Download - MOUNTAIN BLUEBIRD MANUSCRIPT REVIEW HISTORY MANUSCRIPT ... · MOUNTAIN BLUEBIRD MANUSCRIPT REVIEW HISTORY . MANUSCRIPT (ROUND 3) ... function of which theory is primed, ... minimal

1

MOUNTAIN BLUEBIRD MANUSCRIPT REVIEW HISTORY MANUSCRIPT (ROUND 3)

Abstract Consumers often make inferences when they do not have complete information regarding products. Our research shows that consumers often have contradictory naïve theories about the implications of common market phenomena, and that they draw different conclusions as a function of which theory is primed, even when the available information is held constant. Eight experiments demonstrate this basic process. The results show that some of consumers’ commonly held beliefs about various elements of the marketing mix can be contradictory, and drive product evaluations in opposite directions as a function of which naïve theory is active at the time of judgment making. Finally, we discuss the role of consumer knowledge as a moderator of these observations.

2

Consumers rarely have complete information regarding products about which they form judgments. To compensate for this uncertainty, consumers use a variety of inferential strategies to fill the gaps in their product knowledge prior to making judgments and choices (Gunasti and Ross 2009; Kardes, Posavac, and Cronley 2004). For example, consumers will often infer a product’s overall quality (Kardes et al. 2004a), the level of a missing attribute (Dick, Chakravarti, and Biehal 1990), or the social signaling potential of a product (Berger and Heath 2007), and use these inferences when making a decision with incomplete information. Our research focuses on the natural origin of those inferences (i.e., naïve theories) and the implications of the active naïve theory when conflicting alternatives exist.

Naïve theories are informal, common-sense, explanations people use in their everyday lives to make sense of their environment, and often diverge from formal ‘scientific’ explanations of what actually happens (Furnham, 1988). The naïve theories we focus on in this study can be defined as consumers’ assumptions about marketing tactics. Consumers hold many naïve theories pertaining to a variety of domains, including causality (Faro, McGill, and Hastie 2010), metacognitive experiences (Schwarz 2004), and judgment processes (Tsai and McGill 2011). They actually hold so many theories that more than one might be applicable to a given situation, and different theories may compete, and, in some cases, even contradict one another. Our goal is to identify consumers’ naïve theories related to marketing communications, and to investigate variables that lead one theory to dominate.

Recent research has explored how a variety of naïve theories are used as the basis for consumer inference (e.g., Labroo and Mukhopadhyay 2009; Raghunathan, Naylor, and Hoyer 2006; Yorkston, Nunes, and Matta 2010). Posavac, Herzenstein, Kardes, and Sundaram (2010), for example, report that consumers use a firm’s profitability as an inferential basis to generate an attitude about the firm according to the assumption that a profitable firm will possess a constellation of favorable traits. Consumers’ use of this naïve theory often leads to a host of judgmental consequences about a product advertised by a profitable firm, including more favorable evaluations of the firm, perceptions of greater advertisement credibility, more positive brand attitudes, and increased purchase intention. We suggest, though, that consumers’ use of naïve theories is often much more complex. For many marketplace phenomena, consumers may hold multiple potentially contradictory naïve theories that may have opposing evaluative implications, and thus drive different inferences as a function of which theory is active at the time of judgment.

The purpose of our research is twofold. First, we seek to demonstrate that priming different naïve theories regarding a marketplace phenomenon may lead to very different judgments depending on the theory that is salient. Moreover, we seek to delineate several important competing naïve theories about common options within the marketing mix. Thus, our research aims to contribute both on a theoretical front by advancing our knowledge regarding naïve theories and the role they play in inference formation, as well as practically by documenting several sets of competing naïve theories that could be leveraged in practice by increasing the salience of a naïve theory favorable to a firm’s offerings. When Naïve Theories are Contradictory

We suggest that consumers often hold naïve theories about everyday market experiences that have contradictory implications. For example, consumers frequently assume that communications are generally informative and truthful because they have a naïve theory suggesting that communicators are typically helpful (Grice 1975). At the same time, consumers assume that marketing communications are often biased and untrustworthy, because they have a naïve theory suggesting that marketers are motivated to maximize sales via deception or manipulation (Campbell and Kirmani 2008). Hung and Wyer (2008) showed

3

that both of these theories (communications are truthful vs. untrustworthy) can play a role in the interpretation of an ad, and that their relative impact depends on both characteristics of the ad and the level of motivation to think about implications.

Naïve theories associated with the effort required to generate a piece of art can influence the perceived artistic merit of the work (Cho and Schwarz 2008). Specifically, individuals may assume that great artists can produce masterpieces quickly and with relatively little effort, or they may assume that creating great art requires considerable time and effort (Kruger et al. 2004). Cho and Schwarz (2008) showed that those who were primed to make the latter inference rule accessible (i.e., “good-art takes-effort”), positive inferences about quality were drawn from the reported effort that the artist put into his work. Conversely, for those who were primed to make the former inference rule accessible (i.e., “good-art-takes-talent”), inferences about quality decreased with perceived artistic effort. In other research, inferences about the time elapsed between two causally related events can be manipulated by priming different naïve theories about causality (Faro, McGill, and Hastie 2010). Together these results illustrate within the context of evaluative judgments that inferences are malleable through priming because of the preexistence of competing naïve theories.

The susceptibility of evaluative judgments to the priming of naïve theories may have important implications for understanding consumers’ reactions to product communications. Because of the nature of advertising, marketing communications are only able to provide partial information. Then, the consumer must “fill in” the missing information in order to make a purchase decision. Thus, to fill in these informational gaps, consumers often form inferences about what they do not know based on the information that is available (Kardes et al. 2004b). Naïve theories are very useful for consumers because they can be activated with minimal cognitive effort, and can be readily applied to guide inferences regarding marketing communications, products, services, and so on. In our in our current project, we illustrate how commonly held naïve theories may conflict, and how, depending on the availability of one inference rule or another, product evaluations will differ.

It should be noted that not all consumers will be equally susceptible to the priming of opposing naïve theories. Consumers who are experts in a domain have far fewer informational gaps. Thus, we would expect that the judgments of consumers with expertise in a given domain would be less likely to be affected by naïve theory priming. This expectation is consistent with prior work that demonstrates that contextual manipulations of focus are less likely to drive the product judgments of experts versus non-experts (Posavac et al. 2005). Ubiquitous Consumption-Related Naïve Theories

A major focus of marketing research deals with marketing mix variables. Among these variables price has received considerable attention (Ofir and Winer 2002). Not only does price directly impact firms’ revenues, it is also a communication tool and it may carry very different product implications (Monroe 2003). For example, high prices can be interpreted as a cue for high quality (Bagwell and Riordan 1991; Cronley et al. 2005; Rao and Monroe 1989). On the other hand consumers often perceive price as a sacrifice (Zeithaml 1988) and therefore high prices can be judged as “too expensive” (Heyman and Mellers 2008). Thus, high prices may be interpreted as either a sign of high quality or low value depending on the inference rule accessible when price information is processed.

Another interesting facet of pricing strategies is the use of promotions to increase sales. Although consumers typically perceive that marketing and advertising are synonymous, marketers spend three times as much on sales promotions as they do on advertising (Belch and Belch 2009). This tendency is in large part due to the attractiveness of promoted products, and the powerful and readily measurable influence sales promotions have on consumers’

4

buying. Some critics, though, have noted that sales promotion can have potentially damaging effects on brand equity (Jones 1990). The pressing question, then, is when will a consumer promotion be perceived as a “good deal” (Raghubir, Inman, and Grande 2004) versus a signal of poor quality (i.e., the manufacturer is offering a deal on an inferior product; Lichtenstein, Burton, and O'Hara 1989). Thus, the conclusion that a consumer draws regarding a product that is being offered on deal may depend on which naïve theory is active during judgment.

Marketers often rely on social influence techniques to increase the effectiveness of their persuasive attempts (Cialdini 2009; Cialdini and Goldstein 2004). One of the most powerful social influence techniques involves providing evidence that many people believe, or choose, in accordance with a marketer’s aims (i.e., “social validation” or “social proof” in Cialdini’s parlance). Another common appeal is scarcity. That is, the marketer will imply that a product or service has limited availability, it is rare, and thus, because of the scarcity, the product has value (e.g., because others are buying the product up, and depleting inventory). Thus, although demonstrating that a product is popular can be an effective means to increase its perceived value (Bearden and Etzel 1982; Childers and Rao 1992; Witt 1969), highlighting the scarcity of a product can also enhance its desirability (Lynn 1992; Worchel, Lee, and Adewole 1975). Moreover, when a product is perceived to be select, the social signal is sent that the product is desirable (Berger and Heath 2007; Snyder and Fromkin 1980). Clearly, even if these techniques are not mutually exclusive, different mechanisms may be driving each. In the case of social validation appeals, the fact that a large proportion of people prefers, or has bought, the product implies that the product must be good. With regard to scarcity, perceived value is increased precisely by the fact that only a limited number of people have access to the product. Thus, learning that a product is widely available may serve both as a cue of its popularity and high utility, or as an indication that the product is commonplace, lacks exclusivity, and thus is of low worth. Accordingly, consumers may take one of two divergent inferential paths as a function of which naïve theory is active.

