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HAGUEANDNON‐HAGUECONVENTIONABDUCTIONSNOTESFORREUNITEWEBSITEONHAGUECONVENTIONLAWASAT20THOCTOBER2009

DuncanRanton

A. TheLegalFramework

B. Wrongfulremovalsandretentions

C. RightsofCustody

D. ConventionDefences

E. TheJudicialDiscretion

F. Non‐HagueConventionCases

G. Sequestration

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A. THELEGALFRAMEWORK

EssentialReading

• ChildAbductionandCustodyAct1985(PartIandSchedule1)

• CouncilRegulation(EC)No.2201/2003of27November2003concerningjurisdictionandthe

recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of

parentalresponsibility,repealingRegulation(EC)No.1347/2000(“BIIr”),Articles10and11)

1. Definition

Inthiscontext,“abduction”meanstheremovalorretentionofachildbyaparent,guardian

or familymemberwithout the consent of theother personor peoplewho are entitled to

participate indecisionsabout thatchild’s futureandupbringing. Theparadigmabduction

hasshiftedradicallyoverthepasttwentyyears.

2. TheHagueConvention

TheHagueConferenceon Private International Lawwas formed in 1893 to “work for the

progressiveunificationoftherulesofprivateinternationallaw”.Thisitdoesbycreatingand

assisting in the implementation of multilateral treaties promoting the harmonisation of

conflictoflawsprinciplesindiversesubjectmatterswithinprivateinternationallaw.

One such treaty is the 1980 Hague Convention in the Civil Aspects of International Child

Abduction(“theAbductionConvention”).

The Abduction Convention is perhaps the best known treaty emanating from the Hague

Conference,andworld‐wide is thebest knownof thevariousarrangements regulating the

cross‐bordermovementofchildren.

Asat26August2009,eighty‐oneContractingStateshadsigned,ratifiedoraccededtothe

HagueConvention.


TheUnitedKingdomofGreatBritainandNorthern IrelandsignedtheHagueConventionin

November 1984. It was incorporated into our domestic law by the Child Abduction and

CustodyAct1985(Schedule1).TheConventionenteredintoforceon1August1986.

Article3oftheHagueConventionidentifieswhatanapplicantmustdemonstratetolaunch

anapplication:

“Article3

Theremovalortheretentionofachildistobeconsideredwrongfulwhere–

(a) it is inbreachof rightsof custodyattributed toaperson,an institutionor

anyotherbody,either jointlyoralone,underthe lawoftheState inwhich

the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or

retention;and

(b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised,

eitherjointlyoralone,orwouldhavebeensoexercisedbutfortheremoval

orretention.

Therightsofcustodymentionedinsub‐paragraph(a)above,mayarise inparticular

byoperationoflaworbyreasonofajudicialoradministrativedecision,orbyreason

ofanagreementhavinglegaleffectunderthelawofthatState.”

Article3mustbereadinconjunctionwithArticles4and5.Theformer identifiestowhom

the Hague Convention applies. The latter assists in defining rights of custody for the

purposesoftheConvention’soperation:

“Article4

TheConventionshallapplytoanychildwhowashabituallyresidentinaContracting

State immediately before any breach of custody or access rights. The Convention

shallceasetoapplywhenthechildattainstheageofsixteenyears.

Article5

ForthepurposesofthisConvention–


(a) “rightsofcustody”shall include rights relatingtothecareofthepersonof

the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s place of

residence;

(b) “rightsofaccess”shallincludetherighttotakeachildforalimitedperiodof

timetoaplaceotherthanthechild’shabitualresidence.

3. TheEuropeanCustodyConvention

Prior to theentry into force ofCouncil Regulation (EC)No.1347/2000of29May2000on

jurisdictionandtherecognitionandenforcementof judgments inmatrimonialmattersand

the matters of parental responsibility (“BII”), another treaty operated intra‐Europe in

respectofcustodyandabductionissues.

ThiswastheEuropeanConventiononRecognitionandEnforcementofDecisionsconcerning

CustodyofChildrenandonRestorationofCustodyofChildrensignedinLuxembourgon20

May1980(“theEuropeanCustodyConvention”).

The European Custody Convention sought to address “improper removals” between

ContractingStates,aswellasprovidingamechanismbywhichaccessandcustodydecisions

couldberecognisedtransnationally.

TheConventionisobsoletewithintheBIIrMembership.Itstillhasapplication,however, in

relationtojurisdictionsthatarenotpartofthatMembership,namelythefollowing:Bosnia

and Herzegovina, Denmark, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Moldova, Norway,

Serbia/Montenegro,SwitzerlandandTurkey.

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was one of the original six

signatoriestotheEuropeanCustodyConventioninMay1980.Itwasincorporatedintoour

domesticlawbytheChildAbductionandCustodyAct1985(Schedule2).

The European CustodyConventionwas never an especially well‐used instrument, and the

numberofapplicationsmadeunder it(evenpriortoBII)wassmall. TheintroductionofBII

andsubsequentlyBIIrmakesitoflessrelevancestill.


4. BIIr

BIIr is not directly concerned with questions of child abduction, but some Articles

supplement(asopposedtosupplant)provisionsoftheHagueConventioninabductioncases

involvingtwoEUMemberStates.

Article10 isconcernedwithattributingjurisdictiontoMemberStatesfollowingawrongful

removal or retention, and will be considered in the context of examining the concept of

“habitualresidence”.

Article 11 introducessomemodificationofprocedureandsubstancewhereachildwho is

habitually resident in oneMember State is wrongfully removed to or retained in another

Member State. We will return to Article 11 below, when looking at defences to Hague

Conventionapplications.

5. TheSupremeCourtAct1981

The Supreme Court Act is usually invoked in abduction cases that are not coveredby any

othertreatyorconvention.Thiswouldbethecase,forexample, iftherewerenotreaty in

existencebetweenthetwojurisdictionsconcerned.Italsoariseswherethereisatreaty,but

wheretheleft‐behindparentisunabletobringhimorherselfwithinitsterms.

TherelevantsectionsoftheSupremeCourtActaresections19and41,theformerbecause

itpreserves theHighCourt’s inherent jurisdictionas a superiorcourtof lawand the latter

becauseitmakesspecificreferencetotheprocedureformakingchildrenWardsofcourt.

Wardship is a status imposedby theHighCourt in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction

relatingtochildrenand incapacitatedadults. It isbasedupon theconceptofallegianceto

the Crown, and the corresponding duty of the Crown to ensure that the vulnerable are

protected. For practical purposes, it involves reposing in the court rights of

custody/parental responsibility in respect of the child who is a Ward. No significant

decisionsmaythenbetakeninrespectofthatchildwithoutthecourt’sapproval.


6. TheChildAbductionAct1984

The Child Abduction Act 1984 criminalised certain removals of a child from the United

Kingdom.

A“child”forthesepurposesisundersixteen.

Section1makes itacriminaloffenceforaperson“connected”withachildtotakeorsend

himoutoftheUnitedKingdomwithouttheappropriateconsents.

Section2criminalisesthetakingordetainingofachildbyaperson,withoutlawfulauthority

orreasonableexcuse,soastoremovehimfromorkeephimfromthelawfulcontrolofany

personhavinglawfulcontrolofthechild.


B. WrongfulRemovalsandRetentions

EssentialReading

• ChildAbductionandCustodyAct1985(Schedule1,Article3and15)

• ReH;ReS(Abduction:CustodyRights)[1991]2AC476;[1991]3AllER230

1. WrongfulRemovalversusWrongfulRetention

As we have seen already, Article 3 of the Abduction Convention confirms that either a

removaloraretentionmay,ifwrongful,beactionableundertheConvention.

Aremovalorretentioniswrongfulifitisinbreachoftherightsofcustodythatsomeperson

orinstitutionhasinrespectoftheparticularchild.Moreonrightsofcustodylater….

Additionally, theauthorities tellsus thata removalor retentionmaybewrongful if it is in

breach of a court order (Re E (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2005] 2 FLR 759 or of an

implicit prohibitionon removal establishedby case law (C –v‐ C (Minors)(ChildAbduction)

[1992]1FLR163).

