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The Quest for Independence in the CaribbeanAuthor(s): Colin G. ClarkeReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Nov., 1977), pp. 337-345Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/156132 .Accessed: 13/03/2012 10:59

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i. Lat. Amer. Stud. 9, 2, 337-345 Printed in Great Britain 337

Review Article

THE QUEST FOR INDEPENDENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN

Territorial fragmentation and small size destined the Caribbean archipelago to a long history of colonialism and metropolitan rivalry. The partitioning of the region between the Spanish, French, British, Dutch and Danish during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and United States intervention in the Greater Antilles since the nineteenth, culminating in the annexation of Puerto Rico in I898, have ensured that each territory's connexions - political, economic, and intellectual - have been forged almost exclusively with the major countries of Western Europe or North America.

Seventeenth-century colonialism dictated the mode of Caribbean produc- tion - the cultivation of sugar and lesser primary products on plantations manned by unfree labour. Moreover, European imperialism created a Creole system of colour stratification in which whites dominated brown freemen and black slaves. After slave emancipation in the British West Indies in i834-38, indentured workers were imported from Madeira, China, and especially India. The system of East Indian contract immigration continued until 19I7 and was crucial to the development of plantation economies in the most recently acquired British Colonies, Trinidad and Guyana.

External influences and internal developments are inextricably interwoven in Caribbean affairs. The islands have always been affected by the climate of ideas developed in metropolitan countries, and the French Revolution, the United States' sense of 'manifest destiny', and Cold War geopolitics have all at one time or another impinged on the decolonization process. Nevertheless, pressure for self-government within the Caribbean units has been intense. The quest for political freedom has frequently led to social conflict, and in several instances racial hostility, even genocide, has occurred.

Interplay between metropolis and colony, between ideals of liberty and equality and the realities of Caribbean social inequality unite all the books reviewed in this article. Nowhere have these themes been more clearly expressed than in the earliest successful attempt to secure autonomy in the Caribbean - the Haitian Revolution of I789-I804.

L.A.S.-IO

338 Journal of Latin American Studies

Revolutionary Independence Social and racial strife was the salient feature of the labyrinthine course

of the independence movement in Saint Dominique. By the late eighteenth century the social hierarchy was composed of 24,000 whites, an almost equal number of free coloureds, and a slave population of 408,000. Tensions existed between bureaucrat and grand blanc, grand and petit blanc, white and mulatto, mulatto and black, black and white. Beginning with the French Revolution in 1789, each played a vital role on the Haitian stage. Between 1789 and I79I the grands and petits blancs created an explosive situation with their intra-caste struggle; from I790 to 1799 the mulattoes sought elevation to white status, yet ignored slave pressure for freedom and citizenship.

Ott's 1 scholarly account of the Haitian revolutionary wars shows that the blacks were ultimately the chief beneficiaries of the warfare. To further their own ends whites and mulattoes triggered, but failed to control, slave rebellion and thus set the blacks on a course for freedom and independence which otherwise, he argues, might have been beyond their awareness and ability to achieve. Haitian scholars will reject this interpretation, preferring to stress the active role of the slaves. Yet they will probably agree that important though the French Revolution, key personalities, and foreign intervention were to the detailed course of events, these factors should be considered subsidiary to the process of social and racial conflict which cul- minated in the expulsion and massacre of the whites by Dessalines. In a wide-ranging conclusion, Ott extends his discussion into the post-revolutionary period. He emphasizes the influence of the protracted period of armed conflict on the subsequent pattern of militarism and dictatorship; and he traces black-mulatto rivalry through to the Duvalier regime.

A larger time-scale than Ott's provides the framework for Jonathan Brown's account of Santo Domingo, first published in two volumes in I837.2 It eschews Ott's sympathetic treatment of the black revolutionaries and lacks his voluminous documentation. However, Brown's concluding chapter, despite the tincture of color prejudice so common among whites in his day, offers an interesting eye-witness account of Haitian life in the I830s: he documents administrative malpractice and judicial ineptitude, ecclesiastical anarchy, the decay of the plantations, and hostility between mulattoes and blacks. 1 Thomas, O. Ott, The Haitian Revolution 1789-i8o4 (Knoxville, University of Tennessee

Press, I973). Pp. x + 232. $8.50. 2 Jonathan Brown, The History and Present Condition of St Domingo (London, Frank Cass,

1972; first published Philadelphia, William Marshall and Co., I837). I, Pp. iv + 307; IT,. Pp. 289. $34.50.

The Quest for Independence in the Caribbean 339 For nineteenth-century whites, Haiti, the Black Republic, and the second

oldest autonomous state in the Americas, was a symbol of the dangers inherent in slave emancipation and coloured self-government. 'The fact is indisputable', Brown asserted, 'that as a nation the blacks of St Domingo are in a retrograde movement as regards intellectual improvement, and no obstacle seems to exist to prevent this descent to barbarism '. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Britain imposed a century-long hiatus between emancipation and the granting of universal adult suffrage in its Caribbean colonies, and almost two more decades of constitutional decolonization were to pass before independence was finally achieved by the larger territories in the i96os.

Constitutional Decolonization It was never British policy to spawn a myriad of island states in the

Caribbean. In British eyes a federation of all the Commonwealth units was the ideal vehicle for decolonization and for the creation of a viable, democratic and sovereign state. After more than a decade of negotiations, a West Indies Federation was inaugurated in 1958. The union included the 'big three' islands - Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados - together with the Windwards and Leewards. But such were the tensions between the con- stituent units that a Jamaican plebiscite in 1961 narrowly removed the island from the federation. Almost immediately afterwards Trinidad seceded from the rump federation, and both colonies became independent in 1962.

Trinidad and Tobago's involvement in the federal venture is briefly traced by A. N. R. Robinson,4 formerly a leading figure in the ruling Peoples' National party, and an erstwhile Minister of Finance. However, the greater part of his book is devoted to reforms of tariff, banking, insurance, tax and budgeting procedures since Trinidad became independent. Little significance can be attached to this disappointing, disjointed, modern history of Trinidad and Tobago, which completely fails to reflect the author's deep involvement in national politics.

