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The Chad/Cameroon projectis not the help we asked for
or needed. In theabsence of the rule of law
and respect for humanrights and the
environment, financing oflarge-scale oil development
is destroying theenvironment and us.
Help!
Archibishop Desmond Tutu
‘‘
We have radically trans-formed the way we do busi-ness. A persistent focus onquality has vastly improved
the effectiveness of billions ofdollars of Bank lending.
Mr. James D. WolfensohnPresident of the World Bank
(The World Bank Annual Report 2001)
Association Tchadienne pour la Promotion et la Défense desDroits de l’Homme, Chad
Centre pour l’Environnement et le Developpement, Cameroon
Environmental Defense, USA
June 2002
The Chad-Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project:
A Call for Accountability
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At a Glance: The Chad-Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project
The single largest investment in Africa today.
Total Estimated Costs US $ 3.7 billion
Main Activities:· Drilling of 300 oil wells in the Doba fields of southern Chad.· Construction of a 650-mile pipeline from Doba through
Cameroon to the Atlantic.· Building of a marine pipeline at Kribi to a floating storage offloading (FSO) vessel.· Production of 225,000 barrels of oil per day.
Expansion of Activities:The built-in capacity of the pipeline is an incentive tospread oil exploration to other areas in the region. Activeexploration is now occurring near Sarh in southern Chadand may move into the Central African Republic andNorthern Cameroon. No comprehensive or regionalenvironmental and social assessments have been carriedout.
Project Finance (February 2002): Africa Oil and GasDeal of the Year 2001 "The World Bank Group hadalready pledged its commitment, stated as crucial insecuring the other players and allowing the project tomove forward."
Financial Structure & Role of the World BankPrivate Sector Project Sponsors:ExxonMobil (40%)Petronas- Malaysia (35%)Chevron (25%)
The Consortium has made World Bank participation apre-condition for the project for reasons of political riskinsurance and to attract financing from other public andprivate sources.
"…an unprecedented frame-work to transform oil wealth
into direct benefits for the poor" World Bank Press Release
on Approval of Project
June 6, 2000
World Bank Group:IBRD-loans : $93 million IFC - $100 million direct loan and mobiliza-tion of an additonal $300 million in syndicat-ed loans from commercial banks
World Bank's participation led to:European Investment Bank (EIB) loan ofEuros 144 million
Export-Credit-Agencies:U.S. Export-Import Bank - $200 millionCOFACE (France) - $200 million
Commercial lead arranging banks:ABN-AmroCredit Agricole Indosuez
Official Project Montoring Reports: A two track project in which environmentaland social considerations are left behind?
International Advisory Group (www.gic-iag.org).
External Compliance Monitoring Group(www.ifc.org).
Korinna Horta, Environmental Defense, U.S.Samuel Nguiffo, Center for Environment and Development, CameroonDelphine Djiraibe, Association Tchadienne pour la Promotion et Defénse des Droits de l'Homme, Chad
We extend our heartfelt thanks to the contributors to this report. All of them have been active for sev-eral years to promote the inclusion of human rights, social, environmental, public health, labor and legalperspectives in the design and implementation of this project.
Dobian Assingar, Human Rights representative on the Oversight Committee for the Oil RevenueManagement Law, Chad
Hélène Ballande, Les Amis de la Terre, FranceSusanne Breitkopf, Urgewald, GermanyMarion Hellmann and Geneviève F. Kalina, International Federation of Building and Woodworkers,
Geneva, SwitzerlandSteve Hilbert, Catholic Relief Services, CameroonMgr. Patrick Lafon, Secretary General, Catholic Conference of CameroonSusan Leubuscher, Jurist, Brussels, BelgiumIrène Mandeau, Amnesty International, GermanyJohn Nelson, Forest Peoples Program, U.K.Félix Devalois Ndi Ongbwa, Center for Environment and Development, Lolodorf, CameroonPeter Rosenblum, Human Rights Program, Harvard Law School, U.S.Emilie Thenard, Center for International Environmental Law, U.S.Raphael Yimga, Center for Environment and Development, CameroonMartin Zint, Erdoel AG, Germany
Many organizations and individuals in both Chad and Cameroon are working with dedication, compe-tence and courage to help ensure that social justice and environmental protection will not remain emptywords as Africa's largest investment project is transforming their countries for generations to come. Thiswork often involves great personal risks to the individuals involved. They and the organizations around theworld which support them deserve our gratitude.
Finally we wish to thank Archbishop Desmond Tutu for his repeated expressions of concern about thisproject. Our deep gratitude also goes to Jeanne Noua, the admirable leader of the Bakola people in Ndtouavillage in Cameroon. There are many individuals around the world who are involved in helping to ensurethat environmental and social safeguards will be effective in this project. We thank them all. Amongstthose who know the region well and deeply care about its people are Hans Determeyer, Sharon Courtoux,Martin Petri and Ian Gary. A special thanks to Irène Mandeau, whose dedication, wisdom and energy are aguiding light for many of us.
Last, but not least, we thank Hélène Ballande and Emily Miller of Friends of the Earth France and KenWalsh and Bruce Rich of Environmental Defense for their support in producing both the English andFrench language versions of this report.
Delphine DjiraibeAssociation Tchadienne pour la Promotion etDéfense des Droits de l'Homme - ATPDH, Chad Korinna HortaEnvironmental Defense, U.S.Samuel NguiffoCenter for Environment and Development - CED CameroonTaking Stock: Two Years After World Bank Approval of the Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Mgr. Patrick LafonSecretary General, Catholic Conference of CameroonThe Concerns of the Church . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
Dobian AssingarNGO-Representative on the Oversight Commmitteefor the Revenue Management Law, ChadThe Oversight Committee: A Ghost Institution . . .9
Peter RosenblumHuman Rights Program, Harvard Law School, U.S.Analysis of Chad's Revenue Management Law . . .9
Susan LeubuscherJurist, Brussels, BelgiumConventions of Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Raphael Yimga and Steve HilbertCenter for Environment and Development /Catholic Relief Services, CameroonEnvironmental and Social Questions: Business as Usual? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Felix Devalois Ndi OngbwaCenter for Environment and Development,Lolodorf, CameroonThe Impact of the Pipeline on People and theEnvironment in Ocean Province . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
John NelsonForest Peoples Programme, U.K.Impacts on the Bagyeli People in South West Cameroon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
Hélène BallandeFriends of the Earth, FranceA Silenced Public Health Disaster . . . . . . . . . . .18
Irène MandeauAmnesty International, GermanyThe Human Rights Situation in Chad and Cameroon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
Marion Hellmann and Geneviève F. KalinaInternational Federation of Building andWoodworkers, SwitzerlandChronology of a Badly Managed World Bank Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
Susanne BreitkopfUrgewald Cameroon/GermanyWorld Bank Response: Public Relations Replaces Analysis . . . . . . . . . . .21
Emily ThenardCenter for International Environmental Law, U.S.Chadians File a Complaint to the World Bank's Inspection Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
Martin ZintErdoel A.G., GermanyA Visit to the Oil Fields in February 2002 . . . .24
Sources of Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
Contents:
1
Taking Stock: Two Years After World Bank Approval of the ProjectTwo years
after approval ofAfrica's singlelargest invest-ment, which isoften consideredto be a modelfor public/pri-vate sector part-nership, it istime to takestock. The voic-es of the institu-tions and organ-
izations represented in this report are sending urgent dis-tress signals from social, environmental, public health,human rights and legal perspectives. Both non-govern-mental-organizations in the field and official projectmonitoring reports agree that we are faced with a two-speed project. While construction activities by the OilConsortium advance on schedule, regional developmentplans, social and environmental protections and capacity-building are seriously lagging behind and may neverbecome effective. The entire rationale of the project asa contribution to development of one of the poorestregions in Africa has now come into question.
The problems described in this report require imme-diate remedial actions which are primarily the responsi-bility of the World Bank, whose financing made the proj-ect possible. Urgent remedial actions take on additionalweight as the ExxonMobil-led Oil Consortium is expand-ing exploratory activities outside of the Doba Basin, cov-ered by the current project. New oil development willalso use the World Bank-financed pipeline and must besubject to the institution's environmental and social stan-dards and included in the goal of transparent revenuemanagement.
Furthermore, as this project now threatens to go "offthe rail", we need to draw important lessons concerninglong-overdue institutional reforms which will render theWorld Bank accountable for failed development promises.
A key-lesson re-emerging from the experience todate with the Chad/Cameroon project is that public finan-cial institutions must carry out a transparent analysis ofthe political environment and its socio-economic andhuman rights dimensions in the countries where they
operate. Investment decisions which fail to do so are like-ly to contribute to environmental degradation and to fur-ther distorting the societies in the countries concerned.
The World Bank's willful naivete concerning endem-ic corruption, the lack of basic democratic rights and theviolation of human rights in both Chad and Cameroonhas contributed to the high risk situation the project facesnow.
The following briefly reviews the background of theproject, the promises made, current risks, the findings ofofficial monitoring entities and the role of the WorldBank.
BackgroundOn June 6, 2000 the World Bank's Board of
Executive Directors approved the Chad/Cameroon Oiland Pipeline project which will have far-reaching conse-quences for the people and the environment of Chad andCameroon for generations to come. On the same occa-sion, the Board also approved financing for the threetechnical assistance projects, the "Cameroon: PetroleumEnvironment Capacity Enhancement Project", the "ChadManagement of the Petroleum Economy Project" and the"Chad: Petroleum Sector Management Capacity BuildingProject." The intentions of these projects are to developthe technical capacity and build the institutions in Chadand Cameroon to enable the countries to deal with budg-etary issues (Chad) as well as the complex environmen-tal and social implications of the project.
Approval of the project was preceded by two andhalf years of intense international controversy. Chadianand Cameroonian civil society organizations and thebroad international coalition of NGOs supporting themcalled for a moratorium on financing the project. Ourposition was that the project should not go forward untilthe legal framework and the technical capacity had beenput in place to ensure that oil revenues would be used forsocial development and for the protection of the environ-ment.
In response to international pressure, including con-cerns expressed by several donor governments, the WorldBank requested changes in project design and manage-ment from the governments of Chad and Cameroon andthe Oil Consortium. In addition, the World Bank under-took new commitments of its own. The main changes tothe project included the following:
Delphine DjiraibeAssociation Tchadienne pour laPromotion et Défense des Droitsde l'Homme, Chad
Korinna HortaEnvironmental Defense, U.S.Samuel Nguiffo
Samuel NguiffoCenter for Environment andDevelopment - CED Cameroon
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• The Oil Consortium presented a new 19-volume setof environmental studies, re-routed the pipeline awayfrom two biologically-rich areas, and promised toproduce specific oil spill response plans for the oilfields, pipeline sections and the marine terminal;
• The government of Chad adopted a revenue manage-ment law and established an oversight committee,which includes representatives from civil society, toensure transparent use of oil revenues for povertyalleviation;
• The government of Cameroon agreed to the estab-lishment of two national parks, Mbam-Dejerem andCampo Ma'an, to compensate for biodiversity lossescaused by the pipeline. In addition it agreed to set upa foundation, funded by the pipeline companyCOTCO, to mitigate problems faced by the indige-nous Bakola people whose traditional forests will becrossed by the pipeline;
• The World Bank prepared the three technical capaci-ty-building projects which were approved simultane-ously with the Oil project.