Another area in which naïve theories can have countervailing results is the complexity with which an advertisement or product description is constructed. Typically, persuasion increases with comprehensibility of a message (Eagly 1974). Most research on processing fluency has shown that easy to process information leads to more positive evaluations (e.g. Oppenheimer 2006; Reber, Winkielman, and Schwarz 1998). Yet, complexity can be valued in certain contexts (Armstrong 1980). Disfluency leads to more positive evaluations when consumers are confronted with utilitarian contexts or products. But complexity has an aversive effect and leads to lower evaluations for hedonic contexts and products (Galak and Nelson 2010). These results suggest that technical information in an ad can make it appear more detailed and informative, as well as more difficult to understand. Therefore, we hypothesize that the use of technical information may differentially impact judgments depending on the naïve theory that is active.

The existence of competing naïve theories creates marketing communication challenges. Persuasion is enabled by the “congruence between the message content and the recipients’ accessible knowledge and goal” (Maio and Haddock 2007, p. 577). Successfully matching an argument to recipients’ salient knowledge and goals increases motivation, personal relevance, and perceived validity (Fabrigar and Petty 1999, Petty and Wegener 1998). This principle suggests that marketers need to understand the importance of activating one of competing naïve theories in order to match the appeal to consumers’ salient knowledge.

Overview of the Experiments

5

Over the course of eight experiments we show that coexisting, competing, naïve theory activation is subject to priming (experiment 1), colors evaluation of subsequent information (experiments 2-6 and 8), and plays a central role in the inference process (experiments 6 and 7). Our hope was not only to document that priming different naïve theories can result in consumers drawing different conclusions from identical information, but also to highlight key naïve theories that are ubiquitous in consumers’ judgments. To this end, our experiments consider three different consumer goods and two priming manipulations (a magazine article in experiments 2 to 4; order in which participants performed judgment tasks in experiments 6 and 8) to investigate the role of naïve theories in pricing, promotion, advertising, and product descriptions.

In each experiment that considers product evaluations, we predict that a product would be evaluated more favorably when a communication matched the primed theory. Additionally, Experiments 6 and 7 offer evidence of the central role of activated naïve theories in the inference process, and Experiment 8 presents evidence that category expertise defuses the effect of naïve theory priming.

EXPERIMENT 1

When competing naïve theories coexist, we expect that situational factors can make

one theory more salient than another and determine which of the competing theories will be used as an inference rule. The focus of the first experiment is to show that priming leads consumers to use a given naïve theory (instead of another) to inform marketplace beliefs.

Method

Participants and design. One hundred fifteen marketing students participated in the experiment in exchange for extra course credit, and were randomly assigned to one of six priming conditions. . The specific conditions were pricing prime (quality vs. value), promotion prime (quality vs. value), and social influence prime (exclusivity vs. popularity).

General Procedure. Following the procedure used by Cho and Schwarz (2008), participants were asked to participate in multiple ostensibly unrelated studies that had been grouped together for time efficiency purposes. The first study was described as a task about memory and comprehension, and included the priming manipulation. Participants were told that they would read a short article and that questions about the article would come later in the survey package. For each set of naïve theories two versions of an article were used in order to prime one of two competing naïve theories.

After reading the article, participants completed a short filler task that was presented as Study 2, and titled: “Design and Personality.” Participants were shown several exemplars belonging to three categories of common consumer products (forks, cell phones, and watches), and were asked to select their favorite design in each category. After making the selections of their favorite designs, participants were asked to answer a series of questions that presumably measured aspects of their personality. The purpose of the filler task was to eliminate short-term memory effects (McConnell 2001), and preclude demand effects.

The presumed “third study” was described as an investigation of consumers’ opinions and beliefs, and included the main dependent variables. Participants were asked to rate statements relating to various general and marketing relevant phenomena such as, “Product placement in TV shows are”. The response scale ranged from 1 (very effective) to 9 (only disruptive). We embedded three bipolar items into the study (described below) to capture participants’ beliefs for each set of naïve theories (Tormala, Clarkson, and Henderson 2011).

6

Finally, as the second part of the “Memory and Comprehension study” (alleged study 1), participants were asked to summarize in their own words the main idea of the article in order to check that they read and understood it, and answered questions about the article on seven point Likert scales ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very): “How difficult was the article?”; “How credible was the article?”; “How persuasive was the article?”. A suspicion check was included at the end of the questionnaire.

Priming Manipulations and Naïve Theory Measures

Naïve Theories about Price. An article that was presumably taken from HGTV.com, a website that features home improvement tips, served as the prime for the naïve theories related to price. In both conditions, the article focused on relevant issues for choosing new flooring. The three paragraph articles were identical with the exception of four target sentences in the last paragraph (see Appendix A). There, the article focused on the different options available for hardwood floors along with some advice from a designer. In the version that was designed to prime the “value” theory, the designer emphasized the importance of getting a good value for the price: “Remember that more expensive does not always mean better. Take bamboo for example: it is cheaper than other exotic woods, but it is resistant to wear and very stylish. You need to consider your needs carefully in order to get “more bang for your buck”. When the time comes for reselling, a good value for the price will guarantee a better return on investment than expensive products.” In the other condition priming the “quality” theory, the designer emphasized the higher quality of expensive materials: “Remember that price is a first indicator of quality. Take ebony for example, it is more expensive than most exotic woods but it is more resistant and has incomparable style. You need to consider your needs carefully in order to get the best you can afford. When the time comes for reselling, an expensive product will guarantee a better return on your investment by making your house stand out from the competition.” Naïve theories were measured as part of the alleged study 3 when participants rated the statement: “A product with a high manufacturer’s suggested retail price is usually:” using a Likert scale ranging from 1 (A poor value for the money) to 9 (High quality).

Naïve Theories about Promotion. An article that was ostensibly taken from Parade magazine entitled “Travel Industry Searches for ‘The Great Escape’” served as the prime for the naïve theory related to promotion. As with the article described above, both versions were identical except for the last paragraph in which the naïve theory was primed. The version of the article read by participants in the “good value” condition discussed how recent deals offered incomparable value. Specifically the article read, “It offers discounted rates on luxury accommodations in top of the line hotels and preferred airlines. Typically, these packages are only affordable by wealthy travelers. With the exchange rate moving toward more buying power for the American dollar, American travelers can “escape” to Europe on a luxury vacation package while still conserving their discretionary spending.” In contrast, the “lower quality” version of the article discussed how companies are reducing service as they lower prices, and read, “It offers discounted rates on what seems to be luxury accommodations, however, consumers shouldn’t expect the lavish service typically offered by these premium providers. Instead, the providers are simultaneously lowering prices and reducing services. It may be less expensive, but it is also less valuable. So the question might be who will be “escaping” with the new deals being offered in the travel industry: the traveler or the travel industry.” The naïve theory was captured using a statement rating (Tormala et al. 2011) as part of the alleged study 3. The statement read: “A product offered at a special discounted price represents,” and the rating scale ranged from 1 (low product quality) to 9 (a good value for the money).

7

Naïve Theories about Social Influence. The priming of social influence theories also used two versions of an article purportedly from Parade magazine entitled, “Tell me the time, I will tell you who you are.” The article described how the watch you wear can tell something about your personality. Similar to the priming of the previous sets of theories, the first two paragraphs of the story were identical in each version, and the last paragraph described, “James Bond’s Omega watch,” and contained the manipulations. The article either noted that, “There are millions of owners who unanimously acknowledge the quality of the material and the reliability of the mechanism. Everybody loves them” (Popularity primed) or suggested that, “The first distinctive quality of such a watch is the rarity of the material and the uniqueness of the mechanism. Not everybody can own one” (Exclusivity primed). Consumers’ naïve theory about social influence was captured by the following item: “Good products usually are,” which ranged from 1 (Very popular – Everybody loves them) to 9 (Very exclusive – Only select people can buy them).

Results and Discussion

Our initial analyses investigated the success of the manipulations, and probed for confounds. Based on the short summaries of the article provided by the participants at the end of the study, we concluded that all participants read and understood the article containing the priming manipulation. Consistent with our intention to manipulate priming with equivalent versions of an article, a series of ANOVAs did not reveal any differences across conditions in the difficulty, credibility, or persuasiveness of the article (all Fs<1). Two participants perceived a link between the different studies and were excluded from subsequent analysis.

The primary analyses were conducted to explore our hypotheses regarding the effect of priming a naïve theory on consumers’ beliefs about marketplace relationships. In line with our expectations, for each set of opposing naïve theories, the primed theory affected consumers’ beliefs. Specifically, those primed with the “good value” (vs. “quality”) theory were more likely to perceive that a high product price is synonymous with low value (vs. product excellence), M = 4.95 vs. 6.42, t(37) = 3.68, p < .01. Similarly, participants primed with the theory that a discounted promotional price signals good value (vs. lower quality) were more likely to view a discounted price as a signal of good value for the money (M = 6.17 vs. 4.43, t(38) = 3.33, p < .01). Finally, participants who received a social influence prime suggesting that exclusivity (vs. popularity) is good were more likely to believe that good products are those that only select people can own (M = 5.63 vs. 3.94, t(32) = 3.67, p < .01).