Robinson's book symbolizes the West Indian politician's preoccupation with legislation as distinct from other aspects of innovation. The quest for constitutional panaceas persists, however, and Robinson ends with a plea for Caribbean collaboration. 'A decade ago we witnessed the futility of half-hearted union. Now we are experiencing the futility of separateness,

3 Ibid., II, 288-9. 4 A. N. R. Robinson, Patterns of Political and Economic Transformation in Trinidad and

Tobago (Cambridge, Mass., Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 197I). Pp. xiii + 200. $8.95.


however purposeful. To seize and maintain the better future that can be ours, we must impel ourselves towards purposeful union. We must build up the nation of the Caribbean in our own likeness.' 5

But Caribbean identity is riven by race as well as by insularity. Robinson, with Creole sleight of hand, disregards the East Indian segment in Trini- dad's society. However, black-East Indian relations are the focus of two of the three books which deal with Guyana, Trinidad's sociological 'twin' on the mainland of South America.

Vere Daly has written a slight, but clearlypresented, textbook that chronicles the development of Guyana within the context of European exploration and colonization.6 He describes the establishment of European hegemony in Guyana, the creation of sugar plantations and the system of black slavery, the dyking of the coastlands, British annexation in 1814, the free village movement among the emancipated slaves, and the settling of indentured East Indians. Yet the involvement of race in national elections is glossed over, and political issues are confined to boundary disputes, independence in 1966, and the creation of a Co-operative Republic in I970. Significantly, Daly has nothing to say about the West Indies Federation or Guyana's refusal to join this British-inspired institution unless independence was instantly granted

Guyana's road to independence was infinitely more tortuous than that of the larger British islands which were originally part of the Federation. iBasil Ince has charted Guyana's protracted struggle to escape the colonial fold by looking at the territory's social, political and economic evolution, and by setting its constitutional changes against the debate which was taking place contemporaneously in the Special Committee on Colonialism at the United Nations.7

Ince locates the origins of the idea of self-determination in the American and French Revolutions, the Peace Treaties of I9I9, the Atlantic Charter of I94I, and the Cairo Declaration of I943. However, he attributes the practice, as distinct from the theory, of decolonization to the Cold War: the two major post-war powers, the United States and the USSR have been concerned with bloc-building and adding to their list of iclient states and satellites. 'Since suppressing colonial peoples' struggles for independence was not conducive to bloc-building, the obvious move was to support, will- ingly or unwillingly, the subjugated peoples' struggle for freedom'.8

t, Ibid., p. I68. 6 Vere T. Daly, The Making of Guyana (London, Macmillan, 1974). Pp. vi + I28. /I-20. 7 Basil A. Ince, Decolonization and Conflict in the United Nations: Guyana's Struggle for

Independence (Cambridge, Mass., Schenkman Publishing Company, 1974). Pp. xiv + 202. $6.70. 8 Ibid., p. 2.

The Quest for Independence in the Caribbean 341

Why then, was there so much opposition to Guyana's bid for independence in the I95os and early Ig6os? Ince plausibly argues that it was due to the Marxist ideology of the ruling Peoples' Progressive Party (the PPP). This party, led by Cheddi Jagan, came to power in i953, winning eighteen out of the twenty-four seats in the first Guyanese general election based on universal adult suffrage. After less than five months, the constitution was suspended. The British Government asserted that 'from actions and public statements of these extremists it is clear that their objective was to turn Guyana into a state subordinate to Moscow and a dangerous platform for extending communist influence in the Western Hemisphere'.9 Communist Guyana in the I95os might prove as infectious to South America as Haiti's independence a century and a half earlier!

British policy was initially to halt and later to proceed very gradually with Guyana's constitutional advance to self-government and independence until a more acceptable leadership emerged. After the Cuban Revolution in 1959 and the election of President Kennedy, strong United States support was given to British strategy. Through the CIA and the AFL-CIO the United States funded a strike in 1963 aimed at destabilizing the self-governing Jagan administration. A beleaguered Jagan joined opposition leaders in inviting the British colonial secretary, Duncan Sandys, to impose a constitutional settlement as a prelude to independence. Proportional representation was introduced - the only instance of its application in the Common- wealth Caribbean - and Jagan was swept out of office at the general election in 1964. Support for Jagan at the United Nations from the Soviet bloc and from Afro-Asian countries failed to counter British and United States' machinations - a point which Ince takes three chapters to explore.

However, Ince correctly concludes that Guyana's plight in the early I96os was not due entirely to Jagan's ideological position or to Cold War tactics. Guyana's economic dependence - 80 per cent of its exports were provided by bauxite and sugar, both of which were exclusively owned by North Ameri- can and British companies - complicated the issue. More important still was the cultural plurality of the society and the sharp distinction between Africans and East Indians. This cleavage was prised apart by British and United States' policy to produce, temporarily at least, an ideologically more acceptable Guyanese government into whose hands independence could be placed.

The schism in Guyanese, society and the fluctuating relationship between race and electoral politics are the subject of J. E. Greene's careful and

9 Ibid., p. 39.


interesting study.10 Greene's research is based upon data collected from almost I,ooo respondents, though his sample material is not controlled by standard tests of significance. However, it is compared with electoral results, which provide a framework and historical basis for the book.

Greene shows that the Guyanese working-class party, the PPP, which came to power in the landslide victory of I953, was a coalition based upon the East Indian majority of the population and the large African minority. After the suspension of the constitution, Jagan, the East Indian leader, and Burnham, the most prominent African, split: ideology, racial difference and opportunism all played a part. Jagan continued to lead the PPP, while Burnham formed the Peoples' National Congress (PNC), taking with him some members of the original multi-racial party. iBoth leaders extended their support by enlisting their own racial and cultural segments, and in 1961 D'Aguiar, a Portuguese, rounded off the pattern of alignments by creating the United Force, with an appeal to whites, coloureds, Chinese and Amer- indians.

Greene characterizes the change in mass political support between I953 and 1968 as a shift from class-based parties to those reflecting racial distinctions. After the i955 split, the PPP was founded upon the rural, East Indian- dominated Guyana Agricultural Workers Union, the Hindu Sanathan Maha Sabha and the Islamic Anjuman E Islam. Burnham, whose original support was both urban and trade-union based, developed firm links with Creole organizations, such as the Guyana Teachers' Association and the League of Coloured Peoples. By 1961 Burnham had achieved a pact with Sidney King's Association for Social and Cultural Relations with Inde- pendent Africa (ASCRIA) and the Guyana Civil Service Association; three years later he was joined by the Manpower Citizens Association and Muslim defectors from the predominantly Hindu PPP.