• The World Bank established an InternationalAdvisory Group (IAG) of five independent expertsto monitor the implementation of social and environ-mental safeguards of the project.
Risks and Failed Promises• Chad's Revenue Management Law lacks a clear legal
framework. It allows the president of Chad to changerevenue allocation rules five years after adoption ofthe law, i.e., at a time when the stream of oil revenueswill start to be very significant. There appears to be lit-tle political will to let the oversight committee do itswork. Every single step in the establishment of theOversight Committee has been a struggle and theCommittee is not yet effective;
• Compensation and re-establishment of livelihoods foraffected people is a serious problem and many villagersare severely impoverished after their land and otherresources have been taken over by the oil project;
• Environmental problems are not adequatelyaddressed, especially water depletion and pollution,severe dust pollution which is threatening publichealth, and the disappearance of forests and wildlife;
• Protection measures for the indigenous Bagyeli peoplehave not been carried out although the pipeline is nowbeing laid through their traditional homeland;
• Food security is becoming a serious problem as infla-
tion and demand generated by the project are puttingbasic food staples beyond the reach of villagers;
• The public health situation in the oil fields and alongthe pipeline route is becoming more serious with thein-migration of thousands of people in search ofwork. The situation is especially serious with regardsto AIDS, other sexually transmitted diseases, malariaas well as water-borne diseases. The public healthsituation risks becoming catastrophic;
• Labor legislation is not being respected and theInternational Federation of Building and Wood Workersdenounced severe exploitation of workers;
• The establishment of the foundation to finance man-agement of the two national parks and the indigenouspeoples' plan was seriously delayed. Its functioningand the question if its budget will be sufficient to ful-fill its mandate remain unresolved issues.Meanwhile, a logging company is already threaten-ing the Campo Ma'an national park and the indige-nous Bagyeli are being pushed off their land;
Official Project MonitoringMany of the problems highlighted by the contribu-
tions to this report are also reflected in the reports by twoofficial monitoring groups, the External ComplianceMonitoring Group (ECMG), which is under contract withthe International Finance Corporation to monitor compli-ance of the Oil Consortium with the EnvironmentalManagement Plan, and the International Advisory Group(IAG) which has been charged with independent moni-toring of environmental and social safeguards by theWorld Bank.
The following highlights some of their findings.
Report of the External Compliance MonitoringGroup (ECMG) Fourth Site Visit of January 2002(D'Appolonia, March 8, 2002)
The report can be found at www.ifc.org.(Please note that many of the recommendations in
this ECGM report had already been made in previousreports by the ECGM, but that no action has been takenin response)
Food Security"In January 2002, the prices of grain are at least twice
as high as they were in January 2000" (p. 9).
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"There is growing concern among many Governmentofficials in Moundou that the grain shortage and highprices are likely to result in a famine in southeasternChad if vigorous action is not taken shortly" (p. 10).
Regional Development Plan"In-migration is now an actuality and no mitigation
plan is effective, due to various bureaucratic delays withinboth the Government of Chad and the World Bank" (p. 11).
Water Resources"Sufficient information has not been compiled from
which to make a firm determination as to whether theProject is or is not implicating water resources, particular-ly at the Oil Field Development Area (OFDA).... Waterusage is not tracked accurately, specifically at the OFDAwhere significant water withdrawals are to be expected".[According to the EMP mitigation measures are required ifwater consumption reaches 90% of the rates estimated] …"The ECMG was not provided evidence that this processis being followed" (p. 34).
"The placing of pipes across streams temporarilycauses turbid water to flow downstream where it is usedby villagers.… Although the villagers appear to havebeen compensated for this short-term and reversibleimpact, the environmental baseline surveys prior to con-struction did not anticipate impact to village water sup-plies and the Project response has been reactive, ratherthan proactive" (p. 35).
Public HealthIn Kome Atan (Chad): "Garbage is not collected and
sanitation is deteriorating" (p. 12).In Bemboyo (Cameroon): "According to villagers,
the water system constructed by the Project operatesintermittently and is insufficient to meet increasingdemand" (p. 13).
"Living quarters at building L at the TCC main campin Kome are constructed within the minimum require-ments of individual sleeping space, but the significantnumber of its occupants (…) and the lack of internal par-titions create an environment which appears to be highlysusceptible to outbreaks of respiratory diseases" (p. 26).
"The Occupational Health doctor stationed at theBipindi camp clinic has noted that the welders working atthe pipeline construction sites have a relatively highamount of acute respiratory disease, mainly bronchitis andbrochospasm. …Procedures for medical data registration,
processing and analysis do not appear to be consistently inplace" (p. 27).
"The effectiveness of educational material in a com-plex issue as sexually transmitted diseases should be fur-ther evaluated…. The raw data are sent to EMP(Environmental Management Plan) collection points inDouala, N'Djamena and Houston, but the processedinformation is not sent as feedback to the health profes-sionals in the field. The consolidated weekly and month-ly reports do not provide the sufficient detail to analyzethe incidence rates in the various workers and populationgroups" (p. 28).
Additional Loss of Land and Crop Damages"Incremental land is being occupied to accommodate
for the additional needs of the works … The actual num-ber may be higher as damaged crops are not taken intoconsideration in this figure" (p. 17).
Compensation"Some quality problems have been experienced with
bicycles served as part of the in-kind compensation[bicycles were of bad quality and have broken down aftershort periods of use, leading the ECMG to propose thatthere be a guarantee of six months] (p. 20).
"A significant part of the in-kind compensation hasnot yet been paid in Chad" (p. 20).
[Fewer people are requesting in-kind compensation]"It may also be the result of the concerned persons'increasing reluctance to wait a long time for delivery.This is unfortunate, as in-kind compensation is a goodmitigation of such potential negative effects of cash com-pensation as misuse and unfair distribution of benefitswithin the household" (p. 21).
Environmental Foundation"FEDEC (Foundation for Environment and
Development in Cameroon) has the goal of providinglong-term financial support to the two newly establishedNational Parks and to the Bagyeli/Bakola communitythrough the Indigenous Peoples' Plan (IPP). The precisenature, content and size of FEDEC activities has yet to bedefined by its Management Board.…
It should be noted that the FEDEC budget was neverintended to cover all the costs required to operate andensure the protection of the parks" (p. 51).
On potential adverse impacts of logging and associ-ated infrastucture on the Campo Ma'an National Park,
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which include illegal logging and poaching, the ECMGrecommends:
"…the Foundation should assess the proposed man-agement plan developed by the logging company, andscreen and include suitable additional measures to mini-mize the impact within the FEDEC Campo-Ma'an pro-gram" (p. 53).
Capacity-Building Projects"In summary, government capacity required to fulfill
its obligations has not yet been put in place and the slowpace of the Capacity Building project is incompatiblewith the current development of the Consortium's oilfield and pipeline project. Specifically, field monitoringat the work sites (roads, Mbere bridge, drilling sites,monitoring of socio-economic issues) has been minimal"(p. 46).
International Advisory Group: First Mission Report 1, September 28, 2001 and SecondMission Report of December 21, 2001(The reports can be found at www.gic-iag.org)
Two-Speed Project"Most of the national capacity building programmes
have been announced, but many have failed to develop atthe same pace as the consortium's work" (Rep. 1, p. 3).
"The World Bank and both governments must accel-erate the start-up of the institutional development pro-grammes. They must also immediately design the neces-sary measures to ensure catching-up in the mid-term"(Rep. 1, p. 7).
"More generally, we note a lack of progress on all issuesrelating to capacity-building…" (Rep. 2, p. 4).
"Regional planning is still at a standstill despite hes-itant progress in preparing the process" (Rep. 2, p. 5).
"The World Bank is seriously called to account inthis regard: its capacity to supply the requested assistanceto institutions in a timely manner, especially in Chad,could compromise the most important factor in the eco-nomic and social success of the project" (Rep. 2, p. 10).
Security Concerns"Discipline and respect for law on the part of all who
bear arms therefore remain a source of concern" (Rep. 1,p. 4).
"The circulation of weapons of war and uniformed
persons that seem to commit numerous exactions consti-tutes a source of concern for the populations who fear areturn to uncertain times…" (Rep. 1, p. 14).
Lack of Communication"A general and persistent problem is the absence of
effective communication between the main stakeholders"(Rep. 1, p. 10).
"The level of information available to the populationsand their representatives, and the degree of awareness ofenvironmental issues related to the project as well as thoseof a broader nature is weak" (Rep. 1, p. 17).
"For example, partners as prominent as parliamentar-ians have reported a lack of information and eveninvolvement" (Rep. 2, p. 8).
Access to Project Documentation"Since these studies [baseline data] constitute the
very basis of the social and environmental analysis, it isessential that they be available to interested persons andinstitutions, including the IAG. If there are still seriousshortcomings, it is important that the gap be filled beforeconstruction activities are further advanced.Governments and the World Bank must make haste inthis matter without further delay" (Rep. 1, p. 15).
"Data on water management must be consolidated toaddress the main concerns, including those of the fisher-men at Kribi and those of the major rivers…" (Rep. 1, p.15).
"The accessibility of project documentation to allinterested parties remains inequitable. …Certain requestsfor information made by the IAG to the World Bankremain unanswered" (Rep. 2, p. 5).
Environmental Protection/ Indigenous Peoples"Protection for the fishing industry against the effects
of a spill at sea, for example, has not been on the agenda"(Rep. 2, p. 8).
"FEDEC still lacks an action plan, which is supposedto enable the effective start-up of its activities benefitingthe National Parks of Campo Ma'an and Mbam etDjerem, jointly with the Minstry of the Environmental,and those benefiting the Bakola populations, under theaegis of the Indigenous Peoples Plan (Rep. 2, p. 8).
Public Health/Prostitution"Another phenomenon, which is no less important
and may well take on worrisome proportions, is prostitu-
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tion among young female minors. Adult prostitutionalready poses a control and surveillance problem for offi-cial services. Prostitution involving minors, practicedmost often in an occasional manner, present even greaterrisks in terms of public health …” (Rep. 2, p. 6).
Abandonment of Schools[Concerning new risks] "One of the key issues in this
regard involved reported closings of several classes,especially community schools, because teacher defec-tions and students abandoning classes, all attracted to theincomparable gains to be drawn from oil-related jobs,even temporary ones” (Rep. 2, p. 6).
The World Bank's Credibility is on the LineThe warning signs were all there: Wide-spread cor-
ruption, political repression, systematic violation ofhuman rights and a demonstrated lack of commitment onpart of the governments of Chad and Cameroon to reducepoverty and protect the environment.
During the World Bank's Board discussion of theproject, some members raised significant concerns aboutthe viability of the project as a poverty alleviation instru-ment. The United States representative stated that theproject may well represent a "defining moment in WorldBank history" and added:
"On a broader plane we must expect that it [theproject] will also unquestionably be a prism throughwhich the world views the institution and, it is likely,development assistance more broadly. The stakes couldnot be higher" (U.S. Statement of June 6, 2000).
