Download - Participant descriptions of guilt and shame
Motivation and Emotion, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1983
Participant Descriptions of Guilt and Shame 1
Frank W. Wicker, 2 Glen C. Payne, and Randall D. Morgan The University o f Texas at Austin
The purpose o f this research was to see i f naive raters could distinguish between guilt and shame in ways consistent with the descriptions o f emotion theorists. In two studies, 152 participants recalled occasions on which they had experienced guilt or shame and rated these experiences on a large number o f scales that represented either basic dimensions o f emotion or attributes previously postulated to differentiate between these two emotions. Shame and guilt situations differed on a number o f attributes, including felt powerfulness, self-control, self-consciousness and exposure, activity, inferiority, surprise, alienation from others, facial sensation, self- attribution o f justice, and expectation o f punishment. Many commonalities in the meaning o f the two concepts were also suggested, most importantly in terms o f basic attributes such as pain, tension, and arousal. Results were consistent with several previous accounts o f the essential differences between guilt and shame, but not with all such descriptions.
In this research we were concerned, first, with attempts to establish criteria for differentiating the emotions of guilt and shame. The issue is relevant for mental health professionals. It has been claimed that a clear differentiation of these two terms could greatly facilitate our understanding of the dynamics of neurotic symptoms as well as of general emotional development (Lewis, 1971; Piers & Singer, 1953). A second concern of this research was with whether "naive" raters would distinguish between guilt and shame in the same ways as the professionals who have written on this distinction.
1The authors would like to thank Maria Emanuele, Sang Min Lee, Joe Kahler, and Frank Lambert for their assistance with this study.
2Address all correspondence to Frank W. Wicker, Department of Educational Psychology, University of Texas, Austin, Texas 78712.
25
0146-7239/83/0300-0025503,00/0 © 1983 Plenum Publishing Corporation
26 Wicker, Payne, and Morgan
Achieving precise, agreed-upon definitions is one of the difficult on- going tasks for emotion theorists. Over the years there has been consider- able disagreement about the meaning of emotion terms, and guilt and shame have not been exceptions. Some authors appear to have used the two terms almost interchangeably, others have treated them as but different aspects of the same underlying emotion, while others have taken pains to pinpoint what they see as the essential differences between them (Izard, 1977).
Many differences have been proposed. There has been some overlap of opinion among theorists, even though agreement is by no means universal. In general, guilt is said to follow from acts that violate ethical norms, principles of justice, feelings of responsibility, religious codes, or moral values, whereas shame follows from acts that lack propriety, appropriateness, or adequacy. Piers and Singer (1953) proposed that violations of the limits of the superego produce guilt, whereas failure to live up to the ego ideal produces shame. The two emotions are then opposite in the sense that in one case (shame) a goal is not reached, while in the other case (guilt) a boundary is exceeded.
Somewhat suprisingly, it has been argued that shame is the stronger emotion, perhaps because ego ideals can be more basic or powerful than the prohibitions of conscience (Lynd, 1958). Lynd asserts that shame is more likely to be a diffuse feeling involving the whole self, even though the occasion for shame may appear slight to the unemotional observer: "Men blush for their crimes much less than for their weaknesses or vanity. "3 Shame is said to be a greater threat to self-esteem and personal identity (e.g., Izard, 1977; Lynd, 1958). Pride is therefore "the shield against shame" (Tomkins, 1963, p. 133).
Numerous proposals imply that shame is more overpowering or inca- pacitating. It is incongruous, surprising, and bewildering (Lynd, 1958); it causes one to lose control, to feel powerless and externally controlled (Erikson, 1963); it destroys our ability to think logically and act efficiently (Darwin, 1872; Lewis, 1979); it destroys our trust in ourselves and everything else (Lynd, 1958). The "objective" character of guilt, on the other hand, and the accompanying feeling of personal responsibility, should lead to active, self-controlled attempts to restore or make amends.
Likewise, it is claimed that shame will be more often accompanied by heightened self-consciousness, self-imaging, and a "sense of exposure" (e.g., Erikson, 1963; Lewis, 1971). This self-consciousness is described as a two-edged sword: It involves (1) greater focus on the self 4 but also (2)
3Quoted by Lynd from Pere Goriot, by Honore de Balzac. 4Lewis (t971) argued that the direct object of shame is the self, whereas the direct object
of guilt is the thing done.