Experiment 1 shows that the priming of one of two opposing naïve theories can drive the perceived meaning of various market cues. Indeed, participants’ stated beliefs highlight how two ubiquitous theories that consumers often use in forming inferences can be contradictory. Whether regarding product price, promotion, or popularity, consumers may interpret a given cue in very different ways as a function of which naïve theory is active.

One of our aims was to document a series of naïve theories that are particularly relevant in consumer judgment. Although Experiment 1 demonstrates that priming opposing naïve theories affects consumers’ beliefs, much more compelling evidence would be provided if the naïve theory that is primed can be shown to drive evaluations of specific products unrelated to the context in which a naïve theory is primed.

EXPERIMENT 2

The purpose of Experiment 2 was to assess the implications for product evaluations in

the absence of priming or when consumers are primed with one of two opposing naïve theories about product price. Specifically, the study featured a between-subjects manipulation

8

of whether no prime, “quality,” or “value” was primed prior to participants reading about a brand of wine with either a high or low price point. We expected that consumers’ evaluations of the brand would be more favorable when the theory that is primed matches (vs. mismatches) the price point of the product under consideration. That is, we expect that brand evaluation should not be significantly different in control condition since in the absence of priming these theories should be equally likely to get activated, but brand evaluations would be more favorable when a “quality” prime was associated with a high price, or a “value” prime is associated with a low price compared to other conditions.

Method

Participants. Ninety-four introductory marketing students participated in exchange for extra credit.

Procedure. Following Cho and Schwarz (2008), participants were asked to participate in multiple ostensibly unrelated studies that had been grouped together for time efficiency purposes. Similar to Experiment 1, the first study was described as a task about memory and comprehension, and included the priming manipulation. We used the same article about flooring presumably from HGTV.com to manipulate the priming of the competing naïve theories of quality versus value. The no prime condition used the same article, but did not refer to price in the last paragraph. To preclude short term memory and demand effects, participants completed a short filler task.

The alleged study three was introduced as an investigation of consumers’ evaluations. Participants were presented with an ad for a bottle of wine (see Appendix B). Half of the participants received an advertisement that listed the price of the bottle as low ($4.99), whereas the other half were told that the price was high ($39.99). After reading the ad participants provided their evaluation of the wine on three seven-point Likert items (overall evaluation, overall impression, and overall assessment) that were anchored by 1 (extremely bad/extremely unfavorable) and 7 (extremely good/extremely favorable).

After completing the evaluation measures participants were asked to summarize in their own words the main idea of the flooring article to check that they properly read the article, and to respond to questions regarding its difficulty, credibility, and persuasiveness. Results and Discussion

Manipulation check and checks for confounds. All participants summarized the article

accurately. In line with the results of experiment 1, there was no indication of any differences in perceived difficulty, credibility or persuasiveness of the article as a function of experimental treatment (all Fs < 1).

Evaluation. We aggregated the items used to assess product evaluations because they appeared to constitute a single construct (α = .91). A 3 (priming condition: quality, price, or no prime) X 2 (price condition: low vs. high) ANOVA did not reveal any significant main effect but showed a significant interaction, F(1, 88)= 5.49, p<.01. Specifically, when no theory was primed there was no significant difference in evaluation: M= 4.27 vs. 3.94, t<1. When the naïve theory that a high price is an indication of quality was primed, the evaluation was higher for the high price wine (M= 4.60) than the low price wine (M= 3.41), t(88)= 2.93, p< .01 (two-tailed). The reverse pattern was observed when the naïve theory that a low price suggests a good value: M= 3.92 when the price was high versus M= 4.58 when the price was low. The difference was marginally significant, t(88) = 1.71, p= .09 (two-tailed).

Experiment 2 shows that product evaluation is contingent on the naïve theory active at the time of judgment. In order to fully support the matching hypothesis, we need to focus on

9

the cells in which the characteristics of a product match the naïve theory primed (i.e. a high priced product when the naïve theory of quality is active, and a low priced product when the naïve theory about price and value is active) as well as the cells in which the product’s characteristics mismatch the theory active (i.e. a low priced product when the naïve theory about quality is primed, and a high priced product when the naïve theory about the relationship between price and value is primed). Experiment 3 concentrates on these specific conditions.

EXPERIMENT 3

The purpose of Experiment 3 was to further investigate the role of matching the

primed naïve theory to the price information used in an ad by focusing on the conditions in which the price information is consistent. Specifically we expected a crossover interaction in which matching conditions (“value” prime/low price and “quality” prime/high price) would lead to higher evaluations than mismatching conditions.

Method

Participants. Ninety students enrolled in introductory marketing participated in the study in exchange for extra credit and were randomly assigned to an experimental condition.

Procedure. We followed the same procedure and priming manipulation as in experiment 2. The only notable differences in experiment 3 were: (1) the absence of a control condition (to allow focusing on the matching hypothesis) and (2) a more subtle manipulation of price. Half of the participants received an advertisement that listed the price of the bottle of wine as $9.99 (low price condition), whereas the other half were told that the price was $39.99 (high price condition). Participants provided their evaluation of the wine on three seven-point Likert items (overall evaluation, overall impression, and overall assessment). Results and Discussion

Manipulation check and checks for confounds. Participants’ summaries suggested that they read and understood the article, and we did not find any indication of any differences in perceived difficulty, credibility or persuasiveness of the article across conditions (all Fs < 1).

Evaluation. We tested our hypotheses by assessing the effect of the theory primed and price of the wine on product evaluations. Overall evaluation, overall impression, and overall assessment were averaged to obtain an aggregate measure of evaluation (α = .90). Consistent with expectations, a 2 (theory primed: quality vs. value) X 2 (price point: high vs. low) ANOVA revealed the anticipated interaction, F(1, 86) = 6.841, p < .05. No main effects were significant (all Fs < 1). To explore the nature of the interaction, we conducted a planned contrast which compared conditions in which the theory primed and the product price point matched (i.e., value primed/low price point and quality primed/high price point) versus mismatched. In accordance with our expectations of a crossover interaction, results demonstrated that product evaluations were more favorable when the primed theory matched the price point of the wine, M = 4.68 versus 4.13, t(86) = 2.616, p < .05. As we expected this contrast was driven by more favorable evaluations of the high versus low priced wine when quality was primed, M = 4.59 versus 4.01, t(86) = 1.897, p = .031 (one-tailed), but more favorable evaluations of the low versus high priced wine when value was primed, M = 4.77 versus 4.22, t(86) = 1.847, p = .034 (one-tailed).

-------------------- INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

10

--------------------

Consumers draw different conclusions depending on which naïve theory is active at the time of judgment. Specifically, participants’ responses to advertisements featuring the wine brand with either a low price or a high price were dependent on which naïve theory was active: high price signals product quality, or low price equates good value. Our participants formed more favorable product evaluations when the advertisement featured a high price versus low price when “quality” was primed, but the reverse pattern was obtained when “value” was active.

EXPERIMENT 4

Experiment 4 investigates consumers’ reactions to sales promotions. The purpose of this experiment is to explore how consumers’ evaluations of a promoted product may vary based on the naïve theory that they bring to the judgmental context. Consistent with our matching notions developed earlier, we expected that when the link between price promotion and good value was activated through priming, offering a product with a sales promotion would augment consumers’ evaluations, whereas when the quality implications of lower promotional price were primed, a promotion would undermine evaluations.

Method

Participants and design. Seventy undergraduate students participated in the study in exchange for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of a 2 (theory primed: value vs. quality) X 2 (marketing communication: promotional price vs. no promotion) between-subjects design.

Procedure. The procedure was similar to that followed in the previous experiment. Participants were again asked to participate in several presumably unrelated studies. In this experiment participants were asked to read an article in order to prime one of two naïve theories related to promotion: a sale or discounted price signals either “good value” or “lower quality.” The article including the priming manipulation was the same article about the travel industry used in Experiment 1 and was followed by the same filler task as in previous experiments.

Participants responded to the main dependent measures by rating their evaluation of a can of Columbian coffee that they read about in an advertisement. In the “no promotion condition” a description of the coffee was presented with a price of $6.89. In the “promotion” condition, the same can of coffee was advertized in the same way, but its original price was crossed over, though still clearly legible, and a promotion price of $5.51 was displayed. The product evaluation items were identical to those used in previous experiments (i.e., overall evaluation, overall impression, and overall assessment). After completing the evaluation measures participants were asked to summarize the main idea of the travel industry article, and respond to questions regarding its credibility, persuasiveness, and interest. Results and Discussion

Manipulation check and checks for confounds. In accordance with our intent and consistent with the results of Experiment 1, a series of ANOVAs revealed no evidence of any differences in participants’ reaction to the travel article across priming manipulations on dimensions of credibility, persuasiveness, and interest (all Fs < 1). All participants summarized the main points of the article accurately.

