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Marcuse Was Right

One-Dimensional Society in the Twenty-First Century

Richard C. BoxUniversity of Nebraska at Omaha

ABSTRACT

The concept of one-dimensionality identified oppressive charac-teristics of societies in the 1960s, suggesting that they could in-tensify over time until few people are able to imagine alternatives. This concept and its related body of work are largely forgotten today, associated with a time and set of circumstances that have passed. This article argues that instead of disappearing, one-dimensionality has matured and become commonplace, fulfilling Marcuse’s vision of a society that lacks reflexive knowledge and capacity to change. The article describes three aspects of a one-dimensional society—work, aggressiveness, and public affairs—and asks whether we are trapped in one societal dimension.

Here are the governing values in capitalist society: profitable produc-tivity, assertiveness, efficiency, competitiveness; in other words, the Performance Principle, the rule of functional rationality discriminating against emotions, a dual morality, the “work ethic,” which means for the vast majority of the population condemnation to alienated and inhuman labor, and the will to power, the display of strength, virility.

—Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society

It seems, in retrospect, an odd, even improbable, story. A German-Jewish philosopher flees the Nazis in the 1930s, becomes a citizen of the United States, and works during World War II and for a few years after the war for the predecessor agency to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and for the State Department. He then begins a teaching career during which the protests of conservatives over his seemingly radical ideas lead to his dismissal and

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Administrative Theory & Praxis / June 2011, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 169–191. © 2011 Public Administration Theory Network. 1084-1806/2011 $9.50 + 0.00. DOI 10.2753/ATP1084-1806330201

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forced retirement from teaching positions while he acquires a global reputation as a critic of the status quo and an intellectual leader of radical-left politics in the 1960s and 1970s (Kellner, 2005). Paradoxically, although he was widely regarded as a collectivist threat to democracy, he was a passionate advocate of individual liberty and self-fulfillment who resisted domination and oppression no matter the source, whether capitalism or communism.

This story is the personal narrative of Herbert Marcuse, who died in 1979 at the age of 81. His concept of “one-dimensional” society became well-known and controversial after it appeared in print in 1964 (in One-Dimensional Man), but today it has faded from view, seemingly unsuited for a contemporary society that is technologically sophisticated, postmodern, diverse, complex, networked, and self-satisfied with relative economic security and the pleasures of consumerism.

In capitalist society, one-dimensionality is a condition in which the tech-nical rationality of production and consumption is so dominant that people forget about alternative values and ways of organizing themselves. The wealthy and powerful rely on destructive resource extraction and war to sup-port a consumerist economy and suppress global opposition, public welfare is just sufficient to make the system appear humane, and language is purged of hints at human liberation or societal change. People no longer perceive a contradiction between how things are and how they might be, with a resulting “flattening out of the contrast (or conflict) between the given and the possible” (Marcuse, 1991, p. 8).

Marcuse considered his description of one-dimensionality to be a projection “focused on tendencies in the most highly developed contemporary societies,” and he recognized “there are large areas within and without these societies where the described tendencies do . . . not yet prevail” (1991, p. xlix). Despite this caveat, the text of One-Dimensional Man does not read like an exploration of early trends but is, instead, assertive and occasionally sarcastic or ironic, seemingly the work of someone who thinks the phenomena he is describing are already powerfully present. In papers and books written in later years, Marcuse found hope for change in the leftist movements of the 1960s and 1970s, thus moderating the pessimism about change found in One-Dimensional Man, but his analysis of the characteristics of society remained intact.

Other works from the 1950s and 1960s express a parallel concern about the direction of society. An example is the writing of C. Wright Mills, who turned early identification of trends into powerful descriptions of societal characteristics that appear obvious today, although his ideas seemed radical and upsetting to many at the time. Other contemporary writing also describes various parallel aspects of political economy; the work of several authors in this stream of critique is examined in the following discussion.

I argue that the idea of one-dimensionality was prescient when it appeared in the 1960s and that it is especially applicable to today’s circumstances. The

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trends that Marcuse identified have deepened into continuing, stable practices that would be difficult to dislodge or reverse. In this quite particular sense, Marcuse was “right.”

To the extent that this argument is valid, one-dimensionality is worth revisit-ing for fresh insights on society and public affairs. There are many models of conditions in society to draw on, so it is pointless to claim this one is better or complete in itself. However, it presents a view of the nexus of politics and economics that seems especially powerful today. Marcuse’s body of work is large, spreading across philosophy, politics, and sociology, and it explores the nature of life and work, technology, foreign affairs, alternative futures, and more. This article focuses on the idea of one-dimensional society to examine its usefulness for understanding current public affairs and the possibilities for change.

Marcuse’s concept of one-dimensionality fits within the Frankfurt school of critical theory; it is materialist, sensitive to class and domination, and critical of capitalism. Applying typological labels, however, obscures a rich body of detail as well as interesting critiques and comparisons to other descriptions of advanced industrial society. Although any number of concepts could be singled out within the broad idea of one-dimensionality, to begin develop-ing the argument that it has become the norm, I focus on three key areas of thought: work, aggressiveness, and public affairs.

Marcuse’s analysis is, naturally enough, dated. It is also limited by relative inattention to the cultural and historical context of capitalism in the United States, and it describes capitalism in the United States without acknowledging different forms in other countries. This article focuses on the United States as a global economic and military superpower. In the three sections that follow, the narrative describes the historical U.S. setting of each key area of thought, shows how Marcuse dealt with it, and brings the trend line up to the present with the writing of selected contemporary authors. The concluding section examines the extent to which we are trapped in a one-dimensional society or whether there is potential for change.

