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Policing the near abroad: Russianforeign policy in the South CaucasusKavus AbushovPublished online: 26 Jun 2009.

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Policing the near abroad: Russian foreign

policy in the South Caucasus

KAVUS ABUSHOV*

This article tries to understand Russia’s policies towards the South Caucasusand answer the question of whether there is a tension between Russia’sinterests and policies. An attempt is made to identify Russia’s strategicinterests in the region and the crucial factors that shape Russian policies.Based on the assumption that today’s Russia gives de facto support to thesecessionist regimes in Georgia, the author attempts to explain what theKremlin’s motives are in supporting the secessionist regimes. The authorinvestigates whether Russian support for the separatist regimes in the SouthCaucasus is a reaction to the foreign policy orientation of the parent statesor a part of Russia’s security political interests. On the one hand, supportinginstability in the South Caucasus cannot be a part of the Kremlin’s strategicinterests, because that can pose a threat to the North Caucasus. On the otherhand, however, Russian policies are not designed to achieve long-termstability in the South Caucasus, and controlled instability seems to suit theKremlin. Why Russia vies for coercive hegemony and supports secessionismare the central questions of this article.

Recent developments in the South Caucasus have raised questions over thecoherence of Russia’s foreign policy and strategic interests in the SouthCaucasus region. In particular, Russian support for the secessionist regionswithin Georgia, the instrumentalisation of the Mountainous Karabakh conflict,the demand of loyalty from the three South Caucasus states, Russia’s desire tomonopolise the energy transportation from the Caspian basin, and the use ofgas deliveries as a leverage have undermined Georgia’s and Azerbaijan’s trust ofRussia. The absence of Moscow’s impartiality in its military and politicalpresence in the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts has pushed Georgia toseek alternative alliances to balance Russian influence. In response to Georgia’snew alliances, the Kremlin has taken an even tougher stance against it byintroducing an economic embargo and publicly exposing its partisan policies tothe ethno-territorial conflicts in the region. Despite Russia’s resistance, Georgiahas managed to close down the Russian military bases in is territory and aspiresto NATO membership. Moreover, the introduction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Jeyhan

*Kavus Abushov holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in International Law and International Relations

and a Master of Science in International Relations. He is currently studying for his PhD at the

institute of Political Science, University of Munster in Germany. Kavus is affiliated with the

Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy in research projects. Bkavus.abushov@gmail.com�.

ISSN 1035-7718 print/ISSN 1465-332X online/09/020187-26 # 2009 Australian Institute of International Affairs

DOI: 10.1080/10357710902895129

Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 63, No. 2,

pp. 187�212, June 2009

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oil and gas pipelines has undermined Russia’s effort to monopolise energy

resources in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). These develop-

ments give a blurred picture of Russia’s objectives in the region.This article aims to determine whether there is a tension between Russian

interests and policies in the South Caucasus, and hence whether the Russian

policies have been well suited to its interests. Such a task firstly requires

determining a definition of Russia’s foreign policy interests vis-a-vis Armenia,

Azerbaijan and Georgia, and secondly, ascertaining what Russian interests lie

behind its endorsement of the current status quo (which suits the secessionist

regimes) in the South Caucasus region and desire for a military presence.

Thirdly, it will be determined whether Russian attempts in recent years to come

back to the international stage as a great power have had implications for the

South Caucasus.

Russia’s neo-imperialism

Neo-imperialism is a disguised form of imperialism by which a country may

grant independence to another country, but continue to dominate it by control

of markets for goods or raw materials (Munkler 2005: 213�7). Referring

traditionally to former colonies, neo-imperialism has been used to imply

economic, political and cultural control by former colonial powers without

colonialism. Critics of neo-imperialism argue that existing economic and

political arrangements created by former colonial powers are used to maintain

control of the former colonies. Neo-imperialism’s traditional focus has been

on the trade relations between poor countries and leading industrialised

nations. It implies a form of contemporary economic imperialism, i.e.

powerful countries behave like colonial powers by getting involved in the

affairs of less powerful ones and by setting the rules of behaviour in

international politics*/and this behavior is likened to colonialism in a post-

colonial world. The term was used during the cold war by communist

ideologues to describe capitalist nations*/primarily the USA and the United

Kingdom*/and since the end of the cold war has been used to refer to the

policies of the USA, the European Union (EU) and even institutions such as the

World Bank and the International Monetary Fund vis-a-vis Third World

countries. Neo-imperialism does not have its own theoretical definition and,

like imperialism, it is subject to widespread debate on the delimitation of the

term. Economic neo-imperialism was given a theoretical foundation by the

dependency theory, arguing that there is a centre of wealthy states and a

periphery of poor states, and resources are extracted from the periphery and

flow towards the states at the centre in order to sustain their economic growth

and wealth. A central concept is that the poverty of the countries in the

periphery is the result of the manner of their integration in the ‘world system’.

This theory is based on the Marxist analysis of inequalities within the world

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system, arguing that underdevelopment of the Global South is a direct result ofthe development in the Global North (Baylis and Smith 2005: 225�51).Overall, neo-imperialism is based upon the premises of traditional and moderntheories of imperialism, including those developed by Cox, Doyle, Gramsci,Hobson, Lenin, Marx, Wallerstein, etc. The common variables of imperialismand neo-imperialism are the (coercive) control of the centre over the periphery,divide et impera, the export of values, and the political, military and economicpresence of the centre in the periphery. Neo-imperialism is a more profitableform of control and hegemony over the periphery, since the centre does nothave to share the burdens of the periphery or become engaged in imperialistwars. Whereas imperialism has been criticised for not being economicallyefficient (taking into consideration the underdevelopment of the periphery andthe costs of maintaining the empire), but effective, neo-imperialism faces theproblem of the state’s strategy not meeting its ends (Munkler 2005: 37�8). TheUS intervention in Vietnam, Nicaragua and, more recently, in Iraq has raisedthe question of how rational such policies can be.

The case of Russian neo-imperialism seems problematic today, not leastbecause the centre does not have a clear strategy, and all it has is ends. Whereasa modern empire like the USA had a clear goal when intervening in Iraq (energyresources and absolute hegemony in the Middle East) or fighting in Vietnam,Moscow does not have a clear strategy when supporting the status quo in theSouth Caucasus. Russian policies towards the former Soviet republics in thepost-communist period have been considered to be of a neo-imperialist nature.Although Russia during the democratic euphoria of the Yeltsin governmentfocused more on integration into the Western system of states, this was rathershort-lived. The unsuccessful privatisation process, corruption and the Chechencrisis all raised the question of viability of the Western liberal democracy andfree-market-economy-related trend in Moscow, resulting in calls in Russianpolitical circles and society for Russia’s return to its previous ideologies ofcentralisation policy vis-a-vis its regions and balance of power vis-a-vis theWest. Following this, Russian policies were aimed at limited sovereignty for,and reintegration of, the former Soviet republics in the Russian sphere ofinfluence. Russia’s security interests in its south and threats to the Russianminorities in the relevant countries have been used to legitimise terms such as‘near abroad’ or ‘Russian sphere of influence’. Having ruled over the geographicspace for more than 200 years, Moscow has had difficulty in acknowledgingthat these states have complete sovereignty both in their domestic and foreignaffairs. Russia has even been irritated by any shift of identity within the CISstates and regarded the colour revolutions as being US-backed. In Central Asia,the Kremlin has made an effort to tie the states into economic arrangements toensure its involvement in the energy production and transportation. Thus,Russia’s policies towards the South Caucasus states, Ukraine, Belarus andCentral Asia have been designed to guarantee Russia’s domination andhegemony over them, be it cooperative or coercive.