Ratings of Guilt and Shame 27
greater concern with "others" who are observing and evaluating. In support of point 2, Lewis (1979) emphasized the dependency of shame on caring for the evaluating other and on "the vicarious experiences of other's negative evaluations" (p. 381). To Ausubel (1955) shame may be a component of guilt involving external sanctions and evaluations rather then independent self-reactions. Sartre (1956) proposed that the way one appears in the eyes of others is more basic to shame than the way one appears in one's own eyes. There is some disagreement, however, about whether such other- orientation is more characteristic of shame than of guilt. Lynd (1958) stated that it is the exposure of oneself to oneself that is crucial in shame; Rawls (1963) argued that closeness to others intensifies guilt too; and De Rivera (1977) proposed that guilt and shame are both reactions to an implicit other. Piers and Singer (1953) maintained that shame may be internalized and guilt may have an implicit audience.
If closeness to others is a more important antecedent of shame, it is possible that alienation from others is a more likely consequence of the pain that comes from exposure to their negative evaluation. Thus, shame may be more of an isolating experience (e.g., Lynd).
Corresponding to these differences are differences in the predicted consequences of the two emotions. With guilt one expects punishment and attempts to get forgiveness, to restore prior relationships, to confess, to atone. With shame one expects abandonment and attempts to change the self, to hide, or to run away (Morris, 1971).
Several authors have suggested that guilt is more long-lasting, because it does not subside until reconcilation, because it may be followed by laborious attempts to sort out the ethical issues involved, and because it may be sustained by unconscious gratification from the implicit self- statement "I am still a good person because I feel guilty about what I did" (e.g., Lewis, 1979).
Kemper (1978) discussed emotions in terms of a model emphasizing felt power and felt status. One of his suggestions is that guilt tends to occur when one senses that one has too much power, and shame occurs when one senses excess status.
Differences related to bodily expression and bodily awareness have been proposed. It is said that one blushes in shame and feels a hot face, but the guilty face is heavy. There is a greater bodily awareness in shame and less distinctive facial expression in guilt (Izard, 1977).
P R E S E N T S T U D Y
The present study was an attempt to get untrained observers to tell us whether the terms guilt and shame mean different things to them and to
28 Wicker, Payne, and Morgan
compare their descriptions to those in the literature. So stated, this appears to be asking too much of naive observers. The method employed in this study, however, is based on the assumption that "people usually find it easy to tell the difference between these two emotions in their personal experiences [even though] they may not find it easy to describe the differences" (Izard, 1977, p. 422). Participants were asked to recall a previous experience in which they had felt each of these emotions and to rate the experience on several scales. The scales were based on the hypothesized differences reviewed in the above introduction. Thus, subjects were required only to select and rate particular emotional experiences, but average ratings of the two types of experiences could then be compared? This approach is consistent with the prototype theory of concept forma- tion, the view that real-life concepts often "have fuzzy boundaries but ideal examples" (Wickelgren, 1979, p. 297). We assumed that even though our subjects could not give formal definitions of emotion concepts in terms of attributes and rules, they could recall representative exemplars or prototypes that could then be rated, one attribute at a time. Recalled prototypes should be ones that have much personal significance for them, so their ratings may be helpful in the search for a clear differentiation of guilt and shame.
E X P E R I M E N T 1
Method
Subjects. Thirty-one students of introductory educational psychology at the University of Texas at Austin participated in this study. Such par- ticipation was one of their options for meeting a research requirement in the introductory course.
Materials and Procedure. Subjects worked in groups of eight or fewer in a small laboratory room. Upon entering, they were given a rating booklet, which they were not required to sign. At the top of each page of the booklet was a noun indicative of an emotion. Six such nouns were presented in a randomly different order for each subject: Guilt, Shame, Fear, Anxiety, Hope, and Serenity. For each noun, subjects were asked to recall an event in their own experience and to write a brief description of that event in a space provided under the noun. If they felt uncomfortable about describing a particular event, they were allowed to write cryptic notes, write
5This approach is similar to use of the Differential Emotions Scale by Izard and his colleagues.
Ratings of Guilt and Shame 29
descriptions on a separate blank sheet that they could take away with them, or write nothing at all. Next, they rated the recalled experience on each of 34 9-point rating scales. Scales had been chosen in the attempt to represent feeling, evaluation, motivational-, and situational-appraisal aspects of emotion, and to reflect dimensions emphasized by the theoretical differentiations of guilt and shame discussed earlier. Ratings were given by checking one of nine spaces on bipolar scales. The scales, anchored by contrasting expressions such as I felt pain versus I felt pleasure, can be seen in Table I. It was emphasized that a neutral value on this underlying dimension was to be represented by the fifth space on the scale. If subjects could not recall an appropriate experience, they were asked to imagine one, and to rate all experiences on all of the scales. They were encouraged to work rapidly but accurately. Instructions also included an explanation of some of the more difficult scales.
