Appropriate
Restrictive Covenants from Sellers
• Failing to obtain non-competition and non-solicitation
covenants from the Seller can be a costly problem that will
result in a loss in value of the business just purchased.
• Likewise, Sellers should be wary of overly restrictive non-
competition and non-solicitation covenants requested by Buyer,
particularly because courts are typically willing to enforce
more stringent restrictive covenants against a seller than they
are willing to permit with respect to an employee.
146 Copyright 2016, Matthew Cole, Jacobs Law Group, PC
Not Addressing Required Consents
at the Entity Level Properly
• A Seller will typically be asked to represent that selling the shares does not cause a default under any agreement to which the Seller is a party.
• However, a Buyer will also want to be concerned with agreements, such as leases or financing documents, that the corporation whose shares are being sold is a party to and whether a default or consent is required under those agreements. For example, even though the corporation may be a tenant under a lease and the lease is not being assigned, the lease may contain a provision stating that a change in control of the corporation is deemed to be an assignment requiring landlord consent.
147 Copyright 2016, Matthew Cole, Jacobs Law Group, PC
Pitfalls in Using Arbitration
• While not that common, some parties will request that an
arbitration clause be used for all disputes under the stock
purchase agreement. Attorneys will want to carefully consider
whether this is in their client’s best interests.
• Arbitration is not necessarily less expensive or faster than a
courtroom hearing.
• The parties bear the costs of the arbitrators directly, which can
be considerable over time. For example, a panel of three
arbitrators can increase the cost of arbitration exponentially
over the use of a single arbitrator.
148 Copyright 2016, Matthew Cole, Jacobs Law Group, PC
Pitfalls in Using Arbitration (Con’t.)
• Arbitration awards are not appealable in the traditional sense as there is no appellate forum typically for an arbitration judgment. Moreover, the standards for asking a court to overturn an arbitration decision are very high and rarely met.
• If not drafted properly, the parties’ expectations about finality of the award may not come to pass, and the parties may end up in court eventually.
• There are many other drafting traps to avoid, such as not including specific confidentiality provisions regarding the process and award, which can be one reason a party desires to use arbitration rather than the court system in the first place.
149 Copyright 2016, Matthew Cole, Jacobs Law Group, PC