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Visibly Invisible: EU Engagementin Conflict Resolution in theSouth CaucasusTracey C. German aa King's College London at the Joint Services Commandand Staff College , Swindon, UKPublished online: 03 Dec 2007.
To cite this article: Tracey C. German (2007) Visibly Invisible: EU Engagement inConflict Resolution in the South Caucasus, European Security, 16:3-4, 357-374, DOI:10.1080/09662830701751141
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662830701751141
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Visibly Invisible: EU Engagement inConflict Resolution in the SouthCaucasus
TRACEY C. GERMANKing’s College London at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, Swindon, UK
ABSTRACT This essay examines growing European Union (EU) involvement in theSouth Caucasus, focusing on efforts to resolve the protracted conflicts in the regions ofAbkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. To date, the EU has occupied a backseat in conflict resolution efforts, supporting organisations such as the UN and OSCE,which have taken the lead role. However, over a decade of negotiations has produced fewtangible results and the EU now has the opportunity to play a much greater role. This essayargues that the EU needs to become more involved: it has a much wider range of tools at itsdisposal with which to influence the various situations and it is in its own interest to ensurethe stability of its neighbours.
Introduction
The accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union (EU) in
January 2007 has pushed the borders of the organisation eastwards to the Black
Sea and ever closer to the volatile South Caucasus, which is divided by a series
of unresolved conflicts. There has been growing unrest in the region in recent
months: two sets of presidential elections and referenda on independence in
Georgia’s secessionist region of South Ossetia held in November 2006 were
followed by a rally calling for independence in Abkhazia, as well as a similar
referendum in the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. These events have
brought renewed international attention to an oft-overlooked, but increasingly
tense, region, where the threat of violent conflict is high, as the aforementioned
territories seek to sever ties with the central authorities and achieve de jure
independence.
Problems within the Caucasus can no longer be regarded as extraneous to the
security of European states. Separatist disputes in Nagorno-Karabakh,
Correspondence Address: Tracey C. German, Lecturer, Defence Studies Department, King’s College
London at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, Watchfield, Swindon SN6 8TS. Email:
ISSN 0966-2839 Print/1746-1545 Online/07/03-4357�18 # 2007 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/09662830701751141
European Security
Vol. 16, Nos. 3�4, 357�374, September�December 2007
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Abkhazia and South Ossetia have implications not only for stability in the
Caucasus region, but also for Europe and the wider international community.1
These conflicts undermine regional stability, not just because of the threat of a
renewal of fighting, but because they have created security vacuums that are
outside of government control, providing ideal conditions for transnational
security challenges such as terrorism, organised crime and illegal trafficking to
flourish. They also undermine efforts to boost regional cooperation, hampering
economic development and further destabilising the area.
One of the principal aims of the EU in the wake of the 2004 enlargement
process has been to expand the zone of ‘prosperity, stability and security’ that
its citizens enjoy out to its neighbours. This approach has developed from an
understanding that the organisation cannot keep enlarging ad infinitum, that
there is a need to find new ways of spreading security beyond its borders to
ensure the long-term stability of the EU, together with the security of its
citizens. Unstable peripheries, such as the South Caucasus, pose a threat
because their instability could spill over into the security core and thus threaten
the gains already accomplished there in terms of stable security. The EU’s
failure in the Balkans during the 1990s was its largest and most public failure as
an international actor and prompted the realisation that peace and stability on
the periphery are crucial to the security of the Union. Consequently, the EU
has taken steps towards boosting its involvement in conflict resolution efforts in
the South Caucasus.
Recognition of the growing significance of the South Caucasus for European
security is reflected in the EU’s gradual engagement with the region,
particularly with regard to conflict resolution. In February 2001 the General
Affairs and External Relations Council declared that the EU was willing to play
a more active political role in the South Caucasus, stating that it would seek
ways of lending its support ‘to prevent and resolve conflicts’ and assist in post-
conflict rehabilitation.2 In addition to boosting its cooperation with the OSCE
(Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe), UN (United Nations)
and Council of Europe, the Council conclusions affirmed the organisation’s
intention of reinforcing bilateral and multilateral dialogue with the South
Caucasus states, a position affirmed in the organisation’s 2003 European
Security Strategy (ESS), which identified the region as an area in which it
would be taking a ‘stronger and more active interest’.3 Deepening EU
engagement with the three countries of the South Caucasus was demonstrated
by the appointment of the Union’s Special Representative (EUSR) for the
region in 2003 and the inclusion of the three states in the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and in December 2005 Javier Solana, the
EU’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, affirmed
that the organisation was ready to play a greater role in efforts to resolve the
long-running conflicts of the South Caucasus.4 Nevertheless, in spite of the
numerous, well-intentioned declarations of interest, little of any substance with
regards to conflict resolution has actually been achieved.
358 T. C. German
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This essay examines growing EU involvement in the South Caucasus,
focusing on efforts to resolve the protracted conflicts in the regions of
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. To date, the EU has
occupied a back seat in conflict resolution efforts, supporting organisations
such as the UN and OSCE, which have taken the lead role. However, over a
decade of negotiations has produced few tangible results and the EU now has
the opportunity to play a much greater role. This essay argues that the EU
needs to become more involved. It has a much wider range of tools at its
disposal with which to influence the various situations and it is greatly in its
own interest to ensure the stability of its neighbours.