For approximately half the subjects, scales were presented in the order given in Table I. The left-right orientation of anchoring points and the order of presentation of the scales were reversed for the other half.
Results
Table I gives means and standard deviations for Guilt and Shame on each scale. For descriptive purposes, a t test was computed to compare each mean to the constant neutral value of 5 (McNemar, 1955, pp. 107-108), and the resulting significance levels are indicated with each mean. F ratios for comparisons between Guilt means and Shame means are presented only where p < .10. Table I suggests more similarities than differences between the images evoked by these two nouns, but there are suggestive differences too. Both guilt and shame situations were judged as painful, tense, arousing but inhibiting, and novel but not imaginary, with a known cause. People felt they should be punished because they had done the wrong thing, even an unjust thing, and were not living up to their ideal. Although their lives had previously been going very well, they now felt conflicted, self- conscious, and lacking in self-confidence. With heavy faces they anticipated the frowns of others. Note, however, that even though both situations produced a self-conscious or "exposed" feeling, the shame situation produced it to a higher degree, along with a greater tendency to feel low power, low status, lack of control, and passivity (although raters expressed activity in the guilt situation more clearly than they expressed passivity in the shame situation). Two marginal differences, indicating greater sub- missiveness and less self-confidence with shame, are consistent with this general picture of greater helplessness in the shame situation. The two emotions were not different in terms of concern with other-evaluation
Tab
le I
. M
ean
Sco
res
for
Gu
ilt
and
Sh
ame
on
Eac
h S
cale
, S
igni
fica
nce
of
Dif
fere
nce
s fr
om
Neu
tral
Sco
re,
F an
d P
fo
r D
iffe
ren
ce
Bet
wee
n G
uil
t an
d S
ham
e M
ean
s, a
nd
Mea
ns
for
Ser
enit
y an
d H
op
e--E
xp
erim
ent
1
Gu
ilt
Sh
ame
Ser
enit
y
Ho
pe
Sca
le
Mea
n
SD
Mea
n
SD
F
p m
ean
m
ean
I fe
lt p
leas
ure
(vs.
pai
n)
2.68
b
1.81
2.
84 b
2.
18
8.52
6.
16
The
sit
uat
ion
was
fam
ilia
r (v
s. n
ovel
) 3.
29 b
2.
55
3.19
b
2.46
5.
23
4.84
T
he e
mo
tio
n b
egan
sud
denl
y (v
s. g
radu
ally
) 6.
48 b
2.
29
5.65
3.
04
4.10
4.
61
I fe
lt e
xtre
mel
y se
lf-c
on
fid
ent
and
cap
able
3.
77 ~
2.
63
2.65
b
1.96
3.
67
<
10
7,65
5.
74
(vs.
not
at a
ll)
I fe
lt t
ense
(vs,
rel
axed
) 8.
06 b
1.
29
7.94
~
.81
1.52
5.
74
My
face
was
not
at a
//h
ot
and
flu
shed
(vs
. ex
trem
ely)
4.
45
2.35
4.
61
2.38
7.
29
6,29
I
was
dom
inan
t (v
s. s
ubm
issi
ve)
5.23
2.
79
4.10
~
2.29
3.
69
<
10
4.71
4.
84
The
em
oti
on
last
ed a
sho
rt t
ime
(vs,
a l
ong
tim
e)
4.55
2.
78
3,32
" 2.
10
5.74
<
05
3.00
3.
13
I w
as m
ore
co
nce
rned
wit
h h
ow
oth
ers
view
edm
e (v
s. I
vi
ewed
mys
elJ)
5.
90
2.96
5.
90
2.83
3.
90
5.16
P
rio
r to
thi
s ev
ent,
thi
ngs
in m
y l
ife
had
bee
n g
oin
g
wel
l (vs
. poo
rly)
7,
58 b
1.
91
7.32
b
2.06
6.
90
7.48
I
felt
I d
id t
he
wro
ng t
hing
(vs
. ri
ght t
hing
) 7.
00 b
2.
34
7.00
b
2.11
2.
00
2.74
T
he e
mo
tio
n w
as c
ause
d m
ore
by
my
im
agin
atio
n (v
s.
thin
gs th
at a
ctua
lly
happ
ened
) 3.