Yet after receiving assurances from World Bankmanagement that "The project provides a unique oppor-tunity for IFC and Bank to play a significant comple-mentary role in reducing poverty in one of Africa'spoorest regions" (Project Appraisal Document -PAD, p.12) and that the risks had been adequately addressed, thegovernments represented on the World Bank's Boardunanimously, with the notable exception of Italy,approved financing for the project.
This is not a project where Bank managementcan make the traditional argument that the projectwould have gone ahead without World Bank involve-ment and that its participation is improving whatwould otherwise be an environmentally and sociallyquestionable project. The Oil Consortium, the finan-cial press, and the Bank's PAD emphasize that the pri-vate sector sponsors (ExxonMobil, Chevron and
Petronas) as well as the export credit agencies and com-mercial lenders would not proceed with the projectwithout World Bank Group participation (PAD, p. 22).The Oil Consortium's reasons for World Bank Groupco-financing as a pre-condition for the project weretwo-fold: a) it provides political risk insurance for theOil Consortium in a volatile region and b) the WorldBank's seal of approval motivates other public and pri-vate financial institutions to invest in the project.
In view of this situation, the World Bank's realisticanalysis of the potential consequences of a project of thismagnitude would have been of the utmost importance.The Project Appraisal Document (PAD) is meant to be adetailed and honest assessment of a project on the basisof which Executive Directors decide whether a projectshould be financed or not. However, the PAD for theChad/Cameroon project appears to be more a marketinginstrument for the project than an objective document. Itsincomplete, if not misleading, claims deserve seriousquestioning on part of World Bank Board members.
Examples of this are:
Democratic Institutions"Chad has successfully put in place democratic
political institutions" (PAD, p. 121).This claim may put a smile on the faces of Chad's
dictator and his ruling clan but does not correspond toreality. Reports from national NGOs state that there is nodemocracy and rule of law, extra-judicial killings, unlaw-ful arrests and insecurity are increasing. Heads of oppo-sition political parties have been killed or arrested andtortured by government security forces.
The U.S. State Department describes the situation inthe year of project approval (and in subsequent years) asone where "State security forces continue to commitextra-judicial killings, and they torture, beat, abuse andrape persons… The government threatened journalistswith legal retaliation for anti-government articles…Authorities banned demonstrations critical of the govern-ment despite being notified in advance as required bylaw." (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy,Human Rights and Labor, 1999 Country Reports onHuman Rights, 2000 Country Reports on Human Rightsand 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.The reports can be found at www.state.gov/).
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Environmental Management "The governments will have
primary responsibility for themanagement of the indirectimpacts and for monitoring andevaluation of the environmentalmanagement plans" (PAD, p. 30).
The World Bank and theenvironmental assessment stud-ies do not, however, provide adetailed analysis of the existingcapacity of both governments todeal with a project of this com-plexity and magnitude. In thecase of Cameroon where envi-ronmental impacts as a result ofpipeline construction are moresevere, the World Bank ignoresthe findings of its ownOperations Evaluation Depart-ment (OED) which documents indetail the lack of environmentalcredibility of the Camerooniangovernment and the WorldBank's own strategic mistakes:"The Bank rightly recognizedinstitutional weaknesses inCameroon, but preferred to relyon technical assistance to dealwith the issue. Failure to developlocal institutions undermines thesustainability of any achieve-ments in this context" (OEDReport No. 21245, p. 50"Cameroon Forest SectorDevelopment in a DifficultPolitical Economy: AnEvaluation of Cameroon's ForestDevelopment and World BankAssistance" 2000. The report canbe found at http://www.worldbank.org/html/oed).
The capacity building proj-ects which were approved simul-taneously with the oil project aremeant to address some of theproblems. However, there is
broad agreement among development aid agencies that capacity and insti-tution-building require long-term sustained efforts. Clearly, capacity build-ing should have preceded the project and the lack of proper sequencing hasnow led to a two-speed project in which social and environmental measuresare seriously delayed and may not become effective.
In-migration of cattle herders
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Village near oil fields southern Chad
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Public ConsultationAccording to the PAD, an essential component of
addressing project risks in both Chad and Cameroon is"…broad-based public consultation on all aspects ofproject design" (PAD, p. 30). Furthermore the PADstates: "The private sponsors and Governments haveundertaken extensive consultation with local NGOs andthe public" and "Consultation with potentially affectedpeoples, agencies and other stakeholders, includingNGOs, began in this project in 1993" (PAD, p. 32). Thereport fails to mention that these "consultations" in the oilproducing region usually took place in the presence ofarmed military guards. Villagers in the region are trau-matized by major massacres committed by the military in1998 and 1999. The PAD ignores Amnesty International'sreports on the killings of unarmed civilians or the gener-al climate of fear and intimidation in the region. The PADdescribes an idealized consultation process ignoringbasic realities, such as the fact that EPOZOP, a localNGO working closely with affected people, was forced tosuspend its activities for lack of government approval.EPOZOP had undertaken extensive surveys showing thatcompensation payments were dismally low.
A Model Project?One of the key
goals of the project list-ed in the PAD is that it"provide a model foranalyzing and mitigat-ing environmental andsocial impacts forpetroleum operations,as well as for large-scale infrastructureand other investments"(PAD, p. 8).
We fully supportthis goal but it isalready becoming clearthat the project is turn-ing into a model in anegative sense becauseinstitutional, environ-mental and social meas-ures are seriouslyfalling behind whileconstruction is allowed
to go forward at a rapid pace. The monitoring reportsclearly show that the project is now shifting awayfrom its initial poverty reduction objectives to riskmanagement objectives.
We must learn the lessons from the experience thatthe Chad/Cameroon Oil and Pipeline project providesbefore further oil development takes place in the regionwhich will use the same pipeline. In Chad, oil explorationhas begun in the Bassin de Dosseo in the Sarh region. Inaddition, the President of the Central African Republic(CAR) has announced that CAR's oil will start passingthrough the pipeline in 2005. Certainly, World Bank envi-ronmental and social standards must be fully applied inthe context of new oil development that will use thepipeline infrastructure put in place by the World BankGroup.
The present report is a contribution from civil socie-ty organizations in both North and South to show wherethe Chad/Cameroon project is failing. Our goal is toobtain urgent remedial measures and to help ensure thatthe same problems will be avoided in other large-scaleinvestments with potentially devastating impacts on theenvironment and human society.
Lobe Falls near Kribi
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The Concerns of the ChurchMany peo-
ple, even Chris-tians, are quiteunaware of therich social teach-
ing of the Church. It has its roots in the Bible, and theFathers of the Church and takes it as a given that humanbeings are not disembodied creatures. Christ comes tosave the whole man, body and soul. The concerns of theChurches for social justice and the proper organization ofsociety should, therefore, be seen as evangelical ratherthan an unwelcome intrusion into alien territory.Gradually this is being understood in Chad andCameroon. In a joint letter released to the public inOctober 1999, the Christian Churches of Cameroon artic-ulated four concerns that needed to be addressed beforeproject approval if the Chad/Cameroon oil project was tohave a hope for a positive impact on the lives of theimpoverished people of these countries: • the proper use of oil revenues for development and
poverty reduction;• the question of a just compensation for those who
would lose land, property and other assets because ofthe project;
• the meaningful involvement of Civil SocietyOrganizations (CSOs) including the Churches inmonitoring all aspects of the project;
• the proper management of the environment given theenormous potential for disaster;
Besides our international partners, the CatholicBishops of Chad received a copy of this document.Their Christmas-New Year Appeal of January 2000echoed these same concerns. Before and since theapproval of the project, the Catholic Churches ofCameroon and Chad have continued advocacy aroundthe above issues. This explains the visits of the authormade to the World Bank, the US Treasury Department,the US State Department and the US CatholicConference of Bishops in May and June of 2000 and inNovember 2001, as well as the work of the CatholicChurch in Chad, such as, the meeting between theArchbishop of N'djamena and the InternationalAdvisory Group (IAG) on the 16 November 2001.
The evolution of the project so far has proved that theChurches were right in the questions they raised:• To the embarrassment of the World Bank, the
Chadian government used $4.5 million of a $25 mil-lion dollar bonus given it in March 2001, by the oilconsortium, to buy arms. Problems as far as revenuemanagement is concerned are further outlined in thelatest report, dated 21 December 2001, of theInternational Advisory Group (IAG). Every oneaccepts that neither in Chad nor Cameroon are wedealing with democratic and, therefore, accountableregimes, the pretense of periodic "elections" notwith-standing. Questions of governance and corruptionmust remain on the table.
• The compensation issue would seem to have been thebest addressed so far, even if regional compensationis lagging behind, and corrupt government officialsare despoiling individuals of their just dues.
• No one can question that the active involvement ofCSOs especially the Churches and their partners, hasconsiderably enhanced the quality of the project.
• In order to respond to various questions raised as tothe management of the environment, various plansand projects have been mooted. So far, these aremostly on paper. Even basic information about theenvironmental aspects of the project remain difficultto obtain.
• When we consider that the implementation of theproject is already well underway, this is disquietingand has given the Church one further responsibility.With the support of Catholic Relief Services, and inconjunction with other Cameroonian CSOs, allparishes along the entire nine hundred kilometers ofthe pipeline are being prepared and trained to moni-tor implementation of the project.
One thing is certain: the Churches are in this for thelong haul and will continue to monitor the project veryclosely. Carrying out these responsibilities would bemuch more difficult and less effective if our internation-al partners, Catholic Relief Services, the United StatesCatholic Conference of Bishops and others were notengaged with us.
Mgr. Patrick LafonSecretary General, CatholicBishops Conference of Cameroon
9
The Oversight Committee: A Phantom InstitutionPublication
of law #001/PR/99 aboutthe managementof oil revenueswas the result of
concerns expressed by civil society organizations and theWorld Bank about the non-orthodox management meth-ods and practices of the Chadian government.
The efficiency of an institution like the OversightCommittee is measured by the determination of its con-stituent members to assume their role, the political will ofthe country's leaders to let this institution work, the avail-ability of material and financial means and a clear andstrong legal framework.
As a member of the Oversight Committee, I knowthat, of all these elements there has been a determinationon the part of the members of the Oversight Committeeto fulfill their role. This determination has led to themobilization of all members around the issues and prin-ciples such as the adoption of the decree of application,the establishment of clear rules and procedures for theOversight Committee and, above all, the need forapproval by the Oversight Committee of the spending ofthe unspent balance of the oil bonus received by the gov-ernment upon signing of the contract with the oil consor-tium. As long as the application decree had not beenadopted, we unanimously refused to give into govern-mental pressure to agree to use the remaining balance ofthe bonus.
I witnessed, as did the World Bank, the tricksemployed by the government surrounding publication ofthe application decree of law # 001. Under pressure from
the World Bank, the application decree was finally pub-lished but pre-dated to cover the bad intentions of thegovernment. The application decree is far from permit-ting the fulfillment of the tasks of the members of theOversight Committee who sought real independence anda strong mandate in order to be able to control all oil rev-enues accruing to the Chadian government and not onlyrevenue from the three oil fields of Komé, Bolobo, andMiandoum. In the meantime, the consortium has alreadyexpanded its field activities beyond the Doba Basin.
The government clearly shows bad faith by deliber-ately creating obstacles for the functioning of theOversight Committee. Everything leads us to believethat the government wants to turn this institution into asimple consultative instrument that it can use for its ownbenefit.