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For a better understanding of Russian neo-imperialism, its identity and the

maxims on which it is based need to be elaborated. These maxims include

history, the arts, literature, societal behaviour and the mission formed

throughout history, through which the social behaviour of the state towards

the outside world emerges; these maxims form identity and identity is expressed

by these maxims (Berger and Luckman 1967: 62�3). The Russian mission is

based upon its self-perception as the last bastion and spearhead of Orthodox

Christianity, and Moscow as a Third Rome: this was even expressed in a

chronograph of 1512 (Dvornik 1962: 374). Russian history as written by the

Russian historian Karamzin at the beginning of the nineteenth century

concentrated on the achievements of Ivan III and Peter I, who had laid the

foundations of Russian expansionist policies (Dawisha and Parrott 1994:

27�30). The aim of the work was to establish the idea of a powerful nation

state, which the ruling elites in Russia throughout the nineteenth century were

to use for a successful power consolidation. The completion of Russian

expansion towards the south (Caucasus) and east (Central Asia) resulted in

the formation of an image of a multi-ethnic empire (Derzhava) in Russian ruling

elites. The concept of Derzhava was throughout the twentieth century the

leading ideology of the Russian ruling elites and was completed through Stalin’s

centralised military empire.1

Identity or ideology formation became a central feature of Putin’s govern-

ment, when Russia’s identity was unambiguously defined in favour of Russia’s

great power status (Derzhava). Under Putin, Russian foreign policy gained

continuity, and the political system became internally centralised and externally

readapted to great power politics. Proclaiming the Soviet Union’s collapse as

‘the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century’, Putin expressed

nostalgia for it and its values, and even chose the melody of the Soviet anthem

for the new Russian anthem and adopted the emblem of the Russian Empire

(BBC World Service 2005). Thus, Russia’s great power idea derived from its

imperialist era and is therefore closely connected with imperialism.

Russian policies in the South Caucasus in the aftermath of the collapse of the

Soviet Union: Yeltsin era (1991�9)

The ultimate result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union for Russia was an

identity crisis in political circles, and the resulting inconsistency was manifest in

the country’s foreign policy. An unclear preference formation in Moscow’s

foreign policy more or less had two dimensions: the Euro-Atlantic trend, which

saw Russia’s future in Europe as an equal member of Euro-Atlantic civilised

nations, and the Eurasian trend, which was unwilling to recognise the

independence of former Soviet republics and expressed antagonism towards

the West, aspiring to restore Russian post-imperial rule (Donaldson and Nogee

1998: 114, 190�7). After a short period of internationalist idealism, in late 1992

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the Russian foreign policy strategy was determined in favour of Russianpresence in and hegemony over the post-Soviet space. The foreign policyguidelines in 1992 established that the most important foreign policy tasks,requiring ‘the coordinated and constant efforts of all state structures’, includedregulating armed conflicts around Russia, preventing their spread into Russianterritory, and guaranteeing the observance of the Russians’ and Russian-speaking populations’ rights (Roeder 1997: 227). Accordingly, the conflicts inthe Caucasus were viewed as a security threat to Russia with a high level ofspillover. The foreign policy guidelines issued by the Security Council in March1993 reflected Russia’s position regarding its ‘near abroad’ even more clearlyand argued for an external CIS border over which the international communityshould recognise Russia’s key role and rights. The guidelines warned againstany attempts by a third party state’s military for political presence in the statescontiguous with Russia (ibid.). The rhetoric used by the Russian president andforeign and defence ministries echoed the desire to view the post-Soviet space asa Russian sphere of influence and called for a possible reintegration of theindependent republics into a structure where Russia would play its ‘historicalrole’ (Lough 1993). Thus, a post-imperialist strategy was designed, whichimplied the restoration of Russian imperial power over the Baltic, Caucasus andCentral Asia, monopolisation of the Caspian Sea, and allowing the new states alimited sovereignty (Fedorov 1996). The CIS and the later Collective SecurityTreaty (CST) were to be the new tools of Russian foreign policy with theultimate goal of having all former Soviet Union countries included, includingthe Baltic.

Russia was easily irritated when any of the states in the ‘near abroad’attempted to establish relationships with Turkey, Iran or any other Westernstate independent of Moscow. Throughout the twentieth century, Russia madegreat efforts to block any uncoordinated communication of the Soviet Caucasusand Central Asia with Turkey and Iran. Since the early 1990s, Russia has had touse all possible means to prevent a political power vacuum in the region thatother regional states might have made use of. Turkey, in particular, had thepotential for deepening its ethnic and linguistic ties with the Turkic states of theCIS (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan). Forthis and other security and geopolitical-related interests, Russia advocated theguarding of the external borders of the CIS.

The Russian identity crisis following the collapse of the Soviet Union and theformation of its post-Soviet interests were accompanied by ethno-politicaldevelopments in the South Caucasus. These included the conflict betweenArmenia and Azerbaijan over the Mountainous Karabakh region, the conflictsin South Ossetia and in Abkhazia, as well as intrastate political instabilities,which soon began to be highlighted both in Russia’s domestic politics and itsforeign policy. All statements and official policy guidelines in this periodstressed the threat of possible conflicts in Russia’s vicinity and the need toregulate them (Rossiiskie Vesti 1993). The Kremlin viewed the Caucasus not

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only as a single geopolitical region, but also as a security complex, that is a

region of security interdependency. Therefore, the primary threat to Russian

security was widely believed to come from the south (Buzan and Waever 2005:

40�89). The spillover potential of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts,

which were occurring in Georgia and subsequently affecting the North

Caucasus, and the possibility of a Turkish engagement in the Mountainous

Karabakh conflict raised concern over Moscow’s great power status. With the

end of East�West bipolarism, the Russian foreign ministry was convinced that

the new era would be one of regional power-centre tendencies, and to secure its

great power status Russia should retain a regional hegemony (Rossiiskie Vesti

1992). The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kozyrev, in his speech at the

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe summit in 1992, stated

that ‘the former Soviet republics are in effect a post-imperial space where Russia

has to defend its interests by all available means’ (Dannreuther 1997: 11). Thus,

in late 1992, there was an already widely accepted consensus in Moscow

concerning the realisation of Russia’s post-imperial objectives: every republic of

the former Soviet Union should be in the CIS, military presence in these states

should be secured, and the CIS external border with Iran and Turkey in the

south should be guarded by Russian soldiers (Buszynski 1996: 107).