16 b
2.
57
3.55
4 3.
04
3.94
3.
32
I w
as e
xper
ienc
ing
conf
lict
(vs
. no
con
flic
t)
7.81
b
1.80
7.
94 h
1.
84
2.68
5.
45
I fe
lt m
y s
tatu
s in
th
e si
tuat
ion
was
too
tow
(vs
. to
o hi
gh)
4.90
2.
15
5,74
2.
08
3.89
=
05
4.26
4.
68
My
acti
on
was
ina
ppro
pria
te to
th
e si
tuat
ion
(vs
. ap
prop
riat
e)
5.00
2.
89
5.52
2.
91
1.84
1.
97
Th
e ca
use
of
the
emo
tio
n w
as u
nkno
wn
to m
e (v
s. k
now
n)
2.06
b
1.55
I
tho
ug
ht
I w
ould
be
puni
shed
(vs
, aba
ndon
ed)
4.97
2.
40
I th
ou
gh
t I
shou
ld b
epun
ishe
d (v
s. a
band
oned
) 6.
55 b
1.
79
I w
ante
d t
o hi
de (
vs.
mak
e re
stit
utio
n)
5.26
3,
17
I th
ou
gh
t o
ther
s w
ould
fro
wn
(vs
. la
ugh)
7.
06"
2.29
I
was
sur
pris
ed (v
s. n
ot s
urpr
ised
) 4.
84
2.63
I
felt
ext
rem
ely
self
-co
nsc
iou
s o
r ex
po
sed
(vs
. no
t at
all
) 6.
29"
2.75
t
felt
my
po
wer
in t
he
situ
atio
n w
as t
oo l
ittl
e (v
s. t
oo
muc
h)
4.97
2.
52
I fe
lt n
ot in
hibi
ted
(vs.
inh
ibit
ed)
3.45
b
2,05
I
wan
ted
to
rew
ard
othe
rs (
vs. p
unis
h ot
hers
) 4.
61
1.67
I
felt
, ex
trem
ely,
I h
ad d
on
e an
un
just
th
ing
(vs
. no
t at
all
) 7.
42 b
1.
98
I w
as c
on
cern
ed w
ith
the
futu
re (
vs,
the
pres
ent)
5.
19
3.07
I
was
act
ive
(vs.
pas
sive
) 6.
42 b
2,
54
My
fac
e fe
lt n
ot a
t all
hea
vy
(vs
. ex
trem
ely)
3.
68 b
1.
96
Th
e si
tuat
ion
was
am
bigu
ous
(unc
erta
in)
(vs.
cle
ar)
4.10
2.
94
I fe
lt I
was
not
al a
ll li
ving
up
to
my
ide
al s
elf
(vs.
ex
trem
ely)
7.
77 b
2.
04
I w
as n
ot in
con
trol
(vs.
in
cont
rol)
5.
32
2.75
I
felt
cal
m (
vs.
arou
sed)
2.
94 b
2.
25
Oth
ers
wer
e ap
proa
chin
g m
e (v
s. a
void
ing
me)
6,
16 b
2.
24
2.23
b
4.90
6.
00 a
5.87
7.
52 b
5.
55
7.61
a
6.19
" 3.
13 ~
3.
74 b
6.45
b
4.39
4.
74
3.71
b
5.07
7.74
b
6.94
b
2.84
b
5.45
2.04
2,
71
2.05
3.
41
2,05
2.
72
1.65
2.48
2.
22
1,63
2.67
2.
89
2.35
2.
08
2.95
1.95
1.
97
1.85
2.
55
6.14
4.93
4.66
9.96
2.70
7.62
< 0
5
< 0
5
< 0
5
<0
1
<
10
<0
1
2.32
4.
71
4.87
4.
19
4.71
4.
19
3.13
4.74
7.
55
6.81
1.71
4.
19
4.45
7.
68
2.13
2,58
2.
39
7.35
5.
74
1,77
4.
77
5.13
4.
42
5.00
4,
87
4.48
6.23
5.
71
6,71
2.74
6.
32
6.19
5.
58
4.55
3.45
4.
42
4.39
6,
52
m"
~p <
.0
5.
~p <
.Ol.
~aa
32 Wicker, Payne, and Morgan
versus self-evaluation of the self. The only indication of a difference in interpersonal orientation is that shame produced a greater desire to punish others. Finally, it was found that shame lasted longer than guilt.