Mechanisms for Deepening Engagement
The key strategic location of the South Caucasus, squeezed between the Black
and Caspian Seas, Iran, Russia and Turkey, make it an area of increasing
significance in the contemporary security environment, particularly given
regional instability and the potential threat to western economic interests
associated with its energy resources and transport infrastructure. The European
Parliament’s 2004 Gahrton report recognised its growing importance, stating
that ‘due to its geographical location, the South Caucasus can play an increased
role in strengthening international security; whereas if it is instead left out of
the evolving networks of interdependence and co-operation, the susceptibility
of the South Caucasus states to the danger of export of instability from
neighbouring regions would increase’.5
Energy represents one of the most important aspects of the growing
significance of the region and the EU has a keen self-interest in the
development of stability and security in the Caucasus.6 The region is a vital
transit route for oil and gas from the land-locked Caspian Sea to international
markets, a role boosted with the commissioning of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
(BTC) and South Caucasus (SCP) export pipelines, essential elements in
developing the hydrocarbon base in the Caspian basin. The Caspian is set to
become an important source of oil and gas for EU member-states as they seek
to diversify sources to secure supply and avoid over-reliance on any one
country. By 2020 it is estimated that two-thirds of the EU’s energy requirements
will be imported, with European gas consumption in particular set to grow
dramatically over the coming decades as indigenous reserves decline. Conse-
quently, EU member-states are going to become increasingly reliant on
suppliers located on the organisation’s periphery, particularly to the East and
South. Thus, there is a need to ensure reliable and stable export routes, and
energy security has become a significant factor driving deepening engagement
with the Caucasus region.
The need to stabilise the periphery was recognised in the 2003 ESS, which
spoke of ‘preventative engagement’ and the ability to act ‘before countries
around us deteriorate’,7 and has given rise to the development of the ENP,
EU Engagement in Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus 359
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which is seen as one way of stabilising the periphery without enlarging further.
The EU has included the South Caucasus in the ENP with the aim of
advocating political and economic reform, supporting conflict prevention and
resolution, and enhancing intra-regional cooperation.8 The inclusion of the
three South Caucasus states is of considerable significance, recognising the
importance of the region to an expanding EU. A resolution on the ENP issued
by the European Parliament in January 2006 stressed the importance of
peaceful development on the European continent and in neighbouring areas,
stating that the EU must help settle conflicts in the Caucasus region. It
described the ongoing conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh as an impediment to ‘the
development of Armenia and Azerbaijan and regional cooperation as well as
the effective implementation of the European neighbourhood policy’.9
The ENP is viewed as a way to address the EU’s relations with its new
neighbours and promote its shared values, such as democracy, human rights
and the rule of law, in the hope of promoting stability. The EU’s external
relations commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner has described it as the EU’s
‘newest foreign policy instrument’, aimed at using the organisation’s soft power
to leverage reforms that will facilitate the expansion of the ‘zone of prosperity,
stability and security’.10 Crucially, Ferrero-Waldner believes it is about
encouraging reform from within*not imposing it from without. It is hoped
that by encouraging stable democratic development within a country, the ENP
can play a key role in conflict resolution. As Ferrero-Waldner affirms, ‘through
promoting democracy and regional cooperation, boosting national reform
programmes and improving the socio-economic prospects of the region, it can
contribute to a more positive climate for conflict settlement’. The concept of
encouraging reform within a country is rooted in the belief that the EU will
have an adequate level of influence. However, one of the major drawbacks of
the ENP is that, while it is based on the same positive conditionality that
underpins enlargement and rewards progress in reforms with inducements such
as an even deeper relationship with the EU, the greatest potential incentive*membership*is not on offer. This means that the organisation has much less
influence, not just in terms of its relationships with ENP countries, but also in
terms of conflict resolution.
Although the ENP does not offer potential membership of the EU, it does
offer a ‘privileged relationship’ with the aim of sharing the Union’s stability and
prosperity. The relationship is supposed to be mutually beneficial with the EU
serving as a major source of investment and trade for the region, which has
considerable potential for economic growth. The organisation has bilateral
trade relations with each country in the South Caucasus, as opposed to the
region as a whole and the level of trade with the three countries varies
considerably, thereby impacting on the level of influence that the EU is able to
exert. Azerbaijan is the EU’s largest trading partner in the region, whilst trade
with Armenia is limited. Thus, trade leverage also varies considerably. In 2005,
Azerbaijan had a positive trade balance with the EU with exports amounting to
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nearly t2.4bn, predominantly oil, gas and cotton, whilst imports from the EU
totalled t1.5bn. Nevertheless, despite being the EU’s largest trading partner in
the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan’s share of total EU imports was only 0.2 per
cent and 0.14 per cent of total exports.11 By contrast, Armenia accounted for
only 0.04 per cent of total EU imports in 2005, with exports to the region
amounting to t528m, predominantly transport materials and machinery, and
imports of t416m. Georgia’s trade with the EU was similarly limited, with
exports amounting to t264m, predominantly energy resources, and imports
totalling t495m.These figures raise the question of influence within the various relationships
and where the balance lies. Azerbaijan’s strategic importance, in terms of energy
security and geographical location, means that the EU is willing to turn a blind
eye to the country’s painfully slow pace of liberal democratic reform. Without
the lure of potential membership, the EU lacks any form of significant leverage
by which it can seek to influence Azerbaijan’s behaviour, whilst conversely
Azerbaijan appears to have considerable leverage in the form of its hydro-
carbons. This contrasts strongly with the positions of Armenia and Georgia,
which are keen to expand their limited trade links with the EU, but have little to
offer in return, other than potential political support, giving the EU substantial
potential for leverage within the ENP relationship.
In return for a ‘privileged’ relationship with the EU, which includes access to
its internal market, ENP partners accept precise commitments to strengthen
the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights, promote economic
reforms, and cooperate on key foreign policy objectives, such as counter-
terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These
commitments are set out in detailed Action Plans, which are agreed with
individual countries and specify how that partner can achieve a closer
relationship with the EU. These Action Plans establish the joint priorities
that the EU and the states involved wish to tackle together over a five-year
period. They cover a wide range of topics and issues, which vary according to
the country, highlighting the EU’s recognition of the need for a differentiated
approach to its relations with non-member states. This differentiated approach
can be seen most clearly in the organisation’s trade relations with individual
states.