ReH;ReS(Abduction:CustodyRights)[1991]2AC476;[1991]2FLR262istheseminalcase

on thedistinction for Abduction Conventionpurposes between awrongful removal and a

wrongfulretention. ThespeechofLordBrandonisauthorityforthefollowingpropositions

inrelationtotheseconcepts:

(a) to be actionable under the Convention, the wrongful removal or retention must

involve and be across an international border ‐ a wrongful removal or retention

within thecountry inwhich thechild ishabitually resident isnot capableofbeing

remediedbyreferencetotheAbductionConvention;

(b) awrongful retention occurs on a specific occasion – it is not an ongoing state of

affairs;


(c) wrongful removal and wrongful retention are mutually exclusive concepts. One

cannothavebothwrongfullyremovedandbewrongfullyretainingthesamesubject

childatthesametime.

Notethatitispossibleforawrongfulremovalandawrongfulretentiontooccuronthefacts

in relation to the same child at different times (see Re S (Custody: Habitual Residence]

[1998]AC750perLordSlynnat767).

It is not a Convention requirement that the removal or retention be unlawful to be

actionable. Thus, it is possible for a removal or retention that is entirely lawful from the

perspective of the domestic law of the child’s habitual residence to still be wrongful for

Conventionpurposes.Forexamplesofcaseswherethisoccurred,seeReF(ChildAbduction:

RiskifReturned)[1995]2FLR31andReD(Abduction:CustodyRights)[1999]2FLR626.

Obtaininganorder fromanEnglishcourt seeking to restrain the removalofachildwho is

habituallyresidentinanotherContractingStatecanconstituteawrongfulretention(seeRe

B(Minors)(Abduction)(No.2)[1993]1FLR993).

2. BurdenofProof

ThepartywhoisseekingthereturnorderundertheConventionbearstheevidentialburden

of showing that the removal or retention was wrongful. If he or she cannot, then the

applicationmustfail(seeReM(Abduction:Acquiescence)[1996]1FLR315).

3. Timingconsiderations

AwrongfulremovaloccursonthedatethatthechildistakenfromtheContractingState in

which he is habitually resident across an international boundary. There are seldom

evidential difficulties about establishing the date of a removal, which can often be

corroboratedbyaccesstothird‐partymaterial(forexample,traveltickets,passportstamps

andsimilar).

Thepositionvis‐à‐visawrongfulretentionisoftenlessclear. Thegeneralpositionisthata

wrongful retentionoccurswhen thechild isnot returnedat the endof theperiodof time

whichithasbeenagreedhewillspendabroad.


What happens where a parent who is abroad with a child for an agreed period of time

declarespriortotheexpirationofthatperiodthatshedoesnot intendtoreturnthechild?

ThiswasthesituationthecourtfacedinReS(Abduction:WrongfulRetention)[1994]1FLR

82.There,parentshadagreedthattheywouldcometoEnglandfromIsraelforayearwith

theirchildren.Priortotheexpirationofthatyear,themotherannouncedshedidnotintend

toreturn. Conventionproceedingsfollowed,assertingawrongfulretention. Themother’s

defencewasthattheretentionwasnotwrongful,astheagreedperiodabroadhadnotyet

expired.Thecourtrejectedthatargument.Themother’sannouncedintentionnottoreturn

effectively voided the original agreement. The mother could no longer rely upon the

father’sagreementtothelimitedperiodofremoval.

See also Re AZ (Abduction: Acquiescence) [1993] 1 FLR 682, where the Court of Appeal

expresseddoubt aboutwhether anuncommunicateddecisionnot to return a child in the

futurecouldconstituteawrongfulretention.

4. Article15Declarations

Uncertainty sometimes arises aboutwhether a removal or retention is wrongful. In such

cases,referencemightbemadetoArticle15oftheAbductionConvention.

“Article15

The judicial or administrative authorities of a Contracting State may, prior to the

makingofanorderforthereturnofthechild,requestthattheapplicantobtainfrom

theauthoritiesoftheStateofthehabitualresidenceofthechildadecisionorother

determination that the removal or retention was wrongful within the meaning of

Article3oftheConvention,wheresuchadecisionordeterminationmaybeobtained

in that State. The Central Authorities of the Contracting States shall so far as

practicableassistapplicantstoobtainsuchadecisionordetermination.”

Section8oftheChildAbductionandCustodyAct1985providesasfollows:

“Section8

TheHighCourtorCourtofSessionmay,onanapplicationmadeforthepurposesof

Article15oftheConventionbyanypersonappearingtothecourttohaveaninterest

inthematter,makeadeclarationordeclaratorthattheremovalofanychildfrom,or


his retention outside, the United Kingdom was wrongful within the meaning of

Article3oftheConvention.”

Section8hasbeenaffordedawideinterpretation,intermsofthedeclaratoryreliefthatleft

behind parents might seek from the English court (see Re J (Abduction: Ward of Court)

[1990]1FLR276andReP(Abduction:Declaration)[1995]1FLR831).

The Article 15 procedure is not without its drawbacks in terms of delay and potential

expense, and this must be borne in mind before deciding whether to embark upon an

application.


C. RightsofCustody

EssentialReading

• ChildAbductionandCustodyAct1985(Schedule1,Article5)

• ReH(AMinor)(Abduction:RightsofCustody)[2000]1FLR374

• ReD(Abduction:RightsofCustody)[2007]1FLR961

1. WhoseRights?

Article3confirmsthatabreachofrightsofcustodyattributedtoaperson,aninstitutionor

anyotherbody,whetherjointlyoralone,isactionableundertheConvention.

Accordingly,whereasmostapplicationsarebroughtbyleft‐behindparentsclaimingabreach

of their own rights of custody, the Abduction Convention can be invoked by relying on

someoneelse’srightsorrightsvestedinacourtorotherauthority.

In Re H (Abduction) [1990] 2 FLR 439, reliance was successfully placed on the rights of

custodyof the abducting parent to secure her return to Canada. Shewas found to be in

breachofherownrightsofcustody,giventhatherrightsofcustodyincludedaprohibition

onremovingthechildfromthatcountry.

Article3(a)oftheAbductionConventionconfirmsthatrightsofcustodyforthesepurposes

are attributedunder the lawof the country of the child’s habitual residence immediately

beforetheremovalorretention. Itdoesnotmatterwhetherthebundlesofrightsenjoyed

are described domestically as a right of custody. Rather, what matters is whether those

rightsfallwithintheConventiondefinitionfoundatArticle5.

Accordingly,what rights someonehas in relation to a child is amatter for the lawof the

child’s habitual residence. Whether those rights amount to a right of custody for

ConventionpurposesisaquestionforthecourtsoftherequestedState.


2. WhatRightsQualify?

Arighttocontactoraccessalonewillnotentitleaparty tobringConventionproceedings;

theConventiondistinguishesrightsofaccessfromrightsofcustody(Article5).Theformer

alonecannotfoundanapplication(seeReV‐B(Abduction: RightsofCustody) [1999]2FLR

192.

TheearlyConventionjurisprudenceinthiscountrysupportedaviewthatonlyanestablished

legalrightcouldamounttoarightofcustody–seeReJ(Abduction:CustodyRights)[1990]2

AC 562, subnomC –v‐ S (AMinor)(Abduction) [1990] 2 FLR 442. There has since been a

movement away from this rigid stance, and a preference to apply a more purposive

definitionofrightsofcustody.

Thus, the right to insist that a parent did not remove the child from the country of his

habitualresidencewithoutconsent(a“rightofveto”)hasbeenheldbytheHouseofLords

tobearecognisedrightofcustody‐ReD(Abduction:RightsofCustody)[2007]1FLR961.It

mattered not whether the right of veto reposed in the other parent or in the court.

Likewise,itmatterednotwhethertherightofvetocameaboutbycourtorder,agreementor

byoperationoflaw.

However,apotentialrightofvetowouldnotqualifyasarightofcustody. Accordingly,ifa

parenthadtogotocourtandaskforanorderaboutsomefeatureofthechild’supbringing

(to include international relocation), the right to invoke the court’s assistancewas not of

itselfsufficienttocomewithintheConventiondefinition.

The English Court has sought to extend the concept of rights of custody for Convention

purposesviatheartificeofwhataredescribedas“inchoaterightsofcustody”.Theconcept

of such bundles of rights was identified in Re B (A Minor)(Abduction) [1994] 2 FLR 249,

where it was suggested that rights of custody might arise if a child was effectively

abandonedintothecareofapersonwhowasthenresponsibleforday‐to‐daycare,butwho

otherwisehadnorecognisedlegalcustodialright.

