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Sufism and politics in theNorth CaucasusGalina M. YemelianovaPublished online: 19 Aug 2010.

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Nationalities Papers, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2001

ISSN 0090-5992 print; ISSN 1465-3923 online/01/040661-28 © 2001 Association for the Study of NationalitiesDOI: 10.1080/0090599012010213 8

After the collapse of communism in Russia, which is the home of more than 14million Muslims, there has been an Islamic revival that has been part of the processof political and intellectual liberalization of society.1 The major Islamic enclaves ofthe Russian Federation are located in the Volga-Urals, the North Caucasus, andcentral Russia. Russian Muslims are concentrated in the eight autonomous republicsof Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Adyghea, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia,Ingushetia, Dagestan, and Chechnya. Most Muslims belong to the Hanafi madhhab(the juridical school) of Sunni Islam, although Dagestani and Chechen Muslimsadhere to the Shafii madhhab of Sunni Islam. There is also a small Shia communityin southern Dagestan. A large number of Dagestanis, as well as Chechens andIngushes, profess Sufism—a mystical form of Islam, which is also known as parallelIslam.2

The specific geographical and ethnocultural characteristics of the North Caucasuspredetermined a primary role for Sufism in its societal and political evolution.3

Despite a century-long suppression, by the Tsarist and then Soviet regimes, SufiIslam has survived and continued to influence the everyday life and politics of theregion.4 However, Sufism as a religious and sociopolitical phenomenon has beenlargely overlooked by researchers due to Soviet-era political and ideologicalconstraints and to inertia following the demise of the communist system. This articleexamines the historical continuity of the Sufi tradition in the eastern part of the NorthCaucasus, which roughly corresponds to present-day Dagestan, Chechnya, andIngushetia. 5 The focus of the study is the political and ethnic dimensions of Sufism.The first part of the article studies the importance of the historic legacy linked to theSufis’ participation in the gazawat (the Islamic liberation war) against the Russianconquest of the North Caucasus in the nineteenth century and its impact on theevolution of North Caucasian Sufism. The second part examines the present-daydoctrinal and sociopolitical characteristics of North Caucasian Sufism. It alsoconsiders the relations of Sufism with the political authorities, the Islamic establish-ment, nationalists and Islamic fundamentalists,6 or Wahhabis,7 as well as its positionwithin the global Sufi context. The secretive nature of Sufi tariqas (orders) and the

SUFISM AND POLITICS IN THENORTH CAUCASUS

Galina M. Yemelianova

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inaccessibility of the mystical essence of Sufism to all but the Sufis themselves havelimited this research.8

The Historical Evolution of Sufism in the North Caucasus

Historically, Dagestan9 was the first enclave of Dar-ul-Islam (the Land of Islam) onthe territory of the former U.S.S.R. The Arabs brought Islam to Derbend in southernDagestan in the seventh century. By the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, themajority of Dagestanis had adopted the Shafii madhhab of Sunni Islam, although theNogays of northern Dagestan opted for the Hanafi madhhab. Since the sixteenthcentury there has been a Shia community in southern Dagestan which emerged underthe influence of Safawid Iran. During the Middle Ages Dagestan was one of theworld centers of Islamic learning and scholarship. During its “golden age,” whichlasted from the late sixteenth until the middle of the seventeenth century, Dagestanhad a reputation as the bahr al-ulum (the sea of sciences) and the country of ulema(Islamic scholars). The Dagestani cities of Derbend, Tarki, Kazikumukh, and Kunzahwere recognized places of spiritual enlightenment for the Muslims of Eurasia. TheDagestani ulema Ali-khadzhi al-Kumukhi, Muhammad al-Kudutlya, Abu Bakr al-Aymaki, Tayid al-Kurakhi, and Muhammad al-Akusha were highly respected outsideDagestan.10

The first Sufis appeared in Dagestan as early as the eleventh century. Amongnotable Sufi thinkers was Muhammad Abu Bakr ad-Derbendi, who lived in Dagestanduring the eleventh century.11 The ideas of the luminary of Islamic mysticism, AbuKhamid al-Ghazali (1059–1111), had a particular influence on the further develop-ment of Sufi theosophy in Dagestan. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries Sufikhanaqas (lodges) in Tsakhur in southern Dagestan were the centers of Sufilearning.12 The Naqshbandi tariqa took particularly deep root in the region.13 TheNaqshbandiyya first reached the North Caucasus from the Black Sea region ofeastern Anatolia and later from Central Asia. In Dagestan the Mujaddidi branch ofthe Naqshbandiyya was particularly influential.14 The majority of Dagestani Naqsh-bandiis were Avars, Dargins, and Kumyks, although there were also Naqshbandiis ofother ethnic origins. Among the other influential Dagestani Sufi tariqas were theKadiriyya15 and to a lesser extent the Yasawiyya. The latter had particularly strongpositions among the Nogays of northern Dagestan. Compared with Dagestan, inChechnya and Ingushetia, the proliferation of Sufism, and Islam in general, beganmuch later, in the eighteenth century, and has not yet ended. The first propagators ofIslam there were Azeri (Shia) and Kumyk (Sunni) missionaries. Most Chechens andIngushes, like Dagestanis, opted for the Shafii madhhab of Sunni Islam. Similarly,they chose the Naqshbandiiya tariqa although the positions of the Kadiriyya werestronger there than in Dagestan. On the whole, from the eighteenth century themajority of Muslims in the eastern North Caucasus were Sufis.16

The spread of Sufism was enhanced by the physical and social characteristics of

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the eastern part of the North Caucasus, such as its mountainous landscape and theextreme multi-ethnicity and societal fragmentation of Dagestanis and Vaynakh. Themajor viable social unit was a clan, also known as a sihil, qa’am, jins, gar, or neq’iamong the Vaynakh peoples. Several clans formed a tribe, known as a tukhum,haldan, hamadan, tabun , or taip among Chechens and Ingushes. During thethirteenth and fourteenth centuries a wider sociopolitical formation emerged: therural commune— a jamaat among the Dagestanis and a tukhum among the Vaynakh.This was a sociopolitical and territorial entity that united several tribes. Councils ofelders who represented the constituent clans headed the rural communes. Inter-clanand inter-commune relations were regulated by the adat (customary law), whichstructured the economic, political, and sociocultural norms that distinguished localcommunities as coherent sociocultural entities. Members of a commune spoke thesame language, which was recognized as a local lingua franca. Jamaats and tukhumswere self-sufficient formations that enjoyed a large degree of independence.17 Adatand other pre-Islamic local norms and traditions regulated inter-clan, inter-tribe, andinter-commune relations. The power balance between various clans and communesdetermined the stability of local societies. Sufism, which historically was an alterna-tive and anti-establishment form of Islam, thus fitted well the clan-based socialorganization of Dagestanis and Vaynakh. It became deeply integrated into the systemof traditional community, providing its spiritual substance. As a result, a specificregional form of Sufism, known as tariqatism, emerged.18 By the eighteenth century,the majority of Muslims of the eastern North Caucasus were Sufis.19

The Russian invasion of the North Caucasus in the eighteenth and nineteenthcenturies stimulated political and military functions of tariqatism which were notcharacteristic of mainstream Sufism. The Naqshbandi tariqa provided a mobilizingframework for resistance to Russian expansion in the region. The Naqshbandishaykhs and their disciples led the military resistance to the Russians. Ever since, theNaqshbandiis have maintained their active involvement in politics. Under theconditions of extreme polyethnicity and persistent external threat, tariqatism servedas a viable basis for the political unification of the North Caucasus. From 1785 to1791, the Chechen Naqshbandi shaykh Mansur Ushurma united the Chechens andvarious peoples of Dagestan into an anti-Russian political-military union. Between1824 and 1859, Imam Shamyl, also a Naqshbandii, formed an Islamic state, anImamat, on the territory of present-day Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan, basedon the shariat.20 The century-long armed conflict produced muridism,21 a specificpoliticized and militarized version of tariqatism. At the core of muridism was aconcept of gazawat against the Russian invaders, who were regarded as kafirs (non-believers). 22 Among the main participants in the gazawat were the Chechens, Avars,Dargins, and other mountain peoples of Dagestan, as well as the Adyghs.23

In the case of the Chechens and Ingushes, the Caucasian war was also a strongcatalyst in the process of their Islamization. Many of them eagerly embraced theteaching and practice of muridism although some preferred the more contemplative

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Kadiri tariqa. During the 1860s and 1870s, despite the continuous quantitative andpolitical domination of the Naqshbandiyya the positions of the Kadiriyya, especiallyof the wird of Kunta-khadzhi grew steadily. This wird was founded by ShaykhKunta-khadzhi Kishiev, a Kumyk who came to Chechnya from Dagestan. ShaykhKunta-khadzhi received an iznu (permission) on the Kadiri tariqa from Shaykh Jamalad-Din Kazikumukhskii, who also gave an iznu to Umar-khadzhi.24 In contrast totariqatists , Kunta-khadzhi rejected Sufis’ participation in the gazawat and advocatedsocial passivity and spiritual self-perfection. There were also some elements ofShiism in the teaching of Kunta-khadzhi, which mainly concerned the frequency ofrecollection of Ali. Kunta-khadzhi’s imprisonment by the Tsarist authorities and hissubsequent death in exile in 1867 gave a new momentum to the proliferation of theKadiriyya among Chechens and Ingushes. The Russian defeat of the gazawat in1877–1878 and the subsequent establishment of Russian domination in the regionalso affected the later development of Sufism there.25

The Russian victory had a devastating impact on the muridism that was linked tothe Naqshbandiyya. Thousands of Naqshbandi participants in the gazawat weredeported to Siberia and hundreds of thousands more were forced to flee to theOttoman Empire. The remaining Naqshbandiis were seriously weakened by the witchhunt that was unleashed against them by the Tsarist secret police. The Naqshbandishaykhs and ustazes (teachers) and many of their murids were physically eliminated.Those Naqshbandiis who survived were forced either to move to other tariqas thatwere not associated with the recent gazawat or to hide in the mountains. In Chechnyamany former Naqshbandiis joined the Kadiri wird of Kunta-khadzhi, which becamethe largest tariqa. Because of Kadiriis’ loud and ecstatic dhikr they became known asdhikrists. They believed that through their expressive dhikr they physically cleansedthemselves of their unclean social environment. Apart from the wird of Kunta-khadzhi, some Chechen and Ingush Kadiriis also followed the wirds of Batal-khadzhi, Bammat Girey-khadzhi, and Chimmirza. On the whole, in the aftermath ofthe Caucasian war the Kadiriis prevailed in the plains, and the Naqshbandiis main-tained their dominance in the mountains. In contrast to the Naqshbandiis, whorefused to submit to Russian rule, the Kadiriis were prepared to formally accept itdespite their internal opposition to it. This enabled them to work as qadis (Muslimjudges), mullahs, and other Muslim clerics under the Tsarist administration.26 TheDagestani Naqshbandiis went underground. It is unclear whether any Naqshbandishaykhs survived the severe persecutions by the Tsarist and later the Sovietauthorities. The descendants of Dagestani and Chechen Naqshbandiis who fled theNorth Caucasus in the 1870s believe that after the Caucasian war no Sufi shaykhswere left in the region and the Naqshbandi silsila (Sufi transmission chain) there wasinterrupted. Therefore they regard the Dagestani Naqshbandi shaykhs of the laterperiod as false shaykhs.27 The living Dagestani Naqshbandi shaykhs oppose this pointof view, insisting on the continuity of the Naqshbandi silsila and claiming theirauthenticity as Sufi shaykhs.28