Action plans were successfully negotiated with all three South Caucasus
states during 2006. In a speech delivered at the Bled conference in Slovenia in
August 2006, Ferrero-Waldner highlighted the importance of these Plans,
stating that they were ‘designed to promote political reform and sustainable
economic and social development’.12 The individual Action Plans, signed by
the three South Caucasus states in November 2006, highlight the interests of
each specific country involved and the emphasis it gives to certain issues. They
also highlight the objectives of the EU with regard to democratic development
and economic reforms, stating in the introduction to all three that the level of
ambition in the relationship depends on ‘the degree of ( . . .) commitment to
EU Engagement in Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus 361
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common values as well as [the] capacity to implement jointly agreed
priorities’.13 Conflict resolution receives reasonable attention in the Action
Plans, although their focus is more towards economic and political transforma-
tion as opposed to the settlement of outstanding disputes.
Given that the ENP approach is firmly rooted in differentiation, it is
interesting to note the variations in the Action Plans even in the introductions.
The Azerbaijan Action Plan identifies specific ‘common values’ to which the
two parties are committed, including ‘the respect of and support for the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability and internationally recognised
borders of each other’, clearly a reference to the disputed territory of Nagorno-
Karabakh. Precedence is given to this conflict throughout the Action Plan,
particularly when compared with the Armenia Action Plan. Contributing to a
‘peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’ represents the first
priority area in Azerbaijan’s Action Plan, but only the seventh in Armenia’s,
reflecting Baku’s determination to seek a resolution and Yerevan’s tolerance of
the status quo. The Georgian Action Plan notes the EU’s continuing ‘strong
( . . .) commitment to support the settlement of Georgia’s internal conflicts,
drawing on the instruments at the EU’s disposal, and in close consultation with
the UN and OSCE’. It also stresses that the EU is ‘ready to consider ways to
strengthen further its engagement’. Priority area six is identified as the
promotion of a ‘peaceful resolution of internal conflicts’ and stresses the
need for ‘constructive cooperation between interested actors in the region’.
The ENP and associated Action Plans are the rhetoric, providing a
theoretical framework for the development of relations and EU engagement
in the conflict resolution process. But what about the reality? What is actually
happening on the ground and what concrete steps is the EU taking to resolve
the three long-running conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-
Karabakh? To date, the EU has preferred to play an important, but
background, role as a key financial donor, lending its support to negotiating
mechanisms, but not directly participating in them.
Georgia
Georgia is the most pro-Western of the three South Caucasus states and the
relationship between Tbilisi and the EU acquired considerable momentum after
the 2003 Rose Revolution and President Mikhel Saakashvili’s accession to
power.14 The South Caucasian state has sought to maintain an autonomous
and pragmatic foreign policy that removes it from the Russian sphere of
influence and the new leadership in Georgia has been inclined to seek the
engagement of external actors such as the EU, the OSCE and the US,
demonstrating its desire to integrate with the West. The country has ambitious
aspirations of its relationship with the EU and what the organisation could and
should be doing to support it. In particular, it was hopeful that the EU would
provide it with greater political support in its strained relations with Russia and
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the resolution of its separatist disputes. There has been some progress. The
Georgian Action Plan recognises Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity
within internationally recognized borders, and the EU has also pledged
assistance in confidence building, together with economic assistance in the light
of progress in the settlement process.15 Nevertheless, the EU is very aware of the
need to maintain friendly links with Russia and is keen not to jeopardise its
relationship with Moscow, thus it has tended to take a very pragmatic approach
in its relations with Georgia.
Georgia’s secessionist regions represent one of the most serious threats to the
security and stability of the multi-ethnic country, a threat exacerbated by
Russian backing for the separatist territories. Following wars of independence
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the early 1990s, both have existed as de facto
independent states for over a decade.16 Tension is very high in the conflict zones
and the threat of renewed hostilities remains very real, as military skirmishes
have threatened to escalate, jeopardising stability in the volatile Caucasus
region. From the beginning of his presidency, Saakashvili has made the
restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity a priority, expressing his wish to
consolidate the country by resolving the enduring conflicts with the two
secessionist regions. Despite several years passing since he came to power in
which to resolve the disputes, they remain locked in stalemate. The unresolved
conflicts mean that nearly 20 per cent of Georgian territory is outside the
control of the central authorities. They have led to the displacement of around
260,000 people and provide fertile ground for the smuggling of weapons,
narcotics and people.
Saakashvili’s desire to consolidate Georgia’s territorial integrity has pushed
the country towards renewed conflict with Russia, which not only has peace-
keeping contingents in the two regions, but maintains two military bases
elsewhere on Georgian territory and is accused of providing tacit support for the
separatists. The hand of its powerful northern neighbour has been visible in all
of Georgia’s separatist conflicts, as Moscow seeks to maintain political leverage
over the South Caucasian state, and Tbilisi has frequently accused Russia of
seeking to undermine Georgian sovereignty by supporting separatist provinces.
The Georgian leader has cautioned that in the event of large-scale armed
conflict erupting in South Ossetia it would be an issue of bilateral Georgian�Russian relations, not merely an internal conflict. Speaking in September 2005,
Saakashvili declared that there is ‘no Ossetian problem in Georgia’, but ‘a
problem in Georgian�Russian relations with respect to certain territories’.17
Georgia’s separatist conflicts are far more than domestic territorial disputes:
they have both regional and international implications, and represent one of the
principal obstacles to the development of Georgian�Russian relations.