Thedevelopmentofinchoaterightsofcustodycontinuedthroughoutthe1990sandintothe

new millennium (for those interested in the jurisprudence, see Re O (Child Abduction:

CustodyRights)[1997]2FLR702,ReW;ReB(ChildAbduction:UnmarriedFather)[1998]2


FLR 146, Re G (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2002] 2 FLR 703, Re C (Child

Abduction)(Unmarried Father: Rights of Custody) [2003] 1 FLR 252 and Re F (Abduction:

UnmarriedFather:SoleCarer)[2003]1FLR839).

Whatcanbedistilledfromthis lineofauthority isthisproposition: English lawrecognises

thatarightofcustodyforthepurposesoftheConventioncanbeheldbysomebodywhohas

nodefinedlegalright,butwhohasthecareof thechildtotheexclusionoftheholdersof

parentalresponsibility.Thiscanbesoevenifthatcarewasnotbeingexercisedimmediately

beforethewrongfulremoval.

Aninstitution,suchasa localauthorityoradoptionagency,canhaverightsofcustody(see

ReJS(PrivateInternationalAdoption)[2000]2FLR638).

Similarly,acourtmighthaverightsofcustody(ReC(AMinor)(Abduction)[1989]1FLR403).

Theseminalcaseinrelation tosuchrights isReH(AMinor)(Abduction: RightsofCustody)

[2000] 1 FLR 374. There, theHouseof Lords confirmed that the Irish Court had rights of

custodyinrespectofachild,because itwasdealingwithaguardianshipapplicationat the

dateofthewrongfulremoval.TheHouseheldthat:

• a court would have rights of custody in relation to a child if it was seised of a

questionofcustody

• that right of custody would be conferred on the court (at the latest) when the

applicationwasserved,

• therightofcustodywouldcontinueuntiltheapplicationwasdisposedof,and

• questionsaboutthemeritsoftheapplicationcouldnotbedeployedasamechanism

togobehindthecourt’srightofcustody.

Accordingly,thefatherwasentitledtorelyupontheIrishcourt’scustodialrightstoinvoke

theConvention.

3. ActualExerciseofCustodyRights

Article3comes in twoparts, thenet effectofwhich is tomakeclear that simplyhavinga

rightofcustodyattherelevanttimeisnottheendofthematter;therightofcustodymust

alsobeactuallyexercised(Article3(b)).


Forpracticalpurposes inEnglandandWales, thisprovision isconstruedverybroadly. It is

notnecessarytoshowday‐to‐daycareorevenanydegreeofregularorrecentcontactwith

the child. Actual exercise will be presumed if the left‐behind parent is maintaining the

stance and attitude that is broadly in keeping with his right of custody. See Re H; Re S

(Abduction:CustodyRights)[1991]2FLR262perLordBrandon(at272‐273).

Givingpermissiontoachildtravellingor livingabroadfora temporaryperiod is theactual

exerciseofacustodyright(W–v‐W(ChildAbduction:Acquiescence)[1993]2FLR211.

4. BurdenofProof

TheapplicantundertheConventionmustshowonthebalanceofprobabilitiesthathehasa

rightofcustody,andifhecannotthentheapplicationwillfail.

Wherethereisanissueas tocustodialrights, thiscanbeaddressedby thefilingofexpert

evidenceand/orbyseekinganArticle15declaration. ReD(Abduction:RightsofCustody)

[2007]1FLR961suggeststhatthelatteristobepreferredtotheformer,andthatanArticle

15declarationshouldbesoughtfromtheforeigncourtatthehighestlevel.Abalancemust

bestruckbetweendelayon theonehandand theneed for thebest informationavailable

about thecustody rights in issueon theother. AnArticle15declarationwouldbeallbut

determinativeofthequestionsaveinexceptionalcircumstances.


D. Defences

EssentialReading

• ChildAbductionandCustodyAct1985(Schedule1,Articles12and13)

• BIIr,Article11

1. Introduction

ThefollowingprovisionsoftheAbductionConventionareconcernedwith“defences”:

“Article12

WhereachildhasbeenwrongfullyremovedorretainedintermsofArticle3and,at

the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or

administrativeauthorityoftheContractingStatewherethechild is,aperiodof less

thanoneyearhas elapsed fromthedateof thewrongful removalor retention, the

authorityconcernedshallorderthereturnofthechildforthwith.

The judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been

commencedaftertheexpirationoftheperiodofoneyearreferredtointhepreceding

paragraph,shallalsoorderthereturnofthechild,unlessitisdemonstratedthatthe

childisnowsettledinitsnewenvironment.

Where the judicial oradministrativeauthority in the requestedstatehas reason to

believethatthechildhasbeentakentoanotherState,itmaystaytheproceedingsor

dismisstheapplicationforthereturnofthechild.”

“Article13

“Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or

administrativeauthorityof the requested State is notbound to order the returnof

thechildiftheperson, institutionorotherbodywhichopposesitsreturnestablishes

that–

(a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the

childwasnotactuallyexercisingthecustodyrightsatthetimeofremovalor


retention,orhadconsentedtoorsubsequentlyacquiescedintheremovalor

retention;or

(b) thereisagraveriskthathisorherreturnwouldexposethechildtophysical

or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable

situation.

The judicial or administrative authoritymay also refuse to order the return of the

childif itfindsthatthechildobjectstobeingreturnedandhasattainedanageand

degreeofmaturityatwhichitisappropriatetotakeaccountofitsviews.

In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and

administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the

socialbackgroundofthechildprovidedbytheCentralAuthorityorothercompetent

authorityofthechild’shabitualresidence.”

Also of relevance is Article 11 of BIIr in cases between two Member States, and see in

particularthefollowing:

“Article11–Returnofthechild

…

“4. AcourtcannotrefusetoreturnachildonthebasisofArticle13bofthe1980

HagueConventionifitisestablishedthatadequatearrangementshavebeen

madetosecuretheprotectionofthechildafterhisorherreturn.

There are other rules of procedure within Article 11, and provisions concerned with the

recognition of ordersmade in anotherMember State following a refusal to return under

Article13oftheAbductionConvention.

FromtheArticlesquoted,thefollowingpropositionscanbeextracted:

• Contracting States have a mandatory obligation to return wrongfully removed or

retained children, where proceedings are started within the year following the

wrongfulremovalorretentioncomplainedof;


• Thatobligationcontinuesaftertheexpirationoftheoneyearperiodreferredto,but

issubjecttothechildbeingsettledinhisnewenvironment;

• Inadditiontothetwelvemonths/settlementexception,thefollowingdefencesare

available:

o theleft‐behindparentwasnotactuallyexercisinghisrightsofcustodyatthe

timeofthewrongfulremovalorretention;

o theleft‐behindparentconsentedtotheremovalorretention;

o theleft‐behindparentsubsequentlyacquiescedtotheremovalorretention;

o the return sought would expose the child to a grave risk of physical or

psychologicalharmorwouldotherwiseplacehiminanintolerableposition,

and

o the child objects to returning and has attained an age and degree of

maturitysuchthatitisappropriatetohaveregardtohisviews.

Thesedefenceswillnowbeconsideredinturn.

2. Settlement

EssentialReading

• Cannon–v‐Cannon[2004]1FLR169

• ReM(Abduction:Zimbabwe)[2008]1FLR251

WeknowfromArticle12 thatsettlementof thechildconcerned isonlyofrelevanceifthe

periodoftimebetweenthedateofthewrongfulremoval/retentionandthedateonwhich

proceedingsarecommencedexceedstwelvemonths.Settlementrightuptotheendofthat

twelvemonthperiodcannotbeusedasthebasisofadefenceunderArticle12(althoughit

might be relevant elsewhere, such as in the context of a child’s wishes, or as part of an

intolerabilityargument).

Thedateforassessingsettlementisthedateonwhichproceedingsarestarted,andnotthe

dateonwhichtheapplicationisdetermined(seeReN(Abduction)[1991]1FLR413).

What ismeant by settlement? InReN, referred to in theprevious paragraph, the Judge

gave the term its ordinary meaning, and said it involved two constituent elements: “a


physicalelementofrelatingto,beingestablishedin,acommunityandanenvironment”and

“an emotional constituent denoting security and stability”. The following factors,

unsurprisingly,weresaid tobe relevant toan examinationofwhetherachildwassettled:

“place, home, school, people, friends, activities and opportunities but not, per se, the

relationshipwiththemother,whichhasalwaysexistedinaclose,lovingattachment.”

