Download - Telling road users who they are and what they do: can they profit?

John A Michon University of Groningen, The Netherlands

Telling road users who they are and what they do: can they profit?

The points to be raised in this introduction are first of all intended to provide some frame of reference for the papers that follow, and secondly, to indicate that the approach adopted in several of these papers should be considered as an important effort to introduce a new angle or perspective on the psychology of the road user. For various reasons the relevant psychological work in this area has been dominated in the past by the engineer’s philosophy that it is easy to change hardware but difficult to change people and that, therefore, we should do the first rather than bother with the latter. Consequently most of the - considerable - improvements achiev- ed through psychological research during the last 20 or 25 years have been in the hardware components of the system that directly relate to human performance: vehicle ride and handling characteristics, view from the vehicle, operational comfort, road markings, lighting, signs and signals.

The present societal climate favours anti-technological attitudes and this would seem to support new attempts to persuade and to teach people, rather than the introduction of even more sophisticated technological system improvements. Moreover, so many relatively ‘cheap’ improvements of this kind have already been incorporated, or at least considered for incorporation, that further improvements may well require rather large capital in- vestments that society is not (yet) prepared to pay for. Thus, for example, automatic traffic guidance would be technically feasible and it would greatly improve safety, comfort, and energy consumption, but its introduction now would simply be too expensive.

International Review of Applied Psychology (SAGE, London and Beverly Hills), Vol. 29 (1980), 399-413

400 John A. Michon

There is, however, another, scientifically more sound reason favouring efforts to better implement the facts and findings of social and educational psychology in the area of traffic safety. The recent advances in instructional psychology, exemplified in Klahr (1976) or Glaser (1978), and in the cognitive approach to motivational theory (e.g. Mandler, 1975) seem to provide new inputs that may eventually lead to better understood, more effective techniques of positively influencing road user behaviour.

Thus, i t appears that there is reason enough for a more extensive contribution of social and educational psychology to the main body of traffic psychology. But the easy acceptance of such a contribution by the traffic decision makers, the politicians, and the traffic engineers is not only a matter of the prevailing ‘humanistic’ climate. Contributions to the field of traffic research should first and foremost be guided by an evaluation of the possibility that what is proposed can indeed provide policy-sensitive insights. In my opinion much more attention should be paid to such an evaluation by the research community, before claims are made about the relevance of academic studies to the real world traffic environment. It is in this light that the reader should see the notes that follow: if they appear critical, it is because my concern has been to raise a few questions that should at least be considered before we may safely claim that we have made a contribution to the improvement of the road traffic system.

The nature of the problem

Over the years psychologists have in several ways tried to find solu- tions to problems related to unsafe traffic behaviour. The problem of road safety is quite formidable: in their paper Knapper and Cropley point out, for instance, that the numbers of people killed and injured in road traffic accidents exceed the number of casualties of many wars on a per annum basis. In a similar vein Stonex (1965) suggested that it is almost as if the automotive system is ‘precisely that which we would have built if our objective had been to kill as many people as possible’. Yet this seems a view from a somewhat exaggerated perspective; in most industrialized countries the average probability for members of the general population of dying from a traffic accident is approximately one in a million per hour of traffic participation. This risk level is not different from the likelihood of dying from just living - that too is close to

Telling.road users who they are 401

one in a million per hour of life. Also, on ape r mile basis road traffic has become about five times as safe as it was 100 years ago when there were no automobiles and horses were dominating the scene. Even over the last twenty years we have seen a very considerable gain in safety on a per mile basis. Nevertheless, most people entertain the understandable feeling that these numbers are not too relevant, that it is simply improper to die of a road accident and that therefore something ought to be done to reduce the number of such accidents. And as it has been established that in more than three quarters of all accidents the human factor plays a decisive role, at least part of what ought to be done would seem to be of a psychological nature.