The capacity of Burnham to orchestrate electoral support was crucial after the protracted period of racial violence in 1963 had ushered in proportional representation. Although Jagan secured the largest block of votes in 1964, Burnham entered a coalition with D'Aguiar and forced the PP,P into opposition. Moreover, Greene demonstrates that between 1964 and 1968, after which Burnham was able to secure a majority of seats without UF help, the PNC gained strength at the expense of the PPP and UF. The racial minorities, the Muslims, and some Hindus, too, defected to the PNC. This re-alignment is attributed to the strength of PNC party organization and to Burnham's rapid realization that under proportional representation

10 J. E. Greene, Race v. Politics in Guyana (Jamaica, Institute of Social and Economic Research, I974). Pp. xvii + 198. J$3.5o.

The Quest for Independence in the Caribbean 343 there were no dispensable constituencies; every vote counted. In addition, Greene indicates that the PNC secured its position by two gerrymander- ing techniques - proxy voting and the bogus registration of Guyanese citizens overseas.

Greene's study is a valuable contribution to our understanding of Carib- bean electoral politics and the role of race in political behaviour. He shows that once social forces are unleashed, 'individuals... may find themselves responding rather than innovating' 1: such was the situation in Guyana during the racial violence in i963-4, as it had been, too, in the War of the Knives between black and brown in Haiti in i800.

Sovereignty withheld

Notwithstanding Guyanese experience, Britain has been as anxious to decolonize since the Second World War as its Caribbean dependencies have been to secure autonomy: no strident expressions of national sentiment have been required to launch independence. In contrast, the French and Dutch West Indies have been decolonized by incorporation. Guadeloupe, Marti- nique and French Guiana have become separate departements of France and send representatives to the Chamber of Deputies in Paris. Holland combined with its Caribbean possessions to form the Tripartite Kingdom of the Netherlands, from which Surinam seceded as recently as I975.

Puerto Rico's status is midway between incorporation and independence. A colony of Spain for four hundred years, it was annexed to the United States at the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898. Unlike Cuba, Puerto Rico had not sued for independence from Spain, though there was a strong autonomist movement in the island in the decades following the Grito de Lares in I868. In 1897 the Spanish Liberals granted Puerto Rico internal self-government, but a year later the island became a permanent possession of the United States, and remained an unincorporated territory until 1952.

Both Golding 2 and Crampsey 3 have written 'popular' books which treat the entire span of Puerto Rican history. Unfortunately, Golding's account of the Spanish colonial period is journalistic, and it is only when he discusses the United States' intervention that he writes with control and conviction - though with obvious partisanship. Crampsey's work is far

11 Ibid., p. 140. 12 Morton J. Golding, A Short History of Puerto Rico (New York Mentor, 1973). Pp. x + I74.

$I.25. 13 Robert A. Crampsey, Puerto Rico (Newton Abbot, David and Charles, I973). Pp. 206.

?3-75'


better. He ranges more widely, and deals fluently, if briefly, with historical, social, economic and political issues.

Both authors emphasize the significance of the role played by Mufioz Rivera in the passing of the Jones Act in 1917, which conferred adult male suffrage and United States citizenship on Puerto Ricans; both are equally fulsome in their praise of Muiioz Rivera's son, Mufioz Marin, who founded the Partido Popular Democrdtico in 1938, became the first elected Puerto Rican governor in I948, and was the architect of the island's current status as an Estado Libre Asociado, or Commonwealth, of the United States.

As a result of Puerto Rico's close links with Washington, the island's economy is deeply penetrated by United States' business interests; Puerto Ricans have placed economic viability above political sovereignty. A refer- endum held in 1967 showed that 60 per cent preferred the continuance of internal self-government without independence; 39 per cent opted for full integration with the United States; and less than i per cent of those who voted chose independence. Thus, although the Progressive Party, which is pro-statehood, held the governorship between I968 and 1972, Puerto Rico's status has remained unchanged.

A less 'orthodox' version of Puerto Rican experience is presented by Silen in his book emphatically subtitled 'a story of oppression and resistance'.Ti He is unashamedly polemical, contending that ' confrontation between official ideology and that of the revolutionary movement will bring the necessary synthesis between national and class consciousness '.5 Silen's 'enraged generation' demand independence and a break with all forms of United States imperialism. They stereotype Mufioz Rivera and Mufioz Marin as apologists for the Puerto Rican ruling class and advocates of the United States protectorate; they reject the island's economic dependency, and criticize the high rate of unemployment. The independistas are young, strongly associated with the University of Puerto Rico, and influenced by Castro, Marx, and the revolutionary Negro patriot, Pedro Albizu Campos. Unlike Haiti and Guyana, however, race is of lesser importance in social differentiation - and therefore in protest movements - in Puerto Rico, though, distinctions between Spanish and American life-styles are increas- ingly significant.

Issues of race and identity are highlighted rather than blurred by Puerto Rican emigration to the United States mainland, where more than a million islanders and their descendants have settled, especially since the Second

14 Juan Angel Silen, We, the Puerto Rican People: a Story of Oppression and Resistance (New York and London, Monthly Review Press, 197I). Pp. 134. .2'25.

15 Ibid., p. 114.

The Quest for Independence in the Caribbean 345 World War. Paulette Cooper's interesting vignettes depict Puerto Rican- American youth as victims of white prejudice and police harassment.'1 Within their own group they are handicapped by overcrowding and broken homes. Only a few succeed by white standards and their own; a few are 'saved' by conversion to Protestant sects; but the majority drop out of school and are soon enmeshed in drugs and crime. The Puerto Rican in the United States is just as trapped as the islander. Indeed, Jose Torres avers that American children of Puerto Rican parentage ' who have never been to Puerto Rico, would even kill for the freedom' of the island.l7

These books clearly demonstrate the constraints on sovereignty experienced by Caribbean societies, and illuminate the persistence of dependency and social inequality as crucial dimensions of life for islanders and Guyanese. Moreover, they provide a context for the anger of young West Indian radicals. But can the radicals transform rhetoric into action?

COLIN G. CLARKE

16 Paulette Cooper (ed.), Growing Up Puerto Rican (New York, Mentor, I972). Pp. xii + 31.. $1.25.

17 Ibid., p. viii.

Latin America in the Foreign Relations of the United StatesAuthor(s): Gordon Connell-SmithReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (May, 1976), pp. 137-150Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/156208 .Accessed: 13/03/2012 10:59

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal ofLatin American Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

J. Lat. Amer. Stud. 8, I, I37-150 Printed in Great Britain I37

Review Article

LATIN AMERICA IN THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

In the rhetoric of United States foreign relations, the countries of Latin America occupy a very special place. They are 'our sister republics', 'the Good Neighbours', fellow members of a unique international system, and so on. The reality, not surprisingly, is different. Because of the vast disparity of power between the United States and Latin America, relations between them are inherently delicate and subject to strains. The issue of' intervention ' by the United States in the internal and external affairs of the Latin American countries is ever present, whether it is a matter of marines being sent into a small Caribbean republic or of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 'destabilizing' a major South American government. Pan American Day speeches about' the inter-American family ' sound hollow when, for example, the United States refuses to grant Latin American countries preferential trade terms. Latin Americans know that theirs is, in reality, a low priority area for Washington except on those rare occasions in the twentieth century when United States hegemony in the western hemisphere has been seriously challenged.