WORk

In the United States, until the Industrial Revolution, people expected to work independently rather than for others. It was acceptable for one person to work for another as a passing stage in their lives, but until the middle of the nine-teenth century, workers who took direction from an employer were thought of as hirelings or wage slaves (Rodgers, 1974, chap. 2). Samuel Eliot wrote, “To put a man upon wages, is to put him in the position of a dependent,” and the longer he remains in such a position, “the less of a man he becomes” (cited in Rodgers, 1974, p. 33). This attitude was a result of national experience and cultural belief, and it was connected to the American ideal of democracy.


The transition to an industrial economy led, by the middle of the twentieth century, to the sort of worker William Whyte (2002), to use the title of his bestseller from 1956, called The Organization Man. This person is dedicated to the goals of the organization and to group effort rather than individuality or independent judgment. A number of authors wrote about this phenomenon in the decades after the conclusion of World War II: for example, Chris Ar-gyris, Personality and Organization: The Conflict between System and the Individual (1957); C. Wright Mills, White Collar (1951); and Robert Presthus, The Organizational Society (1962).

Mills described “society as a great salesroom, an enormous file, an incor-porated brain, a new universe of management and manipulation” (1951, p. xv). One does not often encounter today such a raw, startled, even angry reac-tion to the organizational society—this description was written when people were becoming aware of the implications of twentieth-century modernism. Listen to the texture of Mills’s description of the settings in which the new worker toils: “The calculating hierarchies of department store and industrial corporation, of rationalized office and governmental bureau, lay out the gray ways of work and stereotype the permitted initiatives” (p. xvii). This results in a worker, the “white-collar man,” who “is more often pitiful than tragic, as he is seen collectively . . . living out in slow misery his yearning for the quick American climb” (p. xii).

In eros and Civilization, Marcuse identified the “performance principle” that caused people to work. This concept is grounded in recognition of scarcity, the fact “that the struggle for existence takes place in a world too poor for the satisfaction of human needs without constant restraint, renunciation, delay” (1955, p. 35). In this context, “whatever satisfaction is possible necessitates work, more or less painful arrangements and undertakings for the procurement of the means for satisfying needs” (p. 35).

If society were entirely free, people would do the work that suited their interests and capabilities and would do it in ways that pleased them. Now, however, the means of making money are in the hands of a few, and these few determine the characteristics of work. Workers become alienated, divorced from control over the type and conditions of their work. To conform to the behavioral norms of society, individuals must exercise repression of their wishes and desires beyond that which would be needed merely to get along cooperatively with others. This increment of additional repression needed for survival in a capitalist economy Marcuse calls “surplus repression”; it is enforced by domination “exercised by a particular group or individual in order to sustain and enhance itself in a privileged position” (1955, p. 36).

In One-Dimensional Man, published in 1964, this view of modern work is incorporated into a broader analysis of society that finds people distracted by sports, fun, and technology and pursuing the “false needs” generated by advertisements for consumer goods, and settling into the Happy Consciousness

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that no longer wonders whether there are alternatives to the status quo. Mills wrote of a similar phenomenon, the “Cheerful Robot,” in The Sociological Imagination. As part of mass, group-oriented society, this person is alienated from his or her work and becomes “the antithesis of the Western image of the free man” (Mills, 1959, p. 172). For Mills, “The society in which this man, this cheerful robot, flourishes is the antithesis of the free society—or in the literal and plain meaning of the word, of a democratic society” (1959, p. 172).

The technology used to maximize capitalist profit damages the physical environment, but a “new technology” could instead be used to fulfill human needs and reduce mindless, alienating labor while minimizing pollution and destructive resource extraction (Kellner, 1984, pp. 330–338). If this transition occurred, humans would move beyond the stage of struggle with scarcity, free themselves from the sort of work demanded by those who control the capitalist system, and cooperatively create a work–society relationship that provides necessary goods without alienated toil. However, this shift would not be in the interests of people who benefit from the status quo, so measures are taken to prevent it (Marcuse, 2001a, pp. 46–47).

Over time, an outline emerges of a society in which business and govern-ment cooperate to stifle knowledge of alternatives, prevent changes in the status quo, and preserve the advantages enjoyed by a few. Marcuse called this condition “containment” and asserted that the trends leading to such a society are familiar:

concentration of the national economy on the needs of big corporations, with the government as a stimulating, supporting, and sometimes even controlling force; hitching of this economy to a world-wide system of military alliances, monetary arrangements, technical assistance and development schemes; gradual assimilation of blue-collar and white-collar population, of leadership types in business and labor, of leisure activities and aspirations in different social classes. (1991, p. 19)

Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky’s (1988) description of the influence of the media in Manufacturing Consent adds detail to the concept of containment. In an environment of increasing concentration of ownership of media outlets among a few large corporations, Herman and Chomsky acknowledged that some leeway exists and that dissent is allowed in the professional reporting of the news, so that the media are not simply mouthpieces for their corporate owners. Nonetheless,

the beauty of the system, however, is that such dissent and inconvenient information are kept within bounds and at the margins, so that while their presence shows that the system is not monolithic, they are not large enough to interfere unduly with the domination of the official agenda. (Herman & Chomsky, 1988, p. xii)


More than four decades after Marcuse wrote about one-dimensional soci-ety, economist James Galbraith described the United States as a “corporate republic, where the methods, norms, culture, and corruption of government have become those of the corporation” (2008, p. 144). Corporations have long been powerful politically as well as economically in the United States, but Galbraith focused on what he described as a transition from the 1980s to today, in which conservative economic ideology has been replaced by the “predator state.” According to Galbraith, the monetarist, supply-side, free-trade ideas that took hold in the Reagan years “promised prosperity without the trouble of planning for it, achieved through a simple three-step program: cut taxes, end inflation, and free the market” (2008, p. 4). In addition, Gal-braith wrote, “They promised an end to a kind of politics that many in elite circles—frankly, in both major parties—had come to loathe: the politics of compromise, redistribution, and catering to the needs and demands of minori-ties and the poor” (2008, p. 4).