Forreasonsthatareself‐evident,settlementcasesoftengiverisetodivergentviewsabout

timing;anapplicantupagainstthetwelvemonthperiodwillargueforawrongfulremovalor

retention that would have the effect of his application being within the year following

removal/retention,andarespondentwillseektoarguetheopposingposition.

Historically,therewassomejudicialdisagreementaboutwhethersettlement,ifestablished,

gaverisetoanobligationnottoreturnachild,orwhetheritsimplygaverisetoadiscretion

nottodirectareturn.EarlyEnglishauthoritiespreferredthelatter,butat leastonelineof

authority fromAustralia suggested thata strictapplicationof theConvention required the

formerconclusion. TheHouseofLords inReM(Abduction: Zimbabwe) [2008] 1FLR251

settledthematterforourpurposes:wheremorethantwelvemonthshaveexpiredandthe

child is settled, the court still has jurisdiction to hear the application and a discretion to

directareturn.

The Court of Appeal in Cannon –v‐ Cannon [2005] 1 FLR 169 looked at the question of

concealment–couldachildbeconsideredsettlediflivingwithanabductingparentinsucha

wayastopreventdetection?Theanswerwaspossibly.Incasesofconcealment,theburden

of demonstrating the necessary elements of emotional and psychological settlement was

much increased. Although it was not the case that a period of concealment should be

disregarded and therefore subtracted from the total period of delay in order to calculate

whetherthetwelve‐monthmark(whichisanapproachthathassomecurrencyintheUSA,

called “equitable tolling”) had been exceeded, judges should look critically at any alleged

settlementthathasconcealmentordeceitasitsfoundation.

Settlement cases will almost always now involve consideration of the separate

representationofthesubjectchild–seebelowunderchild’sobjections.


3. Non‐exerciseofcustodyrights

EssentialReading

• W–v‐W(ChildAbduction:Acquiescence)[1993]2FLR211

• ReW(Abduction:Procedure)[1995]1FLR878

Thissub‐provisionofArticle13hasattractedverylittlejudicialattentioninthisjurisdiction.

Therearetwoorthreereporteddecisionswherethisissueisconsidered,buteventhenitis

inpassing.

Perhaps most usefully, Re W (Abduction: Procedure) [1995] 1 FLR 878 examined the

distinctionbetweenArticles3and13(a).Thecourtobservedthattheformerreferstorights

ofcustodygenerally,whereas the latter is concernedwith rightsofcustodywhicharenot

beingexercisedby thepersonwhohasthecareofthepersonof thechild. This isamuch

narrowersituation,therefore,thanthatcontemplatedbyArticle3.

Asthisisthe(only)Englishauthoritydirectlyonpoint,thisdefencecouldlikelyonlyariseifit

couldbeshownthatanapplicanthadabandonedforallintentsandpurposeshisroleasthe

child’sresidentialparent.

Note that imprisonment of the left‐behind parent will not necessarily deprive him of his

rightsofcustody, either for thepurposesofArticle3or13(a). Itdoesnot follow that, by

virtue of circumstances, including imprisonment or hospitalisation, whereby a parent is

unabletoexercisesomecomponentofhisrightsofcustody(forexample,physicalcare),he

isalsounabletoconsentorrefusetotheremovalof thechildfromthejurisdiction. There

areseveralcaseswherethecourthasconfirmedthataprisonercanstillexercisearightof

custodyforthepurposesofbeingconsultedaboutaremovalfromthejurisdiction–seeReA

(Abduction:RightsofCustody:Imprisonment)[2004]1FLR1andReL(AChild)[2006]1FLR

843.

4. Consent

EssentialReading

• ReP(Abduction:Consent)[2004]2FLR1057


• T–v‐T(Abduction:Consent)[1999]2FLR912

It isadefencetoaConventionapplicationthattheleft‐behindparentagreedtothechild’s

permanent removal from or retention away from the country in which he was habitually

resident. It follows fromthis thatconsent toaholidaydoesnot equatewithconsent toa

permanent relocation (to the extent that any judicial confirmation of this principle is

required,seeReB(AMinor)(Abduction)[1994]2FLR249).

Therewassomedisputearisingfromseveralfirstinstancedecisionsaboutwhetherconsent

wasrelevanttothe“wrongful”stage(thatis,couldaremovalorretentiontowhichtheleft‐

behindparentagreed inadvancebewrongful?)or to thedefencestage. Thiswassettled

definitively by the Court of Appeal Re P (Abduction: Consent) [2004] 2 FLR 1057; issues

concerningconsentshouldbedealtwithunderArticle13(a),whichhastheeffectofputting

theevidentialburdenontheallegedabductor.

Whatisthepracticaldistinctionbetweenconsentandacquiescence?Theauthoritiestellus

it is one of timing: consent pre‐dates the removal or retention and acquiescence comes

aftertheevent(seeLordDonaldsonMRinReA(Minors)(Abduction:Acquiescence)[1992]1

FLR14at29).

Consentmustbeclearandunequivocaltoconstituteavaliddefence. Itmustnotbebased

uponafraud,oronmisunderstanding(ReB(AMinor)(Abduction)[1994]2FLR249andT–v‐

T(Abduction:Consent)[1999]2FLR912).

Whilst it needs to be unequivocal and clear, consent need not be in writing and can be

inferred from a parent’s words and actions as awhole. It is not necessary for particular

magicwordstobeuttered:aconsentdefencecanstillsucceedevenif“Iconsent”hasnever

been said. See in this regard Re C (Abduction: Consent) [1996] 1 FLR 414 and Re M

(Abduction)(Consent:Acquiescence)[1999]1FLR171.

The relevance of timing to the giving of consent was considered in Re K (Abduction:

Consent) [1997]2FLR212. There, thecourtwasconcernedwith thequestionofwhether

consent given and acted upon could be subsequently rescinded if the left‐behind parent

thoughtbetterofit.ReKsupportstheviewthatconsentgivenandacteduponcannotthen

bewithdrawn.


5. Acquiescence

EssentialReading

• ReH(Abduction:Acquiescence)[1997]1FLR872

Aswehaveseen,acquiescenceisconsideredtobetheafter‐the‐eventcorollarytoconsent.

The development of English jurisprudence in this area initially focussed on concepts of

“active”and“passive”acquiescence,applyingdifferentapproachesdependinguponwhich

typewasinissue.ThiserrantlineofauthoritywassweptawaybytheHouseofLordsinReH

(Abduction: Acquiescence) [1997] 1 FLR 872, which remains the seminal authority on

acquiescencecases.

The following approach emerges from the speeches inRe H (per Lord Browne‐Wilson @

884):

“(1) For the purposes of Art 13 of the Convention, the question whether the

wronged parent has ‘acquiesced’ in the removal or retention of the child

dependsuponhisactualstateofmind.AsNeillLJsaidinReS(Minors)‘the

court is primarily concerned, not with the question of the other parent’s

perception of the applicant’s conduct, but with the question whether the

applicantacquiescedinfact’.

(2) Thesubjective intentionofthewrongedparent isaquestionoffactforthe

trial judge todetermineinall thecircumstancesof thecase,theburdenof

proofbeingontheabductingparent.

(3) The trial judge, in reaching his decision on that question of fact, will no

doubtbeinclinedtoattachmoreweighttothecontemporaneouswordsand

actionsofthewrongedparentthantohisbareassertionsinevidenceofhis

intention. But that is a question of theweight to be attached to evidence

andisnotaquestionoflaw.


(4) There is only one exception. Where the words or actions of the wronged

parent clearly and unequivocally show and have led the other parent to

believethatthewrongedparent isnotassertingorgoingtoasserthisright

to the summary return of the child and are inconsistentwith such return,

justicerequiresthatthewrongedparentbeheldtohaveacquiesced.”

Inpractice, therefore, theallegedabductormustprove to thecourt’s satisfaction that the

left‐behindparentacquiesced.Ifheorshecannot,thedefencefails,unlesstheexceptionat

paragraph(4)isengaged.

Recent examples of the judicial approach in operation can be found in Re G (Abduction:

WithdrawalofProceedings,AcquiescenceandHabitualResidence)[2008]2FLR351andD–

v‐S[2008]2FLR393.

Therearecompetinglinesofauthorityregardingwhetherdelaybroughtaboutbecauseofa

lack of knowledge of the Convention remedy can amount to acquiescence. These are

expressedinD–v‐S[2008]2FLR393ontheonehand,andinB‐G–v‐B‐G[2008]2FLR965

ontheother.