11

Evaluation. As in Experiments 2 and 3, an aggregate evaluation score was computed based on the individual items (α = .86). As anticipated, a 2 (naïve theory primed) X 2 (marketing communication) ANOVA revealed a significant interaction, F (1, 66) = 4.97, p < .05 and no main effects, (Fs < 1). Consistent with expectations and the results of the previous experiment, a planned contrast of product evaluations as a function of whether the naïve theory matched versus mismatched the promotion condition revealed that evaluations were more favorable under conditions of match (value is primed/promotion condition, quality is primed/no promotion condition) than mismatch (value is primed/no promotion condition, quality is primed/promotion condition), M = 4.47 versus 3.95, t(66) = 2.229, p < .05. Specific contrasts demonstrated that the evaluation of the coffee offered with a promotion was higher when participants were primed with the theory that a sales deal signals good value rather than when they were primed with the theory that a promotion equates to poor quality, M =4.46 vs. 3.78, t(66) = 1.985, p = .025 (one-tailed). When the promotion was present, the pattern directionally reversed, but the difference was not significant, M = 4.48 vs. 4.12, t(66) = 1.137, p = .13 (one-tailed).


--------------------

The results of Experiment 4 were consistent both with our expectations as well as the implications of Experiment 3. As in the previous study, priming opposing naïve theories resulted in consumers forming different evaluations of a product on the basis of the same information. More specifically, this experiment identifies a driver of consumers’ responses to an important element of the marketing mix: sales promotion, an often-used tool in the marketers’ toolbox. Value-conscious consumers are likely to respond favorably to a product being offered under price inducement because they may perceive it to be a good value. In contrast, those who are focused on quality are likely to be the embodiment of marketers’ fears that sales promotion can undermine product evaluations and brand equity.

EXPERIMENT 5

Experiment 5 investigates the impact of priming exclusivity versus popularity on the

effectiveness of two social influence techniques: social validation versus scarcity (Cialdini 2009). This experiment uses a similar design as previous experiments by explicitly priming one of the two theories using the same article as in Experiment 1. Method

Participants and design. Eighty-six undergraduates who received extra course credit were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (theory primed: popularity vs. exclusivity) X 2 (social influence appeal: social validation vs. scarcity) between-subjects design.

Procedure. The procedure was identical to that followed in the earlier experiments. Participants were again asked to participate in several presumably unrelated studies and read an article in order to prime one of two naïve theories (identical to the one used in the first experiment and priming either popularity or exclusivity). As in the previous studies, a filler task was included. The main dependent measures captured evaluations (overall evaluation, overall impression, overall assessment) of a bottle of wine described in an advertisement. The ad, (similar to Experiments 2 and 3) contained either a social validation appeal: “More than 200,000 cases sold” or a scarcity appeal: “Less than 2000 cases available.” Finally, after

12

completing the evaluation items participants summarized the main idea of the travel industry article, and responded to questions regarding its credibility, persuasiveness, and interest. Results and Discussion

Manipulation check and checks for confounds. Participants’ summaries of the article were accurate. Consistent with our intention to manipulate priming with two versions of an article that did not differ in other respects, a series of ANOVAs replicated Experiment 1 and did not reveal differences across conditions in terms of the credibility, persuasiveness, or interest of the article (all Fs<1).

Evaluation. To test our hypotheses we followed a similar strategy to that of the previous two experiments. The product evaluation items appeared to comprise a single construct (α = .95), and were aggregated. Consistent with expectations, a 2 (theory primed: popularity vs. exclusivity) X 2 (social influence appeal: social validation vs. scarcity) ANOVA revealed an interaction, F (1,80) = 9.057, p < .005 and the absence of main effects (Fs < 1). A planned contrast exploring the nature of the interaction was consistent with the results of the previous experiments. Specifically, when we compared conditions in which the theory primed and the social influence appeal in the advertisement matched (i.e., exclusivity primed/scarcity appeal and popularity primed/social validation appeal) versus mismatched, we found that product evaluations were more favorable, M = 4.64 versus 3.81, t (80) = 3.009, p < .005. As expected this contrast was driven by the greater effectiveness of the scarcity versus social validation appeal when exclusivity was primed, M = 4.68 versus 3.91, t (80) = 1.980, p = .025 (one-tailed), but the greater efficacy of the social validation versus scarcity appeal when popularity was primed, M = 4.60 versus 3.71, t (80) = 2.276, p = .01 (one-tailed).


-------------------- Experiment 5 provides a general replication of the earlier experiments because, once

again, priming different naïve theories leads to consumers forming different evaluative inferences based on identical product information. Whether a widely distributed and consumed or scarce wine led to more evaluative favorability was determined by whether “exclusivity” or “popularity” was active in participants’ minds.

EXPERIMENT 6

Experiment 6 was conducted to replicate the previous results using a different, more

subtle, priming manipulation (an order of judgment task, Cho and Schwarz 2008; Experiment 2), and to investigate the relationship between the active naïve theory and judgment. Theories were primed by either asking participants if the wine was exclusive (exclusivity primed) or popular (popularity primed) before they evaluated the bottle of wine. As in the prior experiments, we expected the new prime to affect product evaluation as a function of the interaction between the prime and the type of product appeal.

The second, and perhaps more important, aim of Experiment 6 was to directly demonstrate the role of the naïve theory active at the time of judgment. Following the guidance of Spencer, Zanna, and Fong (2005), we used an experimental-causal-chain design approach to empirically examine the process underlying the effect observed in previous experiments. The results of Experiment 1 show that priming a naïve theory alters consumers’ reported beliefs about a pair of naïve theories, which establishes the link between priming and naïve theory activation. Experiments 2 to 5 showed that the appeal used in an ad needs to

13

match the naïve theory primed in order to have a positive impact on evaluation, which demonstrates the relationship interactive effect of priming and appeal on evaluation. One of the goals of this experiment is to examine the link between the active naïve theory and the evaluation of the advertised product. We expect that naïve theories will interact with the appeal used in the ad to impact the overall evaluation.

Method

Participants and design. One hundred and six students participated in exchange for

course extra credit and were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of a 2 (ad appeal: social validation vs. scarcity) X 2 (order of judgment: popularity vs. exclusivity judgment task first) between-subjects design.

Material and Procedures. The questionnaire was presented as a collection of independent studies. First, participants were asked to read an ad for a bottle of wine. The ad was identical to the ad used in Experiment 5 and included two versions: a social validation appeal and a scarcity appeal.

After viewing the ad, participants assigned to the “popularity first” condition rated the wine’s perceived popularity (1= Not at all; 7= Very), then, on a separate page, they evaluated the wine (1= Extremely Bad: 7= Extremely Good), and finally on the third page they rated the wine’s perceived exclusivity (1= Not at all; 7= Very). In the “exclusivity first” condition, the order was reversed so that participants rated wine’s perceived exclusivity first, then evaluated the wine, and then rated the wine’s perceived popularity.

Following the same logic as in the previous experiments, we included a filler task in all conditions (approximately 5 minutes long) allegedly as a second study about internet usage. After the filler task, the “third study” was included to measure the participants’ active naïve theory. The setup was similar to the “opinions and beliefs” study from Experiment 1. Participants were asked to rate a series of statements. Imbedded within the set of statements was a single item measure of the focal naïve theory: “Good products usually are 1 (Very popular) to 9 (Very exclusive).” Finally, a suspicion check asking the purpose of the studies was included at the end of the questionnaire.


Check for confounds. No participants perceived a link between the “different studies.” Popularity. When the advertisement included a social validation (vs. scarcity) appeal,

the wine should be judged as more popular. To check this manipulation, popularity ratings were submitted to a 2 (social influence appeal) X 2 (order of judgment tasks) ANOVA. As anticipated, the analysis revealed no effect of order of measurement and no significant interaction (Fs< 1). We also found the expected significant main effect of appeal such that the wine was judged as more popular when a social validation (vs. scarcity) appeal was used (M = 4.56 vs. 3.52; F = 22.11, p < .001), regardless of order of judgment.

Exclusivity. Comparable to the results obtained with popularity ratings, we expected the advertised wine to be considered more exclusive when a scarcity versus social validation appeal was used. A two-way ANOVA including social influence appeal and order of judgment tasks showed the expected a main effect of social influence appeal such that the wine was perceived as more exclusive when a scarcity appeal was used (M = 4.06 vs. 2.79, F = 22.40, p < .001). No other effect was significant (Fs < 1). Together with the popularity results, this suggests that the social influence appeal manipulation was successful and independent of the priming procedure.

14

Active Naïve Theory. In order to check that the order of judgment procedure primed one or the other of the conflicting naïve theories, we submitted the naïve theory measure to a two-way ANOVA using social influence appeal and order of measurement as independent variables. If the new priming manipulation was successful in activating the assumed naïve theory, then the reported beliefs about the pair of naïve theories should differ based on order of judgment procedure. As expected, participants who were asked to rate the wine’s exclusivity first were more likely to report that “good products are exclusive” (M=5.2) and those who were asked to rate the wine’s popularity first were more likely to report that “good products are popular” (M=4.55, F(1, 102) = 8.28, p < .01). In addition, the results are non-confounded with the other manipulations given that there were no other main or interactive effects (all p-values > .3). These results conceptually replicate the results of Experiment 1 and show that the order of measurement manipulation is also a viable manipulation to activate the target naïve theory.

