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Anti-Semitism in Europe before the HolocaustAuthor(s): William I. Brustein and Ryan D. KingSource: International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, Vol.25, No. 1, Religion and Politics. Religion et politique (Jan., 2004), pp. 35-53Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601621 .

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International Political Science Review (2004), Vol 25, No. 1, 35-53

IP S R | RI SP N.;.li.SX

Anti-Semitism in Europe Before the Holocaust

WILLIAM I. BRUSTEIN AND RYAN D. KING

ABSTRACT. It is commonly accepted that the years 1899-1939 represent a highpoint in anti-Semitism in western societies. What factors account for the wave of extraordinary anti-Semitism after 1899? Was the rise of anti- Semitism between 1899 and the Holocaust uneven? Did anti-Semitism vary in content and intensity across societies? Did Germans embrace anti- Semitism differently from French, Italian, Romanian, and British citizens? Data drawn from the annual volumes of the American Jewish Year Book are used to examine these questions systematically. Pooled time- series analyses suggest that variation in anti-Semitism over time and across countries was largely a function of economic conditions and Jewish immigration, and to a limited extent of the rise of leftist parties.

Keywords: * Anti-Semitism * Europe * Holocaust * Prejudice

Delegates from 32 countries met in the French resort town of Evian-les-Bains between 6July and 14July 1938 to discuss ways to helpJewish refugees fleeing the Nazi Third Reich. In the months following Nazi Germany's annexation of Austria in March 1938, Nazi persecution of Jews in the Third Reich reached horrifying dimensions. Nazi Germany had offered its Jews to the world. Many delegates attending the Evian Conference publicly professed their sympathies for the Jewish refugees. However, most countries, including the USA, Great Britain, and Australia, offered excuses for why they could not accept more refugees. The official delegates from Romania, Hungary, and Poland proposed that their countries also be relieved of theirJews. Only the representatives of the Dominican Republic, and later Costa Rica, agreed to increase their quotas. That the world seemed to turn its back on the German and Austrian Jewish refugees, not surprisingly, provided the Nazi regime's anti-Semitic campaign with a propaganda bonanza (Morse, 1968: 214; Weiss, 1996: 331; Friedlaender, 1997: 248-50; Marrus, 1985: 167-9).

The failure of the delegates at the Evian Conference to aid European Jewry was not exceptional as an example of worldwide indifference to the fate of European Jews on the eve of the Holocaust. For in the aftermath of the Evian Conference,

DOI: 10.1177/0192512104038166 ? 2004 International Political Science Association SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)



36 International Political Science Review 25 (1)

indifference to the fate of Europe's Jews included the following: the unwillingness of Hungary and Czechoslovakia to give refuge to the expelled Sudetenland Jews; the American failure to pass the Wagner-Rogers Child Refugee Bill that would have admitted to the USA 20,000 Jewish refugee children from Europe and the us refusal to admit the 936 German-Jewish refugees aboard the ill-fated ship, the St. Louis; Great Britain's decision to close off Palestine to Jewish immigration; and the reneging on pledges made by Argentina and Brazil to Papal authorities to accept baptized Jews into their countries (Friedlaender, 1997: 265-6, 299-300; Mosse, 1985: 231; Marrus, 1985: 285-9).

These examples of insensitivity toward persecuted EuropeanJews on the eve of the Holocaust raise a number of important questions regarding anti-Semitism. It is commonly accepted that the years 1899-1939 are a highpoint in anti-Semitism in western societies (Weinberg, 1986; Bernstein, 1996). What factors account for the wave of extraordinary anti-Semitism after 1899? Was the rise of anti-Semitism between 1899 and the Holocaust steady or uneven? Did popular anti-Semitism vary in content and intensity across societies? If so, why? Did ordinary Germans embrace anti-Semitism in a way that ordinary Americans, British, French, Polish, and Romanian citizens did not, as has been suggested in a number of recent works on German anti-Semitism (Goldhagen, 1996; Weiss, 1996)?' How does anti- Semitism differ from other forms of religious, racial, or ethnic prejudice?

With one notable exception (Fein, 1979), scholars have given minimal attention to a systematic and empirically based national comparison of popular anti-Semitism before 1945.2 The scholarly literature on anti-Semitism typically involves an examination of anti-Semitism within a particular nation (Ascheim, 1981; Birnbaum, 1992; Butnaru, 1992; Byrnes, 1950; Canepa, 1989; Dinnerstein, 1994; Fischer-Galati, 1974; Fitch, 1992; Friedlaender, 1997; Goldhagen, 1996; Higham, 1988; Holmes, 1979; Iancu, 1978; Kershaw, 1983; Lebzelter, 1978; Mandle, 1968; Marrus, 1971; Marrus and Paxton, 1981; Massing, 1949; Michaelis, 1978; Mosse, 1970; Niewyk, 1980; Oldson, 1991; Pulzer, 1992; Sternhell, 1985; Vago, 1993; Volovici, 1991; Weiss, 1996; Wilson, 1982; Zuccotti, 1987) or a nonsystematic and nonempirical analysis of anti-Semitism across several countries (Almog, 1990; Bergmann, 1992; Ettinger, 1988; Grosser and Halperin, 1978; Katz, 1980; Langmuir, 1987; Lindemann, 1991, 1997; Marrus, 1982, 1985; Mosse, 1985; Weinberg, 1986; Wistrich, 1991).