Yet Latin America is the subject of perhaps the most famous of all United States foreign policies: the Monroe Doctrine. In essence this asserts that the security of the United States would be threatened by extra-continental intervention in Latin America. It has led the United States to pursue a policy of excluding as far as possible from Latin America non-American influence which might endanger her security. This has inevitably involved establishing her own hegemony over the region. Significantly, the Monroe Doctrine is closely linked with another fundamental' doctrine' of United S;tates foreign relations: isolationism. For the latter involved keeping the United States out of the European balance of power system, and the Monroe Doctrine applied this policy to the whole hemisphere. President Monroe asserted that' America' had a system separate from that of Europe. In I890 the 'inter-American system' was established which, since I948, has had as its centrepiece the Organization of American States (OAS).

The Monroe Doctrine, then, has been concerned fundamentally with the


security of the United States. This was underlined when, in ratifying the Kellogg-Briand Pact (Treaty of Paris) of 1928, the United States Senate declared: 'The United States regards the Monroe Doctrine as a part of its national security and defense. Under the right of self-defense allowed by the treaty must necessarily be included Ithe right to maintain the Monroe Doctrine, which is a part of our system of national defense.' The Monroe Doctrine was likewise felt to be at stake in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, although the Kennedy administration deemed it wiser to justify its response by reference to the collective security pact signed with the countries of Latin America at Rio de Janeiro in I947. T'he United States has been particularly sensitive over her security in the Caribbean region and approaches to the Panama Canal. It is in this area that the great majority of her armed interventions have taken place. In 1904 President Theodore Roosevelt enunciated what became known as the 'Roosevelt Corollary ' to the Monroe Doctrine. This affirmed the duty of the United States to intervene in cases of 'chronic wrongdoing ' or 'impo- tence' on the part of Latin American governments which might otherwise justify intervention by non-American powers. The Roosevelt Corollary thus provided a rationale for the United States policy of intervention: to forestall intervention by extra-continental powers. Although in principle applying to Latin America as a whole, the Corollary was in practice limited to the sensitive Caribbean region. But it caused the Monroe Doctrine to be associated in the minds of Latin Americans not with extra-continental intervention, but with intervention by the United States herself.

A useful overview of Latin America's relations with the United States is furnished for undergraduate courses in political science and history by Federico Gil.1 In his judgement: Perhaps the most prominent feature in the history of inter-American relations has been its cyclical nature. Periods of rising interest in and concern with Latin America on the part of the United States have invariably been followed by periods of declining interest, increasing conflict, and almost total disregard for the fate of these nations.

And, he notes: The cycles of amity and attention toward Latin America have consistently coincided with particular crises: the world conflict in I914-19I9, the great economic depres- sion, the emergence of European fascism and Nazism, the Second World War, and the new threat of Communism and the Cuban Revolution.2

Two of the high-water marks for Latin America in the foreign relations of

1 Federico G. Gil, Latin American-United States Relations (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., I97I). Pp. x + 339. Paperback, ?Ig9o.

2 Ibid., p. 284.

Latin America in the Foreign Relations of the United States 139

the United States were the Good Neighbour policy associated with President Franklin Roosevelt, and the launching by President Kennedy of the Alliance for Progress. Gil is expressing a widely held view when he asserts that 'The unprecedented example of continental unity that marked the conduct of the American republics during the... [Second World War] more than vindi- cated the prescience of the builders of the Good Neighbor Policy '; while 'The advent of John F. Kennedy's administration and the subsequent forma- tion of the Alliance for Progress constituted a major turning point in the history of United States-Latin American relations '.4 But President Kennedy died less than three years after the Alliance had been launched, and Gil declares that' The indifference of the Johnson and Nixon administrations toward Latin America' contributed to a feeling among Latin Americans that the United States had again lost interest in the region.5

Inevitably, Latin America became a lower priority area for the United States as the latter expanded her foreign relations. For Professor Joseph Tul- chin,6 'This was part of the impact of World War I: to make Latin American policy subordinate ito the expanded needs of American security and consistent with American policy in other areas of the world '. At the same time, 'The Great War in Europe presented the United States with a golden opportunity to establish its hegemony in Latin America'.8 Hitherto, although she had a firm grip upon 'the Caribbean danger zone ', European (especially British) interests were still strongly entrenched in South America. During the war the United States was able to pursue a more aggressive economic policy at the expense of her European rivals. The war transformed her from a debtor nation into the world's greatest creditor, and her businessmen and bankers saw Latin America as a natural field for further expansion of their interests. The United States government encouraged on traditional strategic grounds activities which diminished European influence in Latin America, even apart from the particular economic and financial interests pressing for its support.

'At the end of World War I', in Tulchin's words, 'it became a part of official policy to encourage foreign trade and investment by United States citizens.' 9 Tulchin presents three case studies showing how the United States government 'energetically sought to expand communications facilities under American control, to win control over foreign petroleum reserves, and to replace European bankers with United States bankers as arbiters of the Latin

3 Ibid., p. I84. 4 Ibid., p. 227. 5 Ibid., p. 281. 6 Joseph S. Tulchin, The Aftermath of War: World War I and U.S. Policy Toward Latin

America (New York, New York University Press, I97I). Pp. xii + 287. $Io.oo. 7 Ibid., p. I54. 8 Ibid., p. 3. 9 Ibid., p. 241.