Overall Evaluation. In order to directly test the role of the activated naïve theory in influencing product judgment, we performed a hierarchical regression analysis on the overall evaluation measure (Cohen et al; 2003) using the mean-centered, continuous naïve theory score (i.e., the measured activated naïve theory) and the dummy-coded social influence appeal (social validation appeal = 0; scarcity appeal = 1) as independent variables. The main effect terms were entered at step 1, and the interaction term at step 2. The results show no significant main effects (all ts< 1), but the interaction between the appeal and the activated naïve theory was significant (b=0.76, p<.001). This result supports the hypothesis that product evaluations differ based on the activated naïve theory. In order to unpack this significant interaction and investigate the pattern of results, we created two dichotomous groups based on the naïve theory score. First, “popularity theorists” were defined as participants who scored up to a four and therefore had an activated naïve theory that good products are popular. Conversely, “exclusivity theorists” were defined as participants who reported a score of six or above, indicating an activated naïve theory that good products are exclusive. All the participants who reported a neutral belief (scoring a five on the Likert scale) were not assigned to either group. The resulting pattern is represented in figure 4.


-------------------- In order to further describe and interpret the significant interaction between the naïve

theory score and the social influence appeal, and to replicate the analysis conducted in Experiment 5, a planned contrast was used to compare the cells in which the activated naïve theory matched the appeal used in the ad (exclusivity theorists evaluating a scarce wine; or popularity theorists evaluating a popular wine) to the cells in which the naïve theory and the appeal were mismatched. As expected, the evaluation of the wine was higher in the matching cells than in the mismatching cells (M = 4.48 vs. 3.54, t(51) = 3.92, p < .001). This was driven by higher evaluations of the popular wine compared to the scarce wine by popularity theorists (M = 5.09 vs. 3.46, t(51) = 3.89, p <.001). For exclusivity theorists the evaluation the wine advertised with a scarcity appeal was more positive than the wine advertised with a social validation appeal (M = 4.15 vs. 3.63) but the difference was only marginally significant, (t(51) = 1.481, p = .072, one-tailed).

Taken together, the results of this experiment contribute to a more in-depth understanding of how an activated naïve theory drives product evaluations. First, the simple act of rating whether a product was exclusive or popular is sufficient to activate one of two competing naïve theories. Second, the measured active naïve theory produced the same pattern of results as the manipulated, primed naïve theory (Experiments 2-5). That is,

15

participants reported more favorable evaluations when the activated naïve theory matched versus mismatched the presented product appeal. Thus, Experiment 6 speaks strongly to the robustness of the processes as well as the consistency of the results reported in this paper.

These results also add a great deal conceptually by showing that the naïve theory that is activated in consumers’ minds as a result of priming is directly responsible for our core finding that the match between the appeal used and the naïve theory that is active is crucial to product evaluations.

EXPERIMENT 7

Like Experiment 6, Experiment 7 was conducted to illustrate the central role of naïve

theory activation in inferential reasoning. Wegener and Petty (1995, 1997) showed that judgment correction cannot be performed in the absence of a naïve theory and the amount of correction depends on the strength of belief in the naïve theory. We manipulated correction instructions and measured the amount of correction performed as a function of individual differences in the preference for information about social validation. No priming manipulation was employed. Instead, naïve theory activation was varied using an individual difference variable.

Method

Participants and design. Sixty three undergraduate students participated in the experiment in exchange for extra course credit, and were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (correction instructions vs. no correction instructions).

Procedure. Participants viewed a color ad for Erna Schein Cabernet Sauvignon with the message, “This is a top selling wine. It is widely available and enjoyed by people everywhere!” (a social validation appeal) and a description of the objective qualities of the wine, “This wine is perfumed with exotic floral and spice notes. It is rich and powerful, with firm integrated tannins, and complex cassis, chocolate, and a hint of cherry flavors.”

Half of the participants received correction instructions, “please try to make sure that the popularity of the wine does not influence your opinions. The quality of a wine depends on the aromas and flavors of the wine, not on its popularity.” The remaining half received no correction instructions. Product evaluation was measured on two 10-point scales (“How favorable or unfavorable is your overall impression of this wine?” “How desirable or undesirable is this wine?”). These items were internally consistent (α= .86) and were combined into a single score. Finally, participants filled out the Attention to Social Comparison Information (ATSCI) scale (Bearden and Rose 1990; Lenox and Wolfe 1984). This scale measures the extent to which participants are aware of the reactions of others to their own behavior and are concerned about or sensitive to the nature of those reactions. Participants indicated their extent of agreement on 7-point scales for 13 items (e.g., “It is important to me to fit in the group I am with,” “I usually keep up with clothing style changes by watching what others wear”). The scores were internally consistent (α= .82) and were combined to form an ATSCI index.


An ANOVA showed no difference between the two treatment conditions in terms of

ATSCI scores. We performed a hierarchical regression to consider the impact of the ATSCI score and correction instructions on evaluation. In step 1, we entered the main effects: the presence of correction (dummy coded, with 0 = no instruction to ignore the appeal, 1 =

16

correction instruction), and ATSCI mean centered. It revealed a marginal main effect of the ATSCI score (b = .492, t(60) = 1.83, p = .072, two-tailed). In step 2, we included the interaction term and found a significant ATSCI x correction instruction interaction (b = -1.595, t(59) = 3.01, p< .01, two-tailed).

Follow-up tests were conducted to unpack the interaction. As expected, in the no correction instructions condition, a regression using ATSCI scores (mean centered) as the independent variable showed that more favorable product evaluations were formed as ATSCI scores increased, b= 1.043, t(30)= 3.524, p<.01. In contrast, in the correction instructions condition, ATSCI scores had no influence on product evaluations, b= -.551, t(29)= 1.224, NS. Hence, the social validation appeal had a powerful influence on popularity theorists in the absence of correction instructions. When correction instructions were presented, however, this powerful influence was eliminated completely. These results show that, in the absence of priming, individual differences drive the use of a given naïve theory. Hence, naïve theory activation, not priming per se, drives inferential reasoning and product evaluation.

EXPERIMENT 8

The eighth experiment was designed to investigate consumers’ response to product descriptions using technical versus common language. The use of technical information can make an ad difficult to understand, leading to more conservative product evaluations. Yet, including technical information can also make an ad seem more detailed and informative, leading to more favorable evaluations. Concrete details can make the information contained in a persuasive message seem more relevant (Bar-Hillel 1980). Technical information can also make a product seem more scientifically advanced, technologically sophisticated, and cutting edge.

Similar to Experiment 6, the relevant naïve theories were primed using order of judgment tasks by either asking if the ad was detailed and informative before participants evaluated a multivitamin and multimineral supplement (positive implications of using technical information) or by asking how easy it was to understand the ad before the evaluations of the product (negative implications of using technical information). Further, we investigate the potential of knowledge to moderate sensitivity to naïve theory priming. It is expected that consumers with extensive knowledge of a product category might be less prone to the effects of priming. First, consumers who are very knowledgeable are more likely to have well established criteria and inference rules to evaluate a product (Alba and Hutchinson 1987; Broniarczyk and Alba 1994; Sanbonmatsu, Kardes, and Herr 1992). Also, in the specific case of the implications of the use of technical information, it is possible that highly knowledgeable consumers might not consider technical information as difficult to process as consumers who only have limited knowledge of the product category. Method

Participants and design. One hundred and seventy introductory marketing students participated in exchange for credit. They were assigned to one of the conditions of a 2 (ad content: technical information vs. no technical information) X 2 (judgment task: detailed vs. easy-to-understand judgment first) between-subjects factorial design. Two participants failed to answer some of the questions and were excluded from subsequent analysis.

Material and Procedures. Before participants were exposed to the supplement ad, they rated their prior knowledge of vitamins on 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1(Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree), on three items: “I am very knowledgeable about vitamins”; “I

17

have more experience than most people with vitamins”; “I take vitamins on a regular basis.” These three items showed high internal consistency (α= .856) and were aggregated.

After completing the knowledge items, participants read an ad for a supplement that included a picture of a vitamin bottle and a short description of the product. In the no technical information condition, the description read: “A balanced and complete supplement containing the recommended daily dosages of 10 essential vitamins and minerals.” In the technical information condition the description used the technical name of the vitamins and minerals: “A balanced and complete supplement containing the recommended daily dosages of beta-carotene, ascorbic-acid, anuerine, riboflavin, pyridoxal, dibencozide, calcium, potassium, zinc, magnesium.”

Participants assigned to the “detailed-first” condition rated how detailed and informative the ad was (1= Not at all; 7= Very), gave their overall evaluation of the multivitamin supplement (1= Extremely bad; 7= Extremely good), and finally rated how easy it was to understand the ad (1= Extremely difficult; 7= Extremely easy). Participants in the “easy-to-understand-first” condition rated how easy it was to understand the ad before providing their overall evaluation of the multivitamin, and then rated how detailed and informative the ad was.