Aside from the signing bonus, the first direct oil rev-enues will be received in 2003. However, it is not certainthat in the remaining time (one year), procedural rulesand clear functioning mechanisms for the OversightCommittee will be put place to allow the Committee toeffectively play its role and guarantee the good manage-ment of resources for the well-being of Chadians.
I am appealing to the World Bank to act with respon-sibility and to respect its commitments to turn the Chad-Cameroon oil and pipeline project into a real develop-ment project because the lives of Chadians depend on it.With uncertainty surrounding the establishment of theOversight Committee, the backbone of the Bank's moti-vation for financing the Chad-Cameroon project may bebroken. The World Bank must quickly propose an alter-native to avoid the looming human and environmentaldisaster.
Dobian AssingarRepresentative of Human RightsOrganizations on the OversightCommittee, Chad
Analysis of Chad's Revenue Management Law
Background:The Chad-
C a m e r o o npipeline is a cre-ative attempt to
render the revenue from the exploitation of naturalresources accessible to poor populations that have histor-ically derived little benefit. It involves a partnership
between private sector interests, the government of Chad,the World Bank and the monitoring efforts of the interna-tional community.
In order to satisfy the demands of the oil companies,the World Bank stepped in with loans to cover the gov-ernment's share of the investment. But the choice ofinvolving the World Bank had far broader significance.By agreeing to the loans, the World Bank has taken upon
Peter RosenblumHuman Rights Program, Harvard Law School, U.S.
10
itself the responsibility of ensuring that the revenuereceived by Chad will be managed equitably (such thatthere will be significant allocation to poverty reductionprograms) and transparently (such that corruption will beminimized). While World Bank loans are frequentlyaccompanied by "conditionalities," this was an unusualintervention into the kind of issue that the Bank general-ly deems to be a sovereign political (rather than econom-ic) matter.
None of these World Bank conditions would havecome into place without tremendous pressure fromdiverse sources in the international community, includinghuman rights groups in Chad and Cameroon, environ-mental organizations and grass roots campaigns. Theinternational community has a continuing interest andobligation in insuring that the revenue from the oil proj-ect is used to meet the needs of the Chadian populationand not to enrich the country's leaders and the companiesin the international oil consortium at their expense.
The Program of ReformsInternational pressure led the World Bank Group to
insist on the establishment of several institutional mech-anisms to oversee the project and to build up capacity tomonitor project activities. These include support for themarkets and public finance, the creation of anInternational Advisory Group (IAG) within the Bank,and the development of a Revenue Management Plan(RMP) under Chadian law. This memo focuses primari-ly on the RMP, but recognizes the potentially importantlink between monitoring by the IAG and the effective-ness of the internal oversight provided under the RMP.
Finance and Free MarketsA number of reforms have already been effected,
including the streamlining of the budgetary cycle, theadoption of two anti-corruption laws (one of which cre-ates a High Court of Justice, while the other establishessignificant financial and criminal penalties), and a reformof the Commercial Code. Nevertheless, the marketsremain a source of concern for the World Bank, whichhas prioritized interventions in this area in the upcomingstructural adjustment loan.
The Creation of the International Advisory Group(IAG)
Although this body can only issue recommendations,
these have significant persuasive power. The two highlycritical reports that the IAG has put forth since its cre-ation have served to mobilize and focus internationalattention, and have generated enough negative publicityto force the World Bank and the Chadian government toseek remedies for some of the most pressing problems.
On the other hand, the IAG has not taken a strongstance on the broader political context of the problems -for example, its first report referred only tangentially tothe violence and corruption that marked the presidentialelections of May 2001 - and the issue of human rights isnot expressly in its mandate. NGOs in Chad, however,insist that the IAG take up human rights violations in itsfuture work, and the body responded favorably to thisrequest in its Work Plan of July 30, 2001.
The Oil Revenue Management Plan (RMP)The RMP, promulgated in January 1999 as the Law
Governing the Management of Oil Revenue, is the meansby which Chad promises to transform oil revenue intosustainable development. The RMP reserves the bulk ofrevenue generated for spending on public health, socialservices, education, rural development and similar proj-ects, it promises transparency in the allocation process,and it creates an independent body (the Committee forthe Oversight and Monitoring of Oil Revenue) to imple-ment these commitments.
However, there are a number of potentially problem-atic provisions within the RMP. To begin with, Article 8gives the President the power to modify the allocation ofrevenue every five years by decree, without input fromParliament. Furthermore, the geographical jurisdiction ofthe RMP is limited to three known oil-bearing fields,excluding Sedigui, where drilling is currently takingplace, and any potential drilling sites that are as yetuntapped.
In addition, the criteria for the allocation of the revenueare extremely imprecise, both with respect to the develop-mental sectors to be addressed, and with respect to theregions of the country where projects will be implemented.The World Bank makes the argument that the criteriashould remain flexible in order to permit them to be adapt-ed to changing development needs and strategies.However, the need for flexibility ought to be weighedagainst Chad's history of corruption, and the ethnic andregional discrimination that has been a constant element inthe volatile internal politics of the factions that have suc-ceeded each other to power over the years.
11
Committee for the Control and Supervision of OilRevenue (CCSOR; Oversight Committee)
The Oversight Committee was envisioned by theRMP as an independent body that would monitor alloca-tion of oil revenue to priority sectors, and authorize with-drawals of the funds for approved projects. From the out-set, the composition of the Committee did not inspireconfidence: it was to be dominated by members appoint-ed by political institutions with a minority of membersfrom outside government. Even after the law was passed,the government showed little interest in establishing theCommittee and rendering it effective: Appointmentswere delayed, essential regulatory powers were notadopted and operating funds were not provided. On topof this, the government pressured the Committee torelease funds without sufficient supporting materials.
In response to many concerns that we raised aboutthe original law establishing the Oversight Committee,the World Bank responded that the problems could beresolved by regulation. The Decree of the Organization,Functioning, and Conditions of Control and Supervisionof the Oil Revenue that established the Committee laggedbehind the passing of the Plan by two years. During thisperiod, the members of the Committee prepared theirown draft, which was discarded by the government andreplaced, initially, with a draft that would have signifi-cantly undermined the Oversight Committee and negatedits ability to function as an independent body. For exam-ple, the Committee would only have been permitted tomeet twice in a year. Following pressure from the WorldBank, a modified Decree was adopted on March 26 2001,and made public on July 18 2001. The election of theCommittee members - from government, parliament, thejudiciary and civil society - took place in October 2001.
The Chadian government's hostile attitude to theRMP and the Oversight Committee are a continuingreminder of the fact that these measures were not adopt-ed willingly, but rather at the insistence of the WorldBank. That Bank has had to intervene at several criticalmoments to prevent grave setbacks. For example, itstepped in when it came to light that so-called "signingbonus" of US$25 million received by the Chadian gov-ernment was being spent by the government withoutoversight, including a significant portion allocated tomilitary expenditures. The World Bank is probably bestpositioned to provide systematic monitoring of the gov-ernment's actions under the RMP, but it is not clear thatthe Oversight Body possesses the independence and the
powers that would enable it to do the work on its own.Chad's previous experiences with administrative
oversight by independent bodies have largely been nega-tive - the government systematically eviscerated theNational Human Rights Commission over the past sever-al years by co-opting its members and tight controllingthe budget. Both of these strategies can be seen in thegovernment's dealings with the Oversight Committee.For example, the committee member representing theSupreme Court was appointed mayor of N'djamena, thecapital of Chad. According to other members of theCommittee, he had played a key role in organizing theCommittee during the struggle to elaborate suitable inter-nal regulations. Given the strong political control overjudicial bodies, he had little choice but to accept the newappointment despite its impact on the Committee.
The government has been particularly stingy withfunding for the Committee. Though it eventually bud-geted a small amount for the fiscal year 2002 (100 mil-lion FCFA), the money was not available to the institu-tion as of the early May 2002.
In spite of such hurdles, the Oversight Committeehas shown initial signs of integrity and resolve. On atleast two occasions, the government attempted to pres-sure the Committee into endorsing proposed expendi-tures. The first request, for disbursement of the balanceof the "signing bonus," was in the form of a simple oraldemand and actually preceded the adoption of the Decreeby which the Committee was set up. The second request,made in December 2001, was through a letter in whichthe government proposed the release of 1 billion FCFA tobuy grain and to build a water tower, without providingany technical dossier that could have enabled theCommittee to monitor expenditure. The Committeerefused both requests.
The Oversight Committee was compelled to developits own procedures for authorization, disbursement andsupervision of expenditure, since none were laid out bythe Decree. Many of the Committee's responsibilitieswere, in fact, delineated in the World Bank loan agree-ment. So, for example, the fact that the Committee's pow-ers to monitor the oil revenue include powers to monitoroil production, thus permitting the Committee to ensurethat the amount declared by the government correspondsto quantities produced and sold, was a direct result of theBank's intervention.
However, without significant recognition and sup-port from the government, the Oversight Committee's
12
powers are sorely limited. Article 29 of the Decree statesthat "the Committee is authorized to obtain, with the fullcooperation of the departments and agencies concerned,the information it needs for the proper conduct of its mis-sion." But this role is purely illusory unless and until theCommittee is given powers including the ability to com-pel production of documents (what is referred to in com-mon law systems as "subpoena" power), or to imposesanctions on agencies or individuals who seek to obstructthe investigation.
The role of the Oversight Committee, ultimately, canonly be complementary to that of the government, ratherthan in opposition to it. In terms of social and economicpolicy, the Committee believes, for the most part, that itcan only monitor its application, and can not be engaged inmaking it. So, for example, most of the members of theCommittee to whom the Harvard Law School team spokebelieved that the process of giving content to the open-ended criteria for allocation of oil revenue was a matterreserved for Parliament. For this reason, the inescapableconclusion is that the success of the Chad-Cameroonpipeline project depends on the integrity of those in powerand their willingness to engage in a truly transparent andpolitically open process.
RecommendationsGeneral Recommendations • More systematic monitoring of every stage of imple-
mentation with permanent links between local moni-tors, international organizations, and the governmentof Chad. This might include• Massive reinforcement of the Oversight
Committee under the Revenue Management Planto enable the hiring of full time staff and acquisi-tion of necessary technical expertise; and
• A permanent role for the International AdvisoryGroup, so that it can interface effectively andcontinuously with the local population, theOversight Committee, and the World Bank.
• International human rights monitoring. Neither theWorld Bank nor other governmental and nongovern-mental institutions are in a position to help insure thesuccess of the project without better monitoring ofthe human rights situation in the country and its rela-tionship to the project. The World Bank is not in aposition to engage in or support systematic monitor-ing of human rights, but the need is vital. It could befilled by the UN Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights, or possibly, by an internationalhuman rights NGO, with experience both in monitor-ing and capacity building.
To improve the operations of the OversightCommittee :• Grant full powers to the Committee to enable it to
obtain documents and testimony or sanction directlythose to refuse to comply.
• In order to increase the institutional independence ofthe Oversight Committee, its financial relationship tothe government must be improved and clarified. Onepossible solution would be for the Committee toapproach external funding sources. It is also the case,however, that funds are available within the WorldBank loan for the specific purpose of reinforcing thefunctioning of the Oversight Committee. Theseshould be placed at the Committee's disposal as soonas possible.