Of all the conflicts in the South Caucasus, the EU is most involved in the
search for a settlement of that between South Ossetia (Tskhinvali) and Tbilisi.
South Ossetia is not seeking to become an independent state. Rather, it is
calling for reunification with fellow Ossetians in the Russian republic of North
EU Engagement in Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus 363
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Ossetia-Alania, across the international border between Georgia and Russia in
the North Caucasus. Hence it is seeking to become a constituent part of the
Russian Federation. Russian is the region’s official language, the Russian ruble
is the official currency, and in February 2004 the South Ossetian leader, Eduard
Kokoity, proclaimed that 95 per cent of the republic’s population of
approximately 100,000 had adopted Russian citizenship.18
A fragile peace is kept in the region by a Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF)
that comprises ‘national’ battalions from Georgia, South Ossetia, North
Ossetia-Alania and Russia (500 troops from each). A quadripartite negotiating
body, the Joint Control Commission (JCC), also exists to foster political
reconciliation between the various sides and includes representatives from
Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia, North Ossetia-Alania and the OSCE.19 The
European Commission participates in economic-related issues that are
discussed at the JCC. The EU has provided grants to the OSCE Mission in
Georgia to finance the JCC, but Georgia is keen for the organisation to have
greater involvement in the body, which it feels is very biased against its wishes
because of its composition. The Georgian Action Plan went some way to
reflecting this, with its recognition of the need for the JCC to intensify its work,
but there is still much work to be done.20 A further step towards greater EU
participation would be the inclusion of the EUSR at JCC meetings in an
observatory capacity. His presence would perhaps satisfy Georgia’s wishes and,
as he would only have observer status, may also be acceptable to South Ossetia
and Russia.The situation in Abkhazia21 is somewhat different to South Ossetia and the
EU is far less involved in the search for a negotiated solution, lending its
support to ongoing negotiations and providing financial assistance for
rehabilitation. Abkhazia is seeking full independence, an ambition its leaders
insist is non-negotiable and based on close political and economic integration
with Russia. Following his election to power at the beginning of 2005, the
Abkhazian leader Sergei Bagapsh stated that integration with Russia was a
priority for his government. He described Abkhazia as being tied to Russia ‘by
an umbilical cord’ and said his administration would do ‘everything we can to
make the laws and the acts of legislation of the republic of Abkhazia dovetail
with those of the Russian Federation’.22 Similar to South Ossetia, a majority of
the republic’s population has adopted Russian citizenship. In August 2005 the
Russian Foreign Ministry confirmed that over 80 per cent of Abkhazians hold
Russian passports, a figure that Bagapsh confidently expects to rise, particu-
larly following a declaration from Moscow that, as of 1 December 2005, it will
no longer pay pensions to those Abkhazians who do not hold Russian
passports.23
The UN leads on mediation in the conflict with the United Nations Observer
Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), established to oversee the ceasefire, whilst the
Secretary-General’s ‘Group of Friends’ (France, Germany, Russia, UK and
US) is leading efforts to find a resolution within the framework of the so-called
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Geneva process. Little has been achieved in the years since the 1994 ceasefire
agreement and, speaking during a UN General Assembly summit meeting in
September 2005, Saakashvili called on the international organisation to do
more than merely talk about solutions, declaring that it ‘must act to end the
lawless and immoral annexation’ of Abkhazia.24
Georgia is very keen for the EU to increase its presence in the country and is
encouraging its participation in conflict resolution. It was hopeful that the EU
would establish its own border monitoring mission to replace the now defunct
OSCE mission on the border with Russia.25 However, internal wrangling
between member-states over the issue of Russia meant that no agreement was
reached. Instead of an EU border monitoring mission, the mandate of the
EUSR was enlarged to include reporting on the border situation, together with
the establishment of a support team to work with Georgian border guards in
non-conflict areas, with the aim of strengthening Georgia’s border security.
At present, the largest contribution that the EU makes to conflict resolution
efforts in Georgia is financial and it is the largest donor to the South Caucasus
region. It has been financing the rehabilitation of the conflict zones in South
Ossetia and Abkhazia since 1997, providing assistance worth a total of t33m to
the two areas over the period 1997�2005. At an OSCE donor conference, held
in June 2006, the European Commission pledged a further t2m to assist in the
economic rehabilitation of South Ossetia and indicated that it was ready to
make a similar contribution in 2007, if projects were implemented satisfactorily
and the situation on the ground was ‘favourable’. The organisation has also
announced an aid package of t2 million for victims of the conflict in Abkhazia
to assist in reconstruction, the provision of food, healthcare and job creation
programmes. The EU’s latest project in Abkhazia is a programme worth t4m to
support rehabilitation and reconstruction in the conflict zone, with the aim of
creating conditions for the return of internally displaced peoples (IDPs) and
refugees.26
However, these unresolved conflicts require more than financial aid from the
EU. They also necessitate political action. So far, the organisation has preferred
to provide assistance through economic rehabilitation, humanitarian aid and
confidence building projects, tackling problems at the grass-roots level, as
opposed to engaging in ongoing negotiations. Whilst its financial efforts to date
are commendable, it also needs to engage politically in order for its conflict
resolution efforts to become more effective. With no presence or voice in the
key negotiating mechanisms for either the Abkhaz or South Ossetian dispute,
the EU’s political influence remains extremely limited.
Nagorno-Karabakh
The unresolved dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the majority
Armenian-populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh is one of the most
worrying unresolved conflicts in the Caucasus region, both because it is
EU Engagement in Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus 365
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between two sovereign states and because the three principal regional powers*Russia, Turkey and Iran*all have a differing stance towards the issue, raising
fears that, if there was a renewal of fighting, it could rapidly become
internationalised. The conflict dominates the foreign policies of Armenia and
Azerbaijan, with each seeking allies to strengthen their position, reinforcing the
fears that a renewed conflict could quickly acquire an international dimension.