Ease of understanding. We expected the ad including technical information to be perceived as more difficult to understand. We submitted ease of understanding to a hierarchical regression analysis with technical information, theory primed, knowledge, and all possible interactions as predictors. The main effect terms were entered in step 1, the two-way interaction terms were entered in step 2, and finally the three-way interaction term was entered in step 3. Prior to analysis, the knowledge scores were centered around the mean to reduce multicollinearity among the main effects and interaction terms (Cohen et al. 2003). Dummy coding was used for presence of technical information (no technical information = 0, technical information = 1,) and for theory primed by order of the judgment tasks (easy-to-understand-first = 0, detailed-first = 1). The order in which the question appeared (first or last) or the reported level of knowledge did not have an impact on ease of understanding (bs<.15, NS.). The presence of technical information had the significant negative main effect predicted (b=-1.149, p<.001). No interaction was significant. These results suggest that the technical information manipulation was successful.

Level of detail. Similar to the analysis we conducted on ease of understanding, we submitted the rating of how detailed and informative the ad was to a hierarchical regression using the knowledge score (mean centered), the presence of technical information (dummy coded), the order of the judgment tasks (dummy coded), and all possible interactions entered stepwise. The presence of technical information had a positive main effect (b=.917, p<.001), indicating that the description including the technical names of the vitamins and minerals appeared more detailed and informative than the description using no technical information. Also, the level of knowledge had a significant main effect (b=-.047, p<.05). Participants with a higher level of knowledge judged the ad as less detailed and informative than the participants with a lower level of knowledge regardless of the condition. These main effects were not qualified by any higher level of interaction. These results further suggest that the technical-information-manipulation was successful.

Overall evaluation. Following the initial judgment task (ease of understanding or level of details), participants evaluated the supplement. We submitted the evaluation score to a hierarchical regression. At step 1, we entered the three independent variables: knowledge score, presence of technical information, and theory primed. The level of knowledge had a

18

negative main effect on evaluation b=-.059, p<.005). The more knowledgeable the participants were, the lower the evaluation of the product. At step 2, all possible two-way interactions were entered as predictors. As expected, the interaction between the presence of technical information and the theory primed was significant (b=1.368, p<.001), replicating the results of the previous three experiments. The main effect of knowledge and interaction between the presence of technical information and the theory primed were qualified by a three-way interaction entered at step 3 (b=-.157, p<.05).

In order to decompose the three-way interaction we performed a median split on the knowledge score to create two groups: novices and experts. We ran contrast analyses to compare the matched cells (detailed-first/technical information and easy-to-understand-first/no-technical information) with the unmatched cells (detailed-first/no-technical information and easy-to-understand-first/technical information). For novices, the contrast analysis was significant, t(70)= 4.556, p<.001. The evaluation of the multivitamin supplement was higher when the characteristics of the ad matched the theory primed, M=5.00 versus 3.82. Consistent with our previous results, this significant contrast was driven by higher overall evaluations if the ad did not include technical information when ease of understanding was primed, t(160) = 2.746, p = .003 (one-tailed), M= 5.00 versus 3.87; and higher overall evaluations if the ad included technical information when level of details was primed t(160) = 3.432, p < .001 (one-tailed), M= 5.00 versus 3.79. The results observed with novices are therefore a conceptual replication of the previous three experiments within the product description domain. For experts, the planned contrast was not significant, t(90)=1.178, p=.242, M= 4.11 versus 3.83. There was no difference of effectiveness of either ad regardless of the theory primed, (all ts<1.3, p>.1).


-------------------- In this experiment, we conceptually replicated the results of prior experiments using a

different element of the marketing mix. Additionally, we showed that activating a naïve theory might not be enough to have a significant impact on product evaluation. Our results were qualified by the moderation of the impact of priming naïve theories by level of product knowledge. Experts, because they are likely to have well established criteria to evaluate the product, are generally less prone to context effects, and here were less sensitive to the impact of naïve theory activation. Although experts did not differ from novices when evaluating how easy it was to understand the ad, we cannot exclude the possibility that they had a deeper understanding of the technical information compared to novices.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Decades of research have shown consumers to be adaptive in their decision making,

flexibly and automatically making use of different rules, heuristics, and strategies to guide their behavior. One contributing factor in consumers’ efficiency is their ability to draw inferences about products, services, and marketing communications, even with limited information. The naïve theories that consumers bring to bear in their judgment formation and decision making are multifaceted, and typically allow consumers to evaluate and choose amongst options – in many instances without substantial cognitive deliberation.

Our research contributes to the literature by showing how consumers use naïve theories about market related phenomena in forming product judgments. The core finding that underlies each of the experiments is that subtle primes in the consumer context can activate naïve theories that guide consumers’ beliefs about marketplace phenomena and perceptions of products. To the extent that the activated theory matches the consumption-related stimulus

19

(e.g., an advertisement, or a product attribute), consumers’ product perceptions tend to be more favorable than if the theory and the stimulus are mismatched.

Our study focused on four sets of commonly held naïve theories that, interestingly, have disparate implications for product judgment. Experiment 1 demonstrated that the activation of one of a pair of opposing naïve theories led to opposing interpretations of a given market cue.

Experiments 2 and 3 showed that the price of a product may either contribute to, or detract from, the esteem with which consumers hold the product. When participants were primed with “quality,” the target product was evaluated more favorably when it was described as being high versus low priced. In contrast, when “value” was active, product judgments were more favorable when the product was offered at a low versus high price. Pricing strategies are critically important to the success of any business, and the naïve theories consumers use to interpret pricing information determine what pricing strategy is likely to be most effective. Of course, future research should investigate existing opportunities for firms to influence which theory is active when presenting marketing communications. Thus, by activating the theory that is consistent with the brand’s pricing strategy, marketers can more effective.

Experiment 4 focused on a commonly employed marketplace tactic –offering a product with a sales promotion, in this case a sale price. Interestingly our results both confirm the utility of the tool, as well as affirm the concerns that marketers often have regarding its use. Specifically, when the theory that lower prices signal value was primed, our participants behaved in line with market sales data that testify to the effectiveness of sales promotions – participants responded relatively more favorably to the price inducement than they did when the theory that lower prices signal poor quality was activated. Thus, our data suggest that while marketers will continue to find that sales promotions are effective drivers of sales, in some circumstances the use of promotion may indeed undermine brand equity. Our data suggest that this is particularly likely when consumers learn of the promotion with an activated naïve theory of “sales promotion signals low quality.”

Experiment 5 demonstrated that two of Cialdini’s (2009) core persuasive heuristics, social validation and scarcity, differentially affect product judgments as a function of whether popularity or exclusivity is contextually primed. When “popularity” was activated, participants formed more favorable product judgments with a social validation appeal compared to a scarcity appeal. This pattern reversed when “scarcity” was activated.

These results help to explain the conditions under which popularity appeals versus scarcity appeals are likely to be effective. For example, fundraisers frequently try to create the perception that large numbers of individuals are contributing, and McDonalds sells billions and billions of burgers. The success of popularity appeals depends on the activation of a naïve theory that suggests that the actions of others provide an appropriate guide for one’s own behavior. Conversely, NPR recently stated that “Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2” had the biggest video game launch of all time by creating the perception that the game would be in short supply. Scarcity also enhanced the sales of Cabbage Patch dolls and Furby dolls during the Christmas rush, and De Beers continues to emphasize the scarcity of diamonds. Interestingly, in addition to using popularity appeals, McDonalds currently employs a scarcity strategy in the marketing of its McRib sandwich. The sandwich is offered for only a few weeks a year at limited restaurants, and the availability periods do not correspond across restaurants. Because neither the specific weeks that the sandwich is available, nor the locations at which the McRib will be offered, are announced in advance, fans of the McRib must be ever alert for opportunities to buy the sandwich. As a testament to the success of this approach, hundreds of groups devoted to tracking McRib availability have emerged on social

20

media websites. From our data, however, it appears that the effectiveness of these appeals depends on the activation of a naïve theory that links scarcity to desirability.

Experiment 6 made two contributions. In addition to demonstrating the robustness of our findings by using a subtle priming manipulation, the experiment also clearly implicates the role of the active naïve theory in combination with an appeal to influence judgment. Specifically, the naïve theory that is active in consumers’ minds at the time of decision making is what drives the finding that product evaluations are higher when the active naïve theory matches versus mismatches the influence appeal. Experiment 7 demonstrated that priming is not necessary to obtain naïve theory activation effects on product evaluation. Individual differences in naïve theory activation produce results similar to those produced by naïve theory priming manipulations. Furthermore, correction instructions are effective in eliminating the influence of a naïve theory on judgment.

Experiment 8 documented the role of consumer knowledge as a moderator of the process by which priming naïve theories affects product judgments. Specifically, our data show that consumers who are expert in a given domain are much less likely than are non-experts to be influenced by contextual priming of a naïve theory. This finding is in line with prior research that demonstrates that expertise defends individuals’ product judgments from being unduly influenced by normatively irrelevant contextual phenomena (Posavac et al. 2005). This study also introduces the presence of details in product communications as another marketing phenomenon for which consumers can have opposing naïve theories.