American money market '.0 Weakened by the war, Europe was in no position effectively to resist the challenge. United States objectives had been achieved by 1925 and, in Tulchin's judgement, 'the Department of State could afford to assume a less aggressive position with regard to United States private interests abroad and to insist on no greater advantage for Americans than equal opportunity '." In his introduction, Professor Tulchin underlines the strength of the United States position in the years covered by his valuable study (from the First World War to I925): One striking feature of Latin American policy during this period warrants men- tion.... With very few exceptions, the United States government formulated and executed foreign policy without reference to the demands or responses of the Latin American nations. Though the latter tried to use the League of Nations and the Pan American movement to undermine United States paramountcy in the hemisphere, the United States had no trouble neutralizing the effect of multilateral organizations in the hemisphere and seemed to ignore the reactions of other nations in making decisions.12

But if the United States paid scant regard to Latin American susceptibilities, her policy towards Latin America was not, Tulchin affirms, motivated by economic considerations; nor did business control the State Department, despite ' countless allegations ' to the contrary.'3

Another United States scholar who has been anxious to rebut such allegations is Dana Munro, now Professor Emeritus of History at Princeton Univer- sity. His latest book 14 possesses particular interest since, during the years it covers (I921-33), the author was intimately involved in some of the situations he describes and analyses. Munro was in turn regional economist for Mexico and Central America in the Department of State, a member of its Latin American Division, Secretary of Legation in Panama, Secretary in Nicaragua, Chief of the Latin American Division and, from I930 to I932, United States Minister in Haiti. This experience gives his book a dimension lacking in purely academic studies. Incidentally, Munro's name occurs a fair number of times in Tulchin's study; on occasion, he is shown supporting by his actions the thesis he expounds in his own work, viz. that the interests of the Caribbean republics were not sacrificed to those of United States bankers. The United States and the Caribbean Republics, 192I-1933, like its predecessor, is an important book for students of inter-American relations. But Munro's pro- testations are in a sense somewhat academic: the motivation of United States

i'o Ibid. 11 Ibid., pp. 24I-2. 12 Ibid., p. vi. 13 Ibid., p. 93. 14 Dana G. Munro, The United States and the Caribbean Republics, 1921-1933 (Princeton,

N.J., and London, Princeton University Press, I974). Pp. x + 394. $I7.50. /8-40.

Latin America in the Foreign Relations of the United States 14i

foreign policy has always (necessarily) been complex.l5 National security, the main consideration, includes safeguarding economic interests - especially, as Tulchin shows, when the control of strategic materials is involved. Moreover, Munro reflects the views of the Department of State, and he and his colleagues were by no means the sole architects of United States policy in the Caribbean. Interestingly, although Munro has rebutted charges of United States imperialism, his picture of the State Department acting as trustee of the interests of the inexperienced Caribbean governments is reminiscent of a colonial office approach.

One interesting incident illustrates the significance of an insider's contribution to the understanding of political matters. The publication of the Clark Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine, popularly believed to constitute a repudiation of 'the Roosevelt Corollary, traditionally has marked a not unim- portant step in the development of the Good Neighbour policy. Munro dis- misses this. 'The fact was ', he says,' that the American government had not taken any new official position about the Monroe Doctrine or about the Roosevelt corollary.' 16 He believes that after it had been produced in 1928 the Clark Memorandum was forgotten: ' I do not remember that I was told about it when I took charge of the Latin American division in the spring of... [1929].' 17 The gradual transition from intervention in the Caribbean region to the Good Neighbour policy, involving United States acceptance of the principle of non-intervention in her relations with Latin America, is the main theme of the book.

In the year I933, when Munro's study closes, a new factor would enter United States relations with Latin America: for this was the year of Hitler's advent to power in Germany. The Good Neighbour policy was in part a response to the deteriorating world situation in the subsequent years, and its most notable success is judged to have been the degree of co-operation achieved between the countries of Latin America and the United States during the Second World War (which admirers of the policy have been inclined to exaggerate). But the post-war period brought disillusionment. On the one hand, United States hegemony was further strengthened and Latin American dependence rendered greater than ever; and, on the other, the United States was involved to an unprecedented degree in other areas of the world. When the Cold War developed and Latin America was remote from it, the region was relegated once more to a very low priority in the foreign relations of the

15 Cf. my review of Munro's earlier volume, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, I900-1921 (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, I964), in History, L, i69 (June I965), 26I-2.

16 The United States and the Caribbean Republics, I921-I933, p. 378. .17 Ibid., p. 377.


United States. There was no Marshall Plan for Latin America, and economic aid to the latter was minimal. Nor, when Latin America became more closely concerned with the Cold War, did relations with the United States improve. For the intervention issue again came to overshadow them.

In a new book based upon a diligent study of contemporary sources,18 Dr Parkinson examines the different phases of the Cold War as they affected Latin America. He demonstrates not only the reactions of the Latin American governments as these developed, but also how cold war issues influenced intra- Latin American relations and domestic politics in individual countries. In the early stages of the Cold War Latin America was 'a pawn of the world powers ,19 but by the late I96os, in Parkinson's judgement, the Cold War was 'largely out of the way' and 'a new diplomatic climate was beginning to pervade Latin America .20 He concludes that: With the direct influence of the world powers declining in the underdeveloped world in general, intra-Latin American issues are likely to acquire a new importance, with greater attention being paid consequently to the notion of the balance of power. It is not impossible that, under these conditions, the future of Latin America's international system will begin to resemble that of the nineteenth century rather more than that of the twentieth.21

This last possibility implies a very dramatic lessening of United States influence over the region.

From his scant references to it, Dr Parkinson clearly does not believe that the much-heralded Alliance for Progress importantly influenced Latin America's response to the Cold War situation in the western hemisphere during the I96os. Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onis,22 in a' critical report ',23 conclude that 'A decade of the Alliance for Progress has yielded more shattered hopes than solid accomplishment, more discord than harmony, more disillusionment than satisfaction'.24 Yet, in words comparable with those of Federico Gil,25 they declare at the beginning of their book: 'The birth of the Alliance for Progress in I96I marked a dramatic and fundamental

18 F. Parkinson, Latin America, The Cold War, & The World Powers, 1945-I973: A Study in Diplomatic History (Beverley Hills, Calif., and London, Sage Publications, 1974: Sage Library of Social Research, vol. 9). Pp. 288. ?500o. Paperback, ?3-00.

19 Ibid., p. i I f. 20 Ibid., p. 231. 21 Ibid., pp. 248-9. 22 A United States foreign aid official and a New York Times correspondent assigned to

report on the Alliance. 23 Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onis, The Alliance That Lost Its Way: A Critical Report

on the Alliance for Progress (Chicago, Quadrangle Books for The Twentieth Century Fund, I970). Pp. xiv + 38I, $7.95-

24 Ibid., p. 307. 25 See above.


reorientation of Washington's policy toward Latin America '.26 It would seem, as the title of their book asserts, that the Alliance 'lost its way . What went wrong? The authors are often very critical of the United States: The Alliance, defined as the record of inter-American relations in the past decade, provides additional justification for disillusionment. If it has succeeded in prevent- ing any new Castros from coming to power in the hemisphere, it has done so by military means, failing conspicuously to advance the cause of the democratic left. The United States has intervened openly in the Dominican Republic and less obviously in Brazil and Guatemala to assist not the democratic left but the military and civilian forces of conservatism. In disputes between Latin American governments and U.S. corporations, the United States has applied economic pressures against the Latin American governments with a fine disregard for the disputed issues. Loan officials have consistently required that countries seeking financial assistance undertake monetary stabilization programs; they have not required programs of social reform. The U.S. Congress and the executive branch have restricted loan funds to purchases of U.S. goods (particularly those that are not competitively priced) and such other uses as are consistent with a favorable U.S. balance of payments.27 For Levinson and de Onfs, the democratic ideals of President Kennedy had been abandoned.