Though persecution ofJews has a history of at least two millennia, the late-19th and early-20th century witnessed a high-water mark in hatred against Jews, especially in western Christian societies (Pauley, 1992; Katz, 1980; Byrnes, 1950; Hirshfield, 1981; Lindemann, 1991, 1997; Marrus, 1985; Mosse, 1985; Weiss, 1996; Almog, 1990; Arendt, 1975). How have scholars tried to explain the rise of anti- Semitism in Europe after 1899 and the differences in the intensity of anti- Semitism among various European societies? A number of the popular explanations for the rise of anti-Semitism have analogs in the literature on ethnic prejudice. In particular, theories of modernization, relative deprivation, ethnic competition, and of scapegoating or frustration-aggression prevail as explanations of the rise of anti-Semitism.

Much of the scholarly literature emphasizes the role of modernization to explain the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe. Accordingly, modernization embodied the emergence of liberalism and capitalism, which among other things, led to the political, social, and economic emancipation of Jews. Jewish social mobility and Jewish competition elicited fears among many non-Jews, reinforcing anti-Semitic



BRUSTEIN/KING: Anti-Semitism in Europe 37

attitudes. The underlying argument within the modernization thesis is that the losers (either social groups or nations) in the modernization process tend to harbor the strongest anti-Semitic beliefs (Lindemann, 1991, 1997; Fein, 1987; Almog, 1990; Strauss, 1993).3 Arendt (1975) provides an interesting variant to the modernization thesis. Modernization for Arendt included the transformation of the role of Jews in European societies. By the end of the 19th century, European states became less dependent on wealthyJewish financiers andJews experienced a new status characterized by a loss of real power while remaining holders of major wealth. For Arendt, the inconsistency between insignificant power and phenomenal wealth created within the general public the image ofJews as a despised parasitical social group. Arendt cites as evidence that the greatest periods of modern anti- Semitism coincided with decline in Jewish influence (1975: 4-5). While the modernization thesis seemingly provides a plausible explanation for the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe after 1879, it fails to offer a convincing argument for temporal and spatial variation in anti-Semitism. For instance, the modernization thesis cannot explain why popular anti-Semitism in Europe climbed significantly during the 1880s and 1890s, but fell dramatically in Europe between 1900 and 1914 to rise again to new heights in the early 1920s and mid-to-late 1930s or why levels of popular anti-Semitism tended to be higher in Romania and Germany than in Great Britain and Italy.

A popular explanation for the rise of anti-Semitism is the scapegoat theory. Proponents of the scapegoat theory posit thatJews constituted a minority group dispersed among many countries and served as convenient targets for the majority's problems (Katz, 1980: 247; Ettinger, 1988: 4-7; Fein, 1979: 84-98). Advocates of the scapegoat theory hold that in times of national crisis, people instinctively seek groups upon whom to assign blame for their misfortunes (Blalock, 1967; Marrus, 1982). European societies certainly experienced significant trauma after 1879, including major wars and a series of economic and social upheavals, and for many groups, Jews became the objects of their frustration and aggression (Andreski, 1963).4 But the scapegoat thesis fails to inform us why Jews rather than other minorities became scapegoats for national distress or why in certain societies where Jews were present, other groups served as scapegoats. For instance, in interwar Romania, persecution of Jews far exceeded the harass- ment that fell upon other Romanian minorities, including Germans, Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Greeks, while in post-World War I Italy during a period of dramatic political and economic turmoil, Italian Jews remained untouched by events and anti-Semitism was relatively non-existent.

Pierre Birnbaum (1992) offers a very different theory of the rise of anti- Semitism and of anti-Semitic variation among societies. Birnbaum attributes the rise of modern anti-Semitism to popular reaction against the strong state. Where a strong state is perceived as having imposed on society the emancipation of the Jews, anti-Semitism tends to be strong (for example, Germany and France). On the other hand, where the state is relatively weak and Jews obtained equal rights through society rather than the state, anti-Semitism tends to be muted (for example, the USA and Great Britain) (Birnbaum, 1992: 6-10, 227-8). But how would Birnbaum's theory explain temporal variation in popular anti-Semitism? For instance, most scholars distinguish between the periods of high popular anti- Semitism in France (1890s and 1930s) and the periods of low popular anti- Semitism (1904-30). It makes little sense to argue that the French state was significantly weaker between 1904 and 1930 than during the 1890s. Alternatively,




how would Birnbaum make sense of the extraordinarily high levels of popular anti-Semitism in Romania-a country in which the state refused to grant the Jews civil rights until after World War I and then only after considerable pressure from the victorious nations at Versailles?