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Sufism under the Soviet Regime

The Russian bourgeois and socialist revolutions of 1917 further aggravated thesituation of Sufis in the North Caucasus. The most damaging aspect was theBolsheviks’ atheistic war against Islam, and Sufism in particular. According to somesources, most Naqshbandiis hiding in the mountains of Dagestan and Chechnya hadwelcomed the February bourgeois revolution of 1917. They hoped that the revolutionwould bring about the political independence of the North Caucasus. ThoseNaqshbandiis were active participants in the popular uprising that resulted in theestablishment in 1919 of a “North Caucasian Emirate.”29 They were hostile towardsthe Bolsheviks and supported the anti-Soviet camp represented by the WhiteRussians and the German and Turkish interventionist forces. In 1921, the Bolsheviksdefeated the Emirate and established the Soviet regime throughout the NorthCaucasus. The Bolshevik leadership imposed a new Soviet administrative division ofthe region, which cut across homogeneous ethnic communities.30 The Bolsheviksdealt ruthlessly with the Emirate’s leaders and their Naqshbandi allies. Still, somemanaged to flee abroad or to disappear in the mountains. The majority of Kadiriis, bycontrast, from the first days of the October revolution expressed their loyalty to theBolsheviks. In return, they were allowed to keep their clerical positions. TheBolsheviks’ initial relative liberalism towards Islam sought to secure the support, orat least neutrality, of Russia’s Muslims during the crucial years of the civil war.31

In the late 1920s, the Stalinist leadership toughened its approach towards Islamand Muslims and adopted a policy of eradication of Islam, as well as other religionson the territory of U.S.S.R. According to some sources, 38 Naqshbandi and Kadirishaykhs were executed. Shariat courts were abolished; mosques and medresses weredemolished or turned into various secular premises. Islamic clerics, many of whombelonged to the Kadiri tariqa, were persecuted and sent to exile. Most Sufi bookswere destroyed and the Sufi tradition was subjected to various distortions andaccretions from popular oral myths and fantasies. Among the latter were, forexample, a myth about the future arrival of a mahdi, personified by Kunta-khadzhi,or a myth about the salvation mission of the British.32 As a result, Sufism, andespecially the Kadiriyya, was reduced to an Islamic ritual and an ethno-culturaltradition that lacked its vital spiritual component. The deportations of Chechens in1944 dealt another severe blow to the Kadiri tariqa. Its organizational and spiritualnetwork was irreversibly ruptured, fragmented, and marginalized. Among theChechen deportees in Central Asia emerged a number of new wirds (the wird of Vis-khadzhi and some others), some of which deviated from the main Kadiri principle ofnon-involvement in politics.33

Under the Soviet rule, the Kadiriis suffered larger losses than the Naqshbandiis,who had been less open about their Sufi affiliation. Moreover, since the late 1920s,the Naqshbandiis’ attitude towards the Soviet regime had undergone significantchanges due to their increasing realization that they would not gain quick inde-

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pendence from the Soviet Union and would have to live for some time under itsdomination. They began to return to public life although in a disguised, non-religiousform. Some undercover Naqshbandiis infiltrated the communist and Sovietadministration of Dagestan and Checheno-Ingushetia.34 For example, the ChechenBagautdin Arsanov, a son of the Naqshbandi ustaz, reached the position of colonel inthe N.K.V.D. (Narodnii Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del, People’s Department ofInternal Affairs) (later K.G.B. (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti, Committeeof State Security)). In this capacity he saved a large number of Naqshbandiis fromthe persecution by the Soviet authorities. In the late 1950s Muslim Gerbekov, aNaqshbandii, became prime minister of Checheno-Ingushetia. It is alleged that DoguZavgaev, the last secretary of the Communist Party of Checheno-Ingushetia, alsobelonged to the Naqshbandiyya.35 In Soviet Dagestan the level of the Naqshbandiis’secret political engagement was even higher, since they had their people in all majorpolitical and power structures. It is significant that Sufis had representatives even inthe official Islamic administration—the Muftiyat—which was a constituent part ofthe Soviet totalitarian system.36 From 1943 until 1989 the Muftiyat of the NorthCaucasus (the D.U.M.S.K.) administered the Muslims of Dagestan, Checheno-Ingushetia, and other Islamic autonomous areas of the North Caucasus. Publicly, theD.U.M.S.K.’s leadership subscribed to the Soviet official position on tariqatism,which was qualified as religious obscurantism, and suppressed any Sufi-relatedactivity. However, in practice many members of the D.U.M.S.K. either retained theirSufi affiliation or maintained reverence for Sufism. It could be argued that it was thedistinctly secretive nature of Sufi Islam which secured the continuity of the Islamicfaith and culture in the region in spite of decades of official Soviet atheism.

The Gorbachevian thaw of 1986–1991 enabled the Sufis to end their secretiveexistence. They emerged from underground and championed the grassroots move-ment for Islamic revival. A characteristic symbol of the Sufi dimension of the latterwas the restoration of the traditions of ziyarat (popular Sufi pilgrimage) to over 1,000Sufi shrines. Tariqatists also strengthened their influence on decision making at alocal level through the promotion of their representatives in village administrations.37

This facilitated the renewal of public celebration of major Islamic festivals, as well asthe reintroduction of some elements of the Islamic food norms and dress code thatexisted in pre-Soviet times. However, the most significant was tariqatists ’ return tothe political scene. Tariqatists, and other Islamic traditionalists, Islamists, whorepresented pure, Salafi (ancestral) Islam and members of the dissident democraticintelligentsia made up the core of the Islamic–democratic movement that opposed theexisting party–Soviet system, and the collaborationist D.U.M.S.K. in particular.38 Theultimate goal of the opposition was economic and political liberalization and thecreation of an Islamic state in Dagestan and the North Caucasus in general. Theimmediate demands of the opposition were the resignation of the old leaders of theD.U.M.S.K. under Muftii M. Gekkiev—who was regarded as the major obstacleto genuine religious reform in the region—and their replacement by a younger

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generation of Islamic clerics, the “young Imams”—including both Sufis andIslamists—who claimed to have had no involvement with the Soviet state and theK.G.B.

In 1989 Muftii Gekkiev was charged with corruption, collaboration with theK.G.B., and moral laxity, and was forced to resign. In the conditions of politicaldecentralization of the U.S.S.R., the D.U.M.S.K. gave in to the pressure from variousnationalist factions and split into seven separate Muftiyats, one in each Muslimautonomy of the North Caucasus. Most of them were headed by representatives ofSufi Islam, which was henceforth legalized and became the official strand of Islam.Having achieved legal status, the tariqatists broke their alliance with the Islamistsand claimed tariqatist monopoly over the Islamic umma (community). In order tostrengthen their religious and political positions, tariqatist activists allied with someleaders of the various nationalist movements that mushroomed in the early 1990s.These Islamo-nationalist factions clashed over the right to control the Muftiyat,which was regarded as an indispensable attribute of nationhood as well as animportant source of foreign and domestic cash.

The Chechen drive for independence in 1990 introduced significant nuances in theSufi dynamic in the region. In Dagestan the leadership of the newly establishedautonomous Muftiyat—the D.U.M.D. (the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Dagestan)—was contested by tariqatists and other Islamic traditionalists representing thelargest ethnic groups, i.e. Avars, Dargins, Kumyks, and Laks. Between 1989 and1992 the main strife occurred between Avars, who dominated Islamic officialdom inthe Soviet period, and the rest. This major split was further exacerbated by internalconflicts. Avar traditionalists were divided by their attitude to the Naqshbandi shaykhSayid-efendi Aytseev (Chirkeevskii), an Avar, whose wird had a substantialnumerical superiority over the rest. The integrity of the non-Avar bloc wasjeopardized by disagreements among Dargin, Kumyk, and Lak traditionalists.Initially, representatives of non-Avar ethnic groups took the lead in the race for theMuftiyat. In early 1989 the Kumyks promoted their candidate shaykh MuhammadMukhtar Babatov to the post of Dagestani Muftii. Several months later Babatov wasreplaced by Abdulla Aligadzhiev, a protégé of the Dargin ulema. In January 1990 theKumyks fought back: Bagauddin Isayev, a Kumyk, became the Muftii of Dagestan.

However, the religious supremacy of the Kumyks and Dargins was short-lived.From late 1990, Avar “young Imams” intensified their campaign for the restorationof Avar domination in Dagestani Islamic officialdom. In order to avoid associationwith the old, Soviet-era Islamic establishment, they for tactical reasons emphasizedtheir allegedly democratic image. Thus, they established cooperation with the IslamicDemocratic Party (the I.D.P.), led by Abdurashid Saidov.39 An important factorbehind the Avars’ Islamic advance was the backing of the Avar elite who consideredthe “Avarization” of the Dagestani Muftiyat a counter-balance to the politicaldomination of Dargins, the second largest (after the Avars), ethnic group inDagestan. After the break-up of the U.S.S.R., the Dargin elite led by Magomed Ali

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Magomedov, the present chairman of the State Council (the president) of Dagestanacquired political superiority over the Avar elite who had dominated all vital spheresin Dagestan during the Soviet period.

The Public Face of Sufism after the End of Communism

Sufi Islam, as well as other religious beliefs, received an invigorating impulse as aresult of the political and religious liberalization of the early Yeltsin government.The juridical basis of this process was the decree on “Freedom of ReligiousPersuasions,” which was adopted by the Russian parliament on 25 October 1990.Islamic revivalism has taken different forms: the public celebration of Islamicholidays; the open conducting of Islamic practices such as circumcision, weddings,and funerals; the observance of Islamic duties , such as prayer, fasting, andpilgrimage (al-hajj); and the rapid increase in Islamic publications.40 There has alsobeen a revival of contacts between former Soviet Muslims and their co-religionistsoutside the former Soviet Union. There has been an Islamic building boom:numerous mosques, medresses, Islamic institutes, universities, and cultural centershave been opened. In Dagestan alone over 200,000 people, or almost every fifthDagestani, have been involved in some form of Islamic education: Russia’s Muslimshave acquired access to Islamic education abroad and the study of Islam has beenincreasingly introduced into the curriculum of Russian comprehensive schools.41

The eastern North Caucasus has been the epicenter of the post-Soviet Islamicrevival, which has acquired both Sufi and Salafi, or Wahhabi, dimensions. Apowerful factor behind the rise of Islam in this region has been the persistent Islamicreligiosity of the population, the more severe economic crisis experienced there thanelsewhere in Russia, the Russian–Chechen wars of 1994–1996 and 1999–2000, andwider exposure to foreign Islamic influences. The break-up of the Soviet Union inDecember 1991 and subsequent disintegration of the centralized Soviet political andeconomic system had a particularly devastating impact on the region. It broughtabout a sharp reduction in federal subsidies and a paralysis of military and industrialplants, which were vital for the well-being of the local population. Among the drasticconsequences of the latter were the dramatic decline in the standard of living of themajority of the population, its social and territorial displacement, and deep psycho-logical trauma. The breakdown of vertical center–periphery relations enhanced thecentrifugal tendencies in the region and facilitated the formation of new local eliteswho were searching for a new national ideology to replace communist doctrine.Given the Islamic cultural background of the region, Islam turned into an essentialelement of its post-Soviet political and spiritual transformation.