Galbraith argued that today, although one hears the language of this set of ideas in pure form, they have been discredited because they failed to produce stable economic growth. What has grown up in place of Reagan-style conser-vatism is a predator state, in which global corporations use the mechanisms of government to minimize regulation and transfer wealth from labor to business. Galbraith wrote:

None of these enterprises has an interest in diminishing the size of the state, and this is what separates them from the principled conservatives. For without the state and its economic interventions, they would not themselves exist and could not enjoy the market power that they have come to wield. Their reason for being, rather, is to make money off the state—so long as they control it. (2008, p. 132)

The recent health-care debate is a case in point. Solutions that would have reduced the costs of the private-sector insurance and health-care systems were discarded in favor of those that preserved industry profits and put off for another day the problem of impact on the economy. Thus, “the health care battle is waged in ways that tend to expand the system; the issue is on what terms and with how many concessions to existing predators” (Galbraith, 2008, p. 132).

Galbraith drew from late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century economist Thorstein Veblen to make the point that “the industrial orders are not driven to the brink of subservience” (2008, p. 127). To prevent dissent leading to revolution, low-level workers enjoy a basic level of subsistence and “engineers are kept comfortable with ‘full lunch buckets’” (p. 127) realizing that things could be worse than they are. This vision of “an essentially stable order” (p. 128) is much like Marcuse’s one-dimensional society in which a sense of well-being is fostered by the media and consumer goods. Although people might

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be vaguely aware of the absence of alternatives, they are fearful of endanger-ing their current position. This notion is especially applicable today, in the wake of a major economic downturn. As Sheldon Wolin put it, “Downsizing, reorganization, bubbles bursting, unions busted, quickly outdated skills, and transfer of jobs abroad create not just fear but an economy of fear, a system of control whose power feeds on uncertainty” (2008, p. 67).

Like Galbraith (2008), Wolin (2008) described an increasingly close relationship between business and government. Wolin dated this trend from the outbreak of World War II, which abruptly ended the New Deal era and, thus,

the end of the first large-scale effort at establishing the tentative begin-nings of social democracy in this country, a union of social programs benefiting the Many combined with a vigorous electoral democracy and lively politicking by individuals and organizations representative of the politically powerless. (2008, p. xxiii).

Calling the current political-economic setting in the United States “inverted totalitarianism,” Wolin argued,

[It is] a symbiotic relationship between traditional government and the system of “private” governance represented by the modern business cor-poration. The result is not a system of codetermination by equal partners who retain their distinctive identities but rather a system that represents the political coming-of-age of corporate power. (2008, p. xxi)

A society with these characteristics develops over a long period of time, and it is large and complex. It is difficult to imagine that it is controlled by a small, cohesive group of people, although there is more than enough reason to worry about the influence of an elite of political, economic, and military leaders (see, e.g., Domhoff, 1974; Mills, 1956; Shoumatoff, 2009). However, it is not necessary to hypothesize an elite conspiracy to consider one-dimensionality a useful explanatory tool. It is sufficient to acknowledge that human societies tend to be hierarchical in structure and competitive in relation to resources, which results in a few having much more wealth and power than the many.

Given events over the past few decades, it seems reasonable to conclude that Marcuse’s identification of trends developing in the first part of the 1960s reads like a description of more fully realized characteristics of society in the second decade of the twenty-first century. Greater flexibility in work schedules and mobility between jobs is offset by frequent changes in employers, the weaken-ing of unions, the uncertainties of part-time and contract work, and the potential for unemployment. Trends in personal income favor the wealthy at the expense of middle- and lower-class workers, and the concentration of wealth at the top continues to intensify (Krugman, 2007). Perhaps these trends should not be


surprising, because “the class character of capitalist society means the domina-tion of labor by capital” (Harvey, 2001, p. 79). However, given the advances in working conditions in capitalist society from the nineteenth century through the mid-twentieth century, it might have been reasonable in the 1960s to expect a trendline of progressive easing in the relation between labor and capital.

Despite (or because of) technological advances, globalization, and the greater sophistication and differentiation of work today as compared to five decades ago, the work environment seems to be as one-dimensional as Marcuse thought it was. With increasing integration of corporations and government through campaign contributions, lobbying, gerrymandering of electoral dis-tricts, and so on, there would seem to be little potential for meaningful progres-sive change in the conditions of work. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, work is different in character than it was in the industrial, Fordist era (although many places from which the U.S. purchases consumer goods are in a Fordist phase), but the absence of alternatives and the dominance of the current economic system fit the contours of Marcuse’s model.