The Armenian and Azeri leaders have held discussions intermittently, but
negotiations over the disputed territory have failed to produce any tangible
result in recent years.Nagorno-Karabakh is an enclave within Azeri territory, mainly populated by
ethnic Armenians. Violence erupted at the end of the Soviet era over demands
for autonomy, violence which soon developed into full-blown civil war between
Azerbaijan and the enclave, supported by Armenia. The war lasted from 1988
to 1994, resulting in a definitive defeat for Azeri government forces. At least
20,000 people were killed during the fighting and Azerbaijan lost as much as
20 per cent of its territory (Nagorno-Karabakh and the broad Lachin security
corridor that connects Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia). The conflict area
includes not only Nagorno-Karabakh, but also the total or partial territory of
eight surrounding districts of Azerbaijan, occupied by the Armenians during
the 1992�94 war. Although it is over a decade since a cease-fire agreement was
signed, the two countries are still officially at war over the mountainous region.
The ensuing stalemate has brought no real peace or stability and there are fears
that the conflict could be easily reignited.27
The ‘wall of money’ that Azerbaijan expects to receive over the coming years
from its hydrocarbon reserves could significantly alter the current status quo,
shifting the balance of power towards Baku and making it less inclined to seek
a peaceful resolution. At the same time, Armenia is totally isolated from the oil
windfall and perceives it to be a threat. There is a fear in Yerevan that, in the
short term, oil-rich Azerbaijan will be in an economic and financial position to
settle the conflict by force, whether Armenia likes it or not. This may fuel
hawkishness on the Armenian side, in order to pre-empt the perceived risk of
future Azeri aggression. As long as mediation efforts remain fruitless, the
possibility of renewed hostilities cannot be discounted.
With all parties refusing to compromise, there has been an intensification of
international efforts to resolve the long-running stand-off. The peace process
was kick-started in 2004 and efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement to the
frozen conflict were stepped up by several international and regional actors,
including the OSCE Minsk Group, the UN and the Council of Europe, while
Russia and the US have both issued statements on the conflict.28 Azerbaijan is
keen for greater international involvement in the resolution of the conflict and
has called for the EU, Council of Europe and UN to play a more active role,
although Armenia prefers OSCE Minsk Group mediation.29
There is a deep mistrust of external actors involved in mediation efforts, a
suspicion that undermines attempts to resolve the dispute peacefully. The
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OSCE has been the main external actor engaged with the issue since the early
1990s, but its limitations have been recognised by Bernard Fassier, the French
co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group, who has made it clear that, while the
group can help to facilitate negotiations, it cannot resolve the Karabakh
conflict: ‘The Minsk Group is a political forum. It can put forward political
ideas. However, it does not have financial resources to implement those ideas’.
He has suggested that the EU should perhaps play a greater role, as ‘it has
enough economic capacity’.30
In spite of the danger posed by a renewal of this conflict, current EU
involvement in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is very limited.
It is not directly involved in conflict resolution and prevention mechanisms,
choosing instead to support actively the ongoing political dialogue between the
three parties, as well as the activities of the OSCE Minsk Group. This support is
provided largely by the EUSR, whose mandate covers precisely this area.
Financial assistance from the European Commission is perhaps the most direct
form of support for conflict resolution. The EC has provided considerable
financial aid for the rehabilitation of territories damaged during the conflict,
including the rehabilitation of a railway line, electricity supplies, drinking water
and irrigation and the reconstruction of schools.31 In the future, it is planned
that such financial assistance will be used increasingly to reduce tensions from
the conflict by supporting regional cooperation, post-conflict rehabilitation
and linking assistance levels to progress in conflict resolution.
This financial support from the EU is a start, but more needs to be done to
break the negotiating deadlock. The EU’s official position is that it would
consider contributing to peacekeeping forces in the region, if there was
agreement between the parties on the deployment of such forces, a highly
unlikely prospect.32 The organisation’s determination to maintain a neutral
position means that its policy towards the conflict is often incoherent and
contradictory. This can be seen most clearly in the recently signed Action Plans
prepared for Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijan Plan supports the
country’s territorial integrity, whilst the Armenia Plan supports the contra-
dictory ‘principle of self-determination of peoples’.33 One key reason for the
EU’s often incoherent stance towards this conflict is the position of its member-
states, in particular France.34 The country’s appointment as a co-chair to the
Minsk Group in 1997 angered Azerbaijan, who perceived it to be pro-
Armenian, as France is home to a significant Armenian minority of
approximately 400,000, the largest in Europe, which has an impact on both
the country’s internal and external politics.
The international community, including the EU, needs to take preventative
action and put more pressure on the parties involved to resolve the dispute
peacefully in order to avert the threat of a complex emergency that would
destabilise the entire region. Although the EU is represented within the Minsk
Group by individual member-states, the EUSR needs a presence within the
Group in order to represent the organisation’s position and give it a voice.
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A renewed conflict could spell disaster for the volatile South Caucasus:
the resumption of large-scale conflict would herald a war of attrition, with the
civilian population bearing the brunt of the fighting. Azerbaijan needs to be
persuaded that it stands to lose far more than it would gain from any attempt to
impose a military solution on the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. There is no
military solution to this latent conflict*it can only be solved by political
means.
Conclusions and Outlook
The growing strategic significance of the Caucasus region within the
contemporary security environment means that efforts to resolve the long-
running conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh need to
be stepped up by international and regional actors. Peaceful settlement of the
three conflicts would boost stability in the region and strengthen regional
security and cooperation. After years of stalemate, there is a need for greater
international involvement, but there is a lack of resolve in the international
community to sort out the problem partly because of a fear of setting a
precedent and the need to balance the seemingly contradictory principles of
territorial integrity and self-determination.These separatist conflicts have implications not only for stability in the
Caucasus region, but also for Europe and the wider international community.