But is this a fair judgment? John F. Kennedy expressed great concern for Latin America, which he described in 1963 as ' the most critical area in the world today'. One Latin American country - Cuba - certainly had critical significance for him personally, providing the occasion of humiliating failure (the Bay of Pigs invasion) and his greatest triumph (the resolution of the missile crisis). Moreover, in the early Ig6os it was widely believed in Washing- ton that revolution was imminent in Latin America; President Kennedy him- self declared that 'those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable'. The proclaimed objective of the Alliance for Progress was to promote economic development and far-reaching social change within a democratic framework. But, as Levinson and de Onis themselves point out, the Alliance contained serious inherent contradictions, and it would be unfair to compare Kennedy's rhetoric with the performance of his succes- sors. Traditionally, the United States has linked her own interests with the maintenance of stability in Latin America, and has strongly opposed radical change in the region. She was, therefore, singularly ill-equipped to lead a crusade for fundamental reforms in Latin America, and the Alliance was part of an essentially counter-revolutionary (anti-communist) strategy. Ominously, the area in which the Alliance may arguably be considered to have proved most successful was that of counter-insurgency: a matter of particular

26 Levinson and de Onis, op. cit., p. 5. 27 Ibid., pp. I3-14.


concern to President Kennedy.28 When the danger of revolution in Latin America receded - while United States involvement in Vietnam grew ever greater - it was hardly surprising that the Alliance faltered. To declare that it ' lost its way' could be misleading. But the book by Levinson and de Onis contains a great deal of valuable information and comment on its subject.

By the time President Nixon took office, the war in Vietnam - or, rather, the problem of how to end it - was overshadowing all other aspects of United States foreign and domestic politics. Latin America was, even more than usually, a low priority area. But the inquest on the Alliance for Progress went on, and some politicians and scholars anxiously debated the question of what United States policy towards Latin America should be in the I970s. Various aspects of the debate appear in a volume edited by Richard B. Gray.29 This collection of speeches and articles can induce only pessimism, especially when the generally optimistic platitudes of the official pronouncements are con- trasted with the dismal realities which emerge from some of the other contributions. The Alliance for Progress has failed; Latin American economic integration (linked with the Alliance) remains an aspiration; and the Organiza- tion of American Sitates is in decline. The book also includes ' The Rockefeller Report on Quality of Life in the Americas ', published in I969 after the then Governor of New York State had undertaken a mission to Latin America for President Nixon. Tad Szulc, a journalist with considerable experience of re- porting Latin American affairs, declares that' in providing his perceptive and flexible analysis and recommendations Mr Rockefeller has gone unexpectedly far in establishing foundations for policies that must not be Nixon policies but United States policies'.30 They were destined to become neither. Mr Nixon preferred a 'low profile' policy to one of reviving the ' special relationship', and his administration faced more urgent problems in other regions.

The book ends with an extract from the United States Congressional Record in which Senator Frank Church is highly critical of current United States Latin American policy, and calls for a new one. His denunciation of various aspects of United States 'aid' echoes some of the criticisms made by Latin Americans in the 'Consensus of Vifia del Mar', drawn up and presented to

28 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr, a great admirer of Kennedy, wrote in A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (paperback edn., London, I967), p. 287, that the Presi- dent's interest in counter-insurgency was ' an old preoccupation from Senate days '. More recently, Schlesinger has written of 'the worst folly of his administration: the infatuation with counterinsurgency ': ' The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective ', in Ronald G. Hellman and H. Jon Rosenbaum (eds.), Latin America: The Search for a New International Role (New York, Center for Inter-American Relations, 1975), p. 74.

29 Richard B. Gray (ed.), Latin America and the United States in the 1970's (Itasca, Illinois, F. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., I97I). Pp. xii + 370). $Io.oo. Paperback, $5.95.

30 Ibid., p. 274.


President Nixon a year earlier (I969). Senator Church has since been a prominent critic of the activities of the CIA and the transnational companies in Latin America. But those who think like him are a minority in the United States Senate where, for example, there is strong opposition to a new treaty with Panama which would give the latter substantial concessions in respect of the Canal. The Canal question is presently a focal point of Latin American nationalism, and could prove, with the easing of the Cuban problem, the major issue in United States relations with Latin America during the later 1970S. Strong domestic opposition in the United States to the granting of substantial concessions to Latin American demands has been a constant political reality of the hemisphere situation.

What are termed 'the changing political realities' of relations between Latin America and the United States are discussed in a book which consists of papers (with commentaries) prepared for a conference of distinguished social scientists held at Lima in i972.31 The topics discussed are grouped into four parts: 'Some Latin American Perspectives'; 'Some North American Perspectives'; 'Brazil, Mexico, and the United States'; and 'Armed Forces and Multinational Corporations in Hemispheric Relations'. The editors declare that scholarship on inter-American relations ' must face squarely the challenge of a Latin America that can no longer be understood as merely the shadow cast by the Colossus of the North .32 For, in the words of one con- tributor, ' Latin America's " margin of freedom " is substantial and growing, and is overlooked by an overly great concentration on " dependence " .33 The editors want to get away from ' the basic model in use... one of the structure and functioning of U.S. imperialism .34 But they ruefully admit:

It is one more index of the political and economic imbalances of the hemisphere that the majority of attention in Lima and in the papers and comments was focused on the United States, on North American-based institutions and actors, and on the causes and consequences of their behavior.... Even when the foreign policy of a country as important in its own right as Mexico or Brazil was under consideration, the questions raised most often had to do with the influence (direct and indirect) of the United States on that policy. Countries that have been as innovative as Chile and Cuba in developmental and foreign relations entered into the discussion primarily because they represent challenges to Yankee hegemony and thus test the limits of U.S. power. At times, it was almost as if Latin America did not exist except as defined by U.S. interests and actions.35

31 Julio Cotler and Richard R. Fagen (eds.), Latin America and the United States: The Changing Political Realities (Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1974). Pp. xii + 417. $17.50. fio-oo. Paperback, $4.95. ?2-90.