AggReSSiveNeSS

The extent, intensity, and social acceptability of aggressiveness and violence have increased dramatically in the United States in the post–World War II era. Although at the time, the war stories, Westerns, horror tales, and crime dramas to which people were exposed in the 1950s and 1960s seemed to push the limits of what people could bear, they were tame compared to today’s violent and bloody video games; television dramas; “extreme fighting”; news coverage of war; movies with chainsaw massacres and figures gored, shot, and beheaded in battle; football spectacles on big-screen television with armored figures battering each other senseless in a game organized as a war metaphor; and so on. From a tender age, children are surrounded by a comprehensive culture of horror, terror, aggressiveness, and brutal, bloody physical violence unimaginable when the first people born after World War II (i.e., the early baby boomers) were children. Daily violence in cities and towns claims the lives of minorities and others, seemingly random shootings occur in schools and businesses, the public school system appears in many places to be failing, and government seems helpless to intervene.

When the boomers were growing up, organized violence in the form of war was thought to be an unusual event that occurred only occasionally. A case can be made that this notion was a false perception, but, nevertheless, the ordinary person regarded mobilization for armed conflict as a periodic aberration rather than a permanent condition. Today, young people are taught that the threat from the country’s enemies is always present and that safety and security are a primary focus of society. Children sit by the hour blowing apart the bad guys in their war, crime, and horror video games.

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The military mission and the military life are in the news constantly, and many young people think of it as an exciting career option. There are now public high schools that function as military training academies (Turner, 2009), and in some places Explorer Scouts are being trained to track down, attack, and subdue terrorists, illegal immigrants, and other miscreants. The Explorers (boys and girls) wear military-style uniforms, use compressed-air guns that fire plastic pellets, and participate in realistic exercises such as simulated bus hijackings. A sheriff’s deputy in California who supervises such exercises enthusiastically claims, “This is about being a true-blooded American guy and girl. . . . It fits right in with the honor and bravery of the Boy Scouts” (Steinhauer, 2009).

Scholars and social commentators debate whether a causal link exists be-tween constant exposure to aggressiveness and violence and characteristics of the broader society. I have earlier written that, in a broad sense, “it seems logical to assume that a society in which the people, and especially children, are constantly exposed to aggressive attitudes and actions will be one in which adults behave in these ways, in homes, organizations, government, and ultimately internationally” (Box, 2008, p. 47).

This trend toward aggressiveness and violence does not lack apparent functionality or usefulness. Instead, what might be thought of as a set of ran-domly occurring characteristics of society can be redescribed in sociological terms as functional support for a system organized around commercial and financial benefit. During the late eighteenth century, Americans were ready to fight for something they believed in and the United States was involved in North American conflicts. Overseas, the United States avoided conflict with other countries unless its interests were directly threatened. Although the United States has always had a permanent, full-time military, in the years immediately after the experience of British rule, it was regarded as a threat to liberty, something to be kept to a minimum (Mills, 1956, pp. 175–176).

In the nineteenth century, an externally interventionist and war-prone United States would (among other expansionist actions) forcibly annex northern Mexico, overthrow the queen of Hawaii, and occupy the Philippines. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the United States would coerce, subvert, or overthrow the governments of many countries, often to secure safe conditions for the operation of commercial interests and to prevent the suc-cess of indigenous movements by oppressed, impoverished peoples (Blum, 2005; Kinzer, 2006). In the post–World War II era, the United States became a dominant world power with, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, more than 700 military bases worldwide and a military presence in more than 150 countries (Johnson, 2004, chap. 6). Today, it is involved in two large-scale, overt military interventions, in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Such an imperial reach suppresses resistance to the cultural, political, and economic effects of corporate globalization, providing stability and security


for commercial operations. Successful extension of power on this scale re-quires a huge military establishment that harnesses the productive capacity and people-power of the nation. Total U.S. military expenditure in 2009 represented approximately 57% of federal discretionary spending (Hellman & Sharp, 2008) and constituted 48% of the military expenditure of all coun-tries in the world (Shah, 2009). The influence over legislative bodies, federal agencies, and public policy of a military establishment of this size should not be underestimated. Aside from its sheer size and overseas involvement, this influence can be seen, for example, in the intentional placement of defense materials production in congressional districts to secure political support, grants given in local areas for homeland security, and the difficulty of trim-ming even a little fat out of the budget for military bases through the BRAC (Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission) process in the middle of the first decade of the new century.

In this setting, it makes functional sense to train people from an early age to be competitive and aggressive, to fear and hate the Other, to master the technical skills needed to fight whichever enemy is currently being presented to the public, and to internalize a feeling of patriotic entitlement to coercing the remainder of the world into conforming to the national will. If one started from nothing and was asked to construct an ideal militaristic society serving commercial interests, one cannot help thinking it would look something like the contemporary United States.

Among early voices expressing concern about the militarization of the United States were sociologist C. Wright Mills (1956, chap. 8), who described the resurgence worldwide of the warlords, and President Dwight Eisenhower, who, in his farewell speech on leaving office in 1961, warned of the increasing influence of the military establishment and the arms industry, calling them, collectively, “the military-industrial complex” (1999, p. 448). Marcuse made the connection between militarization and capitalism in One-Dimensional Man, adding to it in later work. After a discussion of alienated labor and “advanced capitalism’s effect on people,” Marcuse wrote:

The individuals who make up the bulk of the population in the “afflu-ent societies” live in a universe of permanent defense and aggression. . . . In such circumstances, society calls for an Enemy against whom the prevailing conditions are to be defended and against whom the aggressive energy which cannot be channeled into the normal, daily struggle for existence can be released. The individuals who are called upon to develop the Great Society live in a society which wages war or is prepared to wage war all over the world. (2001b, p. 65)

The idea of the Enemy becomes internalized, and

the society as a whole becomes a defense society. For the Enemy is permanent. He is not in the emergency situation but in the normal state