As the EU and NATO seek to expand their borders, it is becoming more
important to focus on conflict resolution on the periphery, where the presence
of weak or unstable states poses a threat to the stability of member states. Thus,
resolution of these disputes has become more critical and the EU needs to use
its not inconsiderable influence to play a more active role in the search for a
negotiated settlement, rather than waiting for other actors to negotiate a
solution.
As discussed above, current EU involvement in conflict resolution in the
South Caucasus is limited to political support for existing negotiating
mechanisms and financial assistance for rehabilitation within the conflict
zones. If the organisation is truly committed to boosting stability in the South
Caucasus, and avoiding a repeat of the 1990s Balkans experience, then it must
take more substantive action. There have been numerous well-meaning
statements and reports, but very little has actually been achieved and the
organisation urgently needs to make the move from rhetoric to reality. This
sentiment was echoed in a communication on the ENP from the European
Commission in December 2006, which called on the EU to be more active in
addressing frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus as they threaten to produce
‘major spillovers for the EU, such as illegal immigration, unreliable energy
supplies, environmental degradation and terrorism’.35 It noted that the ENP
has so far achieved little in terms of conflict resolution and that the EU needs
to be more active and more present in regional and multilateral conflict
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resolution mechanisms, as well as in peace monitoring or peacekeeping efforts.
In a highly critical statement, the communication declared that, if the ENP
‘cannot contribute to addressing conflicts in the region, it will have failed in one
of its key purposes’.36
The ENP and associated Action Plans are an attempt to promote a stable
framework for political and economic reform within which violent conflict is
seen as an unacceptable way to resolve political disputes and a hindrance to
further development. The policy is based on laudable ideals, but it remains to
be seen whether it will be any more effective than previous efforts to develop
relationships with peripheral countries. Action Plans were only signed at the
end of 2006 and more time needs to be allowed for a full assessment of their
value. Pessimists will point to the lack of progress made by the three South
Caucasus states in meeting their obligations under the Partnership and
Cooperation Agreements (PCA), which preceded the ENP and represented
the first attempt to cement the relationship with the EU. Although the principal
focus of the PCAs was on trade and economic cooperation, the three countries
did little to implement policies to promote conflict settlement, one of the key
commitments. The EU’s lack of teeth is already becoming evident in terms of its
relationship with Azerbaijan. The latter may have signed up to an Action Plan
pledging democratic reform, but it is showing little sign of acting upon this, well
aware that EU member-states are becoming increasingly reliant upon its ability
to supply them with oil and gas, both as a producer and key transit country.
There are two key issues that need to be addressed if the EU is going to
genuinely deepen its engagement in the South Caucasus. Firstly, can the
organisation get more involved if it wants to? And, secondly, how much can it
actually achieve in reality? With regards to the first issue, there are several
obstacles to further EU involvement in the South Caucasus. The region
comprises three independent states, which may or may not welcome the
involvement of an external actor in their sovereign affairs. They are very
different actors pursuing different objectives in the development of their
strategic partnership. As an organisation comprised of various member-states
that espouses ‘the shared ideals of democratic institutions, human rights, the
protection of minorities and the rule of law’,37 the EU will obviously seek to
promote these ideals, both in its internal and external relations. However, it is
likely to face considerable difficulties in attempting to link these ‘values’ to
reforms in countries that perhaps have a completely different value set and are
more focused on developing their economies and raising the standard of living,
rather than adhering to ‘European’ norms and values. The three South
Caucasus states are sovereign entities that will seek to protect and further
their own national interests, hence the divergence in the approaches of the two
actors.
Whilst Georgia is keen to encourage the EU’s participation in the region,
Armenia and Azerbaijan are slightly more wary, concerned about balancing
their relations with the regional powers, particularly Russia. One of the
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worrying implications of the ENP and the EU’s deepening involvement in the
South Caucasus, particularly within conflict resolution issues, is the potential
for a wide gulf to open up between Russia and the EU, as Russia is involved in
all conflicts in the region, to varying degrees. Russia’s role as a mediator must
be fostered within the OSCE Minsk Group framework and as one of the
principal regional actors. Moscow holds the key to the resolution of territorial
disputes in the South Caucasus, both in terms of its relationship with the
various parties and the mediating role it purports to play. Fundamental issues
remain unresolved and the threat of renewed hostilities persists, as the
separatist leaderships remain entrenched in intransigent positions, with little
incentive to participate in negotiations while they have the security of Russian
backing. Moscow has a very positive role to play as the major economic and
military power, but it needs to move away from its traditional geopolitical view
of the region towards a more cooperative and consensual approach.
The EU has its limitations as an organisation and perhaps greater
involvement in the South Caucasus is a step too far. It has numerous other
commitments both within its own borders and abroad. This raises the question
as to whether it actually wants to become more involved in conflict resolution
on its periphery and what it is capable of achieving. Perhaps it is more
comfortable making rhetorical statements and awaiting settlement, rather than
participating in negotiations and providing peacekeeping contingents. The costs
of deepening engagement with the region may well far outweigh any benefits.