• While the vagueness of the criteria for the allocationof the budget ought to be left to Parliament, it isundeniable that democratic processes in Chad arecompromised by corruption and ethnic and regionaldivisions. One way of mitigating this problem wouldbe to give the Oversight Committee the opportunityto present its views before Parliament at the time ofthe preparation of the budget. Furthermore, the cri-teria for allocation could be indexed to studies ofpoverty indicators, such that poverty reductionstrategies serve as the basis for the government's eco-nomic and social policies, and there is minimal devi-ation.
The World Bank• The World Bank must move beyond its essentially
technical approach to the question of reforming stateinstitutions, and acknowledge what it means to be inpartnership with a repressive political regime in thisproject. When the Bretton Woods Institutions decid-ed to subsidize the reduction of Chad's debt by US$260 million in May 2001, the announcement camejust a few days after the proclamation of the resultsof the presidential elections and the acts of violencewhich followed. If the World Bank ever expressedany reservations to the government, there was cer-tainly no sense that the financial assistance that hadbeen granted to Chad was in jeopardy.
13
Conventions of Establishment
The Con-v e n t i o n s o fEstablishmentwhich are legal
agreements between the Oil Consortium and the govern-ments of Chad and Cameroon extend vast powers to theoil consortium and have far reaching environmentalimplications. But their relationship to the environmentalassessment studies and World Bank environmental poli-cies has not been made explicit.
These Conventions contain provisions that supersedethe national laws on the environment, permitting require-ments and project revenues; international treaties on the
environment and human rights to which Cameroonand/or Chad are Party; and customary land tenure rights.
They block public access to crucial public decisionsin the name of business confidentiality: as “private” con-tracts, the Conventions are protected from scrutiny untilafter they have been agreed by the corporate andGovernment parties.
Convention provisions may apply to any area usedfor project infrastructure, and they remain valid for 25years, with an automatic 25-year renewal envisaged.They apply binding rules to the Governmentsinvolved, but non-binding “industry standards” on theprivate partners.
Susan LeubuscherJurist, Brussels, Belgium
Environmental and Social Questions: Business as Usual?The envi-
ronmental andsocial stakes ofthe Chad/Cam-eroon Oil andPipeline projectcontinue to be
the most visible aspects of the project and reveal contra-dictory interests.
It is doubtlessly for this reason that the pressure ofnational and international public opinion led the WorldBank to make its participation in this controversial proj-ect conditional on a series of commitments by theConsortium and the Chadian and Cameroonian govern-ments.
Several structures have been put in place in order tomonitor the commitments on the social and environmen-tal questions that were solemnly made.
However, despite the triumphalist official discourse,a large number of pertinent facts and situations requirethat we examine what is happening in practice with ref-erence to the environmental and social questions nowthat the project has been underway for over 15 months.
This contribution will present some notable caseswhich will serve to shed light on these painful but littleknown aspects of the construction project. At the sametime, it will demystify the attempt on the part of themultinational companies to create ecologically and
socially responsible profiles for themselves. There isclearly a place here to inquire about the very idea of whatdevelopment means in the context of this project.
The analysis focuses on some of the principal problemsconcerning the environment and the affected populations:
1. CompensationThe debate on the subject of the general conditions
and the implementation of this important aspect of theproject is not new. It is a debate that is never really con-cluded. The Consortium has chosen to "force things" leav-ing unanswered a large number of concerns that were fre-quently expressed by various civil society organizations.
The process of individual compensation, which hasreached its official end, offers a highly controversial pic-ture. This is not surprising. Nevertheless, the Consortiumand the government display total satisfaction despite thenumerous cases in dispute which have not been solved orwere badly solved, the individual and collective frustra-tion, the junk quality of material which was distributed asindividual compensation to certain population groups andthe violation of individual and collective rights, etc.
In the villages traversed by the pipeline, celebrationshave been replaced by less enthusiastic attitudes. A newera of vanquished hope has been created. More than half ofthe monitoring reports on this subject which we havereceived every month since September 2001 have consist-ed primarily of a litany of various of grievances concern-
Raphael Yimga and Steve HilbertCenter for Environment andDevelopment / Catholic ReliefServices, Cameroon
14
ing the Consortium: inaccurate counting of trees, thedestruction of other economic assets, arbitrary evaluationof the age of plants for compensation purposes, other typesof destruction of property which is not taken into accountby the accounting operations, intimidation of individualsand families demanding fair and equitable treatment andthe disappearance of claims, etc..
The communal property compensation procedure tak-ing place is leading in almost all villages to a meeting of thedeaf. Separate from the individual compensation process,communal compensation was intended to be less imposedfrom above and more consultative. Nevertheless, it quick-ly turned out to be mostly a charm operation; the commu-nal process has not even bothered to pretend to be demo-cratic or participatory. Everything is imposed on the com-munities who are forced to chose from a catalogue ofoptions for regional compensation.
The principal reason for disagreement is the inade-quacy of the amounts of compensation attributed to eachvillage, the options in the catalogue and the real needsexpressed by the affected populations.
The COTCO catalogue lists a classroom at the priceof 600,000 F CFA, a health center at 12,000,000 F CFA,a water pipe at 7,500,000 F CFA, a covered market at4,500,000 F CFA, a community house at 7,500,000 FCFA, a soccer field at 1,800,000 F CFA, etc..
All these proposals reflect the needs of the villagersthat were expressed during socio-economic surveys, buthow can any of this be obtained when the regional com-pensation amounts for a large number of concerned vil-lages are less than one million F CFA?
For a region such as the one between Mvengue andKribi, the majority of villages and Pygmy settlements thatare traversed by the pipeline have expressed the need forrural electrification as their regional compensation. TheConsortium refused to listen to this request and justified itsrefusal with the high costs of such an operations. The pop-ulations persist in thinking that there are alternative solu-tions. It is incumbent on the Consortium and the govern-ment to show more good will, especially given the fact thataffected people were not informed about specific limitsduring the local consultations that were held to discusstheir expectations in this regard. In effect, at that time wewere still in the era of vastly overstated promises and prop-aganda which the government and the Consortium makevery good use of with the surreptitious blessing of theWorld Bank. All this reinforces the many feelings of frus-tration at this stage of the project.
The Indigenous Peoples (Bakola/Bagyeli)The establishment of the Foundation for
Development and Environment in Cameroon (FEDEC)within the context of this project was meant to assist withthe management of two new national parks, Mbam-Dejerem and Campo M'an as well as to also handle allspecific questions related to the Bakola/Bagyelo peoples.
Unfortunately, legal status as a public entity, which isnecessary for the Foundation to function well and whichwas announced and promised by the government, wasactually not obtained until about one year after construc-tion of the pipeline had begun.
This means that before the Foundation could begin tofunction, a whole range of problems that should havebeen solved a year ago, were not handled. Only in a fewcases, and because there was no possibility of waiting,did third parties which did not have this mission, nor thenecessary means, handle some of the problems.
Under such conditions, one can easily imagine thefate of these populations who already are severely mar-ginalized in Cameroon's socio-political life.
The power relationships with their Bantu neighborsand the administrative authorities which concern theaccess to land, civil liberties and living conditions in gen-eral, have been strongly shaken by the oil project. Forexample, some of the Pygmies have seen their land beingsnatched away from them by Bantus who were hoping toincrease their individual compensation payments. It wasunderstood that the Pygmies were excluded from thecompensation process.
The recruitment on the various construction sites forunskilled workers did not take the power relationshipsbetween Bantus and Pgymies into account. As a result theridiculously low number of Pygmy workers should not besurprising.
We may not forget that the project is moving forwardin a context where the debate about citizenship of thisspecific group remains entirely open. Since the founda-tion (FEDEC) was not effectively operational, there wasno interlocutor to advance the cause of these marginal-ized populations.
Waiting for FEDEC to enter its active phase, a wholerange of claims, frustrations, violations, in short injus-tices, have accumulated and are waiting to be resolved inall their complexity.
15
Water PollutionOf the about one hundred villages traversed by the
pipeline, less than 10% have a system for drinking water.This means that the water needs of local peoples havelargely to be met by the more or less drinkable waterfrom the water courses that traverse their villages.
We learned that in the villages of Ngovayang andMpangou during several weeks of pipeline construction,important marshes were severely polluted as well asother sources of water for the use of animals and house-holds in the region.
This situation is aggravated by the fact that treetrunks and branches are being left in the river beds whichleads to putrification from organic materials. One canimagine the consequences of such a situation for peoplewho have absolutely no alternative to obtain qualitydrinking water.
Relationships with Affected PeopleIn addition to the almost classical problems of this
project, a bit like those of projects of a similar size, inde-pendently of contexts, there is a rather latent issue whichputs its stamp on all these problems and which rarely getsdiscussed. Because truth itself is a problem.
The relationships between the Consortium and theaffected people are marked by an environment of stronganimosity. On a daily basis these relationships are reflect-ed in dealings with the sub-contractors and contractorsand in certain time-specific and/or continuous activitiesof the liaison office. Examples include the compensationprocess and a whole range of claims and conflicts as wellas information sessions on the project and the construc-tion itself.
This takes place in a context where local populationsare not organized to defend themselves against varioustypes of threats to their interests. Local people are truedwarfs next to the multinational corporations with theirseemingly unlimited resources.
The Impact of the Pipeline on People and the Environment inOcean Province
T h e a n -nouncement ofthe construction
of a large pipeline project was at first welcomed with joybecause we were hoping for a reduction in unemploy-ment, a decrease in poverty, in short an improvement ofthe living conditions of the local populations. In effect,the public authorities only presented the positive side ofthe project, never mentioning its negative aspects and theproblems that pipeline construction may entail on thesocial, environmental, and cultural levels.
Among these problems, we cite conflicts within fam-ilies and villages, between families, people and villages,air, water and soil pollution, and the destruction of faunaand flora. And even this list is not exhaustive.
This text aims to identify some of the problems.
SOCIAL ASPECTS In its preliminary phase, the Chad-Cameroon
pipeline construction project did not encounter resistancefrom the populations along the pipeline route. But after
the initial identification of the pipeline route and the eval-uation of what would be destroyed, the problems began.During these operations, we became aware of severalconflicts between people arguing over the same piece ofland or between two or more families over a part of theforest, or between two villages deciding their boundaries.This incited tensions that, in certain cases, turned intolawsuits. The verdicts sometimes provoked hate betweenparties. Thus today, people who were once friends arenow ready to kill each other. There have even been mys-terious deaths.
ECONOMIC ASPECTSWith regard to the economic situation, large financial
resources were put at the disposition of the SocieteNationale des Hydrocarbures to pay for compensationsfor the destruction (close to 200,000,000 FCFA for theOcean Province, including the regions of Kribi, Bipindi-Lolodorf, and Mvengue). Around 458 individuals wereconcerned with the compensation payments. Before theoperation, these individuals had an average income of
Felix Devalois Ndi OngbwaCenter for Environment andDevelopment, Lolodorf, Cameroon
16
200 FCFA per day which, for a localpeasant, is sufficient. However afterthe payment, some of the beneficiar-ies receive less than 15 FCFA perday. The causes are simple: the firstlies in the fact that the incomesources of some people (cocoa pro-ducers, coffee producers, etc.) weredestroyed. For others, the receivedsums were used for non-profitableends, such as beverages. Finally forthe last group, this situation is due tothe lack of good management. Howcan one give important sums ofmoney to people without offeringtraining in financial management orwithout profitable micro-projects toinvest in? The result is that peopleare poorer than they have ever been.This poverty carries with it the aban-donment of traditional cultural val-ues and an unhealthy climate in thevillages.