Psychologists have accepted the challenge, but their efforts thus far have met with quite different degrees of success. Earlier they concerned themselves mostly with the search for personality factors that would predispose for accident involvement (Shaw and Sichel, 1971). This approach has not been very successful, and few resear- chers are now active in the field of driver selection. It should be pointed out however that the overall failure of this attempt may have been mostly due to the classical mental test approach that has dominated the field. It may well be that a more ethological classification of behaviour patterns or a psychological typology in terms of stress coping patterns will be more successful (Michon, 1979).

Experimental psychology has meanwhile shown that the approach of ergonomically fitting the job to the worker is indeed very successful if it is applied to the road traffic system (e.g. Black, 1966; Forbes, 1972; Shinar, 1978).

The third approach that psychologists have adopted is educational: not only can the traffic environment be changed, it should also be possible to modify the human component in the system in such a way that it becomes better adapted to its task. As far as the training of basic traffic skills is concerned this assumption has received considerable support. Yet, the ability to perform these basic skills would seem to constitute only part of what appears to determine good roadzusership. And thus we may ask what other elements might be incorporated into the education of the road user. In the first four papers that follow the (partial) answer given to this question is that we must teach road users insight into the motivational determinants of traffic behaviour and, more specifically,

402 John A. Michon

into those factors that determine patterns of social interaction on the road.

Social interaction and attitudes

There is no doubt that such factors do indeed play an important role in the behaviour of one road user towards the other. The studies reviewed by Wilde in the first part of his paper indicate, for instance, that such factors as the sexes of the persons involved, their (perceived) social status, and the pecking order among the makes of their vehicles constitute important, so-called ‘salient’ cues that influence interactive behaviour in traffic situation. Other road users are not simply moving, otherwise passive objects that we only have to avoid while we are travelling from A to B. Rather, as Bliersback and Dellen point out, depending on one’s own ‘basic driving pattern’ the other road user will be perceived either as vir- tually non-existent, as an underling, as a competitor, or as an obstacle to be avoided, and sometimes perhaps even as a fellow human being who, like ourselves, is trying to make the most of a difficult situation.

The main point of agreement between the authors of the first four papers in this issue is that ways ought to be found to make such motivational determinants of social interaction in traffic more explicit, and to make this knowledge available to all traffic participants by incorporating it into the traffic education curriculum. We might be able to teach better traffic behaviour if we could ‘identify the attitudes and opinions in the area of interpersonal relations, out of which observable driver behaviour arises’. For instance, providing traffic participants with insight into their motivational patterns might help to reduce the high level of aggression that is so characteristic for much of today’s traffic. More generally Hauber, in his paper, as well as Bliersbach and Dellen suggest that such insight would help reduce such ‘negative affects’ as anger, aggression, withdrawal, etc.

I tend to agree with these implicit claims foj increasing the application of social psychological knowledge to the problems of road traffic. They do in fact signal a trend that already has become very conspicuous in another area of traffic research, namely travel demand analysis. Perceptions and attitudes have become regular inputs, in addition to socio-economic variables such as income and housing, in many studies dealing with the choice of destination,

Telling road users who they are 403

type of vehicle or route (e.g. Stopher and Meyburg, 1976; Hensher and Dalvi, 1978).

The recent impact of attitudes on behavioural travel demand modelling may seem somewhat surprising. Around 1970 many social research psychologists were thoroughly convinced that attitude measurement was on its way out of scientific psychology. The correlations between attitude scales and the corresponding behavioural criteria turned out to be generally low and highly erratic. Since then a revival has begun, not least because of the theoretical developments initiated by Ajzen and Fishbein (1977). As a result, the relationship between attitude and behaviour has been put on a more appropriate footing, implying, firstly, that attitudes influence behaviour only indirectly and, secondly, that the levels of measurement of the attitudes and the corresponding behaviour should be of the same level of specificity. If proper care is taken, a moderately high correlation - usually of the order of 0.40 - between attitude and behaviour may be expected (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977). Such findings have made the application of at- titudinal or, rather more generally, judgmental data to travel demand analysis seem a less uncertain prospect than it appeared only a short while ago.