Pendingguidancefromanappellatecourt,perhapstheclearestguidancethatcanbegiven

aboutthisconceptisthatthedegreeofknowledgeoftheremediesavailableonthepartof

theleft‐behindparentwillbearelevantfactorineachcase.Theweighttobeattachedtoit

will be case‐specific. Once an applicant is aware of a Convention remedy, hemight be

consideredtohaveacquiescedifitisnotengagedpromptly.

Attemptstoachieveareconciliationoragreementforthechild’svoluntaryreturnshouldnot

beinferredasanintentiontoacquiesce–seeReH.

6. GraveRisk/Intolerability

EssentialReading

• ReC(Abduction:GraveRiskofPsychologicalHarm)[1999]1FLR1145

• ReC(Abduction:GraveRiskofPhysicalorPsychologicalHarm)[1999]2FLR478

• C–v‐B(Abduction:GraveRisk)[2006]1FLR1095


Thisisbyfarandawaythemostcommonly‐pleadeddefencetoConventionapplications,and

accordingly has been the subject of the most judicial consideration of any of the

Convention’sarticles.

Themeaningof“graverisk”wasconsideredveryearlyonintheConvention’slifespaninthis

jurisdiction. The riskmust beweighty, andnot trivial. Theharmmust bemore than the

disruptioninherentinanunwelcomereturntothechild’scountryofhabitualresidence.The

graveriskisnottobecomparedtotheparamountconsiderationofthechild’swelfare,and

thetestsarewhollydifferent.

Itmustbeshownthattheriskarisesbyreasonofthereturntotherequestingstaterather

thanbyreturningtotheapplicant.ItisuptotheCourtsintheStateofthechild’shabitual

residencetodecidequestionsofcustodyandtoruleontheparties’meritsasparents.

Anallegedabductorcannotrelyonhisownrefusaltoreturntotherequestingstateforthe

psychologicalharmuponthechildasresultinginanintolerablesituationforthechild(seeRe

C(AMinor)(Abduction)[1989]1FLR403).

Our courts have been very slow to allow this defence to succeed in situationswhere the

abductionitselfhasgivenrisetotheproblemsthatarethenprayedinaidofthedefence‐

see Re C (Abduction: Grave Risk of Psychological Harm) [1999] 1 FLR 1145 and Re C

(Abduction:GraveRiskofPhysicalorPsychologicalHarm) [1999]2FLR478. In the former

case, the issues pleaded in support of the defence were immigration matters that would

result intheabductingmotherbeingseparatedfromhernewhusbandifsheaccompanied

her child back to the USA. The latter concerned a splitting of half‐siblings if a return to

Cyprus was enforced, with the older (and non‐subject) child refusing to cooperatewith a

return.Inbothcases,thecourttooktheviewthattheissuesraisedfloweddirectlyfromthe

wrongdoingoftheabductingparent,andthataccordinglyitshouldbeslowinallowingthose

factorstosustainanArticle13(b)defence.

Thefactthatanabductingparentmightfaceprosecutionifshereturnswiththechildisnot

ofitselfanArticle13(b)defence(seeReL(Abduction:PendingCriminalProceedings)[1991]

1FLR433).


Abuse,whetherbywayofdomesticviolenceor someother formofphysicalor emotional

abuse,willnot of itselfbesufficient to establish this defence. See, for example,W–v‐W

[2004]2FLR499andTB–v‐JB(Abduction:GraveRiskofHarm)[2001]2FLR515.AnEnglish

court will take into account measures which the alleged abductor could reasonably be

expectedtotakepriortooruponherreturntoprotectherself.Further,itistobepresumed

thatthecourtsinthecountryofhabitualresidenceareready,willingandabletoassistthose

whoarethevictimsofabuse. This includes,whereappropriate,punishing theperpetrator

forbreachoforders. If it issubmittedthatthat isnotthecase,goodandcogentevidence

willberequired.

SeealsoReH(Children)(Abduction:GraveRisk)[2003]2FLR141,whereareturnorderwas

made despite compelling evidence that the abductor had endured brutalisation, violence

andthreats. ItwasheldthattheBelgiancourtcouldprotectthemotherand thechildren,

albeit the returnorderwasnot tobe enforceduntil a structureofprotectionandsupport

wasputinplace.

Thehigh‐watermarksinrelationtothisdefencecameinReS(AChild)[2002]2FLR815and

ReM(Abduction:IntolerableSituation)[2000]1FLR930.Theformerinvolvedadecisionto

returnachildtoIsraelnotwithstandingarecentescalationofsectarianviolence,whichhad

inturnimpacteduponthemother’sabilitytofunctionandtheparent. Thecourtaccepted

thatastateofcivilunrestorwarintherequestingStatecouldgiverisetoadefence,butnot

onthecircumstancesastheystoodatthetimeinthatparticularcase.Thelatterrelatedto

thereturnofachildtoNorway,notwithstandinghismother’sfearofphysicalharmfromher

husband who, having been imprisoned for murdering someone whom he believed was

havinganaffairwiththemother,wasduetobereleased.

Foranexampleofacasewherethedefencehassucceeded,seeReD(Article13(b): Non‐

Return) [2006] 2 FLR 305. There, the court was asked to direct the return of a child to

Venezuelaincircumstanceswheretherehadalreadybeenanearlierdirectattemptonthe

mother’slife.TheCourtofAppealfoundthatthespecificandtargetedriskofphysicalharm

to the children and extremely strong evidence of a risk of justified refusing to return the

children.SeealsoKlentzeris–v‐Klentzeris[2007]2FLR996andReM(Abduction:Leaveto

Appeal)[1999]2FLR550.


ThedifficultyinmakingoutthisdefenceiscompoundedbythewillingnessofEnglishJudges,

consistentwithConvention’sobligations,toacceptundertakingsfromtheleft‐behindparent

designedtoaddressandtoameliorateanyshort‐termharmorintolerabilitythatispleaded.

For example, there are now “standard” undertakings offered and sought in these cases

relating to short‐term financial provision and accommodation, concerned with non‐

harassment(usuallywithoutadmission),andconfirmingthenon‐removalofthechildfrom

thecareoftheabductorpendingahearingonnotice inthecourtsoftheStateofhabitual

residence.

In addition, it is not uncommon now for quite inventive arrangements to be put in place

whereby a return order is made, but not implemented immediately pending steps or

hearings to beundertaken in the other Contracting State. SeeRe H (Children)(Abduction:

GraveRisk)[2003]2FLR141,JPC–v‐SLWandSMW(Abduction)[2007]2FLR900andReR

(Abduction: Immigration Concerns) [2005] 1 FLR 33. In the last case, enforcement of a

return to Germanywas deferredpending resolution of immigrationdifficulties thatmight

otherwisehaveresultedintheseparationofthemotherandthechild.

Another difficulty facing parties seeking to argue this defence is the trend towards

international judicialcollaboration. EnglishJudgesareshowinganincreasingwillingnessto

engage directly with the judiciary in other Contracting States to secure the Convention’s

objectives(seeReMandJ(AbductionandInternationalJudicialCollaboration)[2000]1FLR

803, where Singer J spoke to several Judges in California and a warrant for the mother’s

arrestwasrecalledquashed).

A finaldifficulty ispeculiar to EUMemberStates,andarisesbyvirtueofArticle11(4). An

EnglishcourtcannotdeclinetoorderareturnunderArticle13(b)ifadequatearrangements

canbemade tosecure thechild’sprotection in theotherMemberState. Given theother

initiatives(deferredreturns,undertakings,judicialcollaboration),itwillbeveryrareindeed

foranintra‐EUcasetoarisewhereit isnotpossibletoputinplaceadequateprotectionto

addresstheparticularArticle13(b)defencethat isasserted. Englishcourtswilloperateon

thebasisthatotherMemberStatesareinapositiontoprovidethatprotection,absentproof

tothecontrary(arecentdistillationof thisprincipleappears inF–v‐M(Abduction: Grave

RiskofHarm)[2008]2FLR1263).


7. Child’sObjections

EssentialReading

• ReD(AChild)(Abduction:RightsofCustody)[2007]1FLR961

• ReM(Abduction:Child’sObjections)[2007]2FLR72


• ReC(Abduction:SeparateRepresentationofChildren)[2008]2FLR6

This is by far and awayoneof the “hot” abduction topics of recent years. In conjunction

with general considerations of the separate representation of children in abduction

proceedings, ithasyieldedtwoHouseofLords’decisions,severalfromtheCourtofAppeal

andmorestillatfirstinstance.