Russian policies vis-a-vis Georgia and the secessionist conflicts in Abkhazia

and South Ossetia

The break-up of the Soviet Union initiated an identity formation in the North

and South Caucasus. Freed from nearly 200 years of Russian rule, a search for

identity had emerged in the Caucasian states and that identity was primarily

manifest in the form of nationalist tendencies. These tendencies in the North

Caucasus manifested in the emergence of the Confederation of Mountain

Peoples of the Caucasus (which included all seven peoples of the North

Caucasus), which sought to integrate the North Caucasus, including Abkhazia

and South Ossetia, and establish a union that would not be subordinated to

Russia or Georgia. The idea that the territories of the Mountain Peoples of the

Caucasus were annexed by Russia and Georgia was stated at the first assembly

in Sukhumi, Abkhazia in August 1989 (Soslambekov 1990).A resistance identity evolved in Georgia when President Gamsakhurdia’s

nationalistic rhetoric not only frightened the autonomous regions of Abkhazia

and South Ossetia (although the roots of the conflict are older). Gamsakhur-

dia’s rhetoric also became an embarrassment to Moscow and made it difficult

for the Kremlin to find any way to a dialogue with Tbilisi. Gamsakhurdia

proposed the idea of a ‘Caucasian House’, which was quickly adopted by

Chechnya in the North Caucasus (distinguished for its anti-Russian stance) and

by Azerbaijan in the South (Coppieters et al. 1998: 102�6), and had the chance

of becoming the primary anti-Russian coalition in the Caucasus. Therefore, the

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deterioration of the relations between Georgia and the provinces of SouthOssetia and Abkhazia appeared to suit Russia in its efforts to establish an enemyimage of Georgia in the North Caucasus. The two conflicts helped Moscowshift the concentration of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of theCaucasus from seeking independence to defending Abkhazia and South Ossetiafrom Georgia (Aybak 2001: 238). Surprisingly, the conflicts helped Russia shiftthe orientation of the Confederation from an anti-Russian stance to one ofloyalty to Moscow. The presence of large numbers of Chechen fighters in thebattles in Abkhazia guaranteed that Gamsakhurdia’s Caucasian integrationefforts would not include Chechnya. Under Gamsakhurdia, Georgia opted tostay out of the CIS and its main institution, the CST, and spoke symbolically ofGeorgian NATO membership.

Although Russian interests towards the CIS states were clearly defined in theforeign policy guidelines in 1992 and 1993, Russian policy instrumentsregarding the conflicts in the South Caucasus were inconsistent during the firstyears of the Yeltsin period, so that one could not observe a single Russia orRussian elite, but a number of*/sometimes parallel, sometimes intersec-ting*/entities. The Russian position was represented independently by thepresident (the state position), the parliament and the military, each actingautonomously. Therefore, there were a number of situations where it is notclear whether certain actions committed on behalf of the Russian state were apart of the Russian state policy or purely private actions. The Russian state,represented by President Yeltsin and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, from theonset of the conflict conveyed unilateral support to Georgia’s territorialintegrity and developed an interest in preventing the disintegration of Georgiaas a state (Ghebali 2004). This was conditioned by the concerns of the Yeltsinexecutive that Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s secession from Georgia, and thesuccess of separatism in the post-Soviet space, would create a precedent andencourage separatism in Russian North Caucasus. Moreover, the instability inSouth Ossetia and later in Abkhazia had a high level of spillover into Adygeyya,Chechnya and North Ossetia, partly because of kinship between the ethnicgroups.

A contrary policy to that of the Yeltsin executive was that of the RussianDuma, the media and the Russian military bases stationed in Abkhazia, and thevolunteers from the North Caucasus. Indeed, at least half of the fighters inSouth Ossetia and Abkhazia against Georgian forces were volunteers from theNorth Caucasus, without whom the victory of the Abkhazian side would beunthinkable. The volunteers were stimulated by a feeling of solidarity andcompassion for their ethnic kin in the South.

The scale of Russian military assistance in the conflict was of equalimportance: within a short period of time after the start of the conflict, theAbkhazian side managed to access 100,000 landmines and some heavyweapons, neither of which had existed in Abkhazia before the outbreak ofthe conflict (Antonenko 2005: 214). What is not clear, though, is whether these

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weapons were delivered unilaterally by the Russian military base in Gudauta (inAbkhazia), or whether there was any commanded assistance from Moscow.

Before Georgia’s membership of the CIS, Russia showed no sign of sympathyfor Georgia with its problematic South Ossetia and Abkhazia conflicts. Militaryassistance from Russian territory to the separatist fighting groups was indulged,if not encouraged by Moscow (Dale 1996: 127; Rotar 1993; Zeverev 1997).This was conditioned by two factors: firstly, the creation of an enemy image ofGeorgia in the North Caucasus through the conflicts would exhaust Gamsa-khurdia’s and the Chechen leader Dudaev’s efforts to integrate the Caucasus;secondly, to turn the attention of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of theCaucasus away from seeking independence from Russia to the defence of SouthOssetia and Abkhazia.

Furthermore, Gamsakhurdia’s anti-Russian stance and nationalistic rhetorichad already reduced the Russian president’s willingness to pursue a pro-Georgian policy in the Abkhazia conflict. The Abkhazian leader, Ardzinba,enjoyed good relations with Yeltsin’s opponents, namely the Duma speakerKhasbulatov and a number of key government officials. That fact, coupled withAbkhazia and South Ossetia receiving sympathy from North Caucasian elites,would make it hard for Yeltsin to pursue a policy of support or assistance toGeorgia, and to prevent volunteers from the North Caucasus (especially pro-Kremlin Cossacks and Ossets) assisting South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Russian assistance to Georgia against South Ossetia would create a dilemmafor the Kremlin, as during the previous 200 years the Ossets had predominantlyacted in support of the Russian Empire in the North Caucasus. Under theseconditions, Yeltsin’s administration wanted a cessation of military operationsand nothing more for Georgia, because the conflicts in Abkhazia and SouthOssetia had become levers for the Kremlin to use to coerce Georgia into entry tothe CIS in 1993, and to consent to Russia stationing military bases in Georgia, aCIS peacekeeping guard in the conflict zones, and above all the guarding ofGeorgia’s borders (Cornell 2001).

Immediately following Georgia’s consent to the Russian conditions, Tbilisireceived support including limited military assistance from Moscow in order toprevent the disintegration of the state (Jackson 2006: 136). Russian supportsought a legal framework through the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperationbetween Tbilisi and Moscow, signed by the Russian president in Georgia in1994. Although the treaty was not ratified by the Duma, it implied a broadframework for Russian military, economic and political support to Tbilisi,which would strengthen Georgia in relation to Abkhazia and South Ossetia(Jackson 2006: 218).

The prevalent thought in Tbilisi that CIS membership, Russian militarypresence and, later, Shevardnadze’s support for Moscow during the firstChechen campaign would lead to Moscow’s assistance to Georgia to restoresovereignty over Abkhazia and South Ossetia proved to be incorrect and causedthe rise of an anti-Russian feeling from the Shevardnadze administration.

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Moscow was, in fact, in no condition to help Georgia restore sovereignty; the

Abkhazian leader had many times previously defied Russian pressure and had

now, after many years, secured de facto independence (Ryabov 2006: 30). It

seemed that only heavy military intervention in Abkhazia could restore

Georgian sovereignty over the province, and Moscow was firmly convinced

that Georgia was in no condition to wage a blitzkrieg in Abkhazia (Billingsley

1998). At that time, the Kremlin had no intention of antagonising the North

Caucasus by actively supporting Georgia in an offensive.Instead of offering military assistance, Russia used civil and economic levers

to persuade Abkhazia to give up its ambitions of statehood. Russia and a

number of CIS states placed an economic and arms embargo on Abkhazia.

Russian authorities refused to recognise Soviet passports from Abkhazian

people and Russian statements made it clear that Abkhazia had no chance of

becoming independent (Lakoba 2001: 38). The Russian policy of isolating

Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained unchanged up until the Putin era.