`2 Ibid., p. 20.

:' Ibid., p. 242. 34 Ibid., p. I9. 35 Ibid., p. I8.

L.A.S.-IO


But, however regrettable, this does reflect a basic realty. For while Latin America is a low priority area in the foreign relations of the United States, the latter dominates the foreign relations of her weak neighbours. The papers contained in this book are likely to prove more useful to theorists of international relations than to those concerned with analyzing specific contemporary issues in the western hemisphere. To draw upon the book's plentiful jargon, there is not over-much 'policy-relevant knowledge', although there is a great deal to be gleaned about the views of Latin American and United States writers on the matters discussed. There is a considerable variety of comments, for example, on the Alliance for Progress.

Discussion of United States relations with Latin America always raises the question of how far the Twenty Republics can be meaningfully grouped together in this context, given the very considerable differences between them in such important respects as size, natural resources, population, racial com- position and the degree of political and economic maturity each has achieved. This question can be illuminated by considering the cases of two major Latin American countries, Brazil and Mexico, whose leaders have, in fact, claimed a

'special relationship' with the United States. Brazil, then largest and most populous Latin American country, differs from the others in the region both for historical reasons and in her contemporary aspirations and prospects. Mexico is 'special' because she borders upon the United States, and thus constitutes the frontier between the two Americas. She has been described as furnishing a barometer or touchstone of United States relations with Latin America as a whole. But both Brazil and Mexico share with the rest of Latin America (except, of course, Cuba) a high degree of dependence upon the United States.

From the establishment of the First Republic (in I889) Brazil has generally pursued a policy of co-operation with the United States as being the best means of achieving her foreign policy objectives. She has often been described as seeking leadership of a ' sub-system' in South America under the overall hemisphere hegemony of the United States. While aspiring to be something of an intermediary between the latter and Spanish America, Brazil has sometimes been regarded as a ' Trojan Horse,' undermining efforts to confront the United States with a common Latin American position on vital issues. Argentina, with her own aspirations 'to South American leadership, has been especially suspicious of the 'unwritten alliance' between the United States and Brazil. A recent book by Professor Frank McCann 36 analyzes a significant phase of 'Brazil's relations with the United States: the years of Getllio

36 Frank D. McCann, Jr, The Brazilian-American Alliance, I937-1945 (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, I973). Pp. xiv + 527. $I8.50.

Latin America in the Foreign Relations of the United States I47

Vargas's dictatorship, which include the crucial period of the Second World War. In McCann's judgment: While the war undoubtedly increased Brazil's chances to realize its tremendous potential it also made it subservient, very nearly a dependency, to the United States. The growth of that dependency is an undercurrent that runs throughout the events discussed in this book. The war years brought to a peak the tendency in Brazilian foreign policy toward steadily closer approximation with the United States, which had begun during the foreign ministry of the Baron of Rio Branco (I902-I9I2).37 On the Good Neighbour policy, which was being pursued by the Franklin Roosevelt administration during the period covered by the book - and Brazil's role in it - McCann declares: The United States was seeking more than neighborliness, it was seeking economic and political hegemony. Brazilian leaders did not seriously oppose this hegemony, because they became convinced that they had more to gain than to lose by acquies- cence. They were confident that Brazil could maintain its position in South America, and that they could maintain their positions in Brazil.38

The last point has wider application, for there are groups in all the Latin American countries who identify their interests with those of the United States, and such groups are generally in or near the centres of power.

Professor McCann demonstrates how much more 'special' the relation-

ship was to Brazil than -to the United States. In his words, 'When it suited American interest ... Washington would stress the "Brazil is different" theme, but when it was a question of Brazil's interests vis-a-vis the United States it suddenly became a part of Latin America to be dealt with via policies applicable to all republics '.3 His book well illustrates the illusions enter- tained by Brazil's leaders in !the matter of 'their country's importance in the eyes of the United States; for example, their expectation that the latter would press Brazil's claim for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. The United States ambassador reported that ' Vargas was especially pleased when Roosevelt said that he would like to have him at his side during the peace conference '.4 But, with the approach of peace, United States leaders: were maneuvering to insure control of Latin American markets and raw materials. The American military were equally anxious to arrange postwar use of base facilities, and to establish arms-supply arrangements and training missions throughout the area. The desire of big business for a continued supply of strategic materials merged conveniently with military assessments of postwar national security requirements. 37 Ibid., p. 5. 38 Ibid., p. 7. 39 Ibid., p. 332. 40 Ibid., p. 308.

L.A.S.-IO*


According to McCann, the drive for United States domination of the hemisphere accelerated after Roosevelt's death, while President Truman's Secretaries of State, Stettinius and Byrnes, 'had limited knowledge of Brazilian-American relations and even less sympathy for Brazilian aspirations.4l

In the early i96os, under Presidents Quadros and Goulart, Brazil attempted to pursue an 'independent' foreign policy, which expressed itself most obviously in a refusal to support the United States position on Castro's Cuba. It also involved broadening Brazil's foreign relations, notably with the Third World: what Professor Selcher calls 'The Afro-Asian Dimension of Brazilian Foreign Policy'.42 Within the context of a growing self-identifica- tion of Latin America with the Third World it was argued 'that Brazil is uniquely suited to approach non-white Afro-Asia because it has achieved a racial democracy through lack of racial discrimination and a natural process of miscegenation, which represents the ultimate solution to the dangerous racial problem '.43 The practical difficulties of implementing a policy of closer relations with the countries of Africa and Asia, and the limited advantages to Brazil (at least in the short-term) of so doing, are well analysed by Selcher. With the overthrow of Goulart in 1964 a more pragmatic approach was adopted towards the Third World, and Brazil reverted to a policy of close co-operation with ithe United States. When the military government sought to lessen Brazil's economic dependence upon the latter, it did so primarily through expanding economic relations with other industrialized countries, including communist ones.

While the vast power of the United States has been the determining factor in her relations with Latin America, inevitably no country of the region has felt the weight of that power more than has Mexico. Fulfilment of her ' Manifest Destiny' led the United States to acquire through conquest more than half Mexico's national territory, and Mexico has experienced intervention by her powerful neighbour in all its main forms. Karl Schmitt has produced a useful new survey of relations between Mexico and the United States 44 which, while essentially narrative, does reflect the power imbalance between the two countries. In his final chapter, Schmitt considers ,the options which have been open to Mexico in her situation, and the choices her leaders have made. He concludes:

41 Ibid., p. 341. 42 Wayne A. Selcher, The Afro-Asian Dimension of Brazilian Foreign Pohcy, 1956-1972

(Gainesville, Fla., University of Florida Press, 1974: Latin American Monographs, Second Series, no. 13). Pp. viii + 252. $IO.00. 43 Ibid., p. 55.