Before lookingatthosedecisions, it isusefultodeconstructthedefence. Itariseswherea

child,whohasattainedan“ageanddegreeofmaturity”wherehisviewsoughttobetaken

intoaccount,“objectstobeingreturned”. Eachpleadingofthisdefencethereforerequires

two enquiries: does the child object and is he of the requisite age and maturity? The

defenceisnotmadeoutunlesstheanswertobothquestionsisyes.

Theverb“objects” inthiscontext istobeinterpretedliterally;earlierattemptsto importa

particularstrengthoffeelingweresaidtobeimproper(seeS–v‐S(ChildAbduction)(Child’s

Views)[1992]2FLR492.

Theobjectionmustbetotheparticularreturnthatisundercontemplation.Itisareturnto

thecountryratherthantotheapplicantparent.Amerepreferenceastowishingtolivewith

theabductingparent isnotanobjection for thesepurposes. Awillingnessby thechild to

return to the Contracting State in question with the abducting parent would vitiate the

defence.

However, courts are alert to the reality that, in some circumstances, it is not easy to

distinguishareturntothecountryfromareturntotheleft‐behindparent,anditwouldbe

artificialtotry–seeReT(Abduction:Child’sObjectionstoReturn)[2000]2FLR192.


Thereisnoparticularageatwhichthedefencebecomesavailable.InReR(ChildAbduction:

Acquiescence)[1995]1FLR716,thecourtwasconcernedwithobjectionsfromchildrenaged

seven and a half and six, whowere held to be mature enough for their objections to be

considered(albeittheydidnotcarrytheday).Childrenagedeightandsevenwerefoundto

besufficientlymatureinB–v‐K(ChildAbduction)[1993]1FCR382.AsBalcombeLJsaidin

ReR, the younger thechild the less likely it is thathewillhave thematurityatwhich it is

appropriatetotakehisobjectionsintoaccount.

In thenormal courseofevents, the enquiryaboutwhether ornota child objectsandhas

attainedthenecessaryageanddegreeofmaturityisundertakenbyaCAFCASSOfficer.Until

relativelyrecently,thatwastheendofthematter,saveforanexceptionalhandfulofcases

wherethechildparticipatedintheproceedings inamoreactivecapacity. Thesetendedto

becaseswheretherewassomeunusualfeature,forexample,achildwhohadbeeninlocal

authority (or equivalent) careprior to the removal,orwho faced theprospect ofa return

intosuchcare.

Asrecentlyas2007,theCourtofAppealwasrefusingtoallowclearlycapacitatedchildrento

engage in the litigationprocess and to file direct evidence about their objections and the

reasons for those (see Re H (Abduction) [2007] 1 FLR 242). In that case, the “child”

concernedwas fifteen. The Court of Appeal nevertheless confirmed the line of authority

that a child should only be made a party in Abduction Convention proceedings in

“exceptional circumstances”. In all other cases, those objections could be adequately

expressed through a CAFCASS Officer, hence there would be no need for separate

representationtoensurethatthechild’svoiceproperlywasheard.

The Houseof Lords took a different view inReD (A Child)(Abduction: Rights of Custody)

[2007]1FLR961.ItsaidthatchildrenshouldbeheardinAbductionConventionapplications

more frequently than had hitherto been the practice. There was a range of approaches

available toascertainingachild’sview. Inmostcasesan interviewwithaCAFCASSofficer

wouldbesufficient,but inothercases itmightalsobenecessaryforthejudge tohearthe

child, especially if the child had requested this. Only in a few cases would full scale legal

representation be necessary, but whenever it seemed likely that the child’s views and

interests might not be properly presented to the court, in particular if there were legal

argumentswhichtheadultpartieswerenotputtingforward,thechildshouldbeseparately

represented.BIIrrequiredthecourttoaddressattheoutsetwhetherandhowthechildwas


to be given the opportunity of being heard and therewas no reasonwhy this should not

happen innon‐Europeancasesaswell; themoreuniformthepractice thebetter,and the

earliertheissueofthechild’sviewswasaddressedthelesslikelythattheissuewouldcause

delay.

The House of Lords returned to separate representation inReM (Abduction: Zimbabwe)

[2008]1FLR251.BaronessHalehadthistosayabouttheissue(@269):

“[57] Iwould finally comment that, ‘exceptional’ or not, this is a highly unusual

case.CasesunderthesecondparagraphofArt12are,inanyevent,veryfew

and far between. They are the most ‘child‐centric’ of all child abduction

casesandvery likelytobecombinedwiththechild’sobjections.Aspointed

out in ReD, it is for the court to consider at the outset how best to give

effecttotheobligationtohearthechild’sviews.Wearetoldthatthisisnow

routinelydonethroughthespecialistCAFCASSofficersattheRoyalCourtsof

Justice. I accept entirely that children must not be given an exaggerated

impressionoftherelevanceandimportanceoftheirviewsinchildabduction

cases. To order separate representation in all cases, even in all child’s

objectionscases,mightbetosend themthewrongmessages.But itwould

not send the wrong messages in the very small number of cases where

settlement is arguedunder the secondparagraphof Art12. These are the

cases in which the separate point of view of the children is particularly

important and should not be lost in the competing claims of the adults. If

thisweretobecomeroutine,therewouldbenoadditionaldelay.Inallother

cases, the question for the directions judge is whether separate

representationof thechildwilladdenough to thecourt’sunderstandingof

theissuesthatariseundertheHagueConventiontojustifytheintrusion,the

expenseandthedelaythatmayresult.Ihavenodifficultyinpredictingthat

inthegeneralrunofcases itwillnot.But Iwouldhesitatetousetheword

‘exceptional’.Thesubstanceiswhatcounts,notthelabel.”

TheJudgeatfirstinstanceinReC(Abduction:SeparateRepresentationofChildren)[2008]2

FLR6adopted thisdistillationof theproper enquiry tobeundertaken,namely: “whether

theseparaterepresentationofthechildwilladdenoughtothecourt’sunderstandingofthe


issues that arise under theHagueConvention to justify the intrusion and the expense and

delaythatmayresult”.

8. BurdensofProof

Theburdenofestablishingonthebalanceofprobabilitiesthataparticulardefenceismade

out lieswith the alleged abductor. If he or she cannot satisfy that evidential burden, the

defencefailsandthemandatoryobligationtodirectareturnprevails.


E. JudicialDiscretion(andhowtouseit)

EssentialReading

• ChildAbductionandCustodyAct1985(Schedule1,Articles12and13)

• H–v‐H(Abduction:Acquiescence)[1996]2FLR570


1. Introduction

AswehaveseenfromthetextofArticles12and13,establishingsettlementoradefenceis

not an absolute answer to a Convention application. It is instead a “gateway” finding. It

opensupjudicialdiscretion. Itrelievesthecourtoftheotherwisemandatoryobligationto

directareturn.Thatisnottosaythatitdrivesthecourttorefuseareturn.

WhetherareturnisdirectedafteradefenceismadeoutdependsonhowtheJudgehearing

thecaseconsidersheorsheoughttoexercisethediscretionnowavailable.

Toanextent,themanner inwhichjudicialdiscretionfallstobeexercisedwilldependupon

theparticular case and the circumstances of thedefence that has beenmadeout. There

are, however, some principles of general application relevant to the exercise of the

discretion.

2. GeneralPrinciples

Therehithertowasatwo‐stageapproachofexceptionalityappliedtoConventiondefences

in this country. First, the abductor had to make out an exception to the general rule of

return(thatis,tosuccessfullypleadadefence).Second,shehadtothenshowthatthecase

justified an exceptional exercise of the judicial discretion, so that the Judge could depart

fromConventionprinciplesandthespiritofthetreatyanddeclineareturn.

TheHouseofLordssaidinReM(Abduction:Zimbabwe)[2008]1FLR251thatthatapproach

was erroneous. There was no additional test of exceptionality built‐in at the discretion


stage. Thecircumstances inwhichareturnmightberefusedweresufficientlyexceptional.

It was unnecessary and undesirable to add a layer of complexity to the Convention.

Therefore,oncethedefenceismadeout,thediscretionwasatlarge.

ThecourtwasentitledtotakeintoaccountthevariousaspectsoftheConventionpolicy,but

alongside the issueor issues thathad given the court itsdiscretion in the firstplace. The

widerconsiderationof the child’s rightshad its place,asdidwelfare. Itwasnot thecase

thatthespiritoftheConventionshouldalwayscarrytheday,andtheweighttobegivento

Conventionconsiderationswouldvaryfromcasetocase.Thefurtherawayaparticularcase

was fromaspeedy return, the lessweightwouldbe given to thespiritof theConvention.