Russian policy towards the Mountainous Karabakh conflict

Russian policy towards Armenia and Azerbaijan has been primarily defined by

the Kremlin’s attitude towards the Mountainous Karabakh conflict. This is the

only interstate conflict in the CIS. The dispute between the Karabakh

Armenians, Armenia and Azerbaijan has led to a revival of old geopolitical

divisions and disputes in the region, involved Turkey, Iran and the international

community, and has made Russian efforts to achieve hegemonic control of the

South Caucasus highly improbable. The conflict has become an important lever

in Russian foreign policy towards the region and it enables Russia to influence a

large number of issues. For Russia, the factors defining the importance of the

conflict include: military presence, Turkey’s potential military and political

intrusion, and the Caspian energy development and pipeline routes.Russian policy at the start of the Karabakh conflict was inconsistent and had

no clear strategy. That inconsistency caused the departure of the Kremlin-loyal

political elite in Azerbaijan, led by Mutallibov, following Azerbaijani accusa-

tions of Russian military assistance during the Khojaly massacre. The massacre

of Azerbaijanis by Armenian forces in Khojaly (a town in the Mountainous

Karabakh region) was noted for its particularly brutal treatment of civilians and

caused an outrage in Baku, which led to Mutallibov’s resignation and the

instalment of an anti-Russian, pro-Turkish, pro-Western government under

President Elcibey. This occurred at a time when Russia was elaborating a

strategy for the South Caucasus. Therefore that period is the starting point of a

continuous strategy by the Kremlin towards the conflict. Russian assistance to

the Armenian side at the start of the conflict (before a clear definition of foreign

policy interests) was as much based on identity as on strategic interests. The

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Russian administration and the local army officers stationed in Karabakh

expressed solidarity with Armenia, which was based upon religious fraternity.The picture changed after the foreign policy strategy definition in 1992,

when Russia developed an interest in instrumentalising the conflict. Such a

move was driven by the interest to use the conflict as a lever both against Baku

and Yerevan. When Azerbaijan pressed hard for the closure of Russian

military bases in its territory in early 1992, the Armenians were swift to

abandon their policy of seeking maximal sovereignty and reversed their

demand for the withdrawal of Russian bases in Armenia (Trenin 2006: 12).

Assisting Armenia and the Karabakh Armenians in the conflict, Russia used

the conflict as a lever against Baku to impose conditions, which included

Azerbaijan’s entry to the CIS, deployment of military bases, guarding the

country’s borders with Turkey and Iran, and jointly using the resources of the

Caspian Sea (Malek 2000: 11�14; Menon 1998: 129). Azerbaijan’s entry to

the CIS encouraged the Kremlin to broker a ceasefire between Armenia and

Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, Russia continued its military alliance with Armenia

and the transfer of weapons to Armenia was worth US$1 billion in 1997

(Segodyna 1997). After joining the CIS, under the leadership of President

Aliyev, Azerbaijan refused two specific demands of the Kremlin: firstly, there

would be no Russian military presence in Azerbaijan as it was felt that a

Russian military presence would only have a negative effect on the Karabakh

conflict issue; secondly, there would be no joint Russian�Azerbaijan explora-

tion of the energy resources of the Caspian Sea.Russia’s instrumentalisation of the Karabakh conflict stimulated Azerbaijan’s

bargaining efforts and caused Azerbaijan to use its Caspian natural resources as

a bargaining tool for wider negotiations. The Russian calculation that the

Mountainous Karabakh conflict could be used as a lever against Baku to

prevent the implementation of any Caspian pipeline projects proved erroneous.

In 1999, at the Istanbul summit of the Organization for Security and Co-

operation in Europe (OSCE), Moscow demonstrated that it had no resources to

hinder or prevent the construction of an oil and gas pipeline linking the Caspian

Sea with Mediterranean ports.Thus, the conclusion may be drawn that, in one way or another, Russia

contributed to the course of the conflicts in the region, and since the cessation of

fighting, has used the conflict situations as instruments in its foreign policy.

Whether such policies suit Russia’s long-term interests will be discussed in the

final section of the article.

Russian policies under the Putin government

On the issues in the South Caucasus, the Putin administration ended the two

Russias, i.e. that of the president/Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) versus that

of the Duma and the regional elites.

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Russian foreign policy under Putin has been more coherent than that of his

predecessors, and consequently easier to analyse and assess. The existence of a

single Russian foreign policy line vis-a-vis the South Caucasus region is

conditioned by a number of factors. Firstly, during the early years of his

presidency, Putin managed to centralise the power and decision-making

mechanism of the Kremlin, and limited the free will of the regional elites,

including those in the North Caucasus. Putin pressed hard to establish the

strong hand of the Kremlin over all structures of the state, filling civilian

positions with security staff (siloviki).Secondly, when Putin came to power, the Kremlin had no option but to

pursue a consistent policy for the South Caucasus, as from 1994 the West,

driven by its economic interests (the USA and the EU), had started to penetrate

the region and compete for influence in that area.The year 1994 saw the signing of a major oil contract between Azerbaijan

and 10 major oil corporations for the exploration of Azerbaijan’s portion of the

Caspian Sea. The USA and other Western governments gave support to a de

facto delimitation of Azerbaijan’s sector of the Caspian Sea. In 1998, the US

national security strategy argued for the full integration of certain areas of the

CIS into Western economic and political structures (Clinton 1998: 37�40).

Russia’s major tools, the CIS and the CST, had failed to satisfy Russia’s

objectives: the CIS had failed to integrate the foreign and security policies of

member states, and the CST lost Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan in 1999,

although Uzbekistan rejoined in 2005.From 1995 onwards, the Georgian leader, Shevardnadze, discontented with

the lack of substantial support from Moscow in his efforts to restore sovereignty

over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, sought alliances with the USA and NATO for

the purpose of balancing Russian influence which, according to the Georgian

elite, was the main cause of instability in the region (Devdariani 2005: 167�73).

In 1997, Tbilisi applied for NATO membership and provided asylum for

Chechen refugees, including fighters from the Second Chechen War. The next

blow to Russia’s military presence in the region came at the OSCE Istanbul

summit in 1999. Moscow had to undertake to remove its existing military bases

from Georgian territory, including Abkhazia; Tbilisi was suspicious of the

Russian bases as they may have been giving assistance to the separatist regimes.

The OSCE summit also hosted the agreement reached between Georgia,

Azerbaijan and the USA on the construction of an oil and later a gas pipeline

linking the Caspian and Black Seas. The Baku-Tbilisi-Jeyhan pipeline was to

transport oil from the Caspian basin to the European market, bypassing the

existing Novorossiysk pipeline in Russia. The balancing efforts of Georgia and

Azerbaijan in the late 1990s had also led to the emergence of the regional

alliance of GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan [until 2005], Azerbaijan

and Moldova), which was seen in Moscow as an instrument of limiting Russia’s

‘natural interests’ in the region for the benefit of the West (Ivanov 1999).

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Russia under Putin has more than ever desired for a hegemonic influence

(coercive hegemony) over the CIS and therefore pursued policies directed at

gaining leverage vis-a-vis Georgia and Azerbaijan. The relations between

Azerbaijan and Russia warmed after the 10-year lease of the strategic Gabala

Radar Station in the north of Azerbaijan to Russia and some agreements on the

division of the Caspian seabed. Russia, however, still retained an important

lever on Azerbaijan, namely the Karabakh conflict. Russia has de jure supported

Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity in all statements, but has also strengthened its

security-military cooperation with Armenia and concluded mutual defence

treaties (Freitag-Wirminghaus 2005).Russia has reacted to every refusal by Georgia to comply with further pressure

and rage. Georgia’s pro-NATO slogans and Shevardnadze’s refusal to assist

Russia in its campaign in Chechnya led to harsher measures by the Kremlin.