Table I also contains the means for Serenity and Hope ratings, which appear to support the conceptual validity of the instrument by showing an expected pattern. Note that Serenity (and sometimes, to a lesser degree, Hope) contrasts with both Guilt and Shame in that subjects felt calm and relaxed pleasure and self-confidence. They felt they were living up to their ideal self, not that they had done a wrong or unjust thing, and they did not suffer from self-consciousness, conflict, or inhibition. Fear and Anxiety ratings are not presented here, but can be found in Wicker and Payne (submitted for publication).
E X P E R I M E N T 2
Experiment 1 was essentially exploratory. The small number of subjects employed, which was less than the number of scales, limited the power of that study to detect real differences, and limited the appropriat- ness of multivariate analysis. Several steps were taken to increase sensitivity in Experiment 2, including a considerable increase in the number of obser- vations per cell.
Method
Subjects. Participants were 121 students of introductory educational psychology at the University of Texas at Austin.
Materials and Procedure. The settings, booklets, and procedure of this study were similiar to those of the previous one. Only Shame and Guilt were presented in the booklets this time, however, and subjects were asked to recall situations that were relatively pure examples of each one, independent of the other one, before rating each situation on 34 scales. This procedure was repeated over three trials, so each subject rated three guilt situations and three shame situations in all.
The set of scales for this study overlaps only partially with that of experiment 1 (see Table II). A few scales were dropped from the first list, a few were modified in the attempt to clarify their meaning, and a few new scales were added in the attempt to capture distinctions proposed by previous theorists that were not captured by the first list. For example, the scale "I was unhappy with myself in general (vs. only with my behavior)" was inspired by the claim that shame is about the self while guilt is about the thing done. "A short written description of why I felt uncomfortable would
Ratings of Guilt and Shame 33
be easy (vs. difficult)" was suggested by the view that shame is more "wordless' and guilt a more articulated experience (Lewis, 1971).
Instructions for this study were given in writing as well as orally. One subject was randomly discarded for analysis, leaving 60 with each order of presentation.
Results'
Again, much similarity between the two emotions is suggested in Table II: Both involve negative self-evaluation and are painful, tense, agitating, real, present, and depressing. 6 With the more sensitive procedures of this study, however, differences between the two also became highly salient. There were significant differences on more than half of the scales. A Wilks's lambda of .53 was obtained with the MANOVA for the guilt versus shame variable (F(34, 85) = 2.23, p < .01). Univariate F's for which p < .10 are shown in Table II. It can be seen that all significant differences at p < . 10 in Experiment 1 were replicated at p < .05, except one: In Experiment 2 the two emotions did not differ in duration. In addition, several significant differences were found in Experiment 2 that had not been obtained in Experiment 1: Shame scored higher on desire to hide, hot and flushed face, and surprise, while guik implicated more unjust behavior and expectation of punishment. The scales used only in Experiment 2 also produced several dif- ferences in expected directions: Expectation of laughter, feelings of rejection, inferiority, and competition were all greater with shame than with guilt. The MANOVA showed an effect of trials or repetitions, Wilks's Lambda = .55 (F(68,406) = 2.10, p < .01), but trials did not interact with treatment. The last column of Table II shows all univariate P s for trials with p < .05. Trends of means over trials suggest that raters recalled gradually less "potent" situations in later repetitions: In the first-recalled situations they felt more inferior, tense, generally unhappy with themselves, low in status, self-conscious, powerless, out-of-control, and agitated than in those rated later. It is as if subjects became more reluctant over time to recall traumatic events, or used their most memorable examples on early trials. Consistent with either view, later-reported emotions were also more likely to involve imaginary sources, correct behavior, low activity, and brevity. It should be noted, however, that analysis of trial 1 data alone tended to give smaller F's than with the combined data, and basically similar patterns.
6Significance levels for differences from the neutral point are not presented in Table II. It can be seen that most of them would be significant with the large numbers of observations in Experiment 2.
Tab
le I
I. M
eans
and
Sta
ndar
d D
evia
tion
s fo
r G
uilt
an
d S
ham
e on
Eac
h S
cale
, F
and
P fo
r G
uil
t-sh
ame
Co
mp
aris
on
s, a
nd F
fo
r th
e T
rial
s E
ffec
t-E
xp
erim
ent
2
Gui
lt
Sh
ame
Tri
als
Sca
le
Mea
n
SD
M
ean
S
D
F
p F
I fe
lt p
leas
ure
(vs.
pai
n)
3.55
2.