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of affairs. He threatens in peace as much as in war (and perhaps more than in war); he is thus being built into the system as a cohesive power. (Marcuse, 1991, p. 51)

This condition is not without commercial benefit:

When the people, aptly stimulated by the public and private authori-ties, prepare for lives of total mobilization, they are sensible not only because of the present Enemy, but also because of the investment and employment possibilities in industry and entertainment. (Marcuse, 1991, p. 52)

The term Marcuse used for the society he described is the warfare state. Another term we might use today is commercial militarism. The war in Vietnam was in its infancy when One-Dimensional Man was being written, although it appears in Marcuse’s later writing. Nevertheless, that sort of war is described in One-Dimensional Man, and the description echoes much more recently in Iraq:

Torture has been reintroduced as a normal affair, but in a colonial war which takes place at the margin of the civilized world. And there it is practiced with good conscience for war is war. And this war, too, is at the margin—it ravages only the “underdeveloped” countries. Otherwise, peace reigns. (Marcuse, 1991, p. 84)

We might wonder why more citizens do not critically examine these cir-cumstances and decide that it is time for a change. Marcuse’s argument is that in a one-dimensional society, people are persuaded this is how things should be. The media have a powerful influence:

The presentation of killing, burning, and poisoning and torture inflicted upon the victims of neocolonial slaughter is made in a common-sensible, factual, sometimes humorous style which integrates these horrors with the pranks of juvenile delinquents, football contests, accidents, stock market reports, and the weatherman. . . . The consequence is a “psycho-logical habituation of war” which is administered to a people protected from the actuality of war, a people who, by virtue of this habituation, easily familiarizes itself with “kill rate” as it is already familiar with other “rates” (such as those of business or traffic or unemployment). (Marcuse, 1968, p. 259)

And thus, “the people are manipulated, brainwashed; the media, practically their only source of information, reflect and express government interests and policies—or rather those of the capitalist Establishment, which does not exclude some criticism within limits” (Marcuse, 2001c, p. 169). In 2008, in words that echo those of Marcuse, retired U.S. Army Colonel Andrew Bacevich wrote, “For the average American tuning in to the nightly news,


reports of U.S. casualties incurred in distant lands now seem hardly more out of the ordinary than reports of partisan shenanigans on Capitol Hill or brush fires raging out of control in Southern California” (2008, p. 4) Johnson sug-gested, “As distinct from other peoples on this earth, most Americans do not recognize—or do not want to recognize—that the United States dominates the world through its military power” (2004, p. 1).

In the United States, the military draft has been eliminated and a profes-sional, voluntary military has been created. This military formation allows fewer troops to accomplish more, and it reduces civilian resistance to military interventions. With the advanced use of technology, bombs are dropped from beyond harm’s way and by remote control, so it is possible to control large areas of the territory of other nations and to kill large numbers of people with minimal risk. Media coverage of war is tightly controlled so that the public sees, hears, and reads patriotic reports and images transmitted by “embedded” reporters, while disturbing reports and images of dead civilians, uncontrolled resistance, wounded and maimed soldiers, and the bodies of returning dead military personnel are suppressed. In these and other ways, citizen knowledge of the daily effects of war is kept to a minimum.

Fear has become a primary tool of distraction from such characteristics of one-dimensional society as conditions of work, transfer of wealth from the bottom to the top of the socioeconomic scale, and widespread environmental destruction (e.g., deforestation, uncontrolled mineral extraction, species ex-tinction, air and water pollution, and so on). The government and the media occupy the public with security warnings from the ominously named Depart-ment of Homeland Security (ominous in relation to what it implies about the current situation as well as in its unsettling echo of mid-twentieth-century Europe).

The threat of dark-skinned, bearded men spreading nuclear waste or poisonous powder led tens of thousands of people, who live far away from any target that would interest such men, to buy window-sealing duct tape. Along with the fear of human enemies, the government and the medical and pharmaceutical industries warn everyone of the ongoing terrors of exotic dis-eases that may wipe out broad swaths of the population in a single season. Statistically, the danger to an individual from such threats is very small (and the profits to be made from vaccines and medical procedures are substantial). The sturdy American people who fought World War II, a time when the possibility of national extinction seemed quite real, have been replaced by timid generations frightened of exaggerated or false threats. They appear to be ready to strike aggressively at people they perceive as threatening them, even if those people are peaceful civilians and the threat is vague and insubstantial.

I previously stated the central argument of this article: The trends Marcuse identified have deepened into continuing, stable practices that would be dif-

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ficult to dislodge or reverse. It would seem that aggressiveness and violence in service of the political-economic system have developed in a way that supports this argument.

PUBliC AffAiRS

Marcuse did not describe public affairs and government in one-dimensional society in a cohesive or detailed form. What little he had to say about it can be put together with his description of one-dimensional society to begin con-structing a Marcuse-like image of public affairs. Marcuse used the term total administration to identify a state that harnessed the political, legislative, and administrative systems to support the sort of society described in the preceding sections. Thanks to containment and corporate shaping of public opinion, the public votes for people who support the economic agenda, powerful interests contribute to electing the legislators of their choosing and then lobby them to produce laws and programs for their benefit, and the boundaries of action in administrative agencies are determined in significant part by those with wealth and power.