The newly established Muftiyats began to claim a more important role in domesticpolitics. In multi-ethnic Dagestan, the Sufi activists of the largest ethnic groupsclashed over the right to dominate the Dagestani Muftiyat, the D.U.M.D. In late1991, Avar tariqatists intensified their efforts for control over the D.U.M.D. In

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February 1992 they succeeded in organizing the “election” of Sayid Ahmed Darbish-gadzhiyev, an Avar, as the new Muftii of Dagestan. Having achieved their goal, thetariqatists broke their alliance with the Islamo-democrats from the I.D.P. However,the Avar profile of the D.U.M.D. alienated many non-Avar Dagestanis. Kumyks,Dargins, and Laks refused to recognize the legitimacy of the D.U.M.D. and formedtheir own ethnic Muftiyats. The Nogays also undertook an unsuccessful attempt tocreate their own Islamic Board in Tereklimekteb. In order to strengthen their claimsto religious supremacy, Avar tariqatists began to promote the Naqshbandi shaykhSayid-efendi Chirkeevskii, an Avar, to the rank of “the supreme Shaykh ofDagestan.”42 The authority of the next Dagestani Muftii, Magomed Darbishev, alsoan Avar, was already based on Shaykh Sayid-efendi’s blessing. Darbishev’s suc-cessors, Seyid Muhammad Abubakarov (an Avar, 1996–1998) and Ahmad-khadzhiAbdullaev (an Avar, 1998 onward) were also protégés of Sayid-efendi. During theperiod of their administration, Sayid-efendi’s murids, especially from Gumbetovskiiraion (district), the homeland of Sayid-efendi, were appointed to top positions withinthe D.U.M.D. In unofficial circles, the D.U.M.D. became referred to as “the Muftiyatof Gumbet.” Among Sayid-afendi’s other high profile murids was, for example,Khasmuhammad-khadzhi, the head of the Council of the Dagestani Imams.43

In 1994 Avar tariqatists finally realized their ambition: the Dagestani governmentrecognized the D.U.M.D. as the only legitimate supreme Islamic authority inDagestan. The rival Kumyk, Dargin, and Lak Muftiyats were pronounced illegitimateand self-proclaimed. Shaykh Sayid-efendi’s wird of the Naqshbandiyya became defacto the embodiment of mainstream traditional Islam in Dagestan. In order to under-mine the non-Avar opposition, the D.U.M.D. functionaries undertook a rapproche-ment with some non-Avar Dagestani shaykhs. In particular, they succeeded inensuring the loyalty of the distinguished Naqshbandi shaykh Arsanali GamzatovParaul’skii, a Kumyk. The latter was recognized as a second spiritual authority inDagestan, after Shaykh Sayid-efendi. Arslanali Gamzatov was elected the head of theCouncil of the Dagestani Ulema. Among other influential allies of Shaykh Sayid-efendi were Naqshbandi shaykhs Abdulwahid Kakamakhinskii, a Dargin, andBadruddin Botlikhskii, an Avar. It is assumed that through Sayid-efendi these threeshaykhs are continuing the line of Shaykh Seyfulla-qadi who was one of the three“Red Shaykhs” who supported the Bolsheviks in the 1920s. Shaykh Sayid-efendi andhis followers revere Shaykh Seyfulla-qadi as the qutba (the highest rank of shaykh).44

All four shaykhs were pronounced the only genuine shaykhs whereas those shaykhswho either refused to accept the supremacy of Shaykh Sayid-efendi or kept theirdistance from politics were stigmatized as mutashayhks (spurious shaykhs). Amongthe notable opponents of Shaykh Sayid-efendi were the Kumyk shaykhs MuhammadMukhtar Kakhulayskii and Ilyas-khadzhi and the Dargin traditionalists MuhammadAmin, Magomed-hadzhi and Abdulla-khadzhi Aligadzhiev. Significantly, theopposition camp also included perhaps the most respected and knowledgeableDagestani Naqshbandi shaykh, Tadzhuddin Ramazanov (Khasavyurtovskii), as well

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as the Avar alim Idris-khadzhi Israphilov.45

The de facto institutalization of shaykh Sayid-efendi as the official shaykh ofDagestan has been accompanied by his increasing influence in other spheres ofpublic life. His followers have strengthened their presence in the political andeconomic structures of the republic. The approval of Sayid-efendi has become crucialfor many Dagestani polit icians and businessmen.46 Among the high-rankingsupporters of the D.U.M.D., Mukhu Aliev, the chairman of the National Assembly,Gadzhi Makhachev, the leader of the Avar national movement, and SurokatAsiyatilov, parliament deputy and the leader of the Islamic Party of Dagestan (theI.P.D.), have been the most notable. On the other hand, official backing has allowedthe D.U.M.D., and Sayid-efendi’s close associates in particular, to employ the stateinfrastructure, including the official mass media and the militia and intelligenceservices, to secure its religious supremacy. This has enabled the D.U.M.D. to unleasha propaganda campaign against their political and religious opponents, and then theWahhabis in particular.47

The legalization of tariqatism and the increasing political engagement of theD.U.M.D., controlled by tariqatists, has affected the pace and scope of religiousreform in Dagestan. The tariqatists have dropped the demand for an Islamic state,which they pursued within the Islamo-democratic opposition of 1989–1990, and havereplaced it with the goal of the gradual re-Islamization of Dagestani society within asecular political framework. The D.U.M.D. leaders have envisaged this coming aboutthrough the Islamization of education and the gradual reintroduction of Islamic legalnorms that existed in the 1920s. In particular, the D.U.M.D. has called for the intro-duction of religious subjects in state schools and colleges; the right of variousreligious organizations to teach religion outside the curriculum; the creation ofIslamic nursery schools; the right of students at religious institutes to study generalsubjects as well; and the creation of a state Islamic university that would producequalified Imams and Islamic teachers. The D.U.M.D. has also pressed for thedeclaration of Friday as a holiday; the introduction of some elements of the shariatinto the legal system; the amendment of the symbols and paraphernalia of the state tofit the requirements of Islam; adjustment of the slaughter of animals and birdsaccording to the shariat; the imposition of restrictions on the sale of alcohol anderotic literature and the introduction of Islamic dress codes for women.48

The Muftiyat has developed close relations with the puppet Islamic Party ofDagestan that was formed in 1994 as a result of a split in the I.D.P. between thedemocratic faction led by its founder, Abdurashid Saidov, and the pro-governmentfaction of Surokat Asiyatilov. The I.P.D. has turned into a political mouthpiece of theD.U.M.D. Its parliamentary demands have included the removal of the clauses on theseparation of church and state and of schools from the church from the Dagestaniconstitution, and the official recognition of Islam as the “religion of the democraticmajority.” On behalf of the D.U.M.D., the I.P.D. has also lobbied in parliament forthe new freedom of conscience bill, which would endorse the D.U.M.D.’s control of

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clerical appointments, vesting it with powers to confirm the elections of Imams at alllevels and to monitor the registration of all religious organizations.49 The I.P.D. hasregarded Turkish Islam—which is close to the traditions of Naqshbandiyya Sufism—as a possible model for tariqatism in Dagestan.50

The association of the D.U.M.D. and Shaykh Sayid-efendi with the Dagestaniruling regime has weakened their credentials among ordinary Muslims, although therelations between them have not been free of problems.51 Since the mid-1990s, theintrinsic characteristics of this regime have been authoritarianism, widespread fraud,corruption and nepotism. Its core has been made up of the old, atheistic Soviet/partynomenklatura, the members of which have maintained their jobs, although under new“democratic” labels.52 They have been joined by some new figures who representeither the Dagestani nouveau riche, a Dagestani version of the “new Russians,” orthe activists of the major ethnic parties—mafias.53 Although according to theDagestani constitution 14 titular ethnic groups/nationalities have the right oflegislative initiative and are equally represented in the State Council, the actualpolitical and economic power has been monopolized by the Dargins and the Avars.54

Whereas the Dargins have secured their influence in the political domain, the Avarshave prevailed in the economic and ideological spheres. Most top politicians havebeen closely connected with their respective ethnic parties.55

Significantly, the anti-establishment Islamic clerics have not recognized thelegitimacy of the D.U.M.D., which since 1992 has been elected, not by MuslimCongresses, but by a much smaller circle—the Council of Ulema, made up ofsupporters of Shaykh Sayid-efendi.56 There has been a widely held perception that theD.U.M.D. has been linked to semi-criminal structures and has used its monopolyover hajj-related matters for unlawful enrichment.57 Specifically, it is alleged that ithas manipulated visa fees and the prices of the Koran and other Islamic literaturesupplied by various foreign Islamic organizations and funds free of charge.58 Thepublic has also been unhappy with the way in which the D.U.M.D. appoints localImams. Sometimes it installs poorly educated persons whose main virtue is theirloyalty to shaykh Sayid-efendi. Clerical opponents have reproached the D.U.M.D.leaders for their inadequate religious and theological training and the absence ofauthoritative ulema among them. Thus, since the early 1990s Dagestani Muftiis havenot issued one fetwa (legal opinion in written form).59

In post-Soviet Chechnya, by comparison with Dagestan, Sufi development hasbeen determined by the dynamic of the Russo-Chechen conflict.60 Thus, during itsearly stages, the Chechen Naqshbandiis, who had representatives in the majorpolitical and economic spheres, distanced themselves from the Chechen radicalnationalists under the leadership of General Dudayev. The first Chechen MuftiiMuhammad Bashir, a Naqshbandii, refused to back Dudayev during the presidentialelections in 1991. The failure of the Chechen nationalists to mobilize the Naqshbandinetwork for the war of independence facilitated their rapprochement with theKadiriis, who were much more disadvantaged than the Naqshbandiis during the

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Soviet period. An important role in the formation of this alliance was played by Bek-murza, the older brother of Dzhokhar Dudayev and the regional leader of theKadiriis. Subsequently, the distinctive Kadiri circular movements and loud dhikrhave become symbols of the Chechen resistance to Russian imperialism.61

The Private Face of Post-Soviet Sufism

Dagestani tariqatists are affiliated to between 40 and 50 wirds. In Dagestan, thebiggest are the Naqshbandi and Shadhili wirds,62 and in Chechnya the Naqshbandiyyaand the Kadiriyya are the most prominent, particularly the wird of Kunta-khadzhi. InDagestan there is also a substantial number of followers of the Jazuliyya tariqa,which represents a branch of the Shadhiliyya. The Akkin Chechens who live inDagestan’s Khasavyurtovskii raion, mainly belong to the Kadiri tariqa.63 Themajority of Dagestani Sufis are Avars, who are considered the most religious ethnicgroup. There are also many Sufis among the Dargins and Kumyks, who have thereputation for being moderately religious peoples. Tariqatists believe that Sufismrepresents a superior form of Islam due to the Sufi’s direct interaction with Allahthrough a Sufi shaykh, or an ustaz (a teacher). The authority of a shaykh derives froma mystical permission, or barakat, which was presumably transferred from thefounder of the tariqa to successive shaykhs. Each shaykh has his specific silsila.