If there is any doubt in my mind about the success to be expected from this approach it is not because of a priori impossibility to describe or predict certain aspects of traffic behaviour on the basis of a known (or inferred) cognition or attitude. However, I still entertain strong doubts as to whether any progress will be made unless we succeed in formulating a cognitive framework in which the relevant knowledge about perceptions and attitudes, and the observable behavioural patterns connected with them, can be ex- plained in a way that is understandable to the average road user. We shall have to answer two crucial questions that must be raised in any attempt to substantiate the claim that we should teach the motivation, attitudes and preconceptions that underlie social interactive behaviour on the road:

- Does the proposed framework provide an effective theory of driving behaviour? - Does the proposed framework offer a viable educational strategy?

The first question deals with the what, the second with the how of

404 John A. Mrchon

educating road users in terms of social interaction and motivation. In the following two sections I will explain in more detail why, in my opinion, these two questions are so important.

Cognitive structures as effective theories about behaviour

The cognitive approach to behaviour is based on the assumption that action is the result of testing an internal representation of the task at hand, that is, a cognitive structure that incorporates at least the structural relations that are relevant for an adequate performance of that task. Upon the coding of perceptual inputs, hypotheses about the outcomes of alternative actions in response to these inputs are generated and tested internally, and depending on the outcomes of these tests a particular action is decided upon.

These internal cognitive structures need not, and cannot, be com- plete. They should be effective though; that is, the output that they generate'should, by and large, be appropriate to deal with the circumstances. If a cognitive structure is not effective about behaviour in this sense, performance will frequently be erroneous and such unwanted consequences as neurotic behaviours, anxiety, or panic may follow. In this context what we call learning consists of implementing an effective cognitive structure, while remedial training and psychotherapy are systematic efforts to change ineffective structures into effective ones (cf. Mandler, 1975).

In driving it is not different: here too we should attempt to im- pose on the driver an effective cognitive structure that will produce expert driving as its output under all circumstances. Effective structures can be formulated fairly easily for the skill of driving. On the basis of a thorough analysis of the basic demands of the driving task, such as steering, braking, overtaking or crossing intersections, it is possible to define a hierarchy of instructional goals, and to implement a training curriculum for achieving these goals in an effective way (e.g. McKnight and Adams, 1970; Veling, 1977a, 1977b).

The papers by Knapper and Cropley and B!iersbach and Dellen aim at a different goal, namely at identifying the attitudes and opinions in the area of interpersonal relations from which the actual behaviour of the driver results. And they do so by studying the ways in which people organize, comprehend and react to traffic situations in terms of attitudes, and values. The main question is whether this approach is in fact instrumental to the ultimate goals of producing an effective cognitive theory of road user behaviour


that would have to lie at the base of any viable educational programme.

It should be emphasized that we should not be looking for a theory about conscious outputs such as feelings, opinions and attitudes. Rather we need a theory about the processing structures that produce such conscious outputs. If we wish to influence feelings it is not the content of the feelings that matter but the effective causes for those feelings; in a similar way we should provide a bad cook with better recipes rather than try to convince him of the of- fensive taste of his dishes. The reason is that people are not normal- ly well-informed about the causes or effective reasons for their behaviour. Nesbitt and Wilson (1977, p. 231) have most succinctly summarized this as follows:

when people attempt to report on their cognitive processes, that is, on the processes mediating the effects of a stimulus on a response, they do not do so on the basis of any true introspection. Instead their reports are based on a priori, implicit causal theories, or judgments about the extent to which a particular stimulus is a plausible cause of a given response. This suggests that though people may not be able to observe directly their cognitive processes, they will sometimes be able to report accurately about them. Accurate reports will occur when influential stimuli are salient and are plausible causes of the responses they produce, and will not occur when stimuli are not salient or are not plausible causes [emphasis added].

Therefore, in order to provide an effective implicit theory about social interactive factors in driving we must single out salient cues, but salient cues that are known to be effective andplausible causes of the response. Plausible here means that the cause can be stated in a verbally transmittable form that will fit the conscious belief structure of the person.