What could the EU do to boost its involvement in conflict resolution efforts
in the South Caucasus? It needs to redouble its commitment to stability and
democracy in countries in the region, as well as its involvement in the search for
acceptable solutions to the long-running disputes. In addition to providing
financial assistance for rehabilitation and confidence building, it should
promote the negotiation process and advocate the necessity of compromise
and consensus. Confidence must be restored and all sides need to express a
willingness to compromise on key issues such as political autonomy and the
rights of refugees. Thus, the organisation needs to further expand the mandate
of the EUSR and take concrete steps towards enhancing the conflict prevention
aspect of its presence in the region. There was some optimism for positive
action in 2006, as the Austrian and Finnish presidencies made it clear that they
intended to consider expanding the role of the EUSR, as well as supporting EU
conflict resolution efforts, but little was actually achieved.38 In May 2006 the
new EUSR for the region, Peter Semneby, underlined the EU’s ‘more active’
interest in resolving conflicts in the South Caucasus, stating that the
organisation now has ‘unlike a few years ago, the military means to support
settlements’.39 However, whilst it may have the means to support settlements, it
does not appear to be in any hurry to employ them. The role of the EUSR, and
consequently that of the EU, is undermined by the fact that it has no active
presence at any of the negotiating mechanisms for the three conflicts (with the
exception of the JCC in South Ossetia). The EU has more leverage than actors
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such as the OSCE. It is developing into a major international player and is a
key trading partner for the South Caucasus countries, giving it considerable
influence. It failed to act promptly and resolutely in the Balkans, but now has
the opportunity to demonstrate its ability to act as an autonomous player that
can strengthen security and stability in its own backyard. However, without a
voice or visibility in key conflict settlement fora, the EU risks remaining a merefinancial donor, as opposed to the important political actor that it aspires to be
on the international stage.
Disclaimer
The analysis, opinions and conclusions expressed or implied in this essay are those of the author
and do not necessarily represent the views of the JSCSC, the UK MOD or any other government
agency.
Notes1 Former NATO General-Secretary Lord Robertson has described the Caucasus as an ‘area of
crucial importance to [Nato’s] common security’, describing them as ‘front-line states’ against the
threats of terrorism, proliferation and regional instability, and ‘important partners in finding
common solutions to these deadly challenges’. Speech by Lord Robertson delivered at the French
University, Yerevan, Armenia on 15 May 2003, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030515a.htm.
All web links last accessed 14 October 2007.2 2331st Council Meeting, General Affairs, 26�27 February 2001, Press Release 6506/01 (Presse 61),
Brussels, www.ue.eu.int.3 European Union, European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, EU, Brussels,
12 December 2003, p. 8.4 ‘Summary of remarks by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, at press briefing
with foreign ministers of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia following political dialogue meetings’
Brussels, 13 December 2005, S411/05, http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/
discours/87535.pdf.5 Report with a proposal for a European Parliament recommendation to the Council on EU policy
towards the South Caucasus (2003/2225(INI)), European Parliament, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy, Rapporteur: Per Gahrton, 2
February 2004, A5-0052/2004, p. 7.6 The Tannock report on the ENP, published in December 2005, described energy policy as an
important aspect of the EU’s policy as ‘the EU is surrounded by the world’s largest oil and
natural gas reserves (Russian and the Caspian basin, the Middle East and North Africa) and
many countries in the neighbourhood . . . are suppliers or . . . transit countries’. Report on the
European Neighbourhood Policy (2004/2166(INI)), European Parliament, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Rapporteur: Charles Tannock, 7 December 2005, A6-0399/2005, p. 10. This reinforced
the opinion of the earlier Gahrton report, which asserted that the South Caucasus region would
become increasingly important for energy supply to the EU.7 European Union, European Security Strategy, pp. 8 and 11. Outlining key threats to the security
of the EU and its member-states, the ESS highlighted the dangers of unresolved conflict: ‘[It] not
only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters
investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions
are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty’, p. 2.8 For an analysis of the ENP and its implications see Roland Dannreuther, ‘Developing the
Alternative to Enlargement: the European Neighbourhood Policy’, European Foreign Affairs
EU Engagement in Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus 371
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Review 11/2 (2006), pp. 183�201; Karen E. Smith, ‘The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood
Policy’, International Affairs 81/4 (2005), pp. 757�773; James Wesley Scott, ‘The EU and ‘‘Wider
Europe’’: Toward an Alternative Geopolitics of Regional Cooperation?’, Geopolitics 10/3 (2005),
pp. 429�454.9 European Parliament Resolution on the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004/2166 (INI)), text
adopted by parliament on 19 January 2006, A6-0399/2005, P6_TA-PROV(2006)0028, http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/fd/deea20060619_08c/deea20060619_08
cen.pdf, p. 8. The resolution also called for the OSCE Minsk Group to more effectively
coordinate their action with the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus in
order to progress the negotiation process.10 Benita Ferrero-Waldner, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy: The EU’s Newest Foreign Policy
Instrument’, European Foreign Affairs Review 11/2 (2006), p. 139.11 The European Commission � External Trade, European Union and its main trading partners:
economic and trade indicators, Armenia: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/
tradoc_113345.pdf; Azerbaijan: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_
113347.pdf; Georgia: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113383.pdf.12 However, she criticised leaders in the region for their ‘inflammatory rhetoric’ and noted that
‘defence expenditure in the region is going through the roof’. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Political
Reform and Sustainable Development in the South Caucasus: The EU’s Approach. Speech delivered
at ‘Caspian Outlook 2008’ Bled Strategic Forum, 28 August 2006, Speech/06/477, http://
ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/ferrero-waldner/index_en.htm.13 See EU/Armenia Action Plan (Final), November 2006, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/