An emphasis on the role of distinct political cultures as an explanation for national variation in anti-Semitism is implicit in two recent books on Germans and the Holocaust. Weiss (1996: viii), in accounting for the magnitude and breadth of modern German anti-Semitism, points to a "powerful culture of racism" existing in Germany. Goldhagen (1996) sees German anti-Semitism as a unique force throughout much of the 19th and 20th centuries. For Goldhagen (1996: 32, 54), anti-Semitism was an axiom of German culture which provided Germans with "a model of cultural coherence." In Germany, anti-Semitism embodied an "eliminationist" ideology interpreting Jewish influence as naturally destructive and advocating the irrevocable elimination of Jewish influence from society (Goldhagen, 1996: 48). Unfortunately, neither Weiss nor Goldhagen systematically examine non-German political cultures and non-German anti-Semitism. More- over, their distinct political-culture models fail to explain temporal variation in German anti-Semitism. Numerous scholars of German anti-Semitism have pointed to the ebb and flow of German anti-Semitism between 1814 and 1945.

We suggest that theories of anti-Semitism that emphasize characteristics of the state, cultures, and modernization take us a long way in explaining anti-Semitism. However, these theories run into some trouble in terms of explaining temporal or spatial variation in anti-Semitism. The scapegoat theory clearly explains (theoretically) temporal variation, but is short of explaining whyJews are selected as opposed to other groups and places a great importance on economic conditions and less emphasis on, for example, political aspects of anti-Semitism. We seek to take extant research a step further by attempting to account for temporal and spatial variation in European anti-Semitism.

From the perspective of this article what made anti-Semitism different from other forms of xenophobia or dislike of minorities is that Jew hatred is more multifaceted than other kinds of prejudice. White prejudice against blacks typically embraced a racial form of dislike, while persecution of Armenians and Greeks in Bulgaria usually revolved around economic fears, and antipathy toward Irish Catholics or Italian Catholics in the USA during the 19th century largely took a form of religious hatred. Popular anti-Semitism, by contrast, incorporated religious, economic, racial, and political prejudice. Consequently, Jews were disliked and feared for their religious beliefs and attitudes, their so-called racial characteristics, perceived economic behavior and power, and their assumed leadership or support of subversive political and social movements. That popular anti-Semitism embodied numerous forms may help explain whyJews rather than other minorities were frequently sought out as scapegoats or useful targets during periods of both worldwide and national difficulties. It may also help explain why other traditional "middlemen groups" such as the Greeks in the Balkans, the Syro- Lebanese in West Africa and Latin America, the Parsis in India, and the Scots in South Africa and many parts of Canada rarely experienced the magnitude of persecution encountered by Jews (Zenner, 1987: 256-7). Yet, we should not conclude that where Jewish minorities exist, they must always be singled out for condescension during times of crisis. For example, during the tumultuous years preceding the fascist takeover in Italy, Jews were rarely targeted for Italy's ills.




Spatial and Temporal Variation in Popular Anti-Semitism

To account for the rise of popular anti-Semitism between 1899 and 1939, we focus on the evolution and popularization of the four strains of anti-Semitism. The four strains (religious, racial, economic, and political) contain within themselves four distinct anti-Semitic narratives.5 The evolution of the four narratives of anti- Semitism provided anti-Semites with ample ammunition to wage their war against Jews during the late-19th and early-20th centuries. However, the presence of religious, racial, economic, and political narratives about Jews cannot sufficiently explain the dramatic explosion of anti-Semitism in western societies on the eve of the Holocaust or variation in anti-Semitism across space and time. European societies varied in terms of their popular anti-Semitism. Our model suggests that in societies and periods in whichJews were perceived as a greater religious, racial, economic, and political threat or challenge to non-Jews, popular anti-Semitism should have attained higher levels. What factors may account for changes in the perception ofJews as a threat to non-Jews? We propose that what ignited the four anti-Semitic narratives as well as what helps explain the temporal and spatial variation in popular anti-Semitism are the effects of four critical factors: deteriora- tion in a nation's economic well-being, the impact of increased immigration of eastern European Jews, the growth of popular support for the political left, and the extent to which leadership of the political left was identified with Jews.