If we say a driver has an effective cognitive theory of social interaction on the road, what exactly do we mean? In brief it means that given an input, for instance, close following or hesitant behaviour of another driver, the driver will produce an adequate, sensibly tolerant output (manoeuirre) that will reduce rather than enhance risk. What cognitive structures about other people’s motivations will be able to achieve this? In the light of what has been said thus far it seems doubtful that interview or questionnaire data have a high a priori probability of hitting the target. Interview data are conscious outputs for which subjects, as Nesbitt and

406 John A . Michon

Wilson (1977) argue, often cannot specify the discriminative cues, and that are based on implicit a priori theories of doubtful effectiveness. We should therefore first of all establish whether indeed the driving pattern of thrill, or the stereotypes of bad drivers do in fact refer to effective implicit theories, i.e. theories that single out the influencial stimuli from the complex behaviour of the other road user. In other words: can we really predict interactive behaviour from these driving patterns and attitude scales? The authors do not tell us (yet).

But even if one accepts these typologies one should be aware that it is not clear to what extent they relate to ‘salient cues’, or in other words, whether they provide an effective theory of driving (of others). In my opinion motives and attitudes (or more generally, given reasons) as a basis for an effective cognitive theory have not been terribly successful in the past. I wonder, in fact, if we should not concentrate on a driving pattern typology that is based on observable behavioural characteristics that signal particular inten- tions about interactive behaviour. The ethological approach should be taken more seriously. It is in fact surprising that genuinely ethological studies such as Shor’s (1964) have not attracted more attention. Shor showed quite clearly that social interaction can be defined in terms of observable behaviour. More specifically Shor also established that resident drivers communicate non-verbally in a ‘dialect’ that is not easily understood by occasional non-resident drivers. Other, similar approaches by Quenault (1967, 1968) and Hahn (1971) have likewise never received adequate field testing (see also Wilde’s review in this issue).

It may well be that we can combine teaching the ability to perceive such observable behaviour patterns with the teaching of insight into the patterns of opinions and attitudes that emerge from an effective cognitive theory that is both salient and subjectively plausible. Whether such a combination will be successful is, on the available evidence, impossible to predict.

Aggression on the road

Perhaps I can clarify the foregoing arguments by a somewhat more detailed discussion about the aggressive behaviour that seems to be so characteristic for much of the social interaction on the road. Ag- gression qualifies as an example since it is one of the main topics discussed in this issue, particularly by Hauber, and by Bliersbach and


Dellen. The approach taken by these authors in particular seems to imply the following proposition: having insight into the motivations of other road users will help to improve social interaction on the road, since it would clarify the reasons for the intense feelings that result from undesirable interactions. Thus, Bliersbach and Dellen direct attention to the fact that although drivers could ‘speak about their emotions, they could not understand the intensity of their feelings’. And they add: ‘obviously there are processes in driving of which the drivers are not aware’.

In the light of the foregoing it will come as no surprise that 1 am somewhat sceptical about the effectiveness of the approach based on attitude scaling and interview techniques for increasing the awareness of these inaccessible or unconscious processes. In fact, I think that relatively little can be done to reduce aggressive reactions in road traffic along these lines at all. My scepticism is based on some assumptions about the conditions underlying negative affect as they are made by the cognitive theory of motivation.

Close following, cutting into one’s lane, a pedestrian crossing in front of a car at close range, etc., will all interfere with a driver’s momentary behaviour goals. Interruption of behaviour is the most common factor to raise arousal in a subject and to elicit emotional responses. The emotional response need not be negative, but will depend on the context of the situation. If the interruption promises a pleasant sequel, the response will be one of joy; if not, then the affect will take a negative colouring. As Mandler (1975, p. 159) observes: ‘Interruptions are, on the whole, disruptive because they usually block the activity that is most appropriate to the situation’.