The administrative state grows to provide social benefits denied the people in a pure capitalist system (e.g., retirement, health care, environmental protec-tions), and individuals become even more dependent on the current system and given reality:

The beneficiaries are inextricably tied to the multiplying agencies which produce and distribute the benefits while constantly enlarging the giant apparatus required for the defense of these agencies within and outside the national frontiers; the people turn into the object of administration. (Marcuse, 1970, p. 58)

This view bears an uncanny resemblance to Alexis de Tocqueville’s concern, expressed in the first part of the nineteenth century, that the char-acteristics of democracy he observed in the early United States could, with the passage of time, produce a quite different sort of democracy worldwide. He foresaw a future government that had become “an immense, protective power” that “daily makes the exercise of free choice less useful and rarer.” This government “extends its embrace to include the whole of society,” cov-ering it “with a network of petty, complicated rules that are both minute and uniform.” This situation “does not break men’s will, but softens, bends, and guides it,” so that eventually “each nation is no more than a flock of timid and hardworking animals with the government as its shepherd” (Tocqueville, 1969, p. 692). One might think people in this imaginary future society would find this scenario upsetting and seek to change it, but instead they are comforted by the sense that they have found a way to reconcile “the need of guidance” with the desire to be free:


Their imagination conceives a government which is unitary, protective, and all-powerful, but elected by the people. Centralization is combined with the sovereignty of the people. . . . They console themselves for being under schoolmasters by thinking that they have chosen them themselves. (Tocqueville, 1969, p. 693)

Despite the tremendous growth of the public sector in the United States, it has been buffeted over the past three decades by a neoliberal ideology that has used the market metaphor of “running government like a business” to privatize and contract out public services, to elevate efficiency and sell an image to the public above citizen involvement in decision making, and to steer attention away from values such as social justice, constitutionalism and law, and a duty to serve the public interest (Box, 1999, 2007, 2008; Box, Marshall, Reed, & Reed, 2001). This hollowing out of the capacity of the public sector is an expression of the economistic perspective of the private, corporate sphere as it penetrates the public sphere. This trend can be viewed as a corrective to the growth of the welfare state.

Application of market ideology to the public sphere is a way to change the balance between providing benefits to avoid outright public rebellion against living conditions and providing a level of benefits that costs the wealthy more than they want to pay. If containment has been so successful that public ex-penditure can be cut without creating an unacceptable level of instability in the existing order, it is cost-efficient to do so. The U.S. government recently pumped hundreds of billions into the private economy as an antirecessionary measure. However, a significant portion of this money has been used to support and stabilize corporations, and the entire expenditure may be viewed as a means of calming a crisis and preserving the status quo. In Galbraith’s (2008) terms, the public purse is now being used to protect the predators from the periodic crises of capitalism that they cause. One way to view such expenditures is to think of the resulting debt and unemployment as a tax on workers.

Because public knowledge of alternatives to the current situation has been gradually closed off, the potential for large-scale changes in work, aggressive-ness, or other aspects of one-dimensionality seems weak. What appear to be paradigm-changing debates on public policy are instead about a little more or less government involvement in the private economy, a little more or less taxation, a little more or less environmental destruction, a little more or less war, a little more or less health care, a little more or less corporate influence over elections, and so on, but they do not involve fundamental changes in the character of the political and economic systems.

There is a narrow range of potential alternatives in the public sphere in the United States, and the differences between polar positions do not represent much structural change. To put it differently, the differences do not present a significant threat to the profit maximization of entrenched interests. Thus, “the reality of pluralism becomes ideological, deceptive. It seems to extend

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rather than reduce manipulation and coordination” (Marcuse, 1991, p. 51). This notion helps prevent the perceived “‘catastrophe’ of self-determination” (Marcuse, 1991, p. 52), with the result that “the world tends to become the stuff of total administration, which absorbs even the administrators. The web of domination has become the web of Reason itself, and this society is fatally entangled in it” (Marcuse, 1991, p. 169).

On the surface, a parallel exists between today’s angry populist conservatives and the anti-Federalists of the American founding era. Much like contemporary conservatives, anti-Federalists believed that a wealthy, well-educated Eastern elite intended to force on them a centralized government that would strip them of political power and take away their money by collecting taxes and debt (Wood, 1969). The anti-Federalists had clearly identified opponents who were, in fact, taking some of the actions anti-Federalists believed that they were taking.

Contemporary populist conservatives, in contrast, seem to be paradoxi-cally opposing their own interests. Many of them have incomes just sufficient to keep them fed and housed, many have poor health insurance coverage or none, and many have had relatively stagnant real incomes and wealth over several years while those at the upper end of the income scale have experienced significant increases. Nevertheless, these people enthusiastically support leaders who would keep them relatively poor and disempowered in the name of freedom and fighting threatening Others, such as a mythic East Coast–educated elite, blacks, immigrants, atheists, social libertarians, and bad people overseas.

The governing class has become sophisticated in shaping public knowledge and sentiment, in controlling the terms and conditions of public discourse— in, to use Marcuse’s term, containing the potential for social change. Facts and language have parted ways and “the result is the familiar Orwellian language (‘peace is war’ and ‘war is peace,’ etc.)” (Marcuse, 1991, p. 88). Recently, an example of such language justified the invasion of Iraq by saying it was intended to make that country democratic. In this confusion of perception and reality, the speech of ordinary, everyday affairs becomes “purged language,” emptied of “the means for expressing any other contents than those furnished to the individuals by their society” (Marcuse, 1991, p. 174).