An important characteristic of a shaykh is his alleged ability to perform miracles,or karamat. Interestingly, the concept of karamat does not exist in mainstreamSufism and is perceived as vulgarized deviation.64 Tariqatists also recognize theability of one shaykh to teach simultaneously by different wirds, or even differenttariqas. Thus, Shaykh Sayid-efendi teaches according to the Naqshbandiyya andShadhiliyya, whereas Shaykh Tadzhuddin Ramazanov has permission to teachaccording to the Naqshbandiyya, Shadhiliyya, and Jazuliyya.65 The tariqatists alsoattribute supernatural characteristics to the mazars (the graves of Sufi shaykhs andother shrines) and sanction a ziyarat (visiting the shrines of well-known saints),reading the Koran at cemeteries, maulids (chanting praise to saints or shaykhs), andusing amulets and talismans. They endorse the payment to the saints for dua’ bi-tavassul (help) and believe that baraka (divine grace) could be passed down throughsaints, shaykhs, and artefacts related to them (such as shrines). Compared with main-stream Sufism, in tariqatism emphasis is placed on the times and form s ofdhikr, participation in other forms of devotion, and fulfilment of the tariqa’s materialobligations rather than on mysticism and spiritual perfection.66

Tariqatism is noted for its conformity with Orthodox Islamic institutions and itsactive involvement in social life. These characteristics of tariqatism have developedas a reaction to the oppressive non-Islamic political and cultural environment.Historically, in the Islamic heartland the relationship between ulema, who repre-sented prophetic Islam, and Sufis was characterized by distrust and even hostility.The ulema, who regarded the shariat as a sacred unique way towards God, refused to

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recognize the Sufis’ own spiritual path.67 However, in Dagestan, Chechnya, andIngushetia, as well as in other Islamic regions of the former U.S.S.R., the usualantagonism between the Sufis and ulema has been superseded by the necessity oftheir cooperation in the face of Russian Orthodox domination. This has produced aparadoxical situation in which the members of the Islamic legal establishment haveoften been Sufis. Some representatives of the local Islamic authorities argue thatthere is no conflict between the ulema and Sufis, and that the shariat is an obligatoryregulator of Sufis’ life.68 Other characteristics of contemporary tariqatism include itsdeep integration into the system of traditional community, clan, or family ties. It isoften simply the ancestral tradition which determines which wird a person belong to.In other words, Sufism has turned in to one of the cultural denominators ofDagestanis, Chechens, and Ingushes. Local Sufis are characterized by theirpretensions to religious exclusivity, a fanatical commitment to their faith, the rigidnature of their organization, and absolute submission to religious authorities.Furthermore, post-communist national revival has facilitated the merger between theSufi structures and semi-illicit ethnic clans. As a result, the tariqas have begun toplay an increasing role in political and economic spheres, assuming an intermediaryfunction in resolving disputes between clans.69

In Chechnya and Ingushetia, Sufism suffered especially badly during Soviet times.The local Sufis, the Kadiriis in particular, admit that there the “high” spiritual andtheosophical Sufism has been destroyed and that the present Sufism represents onlyits popular and ritual side. Therefore, Chechen and Ingush Sufis have something ofan inferiority complex in the face of Dagestani tariqatists. Compared withDagestanis they do not have living ustazes any more. The last Chechen ustazes werethe Kadiri shaykhs Kunta-khadzhi and Umar-khadzhi. Because of the absence ofliving teachers, the Chechen Kadiriis emphasize the external side of Sufism—theform of the public dhikr and other visible attributes of Sufi affiliation. Comparedwith the latter, the period of individual meditation and ecstatic experience is muchshorter.70

In Dagestan the situation is more complicated. According to the prominentDagestani alim Magomed Rasul Mugumayev (an Avar), there have been no genuineSufi shaykhs in Dagestan since the Caucasian war. The last Dagestani Naqshbandishaykh was Shaykh Sharafuddin, who received the iznu of the Naqshbandi tariqafrom his shaykh, Muhammad-khadzhi al-Madani. The latter was a son and successorof the Naqshbandi shaykh Abdurahman as-Sughuri (died 1882), who, in turn,continued the line of the Naqshbandi shaykh Jamal ad-Din al-Ghumuqi. ShaykhSharafuddin took an active part in the anti-Russian uprising in 1877–1878 under thespiritual leadership of Naqshbandi Shaykh Abdurahman as-Sughuri and his sonMuhammad-khadzhi. After their defeat they were sent to exile in Siberia, thoughlater on they managed to flee to Ottoman Turkey without leaving any successor inDagestan.71

This version of events is shared by some Dagestani Sufis, especially in Kazbek-

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ovskii and Gergebilskii raions of Dagestan. They associate themselves exclusivelywith shaykhs Abdurahman as-Sughuri and Sharafuddin, and regard the mausoleumof Shaykh Abdurahman as-Sughuri as their major place of Sufi veneration. They alsobelieve that after Sharafuddin’s death the chain of succession was either interruptedor distorted. As a result, the Naqshbandiyya in Dagestan was subjected to stagnationand marginalization. They recognize the present peripheral position of DagestaniNaqshbandiis within the global Naqshbandi network and seek their reintergation intothe mainstream Naqshbandiyya. Thus, they welcomed the visits of foreign Naqsh-bandi shaykhs Zulfukar (a Pakistani) and Nazim al-Haqqani (a Turk) to Dagestan in1995 and 1997, respectively.72

The foreign Naqshbandiis, including the mahajirs (natives) from the NorthCaucasus, are also convinced that since the end of the Caucasian war there have beenno Sufi shaykhs in the region and the present living Dagestani shaykhs are spuriousshaykhs. They regard the “official Dagestani shaykh,” Sayid-efendi Chirkeevskii, asa descendant of those Naqshbandiis who had submitted to Russian/Soviet rule andwho have been on the payroll of the imperial Russian, Soviet, and post-Sovietadministrations in Dagestan. Shaykh Sayid-efendi’s opponents accuse him and hispredecessors of forging the silsila in order to prove his Sufi credentials. SomeDagestani Sufis follow the path of dead shaykhs Ali-khadzhi Akushinskii, Amay,Gasan Kakhibskii, Kunta-khadzhi, and Vis-khadzhi.73

There is yet another group of Dagestani Naqshbandiis, who distance themselvesfrom both Sharafuddin and Sayid-efendi. Among them are shaykhs TadzhuddinRamazanov (Khasavyurtovskii), Magomed Amin Gadzhiev, Mukhadzhir Dogre-linskii, Ramazan Gimrinskii, Abdulwahid Kakamakhinskii, Muhammad MukhtarKakhulayskii, Siradzhudin Khurikskii, and Abdulgani Zakatalskii. All of them havetheir own distinct silsilas. They consider Sayid-efendi’s elevation to the position ofthe main Dagestani Shaykh as irrelevant to the ascetic and spiritual essence ofSufism. It is worth noting that some of those Dagestani shaykhs by far excel the“official shaykh” in their knowledge of Is lam, Sufi theosophy, and Arabic.Naqshbandi shaykh Tadzhuddin Ramazanov, who is the oldest and the most know-ledgeable Dagestani shaykh, reckons that he is the last living shaykh in Dagestan. Itis noteworthy that shaykh Tadzhuddin has a different silsila from that of ShaykhSayid-efendi Chirkeevskii.74

The “official shaykh,” Sayid-efendi Chirkeevskii, is a controversial figure indeed.Although he recognizes Shaykh Abdurahman as-Sughuri he believes that the latterdid not leave a successor. Sayid-efendi claims to represent a separate branch of theNaqshbandi tariqa which is different from the line of Shaykh Abdurahman as-Sughuri and which was initiated by the Naqshbandi Shaykh Seyfulla-qadi.75 The wirdof Sayid-efendi is noted for its high degree of internal solidarity and multi-ethniccomposition. Shaykh Sayid-efendi enjoys genuine respect among a large numberof ordinary Dagestani Muslims, especially Avars. Avar Islamic and politicalofficialdom and the strongly censored local media present him as one of the few

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great living Naqshbandi shaykhs in the world. The Islamic periodicals, such as theNur-ul Islam and the As-Salam , abound with exaltations of Shaykh Sayid-efendi andabstracts from his works.76 However, first-hand contact with Shaykh Sayid-efendi,and the judgements of some prominent Dagestani ulema and intellectuals about himare at dissonance with the official presentation. Shaykh Sayid-efendi, who in Soviettimes was an ordinary shepherd, does not reveal deep knowledge of Islamic doctrineand Arabic. It is hard to imagine that he has actually written numerous books inArabic which are widely available in the local shops.77 He gives an impression of asimple and unambiguous person. It could be that Shaykh Sayid-efendi has beenmanipulated by his murids, who are linked to particular factions in the Avar estab-lishment.78

The members of Shaykh Sayid-efendi’s group, although not Sayid-efendi himself,are noted for their intolerance towards the others. They argue that Shaykh Sayid-efendi and his allies are the only living representatives of the Naqshbandi silsila,which has survived only in Dagestan. The other Naqshbandi shaykhs in Dagestanand abroad are regarded as mutashaykhs (spurious shaykhs).79 This view has beenpromoted by the Dagestani mass media. In the Islamic universities and medressescontrolled by supporters of the D.U.M.D., students are educated in a spirit of enmitytowards other shaykhs. In 1997, Shaykh Sayid-efendi’s party orchestrated apropaganda war against the visit to Dagestan of the foreign Naqshbandi shaykhNazim al-Haqqani, who claimed to be linked to the line of Dagestani ShaykhAbdurahman as-Sughuri. Shaykh Nazim was charged with forging the Naqshbandisilsila, distorting Sufi teaching for his own and political ends, and close involvementwith the Western political establishment and anti-Russian forces within Russia.80

Sufism versus Wahhabism

Since the late 1980s the North Caucasus has witnessed an emergence of Wahhabism ,also known as Salafism . Its proliferation has occurred in the context of the re-integration of the Russian umma (the Islamic community) into the Muslim worldfrom which it had been isolated for over a century. There have been severalmechanisms by which this proliferation has occurred, including the annual par-ticipation of thousands of Russian Muslims in the hajj and umra (the small hajj), thegrowing number of Russian Muslims studying in foreign Islamic universities andcolleges, the staffing of newly opened medresses and Islamic colleges with foreignIslamic teachers, and the openness of Muslim-populated areas of Russia to foreignIslamic missionaries, Islamic literature, and foreign mass media. The advance ofWahhabism has been facilitated by its substantial financial resources in poverty-stricken Muslim areas and the attractiveness of its religious doctrine and its appealbeyond the traditional clan network.81

