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TOWARD A THEORY OF FORCE DESIGN:

The Foundation of Capability-based Defense Planning

Salvador Ghelfi Raza1, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

Emerging from a millennium capped by a half

century of defense thinking dominated by Cold War-

era necessities, now tainted by the aftershocks of

September 11th and aware of the inadequacy of

traditional rigid defense structures (whatever their

military might,) every nation state is finding a

need for a new concept and framework for defense

theory. Force Design--a complex-yet-taxonomic

decision making process which amalgamates policy

formulation, modernization of military hardware, and

organizational restructuring with changes in the

decision-making processes—fulfills that need.

In conjunction with effective decision-making

processes that recognize long-term goals (as well as

1 Dr. Salvador Ghelfi. Raza is professor of National Security Affairs at the Center for Hemispheric Studies (CHDS) in the National Defense University. He received a Ph.D in Strategic Studies from the University of Rio de Janeiro, and has a M.A from the University of London. He is a member of the Group for Strategic Studies (Grupo de Estudos Estratégicos) of the University of Brazil (UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro). His current research and teaching interests include force design, defense analysis, games and simulation, and crisis management. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied do not reflect views of any agency, organization or government. ([email protected]).

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procedures that can guide its execution,) Force

Design affords the two-way flow of critical

information and assessments needed both at the

political level and within defense ministries and

their subparts. Through Force Design a professional

defense sector can be created, appropriately sized,

based on an efficient use of resources, working

within precise guidelines and therefore subject to

democratic control.

Absent Force Design, decisions are taken based on

a set of foundations seen axiomatic and absolute

only because they remain unexamined; as a result

ministries and the political leadership often appear

to respond to events as they unfold. When problems

arise, the problem becomes the focus of attention.

In such situation, the urgency of decision making in

and of itself pushes aside the seemingly abstract

notion of force design.

Unless Force Design is addressed head on, unless

a system competent to address force design is

already in place, choices offered by ministries to

the political leadership are often no broader than

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between building “more of the same” (easier than

doing a comprehensive review) and developing an

entirely new approach (generally hinged imprudently

to some form of “technology”).

Lacking an existing force design capability,

inappropriate defense decisions taken in a hurry

generally fail to take into account the various

tradeoffs cannot systematically examine their

interaction(s). That is, decisions made tend to

result in capabilities later to be found incapable

of meeting defense objectives, i.e., operational

failure.

What is Force Design? This paper attempts to

depict the dynamic which it is. Its foundation is

capability-based defense planning. Upon this

foundation is a set of coherent concepts and a

framework that make them practical in both term and

significance. The resultant analytical construct

abstracts military capabilities into their component

elements, explicating concept and relationships.

Framework and concept to form a hierarchy which

articulates processes that allow ways and means to

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develop and choose defense alternatives--even when

limitations of knowledge and information exclude the

possibility of assessing all expected outcomes.

The final goal of Force Design is to accomplish a

system of concepts manifest within a framework which

is an open-ended measurement tool capable of 1)

assessing the changing relationship between

capabilities requirements and defense demands –

properly addressing the challenge of defense

planning in an era of uncertainty of threats and

information technology and 2) specifying

capabilities to be added that might lead to

different choices under three concurring

perspectives - adaptation, modernization and

transformation.

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INTRODUCTION

The demise of the Cold War, information

technology trends, and other contemporary factors

are associated causes for the emergence of new

uncertainties and threats to the State’s security

goals. However diffuse and asymmetric in their

impact, these causes have imposed defense reforms in

order to face a broad and more complex nexus of old

and new tasks, associated with efforts to eliminate

redundancy and inefficiency in the defense resource

allocation process. Such accounts often fail to

predict correctly that defense reforms effort in is

determining required military capabilities,

connecting present fiscal possibilities with future

demands of the use or threat of force towards

politically oriented objectives.

The term defense reform sounds like an aggressive

approach to get military superiority and

organizational strength. In fact, it is usually just

the opposite – an attempt to break out of a

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deteriorating situation, more likely to reflect a

recognition that one has fallen behind than an

attempt to exploit new possibilities.

The most telling basis for judging the complexity

of defense reforms is the degree of uncertainty of

political objectives, evolving technological

possibilities and resource allocation priorities,

considering that defense can both inhibit and

stimulate economic growth2. A few examples might

give the sense of the manifestation of these reform

trends and goals in the Western Hemisphere3:

Argentina recently changed in its military

conscript/professional personnel ratio and is

endeavoring to integrate planning, programming, and

budgeting procedures in its defense planning and

2 There is a lack of consensus in the empirical literature on the positive and negative economic effects of defense spending. On one hand, it is assumed that defense spending divert resources from private and public non-defense investments (crowding out); on the other, it is assumed that defense spending increases the utilization of capital (crowding in). The latter position is support by the Benoit Thesis, referring to a positive association found between defense spending and growth for 44 less developed countries over the 1950-65 period.