CULTURAL ASPECTS The cultural values of certain
tribes are in danger. The project hascaused the Bagyieli people to losecertain practices. Several types ofanimals and vegetables have disap-peared from the encampments andneighboring villages. Some tradi-tional dances can't be practiced any-more because of the hate in the vil-lages. The evenings of storytellinghave also vanished.
ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTSThe project is having a large
impact on the environment. At pres-ent, the stripping work along theembankment and the soldering of thepipeline are being completed. Duringthis phase, several species of animalsand trees have disappeared from theproject area. The animals fled,frightened by the sounds of theengines. As for the trees, many have
Forest clearing for pipeline infrastructure
phot
o by
Kor
inna
Hor
ta
Increased poaching for the bushmeat tradeph
oto
by K
orin
na H
orta
been knocked down during the stripping work. The watercourses have beeneither altered from their normal routes or dried by the electrical pumps. Weequally note the appearance of floating greasy materials in the water, a signthat oils and liquid fuels have escaped from time to time from the motors.Aluminum and other wastes are being left along the roads, even in the areasin restoration.
From the beginning of the project, COTCO assured that there would not beany displacement of populations or individual people in Cameroon. But now, in
17
the Ocean Province, we note fourcases of people that have been dis-placed. For one of these people thepipeline passes just 12.5 meters fromhis former house. Another case in thevillage Madoug II is more serious:The pipeline runs two meters from akitchen!
COTCO isn't reacting to thesesituations. Instead COTCO asks theaffected people to destroy their hous-es themselves without compensa-tion.
The Bagyelis are being left inthis situation with no help. Therewas a lot of talk about a plan for thevulnerable indigenous people, butCOTCO has taken no action in thefield. We think that these populationshave the same rights as the Bantusbut they are not treated the same wayby the consortium. No compensa-tion has been given to them, evenwhen their fields have beendestroyed. It is only the Bantus whohave been compensated. As for thePygmies, we have been asked to waitfor the plan for the vulnerableindigenous populations.
An important question howeverposes itself around this plan: who willbenefit from it? Those from theBagyeli tribe affected by the pipelineor all the Bagyelis? Up until now, noclarification has been made on thissubject.
In conclusion, we think thatthere is still time to review the com-mitments made by the various par-ties to the project and to see if theyare being implemented. This isessential if we want a pipeline thatwill benefit the people and that cantruly contribute to the fight againstpoverty in our country.
A “Gas Station” in Doba
phot
o by
Kor
inna
Hor
ta
Esso Trucks
phot
o by
Kor
inna
Hor
ta
18
Impacts on the Bagyeli People in South West CameroonF o r e s t
Peoples Project(FPP) andPlanet Survey
staff carried out fieldwork with Bagyeli communitiesduring February and March 2001 to consult with theBagyeli and other actors involved with the pipeline con-struction in South West Cameroon, to carry out prelimi-nary mapping of the pipeline's impacts on Bagyeli lands,and to document Bagyeli concerns about the pipeline'sconstruction. This work concluded that no Bagyeli hadreceived, or were likely to receive, individual compensa-tion for the effects of the pipeline crossing their lands,even though we established that the pipeline will crossBagyeli lands and damage resources upon which theyrely.
To quote one Bagyeli man:"We live by the hunt but we get nothing for the
destruction of the forest. They pay compensation onlyaccording to the way of life of the Myi (Bantu). Thatwhich is paid to the Myi is not paid to the Bagyeli"
We also found that some Bagyeli had been pushedoff their lands by their neighbours, who appropriated thecompensation due to the Bagyeli for themselves. As oneBagyeli elder described:
"The Myi (Bantu) have taken our land so that theMyi can get the compensation. They harassed us byforce because we were Bagyeli. The Myi knew that theproblem would come, so they cultivated the land thathad belonged to the Bagyeli, in order to get the com-pensation."
The report of this consultation is contained in thebriefings section of the FPP website (www.forestpeo-ples.org). This work's findings validate earlier concernsraised by FPP, Planet Survey and many others about thequality of the community consultations carried out duringthe design of the compensation programme andIndigenous Peoples Plan, and highlight how the pipeline'scompensation process is deepening the inequality and con-flicts between the Bagyeli and their Bantu village neigh-bours. Further, the GEF funded Campo Ma'an NationalPark, which is outside of the pipeline zone, but whichforms part of the environmental offset for the pipelineproject to compensate for its negative environmentalimpacts, has led to increased pressure on local Bagyelicommunities who have customarily practised their liveli-hood strategies within the area now covered by the park.Hence Bagyeli communities from all over South WestCameroon are coming under increasing pressures on theiraccess to lands which they have customarily used, due pri-marily to the arrival of the pipeline, whose route is nowbeing cut through the forest. There is a great worry thatfuture processes to allocate community compensation aspart of the Indigenous Peoples Plan and the work ofFEDEC will not involve adequate involvement of Bagyelicommunities, and that their aspirations for secure access totheir natural resource base, which is essential for them tosecure their livelihoods, will not be met. Further work todocument the impacts of the pipeline on Bagyeli commu-nities will be carried out by FPP and Planet Survey duringFebruary 2002, and updates will be made available onFPP's website
John NelsonForest Peoples Programme, U.K.
A Silenced Public Health DisasterThe impact
of the ChadC a m e r o o npipeline project
on the health of the exploitation site's population and onthe construction zones were identified at the very begin-ning when the project's preliminary plans first being weredeveloped. NGOs alerted the World Bank to the fact thatif the project was to move forward, the Bank would carryresponsibility for a health catastrophe. The most impor-
tant risk concerns the explosion of sexually transmitteddiseases (STDs), notably AIDS, as a result of the flood ofsingle men into the construction areas.
Eighteen months after the World Bank gave the greenlight to the pipeline project, the state of affairs is alarm-ing. A three-part force consisting of local public authori-ties, oil consortium companies, and the World Bankissupposed to be addressing the serious impacts on thehealth of the Chadians and Cameroonians living in thepetroleum zone. However it is really just a three-player
Hélène BallandeFriends of the Earth, France
19
game in which, in order to hide those guilty of this socialcatastrophe, none of the players will give the othersaway.
The Chadian and Cameroon governments are facinga general collapse of their health systems. Health infra-structures are sporadic, insufficiently funded for ade-quate functioning and there is a serious lack of personnel.This crisis is largely the result of structural adjustmentprograms imposed by the World Bank and the IMF in the90s that drove these countries to cut personnel budgetsfor hospitals and privatize the health services.Furthermore, corruption extends into all aspects of thehealth system. World Bank technical assistance projectsfor these governments were thus designed to face suchpotential disasters before the pipeline construction began.However, as predicted, the technical assistance projectsare seriously delayed wile the construction of the pipelineis advancing speedily.
The International Advisory Group (IAG) chargedwith monitoring the Chad-Cameroon project underlinesin its last report the slowness of capacity-building and theinertia of World Bank services, characterize this situationas one of prolonged lethargy. Given the consequences interms of human lives and the AIDS explosion in northernCameroon and Chad, it seems criminal in today's worldthat the launching of the project was not postponed untilsuitable structures were in place to prevent and controlthe explosion of sexually transmitted diseases.
The consortium is also associated with efforts aimedat the prevention of diseases their personnel might faceupon arrival. Here again, the state of affairs published bythe experts of the External Compliance MonitoringGroup (ECMG), an organization charged by the WorldBank Group with the periodic evaluation of the Chad-Cameroon project, is distressing. COTCO and TOTCOprepared a health plan with the physicians of Exxon, whoare based in Houston. But it is important to note the lackof expertise of these physicians who are experts in work-related medical fields but who are now faced with thespecific health context of tropical countries like Chad andCameroon. As far as we know, these physicians were nottrained in tropical medicine or public health. The healthplan which was developed is a secret document that hasnot been evaluated by specialized services at the WorldBank, and there were no efforts to consult with NGOswho are recognized for their work in public health.. Inany case, the local population has no information aboutthe responsibilities of the consortium concerning the pro-tection of public health.
It appears in fact that COTCO and TOTCO are notcapable of assuring a sufficiently serious follow-up to theproject's impact on the health of the local populations. Inepidemiological terms, no data are actually available andthe consortium has reportedly developed a database thatis less effective than similar databases proposed by inter-nationally renowned research centers such as the Centerfor Disease Control in Atlanta, or the World HealthOrganization (WHO).
Large sums of money have been spent by the consor-tium to hold meetings and colloquiums in the grandhotels in Yaoundé and Douala, but the on-site follow-uphas been incomplete. Exxon appears to be more con-cerned about protecting itself than about carrying outeffective health programs in the field. For example,every person who has the most rudimentary informationon the health situation in tropical regions knows that it isnecessary to have a laboratory to confirm medical diag-noses. But the consortium does not plan on having abush laboratory on-site in their work-health plan. A labwas put in place around 2001 on the Dompta site, butthen closed for budget reasons. This point was empha-sized by the ECMG in its evaluation report, but the con-sortium and the World Bank have so far failed to act onthe concerns expressed.
In addition to the general problems, there are othertechnical problems that will have dramatic impacts onthe health of the populations in the project zone. Forexample, the treatment for sleeping sickness that strikesthousands of victims each day in Africa is still inade-quate. Access to treatments, notably for children, inhealth centers managed by the consortium and its sub-contractors is insufficient. Finally, the AIDS preventionprogram in Northern Cameroon was entrusted to a falseNGO run by the Lamido of Rey Bouba, which accordingto its own words is specialized in "reflection about themanagement of natural resources"!
Turning to the World Bank, its silence and inertia areagain in evidence. Its commitments on paper and inspeeches are as large as the size of its inertia and theextent of the AIDS deaths that we are counting on in thecoming years. However, the World Bank continues itsmedia tour visiting the governments asking them to con-tribute money to the launching of the World Bank pro-gram on AIDS.
In the medical domain, the Chad-Cameroon projectis marked by scandals that so far have been silenced forthe profit of multinationals and their shareholders.
20
The Human Rights Situation in Chad and CameroonCHAD. The
former Frenchcolony of Chadhas experienced
continual and severe armed conflicts since its independ-ence in 1960. This state of affairs has led inevitably toviolations of fundamental rights such as, for example,extra-judicial executions and torture. Moreover, personsresponsible for serious human rights violations commit-ted under the regime of former president Hissein Habre,including thousands of extra-judicial executions, enjoytotal impunity to this day. Some of those responsible forthese violations have regained their former positionsunder the current president Idriss Deby. Torture contin-ues to be regularly used during interrogations and as ameans of intimidation. Amnesty International hasknowledge of cases in which people have been subject tosuch treatment.