The first Wahhabis in the region turned up in Dagestan in the mid-1980s. From thevery beginning there were two distinct trends in Dagestani Wahhabism : one intel-

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lectual and one popular. The first noted Dagestani Wahhabi was Ahmed-qadiAkhtaev, an intellectual and one of the leaders of the Islamic Renaissance Party (theI.R.P.), which was later transformed into the educational organization Al-Islamiyya.82

Both organizations advocated the gradual Islamization of society and the transforma-tion of Dagestan into an Islamic state.83 Akhtaev advocated the active participation ofMuslims of all branches of Islam in political life through an effective and credibleIslamic political party. Ahmed-qadi argued that, since Dagestan was part of theRussian state, it was inappropriate to apply the concept of takfir (non-belief) to it andto wage an armed jihad there. Nevertheless, he supported the idea of a future Islamicunification of the Caucasus, which would allegedly force Russia to take this unifieden tity in to accoun t and to coopera te w ith i t on equa l t e rm s. 84 W hereasintellectual Wahhabism was centred primarily in Makhachkala, popular Wahhabismspread predominantly in the rural areas inhabited by Avars, Dargins, and Lezgins. InJuly 1998 three villages in Buynakskii raion (Karamakhi, Chaban-Makhi, and Kadar)proclaimed themselves an Islamic territory, based on the shariat. Wahhabism alsorapidly proliferated in Kizilyurtovskii, Khasavyurtovskii, Karabudakhkenskii, andTsumadinskii raions. By the end of 1990 Wahhabis already made up between 7%and 9% of Dagestani Muslims.85

Relations between the tariqatists and Wahhabis have been controversial anddependent on the particular religious and political circumstances. In doctrinal termsthere is an intrinsic conflict between Sufism and Wahhabism. Wahhabism allegedlyrepresents the “pure” and true Islam of Prophet Muhammad and the four “righteousCaliphs.” Wahhabis advocate the tawhid (strict monotheism) and oppose tariqatismas a deviation from Islam. They seek the restoration of original Islam through itspurging of Sufi-related bid’a (innovations). Wahhabis do not consider themselves tobe bound by the Shafii madhhab, which has been traditionally dominant in Dagestan,or by any other madhhab ; they concur only with those regulations of the fourmadhhabs that can be tested by reference to the Koran and the Sunna. Wahhabisbelieve that on questions of ibadat (homage to Allah), only what is prescribed in theKoran and the Sunna is permissible; everything else is a deviation from Islam. Inmuamalat (social practice), everything is permitted unless it is specifically forbiddenby the Koran and the Sunna.86

The Wahhabi ideologists count as many as 100 bid’a in Sufi doctrine and practice.They are particularly critical of the Sufi veneration of saints and shaykhs as inter-cessors between believers and Allah. They regard excessive worship and glorifica-tion of Islamic saints (even of the Prophet Muhammad) as a deviation frommonotheism, which proscribes the worship of anyone other than Allah. Apart fromclear, conceivable knowledge embodied in the shariat, Wahhabis rule out theexistence in Islam of another hidden, mystic knowledge that is supposedly accessibleonly to saints and Sufi shaykhs. They do not recognize the mystical ability of thesaints and of the Prophet himself to intercede on behalf of Muslims before Allah, andchallenge the legitimacy of praying to the saints for dua’ bi-tavassul. Neither do

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Wahhabis accept that baraka can be passed down through saints, shaykhs, andrelated artefacts (such as shrines). Wahhabis thus reject such Sufi practicestraditional to Dagestani society like ziyarat, reading the Koran at cemeteries,chanting praise to saints or shaykhs, and using amulets and talismans. Thoughcondemning innovations, at the same time Wahhabis advocate the strict observanceof all provisions of the Koran and Sunna concerning ritual and ceremony and thebehavior and appearance of Muslims, even if these provisions are unfamiliar to mostDagestanis. In particular, they insist on unshaven beards and shortened trousers formen and hijab or even niqab (face veil) for women. On the whole, Wahhabismattracts new converts by its rationalism, accessibility, and ability to overcome theelitist and closed nature of Sufism.87

Of special significance is the difference between Wahhabis and tariqatists on theissue of Islamic jihad. Wahhabis accuse Sufis of distorting Islamic teaching on thejihad and of effectively consigning the jihad to oblivion. Wahhabis perceive thejihad as the core of Islam, without which it is like a “lifeless corpse.” Unlike thetariqatists, who interpret the jihad predominantly in terms of the spiritual self-perfection of a Muslim, Wahhabis believe that the jihad also implies a campaign tospread Islam all over the world. Moreover, Wahhabi radicals view the jihad as apreventive armed advance in order to overcome those obstacles which the enemies ofIslam place in the path of its peaceful proliferation. This approach opens up thepossibility of declaring a jihad against the present government which allegedlyresists the effective ad-da’wa al-Islamiyya (summons for an Islamic way of life) inDagestan. In this respect, the Wahhabis strongly criticize the tariqatists for theirideological and political corruption and for their support of the present regime.Wahhabis also accuse shaykh Sayid-efendi and his entourage of legalizing usury,which is forbidden by the shariat, by allowing money to be invested in state andcommercial banks.88

Despite the doctrinal collisions the actual relations between tariqatists andWahhabis have been complicated. In 1989–1990 they united in the opposition move-ment against the Soviet political and religious establishment. The tariqatists wereactive participants in anti-government protests in favor of wider Islamic liberalizationin Dagestan. In July 1991 they organized a demonstration for the freedom of hajjwhich ended in violent clashes with the Dagestani militia.89 In the early 1990s thealliance between tariqatists and Wahhabis fell apart after the removal of the Soviet-era D.U.M.S.K. and the institutionalization of tariqatism. Wahhabism became thesymbol of unofficial Islam, oppressed and persecuted by the authorities. Despite theofficial antagonism towards Wahhabism , there have also been cases of grassrootscollaboration between the tariqatists and Wahhabis. For example, in May 1998tariqatists and Wahhabis of the village of Kirovaul of Kizilyurtovskii raion formed ajoint vigilante brigade and a shariat commission to deal with drug addiction,alcoholism, theft, and prostitution. When these shariat structures began to work, theincidence of livestock and property theft decreased dramatically, and the moral

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atmosphere in the village improved. The case of Kirovaul, in spite of its localizedcharacter, showed that if there was no interference from outside, the doctrinaldifferences between Wahhabis and tariqatists need not constitute an obstacle fortheir constructive cooperation in solving social problems.90

Similarly, tariqatist clerics not belonging to the official party of shaykh Sayid-efendi have been le ss aggressive tow ards Wahhabis . For example , shaykhMuhammad Mukhtar disagreed with the D.U.M.D.’s portrayal of Wahhabis as kafirson the basis that they accused other Muslims of kufr. He and a number of Darginulema and Imams, led by Abdulla Aligadzhiev, repeatedly expressed their willing-ness to hold a dialogue with the Wahhabis.91 Another manifestation of the possibilityof ideological reconciliation between tariqatists and Wahhabis was their participa-tion in the Congress of Muslims of Dagestan, held on the initiative of Al-Islamiyya inKudali in September 1998. There were 585 delegates to this Congress, representingDagestani tariqatists, Wahhabis and ulema. The Congress denounced enmity amongthe different trends in Islam and called for strengthening the religious and legal baseof the Islamic movement by creating a council of ulema and gradually introducingshariat norms in the life of society. The Congress adopted a resolution in favor ofending the conflict between the different trends in Islam and strengthening thereligious and legal base of the Islamic movement by creating a Council of Ulema topromote the re-Islamization of Dagestani society.92 Yet another example of atariqatist–Wahhabi joint venture was the Islamic Shura (Council) of Dagestan whichwas formed in spring 1998, which included Wahhabi representatives and sometraditionalist ulema.93

Despite obvious constraints Wahhabism has attracted some social groups by itscrusade against a semi-criminal regime and one of i ts constituent parts, theD.U.M.D.; by its call for social equality and justice; by its egalitarianism; and by itspractical social and material support. Particularly appealing has been the Wahhabis’condemnation of the “non-Islamic” custom, firmly rooted in Dagestan, of spendinghuge amounts of money on weddings, funerals, and other family events, the costsof which in a poverty-stricken society have become ruinous for the bulk of thepopulation. Social welfare provided by the Wahhabi jamaats to its members anddirect financial assistance to individuals in need has also created strong incentives tojoin the movement. On several occasions during the 1990s Wahhabi leadersdemonstrated their ability to mobilize their followers for the struggle against theinjustice and lawlessness created both by corrupt officials and by the semi-criminalethnic parties associated with them. Equally important, Wahhabi jamaats are highlyorganized, capable of offering members not just a sense of social protection, but also,if necessary, armed protection against the criminal free-for-all and the arbitrariness ofthe police.

The social d imension of the Wahhabi movement has been of paramountimportance. In contrast to tariqatism, which is deeply rooted in the primordial socialnetwork, Wahhabism has provided a mechanism for the democratization of

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Dagestani society through cleansing its Islamic life of mysticism, superstition, andpatriarchal elements. Wahhabi jamaats, which advocate strict spiritual allegiance toAllah alone, offer a modern form of social solidarity. Wahhabism allows the detach-ment of the individual from the system clan ties that still cement Dagestani societyand have been intrinsically interwoven with tariqatism. The yearning for individualindependence and self-determination has been especially strong among the young,who were particularly badly affected by the recent, rapid property-based stratificationof society, the loss of moral points of reference, and the interruption of the socializa-tion process.94

Under pressure from the tariqatist D.U.M.D., the Dagestani parliament issued aban on the activities of the Wahhabis, who were defined as religious extremists inDecember 1997. The official campaign against Wahhabism which began in late 1997has had a radicalizing impact on its devotees. Many moderate Wahhabis have alliedthemselves with the radicals and accepted their program. The dynamic of theWahhabi movement has since been defined by the radicals, who call themselves the“Islamic Jamaat of Dagestan” (the I.J.D.). Their leader is Bagauddin Muhammad.Unlike the moderate Wahhabis, the radicals have refused to cooperate with thecurrent Dagestani government, which they described as kafir, and have focused theiractivity on building their organization, religious propaganda, and introducing theshariat at a local level. Their ultimate goal has been the creation of an Islamic state inDagestan and the subsequent political unification of the Caucasus as a single Islamicentity. The radicals regard Afghanistan and Sudan as possible models for an IslamicDagestani state. In their publications they have openly expressed their favorableattitude towards the Afghan Taliban movement. They have also categoricallyrejected any dialogue with tariqatists, whom they accuse of shirk (polytheism).95

Another important implication of the crackdown on Wahhabism has been itsrapprochement with the Chechen radical nationalists. The death of Ahmed Akhtaevin rather mysterious circumstances in March 1998 dealt another irredeemable blow tothe moderate Wahhabis.96 In early 1998 the leaders of Wahhabi Jamaat announced ajihad against the Dagestani regime. In August and September 1999 they participatedin the abortive Chechen military invasion of Dagestan under Chechen field com-manders Basaev and Khattab in Tsumadinskii, Botlikhskii and Novolakskii raions ofDagestan. The Dagestani authorities’ reaction to the invasion was further suppressionof Wahhabism and the adoption of a new and tougher law aimed at the completeeradication of Wahhabism in Dagestan. The participation of radical Wahhabis in theChechen incursion has shifted Dagestani public opinion decisively in favor oftariqatism and undermined the Wahhabis’ chances of success in the foreseeablefuture.