See Benoit, Emile, Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries. Boston, USA: Heath, 1973. Sandler, T. E Hartley, K. The Economics of Defense. Cambridge, Ma: Cambridge University Press, 1995. pp. 200-220. review the literature and tabulate models alternative to that of Benoit arrising at different conclusion.3 The object of analysis for this paper was limited to the Western Hemisphere – The Americas. However, its conclusions and the proposed theoretical model it offers have higher ambitions in their possible applications.

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resource management system, struggling to maintain

its operational military capability4.

Bolivia, Ecuador and the Dominican Republic

are endeavoring to produce Defense White Books

within the context of new roles for their Armed

Forces; whereas Chile is in the stage of revising

its White Book.

Peru is reforming its defense organizational

structure. And the Paraguay is struggling in the

political arena to approve its Defense Organization

Law that would redefine military roles and mission

and reorganize the defense sector, eventually

changing the responsibilities of the Ministry of

Defense.

Brazil faces complex civil-military relations

in the wake of the creation of its Ministry of

Defense (1999) and its National Defense Policy

(1996), with impacts on its defense command and

4 Argentina, Cámara de Diputados de La Nación, Ley 24.948 de 18 de febrero de 1998. Reestructuración de las fuerzas armadas. For Directives of Military Planning, see http//www.ser2000.org.ar/protect/Archivo/ d000 cbd2 htm. (Oct/02/9). And for operational capabilities, see http://64.69. 09.103/mic/eabstract.cfm?recno=8796 (Jun/ 25/2002).

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http://64.69.109.103/mic/eabstract.cfm?recno=8796


control structure. Brazil’s National Multi annual

Plan PPA, explicitly declares that5:

“The modernization of the Defense National System

will be the main objective of the project for

reequipping and adjusting the Brazilian Army, the

Brazilian Navy and the Brazilian Air Force, together

with the project for managing the armed forces

policy. Both projects will contribute to reequip and

adjust force structure to a new technological

pattern, assuring the country higher protection”.

In the US case, particularly, 11th catalyzed,

albeit drastically, post-Cold War demands for

reform. As early as February 2001, the Project on

Defense Alternatives of the Commonwealth Institute

at Cambridge already pointed out four causes of

inefficiencies of the US Armed Forces, demanding

reforms in the context of the Quadrennial Defense

Review:

“One type of inefficiency is manifest in excess

infrastructure – a Cold War residue. Today, the US

5 Brazil, National Government. Plano Plurianual. http://www.abrasil.gov.br/anexos/links/links.htm . For an oeverview of current status of Brazilian Defense Reforms, see http://www.estado.estadao.com.br/edicao/ especial/militar/militar/militar16.html; and http://www.estado.estadao.com.br/edicao/especial/militar/militar/ militar11.html. (Oct 2001).

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http://www.estado.estadao.com.br/edicao/especial/militar/militar/militar11.html

http://www.estado.estadao.com.br/edicao/especial/


Armed Forces still maintain 20 percent of excess

infrastructure. Crude, costly and seemingly

intractable, this problem has had little political

salience. The support of excess infrastructure

drains money away from training, maintenance, and

quality-of-life accounts. A second type of

inefficiency derives from inter-service rivalry and

redundancy. A third type of inefficiency involves

having military “tools” and procedures that do not

correspond closely to today’s operational

challenges. Persistent shortages despite the

expenditure of more than $250 billion on procurement

during the past five years indicates a failure to

configure our armed forces to meet current needs. A

final type of inefficiency results from the failure

to fully exploit information-age technology and

organizational principles, which could reduce

structural redundancies in our military and increase

its flexibility. By contemporary business standards,

our military remains an industrial age organization”

6.

6 The Commonwealth Institute. The Paradoxes of post-Cold War US Defense Policy: An agenda for the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. Project on Defense Alternatives, Briefing Memo # 18. 5 February 2001. Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. pp. 6 Captured at

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What is extraordinary are not these changes in

themselves, since defense has an evolutionary

nature, been future oriented; but the scale and

scope of current defense reforms, with countries

endeavoring simultaneously to:

Define organizational requirements in

association with new decision-making, control and

oversight mechanisms aiming at a higher degree of

political control over defense issues and

priorities.

Increase the efficiency, efficacy and economy7

of defense resource allocation, with a focus on the

processes and criteria used for the formulation,

spending and evaluation of the defense budget.