A decline in a nation's economic well-being should produce higher levels of anti-Jewish feelings. This should be the case particularly in an environment in which Jews are seen as controlling or owning major economic resources and perceived as economically superior. On the other hand, we should not expect to find high rates of anti-Semitic sentiments in times of economic stability or growth or in situations in which Jews are not perceived to be in positions of dominance within a nation's economy. Increased levels of eastern European Jewish immigration should affect popular anti-Semitism in several ways. Since many of the new Jewish immigrants from eastern Europe possessed few resources and little formal education, they typically competed with many in the host population for low- paying jobs. Competition often bred animosity, resulting in heightened levels of anti-Semitism.6 The new Yiddish-speaking arrivals from eastern Europe's Jewish ghettos (Ashkenazic Jews) with their strange customs and religious practices frequently struck western European non-Jews as a very different sort of Jew than the more assimilated Sephardic Jews who had lived in the West for centuries. The influx of eastern European Jews should have fueled the negative racial stereotypes existing within western European culture and, thereby, contributed to growing anti-Semitism. Particularly in the aftermath of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, many European non-Jews associated recent eastern European Jewish immigrants with Bolshevism. Given that many of these Jewish immigrants appeared impoverished, had fled persecution, and came from the former Russian empire, they were perceived to favor parties of the political left. What made matters worse forJews were the numerous press reports in the West claiming thatJews were over- represented in the leadership of the Bolsheviks and the Communist Party. For many Europeans, Bolshevism gravely threatened the existing social, economic, and religious or&er. Anti-Bolshevik tendencies fed anti-Semitic attitudes. Anti- Semites had often accused Jews of seeking retribution against non-Jews by plotting to seize power. Many anti-Semites cited Jews as the founders of revolutionary socialism and anarchism and saw the hand of Jews in periodic labor unrest. Thus,



40 International Political Science Review 25(1)

we should expect to see increased anti-Semitism in societies where the political left exhibits growing strength and where prominent leftist leaders were identified as Jews. However, where support for the political left is weak or declining or where Jews are not seen as playing important roles in the left, we should expect lower levels of anti-Semitism.

Our study examines popular anti-Semitism, which refers to hostility (as expressed in sentiments, attitudes, or actions) rooted in the general population toward Jews as a collectivity, between the years 1899 and 1939. Others have suggested the year 1879 constitutes an appropriate embarkation point for a study of popular anti-Semitism in that it coincides with the emergence of political parties and a press embracing a comprehensive anti-Semitic ideology and is also the year in which Wilhelm Marr first coined the term "anti-Semitism" in his pamphlet The Victory of Judaism over Germanism (Weinberg, 1986: 93; Bernstein, 1996: 49; Dimont, 1962: 313). While we agree that 1879 is an ideal starting point, we begin our study in 1899 for data-collection purposes (explained in more detail below). The year 1939 will serve as the endpoint of this study, for that eventful year witnessed the outbreak of World War II and a qualitatively new phase in anti- Semitism leading to the near annihilation of European Jewry.

A comparative study of popular anti-Semitism in Europe before the Holocaust could easily include any number of European countries. For compelling reasons we have chosen to examine popular anti-Semitism in Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Romania. The inclusion of these five countries appeals for a number of important reasons. Each of these countries was politically autonomous during the years between 1899 and 1939 and each permitted contested elections for much of the period (Italy's last free election occurred in 1921 and Germany's last free election occurred in 1932). By including Italy we have the added advantage of a society much like Germany in that it too accomplished its unification relatively late and it too came under fascist rule during the interwar period. Moreover, the list of countries offer what many scholars assume (for example, Fein, 1979) to be a wide range of anti-Semitism: Germany and Romania ranked as high, France ranked as intermediate, and Italy and Great Britain ranked as low. This sample also includes significant variation in levels of economic development (Great Britain and Germany being quite advanced and Italy and Romania less developed) and religious denomination (Great Britain and Germany being largely Protestant, France and Italy predominantly Roman Catholic, and Romania largely Orthodox). There are a large number of other European countries, including Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Austria, that would have been ideal candidates for a comparative study of anti-Semitism in Europe before the Holocaust. Unfortunately, these countries were not included in this study because they were not politically autonomous for the entire period of the study or they reappeared after World War I as a significantly different political or national entity. Lastly, our choice of cases was limited by the unavailability of data for many countries whose boundaries were dramatically transformed in the aftermath of World War I.

Data and Measures

Analyzing anti-Semitism across time and space required a data source with anti- Semitic information sorted by year and country. We, thus, systematically examined the volumes of the American Jewish Year Book (AJYB). The AJYB has been published




annually since 1899 and contains a section dedicated to summarizing leading news events of the previous year from around the world.7 Among the information on Jews provided by the AJYB are promotions of prominent Jews, obituaries for popularJewish figures, special religious events, changes in laws pertaining to Jews, and accounts of violence and discrimination against Jews. We derive our information from the latter two accounts. Specifically, we systematically read the annual accounts of Jewish issues that happened in or pertained to Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Romania between 1899 and 1939. While reading the accounts from the AJYB, we made note of all anti-Semitic acts and sorted them by country, year, and type of act. Our typology consisted of 13 categories ranging from false accusations against Jews to murderous riots (see Table 1 for the typology). Occasionally, we encountered an act that could realistically fit into more than one category. In this case, we generally went with the more serious category or further examined the context of the act. For instance, a serious assault within a riot could be tallied as a violent act, but since the assault was in the context of a riot we recorded the act as a "riot resulting in physical injury to Jews." Many acts did not fit neatly into a specified category, but clearly discriminated against Jews in some fashion. Instead of creating many new categories with very small numbers, we elected to group these acts into a general category titled "laws and acts of discrimination" (see Table 1). Our examination of the AJYB resulted in 1295 anti-Semitic acts in five countries over a 41-year period (1899-1939).8

Although the AJYB is a rich source of information on anti-Semitism, we do acknowledge the limitations of our data. For instance, it is possible that the editors of the volumes reported events that they found significant. Moreover, the reports of events from around the world were sent to the editors by local and national Jewish organizations and the accuracy of the reports may have some reliability problems. Nevertheless, we feel the information contained in the AJYB is the most useful data available to assess the frequency and nature of European anti-Semitism before the Holocaust.