In Chechnya the broad advance of Wahhabism began considerably later than inDagestan—during the first Chechen war in 1994–1996. Before the war the number ofChechen Wahhabis was relatively small. They were members of the opposition to theDudayev regime and its ally—the Kadiriyya. The conditions of war enhanced the

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proliferation of radical Wahhabism centered on the armed jihad against kafirs. Themajor agents of Wahhabism in Chechnya were foreign Islamic fighters who came toassist their Islamic brethren in fighting the jihad against the Russian invasion, andradical Dagestani Wahhabis. The overwhelming majority of Chechen Wahhabis havebeen marginalized young people with vague knowledge of Islam. They have treatedWahhabism more as a profession and means of living than a religious belief. Theirrole model was the legendary field commander Khattab.97 Since 1996 Wahhabism hasbegun to penetrate the Chechen political establishment. The Chechen radical nation-alists Shamyl Basayev, Movladi Udugov, Zalimkhan Yandarbiyev, and their associ-ates have turned to Wahhabism , which, they believed, would ensure a better mobi-lizing ideology for the war of independence and would guarantee an uninterruptedflow of hard currency from Islamic sources abroad. The rapprochement betweenthese Chechen nationalists and the Wahhabis has occurred against the background ofthe split between the former and President Maskhadov, who had appealed to SufiIslam.

In Chechnya, then, the relationship between Sufis and Wahhabis has been stronglyinfluenced by the Russian–Chechen war, on the one hand, and the power strugglewithin the Chechen leadership, on the other. Thus, during the first Chechen war in1994–1996 the Sufis, mainly Kadiriis, and Wahhabis fought together against theRussian invasion. The Naqshbandiis, many of whom opposed the armed struggle,remained neutral. The war brought about enormous human and material losses andtotal devastation of the state and societal infrastructure. Among its consequenceswere political and economic anarchy, unprecedented corruption, and the rise of crimeand banditry. The authority of the Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov has beenchallenged by field commanders Shamyl Basayev, Salman Raduyev, Khunkar-pashaIsrapilov, Arbi Barayev, and others, who have established control over variousregions of Chechnya. The political confrontation between President Maskhadov andhis former colleagues has acquired an ideological dimension. Whereas Maskhadovhas been linked to the Kadiriyya, his opponents subscribe to Wahhabi Islam. InAugust 1997 President Maskhsdov banned Wahhabism on the territory of Chechnya.

In early 1998 the position of Chechen Wahhabis was further strengthened by themass exodus of Wahhabis under the leadership of Bagauddin from Dagestan toChechnya. The arrival of Bagauddin introduced an intellectual element into ChechenWahhabism. This provided Shamyl Basayev, Khattab and the like with an ideologicalframework for intervention in Dagestan. In August and September 1999 theDagestani and Chechen Wahhabis and Chechen nationalists invaded Tsumadinskii,Botlikhskii and Novolakskii raions of Dagestan. The invasion sparked the secondChechen war, which shows no sign of ending. President Maskhadov regarded therenewal of Russian military operations against Chechnya as a violation of theKhasavyurt agreements of 1996 and joined the anti-Russian Wahhabi camp.However, most Chechen Sufis, who earlier supported Maskhadov, supported the pro-Moscow Chechen administration under Muftii Ahmed Kadyrov, who was appointed

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to this post by President Putin in May 2000. It is significant that this time theChechen Kadiriis and Naqshbandiis united to support Ahmed Kadyrov.98 Thus, theChechen Sufis chose to support the federal forces whereas the Wahhabis allied withthe irreconcilable Chechen radical nationalists who refused any dialogue withMoscow.

Conclusion

The post-Soviet structural and ideological crisis contributed to the rise of bothtraditional Sufi, or tariqatist, Islam and Wahhabism in the North Caucasus. TheIslamic resurgence has been greatest in Dagestan and Chechnya. In the early stage ofthis Islamic movement the Sufis and Wahhabis acted together against Soviet-eraIslamic officialdom and the communist/Soviet nomeklatura. Their alliance fell apartafter the representatives of tariqatism, which used to be “unofficial” parallel Islam,took control of the local Muftiyats, effectively giving tariqatism the status of officialIslamic ideology. In Dagestan an intensive ethnic and economic differentiationfostered the formation of alliances between representatives of tariqatist Islamicofficialdom and the corresponding ethnic and political groups in the ruling elitewhich were fighting for the redistribution of power and ownership. By 1994 the toppositions in the political, economic and religious spheres were practically monopo-lized by Dargins and Avars, the most numerous ethnic groups in Dagestan. TheDagestani Muftiyat, or the D.U.M.D., fell under the influence of the Avars, morespecifically, of the Avar Naqshbandi /Shadhili shaykh Sayid-efendi Chirkeevskii,who was elevated to the status of the “national shaykh” of Dagestan. The legalizationof tariqatism led to an increasing political engagement of those Dagestani Sufis whobelonged to Shaykh Sayd-efendi’s party. They have been among the main orches-trators of the campaign against the Wahhabis, who became the leading protagonistsof unofficial, persecuted Islam. The Dagestani Sufis and traditionalists (mainlyDargins and Kumyks, but also some Avars) who refused to accept the legitimacy ofthe D.U.M.D. and the supremacy of shaykh Sayid-efendi have remained politicallypassive. Nevertheless, they have been less hostile towards Wahhabis and haverecognized the possibility of a constructive partnership with the latter.

In Chechnya the Sufi revival has been determined by the dynamic of theRussian–Chechen conflict. There the political, economic and corporate interests ofthe Chechen participants of the conflict have had certain priority over their religiousaffiliation. Thus, during the first Chechen war in 1994–1996 the Chechen Kadiriisand Wahhabis fought together against the Russian federal forces, and mostNaqshbandiis remained uninvolved in the conflict. The postwar regrouping withinthe Chechen national leadership was accompanied by change in religious alliances.The side of the Chechen President Maskhadov expanded further its collaborationwith Sufis by strengthening its links with both Kadiriis and Naqshbandiis. TheChechen opposition, represented by a number of powerful warlords, allied with

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radical Wahhabis and adopted the Wahhabi ideology of an armed jihad againstRussian imperialism and of Islamic unification of the North Caucasus. During thesecond Chechen war in 1999–2000 the Chechen Sufis adopted a pro-peace moderateposition and backed the pro-Moscow Chechen administration of Ahmed Kadyrov,and President Maskhadov joined the radical nationalists and Wahhabis.

The ongoing official physical and ideological crackdown on Wahhabism , whichhas been portrayed as a foreign and destructive form of Islam, has secured for Sufismthe position of traditional authentic Islam. However, given the close interweaving ofSufism with primordial social networks based on clan solidarity, it is unlikely that itcould provide a plausible ideological framework for the future modernization anddemocratization of local societies. Moreover, the prolongation of the currenteconomic and societal disorder, on the one hand, and the association of tariqatismwith semi-criminal and inefficient regimes, on the other, may increase the attractive-ness of other than Sufi Islamic solutions to the crisis.

NOTES

1. Here, the term “Islamic revival” or “Islamic renaissance” refers to the process ofrediscovering the cultural and ethnic identities of post-Soviet Muslims which was trig-gered by the Gorbachevian political liberalization in the late 1980s.

2. Scholars are divided over the origins of the term “Sufism,” or at-tasawwuf . Some derive itfrom the Arab word safawa (to be pure); some from the Greek word sophia (wisdom); yetsome others from the Arab word suf (coarse wool, from which the gown of an ascetic-hermit was made). Sufism represents a mystical side of Islam. It developed in parallel tomainstream Islam. The Sufis believe that Sufism is a higher form of Islam. The leadingSufi thinkers were Abu Yazid al-Bistami (died in a.d. 875), as-Sarraj at-Tusi (died in a.d.988), al-Kalabazi (died in a.d. 990), al-Khudzhviri (died in 1072), as-Sulami (died in1021), al-Ghazali (died in 1111), as-Suhrawardi al-Maktul (died in 1191), Ibn Arabi (diedin 1240 ), Abd ar-Razzak Kashani (died in 1329), and Bahauddin Naqshband (died in1389). By the end of the twelfth century specific Sufi organizations—tariqas (a “way,” ora school in Sufism)—had emerged, headed by particular Sufi shaykhs. By the fourteenthcentury there were 12 major tariqas: Rifaiyya, Yasawiyya, Shadhiliyya, Suhrawardiyya,Chishtiyya, Kubrawiyya, Badaviyya, Kadiriyya, Mawlawiyya, Bektashiyya, Khalwatiyya,and Naqshbandiyya. For more information see: John S. Trimingham, The Sufi Orders inIslam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973); The Naqshbandis in Western and CentralAsia: Change and Continuity (Istanbul: Svenska Forskningsinstitutet, 1999); M. M. Al-Janabi, Al-Ghazali: Mystical Theologico-Philosophical Synthesis (New York: EdwinMellen Press, 2000); Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Mystics andCommissars. Sufism in the Soviet Union (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985),p. 1.

3. The North Caucasus occupies some 255,000 square kilometers (1.5% of the territory ofthe Russian Federation) and is populated by some 12.8 million people (8% of the totalpopulation). P. Hanson and M. Bradshaw, The Territories of the Russian Federation(London: Europa Publications, 1999), p. 50.

4. There has been no sociological survey of Sufis in the North Caucasus, or elsewhere inIslamic Russia. According to some experts in Dagestan alone Sufis constitute over 60% ofthe Muslim population. Some others believe that they make up only about 30% of

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Dagestani Muslims. Interview with Magomed Kurbanov, the Deputy Minister ofNationalities of Dagestan, Makhachkala, Dagestan, 30 June 1998; interview with MuradZargishev, the editor-in-chief of the journal Musul’mane, Moscow, 27 April 2000.