action_plans/armenia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf, p. 1; EU/Azerbaijan Action Plan (Final), November
2006, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/azerbaijan_enp_ap_final_en.pdf, p. 1; EU/
Georgia Action Plan (Final), November 2006, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/
georgia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf, p. 1.14 EU financial aid to the country increased significantly post-2003 and in 2004 the European
Commission utilised its Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) to support Georgia’s democratisa-
tion, providing t4.65m.15 EU/Georgia Action Plan (Final), pp. 10 and 17.16 Secessionist campaigns in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were revived during the national
revitalisation movement at the end of the 1980s when the renewed upsurge of Georgian
nationalism during Mikhail Gorbachev’s era of perestroika increased inter-ethnic tensions within
the Soviet republic, as manifold national groups were permitted free expression throughout the
USSR and the manipulation of ethnic affiliation became a key dynamic in political life. Both
regions have traditionally been suspicious of the Georgian state, fearing what is perceived to be
Georgian ‘chauvinism’ that threatens a loss of ethnic identity.17 BBC Monitoring (online version), Imedi TV, Tbilisi, 16:02GMT, 9 September 2005.18 Novyie Izvestiya, 4 February 2004, pp. 1�4.19 The OSCE (then CSCE) established a mission in Georgia on 6 November 1992 with the primary
task of bringing conflicting parties in the country’s separatist conflicts closer. In 1994, its mandate
in South Ossetia was expanded to facilitate cooperation with and among the parties concerned
and, with their consent, monitor the Joint Peacekeeping Forces. More recently it has been
involved in projects to reduce the number of small arms in the region. For further information see
Farian Sabahi and Daniel Warner (eds), The OSCE and the Multiple Challenges of Transition
(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2004).20 EU/Georgia Action Plan (Final), p. 17.21 The republic was de facto independent during the 1920s, before Stalin incorporated it into
Georgia and encouraged ethnic Georgians to migrate to the region. Consequently, by 1989
Abkhazians only constituted 18 per cent of the population, while ethnic Georgians accounted for
46 per cent, unlike other regions where the ethnic group seeking independence was in the
majority. Gamsakhurdia took a more conciliatory approach in relations with Abkhazia than with
South Ossetia and avoided all-out war. However, his successor, Shevardnadze, was far more
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confrontational and, with both sides refusing to compromise, war broke out in 1992. The
Georgian forces were defeated by the end of 1993 and the 1994 Moscow agreement formalised a
ceasefire, providing a legal basis for the introduction of a CIS peacekeeping force that is made up
of around 1,700 Russian peacekeepers, together with the establishment of a UN observer mission
(UNOMIG) to monitor the agreement.22 BBC Monitoring (online version), 11 January 2005, NTV Mir, Moscow, 10:00GMT, 11 January
2005.23 BBC Monitoring (online version), 19 August 2005, ITAR-TASS news agency, Moscow,
10:15GMT, 19 August 2005.24 ‘Steps to Reform UN Should Unite, Not Divide, International Community, General Assembly
Told’, Sixtieth General Assembly, Plenary, 5th and 6th Meetings, GA/10384, Department of
Public Information, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/ga10384.doc.htm.25 Tensions flared between Russia and Georgia at the end of 2004 when Moscow refused to extend
the OSCE border monitoring mandate, which covered Georgia’s border with the Chechen,
Ingush and Dagestani republics, arguing that the missions had completed their tasks and were no
longer required. The mandate expired at midnight on 31 December 2004.26 European Commission Delegation to Georgia, ‘Abkhazia: Planned Projects’, www.delgeo.
cec.eu.int/en/programmes/Abkhazia.htm#A1.27 For further details see Michael P. Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and
Implications (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998); Svante E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers:
A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus (London: Routledge, Curzon, 2001); Thomas
de Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War (New York: New York
University Press, 2003).28 In December 2004 Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed Russia’s readiness to act as a
mediator and guarantor in the conflict, an idea rejected by Azerbaijan, as Russia is perceived to
be a strong ally of Armenia and therefore liable to act in Armenia’s interests. At the beginning of
2005 the US State Department issued a statement on the conflict in which it stated its
commitment to advancing a peaceful settlement and its support for Azerbaijan’s territorial
integrity. See The United States and the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, Fact Sheet, Bureau of
European and Eurasian Affairs, US Department of State, Washington DC, 7 February 2005,
www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/41401.htm.29 Speaking in London on 13 December 2004, Ilham Aliyev declared that the Nagorno Karabakh
issue should be put on the ‘permanent agenda’ of international organisations in order to
help establish peace in the region. BBC Monitoring Select Central Asia and South Caucasus,
14 December 2004, p. 15, MPA news agency, Baku, 14 December 2004.30 BBC Monitoring Select Central Asia and South Caucasus, 27 January 2005, p. 12, Turan news
agency, Baku, 16:16GMT, 27 January 2005.31 Country Strategy Paper 2002�2006. Tacis National Indicative Programme 2002�2003. Azerbaijan.
Adopted by the European Commission on 27 December 2001, pp. 13�14.32 Nicu Popescu, ‘The European Union and Conflicts in the South Caucasus’, 8 January 2007,
www.caucaz.com.33 EU/Armenia Action Plan (Final), p. 9.34 Politicians there have been pushing for Turkish recognition of the mass killing of Armenians in
1915 as a ‘tragedy’ and in October 2006 the French lower house of parliament passed a bill
making it a crime to deny that the mass killing of Armenians in 1915 was ‘genocide’, although the
bill is unlikely to become law as the Senate has no plans to consider it.35 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on strengthening
the European Neighbourhood Policy, COM (2006) 726 Final, 4 December 2006, p. 2.36 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on strengthening
the European Neighbourhood Policy, p. 9.37 Romano Prodi, ‘Russia and the European Union � Enduring Ties, Widening Horizons’, speech
delivered on 23 April 2004, Tretyakov Gallery, Moscow � http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/
external_relations/news/prodi/sp04_198.htm.
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38 See Operational Programme of the Council for 2006 submitted by the incoming Austrian and
Finnish Presidencies, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 22 December 2005, 16065/05,
POLGEN 51, p. 53.39 Celia Chauffour, ‘Peter Semneby: A more active interest of the EU in resolving the conflicts’,
21 May 2005, www.caucaz.com.
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