Although we could partition our typology in Table 1 into categories corresponding to the four forms of anti-Semitism mentioned earlier (for example, laws or acts againstJewish practices largely conform to religious anti-Semitism and boycotts againstJewish businesses conform to economic anti-Semitism, and so on), these categories would not necessarily be mutually exclusive and our argument posits that all forms of anti-Semitism should vary by a country's economic well- being, Jewish immigration, and electoral support for leftist parties. Thus, we include all anti-Semitic acts from Table 1 in our analysis.9

We measure economic well-being within the respective countries using gross domestic product (GDP). Specifically, we measure GDP as total GDP per capita for a given year, expressed in units of 1000. The GDP per capita is given in 1990 dollars and is drawn largely from Maddison (1995) and Good and Ma (1998). While yearly GDP data were available for four of the countries, Romanian GDP figures are yearly only from 1925 to 1940, and are decennial for the period prior to 1925. Where data were not available, we interpolated the GDP figures based on the nearest preceding and proceeding figures.

Our measure of Jewish immigration reflects the change in the percentage of Jews residing in a country from the previous year. We used the change in percentage, as opposed to raw numbers, to standardize the immigration variable. This standardized variable helps account for both subtle and dramatic shifts in the general population relative to Jewish immigration, for instance, when Romania acquired Southern




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Dobrudja, Bessarabia, Bukovina, Transylvania, part of the Banat, and part of Hungary proper after World War I. The AJYB furnishes annual figures of the Jewish population for each country between 1900 and 1940. Since it is generally recognized that between 1881 and 1940Jewish immigrants came almost exclusively from central and eastern Europe, the figures for increasedJewish population should largely represent eastern European Jewish immigration. As with GDP, missing data on Jewish immigration were interpolated based on the values of the preceding and proceeding years.

Lastly, we measure support for the political left by the percentage of all votes cast for the leftist parties in Great Britain,10 France,"1 Germany, Italy,"3 and Romania.'4 All national election results covering the period of 1899-1939 for the respective countries were gathered from Flora (1983), Mackie and Rose (1982), and Dogan (1946). In non-election years, we carried over the figure from the most recent election year.

To account for population variance in the five countries, we also standardized the dependent variable, that is, anti-Semitic acts. In all analyses, we measure anti- Semitism as the number of acts per, million people in the respective countries. This standardized variable allows a more fruitful comparison over time and between countries and allows us to pool our data for multivariate analyses. But before examining the effects of GDP, Jewish immigration, and support for the political left on anti-Semitic acts, we first address regional and temporal variation in anti-Semitic acts between 1899 and 1939.

Regional Variation in Anti-Semitism

Our investigation of the AJYB revealed significant variation across the five countries of interest. Figure 1 compares the average number of anti-Semitic acts per million people for the 41-year period across the five countries. According to Figure 1, Great Britain, France, and Italy had rather few anti-Semitic acts: recording less than 0.05 acts per million people. Yet the number of anti-Semitic acts in Germany was more than five times that of Great Britain, France, and Italy, and the number of anti-Semitic acts in Romania was three times that of Germany (see Figure 1 ).15

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FIGURE 1. Mean Number of Anti-Semitic Acts per Million People by Country, 1899-1939




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Our analysis also revealed variation in the nature of anti-Semitic acts across countries. Figure 2 suggests that anti-Semitic acts in France and Italy were excep- tionally non-violent, with only 6 percent and zero percent of all acts being violent, respectively.'6 The percentage of violent acts was slightly higher in Germany (9 percent) as well as in Great Britain (15 percent). Romanian anti-Semitism appeared to be the most violent, with 34 percent of all acts being violent in nature.

Lastly, Figure 3 shows considerable temporal variation in anti-Semitism for all five countries included in the analysis. Thus, we find that anti-Semitic acts were relatively infrequent in France, Great Britain, and Italy, yet significantly more frequent in Germany and particularly in Romania. We also found that Romanian anti-Semitism was much more violent than in the other countries. Furthermore, there was considerable temporal variation in anti-Semitism over the 41-year period.