12
3.48
2.
22
In c
ompa
riso
n to
oth
ers
I fe
lt i
nfer
ior
(vs.
sup
erio
r)
5.96
2.
21
6.40
2.
24
7.03
<
.01
6.35
T
he e
mot
ion
bega
n su
dden
ly (
vs. g
radu
ally
) 5.
09
2.79
5.
34
2.83
I
felt
ext
rem
ely
self
-con
fide
nt a
nd
cap
able
(vs
. n
ot
at a
ll)
4.06
2.
34
3.60
2.
22
7.95
<
.01
I fe
lt t
ense
(vs
. re
laxe
d)
6.70
2.
33
6.96
2.
21
14.2
9 M
y fa
ce w
as n
ot a
t all
hot
and
flu
shed
(vs
. ex
trem
ely)
5.
20
2.73
4.
39
2.64
14
.72
< .0
01
t w
as d
omin
ant
(vs.
sub
mis
sive
) 4.
97
2.45
4.
22
2.50
16
.12
< .0
01
The
em
otio
n la
sted
a s
hort
tim
e (v
s. a
lon
g ti
me)
4.
31
2.52
4.
22
2.57
4.
19
I w
as m
ore
con
cern
ed w
ith
ho
w o
ther
s vi
ewed
me
(vs.
ho
w
lvie
wed
mys
elJ)
5.
52
2.83
5.
59
2.91
I
was
un
hap
py
wit
h m
ysel
f in
gene
ral
(vs.
onl
y w
ith
my
beha
vior
) 5.
07
2.91
4.
94
3.02
3.
90
Aft
er t
his
even
t I
felt
not
at
all d
epre
ssed
(vs
. ex
trem
ely)
3.
77
2.28
3.
64
2.16
T
he
emot
ion
was
cau
sed
mo
re b
y m
y i
mag
inat
ion
(vs.
thi
ngs
that
act
uall
y ha
ppen
ed)
3.42
2.
62
3.41
2.
52
3.54
A
sho
rt w
ritt
en d
escr
ipti
on o
f w
hy I
fel
t u
nco
mfo
rtab
le
wou
ld b
e ea
sy (
vs.
diff
icul
t)
5.66
2.
79
5.37
2.
88
I fe
lt m
y st
atus
in
the
situ
atio
n w
as t
oo l
ow (
vs.
too
hig
h)
5.15
2.
15
5.58
2.
35
7.17
<
.01
4.54
M
y ac
tion
was
ina
ppro
pria
te
to t
he s
itua
tion
(vs
. ap
prop
riat
e)
5.28
2.
67
5.21
2.
75
In t
his
situ
atio
n m
y a
tten
tion
was
sca
tter
ed a
nd d
istr
acte
d (v
s. fo
cuse
d an
d co
ncen
trat
ed)
4.72
2.
75
5.07
2.
82
2,84
<
.10
I w
as f
eeli
ng c
oope
rati
ve (
vs.
com
peti
tive
) 4,
81
2.33
4,
48
2,27
3.
55
'--.
05
I th
ough
t I
wou
ld b
epun
ishe
d (v
s. a
band
oned
) 5.
84
2.16
5,
41
2.20
6.
58
< .0
5 I
wan
ted
to h
ide
(vs.
mak
e re
stit
utio
n)
4.96
2.
84
5.71
2.
90
9.86
<
.01
I th
ough
t ot
hers
wou
ld l
augh
ext
rem
ely
(vs.
not
at a
ll)
3.99
2.
47
4.85
2.
70
25.7
5 <
.001
I
was
not
sur
pris
ed (v
s. s
urpr
ised
) 4.
74
2,54
4.
21
2.54
7,
07
< .0
1 I
felt
ext
rem
ely
self
-con
scio
us o
r "e
xpos
ed"
(vs.
not
at a
ll)
5.78
2.
47
6.61
2.
41
19.2
5 <
.001
3.
18
I fe
lt m
y po
wer
in
the
situ
atio
n w
as t
oo l
ittl
e (v
s. t
oo
muc
h)
5.22
2.
43
5.98
2.
45
16,8
0 <
.001
8.
86
I fe
lt n
ot i
nhib
ited
(vs.
inh
ibit
ed)
4.04
2.
32
3,52
2.
30
10.2
3 <
.01
I w
ante
d to
rew
ard
othe
rs (
vs. p
unis
h ot
hers
) 4.