From 1999, Russia changed its isolationist policies relating to Abkhazia and

South Ossetia; Russia opened its border to Abkhazia and ignored the trade and

arms embargo (although de jure the embargo is still in force), and supported the

Figure 1. Administrative map of Caucasus in USSR, 1952�1991.

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employment of Russian reserves and retired officers at the security ministries in

Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Popescu 2006a: 4�5, 43). Moreover, from 2000,

Russia has applied a visa regime on Georgia, whilst permitting the naturalisation

of Abkhazian and South Ossetian citizens. Moscow justified its stance on the

granting of Russian citizenship as a ‘humanitarian’ gesture, aimed to provide

recognised passports to people who would otherwise be unable to travel abroad(Socor 2002). In this way, Russia reserved the right of humanitarian intervention

in both regions in case of Georgian intervention. Russian pressure was followed

by the bombing of Georgian villages on the Chechen�Georgian border during the

Pankisi crisis in 2002.The change of government in Georgia raised the hope that there would be an

improvement in the bilateral relations between Russia and Georgia. Saakashvi-

li’s civilian intervention in Ajaria (an autonomous region in Georgia that

accepted Georgian sovereignty, but disobeyed the central government in

administrative issues) did not meet with any Russian resistance. Saakashvili

wished for a similar scenario in South Ossetia, but unsuccessfully. Georgian

attempts to frighten South Ossetia in 2004 were met by Russian resistance, both

politically and militarily (Torbakov 2004). The relations between Georgia and

Russia since 2004 have soured to the extent that Russia has undermined itssupport for Georgia’s territorial integrity. In an infamous statement, a Russian

foreign ministry spokesman, speaking on Georgia, announced: ‘We respect the

principle of territorial integrity, but in Georgia’s case territorial integrity is still

more of a possibility than a political and legal reality’ (Savchenko 2006).In April 2008, a Georgian unmanned aircraft was shot down over Abkhazia.

The incident soured the relations between Georgia and Russia, since the former

accused the Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia (at the Gudauta base) of shooting

down the drone. The Georgian government provided video evidence of the

aircraft being shot by a MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter, which the Abkhazian authorities

do not have in their possession. The Abkhazian authorities, on the other hand,

insisted the Georgian aircraft had violated Abkhazian airspace and as retaliation

they had shot down the drone. The incident, whether committed by the Russian

peacekeepers or not, demonstrated Russia’s sensitivity towards Georgia’spotential military intrusion into Abkhazia. Following the event, Valery Kenya-

ikin, the Russian foreign ministry’s ambassador-at-large, said on 25 April that

Russia would do everything possible to protect the interests of Russian citizens

living in Georgia’s breakaway republics: ‘We will not leave our citizens in

Abkhazia and South Ossetia in difficulty and this should be clearly understood . . .

We will do everything possible to avert a military conflict.’ He also added,

however, that Russia would ‘have to use military force’, if the need arose (RiaNovosti 2004). Sergei Mironov, speaker of the Federation Council, Russia’supper house of parliament, said, commenting on Kenyaikin’s statement, that:

Russia proceeds from the fact that a great number of Russians live in

Abkhazia. It is evident that if there is a threat to the lives of Russian

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nationals � or any other threat � Russia will not remain on the sidelines (Ria

Novosti 2008).

On 18 April 2008, the outgoing president, Vladimir Putin, instructed his

government to establish official ties with counterpart agencies in breakaway

South Ossetia and Abkhazia, leading to Georgia’s condemnation of what it

described as an attempt at ‘de facto annexation’ (Civil Georgia 2008).

Russia has not only been lobbying the interests of Abkhazia and SouthOssetia with international organisations, but also supporting many kinds ofeconomic projects in both regions. These include a railway between theAbkhazian capital Sukhumi and the Russian Black Sea resort of Sochi,encouragement of Russian firms to invest in the breakaway region, as well asthe purchase of assets. At many levels, Russia has made it clear that aninvoluntary reintegration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Georgia is not aviable option. Furthermore, a number of statements made by the Russianpresident have disguised the sympathy of the Kremlin for Abkhazia and SouthOssetia’s independence (Suddeutsche Zeitung 2006). As Charles King (1995:106�20) puts it, Russia’s policy of ‘encouraging separatist movements under theguise of defending embattled Russian minorities, and then intervening as apeacemaker when the conflict between the separatists and the successor regimesgets out of hand’ is merely a ‘protection racket’.

Russia’s rise as a great power and implications for the South Caucasus

In the South Caucasus, Russia has never ceased to be the regional power and hashad the relevant autonomy to influence the dynamics of processes. Therefore,Russia’s great power status at the level of the international relations system isnot particularly relevant to the South Caucasus. Although there is scarcelyconsensus in international relations as to the definition of great powers, the onegiven by Buzan and Waever is more relevant to explaining Russian interests.The relevant criterion of a great power is the polarity in the regional securitycomplex, so that a great power must be the only pole in its regional securitycomplex (Buzan and Waever 2005: 458).

Any alliance which produces new poles would alter the status of the greatpower. That attitude was taken by the Russian foreign ministry as early as1992, when official guidelines viewed the modified international system as oneof regional power centre tendencies, necessitating Russia to dominate in itsregional ‘shell’ (Roeder 1997: 227). For that reason, the Kremlin embarked onmeasures to deepen the relative autonomy of the CIS regional security complexand insisted that the CIS should be the dominant international legal regime forresolving disputes and regulating relations in the post-Soviet space. The Kremlinhas constantly reacted with antagonism and irritation to the balancing efforts of

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the states of the CIS. Russia was enraged in the first years of GUAAM’sexistence as it viewed GUAAM as a US- and NATO-initiated quasi-alliance tobalance Russia’s power in the CIS. The Kremlin has always been sensitive toshifts of values within the CIS and that was obvious from its reaction to therevolutions in Georgia and the Ukraine (Popescu 2006b: 1).

Russia in 2007 was more self-confident in the international community thanit was in previous years. The strengthening of the Russian international positionowed much to the improvement of the country’s economic performance as wellas to its domestic consolidation. Russia’s large oil and gas revenues enabled it toinitiate large investment projects in the CIS and abroad, and generated theresources required to pursue its foreign policy strategy. In his 2006 address,Putin accordingly stated that the country’s economic growth had had an effecton Russia’s international position (Popescu 2006a: 4). This indicates, as DmitryTrenin argues, that Russia

came to the conclusion that the withdrawal has ended, and it is time to

counter-attack . . . it is time to re-establish a great power and that the CIS is

the space where Russian economic, political, and informational dominance

should be established (Popescu 2006a: 4).

The role of the key external players

The USA

Russian policies towards the South Caucasus have to a certain extent beeninfluenced by the efforts of the USA and EU to exert influence in the region, andthe growing importance of the influence of external players in the region hascaused Russia to increase its pressure. In particular, the adoption of Baltic Statesinto NATO, the EU and US missile defence plans for Poland and the CzechRepublic, and Washington’s support for Georgia’s accession to NATO havebeen factors which have strengthened the Kremlin’s insistence on exclusivepresence in the CIS and, in particular, the South Caucasus. Foreign ministerLavrov’s warning message for the USA and the Kremlin’s objection to Georgia’sNATO membership indicate the Kremlin’s annoyance with US or Europeanpresence in the CIS (Rferl 2007).