Explaining Regional and Temporal Variation in Anti-Semitism

Having provided a descriptive account of European anti-Semitic acts between 1899 and 1939, we now attempt to account for variation in anti-Semitic acts with a multivariate analysis. As previously stated, we argue that variation in anti-Semitic acts is largely a function of a country's GDP, level of Jewish immigration, and support for the political left. Given our hypothesis that these variables should influence variation in anti-Semitism over both our 41-year time period and across our respective countries of interest, the most efficient form of estimation is pooled time-series analysis. Pooled models with heterogeneous dependent variables across units (countries here) can raise estimation problems. Autocorrelation can inflate significance levels and lead to biased results; heteroscedasticity may arise because of vast country-level variation on the variables; and sociopolitical differences across




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TABLE 2. Regression of Anti-Semitic Acts in Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Romania on Predictor Variables, 1899-1939

Unstandardized coefficient Standard Variable (Standardized coefficient) error

Year .................... .01lb .004 (.255)

Great Britain ................... .308 .191 (.250)

France ................... .128 .103 (.103)

Germany (1899-1932) ....... .296b .107 (.107)

Germany (1933-39) ....... .954b .189 (.189)

Romania ................... .590 b .134 (.478)

GDP ................... -.013a .007 (-.341)

Jewish immigration ........... .188 a .108 (.089)

Leftist vote ..0.................. .003 .004 (-.091)

Constant ........................ -18.086 b 6.62 R-square ................... .502

a p<.05, one-tailed bp<.05, two-tailed Note: Italy is the reference category for country variables. Numbers in parentheses represent the standardized coefficients.

countries can lead to heterogeneity and omission of variable bias (Sayrs, 1989). Further, nonstationarity may bias results if variables tend to move in the same direction over time. With these potential difficulties in mind, and because of the variation across countries and the high number of years relative to countries, we feel fixed-effects estimation is the most appropriate and most conservative estimator to test our hypothesis. However, we conducted additional analyses with alternate estimation techniques to test the robustness of our model (see below).

In our analysis, country is our fixed unit. We include dummy variables for each country, with Italy as the reference category. Given the drastic social and political change in Germany after Hitler came to power, we also include a dummy variable representing Hitler's period of rule in Germany (1933-39). We also control for year in our analysis to help account for unmeasured socio-political change and nonstationarity in our variables.

The results of the pooled time-series analysis suggest that, as expected, GDP had a significant and negative effect on anti-Semitism (see Table 2). As economic conditions worsened, incidents of anti-Semitism increased. Also consonant with our theory, increases in Jewish immigration led to increases in anti-Semitism. However, the effect of leftist voting was statistically nonsignificant in our pooled model.

Because of the potential problems associated with time-series analysis (see above), we ran additional tests to examine the robustness of our coefficients.




Analysis of residuals detected some autocorrelation in our model, and thus we ran a random-effects model using generalized least squares (GLs) estimation and added a lagged dependent variable measure to the model to correct for autocorrelation. In this model, the substantive results held and the statistical significance ofJewish immigration and GDP improved over the fixed-effects model (p < .01, one-tailed).17 We report the fixed-effects model here because we feel it is the most appropriate and more conservative statistical test of our theory.

We further analyzed the relationship between leftist voting and anti-Semitism, which was statistically nonsignificant in our pooled model. Leftist support appears to be a poor predictor of anti-Semitism across countries. For instance, Romania had a noticeably high number of anti-Semitic acts, yet electoral support for leftist parties never reached 10 percent during this time period. In contrast, Italy's leftist parties were considerably stronger, yet Italy had rather low levels of anti-Semitism. Likewise, correlations within each country between anti-Semitic acts and -leftist support were generally positive (negative only in France), but mostly nonsignificant. The only exceptions were Germany prior to Hitler and to a lesser extent Romania. We found a striking correlation of nearly .65 between leftist voting and anti-Semitism in Germany, but beyond this we find few meaningful correlations between leftist voting and anti-Semitism. However, to be fair to our theory, we argue that the relationship between increasing support for the political left and rising anti-Semitism includes the popular perception that the leadership of the left was identified with Jews. We are unable to test this proposition at this time, although anecdotal evidence suggests that the allegation of Judeo- Bolshevism held significant sway, particularly in Germany and Romania, but had an insignificant presence in Italy. Further research is required to examine this proposition more fully.'8

Lastly, the variable representing linear time (year) remained significant in the model, and we feel this warrants attention. This could suggest that other sociopolitical changes occurred that are not encompassed in our model. For instance, during this period it is plausible that Jews became more assimilated within their host societies, which would mean more contact with the general population and increased competition for employment and resources. However, a methodological explanation seems equally plausible. It is likely that communication of anti-Semitic acts increased with technological advances in the early-20th century. If this is the case, the American Jewish Year Book may have underestimated the number of acts in the early 1900s relative to later years included in our investigation.'9