PerBaronessHale@266:

“[43]MyLords,incaseswhereadiscretionarisesfromthetermsoftheConvention

itself, itseemstomethatthediscretionisat large.Thecourt isentitled to

takeintoaccountthevariousaspectsoftheConventionpolicy,alongsidethe

circumstances which gave the court a discretion in the first place and the

wider considerations of the child’s rights and welfare. I would, therefore,

respectfullyagreewithThorpeLJ inthepassagequoted inpara[32]above,

save for theword ‘overriding’ if it suggests that the Convention objectives

should always be given more weight than the other considerations.

Sometimestheyshouldandsometimestheyshouldnot.

[44]That,itseemstome,isthefurthestoneshouldgoinseekingtoputaglosson

thesimple termsof theConvention.As is clear from the earlierdiscussion,

the Convention was the product of prolonged discussions in which some

careful balances were struck and fine distinctions drawn. The underlying

purposeistoprotecttheinterestsofchildrenbysecuringtheswiftreturnof

thosewhohavebeenwrongfullyremovedorretained.TheConventionitself

has defined when a child must be returned and when she need not be.

Thereafter theweight tobe given toConventionconsiderations and to the

interests of the child will vary enormously. The extent to which it will be

appropriate to investigate those welfare considerationswill also vary. But

the further away one gets from the speedy return envisaged by the

Convention,the lessweightythosegeneralConventionconsiderationsmust

be.”


Pre‐dating the decision in Re M by many years, the decision in H –v‐ H (Abduction:

Acquiescence)[1996]2FLR570stillprovidesausefulchecklistoffactorsthatacourtmight

consider weigh in the balance when deciding how to exercise the judicial discretion that

arises(perWaiteLJ@574‐575):

“(1) the comparative suitability of the forum in the competing jurisdictions to

determinethechild’sfutureinthesubstantiveproceedings;

(2) the likely outcome (inwhichever forum they be heard) of the substantive

proceedings;

the consequences of the acquiescence, with particular reference to the extent to

which the childmayhavebecomesettled in the requestedState [thiscase

concernedacquiescence– read theconsequencesof thedefence thathas

beenfoundtobemadeoutinthiscase];

the situation which would await the absconding parent and the child if

compelledtoreturntotherequestingjurisdiction;

(5) the anticipated emotional effect upon the child of an immediate return

order(afactorwhichistobetreatedassignificantbutnotasparamount);

theextenttowhichthepurposeandunderlyingphilosophyoftheHagueConvention

wouldbeatriskoffrustrationifareturnorderweretoberefused.”

ReD(AChild)(Abduction:RightsofCustody)[2007]1FLR961isauthorityfortheproposition

that the exercise of discretion ought not to take account of the court’s view of the

“morality”oftheabductor’sactions,andseeBaronessHale@981:

It was said byWaite J inW–v‐W (Child Abduction: Acquiescence) [1993] 2 FLR 211 that

thesefactorsshouldnotbeappliedrigidlyandmathematically,butinsteadusetoinforman

overallimpressiongainedfromtheevidence.Thisstatementwasmadeinthecontextofa

defenceofacquiescence,but itapropositionthat istruegenerallyofthemanner inwhich

thecourtshouldexerciseitsdiscretion.

3. DiscretionandSettlement

It isdifficult toenvisage,giventheJudgment inReM(Abduction: Zimbabwe) [2008]1FLR

251, that judicialdiscretionwouldbe exercised in favourofdirecting the returnofa child

found to be settledhere. See in particularwhat BaronessHale had to say about the less


weighttobegiventoConventionconceptswherewhatonesoughtwasnotaspeedyreturn

(referred to above). See also in particular the following paragraph from Baroness Hale’s

speech(@267):

4. DiscretionandConsent

SeeReK(Abduction:Consent)[1997]2FLR212andReD(Abduction:DiscretionaryReturn)

[2000] 1 FLR 24. Both support theproposition that, if a defence of consent ismadeout,

thenineffectthereisnoabductionandtheresultisthatthespiritoftheConventionisaless

potentfactor.ReKisadecisionofHaleJandReDofWilsonJ,whichgivessomeinsightinto

howtheHouseofLordsandtheCourtofAppeal,respectively,mighttreatthequestion.

InReD,however,returntoFrancewasdirecteddespitethefactthatadefenceofconsent

was established. Thiswas on account of the connectionof the family to France, and the

relativeeasewithwhichthecourtstherecoulddealwiththefamilydispute.

It will accordingly not always be the case that discretion will be exercised in favour of

directingareturnifconsentismadeout.

5. DiscretionandAcquiescence

H –v‐ H (Abduction: Acquiescence) [1996] 2 FLR 570 was an acquiescence case, and the

factorslistedthereremaingoodlawastowhichissuesarerelevant.

6. DiscretionandGraveRisk/Intolerability

In light of Re D (A Child)(Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2007] 1 FLR 961, a finding that

Article13(b) ismadeoutwillalsoalmost invariablyresolvethatthediscretionoughttobe

exercisedtodeclinethereturn.PerBaronessHale@981:

7. DiscretionandChild’sObjections

Thebalance to be struck is between the child’s objections and enforcing the spirit of the

Conventiondespite thoseobjections. Thecourt inReD (Abduction: DiscretionaryReturn)

[2000]1 FLR24 expressed the viewthat itwasmore likely fora return tobe refused ina

child’sobjectionscase,asopposedtocaseswheredefencesofconsentoracquiescencehad

beenmadeout.


ThecurrentthinkingonhowdiscretionfallstobeexercisedinthesecasesisalsofoundinRe

M (Abduction: Zimbabwe) [2008] 1 FLR 251 and again in the speechof Baroness Hale@

266‐267:


F. Non‐AbductionConventionCases

EssentialReading

• ReJ(ChildReturnedAbroad:ConventionRights)[2005]2FLR802

1. Introduction

The late 1990s and early 2000s saw twodivergent lines of authority arise concerning this

speciesofabduction.Thefirst,favouredbyWardLJ,wasthatthewelfareoftheparticular

child concerned was the court’s paramount consideration in non‐Convention abduction

cases.Acourthadadutytodeclinetoorderareturniftodosowouldnotbeinthatchild’s

paramountwelfareinterests.SeeReJA(ChildAbduction:Non‐ConventionCountry)[1998]1

FLR231).

The competing line of authority, preferred by Thorpe LJ, was to apply the Convention

machineryanalogouslytonon‐Conventioncases.Therewasastartingprinciplethatitwould

beinachild’s interestsforthecourts inthecountryofhishabitualresidence todecideon

hisfuture,andexceptionalcircumstanceswererequiredtodepartfromthatstartingpoint–

see Re E (Abduction: Non‐Convention Country) [1999] 2 FLR 642, Re M (Abduction:

PeremptoryReturnOrder) [1996]1FLR478andReZ (Abduction:NonConventionCountry

[1999]1FLR1270.

The latter approach gained currency and was the preferred approach until the question

reached the House of Lords in 2005 in Re J (Child Returned Abroad: Convention Rights)

[2005]2FLR802.

2. ReJ

ReJconcernedaSaudifatherandamotherwhowasadualnationalofSaudiArabiaandthe

UK. Theyhadachild. Theirmarriagefell intodisrepair. Themotherobtainedthefather’s

consenttocometoEnglandwiththechildtostudy.ShelaterresolvednottoreturntoSaudi

Arabia.ThefatherstartedproceedingsinEnglandforthechild’speremptoryreturntoSaudi

Arabiaunder thecourt’s inherent jurisdiction. That application failedat first instance,but


succeededonappeal.ThemothertookthecasetotheHouseofLordsgiventheconflicting

Court of Appeal authorities. Her case was that she would be prevented a fair hearing in

SaudiArabia,andthatshewouldnotbeabletomoveacourttheretograntherpermission

torelocatetoEnglandwiththechild.

BaronessHale(foritwasshe)gavethespeechonbehalfoftheHouse.Thecourtnippedin

thebud the competing line of authority that sawa quasi‐AbductionConvention approach

applying to thesecases. Thecourtcouldorderan immediate return inappropriate cases,

but that should not be the automatic reaction in the absence of a treaty obligation.