5. The territory of Dagestan is 50,300 square kilometers and its population was 1,954,252 in1995. The urban population makes up 43.6% of the total and the rural population is56.4%. Dagestan is one of the least economically developed autonomous republics of theRussian Federation and is strongly dependent on federal subsidies and other suppliers. Itis populated by over 30 different ethnic groups, which belong to various Ibero-Caucasian,Turkic, and Persian ethno-linguistic families. Each ethnic group has its own culture andspeaks a distinctive language incomprehensible to the rest. The largest ethnic groups arethe Avars, Dargins, Kumyks, and Laks. Until 1990 Chechens and Ingushes lived withinthe single autonomous republic of Checheno-Ingushetia, the territory of which was 19,300square kilometers. Acccording to the census of 1989 there were 956,879 Chechens and237,438 Ingushes in the republic. Both the Chechen and Ingush peoples belong to thenortheastern branch of the Ibero-Caucasian ethno-linguistic family. In 1990 the Chechennationalists headed by General Dzhokhar Dudayev proclaimed Chechen independence,which facilitated the emergence of the Ingush Republic. The Chechen secessionist drivetriggered the protracted Russian–Chechen conflict, which has brought about heavy humanand material losses. Also, the Chechen war has hampered adequate academic investiga-tion into the Sufi dynamic there. The Territories of the Russian Federation, pp. 50, 61.

6. In this article the term “Islamic fundamentalism” refers to the desire to return to the pure,unadulterated Islam of the period of the Prophet Muhammad and the four righteousCaliphs.

7. Historically, Wahhabism was a religious and political movement within the most strictand rigid Khanbali maddhab of Sunni Islam. It originated in the mid-eighteenth century inArabia and was named after its leader, Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab. Strictly speaking, theuse of the term “Wahhabism” in relation to Islamic fundamentalism in the NorthCaucasus and elsewhere in the Islamic regions of the former Soviet Union is incorrectbecause the latter is based on a wider doctrinal foundation than the teaching of Abd al-Wahhab. However, due to the term’s wide acceptance by politicians, journalists and thewider public this article uses it to denote the local form of the Islamic fundamentalistmovement.

8. The article is based on the findings of the Economic and Social Research Council(E.S.R.C.)-funded projects “Islam, Ethnicity and Nationalism in post-Soviet RussianFederation” (1997–1999) and “Ethnicity, Politics and Transnational Islam: A Study of anInternational Sufi Order” (1998-2001) and the Leverhulme-Trust-funded project “EthnicPolitics and Islam in the Western North Caucasus” (2000–2003).

9. Literally, in Turkic languages, “Dagestan” means “the mountain country.” 10. I. Zargishev, “Dagestan—strana alimov,” Musul’mane, No. 2, 1999, p. 35. 11. Muhammad Abu Bakr ad-Derbendi was the author of the famous Sufi treatise Reykhan al-

khakaik va bustan al-dakaik (The Bouquet of Truth and the Garden of Subtleties).12. Anna Zelkina, In Quest for God and Freedom. Sufi Responses to the Russian Advance in

the North Caucasus (London: C. Hurst, 2000), p. 47. 13. The Naqshbandiyya is one of the major Sufi tariqas. It was founded by Yaqub al-

Hamadani in the twelfth century. It is named after Muhammad Baha ad-Din an-Naqshbandi (1318–1389), who gave it its final structure.

14. The Mujaddidi branch of the Naqshbandiyya derives from Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi al-Mujaddid (died in 1624). Moshe Gammer, Muslim Resistance to the Tsar. Shamil and theConquest of Chechnya and Daghestan (London: Frank Cass, 1994), p. 39.

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15. The Kadiriyya was founded in Baghdad by Abd al-Kadir al-Ghilani in the mid-twelfthcentury.

16. Wimbush, Mystics and Comissars, p. 3. 17. Zelkina, In Quest for God and Freedom, p. 15; Robert Bruce Ware and Enrev Kisriev,

“Ethnic Parity in Dagestan,” Europe–Asia Studies, Vol. 53, No. 1, 2000, p. 109.18. The term tariqatism derives from the Arab word tariqa (way), which also means a

specific Sufi way towards comprehension of Allah. 19. Wimbush, Mystics and Comissars, p. 3.20. Marie Bennigsen-Broxup, ed., The North Caucasian Barrier (London: Hurst, 1992),

p. 34. 21. The term muridism derives from the Arab word murid (a disciple of a Sufi shaykh). 22. See also: Gammer, Muslim Resistance to the Tsar; Zelkina, In Quest for God and

Freedom, pp. 121–159; N. A. Smirnov, Muridism na Kavkaze (Moscow: AN SSSR,1963), pp. 136–179.

23. Adyghs belong to the Western Caucasian or Abkhaz-Adygh ethno-linguistic group, whichalso includes Abkhazs, Abazins, Circassians, and Kabardins. The majority of Adyghs areSunni Muslims of Khanafi madhhab . Compared with various peoples of the eastern NorthCaucasus, the Adyghs did not succumb to Sufi Islam. The Adyghs, alongside theChechens, fled the region en masse after the Caucasian war. Most of them settled in theOttoman Empire.

24. Interview with Ibragim Tadzhuddinov, a Naqshbandi, Ashali, Dagestan, 12 August2000.

25. Wimbush, Mystics and Comissars, p. 10; S. Prozorov, ed., Islam na Territorii BivsheiRossiiskoi Imperii, Vol. 1 (Moscow: Vostochnaia Literatura, 1998), pp. 61–62.

26. Wimbush, Mystics and Comissars, p. 10; interview with Shamyl Beno, a Naqshbandii anda Moscow representative of the government of Chechnya, Moscow, 24 April 2000.

27. Interview with Shamyl Beno, Moscow, 24 April 2000. 28. Interviews with Naqshbandi Shaykh Sayid-efendi Chirkeevskii, Naqshbandi Shaykh

Tadzhuddin Ramazanov, and Naqshbandi Shaykh Siradzhuddin Tabasaranskii, Dagestan,August 2000.

29. Bennigsen Broxup, ed., The North Caucasian Barrier. The Russian Advance towards theMuslim World (London: Hurst, 1992), p. 115; interview with Shamyl Beno, Moscow, 24April 2000; interview with Magomed Rasul Mugumayev, an alim of Dagestan,Makhachkala, 15 August 2000.

30. In 1920 the Mountain Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was formed, whichcomprised Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabarda, Balkaria, and North Ossetia. In 1924 theMountain Republic was disbanded. During the administrative delimitation of 1922–1924,Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and North Ossetia were transformed intoautonomous regions of the Russian Federation. In 1921 the Autonomous Soviet Socialistrepublic of Dagestan was formed within the Russian Federation.

31. Bennigsen Broxup, ed., The North Caucasian Barrier, p. 116.32. Interview with Shamyl Beno, a Naqshbandi and a Moscow representative of the govern-

ment of Chechnya, Moscow, 24 April 2000. 33. Wimbush, Mystics and Commissars, p. 10.34. In 1934 the Chechen and Ingush autonomous regions of the Russian Federation were

unified to make the autonomous region of Checheno-Ingushetia, which in 1936 was trans-formed into the autonomous republic of Checheno-Ingushetia within the RussianFederation.

35. Interview with Shamyl Beno, Moscow, 24 April 2000.

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36. The institution of the Muftiyat was introduced by Tsarina Catherine the Great in 1789.During the Soviet per iod there were four M uftiyats : the M uft iyat in Tashkent(Uzbekistan) administered the Muslims of Central Asia; the Muftiyat in Baku (Azer-baijan) was in charge of the Muslims of the Transcaucasus; the Muftiyat in Makhachkala(Buynaksk) controlled the Muslims of the North Caucasus; and the Muftiyat in Ufa(Bashkortostan) dealt with the Muslims of the Volga-Urals and central Russia.

37. Islamskii Vestnik, No. 22, 1999. 38. In the Islamic regions of the former U.S.S.R. the term “traditional Islam” is applied to all

forms and branches of regional Islam which have integrated local pre-Islamic traditionsand adat norms. Traditional Islam is widely regarded as the antithesis of foreign Islam,which is associated with Salafism, or Wahhabism. Here the term “Islamism” is applied tothe political activity of the proponents of Salafism, Wahhabism , and other forms ofIslamic fundamentalism.

39. The I.D.P. was formed in 1990 by Dagestani intellectuals of democratic orientation underthe leadership of Abdurashid Saidov. The original programme of the party presented aparadoxical combination of Islamic and democratic ideals, opposing the rule of thecorrupted party nomenklatura and calling for its replacement by an Islamic-democraticgovernment. In doctrinal terms it favored tariqatism although it was also tolerant towardsWahhabism . Interview with Abdurashid Saidov, Moscow, 16 April 2000.

40. Among new Islamic periodicals were the newspapers Tawhid (The Unity), As-Salam (ThePeace), Nur-ul-Islam (Light of Islam), Islamskii Vestnik (Islamic News), IslamiskieNovosti (Islamic News), Islam Minbire (Tribune of Islam), Musul’manskaia Gazeta(Muslim Newspaper), Persona (Personality ), Mezhdunarodnaia Musulmanskaia Gazeta(International Islamic Newspaper), Altyn Urda (Golden Horde), Islam Nuri (Light ofIslam), Iman (The Faith), Gratis, Tugran-Yak, As-Salam (The Peace), Hakikat (TheTruth), Islamskii Poriadok (Islamic Order), Put’ Islama (Path of Islam), Znamya Islama(Banner of Islam), Zov Predkov (Call of Ancestors), and Khalif. The Islamic journalsincluded Iman Nuri (Light of Faith), Islamskii Mir (Islamic World) and Musul’mane(Muslims).

41. For example, in the 1980s only 179 mosques, affiliated to the Spiritual Board of Muslimsof European Russia and Siberia (the D.U.M.E.S.), based in Ufa, and the Spiritual Board ofMuslims of the North Caucasus (the D.U.M.S.K.) in Makhachkala were functioning.There were only two medresses at the level of secondary Islamic education in Ufa and nohigher Islamic schools at all. Muslim clerics from Russia could receive higher Islamiceducation in the Islamic Institute in Tashkent, which produced only 15 graduates per year.In 2000, by contrast, there were already over 5,500 registered mosques, 106 religiousschools and 51 registered religious centers and boards (around 1,000 mosques inTatarstan, 500 in Bashkortostan, 1,670 in Dagestan, 400 in Ingushetia, 140 in Kabardino-Balkaria and 2,000 in Chechnya). Agrumenti i Fakti, Dagestan, No. 24, 1998; R.Mukhametshin, “Islam in Russia,” manuscript; interview with Takhir Atmurzayev, theDeputy Muftii of Kabardino-Balkaria, Nal’chik, Kabardino-Balkaria, 31 October 2000.

42. Galina Yemelianova, “Islam and Nation Building in Tatarstan and Dagestan of theRussian Federation,” Nationalities Papers, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1999, p. 619; interview withMurad Zargishiev, the editor-in-chief of Musul’mane, Moscow, 27 April 2000.

43. D. Makarov, Ofitsial’nii i Neofitsial’nii Islam v Dagestane (Moscow: NIOPIK, 2000),p. 10.

44. Nurul-Islam, No. 3, 1997; D. Makarov, Ofitsial’nii i Neofitsial’nii Islam v Dagestane(Moscow: NIOPIK, 2000), p. 10.

45. Interview with the members of the Department for Religious Affairs of the government of

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Dagestan, Makhachkala, 22 June 1998.46. Interview with M. Kurbanov, Makhachkala, 17 July 1997.47. In spite of close collaboration between the D.U.M.D. and the Dagestani authorities,

relations between them have not been trouble free. For example, in 1997–1998 theD.U.M.D. bitterly criticized the government for slowing down the Islamization projectpromoted by the D.U.M.D., and for “insufficient” hostility towards Wahhabis. As-Salam,No. 23, 1997.