44 Karl M. Schmitt, Mexico and the United States, 1821-1973: Conflict and Coexistence (New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., I974). Pp. xvi + 288. ?5.80. Paperback, z2.35.


if Mexico's leaders desire the maximum freedom of action in a world of unequal powers, they must first keep their own house in order and, second, broaden the base of economic support to reduce the level of dependence on the United States. Finally, they can pray that primary United States international interests do not focus on the Western Hemisphere, much less on them.45

Perhaps Professor Schmitt would apply these observations to Latin America as a whole.

The foreign relations of the United States, like those of all sovereign states, have been conducted basically to further national interests. This obvious point is worth making only because, especially in respect of Latin America, her political leaders and some influential historians have been at such pains to maintain that United States foreign policies have been more altruistic than those of traditional great powers; and, in the contemporary world, those of her communist rivals. In the world of power politics the interests of weak nations have, as a rule, been subordinated to those of strong ones. The case of the Latin American countries as weak nations is no exception; and the United States furnishes perhaps an outstanding example of that propensity for equating morality with power which is a characteristic of great nations. United States interventions (or 'imperialism') in Laitin America, and her ' neglect' of the region - the two major charges levelled against her - alike derive from the vast margin of power she enjoys over her southern neighbours. Until this imbalance of power is significantly redressed, the traditional role of Latin America in the foreign relations of the United States will persist.

There are signs that such a process is beginning to take place. The fact that Cuba - historically so closely linked with United States ambitions and her ultimate emergence as a great power - has been detached from her system and aligned with her major rival, alone suggests a dramatic change. The case of Cuba also demonstrates that United States relations with Latin America no longer enjoy the traditional degree of isolation (never, of course, by any means absolute) from her relations with the rest of the world. Yet there are no signs of a ' second Cuba' in the hemisphere. Latin America's attempts to form a common front to strengthen its position vis-a-vis the United States have so far enjoyed very limited success. Efforts to develop international relations (above all, economic relations) outside the hemisphere, both with non-American industrialized countries, including members of ,the Soviet system, and in co- operation with the Third World, have been more significant. But the' margin of freedom' remains smaller than some of the writers cited would appear to believe.

Meanwhile, if Latin America does not loom large in the foreign relations of

45 Ibid., p. 269.


the United States, inter-American relations should be of considerable interest not only to scholars concerned with Latin America, but also to students of United States foreign policy. For Latin America may be considered as both a test-case and a laboratory of the latter. It has been a test-case, for example, of the professed concern of the United States for democracy and the rights of small nations. Perhaps more importantly, Latin America has been a laboratory in which the United States has developed techniques (as varied as supervising free elections, and destabilizing governments of which she has disapproved) for achieving her objectives, which she has later employed - very often with success, sometimes disastrously - in other regions following her emergence as a global power. It is to be hoped that these are matters to which more scholars, especially historians, will address themselves.

GORDON CONNELL-SMITH

AnticKnightClarkeArticle Contentsp.337p.338p.339p.340p.341p.342p.343p.344p.345

Issue Table of ContentsJournal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Nov., 1977), pp. 193-380+i-viiiVolume Information [pp.i-ii]Front MatterRobert Arthur Humphreys [pp.193-198]Race and Social Control in Independent Brazil [pp.199-224]Interest Groups and Development: The Case of Brazil in the Nineteenth Century [pp.225-250]A Populist Precursor: Guillermo Billinghurst [pp.251-273]Jose Marti and the United States: A Further Interpretation [pp.275-290]The Extradition of Marcos Perez Jimenez, 1959-63: Practical Precedent for Enforcement of Administrative Honesty? [pp.291-313]Review ArticleMinerals, Multinationals, and Foreign Investment in Latin America [pp.315-336]The Quest for Independence in the Caribbean [pp.337-345]

Reviewsuntitled [pp.347-350]untitled [pp.351-352]untitled [pp.352-353]untitled [pp.354-355]untitled [pp.355-356]untitled [pp.356-358]untitled [pp.358-360]untitled [pp.360-362]untitled [pp.363-364]untitled [pp.364-366]untitled [pp.366-367]untitled [p.368]untitled [pp.369-370]untitled [pp.370-371]untitled [pp.371-372]

Book Noticesuntitled [p.373]untitled [pp.373-374]untitled [p.374]untitled [pp.374-375]untitled [p.375]untitled [pp.375-376]untitled [p.376]untitled [pp.376-377]untitled [pp.377-378]

Other Books Received [pp.378-379]Back Matter [pp.iii-viii]

Connell-SmithArticle Contentsp. 137p. 138p. 139p. 140p. 141p. 142p. 143p. 144p. 145p. 146p. 147p. 148p. 149p. 150

Issue Table of ContentsJournal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (May, 1976), pp. 1-180Front MatterThe Brazilian Economic 'Miracle' and Regional Policy: Some Evidence from the Urban Northeast [pp. 1 - 27]The Soldier as Radical: The Peruvian Military Government, 1968-1975 [pp. 29 - 51]Peru: The Political Economy of an Intermediate Regime [pp. 53 - 71]The Making of the Grace Contract: British Bondholders and the Peruvian Government, 1885-1890 [pp. 73 - 100]Professionalization and Politicization as Motivational Factors in the Brazilian Army Coup of 15 November, 1889 [pp. 101 - 125]Review ArticleSlavery and Race in the Evolution of Latin American Societies: Some Recent Contributions to the Debate [pp. 127 - 135]Latin America in the Foreign Relations of the United States [pp. 137 - 150]

Reviewsuntitled [pp. 151 - 152]untitled [pp. 152 - 154]untitled [pp. 154 - 157]untitled [pp. 157 - 158]untitled [pp. 158 - 160]untitled [pp. 160 - 162]untitled [pp. 162 - 163]untitled [pp. 163 - 164]untitled [pp. 164 - 166]untitled [pp. 166 - 167]untitled [pp. 167 - 168]untitled [pp. 168 - 170]untitled [p. 171]

Book Noticesuntitled [p. 173]untitled [p. 173]untitled [p. 174]untitled [pp. 174 - 175]untitled [p. 175]untitled [pp. 175 - 176]untitled [p. 176]untitled [pp. 176 - 177]untitled [p. 177]untitled [pp. 177 - 178]untitled [p. 178]untitled [p. 179]untitled [pp. 179 - 180]

Back Matter

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