Conclusion

The scholarly literature on anti-Semitism typically involves an examination of anti- Semitism within a particular nation or a nonempirical analysis of anti-Semitism across several countries. In contrast to the extant literature on European anti- Semitism, we provide a systematic, comparative, and empirical examination of societal variation in anti-Semitism before the Holocaust. We have argued that the four strains of anti-Semitism (religious, racial, economic, and political) were likely ignited by the effects of declining economic well-being, increased Jewish immigration, growth of leftist support, and identification ofJews with the leadership of the political left in the decades before the Holocaust. Correspondingly, we contend that regional and temporal variation in anti-Semitism is largely a function of GDP, Jewish immigration, and support for the political left. This model of



48 International Political Science Review 25(1)

European anti-Semitism was mostly supported by our data, which examined anti- Semitic acts between 1899 (the first year of the AjYB) and 1939. Consistent with our expectations and with related literature on intergroup relations and group threat (Blalock, 1967; Qullian, 1995; Giles and Evans, 1985; Giles and Buckner, 1993), our findings suggest GDP and immigration have a significant effect on anti- Semitism. Specifically, when GDP decreases, be it across country or over time, anti- Semitic acts increase. Likewise, at times and places at which Jewish immigration increases, we again find that anti-Semitic acts increase. Yet, our analysis of leftist voting did not reveal a significant relationship with anti-Semitism. Supplementary analyses suggest that only in Germany was this relationship substantial. We feel that the importance of the left for understanding anti-Semitism in Germany, but to a lesser extent in other European countries, may be an avenue for future work on anti-Semitism.

The strong relationship between declining GDP and rising levels of anti- Semitism would appear to give support to the scapegoat theory of anti-Semitism as well. The scapegoat theory holds that in times of significant national trauma, the host population has a tendency to blame minorities for its misfortunes. However, as we have stated above, the scapegoat theory fails to provide an explanation for why Jews rather than other minorities become victims and why in some societies during periods of social and economic malaise groups other than Jews are portrayed as scapegoats. Further empirical research and innovative research design may be needed to elaborate this suggestion more thoroughly.

Although we made few assumptions about the nature of European anti- Semitism, our investigation of the volumes of the American Jewish Year Book revealed significant variation in the nature of anti-Semitic acts. For instance, we found that Romanian anti-Semitism was rather violent (more than a third of all acts were violent). In contrast, German (and later Italian) anti-Semitism often involved dismissals and requests that Jews leave posts, appointments, or employment decisions, as well as discriminatory laws. Anti-Semitic acts in France, Italy, and Great Britain, meanwhile, were largely composed of media attacks (between 25 percent and 31 percent) and non-violent acts.

Taken together, we may conclude that the number and nature of European anti-Semitic acts before the Holocaust varied significantly over time and across countries. Moreover, this variation was at least partly a function of economic well- being and Jewish immigration. We suggest future research expand our work on anti-Semitic acts to include anti-Semitic attitudes and discourse.

Notes

1. In a provocative study of the role of ordinary Germans in the Holocaust, Goldhagen (1996) claims that German anti-Semitism was indeed qualitatively different by virtue of its eliminationist character and the extent of its embeddedness in German culture and society before 1945. Goldhagen's work suggests that before World War II popular anti- Semitism was both qualitatively and quantitatively different outside of Germany. Some might dismiss the value of such a comparison given that the Holocaust was perpetrated by Germans and not by other Europeans. However, the fact that Germans organized the Holocaust does not by itself demonstrate that German popular anti-Semitism was sui generis. For is it unreasonable to argue that if a political movement such as the German Nazi Party, with its agenda of eliminating Europe's Jewish population, had come to power in another country, a genocidal campaign against the Jews might have been undertaken?




2. Fein's (1979) systematic and empirical examination of national variation in Jewish victimization in the Holocaust is a notable exception to the rule. However, Fein's study does not focus centrally on either the rise of modern anti-Semitism or national variation in popular anti-Semitism before World War LI.

3. The modernization argument shares a great affinity with the "power" model of intergroup hostility and the racial threat model in sociology. These models see growing antipathy on the part of a formerly advantaged ethnic or racial group resulting from competition with a rising ethnic or racial group for control of economic, political, and social resources (Giles and Evans, 1986; Wald and Shye, 1994; Blalock, 1967; Quillian, 1995; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996).

4. A more general application of the frustration-aggression model is found in Dollard et al. (1939).

5. There is a rather rich literature on the four strains of anti-Semitism in Europe. For religious anti-Semitism, see Hertzberg (1968), Ruether (1987), Quinley and Glock (1987), Lindemann (1991), Mosse (1970), Efron (1994), Weiss (1996), Pulzer (1992), Weinberg (1986), Katz (1980), Pauley (1992), and Wistrich (1991); for racial anti- Semitism, see Efron (1994), Katz (1980), Pauley (1992), Wistrich (1991), and Poliakov (1971); for economic anti-Semitism, see Weiss (1996), Pauley (1992), Katz (1980), Birnbaum (1992), Ruppin (1934), and Arendt (1975); and for political anti-Semitism, see Wilson (1982) and Lindemann (1997).