Trying to imagine the kind of situations that are likely to arise in road traffic, I find it extremely difficult to think of any that would signal pleasant consequences. In other words, anger and aggression are the most natural responses to interruptions of traffic behaviour. And it remains to be seen whether insight into the plausible reasons for these interruptions would help to alleviate the amount of aggression shown. Teaching how to divert aggression and anger in a harmless way might be a successful strategy, but this scapegoat approach has considerable dangers of its own.

Also, the underlying processes that determine the likelihood or the intensity of an aggressive response seem to me to be of a kind that is difficult to explain to the driving population. For example,

408 John A. Michon

one aspect of these rather intensive emotional responses - ‘magnified affects’, as Hauber calls them - is that driving as an attention demanding task is likely to increase the average arousal level of a person above the normal level, which in turn could easily lead to exaggerated emotional responses to even rather minor eliciting stimul. But arousal, and likewise attention and other psychological constructs, are not easily put in a cognitive context that brings them under conscious control of the person.

A viable educational strategy?

Turning to the question of how we should teach social interactive behaviour, given any type of effective cognitive theory, I think that the approach taken by Wilde in his research on readership of accident reports in the mass media opens up an extremely important new possibility. The findings of this analysis, summarized in his present contribution, are very interesting: people read and, propor- tionally, even overread the accident reports in their newspapers; they feel a need for information about traffic safety and see that newspapers can fulfil this need. And people talk about accidents too! ‘Drivers also form theories about the causation of particular accidents in the absence of sufficient information’ (Wilde, this issue). But, we may add once again, in their actual form these theories do not necessarily belong to that class of effective, plausible, cognitive theories discussed earlier.

The relative failure of the usual campaign materials to hammer their message home has, by now, been established quite thoroughly (see, for example, the recent paper by Anderson, 1978). The newspaper accident report, however, apparently attracts regular attention, and an instructionally sound way of communicating information about an accident coupled with information about avoiding such an accident might prove very effective. The first and foremost requirement, again, is that an effective and plausible cognitive theory is available to be imposed on the reader: ineffective theories, that is, theories that do not teach anything abqut the salient effective stimuli producing certain output behaviours, will not do.

The question that remains unanswered by the present studies is whether the basic driving patterns described by Bliersbach and Dellen, or the factors derived by Knapper and Cropley that determine the attitudes towards dangerous behaviours, situations and people can indeed serve as the ingredients for the kind of

Telling rood users who they are 409

newspaper reports Wilde has in mind. In my opinion they can, if together they would indeed constitute an effective working theory of driver interaction and if they could be specified in terms of salient cues that make the various types of behaviour recognizable. But do they?

Speed limitations

An example of a well specified area in which influencing behaviour has been, and still is, attempted on a large scale is that of speed limitation. Such restrictions have now been introduced in nearly all motorized countries. While they were originally introduced mostly for safety reasons, the energy shortage has now become the predominant motivation for introducing speed limits where they did not exist before, or for lowering already existing limits.

Speed limitations are demonstrably instrumental in reducing accident rates. They make the driver’s decision making easier, shorten required braking distances and make the impact upon colli- sion less violent. Yet speed as such seems to be only secondary im- portance; much more important is the fact that speed limits tend to narrow the speed distribution, so that traffic flow becomes much more homogeneous. The absence of unexpected differences in speed between vehicles increases the predictability, particularly in uncertain situations such as left turns, crossing intersections and overtaking in the face of oncoming traffic.

There are now quite solid data on the effect speed limits have on the accident rates, particularly fatalities. A most interesting study, since it spans a period of no less than fifteen years, is reported by Salusjarvi in this issue. It clearly shows a differentiated picture of the effect of various speed regulations, both under experimental control and under national policy between 1962 and 1976 in Finland. These results are well supported by other systematic research in various countries, such as Germany, Austria, the USA and Sweden, all of which show a decrease in fatalities and/or injury accidents of between 15 and 25 percent when the free speeds are reduced to a maximum of 90 or 100 km/h. The Swedish findings, morover, support Salusjarvi’s proposition that it is necessary to bring the limit down to below the 85th percentile of the free speeds: while it finds no difference in injury rates between free speed and 110 km/h limit conditions, a 90 km/h limit quite abruptly shows a 25 percent decrease in injuries.