The US influence in the region within the last decade has increasingly grownat the expense of Russia’s influence. For a number of CIS states, the USA hasbeen a favourite ally to balance Russian power in the region, and a number ofprojects have been achieved only by virtue of US support. The USA has hadcommon interests with Georgia, Azerbaijan and the Ukraine, and has thereforebeen preferred by them. The primary interests of the USA in the South Caucasusand Central Asia are energy-related, not political- and security-related. Thus,conflict resolution in Georgia or Azerbaijan is not a top priority for the USA,

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and Washington is certainly not interested in confrontation with Russia on

these issues. Thus, having achieved what it wanted through the pipelines linking

the Caspian with the Mediterranean, Washington is not eager to dominate in

the peace processes in the region, and has left this area to Russian autonomy.

Nevertheless, the US�Russian rivalry within the CIS has even increased since the

launch of the Baku-Tbilisi-Jeyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum oil and gas

pipelines, since Washington has tried to persuade both Kazakhstan and

Turkmenistan to join. The US military training program for Georgia and

support for its NATO accession have outraged the Kremlin further, leading to a

harshening of its position both on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia has also

been angered at the colour revolutions within the CIS, regarding the change as

American-sponsored.The West had a golden opportunity to embrace Russia and give it a special

role in the early 1990s when Russia experienced its period of ideal Euro-

Atlanticism. Following the NATO campaign in Kosovo, and later the US

intervention in Iraq, it became obvious that the potential of the 1990s for

Russia’s rapprochement with the West no longer existed. President Putin’s

reception of Hamas leaders in 2007 and resistance to Kosovo’s independence

caused deeper tensions in the relations, and this had an effect on Russia’s

approach to the South Caucasus and Central Asia.Meanwhile, it should be borne in mind that Russia’s policies towards the

region have caused Georgia and Azerbaijan to seek external powers to

balance Russia. As the Kremlin’s ambitions towards the CIS were becoming

determined in its foreign policy guidelines in the 1990s, the West was

preoccupied with the crises in the Balkans and started to express interest in

the region only in 1996. Western engagement in the region was perceived

both in Georgia and Azerbaijan as a chance for political sovereignty and

engagement.

Turkey

Russia has viewed Turkey’s relations with Central Asia and the South Caucasus

with deep suspicion and, at times, has told Ankara to keep out of its regional

shell. Russia’s approach has been generated by its historical rivalry with Turkey

(or rather its predecessor) in the Caucasus and Central Asia as well as the

Balkans, and the potential of Turkey to fill the political power vacuum in the

CIS. Firstly, Moscow was disturbed by Turkey’s ethnic and linguistic ties with

Azerbaijan and Central Asian republics, and its ability to turn the kinship into

political action. Moscow took the Turkish president Turgut Ozal’s efforts to

unite the Turkic world very seriously and had to make sure that the Turkish role

remained at a minimum. Accordingly, Russia tried to deploy its troops on the

Turkish borders with all three states in the South Caucasus and finally achieved

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this in Armenia and Georgia. Russian�Turkish interaction, or even confronta-

tion, became most obvious in the course of the Mountainous Karabakh conflict.

President Ozal’s statements following Armenian attacks on the Azerbaijani

exclave of Nakhchivan (known for its vulnerability) on possible military

intervention on Azerbaijan’s side caused great tension. Russian Minister of

Defence Grachev, in a number of statements, hinted that Turkey would face

Russia in the case of military intervention in the conflict (Trenin 1996: 91).Russian objection to the construction of a pipeline via Turkish territory to

transport the energy resources of the Caspian Sea to Western markets was,

however, not as harsh as in the Mountainous Karabakh conflict. Having

secured a dominant position in the peace processes in all three conflicts in the

Caucasus, the Kremlin ignored the importance of the pipeline and the

integrative role it might play in the future between Turkey and the littoral

states of the Caspian Sea. In 2007, Russia managed to secure various

agreements on the transportation of oil and gas from both Kazakhstan and

Turkmenistan. However, both countries have expressed an interest in using the

newer oil and gas pipelines (Kazakhstan is already transporting its crude oil via

the Baku-Tbilisi-Jeyhan pipeline) linking the Caspian Sea with the Mediterra-

nean via Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.

Iran

Russia has not regarded Iran as a rival and has cooperated with it on a number of

questions in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The existence of large numbers of

Azeris in Iran and Azerbaijan’s religious-cultural similarity with the latter was a

cause for concern in the Kremlin in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of

the Soviet Union. However, the course of the political relations between Iran and

Azerbaijan later showed that a political and cultural rapprochement was not

possible. Both Iran and Russia have shared the interest of minimising the

US presence in the region, and Tehran has counted on Russian support for its

position on the delimitation of the Caspian Sea. Iran has also benefited from a

trilateral cooperation with Russia and Armenia. Particularly during the Elcibey

government, and also during the early years of the Heydar Aliev government, Iran

developed common interests with Russia vis-a-vis Azerbaijan. Tehran has been

sceptical to economic and political developments in Baku and has, until recently,

had no desire for a fully sovereign, democratic Azerbaijan. Thus, unlike Turkey,

Iran has not influenced the shaping of Russian policies towards the region.

The European Union

Like the USA, the EU has also made energy security a priority in the region. The

EU’s policies have been less affected by identity since the EU does not regard the

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Caucasus as part of the ‘real Europe’. Within the last few years, the EU has been

more actively engaged in the peace processes within the Caucasus and has

created the post of a Special Representative for the South Caucasus and

included the region in the European Neighbourhood Policy.There has been a conflict of interests between the EU and Russia on the

transportation of oil and gas from the Caspian Sea. The EU has tried to

convince Turkmenistan to join the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, which

might reduce the EU’s dependence on Russia for gas deliveries. A number of

new EU member states, such as the Baltic States, Poland and the Czech

Republic, have stressed Georgia’s unresolved conflicts on the EU�Russian

agenda.

Coherence of interests and foreign policy instruments

Russian interests

Russian interests in the South Caucasus can be summarised as follows:

guaranteeing its exclusive military and political presence in the area; the

avoidance of a NATO presence in the area; restricting Western intrusions; the

disturbance of regional cooperation; and the use of the warm-water Black Sea

port in Abkhazia. The Russian intent to prevent energy projects in the Caspian

Sea no longer exists, since the littoral states are not in a position to cancel or

alter existing projects, even if they were persuaded to do so by Russia.

Exclusive military and political presence in the region

Since 1991, Russia has constantly sought allies in the South Caucasus and these

have been the de facto states, through which Russia has guaranteed its presence

in the region. The continued Kremlin pressure for military and political presence

in the South Caucasus has both internal political and foreign policy dimensions.