6. Our thinking on the relationship between immigration and prejudice has been largely informed by the competing models of Olzak (1992) and Hechter (1978). Olzak posits that greater social contact from decreasing occupational and residential segregation produces increased ethnic competition. Competition along ethnic lines, according to Olzak, leads to increased ethnic intolerance. On the other hand, Hechter sees immigration as fostering higher ethnic segregation, leading to the introduction of a hierarchical cultural division of labor in which ethnic groups are assigned to particular occupational or social roles. Ethnic tensions are likely to erupt as ethnic groups become aware of the existence of inequality along ethnic lines.

7. While the volumes of the American Jewish Year Book correspond to the Jewish year (autumn to autumn), years from the Christian calendar are noted in the volumes. Thus, coding the data according to the Christian calendar was not problematic.

8. A note regarding the coding process and inter-coder reliability is warranted here. Three graduate research assistants coded and classified the anti-Semitic acts from the AJYB. All research assistants received the same training. Initially, one of the research assistants read through the appropriate sections of all 41 volumes of the AJYB, coding acts where appropriate. Thereafter, two different research assistants (but trained the same) reread the volumes, alternating every other year, to check for missed acts and coding discrepancies. The few mistakes that were found were corrected during the second reading. While most anti-Semitic acts were relatively straightforward, those that were not easily discernable were copied and reviewed by all the coders and, when necessary, the project coordinator. Having read through the volumes of the AJYB twice and having consulted on all potentially difficult cases, we feel that issues of inter-coder reliability were well addressed throughout the research process.

9. We also considered separating categories that largely entail actions by the state (categories 2, 5, and 8 from Table 1) from categories that almost exclusively include acts committed by members of the general public. However, these groups were correlated at .85, which justifies combining these categories into one measure of anti-Semitism.

10. Leftist support in Great Britain was taken to be the total percentage of votes for the Labour Party, Independent Labour Party, Communist Party, and National Labour Party. Figures through 1918 include Ireland; thereafter, the figures include only Northern Ireland. Also, in the case of Great Britain, votes for the Labour Party are also counted as support for the left, though some might argue that by the mid-1920s the programs of the British Labour Party espoused a mild form of socialism. In fact, the same could be said for most of the Continental social-democratic and socialist parties. Moreover, in the




eyes of many anti-Semites, the British Labour Party differed very little from the more radical leftist parties.

11. Leftist support in France included votes for the Socialists, Socialist Party, Independent Socialists, Socialist Republicans, and Communist Party.

12. Leftist support in Germany included votes for the Social Democrats, Independent Social Democrats, and Communist Party.

13. Leftist support in Italy included votes for the Socialist Party, Independent Socialists, Reformist Socialists, and Communist Party.

14. Leftist support in Romania included votes for the Social Democratic Party, Socialist Party, and the Worker and Peasant Bloc.

15. Although anti-Semitic acts were significantly more prevalent in Romania than Germany over the 41-year period, we found no significant difference during Hitler's period of power.

16. Acts were coded as violent if they fell into the following categories: (1) vandalism or destruction of property, (2) riots with vandalism, destruction of property, or physical assault or murder, and (3) violent acts against the person, murder, deportation, or false arrest. The latter category consisted nearly exclusively of violent acts or murder. For instance, in Romania, 44 of the 46 acts in that category were violent, while only two were non-violent false arrests or deportations.

17. These results are available from the authors upon request. 18. We also conducted analyses using only system-challenging leftist parties. Although this

operationalization of leftist support showed a positive effect on anti-Semitic acts (consistent with our expectations), the coefficient was not statistically significant.

19. Subsequent "moving regression" analyses suggest the variable "year" is rather unstable, particularly when the early years are removed from the analysis. This is consistent with our methodological explanation.

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Biographical Notes

WILLIAM I. BRUSTEIN is Director of the University Center for International Studies, Professor of Sociology, Political Science, and History, at the University of Pittsburgh. He has published widely on the issue of political extremism. His most recent book is Roots of Hate: Anti-Semitism in Europe Before the Holocaust. ADDRESS: University Center for International Studies, 4G40 Wesley W. Posvar Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA [email: brustein~ucis.pitt.edu].

RYAN D. KING is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Sociology at the University of Minnesota, where he is completing his dissertation research on the enforce- ment of hate-crime laws in the USA. His recent work includes "Politicized Scholarship? Science on Crime and the State" in Social Problems with Joachim Savelsberg and Lara Cleveland. ADDRESS: Department of Sociology, University of Minnesota, 909 Social Sciences Building, 267-19th Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA [email: [email protected]].

Acknowledgments. The authors would like to thank Amy Ronnkvist and Marit Berntson for assistance with the data collection, as well as Kenneth D. Wald and James Meadowcroft for helpful comments on earlier drafts. This research was supported by grants from the National Science Foundation (No. SES-9905000), the Dr. Sol and Mitzi Center Fund, the Philip and Florence Dworsky Endowment, the Edelstein Family Foundation, and a University of Minnesota Grant-in-Aid of Research.



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