In addition, human rights workers continue to bethreatened on account of their activities in the area of
human rights but also for their involvement in monitor-ing the Chad-Cameroon oil and pipeline project. In fact,for several years, human rights workers have fought toobtain better management and better environmental pro-tection and have criticized the project on account of itspotential economic, social, ecological and human rightsconsequences.
CAMEROON. Human rights violations are the orderof the day. Amnesty International regularly denouncesextra-judicial executions, the use of torture and inhumanetreatment, the disastrous conditions in the prisons, the lackof equitable judicial process, which sometimes takes placebefore military tribunals, and the imposition of the deathpenalty.
Amnesty International is campaigning against restric-tions on freedom of expression and most particularlyagainst incarceration of non-violent political prisoners.
Investigative journalists, human rights workers,opposition politicians, and Anglophone minorities havebeen particularly singled out for abuse.
Irène Mandeau Amnesty International, Germany
Chronology of a Badly Managed World Bank ProjectThe primary
objective of theC h a d -Cameroon oilpipeline project,co-funded bythe World Bank,i n v o l v i n g
ExxonMobil, Chevron, Petronas, was to improve the liv-ing conditions of people on the path of the project in bothcountries. Since the beginning of the construction activi-ties in November 2000, unions reported that the compa-nies involved in the project have been using the econom-ic situation in these countries to exploit workers.
Already in November 2000, construction workersunions asked the IFBWW to assist them in organizing asocial dialogue between the consortium COTCO(Cameroon Oil Transportation Company), TOTCO(Tchad-Oil Transportation Company), the World Bankand the trade unions. The main contractors involved inthe construction work have been Doba Logistics S.A
(SDV), David Terrassement (Bouygues), Satom S.A(Sogea), Subsahara Services Inc (KBC) and Willbross &SPIE-Capag. They have been suspected of either impos-ing unfavorable working conditions or simply disrespect-ing the text governing work in Chad and Cameroon.
An IFBWW delegation visited the construction sitesin December 2000 and many workers complained aboutbad wages, poor working conditions and the lack of ade-quate housing and food. Since then, the IFBWW hasbeen urging Vice-President of Esso responsible for theproject and the General Director of COTCO to accept asocial dialogue and collective bargaining on wages andworking conditions. Due to his persistent refusal, work-ers went on strike at several construction sites. Forexample hundred forty workers laying pipes to conveyChadian oil from Doba to Kribi in Cameroon werereported on strike in the locality of Nkongmeyos inCameroon's Center Province requesting increases of theirhourly wages and daily food ration, job guarantees, anend to arbitrary and unfair dismissals. The local districtadministrator mediated a compromise in which the strik-
Marion F. Hellmann-Theurer andGeneviève F. Kalina, International Federation ofBuilding and Wood Workers,Switzerland (IFBWW with a totalof 10 million affiliated members).
21
ers agreed to resume work after they were promised a 27per cent salary increase, alongside guarantees that theywould keep their jobs for the entire eight-month durationof work in Nkongmeyos.
In October 2001, the IFBWW in cooperation withthe Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) carried out an evalua-tion workshop in Yaoundé. Once again, workers' repre-sentatives indicated that the consortium had not takentheir demands into consideration including poor wages;discrimination between whites and blacks; access ofworkers to their contract forms; the organization of acampaign against the spread of HIV/AIDS; and freedomof association. COTCO and the World Bank never react-ed to these requests. Against this background, the con-struction unions decided to impose an ultimatum by 31December 2001 calling on the consortium to immediate-ly improve the working conditions, provide workers withdecent salaries and enter into a social dialogue.
IFBWW asked its affiliates in France to support theworkers in Cameroon and Chad. French affiliate ForceOuvrière (FO) has been very supportive because of theinvolvement of French companies in this project. FO hasmet the Director for Human Resources of VINCI in Paris(Sogea, belongs to VINCI) who promised his rapid inter-vention to improve working conditions and the relationswith the union. Unfortunately, the directors for HumanResources of SPIE S.A. (belongs to Bouygues) andBouygues have always refused to meet FO.
The IFBWW launched a solidarity campaign for thestart of a social dialogue with the unions. At the begin-ning of January 2002, the Minister of Labor had invitedthe consortium, the World Bank and the trade unions tonegotiate an agreement to be examined by the newlyestablished ad hoc Committee.
Some days later FTBAC reported that the parastatalcompany LABOGENIE suspended Jean Mechel Mbag's
labor contract arbitrarily for a limited time due to histrade union activities in Cameroon. The IFBWWSecretariat protested strongly to the President ofCameroon and many affiliates joined its solidarity chain.Jean Michel Mbaga has been the Inter State Coordinatorfor trade union follow-up in the Chad-Cameroon OilPipeline Project.
On 28 January 2002, the Trade Union Center inCameroon, CSTC (Confédération Syndicale desTravailleurs du Cameroun) wrote to the Minister ofLabor and Social Affairs in Cameroon urging the differ-ent companies involved in the project to react.
Finally on 6 March 2002, after long negotiations andindustrial actions the first company, Doba Logistics,signed a collective agreement with the confederationsand the Inter State Coordinator. It applies retroactively tothe 1st of February 2002 and includes a salary scale;unemployment benefits; transport allowance; health andsafety and training allowance; and a solidarity fund.Extra working hours and housing are now applied in con-formity with the country's legislation. The employer hasagreed to subscribe to a health insurance for workers andtheir families.
This agreement is a victory for the workers at DobaLogistics and a big help for the workers at other companiesto struggle for their rights. Companies involved in this proj-ect must also learn their lessons and should quickly sign acollective agreement without delay. The World Bank mustreview their policy on social, labor and trade union rights.The right to organize and collective bargaining are not oftenobserved in many countries. However both rights are pre-requisites for social dialogue and proper management atwork sites. There are hopes for change: The InternationalAdvisory Group which was established by the World Bankmet trade union representatives in April in order to evaluatethe socio-economic situation in Cameroon.
The World Bank Response: PR replaces analysisIn response
to the criticisms,the World Bank
and the Oil Companies - at least on paper - have tried tobuild in certain so-called "safeguards": "Capacity build-ing" projects for Chad and Cameroon should ensure thatboth governments are able to adequately protect the inter-
ests of the people and the environment. A "contractualundertaking" should ensure that any oil to be shippedthrough the pipeline, no matter where it comes from,should be produced in accordance with theEnvironmental Management plan. Finally, a group ofdonors made their approval of the project conditional tothe establishment of an International Advisory Group
Susanne BreitkopfUrgewald, Germany
22
(IAG) that should monitor all aspects of implementation. For those who have continued to follow the project
development and the situation on the ground closely, it isobvious that these and other so-called safeguards havebeen but idle exercises in paperwork. After all, no bind-ing guarantees have been provided and the situation onthe ground remains worrisome.
An internal email communication between the WorldBank's vice president for Africa, Jean Louis Sarbib, andthe Head of the Environmental and Social unit, IanJohnson, clearly demonstrated the Bank's preoccupationwith public relations at the expense of true safeguards:Instead of objectively evaluating the merits of the megapipeline, the Bank managers wanted to "secure supportfor the project". Sarbib and Johnson agreed on a anapproach to "buy time from critics" and "push ahead withthe main thrust of the campaign towards the key decisionmakers and opinion makers": According to the leakeddocument, Mr. Wolfensohn had suggested "building astrong case for use with the media, parliamentarians andnational administrations". The oil companies needed tobe convinced to "make statements to protect our (theBank's) reputation." Finally, NGO critics needed to beconvinced "that we [i.e., the Bank] really are prepared tolisten, learn, and eventually, make some proposals thatmight mollify them".
Today's dismal realityOne of the "mollifying" measures was the establish-
ment of the International Advisory group (IAG). IAGmembers today confirm almost all the concerns that hadbeen raised years ago. In their latest report they found that"social dangers are already present, while minimizationprogrammes have yet to be implemented".
The much praised "capacity building" turned out to benothing but a smokescreen: While the World Bank hadassured in their written reply to the German Governmentthat "under no circumstances would the pipeline projectproceed without the capacity building projects in bothcountries being made effective", the IAG recently stated "alack of progress on all issues relating to capacity building."It added, "the commercial project is moving forward whilethe institutions are limping along".
Whereas the World Bank's conclusion that all riskshave been mitigated to a manageable level might be true forthe oil companies, the risk carried by the populationremains enormous, and appears far from "manageable".With the construction activities now fully underway, prob-
lems that have long been foreseen are on the rise as is thefrustration among the population that still sees no tangiblebenefits from the project. Prostitution among minors hasbecome one of the major "economic activities" in the proj-ect area and the incidence of AIDS spread has increasedsignificantly. Conflicts over jobs between migrants andlocal residents have become common as have strikes allalong the pipeline route. Classes have been shut downbecause teachers and students have abandoned schools toseek work with the oil consortium; farmers have left theirfields behind in order wait at the gates of the base camps inthe hope of getting jobs with the oil project. "Only the fieldscultivated by the women are still being tilled", reports adevelopment consultant from Germany who visited theDoba region in October 2001. Dust pollution from heavyvehicles using the deteriorating roads with high speed ismaking local residents sick.
Nobody is liableWith the project moving ahead the situation for local
residents is only getting worse. The IAG and other moni-toring bodies can certainly be helpful in documenting thecomplex situation, but what eventually counts is adequateaction to meet the agreements made. The crucial problemhere appears that none of the agreements made seem to belegally binding. Who is liable in case of damage done toany Chadian or Cameroonian citizen? Do affected peoplehave adequate - if any - remedy? If not, what can be doneto protect them and their environment before major catas-trophes happen?
When analyzing the written statements made by theWorld Bank, little can be found that would satisfy thedemand for actual and legal guarantees and remedies forthe population. Instead, the documents are characterized byphrases referring to "creation of ownership" in the Chadiangovernment, "continued dialogue with the population","responsibility of the oil companies" and the like. But, whoamong the principle actors in this project is ultimatelyresponsible - and for what?
According to the "Conventions of Establishment",which provide the legal basis for this project and werepassed into law in Chad and Cameroon, the companies arelegally entitled to transport oil from areas other than theDoba basin. The Conventions, which in case of conflictsupersede the national legislation, set out a wide range ofrights for the companies. In Cameroon, the convention liststen national laws that do not apply to this project.Commenting on the liability on the part of the companies,
23
the international laywer Saman Zia Zarifi found that "theMNCs (Multinational Companies) involved in the pipelineproject bear very little, if any, legal responsibility for anyimpact their activity may have on the people and livingenvironments of Chad and Cameroon." Because the stan-dards and guidelines set out in the Environmental ImpactAssessment are far too vague to be a basis for any legalaction. Zarifi concludes: "The MNCs are for all intents andpurposes operating outside the bounds of any legal system".
Theoretically, the governments carry the bulk ofresponsibility in this project. They are at the same timeexecutor (as part of the pipeline company) and monitor (intheir function as a government). This situation poses a con-flict of interest. The judiciary in both countries is highlyinefficient and corrupt, interventions for political reasonsare common. Both governments have shown no will toenforce their laws and to protect their people. On the con-trary, government officials have continued to intimidatecritical citizens and reportedly even stolen parts of the com-pensation payments. Where the rule of law is beingreplaced by the rule of the gun, citizens are deliberatelydenied access to basic civic rights.