Taken together, our results suggest that the consumer is influenced by many naïve theories that determine the direction of the effects on consumer response for many marketing mix variables. These findings are consistent with those of Mitra and Lynch (1995), who demonstrated that advertising can either increase or decrease price sensitivity depending on the effects of advertising on consideration set size versus perceived differentiation among brands. As Zhao, Lynch, and Chen (2010) emphasize, when marketing variables have opposing judgmental effects, researchers may erroneously conclude that a marketing variable has no effect when the variable actually has important effects. Similarly, our results imply that researchers are likely to underestimate the impact of marketing variables when data are aggregated across consumer segments applying different naïve theories. Accurate assessment of the impact of marketing variables on consumer response requires identifying the naïve theories that different segments are likely to use, and isolating the effects of the different naïve theories. The present research provides an important first step toward this goal.

Of course, our research has some limitations that could be addressed in future research. One issue is delineating the extent to which priming of given naïve theories endures both temporally, and in response to potential distraction. We suggest that in practice marketing communications that suggest a given naïve theory, then make a product appeal, are likely to be efficacious in line with our results. Indeed, our procedures are likely to underestimate priming effects compared to an advertisement because of the intervening tasks that we gave participants between priming and product evaluation. Nevertheless, understanding the factors (individual and contextual) that maximize the power of activating naïve theories in real-world marketing communications to drive choice is an important goal going forward.

21

Appendix A: Article used in Experiment 1 Flooring is an important consideration in any home decorating project because it can be one of the biggest expenses and it can influence the look, feel, and functionality of the space. Thus, it is well worth taking the time to plan your flooring choices. First, consider the basics. The subfloor may determine the types of flooring that can be used. For example, almost any flooring can be applied to a solid concrete subfloor, but if your base is a suspended timber subfloor, you must check the floor loading before choosing a heavy material such as quarry tile. Next, consideration of the characteristics of the space can dictate flooring recommendations. If you have a small house or apartment, consider carrying one floor treatment of the same color throughout, breaking only at the kitchen and bathroom areas. Use plain colors rather than a pattern to give the room more "space." The use of a solid color also makes decorating easier. In a larger house, if you choose to change color and/or flooring between rooms, picture how the transition will look when the doors are open. The following final paragraph was used as the priming manipulation of Quality To give a formal living room that “special” feel, hardwood floor is a popular choice. There's something really special about a hardwood floor and there are now more possibilities than ever before. With so many options how should you choose? Here are some tips from designer Vern Yip. “Remember that price is a first indicator of quality. Take ebony for example, it is more expensive than most exotic woods but it is more resistant and has incomparable style. You need to consider carefully your needs in order to get the best you can afford. When comes time for reselling, an expensive product will guaranty a better return on your investment by making your house stand out from the competition.” The following paragraph was used as the priming manipulation of Value To give a formal living room that “special” feel, hardwood floor is a popular choice. There's something really special about a hardwood floor and there are now more possibilities than ever before. With so many options how should you choose? Here are some tips from designer Vern Yip. “Remember that more expensive does not always mean better. Take bamboo for example: it is cheaper than other exotic woods, but it is resistant to wear and very stylish. You need to consider carefully your needs in order to get “more bang for your buck”. When comes time for reselling, a good value for the price will guaranty a better return on investment than expensive products.”

22

Appendix B: Ads used in experiment 2 for the low and high price conditions

Shiraz 2005

Ripe, rich and round, with lots of spicy , earth-scented black cherry and berry flavors, hinting deliciously at chocolate on the smooth finish.

Shiraz goes very well with beef and other hearty foods. It also goes well with Indian, Mexican, and other spicy foods.

Shiraz 2005

Ripe, rich and round, with lots of spicy , earth-scented black cherry and berry flavors, hinting deliciously at chocolate on the smooth finish.

Shiraz goes very well with beef and other hearty foods. It also goes well with Indian, Mexican, and other spicy foods.

23

REFERENCES Alba, Joseph W. and J. Wesley Hutchinson (1987), "Dimensions of Consumer Expertise," Journal of Consumer Research, 13 (4), 411-54. Armstrong, J. Scott (1980), "Unintelligible Management Research and Academic Prestige,"

Interfaces, 10 (2), 80-86. Bagwell, Kyle and Michael H. Riordan (1991), "High and Declining Prices Signal Product

Quality," The American Economic Review, 81 (1), 224-39. Baron, Reuben M. and David A. Kenny (1986), “The Moderator-Mediator Variable

Distinction in Social Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1173–82.

Bar-Hillel, Maya (1980), "The base-rate fallacy in probability judgments," Acta Psychologica, 44 (3), 211-33.

Bearden, William O. and Micheal J. Etzel (1982), "Reference Group Influence on Product and Brand Purchase Decisions," Journal of Consumer Research, 9 (2), 183-94.

Bearden, William O. and Randall L. Rose (1990), "Attention to Social Comparison Information: An Individual Difference Factor Affecting Consumer Conformity," Journal of Consumer Research, 16 (4), 461-71.

Belch, George E. and Michael A. Belch (2009), Advertising and Promotion: An Integrated Marketing Communications Perspective, Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin.

Berger, Jonah, and Chip Heath (2007), “Where Consumers Diverge from Others: Identity Signaling and Product Domains,” Journal of Consumer Research, 34 (August), 121-134.

Broniarczyk, Susan M. and Joseph W. Alba (1994), "The Role of Consumers' Intuitions in Inference Making," Journal of Consumer Research, 21 (3), 393.

Campbell, Margaret C. and Amna Kirmani (2008), "I know what you're doing and why you're doing it: The use of persuasion knowledge model in consumer research," in Handbook of Consumer Psychology., ed. Curtis P. Haugtvedt, Paul M. Herr and Frank R. Kardes: New York, NY: Taylor & Francis Group/Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 549-73.

Childers, Terry L. and Akshay R. Rao (1992), "The Influence of Familial and Peer-based Reference Groups on Consumer Decisions," Journal of consumer research, 19 (2), 198-211.

Cho, Hyejeung J. and Norbert Schwarz (2008), "Of great art and untalented artists: Effort information and the flexible construction of judgmental heuristics," Journal of consumer psychology, 18 (3), 205-11.

Cialdini, Robert B. (2009), Influence : Science and Practice, Boston: Pearson Education. Cialdini, Robert B. and Noah J. Goldstein (2004), "Social influence: Compliance and

conformity," Annual Review of Psychology, 55, 591-621. Cohen, Jacob, Patricia Cohen, Stephen G. West, and Leona S. Aiken (2003), Applied Multiple

Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences, Mahwah, N.J. :: L. Erlbaum Associates.

Cronley, Maria L., Steven S. Posavac, Tracy Meyer, Frank R. Kardes, and James J. Kellaris (2005), "A selective hypothesis testing perspective on price-quality inference and inference-based choice," Journal of Consumer Psychology, 15 (2), 159-69.

Dick, Alan, Dipankar Chakravarti, and Gabriel Biehal (1990), "Memory-Based Inferences during Consumer Choice," Journal of Consumer Research, 17 (1), 82-93.

Eagly, Alice H. (1974), "Comprehensibility of persuasive arguments as a determinant of opinion change," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29 (6), 758-73.

24

Fabrigar, Leandre R. and Richard E. Petty (1999), "The Role of the Affective and Cognitive Bases of Attitudes in Susceptibility to Affectively and Cognitively Based Persuasion," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25 (3), 363-81.

Faro, David, Ann L. McGill, and Reid Hastie (2010), "Naïve Theories of Causal Force and Compression of Elapsed Time Judgments," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98 (5), 683-701.

Furnham, Adrian (1988), Lay theories: Everyday Understanding of Problems in the Social Sciences: Elmsford, NY, US: Pergamon Press.

Galak, Jeff and Leif Nelson (2010), "The Virtues of Opaque Prose: How Lay Beliefs About Fluency Influence Perceptions of Quality," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47 (1), 250-53.

Grice, H. Paul (1975), "Logic and Conversation," in Syntax and Semantics: Speech acts, Vol. 3, ed. Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan, New York: Academic Press, 41-58.

Gunasti, Kunter and William T. Ross (2009), "How Inferences about Missing Attributes Decrease the Tendency to Defer Choice and Increase Purchase Probability," Journal of Consumer Research, 35 (5), 823-37.

Heyman, James E. and Barbara A. Mellers (2008), "Perceptions of fair pricing," in Handbook of Consumer Psychology., ed. Curtis P. Haugtvedt, Paul M. Herr and Frank R. Kardes: New York, NY: Taylor & Francis Group/Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 683-97.

Hung, Iris W. and Robert S. Wyer (2008), "The impact of implicit theories on responses to problem-solving print advertisements," Journal of Consumer Psychology, 18 (3), 223-35.

Jargon, Julie and David Kesmodel (2010), "Bona Fide Fans Chase Rib-Free Rib Sandwich. Lovers of Elusive McRib Pork Patty Track Their Sightings," The Wall Street Journal, October 10, 2010.

Jones, John Philip (1990), "The double jeopardy of sales promotions," Harvard Business Review, 68 (5), 145-52.

Kardes, Frank R., Maria L. Cronley, James J. Kellaris, and Steven S. Posavac (2004a), "The role of selective information processing in price-quality inference," Journal of Consumer Research, 31 (2), 368-74.

Kardes, Frank R., Steven S. Posavac, and Maria L. Cronley (2004b), "Consumer inference: A review of processes, bases, and judgment contexts," Journal of Consumer Psychology, 14 (3), 230-56.