Define affordable military forces, balanced

against multiple axes, to hedge against uncertainty

in the current and future threat environment.

http:://www.comw.org/pda/0102bmemo18.html. (8/28/2001). 7 Efficacy is defined as a measure of task accomplishment: the degree to which the activity/process and resultant output delivered met the desired expectation. Efficiency translates the best combination of resources to maximize efficacy. It is measured as a relationship of outputs to imputs, usually expressed in terms of a ratio. A higher efficiency ratio translates a situation where changes in defense capabilities for a small change in resources are balanced across all resources used to produce those capabilities. Economy reflects the degree to which efficiency is obtained with lesser fiscal spending

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These overarching themes are linked into mutually

determinant chains of cause and causality, making

few of the decisions in security requirements and

defense planning either simple or noncrontoversial.

Previously unnoticed is the necessity of an

articulated set of concepts and its associated

analytical framework for planning defense

alternatives based on military capabilities. That is

why the following questions are always present: What

criteria oriented the identification of military

capabilities? What strategies do those capabilities

support and how do those strategies support

political objectives? How are budgets related to

those capabilities?

All these questions pertaining to the defense

reform debate – in its different shapes and

perceived priorities – have a common goal and a

common assumption. The common goal is to determine

credible military capabilities that connect current

fiscal possibilities to future alternatives of

possible military action, with an acceptable degree

of political risk. The common assumption is that

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peace has yielded insofar as the strength and

credibility of military capabilities to deter

threatening intentions by others.

While these central arguments of defense planning

are rather common-sensical, it is important to keep

in perspective that defining requirements for

affordable and credible military capabilities is a

complex issue demanding a set of valid conceptual

propositions articulated by a coherent internal

logic.

Conceptual propositions breed from reasoning and

a critical examination of past events while setting

requirements for future register that will bring

empirical evidence which, eventually, will make them

invalid. No conceptual proposition that pretends to

be scientific may postulate eternal validity. The

internal logic of the conceptual system provides the

articulating rules of its component propositions,

establishing a causal relationship between concepts,

which provides the starting point and the

interdependency of the parts for the desired or

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intended final product8. This logic is only valid

insofar as it is useful for instructing the

collection, organization and interpretation of

quantitative and qualitative information; orienting

the research of alternative solutions for the

assorted problems; flanking its analysis with

consistent and explicit criteria; and allowing the

precise communication of results.

The validity of a conceptual system and its

internal logic assures that the devised problem is

the real problem, and not that it can be solved

within its domain of existing competencies; and that

the solutions proposed consider the relevant aspects

of the problem. Without the support of a valid

conceptual system, defense reform propositions are

mere opinions, without any ways of ascertaining

which opinion is better.

The required mind set for approaching defense

reforms must take into account the fact that most

conceptual propositions and their articulating logic 8 This is the requirement of making the axiology of the method explicit as condition of scientific research. Without an axiological option explicated, the criteria used to define the problem, determine appropriate research and integrate results are methodologically flawed. For a theoretical discussion of axiological options and its relation with developing conceptual systems, see OLIVA, A. Conhecimento e Liberdade. 2 ed. Porto Alegre: Edipurs, 1999. pp. 124.

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used for defense planning have their origin in the

last 50 years, in the wake of the Cold War, and are

already becoming either obsolete or inadequate. This

situation is potentially harmful for three

intertwined reasons:

It might harbor inefficiency, compromising

the effectiveness of military capability.

It might create misleading performance

evaluation criteria, masking capability

inefficiencies through methodologies deprived of

analytical rigor.

It might cause the breakdown of policy,

strategy and resource allocation into isolated

processes, breeding into stove piping capabilities.

The outcome of this condition entails risks that

are not always recognized, with defense planners

often trying to “purchase a breakthrough model”

through experiences taken from other cases.

Unfortunately, these models do not work properly

because they do not “import” the conceptual system

and the people who understand it.

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Given post-Cold War demands of security and

defense, and the aftermath of September Eleven, past

conceptual system are to be taken with a grain of

salt. It seems appropriate and opportune to propose

a new conceptual framework for designing defense

alternatives. This would focus on the reevaluation

of the concepts of security and defense, taking into

consideration its evolving nature and diffused

contours; the mechanisms for forecasting

contingencies, within a framework that integrate

distinctive rising and falling patterns; and

requirements for efficiency and economy in defense

resource management. Such endeavor should more

properly be called Force Design.