The existence of the Inspection Panel notwithstanding,the nature of the World Bank is such that it can never beheld liable for any harm it may cause citizens of the worldlet alone for environmental damage. Yet as an institutionclaiming to fight poverty and using public money, theBank, to a certain extent is accountable to the general pub-lic. This explains its strong reaction to public criticism andits many press releases and its development of intense PRactivities in recent years. The Bank is, in theory, account-able to its "shareholders" (i.e., the national governments,who take the final decisions on its projects and policies).While it remains highly influential in indebted countries
such as Chad and Cameroon, it is in fact not accountable toanybody in these countries. While there are some weak for-mal internal mechanisms, no legal remedies exist to bring theWorld Bank to justice - the institution follows its own rules.
The Citizen's Dilemma: Zero Remedy In conclusion, the local population is facing three pow-
erful promoters of the oil development - the oil consortium,the governments and the World Bank -- none of whom canultimately be held liable for damage.
The World Bank's loan agreement for the pipeline proj-ect illustrates the dilemma for the affected people: Under"conditions" it states, among others, that all non-project oilthat will flow through the pipeline must be developed "inaccordance with the Environmental Management Plan withrespect to environmental analysis, protection and consulta-tion". Is this document legally binding? How will the Bankenforce it? In fact, oil companies have already cleared landoutside the project area and established a base camp nearSARH in southern Chad. No environmental assessmentwas provided before these activities started which consti-tutes a clear breach of the loan agreement. However, noaction can be expected, since neither party to the agreement-- the World Bank or the oil companies -- seem to have aninterest in enforcing it. And the Chadian citizens cannottake legal action on the basis of an agreement that they arenot part of.
The citizen's dilemma: While local people are beingmollified by promises and goodwill declarations, they aresystematically being excluded from any type of legal agree-ment that would provide them access to their civic rights inthe scope of this project.
Six Months after the Ground-breaking Ceremony, Chadians file aComplaint to the World Bank's Inspection Panel
Once theBank approves aproject, locallyaffected peoplehave little
recourse to ensure that their rights and their environment arerespected in the development of a World Bank-financedproject, particularly in countries, like Chad, where freedomof expression is severely curtailed. In March of 2001, in
spite of severe threats to their security, 296 Chadians, repre-sented by the elected député of the oil region, Mr. NgarlejyYorongar, filed a complaint to one of these recourses, theWorld Bank Inspection Panel ("the Panel"). The complaintraised concerns over protection of the local environment,resettlement and compensation issues, protection of indige-nous peoples, cultural property, use of oil revenues, gover-nance and human rights.
Created in 1993, the Panel is a unique approach intend-
Emilie ThenardCenter for InternationalEnvironmental Law, U.S.
24
ed to increase accountability at the World Bank. Through thePanel, locally affected people can request an independentanalysis of the Bank's role in a project and demand that theirrights under the Bank's own policies and procedures berespected. At the time of writing, the Panel is still conduct-ing its investigation. After three trips to Chad, it is expect-ed to submit the report of its findings to the Bank's Board ofDirectors in April 2002. So far the Bank's reaction has beento claim that all the concerns had been addressed or are notwithin the Bank's purview.
Regardless of the Panel's actual findings, the filing ofthe complaint itself less than six months after the ground-breaking ceremony, and after five years of intense debatewith local and international civil society presents a troublingquestion to the Bank. Despite volumes of documents andmany resources and time devoted to project preparation, thecomplaint questions basic elements of the Bank's manage-ment of the project. Local people are concerned about thecompensation scheme, the lack of information and risks tothe water supply. As the reports of the InternationalAdvisory Group (set up to monitor the pipeline implemen-
tation) have noted, the Bank has so far failed to integrate theextraction and pipeline project with development improve-ments for the people on the ground and in the region. Basiccapacity-building projects, for example, are continuouslydelayed. This two-speed approach between the develop-ment of the consortium-driven infrastructure and the Bankand government-driven capacity building and other devel-opment projects is repeating itself, just like in many otherBank-financed projects in the past.
Whether the Panel judges that the Bank has complied ornot with its safeguard policies, some issues outside of thepolicies but that are even more central to how the WorldBank accomplishes its mission. For example, there are nopolicies that address the issue of human rights, yet theChadians being consulted do not have the choice but toacquiesce to the wishes of the government regardless of thehardships that are imposed on them. While it is still arguablyearly to tell how this project will harm or benefit local peo-ple because the oil and its revenues have not started to flow,the local people's complaint to the Panel questions the fun-damental premise of the Bank's efforts in this project.
Report on Visit to the three Oilfields under Construction in theSouth of Chad, Miandoum, Bolobo und Komé (February 2002)
G e n e r a lobservations: thetraditional bush
areas, crossed by small unpaved roads, have taken on themood of an industrial compound. Many of old roads arenow twice as large as they were formerly while many newroads now service the various construction sites. The affect-ed populations have not received any compensation as somelocal experts travelling with me explained since Chadian lawdoes not provide for compensation for land used for the con-struction of public roads. A question remains: are those roadspublic roads or are they infrastructure components for a pri-vate construction site? The benefits provided by those roadsto the local population are likely to be minimal if not nega-tive.
There is heavy traffic on the roads throughout the day,mainly by trucks. The unpaved roads generate large plumesof dust. A layer of red dust extends about a hundred yardson to either side of the road. This dust has become a princi-pal complaint of the local people. Agriculture is now limit-ed to areas far from the road. Concern about this problemwas repeatedly raised by our partners. The consortium
promised to water the streets regularly but nothing happens.Here is the actual response of the world-straddling multina-tional Exxon: flagmen stand beside the roads waving theirflags if a vehicle is driving to fast and then disappear forminutes at a time under a cloud of dust.
Due to the lack of other ways to earn money in the area,the job of a flagman is very popular. Many teachers leavetheir schools to work as flagmen. Students drop their studiesto work as a flagmen or guards. We stopped at several placesand spoke to the guards and flagmen. Most of them spokeFrench which in Chad is a clear sign of educational attain-ment. The situation is completely crazy: As a result some ofthe better educated people of Chad now stand along the roadsdoing stupid jobs. At the same time workers from all over theworld are doing the more specialized construction work of thepipeline. Many Chadians would have liked to have receivedspecialized training during the preparatory phase of the proj-ect but they were not given the opportunity.
The majority of the generally uneducated people of thearea will have to move away from the areas of the oil-pro-duction-plant. The farming methods of the past will nolonger work. My local companions showed me some of
Martin ZintErdoel AG, Germany
25
first signs of decline in the neighbouring villages. The peo-ple realize that their traditional ways of earning their liveli-hoods will not last and they are losing the vital energy thatis necessary to survive in this region. Many more than theofficially named number of 150 families will be displaced- or moved "voluntarily" as living conditions become unac-ceptable, local experts say.
The locations of the future boreholes are alreadycleaned from vegetation and levelled in a scale of approxi-mately 100 x 100 meters. Where drilling is already done,the extracted mud and the used and polluted water is storedin basins, covered by plastic sheets. Many basins are dry. Itis not clear, if the water seeped away or evaporated. Theguards think, that the waste and the water is toxic. It is theirtask to prevent people from approaching the storage sites.The guards are protected by dust-masks and helmets. Afterpublic complaints, Esso now starts to protect the sites byfences. But in view of the quantity of such areas and otherfacilities, including an international airport and the Essobase camp, you continuously run into fences. There is a vis-ible contradiction between the arithmetically small scale ofland used by the project-facilities and the reality of theareas where fences no longer allow free-movement
In front of the Esso base camp, a crowd blocks the
road. They are workers on strike and are demanding wageincreases of 50% and a reduction of the workweek from 60to 39.5 hours which would match the situation inCameroon. The mood is tense and I've been advised not tostop, but to go on another some hundred meters.
A big village has arisen from nowhere, completelywithout planning or accompanying infrastructure. There isno water supply nor provisions for wastewater. Latrines areopen holes with simple straw mats to protect the place fromindiscreet views.
The people who live there are looking for jobs The vil-lage is called "Satan" which derives from the French phraseça attend (literally, "it waits") but the name is also a play onthe word for devil. Many people offer such products andservices as home made millet beer and prostitution. Butwhen our car broke down as we left the village, a carmechanic was found within five minutes who repaired thecar on the spot. This incident indicates the high standard ofeducation of some inhabitants of Satan. A Catholic priest(Père Enzo, Italian) and a Protestant pastor provide withvery modest means for the inhabitants of Satan. One hun-dred and fifty kilometers to the south a second Satan hasarisen near the town of Bâm through which the pipelinepasses.
Centre Primo Levi, Statement by Dr. Fabrice Giraux,Paris, 27 June, 2001
External Compliance Monitoring Group (ECMG),Chad Export Project, Cameroon PetroleumEnvironment capacity Enhancement Project, ChadPetroleum Sector Management Capacity BuildingProject, Report on Fourth Site Visit, January 2002.
Financial Times, African Energy, "Chad arms purchasesshow limits of donors' oversight", Issue 34, January 2001
Friends of the Earth, Broken Promises - The ChadCameroon Oil and Pipeline Project; Profit at AnyCost?, Netherlands, June 2001
International Advisory Group, Chad-CameroonPetroleum Development and Pipeline Project, Reportsof Mission to Cameroon and Chad, September 28,2001 and December 21, 2001
Le Monde, Le Tchad en voie de "pétro-dictature",Paris, 30 Mai 2001
United States Government, Statement at World BankBoard Meeting on the Chad/Cameroon Oil & PipelineProject, Washington, D.C. June 6, 2000
World Bank, Chad-Cameroon: Petroleum Developmentand Pipeline Project, Project Appraisal Document,Washington, D.C., April 20, 2000.
World Bank, Inspection Panel, Report No, 22745,Report and Recommendation on Chad, PetroleumDevelopment and Pipeline Project (Loan No. 4558-CD); Management of the Petroleum Economy Project(Credit No. 3316-CD); Petroleum Sector ManagementCapacity Building Project (Credit No. 3373-CD), Washington, D.C., 2001
World Bank, Annual Report 2001, Washington, D.C.2001
World Bank, Press Release 2001/344/S - Chad toReceive US $260 Million in Debt Service Relief,Washington, D.C., May 22, 2001.
Sources of Information
FINANCIALTIMESAFRICA ENERGY, ISSUE 34,JANUARY 2001
Chad arms purchasesshow limits of donors'oversightChad has embarrassed the World Bank byspending part of the $25m signature bonus forthe Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline on arms beforea committee to supervise the use of oil revenueshas been set up.
The Bank had promised to establish mecha-nisms to ensure the money was spent on badlyneeded health, education and infrastructureprojects.
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Women near the oil fields in southern Chad.
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Village near the Doba oil fields with mango trees essential to locallivelihoods.
Association Tchadienne pour la Promotion et la Défense des Droits de l’Homme, ChadB. P. 4082 • N’Djamena, ChadTel: 235 51 88 53Fax: 235 53 31 32
Centre pour l’Environnement at le Developpement, CameroonPO Box 8451 • Yaounde, CameroonTel: 237 22 95 24 / 38 57Fax: 237 22 38 59
Environmental Defense, USA1875 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 600Washington, DC 20009, USATel: 202 387 3500Fax: 202 234 6049www.environmentaldefense.org
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