410 John A . Michon

One characteristic of most of the recent studies is that they have been able to decompose the gains in safety according to different contributing factors. Table 1 shows such a decomposition for the USA. A maximum speed of 55 km/h became effective in November 1973 and lasted throughout the summer of 1974. On the whole these results demonstrate that speed limits increase road safety, particularly because they are effective in increasing the homogenei- ty of traffic flow.

TABLE 1 Percentage changes in motor vehicle accident fatalities in

the USA in 1974, relative to the same periods of 1973

Factor Time Periods

Jan-April 1974 May-August 1974 % 070

Reduction in speed Reduction in amount of travel Change in day-night mix of travel Change of road type used Reduction in average occupancy Increase in safety belt usage Unknown Change in age of driver, change

of type of vehicle

-1 1 - 5 - 2 - 1 - 3 - 1 - 2

+ 1

-24 -

-10

- 2

- 2 - 2 - 2

+ 1

-17

Salusjarvi’s paper raises several other interesting questions that relate to the political motivations that underlie speed regulations. His accusations addressed to the Finnish authorities should be taken seriously since they seem to be characteristic for a contem- porary way of using scientific findings so that in the end the citizen’s belief - and consequently his readiness to accept new regulations - are drastically undermined.

Salusjgrvi’s bitter conclusion is that the whole purpose of the research programme leading up to a set of plausible and probably effective proposals for policy, ‘has been to demonstrate that the decisions taken were not based on the initial goals that led to the in-

Telling road users who they are 41 1

troduction of speed limits’. Under the guise of improving safety, speed limits were introduced that were inspired by quite different motives, most likely of a short range economic nature although Salusjarvi is not explicit in this respect.

In the light of what has been said earlier in the paper about the plausibility and salience of causal factors, authorities should be extremely careful to specify the reasons for a particular measure, as well as to publicly evaluate the success. With an increasing educational sophistication of the general population, adequate and cor- rect information is increasingly a necessary precondition for successful government (cf. Neisser, 1976, Ch. 9).

Knowing that there are speed limits and that they are effective in reducing the rates of serious accidents is not enough to make road users obey the regulation under all circumstances. This again raises the question how to teach them, to which question all of the arguments about social interactions and driving patterns put for- ward earlier in this paper appear to be relevant. One other point not dealt with thus far may be raised in this context: it appears to be especialy relevant in the light of the findings reported by Malaterre and Saad, and by Summala.

Not only social psychological concepts such as the ‘thrill drive’ pattern or the ‘lead driver’ stereotype may be difficult to transmit to road users in terms of a plausible and effective cause. Even the kind of observational information obtained by Malaterre (i.e. the differentiated use of speedometer readings) or by Summala (the evasive manoeuvres when approaching a pedestrian on a dark road) would seem to be difficult to teach. It is not enough to point out to people that there are salient aspects of their driving behaviour. One should also frame the information into a plausible cognitive representation of what it is that driving is all about. As I already in- dicated in the section on aggression, it is not always easy to frame the psychologist’s insight into human information processing in a plausible context. While it is relatively simple to convince motor cy- cle riders that they should wear crash helmets, since it is a plausible argument that landing on one’s head may lead to a headache, it is difficult to advise vehicle operators about the onset of lapses of attention, or the need to collect more evidence from a speedometer. The hypothetical constructs (attention, information sampling) are not easily representable in popular psychology, even though the concomitant behaviour may be explicitly specifiable. Thus it may

412 John A . Michon

be possible to point out what to do, but frequently we fail to specify why it should be done.

Future efforts to incorporate such behavioural data, as have been observed by Malaterre and Saad, and Summala, into the training or persuasion of road users depend, again, on the possibility of providing these people with plausible and effective cognitive theories of their behaviour. If we wish people to understand what they are doing we should provide them beforehand with a good theory of their behaviour.