Concerning domestic politics, Russian presence in the area is necessitated by its

perception of the South Caucasus threatening the North Caucasus. Since the

break-up of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin has viewed the Caucasus as a single

region with a high level of security interconnectedness. Therefore, at any signs

of the escalation of conflict, Russia has made it clear that it cannot afford

instability near its southern borders. In this context, there is a strong belief in

the Kremlin that any military conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia could

destabilise the North Caucasus and pose threats to Russian statehood.There is no doubt that a Georgian military intervention in Abkhazia and

South Ossetia would raise the concerns of the North Caucasian peoples, and

both regions would receive volunteer fighters, causing a spillover effect of

conflict to the Russian North Caucasus. A spillover effect in the case of

Mountainous Karabakh is not real, but imagined. The only undesirable effect

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of a resumption of military operations in Karabakh would be the involvement

of Russia, and possibly Turkey and other states, in the conflict.The concept of a spillover effect in the Caucasus has, however, also been

instrumentalised. It should be clearly noted that Russia is still the relevant

power in the South Caucasus and still has certain resources to influence the

security-political developments in the region.3 Hence, Russia could substantially

accelerate the peace process in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia if it was

actually concerned about a spillover of conflict from the South to the North. As

the elections in Abkhazia demonstrated, Russia expressed no intention of

encouraging the instalment of a neutral or liberal government in Sukhumi that

would be willing to share sovereignty with Tbilisi.3

Balance of power

For obvious reasons, the parent states in the South Caucasus cannot wage a

blitzkrieg against the secessionist regions, so any military intervention will be

long-lasting. In this context, Russian support for Abkhazia and South Ossetia

serves the purpose of balancing power against Georgia. As long as there is a

military balance of power between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the one hand,

and Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Georgia on the other, a resumption of military

operations between them is not a real threat, and it is also clear that the

secessionist regions will surely not accept any reintegration to the parent state in

the current circumstances. Thus, it is quite obvious that Russia prefers a

situation of controlled instability in the South Caucasus rather than long-term

stability for the region.

Restriction of Western intrusion and NATO presence

Russia’s interest to keep NATO and the West out of its regional shell is related

to its self-image as a great power. Speaking at the influential Russian think tank,

the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, in 2007, the Russian Minister for

Foreign Affairs, Lavrov, accused the USA of ‘playing games’ in the CIS, saying:

‘one should inform our Western partners that attempts to contain Russia in her

regional ‘‘shell’’ are hopeless’ (Yasmann 2007). That and other statements from

the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the presidential administration indicate

that Russia still perceives the West (perceived in Russian thinking in its old

format) as an enemy and continues to think in terms of the old power politics of

the cold war era. Since the states to its south share the regional complex, any

Western presence would disturb Russia’s status as a great power. Therefore, the

Kremlin insists that the states to its south should agree their foreign policies,

with respect to the West, with Russia.In particular, Russia has expressed its will for a neutral Georgia to its south

and has tried to persuade the Georgian administration to give up its entry into

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NATO (Corso 2007). In 2004, in the course of the negotiations between

Georgia and Russia on the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia,

Russia demanded guarantees from Georgia that its withdrawal would not be

accompanied by a third state’s military presence.

Instruments of foreign policy

Russian policies in the South Caucasus have strengthened the alignment efforts

of Georgia and Azerbaijan, pushed Georgia further towards NATO member-

ship and led to the closure of Russia’s two remaining military bases in Georgia.

In fact, Georgia’s NATO application and rapprochement with the West was the

result of Tbilisi’s discontent with Moscow’s support for Abkhazia and South

Ossetia, and search for alternative alliances to balance Russian power in the

region. The question then arises as to whether Russia’s interests are reconcilable

with those of Georgia. In other words, what would Russia offer Georgia for a

potential withdrawal of the latter from NATO membership and partnership

with the USA?Georgia’s NATO application pursues the purpose of guaranteeing the

country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity through membership of the

alliance. Therefore, Georgia would only withdraw from NATO membership

if Russia helped it restore sovereignty over the breakaway regions. Whether

Russia has the resources to assist Georgia to subdue Abkhazia and South

Ossetia is another question.Meanwhile, it seems that the existence of the ethno-territorial conflicts in

Georgia assures its exclusion from NATO, since the alliance would not be

prepared to allow Tbilisi to join when the ethno-territorial conflicts are not

close to a resolution. Georgia’s NATO membership would be interpreted by the

Kremlin as a NATO attempt to assist Georgia to restore its sovereignty over the

breakaway regions. The conflicts are important instruments used in Russia’s

attempts to keep NATO out of the region and to prevent any form of regional

cooperation.It is evident that Russia is in no position to pressure Abkhazia to accept

Georgian sovereignty. If Russia could not pressure it to repatriate Georgian

refugees in 1994, now that Abkhazia has substantially secured its statehood, the

Kremlin would not be able to afford such a policy (Lakoba 2001: 37). It is

worth stating that Abkhazian society and its elite maintain a hard position

towards Abkhazia’s reintegration into Georgia and would resist any such

attempts with force.The situation is slightly different for South Ossetia whose elite and society’s

stance towards Georgia is not as dogmatic (Trenin 2006: 18). South Ossetia

depends heavily on Russia, and continues to communicate with Tbilisi. Russia

could use its assistance in the resolution of the conflict as a resource to offer

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Georgia a potential for a rapprochement of the two and as an incentive for

Tbilisi to give up its application for NATO membership.As to the Mountainous Karabakh conflict, Russia has few resources to resolve

the conflict and its resolution might harm its own interests in the region.

Pressuring Armenia and the Mountainous Karabakh de facto authorities to

resolve the conflict would change the balance of power between the conflict

parties in the region and induce Armenia to renege on Russia and seek new

alliances. Such a move would ruin Russia’s close alliance with Yerevan (Russia’s

most loyal ally in the CIS), whose military ability and economy are heavily

dependent upon Russian aid. If Russia lost Armenia as a partner, it would gain

Azerbaijan. That situation, however, would not be so advantageous to Russia;

Azerbaijan is unlikely to cooperate with Russia on the exploration of the

Caspian fossil-fuel reserves or on pipeline routes, and would seem unlikely to

host Russian military bases on its soil.The Baku-Tbilisi-Jeyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum oil and gas pipelines

might threaten Russia’s energy monopoly in Europe as both pipelines would

gain greater importance if Kazakh and Turkmen gas and oil join the route.

Turkmenistan has the fifth largest gas reserves in the world.Russia does not have viable economic interests in Abkhazia and as long as the

region’s political status and property rights are not resolved, it is unlikely to

fully use Sukhumi port. Obviously, the Kremlin’s long-term economic interests

are undermined by its political and security policies. By supporting Abkhazia’s

de facto independence and South Ossetia’s requests for reunification with North

Ossetia, the Kremlin neglected the threat of separatism in the North Caucasus.

Particularly after Putin’s victory in the Chechen campaign, Russia has felt secure

enough to speak in favour of complete secession of the de facto regimes in the

South Caucasus. Considering that Chechnya and Dagestan still remain

vulnerable regions, the unification of the two Ossetias, and Abkhazia’s and

Karabakh’s secession from the parent states might destabilise the North

Caucasus in the future.4

Brief comparison with the policies towards Kazakhstan

Russian policies in Central Asia have substantially differed from its policies in

the South Caucasus. Its security interests have not been as pressing as in the

South Caucasus and economic policies have been more dominant. Its security-

political presence has been guaranteed by the CST, of which all Central Asian

states, except for Turkmenistan, are members. Numerous factors have played a

role in the rapprochement of Central Asian states with Russia. In the case of

Kazakhstan, identity has played a big role and produced political consequences

for interstate relations. Kazakhstan, with its large ethnic Russian population,

has not vied for ethnic nationalism or adopted an anti-Russian stance since

gaining independence. Russia has been regarded positively both at the elite and

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societal levels in Astana, and the Russian language has remained as the state and

dominant language. In its multilateral foreign policy, Kazakhstan, cooperating

both with China and the USA, has made partnership with Russia a priority.