Increasingly, step by step, knowledge of alternative futures fades into a vaguely remembered past, a past that may be ridiculed for the naiveté of its idealism and its failure to accept the inevitable end of history that comes with the homogenization of global neoliberal capitalism. Wolin noted that, in ef-fect, what has been created is

a new type of political system, seemingly one driven by abstract total-izing powers, not by personal rule, one that succeeds by encouraging political disengagement rather than mass mobilization, that relies more on “private” media than on public agencies to disseminate propaganda reinforcing the official version of events. (2008, p. 44)


Marcuse knew decades ago that centralization of economic power was cutting the public out of the governance loop, as “the monopolization of the economy asserts itself in the concentration of power in the executive branch of the government” (2001c, p. 175). Direct control of the government is out of reach of the people:

In the American democracy today, the government is by definition (be-cause it was elected by the people, and because it is the government) immune against subversion, and it is (by the same definition) safe from any other than verbal criticism and a congressional opposition which can easily be managed. (Marcuse, 2001c, p. 176)

Galbraith used his concept of the predator state to offer a current vision of government that has been captured by corporations and is immune from citizen influence:

The Predator State is an economic system wherein entire sectors have been built up to feast on public systems built originally for public purposes and largely serving the middle class. The corporate republic simply administers the spoils system. On a day-to-day basis, the busi-ness of its leadership is to deliver favors to their clients. These range from coal companies to sweatshop operators to military contractors. (2008, pp. 146–147)

We might add, from the recent West Virginia mine disaster and Gulf oil spill, mine operators and offshore drilling companies. This predator state

is a coalition of relentless opponents of the regulatory framework on which public purpose depends, with enterprises whose major lines of business compete with or encroach on the principal public functions of the enduring New Deal. It is a coalition, in other words, that seeks to control the state partly in order to prevent the assertion of public purpose and partly to poach on the lines of activity that past public purpose has established. (Galbraith, 2008, p. 131)

It may be argued that electronic technologies have made it unlikely that government can control the flow and quality of information and that people in local communities are free to form views of their own, finding new ways to organize collective decision making and economic exchange, thus suggesting alternatives to one-dimensional society. Promising countertrends to the given reality exist, as examined in the following discussion, but government is not an independent player in the global political-economic system nor are state and local governments exempt from the characteristics of that system or immune to its effects. Technology has the potential to encourage imagination of alterna-tives and allow the free flow of information, but a quantitative dimension exists that can limit its impact. If only a small portion of the information exchanged

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leads people to consider progressive alternatives to existing political-economic realities, the overall effect is to reinforce one-dimensionality.

At the local level, commercial militarism is not an immediate issue; in-stead, a central concern is to shape public policy and administration so they maximize financial returns to property owners (Logan & Molotch, 1987). The local political economy is nestled within the global political economy, which seeks the highest possible return from competitive resource extraction and use of labor, and the local economy competes for its share. Within the local setting, speculation on land and buildings is a central engine of pub-lic policy. Places exist in which residents are able—perhaps in some cases only partially and during limited periods of time— to overcome control by dominant financial interests and to use government to ameliorate some of the consequences of the search for speculative profit (e.g., pollution, congestion, high housing costs, minority ghettos, violence). They may achieve these accomplishments by resisting what are perceived to be damaging develop-ment proposals (Logan & Molotch, 1987, chap. 6) or with initiatives such as building mass transit systems, requiring affordable housing, or using growth management techniques to limit sprawl and excessive infrastructure costs. Nevertheless, politically and economically, this battle can be an uphill struggle against considerable odds (Box, 1998, chap. 2; 2005, chaps. 6, 7). Marcuse expressed these challenges:

In communities still essentially conservative and conformist, self-control would not mean any progress other than, perhaps, progress in efficiency. . . . The aim of control is indeed “rationalization,” i.e., an organization of work and leisure less wasteful and destructive of human and natural resources, but precisely this aim can be preserved only by a revolutionary sensibility, imagination, and reason—otherwise, it remains a rationalization of unfreedom, a higher stage in the development of capitalism. (2001c, p. 181)

Given the characteristics of the society Marcuse described in the post–World War II period, it would have been reasonable when he wrote to expect that public affairs would increasingly become an element within one-dimensional society, serving as a tool to facilitate its goals and strengthen the neoliberal state. War and fear of enemies would be used often to boost the economy and distract people from the underlying agenda of profit maxi-mization. The range of political positions could be expected to narrow in approaches to public policy, despite the noisy rhetoric of political infight-ing. The public sphere would increasingly reflect the values and operating techniques of the private sector by abandoning commitments to citizen self-determination, social justice, and the public interest, substituting instead privatization, efficiency maximization, and control of the image and mean-ing of the public sphere through use of Orwellian language that is purged


of reference to alternative futures. In this setting, local citizen initiatives to organize and seek other ways of living would be tolerated and sometimes thrive, provided they fit within the existing economic framework and did not seriously infringe on entrenched interests.

Galbraith suggested, “Everywhere you look, the public decision is made by the agent of a private party for the purpose of delivering private gain. This is not an accident: it is a system” (2008, p. 147). Marcuse would no doubt agree.

CONClUSiON: ARe We TRAPPed iN ONe diMeNSiON?

The casual reader could understandably conclude that Marcuse was an old radical from another time and societal setting who was out of touch with modern American society. The argument presented herein is that on closer examination we find a complex and prescient description of political and economic trends that have, since Marcuse wrote, strengthened and become more firmly entrenched. This argument appears to be true despite the periodic eruption of movements in protest of societal conditions; such movements (e.g., civil rights, women, environment, anti-globalization, and so on) seem to be capable of moderating some gross abuses, but it can be argued they have not changed the fundamental characteristics of the political economy. In addition, the tightening partnership between corporations and the public sector has made available the financial powers of the state to protect the pri-vate sector from periodic crises resulting from risky and abusive behaviors and overproduction.