References

Ajzen, J., and Fishbein, M. (1977). ‘Attitude-behavior relations: A theoreticai analysis and review of empirical research’, Psychological Bulletin, 84, 888-918.

Anderson, J.W. (1978). ‘The effectiveness of traffic safety material in influencing the driving performance of the general driving population’, Accident Analysis and Prevention, 10, 81-94.

Black, S. (1966). Man and Motor Cars: An Ergonomic Study. New York: Norton. Forbes, T.W. (ed.) (1972). Human Factors in Highway Traffic Sufety Research.

New York: Wiley. Glaser, R. (ed.) (1978). Advances in International Psychology. Hillsdale, New

Jersey: Erlbaum. Hahn, C.P. (1971). ‘The use of movie film and laboratory methods for assessing

driving skill’, in Psychologicd Aspects of Driver Behavior, Vol. I . Voorburg, The Netherlands: Institute for Road Safety Research SWOV.

Hensher, D.A., and Dalvi, Q. (eds.) (1978). Determinants of Travel Choice. Farn- borough, Hampshire: Saxon House.

Klahr, D. (ed.) (1976). Cognition and Instruction. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Erlbaum. Mandler, G. (1975). Mind and Emotion. New York: Wiley. McKnight, A.J., and Adams, B.B. (1970). Driver Education Task Analysis, Vol. I ,

Task Descriptions. Alexandria, Virginia: Human Resources Research Organiza- tion.

Michon, J.A. (1979). Dealing with Danger. Groningen, The Netherlands: University of Groningen Traffic Research Center.

Neisser, U. (1976). Cognition and Reality: Principles and Implications of Cognitive Psychology. San Francisco: Freeman.

Nesbitt, R.E., and Wilson, T.D. (1977). ‘Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes’, Psychological Review, 84, 23 1-259.

Quenault, S. W. (1967). Driver Behaviour: Safe and Unsafe Drivers. Crowthorne, Berkshire: Road Research Laboratory.

Quenault, S.W. (1968). Development of the Method of Systematic Observations of Driver Behaviour. Crowthorne, Berkshire: Transport and Road Research Laboratory.


Shaw, L., and Sichel, H. (1971). Accident Proneness: Research in the Occurrence, Causation and Prevention of Road Accidents. Oxford: Pergarnon.

Shinar, D. (1978). Psychology on the Road: The Human Factor in Traffic Safety. New York: Wiley.

Shor, R.E. (1964). ‘Shared patterns of nonverbal normative expectations in automobile driving’, Journal of Social Psychology, 62, 155-163.

Stonex, K.A. (1965). ‘Law, traffic and engineering technology’, in A Collwuy on Motor Vehicle and Traffic Law. Washington, D.C.: Highway Research Board.

Stopher, P.R., and Meyburg, A.H. (eds.) (1976). Behavioral Travel-Demand Models. Lexington, Massachusetss: Heath.

Veling, I.H. (1977). Het CBR Theoretisch Verkeersexamen: Verslag van een Theoretische en Empirisane Analyse (The CBR Theoretical Traffic Exam: Report on a Theoretical and Empirical Analysis). Soesterberg, The Netherlands: Institute for Perception.

Veling, I.H. (1977b). ‘Erfahrung rnit der Audiovisuellen Darbietung von Prufungsfragen’, in Entwicklungen und Konzepte fur die Fahrerlaubnisprufung. Koln: Verlag der Technischen Uberwachungsverein Rheinland.

Dire aux usagers de la route ce qu’ils sont et ce qu’ils font: peuvent-ils en tirer profit?

En introduction a un ensemble d’articles de recherche ayant trait a divers aspects du comportement des conducteurs, Ie probltme qui se pose est celui d’enseigner aux usagers de la route les rtsultats de ces recherches, de telle sorte que leur comportement de conducteur puisse Etre ameliork. Toutes les connaissances acquises doivent Etre vtritablement inttgrees dans une theorie cognitive plausible du comportement. Certaines des difficultts que rencontre une telle ex- igence sont discutees.

Download - Telling road users who they are and what they do: can they profit?

Top Related