80
1.78
4,
23
t,81
16
.85
< .0
01
I fe
lt,
extr
emel
y, I
had
don
e an
un
just
thi
ng (
vs.
not
at a
ll)
6.09
2.
48
5.56
2,
71
6.86
<
.01
I w
as c
once
rned
wit
h th
e fu
ture
(vs
, th
e pr
esen
t)
4.32
2,
96
4.39
2.
89
I w
as a
ctiv
e (v
s. p
assi
ve)
5.99
2.
65
5.52
2.
73
7.11
<
.01
4.68
N
egat
ive
eval
uati
on w
as c
omin
g m
ore
fro
m m
ysel
f(vs
. ot
hers
) 6.
05
2.82
5,
75
2.89
T
he s
itua
tion
was
am
bigu
ous
(unc
erta
in)
(vs.
cle
ar)
3.92
2.
68
4.29
2.
70
3,91
<
.05
I fe
lt I
was
exc
eedi
ng b
ound
arie
s o
f co
rrec
t be
havi
or n
ot
atal
l(vs
, ex
trem
ely)
3.
79
2.40
3.
98
2.53
3.
27
I w
as n
ot in
con
trol
(vs.
in
cont
rol)
4,
76
2.67
5.
39
2.62
8.
46
< .0
t 3.
23
My
bod
y fe
lt c
alm
(vs
, ag
itat
ed a
nd a
rous
ed)
3.64
2,
26
3,4I
2.
20
5.10
O
ther
s w
ere
reje
ctin
g m
e (v
s. a
ccep
ting
me)
4.
64
2.35
5.
20
2.27
11
,20
< .0
1
e~
36 Wicker, Payne, and Morgan
DISCUSSION
Results were compatible with a number of claims in the literature about how shame and guilt differ, but not with all of them.
Our subjects seemed to agree strongly with the view that shame is the more incapacitating or overpowering emotion (e.g., Lewis, 1979; Lynd, 1958). They were more active and felt greater control when guilty; they felt more submissive, inferior, inhibited, and lacking in status, power, and self- confidence when ashamed. With shame they appeared in general to be weaker, more helpless, and under the scrutiny and control of others. Perhaps the active, controlled quality of guilt is consistent with the metaphor of exceeding a boundary and the passive, helpless quality of shame is a correlate of failure to achieve a goal (Piers & Singer, 1953). These results are reminiscent of Erikson's (1963) statement, in a developmental context, that "shaming exploits an increasing sense of being small" (p. 253), and they document a sense in which shame can be said to be the greater threat to self-esteem. They also suggest a basis for the claim that shame is the "stronger" emotion, but it should be noted that our raters did not consider it stronger in terms of the degree of pain, tension, or arousal produced.
What can be said about the situation that produces the greater incapacity of shame? It is seen as more ambiguous and more surprising, both of which can increase the difficulty of reacting appropriately and adequately. Therefore, the resulting response may be a weak one such as "hiding" rather than an active purposeful one such as "making restitution."
There was also support for the claim that shame entails greater self- consciousness and feeling of exposure to the evaluative view of others (e.g., Lewis, 1971). In this sense shame could be said to be more oriented toward others than guilt, but there was no expressed difference in concern for other-evaluation versus evaluation by the self in either study. In this there is more agreement with theorists such as De Rivera (1977) and Rawls (1963), who argued that other-orientation is characteristic of guilt and shame, than with the many writers who argued that it is more characteristic of shame. The difference between the two emotions may lie in the extent to which one feels actively scrutinized by others and not in the attribution of importance to evaluation from them. Or it may lie only in objective self-awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972).
On the other hand, subjects did seem to express greater alienation from others when ashamed. They reported a greater desire to punish others, compete with them, or hide from them with shame. Other people were more likely to reject the raters, laugh at them, or abandon them. Apparently the incapacity that is associated with shame often comes at the hands of others. Therefore, the greater extrapunitiveness with shame may reflect a desire for
Ratings of Guilt and Shame 37
revenge, to rectify the power imbalance and/or return the pain received. Or perhaps this attitude is a defense to rationalize denial and protect self- esteem from the "prying" and negative evaluating tendencies of the other person. If so, it would appear that, even as they experienced shame, our subjects were working at defending themselves against it (Lewis, 1971). As Erikson says of the shamed person, "He would like to destroy the eyes of the world ''7 (1963, pp. 252-253). With guilt, these extrapunitive mechanisms may be either weaker or counterbalanced by the desire to make restitution to others. 8
The view that guilt is more tied to ethical and moral issues than shame was supported by differences on the "I had done an unjust thing" scale and on expectation of punishment in Experiment 2. Evidence for this difference was somewhat weak: It did not appear on "exceeding boundaries" or on any of the relevant scales of Experiment 1. The problem may have been simply that it was difficult to find wordings for scales that could not be interpreted in terms of transgressions of propriety or appropriateness as well as ethical transgressions. Thus, there is tentative evidence that raters felt a difference in salience of ethical values or principles of justice.