Astana has joined the Baku-Tbilisi-Jeyhan pipeline, but has also agreed to use

the existing Russian pipeline.

Russia’s leeway: the possession of soft power

One important manifestation of Russian great power status is that it only

applies security-political and military, and to a much lesser extent economic

power when it wishes to cause changes in policies in places in its sphere of

interest. At a time of intensive globalisation, as democracy is identified with

economic prosperity, and the growing importance of human resources, capital

investment and technological innovation have become attractive sources of soft

power. However, Russia’s major policy instruments in the region still revolve

around hard power (Hill 2006; Nye 2005: 1�33; Popescu 2006b; Tsygankov

2006). For example, an empire like the USA, with its enormous military and

economic potential, applies soft power as well as hard power to achieve its

goals. The USA uses democracy as a banner for its taxpayers and the

international community to justify unpopular policies, such as the intervention

in Iraq or supporting opposition groups. Only in the nineteenth century, when

Russia completed its colonisation of the Caucasus, did Moscow undertake a

policy of power consolidation in the region. Then it deployed military-political

means as well as instruments of soft power, such as the dissemination of the

values of European enlightenment. The Russian language and its literature were

privileged as a means of communication with enlightened Europe. Later, when

communism was firmly established, Russia became the centre of the ‘correct’

political ideology for these states. Unlike the early USSR expansionist period,

Russia, after the break-up of the Soviet Union, aimed at restoring its lost

influence and has concentrated solely on military-political and economic

pressure to solve problems. Only recently, following the non-violent revolutions

in Georgia, the Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, have Russian politicians come to

realise that there is a lack of ideology in Russian foreign policy. More recently,

Russia has tried to make use of its migrant labour force from the Caucasus

states, Russian schools in the region as well as the dissemination of its popular

culture as instruments of soft power (Hill 2006: 2). However, unlike the Soviet

Union, Russia has neither a particularly strong ideology nor an attractive

political system to use as soft power. The terms ‘pluralist democracy’ and ‘free

market economy’ are phrases coined by the West and even Russian popular

culture (including software and DVDs) includes Western elements. Further,

Russia’s policies towards Georgia and, to a lesser extent, Azerbaijan (where the

elite is Russian-speaking) have critically undermined the development of any

Russian soft power, implying that as long as hard power is negative, soft power

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will not evolve. As Russia hardened its stance towards Georgia by adopting

regulations leading to the deportation of Georgian migrant workers, it became

obvious how restricted Russia’s soft power potential is.

Conclusion

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has had difficulty recognising the

sovereignty of the three states of the Caucasus. The tensions which have arisen

because of the differences between the scenario for the South Caucasus which

Russia desires and the scenario which the states themselves prefer can be

explained by the fact that Russia simply lacks experience in dealing with an

independent South Caucasus. The policies Russia has used to restore control

over the South Caucasus have been destructive not only for the states

concerned, but also for the Kremlin, because they have produced an opposite

effect. The harder Russia has pressured the states, the more resistant they have

become. Its policies have led to the closure of the two remaining military bases

in Georgia and, as soon as the Karabakh conflict is resolved, the last Russian

military bases in the South Caucasus will leave Armenian territory. The biased

Russian stance on the Karabakh conflict has led to rising mistrust of Moscow in

Azerbaijan and caused it to seek alternative allies to balance Russia’s partiality.This article raised the question of whether Russian policies in the South

Caucasus matched its strategic interests in the region. Based on the argument that

Russia in fact has an interest in the continuation of the frozen conflicts in the

region, the conclusion is that Russian policies have been carefully designed to suit

its short-term interests. Russian policy as an instrument of support for

secessionist regimes and its purchase of assets in Armenia cannot be regarded

as serving its long-term interests. Any form of instability, whether it is long or

short term, especially in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, can harm Russia’s internal

and external interests. It is obvious that the conflicts, in particular the

Mountainous Karabakh conflict, cannot remain frozen for an indefinite period,

and that both Azerbaijan and Georgia are investing heavily in the military sector,

with Azerbaijan seriously considering military intervention. The ethno-territorial

conflicts in the region cannot remain long-term policy instruments and any

instability in the region would be deemed to involve Russia.However, currently, Russia seems to benefit from the existence of ‘controlled

instability’ in the region in a number of ways. The Karabakh conflict guarantees

Russia’s military presence in the region. Russia’s military alliance with Armenia

guarantees a balance of power between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and makes it

difficult for Azerbaijan to use force to resolve the Karabakh dispute. Russia

provides tacit support to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, has established a balance

of power and hindered a Georgian military solution to the secessionist problem,

and further impeded Georgia’s accession to NATO (assuming that NATO

would not accept a conflict-driven Georgia). Consequently, Russia’s policies

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have led to the closure of Russian military bases in Georgia and pushed Georgia

and Azerbaijan into seeking NATO membership. If the situation remains the

same for another decade or two, then Russia’s policies will have been effective

but, if the contrary occurs, then Russian influence over the region will be

seriously compromised. And since Russia has no interest in incorporating

Abkhazia and South Ossetia or recognising their independence (this would

cause Russia’s isolation both in the CIS and globally), the current situation is

temporary.Instead of pursing the policy of coercive hegemony, Russia could pursue a

cooperative hegemony in the region and try to create a unity with the countries

of the South Caucasus. Having said this, Russia’s own resources at this stage are

not unlimited concerning the reconciliation of the secessionist regions and their

parent states. Russia could start the process by taking constructive steps to

appease both sides, through an internationalisation of the peacekeeping forces

in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and pressing Tbilisi to offer a wider autonomy

for South Ossetia. Russia and the EU could act as guarantors for the process.For the Mountainous Karabakh conflict, Russia could do more to soften the

province’s stance towards Azerbaijan, such as the release to Azerbaijan of the

buffer zone outside Mountainous Karabakh, the occupation of which has

caused the migration of a large number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in

Azerbaijan, and therefore hardens the Azeri society’s position on the issue.

Notes

1. The concept of Derzhava implies a multi-ethnic state which can influence the system of

international relations through its military-political potential.

2. The concepts of relevant and relative power can be summarised as follows: relevant power is

the one that is not necessarily powerful in international politics, but has a large number of

tools to influence the security-political and economic processes within a region; relative power

is the one that has the relative economic and military power in international politics, but its

power is not directly relevant to the security-political and economic needs of a region. In the

case of the South Caucasus*/Russia being the relevant power and the USA the relative

power*/many strategic problems in the region can only be resolved by the Kremlin’s

mediation or consent.

3. At the presidential elections in Abkhazia in October 2004, Russia sought the election of

Khadjimba, who had demonstrated loyalty to the Kremlin, and did not favour Sergei Bagapsh,

who had promised to pursue an independent policy towards Russia in his election campaign.

Russia used economic levers against Abkhazia to include the Kremlin-loyal Khadjimba in the

government. The Russian border with Abkhazia along the Psou River was closed and rail and

bus connections were cancelled, all of which was carried out with the consent of North

Caucasus regional governments. For an account of Russia’s stance towards the Abkhazian

elections, see Antonenko (2005: 258�68) and Socor (2004).

4. Taking into consideration that Chechnya is run by an authoritarian leader, Ramzan Kadyrov,

who places Chechen interests above everything else and who says he has sworn loyalty to

President Putin and not his successor, and the fact that Chechnya still holds a tremendous

number of fighters, Chechnya’s loyalty to Russia is not fixed.

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