Three topical areas are examined to illustrate the usefulness of the concept of one-dimensionality: work, aggressiveness, and public affairs. There are other interesting topics embedded within this concept, but these three serve, at least preliminarily, to support the argument that one-dimensionality continues to be a powerful way to think about the political-economic system.

The focus of this article is Marcuse’s description of conditions and trends, not his prescriptions for change. However, it is important to think about whether significant change is possible given the adaptability and durability of one-dimensional conditions. Kellner wrote that capitalist society is more than one-dimensionality; rather, it is a “closed, monolithic system”:

[It is] preferable to see it as a system of contradictions, tensions and con-flicts which capital desperately tries to manage—and profit from—but which oscillates from stasis to change, from oppression and domination to struggle and resistance, and from stability and containment to conflict and crisis. (1984, p. 274)

Kellner (1989) noted that Marcuse’s writing following One-Dimensional Man in 1964 focused attention on the possibilities for constructive change. Marcuse wished for a society that would be relatively free of oppression, the

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necessity of meaningless work to secure life’s basic needs, and an economy dependent on destructive resource extraction and war. Based on analysis of the student movement, the arts, and other forms of resistance to the status quo, he remained hopeful that movement toward such a future was possible, despite the conditions and trends that he described in powerful and dark language. Kellner thought that one-dimensionality can be taken too far, that a theory of “‘organized’ or ‘state’ capitalism” in which society can manage “its funda-mental problems and conflicts indefinitely” is “deeply flawed” (1989, p. 203). This deep flaw is due to the crises of techno-capitalism, which demonstrate a systemic instability and thus a capacity for change.

The idea that contemporary society can be changed in a progressive direc-tion is supported by historian Howard Zinn’s perspective on societal change, as found in a 2006 interview with Shelly Fredman. Fredman asked Zinn about critics who found him naive and about whether the protests of ordinary people could make a difference. Zinn responded:

It’s true that any talk of hope is dismissed as naive, but that’s because we tend to look at the surface of things at any given time. And the surface almost always looks grim. The charge of naiveté also comes from a loss of historical perspective. History shows that what is considered naive in one decade becomes reality in another. If you listen to the media, you get no sense of what’s happening. I speak to groups of people in differ-ent parts of the country. I was in Austin, Texas recently and a thousand people showed up. I believe people are basically decent, they just lack information. (Fredman, 2006)

Zinn supported this view with the examples of successful actions to end the Vietnam War and apartheid in South Africa. This view is an optimistic vision of bottom–up, incremental change over time, and we may join Zinn in spirit by hoping that things go this way.

In the meantime, an examination of events and conditions over the past several decades suggests that (in the United States, at least) society is moving, as suggested by Galbraith (2008), toward a closer partnership between great wealth and government. In this partnership, the public sector protects the in-creasingly lopsided accumulation of wealth by a few through redistribution of a portion of it to the remainder of the population. This process gives society a somewhat humane appearance, allowing the economic and institutional status quo to remain largely undisturbed.

The capitalist model of political economy may or may not be the last word in organizing societies—the end of history—but it seems to have, for the foreseeable future, the strength to contain potentially large-scale changes and withstand its recurring financial crises. As critical geographer David Harvey wrote, these recurring crises are caused by overaccumulation, result-ing in “capital surpluses and lack of investment opportunities, falling rates


of profit, and lack of effective demand in the market” (2001, p. 240). This results in “a social cost” as the capitalist production system rationalizes; the human consequences include “bankruptcies . . . forced devaluation of capital assets and personal savings, inflation, increasing concentration of economic and political power in a few hands, falling real wages, and unemployment” (Harvey, 2001, p. 240). As catastrophic as this situation can be, rather than causing the system to change into something more favorable to the average citizen, these periodic crises “have the effect of expanding the productive capacity and renewing the conditions of further accumulation, . . . [and thus] we can conceive of each crisis as shifting the accumulation process onto a new and higher plane” (Harvey, 2001, p. 241).

There are times when groups of people demand significant change. In the United States in 2008, it seemed clear to many that a nationwide coalition of sorts had formed to support movement away from an aggressive neoliberalism. Although these events promised significant change, it appears now that the potential is quite limited for far-reaching modifications in the relationships among government, the private sector, and citizens, the characteristics of work and leisure, the way society treats the physical environment, and the structural economic and political dependence on militarism and war.

A kinder, gentler, more seemingly rational patina covers over the underlying realities for the time being, and the likelihood of exceptionally violent, destruc-tive, socially abusive public actions has diminished somewhat. This, however, is not the same thing as fundamental change in the overall political-economic system. Whatever one’s views about these issues, although Marcuse’s concept of one-dimensionality needs assistance from contemporary writers to adapt to current circumstances, it continues to be a useful way to describe conditions in society and to think about the potential for change.

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Richard C. Box is Regents/Foundation Professor in the School of Public Administration, University of Nebraska at Omaha. His writing focuses on the application of critical social theory in public affairs. He is the author or editor of Citizen Governance: leading American Communities into the 21st Century (Sage, 1998), Public Administration and Society: Critical Issues in American Governance (2004; 2nd ed., M.E. Sharpe, 2009), Critical Social Theory in Public Administration (M.E. Sharpe, 2005), Democracy and Public Administration (2007, M.E. Sharpe), and Making a Difference: Progressive values in Public Administration (M.E. Sharpe, 2008).

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