With the two scales directed at perceived physiological correlates of the emotions, one difference was found. The shamed face was remembered as more hot and flushed, which is consistent with the literature (Izard, 1977) and with the finding that more surprising, incapacitating, ego-threatening situations elicit shame. Use of more bodily oriented scales in future studies might reveal a fuller pattern of physiological differences.
Though our raters seemed to agree more than disagree with emotion theorists, they did not always agree. Consider, for example, the claim that guilt lasts longer than shame. Subjects reported the opposite difference in Experiment 1 and no difference in Experiment 2. They also did not agree with Kemper's (1978) association of guilt with excess power and shame with excess status. Power ratings were not above the neutral point with guilt, and shamed respondents reported a deficit of status. While the proposal that a feeling of excess status would produce shame seemed palusible, shamed subjects tended in fact to feel that they were getting less status than they deserved or wanted. This result, however, may reflect the defensive esteem-
7Such defensiveness might have masked a greater concern for the evaluations of others in shame situations, a point that should remind us o f the necessity for caution in interpreting rating data.
sOther interpretations can be offered o f course, but the ones that have come to the authors ' attention appear less compelling than those presented in the text. For example, it is possible that shame is more likely to follow the act o f punishing someone else (which is correlated with desire to punish) than is guilt. But it seems probable that guilt would be the more com- mon consequence.
38 Wicker, Payne, and Morgan
supporting tendency proposed above. The rating procedure was also not sensitive to proposed differences in orientation toward self versus thing done, degree of articulation, or consequent depression (e.g., Lewis, 1971).
Finally, whereas differences between guilt and shame have been the focus of this paper, Tables I and II suggest many commonalities too. In only 6 of 68 comparisons in two studies were the two emotions significantly different at p < .05 and on opposite sides of the neutral point. In the majority of cases the difference was one of degree but not direction. In both studies, for example, raters felt self-conscious and exposed when guilty but even more so when ashamed. Also, while many differences were significant, the absolute magnitude of the difference was usually not very large. In Experiment 2 this may reflect a gradual weakening of recalled incidents over trials, since absolute differences seem somewhat larger in Experiment 1. But in addition, subjects in both studies probably often chose experiences in response to one emotion word that theorists would consider more ap- propriate to the other. And there may be source of confusion other than limitations of raters. Each word could have several common meanings-some independent, but others equivalent to a meaning of the other word. Or both emotions may often be aroused by the same situation and they may fuse (Lewis, 1979). Yet despite these potential sources of noise (as well as rating biases, memory limitations, and effects of scale wordings), differences emerged that suggest that undergraduate education majors make many of the same distinctions between guilt and shame as do psycho- logists, psychoanalysts, and philosophers who have studied these emotions. The question of the extent to which ratings reflected observed features of personal experience as opposed to previously learned, culturally trasmitted conceptions of how shame and guilt differ is open to debate, but at least these concepts had not been discussed in the introductory educational psychology course subjects were taking. These ratings may be taken as support for the generality and validity of several distinctions that have emerged from prior clinical, introspective, and theoretical work - fo r their generality in our representations of experience, if not in our experience.
The standard deviations in Tables I and II show that there was con- siderable variation among raters on each scale. This variability is not surprising when we remember that the particular situation that represented an emotion was different for each rater. It means, however, that we probably need a large number of observations, as in Experiment 2, to detect real average differences among emotions.
Nevertheless, it has been shown that a "critical-incident" technique of structured naive introspection about remembered emotional experiences can demonstrate differences in the usage of conceptually similar emotion terms that are consistent with prior theory. Raters would probably have great difficulty telling us how they use these terms if they were asked
Ratings of Guilt and Shame 39
directly. But apparently they can rate particular situations consistently and meaningfully, and in so doing help determine which of the distinctions made by psychological theorists have functional significance to nonpsycho- logists in important life settings.
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Press, 1977. Duval, S., & Wicklund, R. A. A theory of objective self awareness. New York: Academic
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