Likewise, a convenient starting propositionmight be that itwould bebetter for a child to

havehis future decided in his home country. There could beno “strongpresumption” in

favour of a return. The court must focus on the particular child in the particular

circumstances.Whatwasinthischild’sinterests?

Baroness Hale went on to suggest factors that might be relevant in such cases to

determiningapplicationsforsummaryreturn(seeparagraphs[33],[34],[37],[39]and[40].

ThefollowingepitomeofthosefactorsistakenfromtheheadnoteinFamilyLawReports:


3. Post‐ReJDecisions

Re H (Abduction: Non‐Convention Application) [2006] 2 FLR 314 and Re H (Abduction:

Dominica:CorporalPunishment)[2007]1FLR72bothwarrantreadingiftimepermits.

4. BilateralArrangements

The UK has a bilateral arrangement with one other State, namely Pakistan, which is of

relevance to issues of the cross‐border movement of children. Additionally, there is a

bilateralarrangementinplacebetweenEgyptandEnglandandWales.

ThearrangementwithPakistanisintheformofaProtocol.ThetextoftheoriginalProtocol,

concludedon17 January2003,appears inFamilyCourtPractice(inPart IV). Itcanalsobe

found(amongstotherplaces)onthewebsiteoftheForeignandCommonwealthOffice,at

thefollowingaddress:

http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/word/uk‐pakistan‐protocol

TheProtocolhasbeenrevisitedtwicesince,inSeptember2003andFebruary2006,andsee

thefollowinglinksforthedocumentsemergingfromthosesessions:

http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/word/UK‐Pakistan‐protocol‐guidelines

http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/word/uk‐pakistan‐points

The Protocol is primarily concernedwith child abduction cases, but cases that involve the

cross‐borderrecognitionofordersastocustodyandaccessalsofallwithinthe“spirit”,ifnot

theletter,oftheagreement.

In terms of practical operation, the Protocol looks to appoint liaison judges in the two

jurisdictions; in England and Wales, the liaison judge is Lord Justice Thorpe. The liaison

judgesareintendedtoworktogethertoadvancetheobjectsoftheProtocol.

The arrangement with Egypt is styled as an agreement known as the Cairo Declaration,

whichwasconcludedon17January2005.AcopyoftheDeclarationisreproducedinFamily

CourtPractice(inPart IV). Itcomprisesaseriesofagreedprinciplestobeappliedtocross‐


border cases, whether relating to abduction or recognition/enforcement of orders, as

betweenthetwojurisdictions.

Far less has been written about the Cairo Declaration than the Anglo‐Pakistan Protocol.

However,thespiritoftheagreementsissufficientlysimilartoenabletheguidanceissuedin

relationtothelattertobeappliedanalogouslytotheformer.

NeithertheProtocolnorthedeclarationisabindingarrangement.Further,bothconcluded

priortotheHouseofLords’decisioninReJ.Accordingly,anythingsaidineitherdocument

mustbereadassubjecttotheprinciplesfoundinthatcaseaboutthetaskandapproachof

theEnglishcourt.


G. Sequestration

EssentialReading

• Richardson–v‐Richardson[1990]1FLR186

• ReS(Abduction:Sequestration)[1995]1FLR858

1. Introduction

AWritofSequestrationisaWritofExecutionintheHighCourt.Traditionally,itwasaform

ofpunishmentthatthecourtwouldconsiderapplyingwhendealingwithacontemnorwho

hasfailedtoperformanactwithinaspecifiedtime,orelsewhohasdisobeyedaninjunction.

Sequestrationhasbeenused inabductionproceedingsasa fulcrumtomoveanabductor,

especiallyinnon‐Conventionproceedings,toobeyordersrelatingtothereturnofachildto

EnglandandWales.

AWritofSequestrationordersthirdpartiestotakepossessionofthepropertyorassetsof

thecontemnor,andtomanagethemorotherwiseapplytheminaparticularway.

2. Whenisitappropriate?

Giventhatitisdesignedtoaddresscontempt,theremustbeanordertobeenforced,which

must have been served personally on the contemnor. Alternatively, the court must be

persuadedthatitcandispensewiththerequirementforpersonalservice,onthebasisthat

theorderhasbeenbroughttotheattentionofthecontemnorinsomeotherway.

Theordermustalsobeendorsedwithapenalnotice.

There must be property within the jurisdiction that is susceptible to the Writ of

Sequestration.Thiscanincluderealandpersonalproperty,freeholdorleasehold interests,

choses inaction,pensionsandstocks. Sequestrationcannotbedeployedagainstproperty

ownedbythecontemnorastrustee.


3. Procedure

Sequestration isonlyavailable in theHighCourt,andcasesproceedingatother levelswill

needtobetransferreduptoenablesequestrationtobedeployed.

TheleaveofthecourtisrequiredtoissuetheWrit.TheapplicationforleaveisbyNoticeof

Motion stating the grounds of the application. This must be supported by an affidavit.

Consentstoactonthepartofthewould‐besequestratorsmustalsobefiled.

TheNoticeofMotionmustbeservedpersonallyonthecontemnor(althoughthecourtcan

provide for substitutedserviceordispensewith italtogether if satisfied that theNoticeof

Motionhascometothecontemnor’sattentionthroughsomeothermeans).Whetherleave

shouldbegrantedisamatterofjudicialdiscretion.

If leave is granted to issue aWrit, four sequestrators takepossessionof the contemnor’s

property.Thecourtmayauthorisepaymentsoutforparticularpurposes,maysanctionthe

sale,mortgageorlettingofproperty,etc.

The sequestration lasts until the contemnor has cleared his contempt, when it will be

discharged.Thecourtmaydischargeitsooneronapplication.

RSCOrder45,rules5to7apply.

4. Inaction

InRichardson‐v‐Richardson[1990]1FLR186, thecourtwasaskedwhethersequestrators

shouldbepermittedtoraisemoneyagainstthesecurityofapropertyleftbehindinEngland

byanabductingmother,and toprovide thatmoney to the father touse to fund litigation

abroad. Thecourthadnodifficulty inconcluding that itwasappropriate tosanction that

course of action; to dootherwisewould render the sequestrationnugatory. This had the

desiredeffect;thechildrenwerepromptlyreturnedtoEngland.

InMir –v‐ Mir [1992] 1 FLR 624, the court permitted the sale of a property in England

belonging to a father who had abducted aWard of court to Pakistan, for the purpose of

ensuringthatthemothercouldfinancelitigationinPakistan.


The contemnor in Re S (Abduction: Sequestration) [1995] 1 FLR 858 was a third party, a

friendoftheabductingmother.Thecourtwassatisfiedthatthemother’sfriendknewofthe

ordersmadebythecourt,andwascomplicitintheirdeliberatefrustrationofthoseorders.

Permission was granted to issue a Writ of Sequestration against the property of the

mother’sfriend.

5. Disadvantages

Sequestration is notoriously expensive, involving as it does four professionals in the

management of the contemnor’s assets and properties. It is not uncommon for the

sequestrators’ costs quickly to run into figures measured in tens, or even hundreds of

thousandsofpounds.

Theskillsetrequiredtoactasasequestrator isaspecialistone,whichrestrictsthepoolof

individuals towhomonemight turn. This specialisationadds to the cost issue referred to

above.

Thecourtwillbeunlikelytosanctionacourseofactionthatwillnotenrichanybodybutthe

sequestrators–that is,therewillneedtobeenoughavailable intermsofthecontemnor’s

assetstomaketheexercisecommerciallyviable(seeClark–v‐Clark[1989]1FLR174).

As a general rule, I would not consider sequestration as being sensible unless therewere

unencumbered assets belonging to the contemnorwithin the jurisdiction in the region of

£100,000.

6. AlternativestoSequestration

If one hopes to cut off financial supply to an abductor, for example, by preventing him

accessing bank accounts that are enabling him to operate abroad and continue to stay

beyond the reach of court orders, this can readily be achieved by way of a freezing

injunction,withouttheaddedcomplicationandcostofsequestration.

Where a fighting‐fund is sought to enable a left‐behind parent to take part in litigation

abroad,thismightbealternativelyobtainedundertheMatrimonialCausesAct1973(seeAl

Khatib –v‐Masry [2002]1FLR1053,wherea fighting fundof£2.5millionwasawarded in

ancillary relief proceedings to enable awife to engage in litigation abroad to recover her


abductedchildren)and/orundersection15of,Schedule1to,theChildrenAct1989(ReS(A

Child:FinancialProvision)[2005]2FLR94).

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