Kruger, Justin, Derrick Wirtz, Leaf Van Boven, and T. William Altermatt (2004), "The effort heuristic," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40 (1), 91-98.

Labroo, Aparna A. and Anirban Mukhopadhyay (2009), "Lay Theories of Emotion Transience and the Search for Happiness: A Fresh Perspective on Affect Regulation," Journal of Consumer Research, 36 (2), 242-54.

Lennox, Richard D. and Raymond N. Wolfe (1984), "Revision of the Self-Monitoring Scale," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46 (6), 1349-64.

Lichtenstein, Donald R., Scot Burton, and Bradley S. O'Hara (1989), "Marketplace Attributions and Consumer Evaluations of Discounts Claims," Psychology & Marketing, 6 (3), 163-80.

Lynn, Michael (1992), "Scarcity's Enhancement of Desirability: The Role of Naive Economic Theories," Basic & Applied Social Psychology, 13 (1), 67-78.

McConnell, Allen R. (2001), "Implicit theories: Consequences for social judgments of individuals," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37 (3), 215-27.

Maio, Gregory R. and Geoffrey Haddock (2007), "Attitude change," in Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles (2nd ed.). ed. Arie W. Kruglanski and E. Tory Higgins, New York, NY, US: Guilford Press, 565-86.

25

Mitra, Anusree and John G. Lynch, Jr. (1995), "Toward a Reconciliation of Market Power and Information Theories of Advertising Effects on Price Elasticity," Journal of Consumer Research, 21 (4), 644-59.

Monroe, Kent B. (2003), Pricing : Making Profitable Decisions, Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill/Irwin.

Ofir, Chezy and Russell S. Winer (2002), "Pricing: Economic and Behavioral Models," in Handbook of Marketing, ed. Barton A. Weitz and Robin Wensley, London: Sage Publications Ltd.

Oppenheimer, Daniel M. (2006), "Consequences of erudite vernacular utilized irrespective of necessity: problems with using long words needlessly," Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20 (2), 139-56.

Petty, Richard E. and Duane T. Wegener (1998), "Matching Versus Mismatching Attitude Functions: Implications for Scrutiny of Persuasive Messages," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24 (3), 227-40.

Petty, Richard E., Pablo Briñol, and Zakary L. Tormala (2002), "Thought Confidence as a Determinant of Persuasion: The Self-Validation Hypothesis," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82 (5), 722-41.

Posavac, Steven S., Michal Herzenstein, Frank R. Kardes, and Suresh Sundaram (2010), "Profits and halos: The role of firm profitability information in consumer inference," Journal of Consumer Psychology, 20 (3), 327-37.

Posavac, Steven S., Frank R. Kardes, David M. Sanbonmatsu, and Gavan J. Fitzsimons (2005), "Blissful insularity: When brands are judged in isolation from competitors," Marketing Letters, 16 (2), 87-97.

Raghubir, Priya, J. Jeffrey Inman, and Hans Grande (2004), "The Three Faces of Consumer Promotions," California Management Review, 46 (4), 23-42.

Raghunathan, Rajagopal, Rebecca Walker Naylor, and Wayne D. Hoyer (2006), "The Unhealthy = Tasty Intuition and Its Effects on Taste Inferences, Enjoyment, and Choice of Food Products," Journal of Marketing, 70 (4), 170-84.

Rao, Akshay R. and Kent B. Monroe (1989), "The Effect of Price, Brand Name, and Store Name on Buyers' Perceptions of Product Quality: An Integrative Review," Journal of Marketing Research, 26 (3), 351-57.

Reber, Rolf and Norbert Schwarz (1999), "Effects of Perceptual Fluency on Judgments of Truth," Consciousness and Cognition, 8 (3), 338-42.

Reber, Rolf, Piotr Winkielman, and Norbert Schwarz (1998), "Effects of Perceptual Fluency on Affective Judgments," Psychological Science, 9 (1), 45-48.

Sanbonmatsu, David M., Frank R. Kardes, and Paul M. Herr (1992), "The Role of Prior Knowledge and Missing Information in Multiattribute Evaluation," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 51 (1), 76-91.

Schwarz, Norbert (2004), "Metacognitive experiences in consumer judgment and decision making," Journal of Consumer Psychology, 14 (4), 332-48.

Snyder, C. R. and Howard L. Fromkin (1980), Uniqueness, the human pursuit of difference, New York: Plenum Press.

Spencer, Steven J., Mark P. Zanna, and Geoffrey T. Fong (2005), "Establishing a causal chain: Why experiments are often more effective than mediational analyses in examining psychological processes," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89 (6), 845-51.

Tsai, Claire I. and Ann L. McGill (2011), "No Pain, No Gain? How Fluency and Construal Level Affect Consumer Confidence," Journal of Consumer Research, 37 (5), 807-21.

26

Wegener, Duane T. and Richard E. Petty (1995), "Flexible Correction Processes in Social Judgment: The Role of Naive Theories in Corrections for Perceived Bias," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68 (1), 36-51.

--- (1997), "The Flexible Correction Model: The Role of Naive Theories of Bias in Bias Correction," in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. Volume 29, ed. P. Zanna Mark: Academic Press, 141-208.

Witt, Robert E. (1969), "Informal Social Group Influence on Consumer Brand Choice," Journal of Marketing Research, 6 (4), 473-76.

Worchel, Stephen, Jerry Lee, and Akanbi Adewole (1975), "Effects of Supply and Demand on Ratings of Object Value," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32 (5), 906-14.

Yorkston, Eric A., Joseph C. Nunes, and Shashi Matta (2010), "The Malleable Brand: The Role of Implicit Theories in Evaluating Brand Extensions," Journal of Marketing, 74 (1), 80-93.

Zeithaml, Valarie A. (1988), "Consumer Perceptions of Price, Quality, and Value: A Means-End Model and Synthesis of Evidence," The Journal of Marketing, 52 (3), 2-22.

Zhao, Xinshu, John G. Lynch Jr, and Qimei Chen (2010), "Reconsidering Baron and Kenny: Myths and Truths about Mediation Analysis," Journal of Consumer Research, 37 (2), 197-206.

27

This document is part of a JCR Manuscript Review History. It should be used for educational purposes only.

FIG

UR

E 1

EXPE

RIM

ENT

3Pr

oduc

t Eva

luat

ion

as a

Fun

ctio

n of

Pro

duct

Fea

ture

s and

Naï

ve T

heor

y Pr

imed

4.77

4.01

4.22

4.59

3.84

4.2

4.4

4.6

4.85

Val

ueQ

ualit

y

Theo

ry p

rimed

Low

Pric

eH

igh

Pric

e

28


FIG

UR

E 2

EXPE

RIM

ENT

4Pr

oduc

t Eva

luat

ion

as a

Fun

ctio

n of

Pro

duct

Fea

ture

s and

Naï

ve T

heor

y Pr

imed

4.46

3.78

4.12

4.48

3.6

3.84

4.2

4.4

4.6

Val

ueQ

ualit

y

Theo

ry p

rimed

Prom

otio

nN

o Pr

omot

ion

29


FIG

UR

E 3

EXPE

RIM

ENT

5Pr

oduc

t Eva

luat

ion

as a

Fun

ctio

n of

Pro

duct

Fea

ture

s and

Naï

ve T

heor

y Pr

imed

4.6

3.71

4.12

4.69

3.6

3.84

4.2

4.4

4.6

4.8

Popu

larit

yEx

clus

ivity

Theo

ry p

rimed

Soci

al V

alid

atio

nSc

arci

ty

30


FIG

UR

E 4

EXPE

RIM

ENT

6Pr

oduc

t Eva

luat

ion

as a

Fun

ctio

n of

Pro

duct

Fea

ture

s and

Naï

ve T

heor

y H

eld

5.09

3.63

3.46

4.11

3.3

3.5

3.7

3.9

4.1

4.3

4.5

4.7

4.9

5.1

Popu

larit

yEx

clus

ivity

Theo

ry H

eld

Soci

al V

alid

atio

nSc

arci

ty

31


FIG

UR

E 5

EXPE

RIM

ENT

8Pr

oduc

t Eva

luat

ion

as a

Fun

ctio

n of

Pro

duct

Fea

ture

s, N

aïve

The

ory

Prim

ed, a

nd K

now

ledg

e Le

vel

3.87

5.00

5.00

3.79

3.6

3.84

4.2

4.4

4.6

4.85

5.2

Ease

Det

ails

Theo

ry p

rimed

Nov

ices

3.96

4.11

4.11

3.67

3.6

3.84

4.2

4.4

4.6

4.85

5.2

Ease

Det

ails

Theo

ry p

rimed

Exp

erts

Tech

nica

lIn

form

atio

n

No

Tech

nica

lIn

form

atio

n

Download - MOUNTAIN BLUEBIRD MANUSCRIPT REVIEW HISTORY MANUSCRIPT ... · MOUNTAIN BLUEBIRD MANUSCRIPT REVIEW HISTORY . MANUSCRIPT (ROUND 3) ... function of which theory is primed, ... minimal

Top Related