48. As-Salam, No. 22, 1997; As-Salam, No. 13, 1988. 49. Dagestanskaia Pravda, 29 May 1996; As-Salam, No. 23, 1997; As-Salam, No. 24, 1997;

Nur-ul-Islam, No. 12, 1998; Islamskii Vestnik, No. 24, 1998.50. The new Central Mosque in Makhachkala, opened in 1996, was built with Turkish aid,

and until 1998 a representative of Turkey was the Imam of the mosque. 51. In 1997–1998 the D.U.M.D . was critical of the government for not conforming to

“Islamic” ethical standards and its insufficiently firm approach towards Wahhabism . Afterthe assassination of Muftii Abubakarov in August 1998 the D.U.M.D. accused theauthorities of criminal passivity towards the advance of Wahhabism. As-Salam, No. 15,1998.

52. In the aftermath of the break-up of the U.S.S.R. the Dagestani authorities were the mostresistant to any democratic reforms. They hung on to the Soviet political system until1995, much longer than anywhere else in Russia.

53. The term “ethnic party” was introduced by the Dagestani sociologist Enver Kisriev todescribe quasi-party political organizations based on ethnic and clan solidarity. See EnverKisriev, “Dagestan,” in V. Tishkov, ed., Mezhetnicheskie Otnosheniia i Konflikti v post-Sovetskikh Gosuarstvakh, Ezhegodnii Doklad (Moscow: Nauka, 1998), p. 39.

54. The Dagestani constitution of 1994 nominated the 14 largest ethnic groups as titular. Theyare: Avars, Dargins, Kumyks, Lezgins, Russians, Laks, Tabasarans, Chechens, Azeris,Nogays, Mountain Jews and Tats, Rutuls, Aguls, and Tsakhurs. Konstitutsiia RespublikiDagestan (Makhachkala, Dagestan: Yupiter, 1994), p. 20.

55. The Dargin clan includes, for example, M. Magomedov, the head of the State Council ofDagestan, and Amir Saidov, the Mayor of Makhachkala. The leaders of the Avar clan areM. Aliev, the chairman of the People’s Assembly (the parliament), G. Makhachev, theVice-Premier and former leader of the Avar national movement, S. Asiyatilov, the leaderof the Islamic Party of Dagestan (the I.P.D.) and Muftii Abdullaev of Dagestan.

56. Interview with Idris-khadzhi, Makhachkala, 15 July 1997; interview with Ilyas-khadzhi,Makhachkala, 22 June 1998.

57. For example, one of the main donors of the D.U.M.D. is Sharapuddin Musaev, the head ofa large organized crime group in the town of Kaspiisk known as the “Kaspiisk mafia.”

58. According to some figures, financial machinations made the D.U.M.D. some US$182,000profit from the hajj in 1998 alone.

59. Interview with A. Magomedov, Imam of Karlabko, Makhachkala, 16 June 1998. 60. For more information, see Ben Fowkes, ed., Russia and Chechnya: The Permanent Crisis.

Essays on Russo-Chechen Relations (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1998); SebastianSmith, Allah’s Mountains. Politics and War in the Russian Caucasus (London: I. B.Tauris, 1998); E. W. Walker, No Peace, No War in the Caucasus: Secessionist Conflictsin Chechnya, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1998), pp. 1–11.

61. Bennigsen Broxup, The North Caucasus Barrier, pp. 112–146; interview with ShamylBeno, Moscow, 24 April 2000.

62. The tariqa of Shadhiliyya took root in Dagestan in the nineteenth century.

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63. The data were provided by Magomed Kurbanov, the Deputy Minister of Nationalities ofDagestan, Makhachkala, 30 June 1998.

64. Interview with Professor Maissam al-Janabi, Moscow, 26 October 2000.65. Interview with Ibragim Tadzhuddinov, a son of Shaykh Tadzhuddin Ramazanov, Ashali,

16 August 2000. 66. Ibid.67. Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam, p. 241.68. Interview with Ibragim Tadzhuddinov, Ashali, 23 August 2000.69. M. R. Kurbanov and G. M. Kurbanov, Religiia v Kul’ture Narodov Dagestana

(Makhachkala, 1996), p. 66; Bennigsen and Wimbush, Mystics and Commissars,pp. 9–11.

70. Interview with Sayid Usmanov, a Kadirii, Moscow, 27 October 2000.71. Zelkina, In Quest for God and Freedom, pp. 108–115; interview with Magomed Rasul

Mugumayev, Makhachkala, 29 August 2000.72. Interview with Abdul Wahid, a representative of the line of Shaykh Sharafuddin,

Makhachkala, 29 June 1999. 73. Nur-ul-Islam , No. 3, 1997; interview with Naqshbandi Shaykh Sayid from Syria,

Moscow, 4 November 2000.74. Shaykh Tadzhuddin Ramazanov is almost 100 years old. He is very frail. He cannot see

and can hardly hear. However, his mind remains clear. He is fluent in Arabic and demon-strates a good knowledge of the Koran, Sunna, and the Sufi writings. Interview withShaykh Tadzhuddin, Khasavyurt, Dagestan, 21 August 2000. The silsila of ShaykhTadzhuddin was obtained during the interview with him.

75. Interview with Magomed Rasul Mugumayev, Makhachkala, 29 August 2000. The silsilaof Naqshbandi tariqa was provided by representatives of the D.U.M.D., Makhachkala,August 2000.

76. See, for example, Musul’mane, No. 2, 1999, pp. 12–14; Nur-ul Islam, No. 1, 2000, p. 5.77. Among Sayid-efendi’s widely advertised books are, for example, Majmuat-ul-Favaid

(The Questions and Answers), Kisasu-l-Anbiyat (The Life of Prophets) and Nazmabi (TheBook of Verses).

78. Interview with Shaykh Sayid-efendi Chirkeevskii, Dagestan, August 1999.79. Interview with Abdul Kerim, Imam of Buynaksk mosque, Buynaksk, 28 July 1997.80. Interview with murids of Shaykh Sayid-efendi, Makhachkala, 11 June 1999.81. The material and financial resources of the Wahhabis are a matter of extreme secrecy and

controversy and it has been impossible to obtain direct information on the issue. However,indirect sources suggest that their funding has foreign origins, derived from variousofficial and non-official Islamic organizations and funds that have provided generousassistance to the Muslims of the former U.S.S.R. under the banner of da’awa (summonsto Islam). Among such foreign sponsors have been the University of Imam Muhammadben Saud, the Islamic Development Bank, the Organization of Islamic Conference, theWorld Islamic League, the World Association of Islamic Youth and the World Center ofIslamic Sciences of Iran. Non-official Islamic assistance has been even more impressive.It has been provided by the Committee of Muslims of Asia of Kuwait, the Iranian worldorganization Madaris, the Islamic charities Taiba and Ibraghim al-Ibraghim of SaudiArabia, the international Islamic charities Ibraghim Hayri, Igatha, and Zamzam and theU.A.E. Islamic charity organization Al-Khairiyya.

82. The I.R.P. was founded in 1990 in Astrakhan. It opposed the Soviet/party regime and thecollaborationist Islamic establishment and sought re-Islamization of traditionally Islamicareas of the U.S.S.R. and the return of Soviet Muslims to an original pure Islam.

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Originally, the I.R.P. claimed to have a nationwide character. In 1992 it split into anumber of separate parties representing Muslims of different Islamic regions of theformer Soviet Union. The Dagestani branch of the I.R.P. subsequently evolved into anIslamic educational and cultural organization, Al-Islamiyya. I. Ermakov and D. Mikulskii,Islam v Rossii i Srednei Azii (Moscow: Lotos, 1993), pp. 175–176.

83. M. Kurbanov and G. Kurbanov, “Islamskii Faktor: Realnost I Domisly. NarodyDagestana,” Etnos i Politika, No. 3, 1994, p. 11.

84. Ibid.; Islamskie Novosti, No. 2, 1992; Put’ Islama, Nos 6–7, 1997.85. The centers of Wahhabism in Kizilyurtovskii raion were the villages of Zubat-Miatli,

Miatli, Kirovaul, Komsomolskoye, Chontaul, and Sultan-Yangiyurt; in Buynakskiiraion—the villages of Karamakhi, Chaban-Makhi, Kadar, Verkhnee Kazanishe, andNizhnii Dzhangutay and the Lezgin town of Belidzhi. Interview with Ahmed-qadiAkhtaev, Makhachkala, 19 July 1997.

86. D. Makarov, Ofitsial’nii i neofitsial’nii Islam, pp. 26–31.87. Video recording of a mosque address, Kizilyurt, Dagestan, 5 January 1996.88. Interview with Muhammad-Shafi, Makhachkala, 21 July 1997.89. D. Makarov, “Radikal’nii Islamism na Severnom Kavkaze: Dagestan i Chechnya,”

Conflict–Dialogue–Cooperation, Bulletin, No. 2, 2000, p. 44.90. Ibid.91. Kisriev, “Dvizhenie Wahhabitov v Dagestane,” in V. Tishkov, ed., Mezhetnicheskie

Otnosheniia i Konflikti v post-Sovetskikh Gosudarstvakh. Ezhegodnii Doklad, 1998(Moscow: Nauka, 1999), p. 43.

92. Molodezh Dagestana, No. 36, 11 September 1998; Molodezh Dagestana, No 36, 1998.93. The Islamic Shura of Dagestan consists of 40 representatives of Wahhabis and traditional-

ists from Akhvakhskii, Botlikhskii, Tsumadinskii, Buynakskii, Untsukulskii, Novolakskii,Karabudakhkentskii and Khunzakhskii raions of Dagestan. Moskovskie Novosti, No. 31,1999.

94. D. Makarov, Ofitsial’nii i neofitsial’nii Islam, p. 67.95. “Taliban: Chto Skrivaetsia pod Flerom Taini?” Khalif, No. 2, 1997.96. The new leader of the Al-Islamiyya, Sirazhuddin Ramazanov, also from Kudali, lacked

the charisma, knowledge and political skills of Akhtaev and failed to ensure the integrityof the organization. Novoe Delo, No. 38, 1998.

97. Abdurahman Khattab Ibn Ul was born in 1963 into a well-known Cherkess family inJordan. In the 1980s he fought against the Russian troops in Afghanistan. Later on hegraduated from the Military Academy in Amman and served several years in the CherkessGuard of King Husseyn. Then he took part in the war in Bosnia, where he organized amilitary training camp for local Muslims. From December 1994 Khattab has been inChechnya, where he became one of the most influential and charismatic militarycommanders.

98. The agreement about cooperation between the Kadiriis and Naqshbandiis was reached in1996 at the meeting between Muftii Kadyrov, a Kadiri leader, and Shamyl Beno (aNaqshbandi leader). Interview with Shamyl Beno, Moscow, 24 April 2000.

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