This paper offers a conceptual framework for

force design with the identification and

relationship of variables required to understand and

plan defense reforms, accommodating three

potentially concurring circumstances: adaptation,

modernization and transformation. It proposes an

innovative approach for understanding defense reform

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trends and possibilities, systematically

articulating concepts and processes to assure armed

forces efficacy, efficiency and economy, providing

unity of purpose, unity of effort and unity of

action for effectively wielding power in support of

national will. Its overarching thesis is that force

design must serve as a guide to defense planning,

contributing to armed forces accountability,

professionalism and civilian control. Thus, defense

reforms can play an important role in both preparing

for the use of force and in maintaining peace. Its

underlying assumption is that defense reform demands

emerge as the differential between current defense

capabilities and the outcome of defense planning

offer of future conditions.

The paper is organized in four parts. Part one,

“Force Design”, sets the stage. It defines force

design as the fabric of military capability and

develops a theoretical construct (an idealization

of a situation appropriate for a problem) that

abstracts capabilities components and identify its

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relationships, discussing some tensions among these

components and its relationships. Part two, “Force

Design Framework”, presents three logical blocks,

articulated in an approach that examines the concept

of security and defense, presents mechanisms for

developing scenarios, and examining defense

superintendence requirements. Part three uses force

design concepts to present some judgments about

actual trends in defense reforms, taking a hard look

at current defense superintendence potential

mismanagement in the Western Hemisphere. Part four,

explores both the construct of capabilities and the

force design framework to present the concepts and

interrelationship of Adaptation, Modernization and

Transformation. The paper progress from a rather

conceptual approach in parts one and two to a

pragmatic proposal of a template in part five, to

conclude presenting Force Design as a new area of

study with its own articulated set of concepts and

hypotheses.

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PART 1

FORCE DESIGN

Force design is the fabric of military

capabilities and, as such, it provides the

foundations for an integrated project of defense.

Its purpose is the conceptualization, development

and evaluation of alternative military capabilities

to attend defense requirements in response to

security demands, assuring that the proper set of

effective and efficient military is economically

identified, developed, organized, fielded and

supported.

Force design results – an integrated project of

defense - is the source of guiding principles that

contributes to communicate goals and plans that are

reinforced through rules and norms at all levels of

the defense organization. Such a project ties

objectives together and gives meaning and purpose to

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operational procedures, enabling all parts of the

organization consistently contribute to the overall

effort even though they have to act independently in

an environment changing rapidly. Equally important,

it include an indication of what capabilities will

not be develop, retaining an appropriate focus in

building essential capabilities. The basic purpose

of an integrate project of defense is to provide

guidance to those whose actions can affect the focus

and development of the required military

capabilities.

Although subordinating all defense operational

processes to a common purpose force design allows

the necessary latitude for leadership and

initiatives serving as an umbrella over the various

functional activities developed within the defense

establishment, establishing the context within which

day-to-day decisions are made and sets the bounds on

strategic options. Further, an integrated project of

defense guides in making trade-offs among competing

requirements for short-term and long-term goals.

Finally, it provides consistency among programs

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providing the instance of reference for resource

allocation.

These guiding principles are defined as the

pattern of decisions that determine the ultimate set

of military capabilities; being the blueprint for

force planning, programming and budgeting9,

underpinning all defense related functions, to

include procurement and acquisition; intelligence

gathering; operational training and evaluation;

personnel (civil and military); educational

requirements; and technology research. Essentially

it is because of the ability of these guiding

principles to coordinate operational activities with

policy requirements assuring consistency over time:

that military capabilities development evolve in a

directed manner renewing, augmenting and contracting

its components to reinforce and expand defense

possibilities.

9 The traditional methodological approach for determining defense requirements was through procedures commonly named either as force planning, strategic planning or military planning. These are methodological approaches inherited from the Cold War period, led by the US initiative under the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). This System provided the benchmark for other similar national initiatives, like the Brazilian Navy Systematic for High Level Planning with its associated “Director Plan.”

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Although force design mills operational

requirements into defense alternatives, it is not

merely the application of military planning at

ministerial level, warning those who enter its

domains about the inadequacy of military operational

planning10 concepts and methodologies for the

processes and products that fall under its purposes.

This requires attention to the organizational

structure of a ministry of defense, involving

determining the number and qualification of the

individuals on the force design team.

Force design provides a set of concepts and its

articulating logic required for swiveling political

options into military capability requirements and

for cranking these requirements into force

alternatives, assuring jointness and

interoperability. It provides a functional logic for

management of the defense system, disciplining the

relationships of its component parts.

10 Military operational planning refers to current practiced methodologies used to determine the best alternative form of assigning tasks and to direct actions to secure military objectives by the application or the threat of force.

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Once an integrated project of defense has been

defined, it informs the development of subparts

related to individual services and defense agencies

that will converge to produce the required set of

military capabilities. The same logic that provide

focus on the required decisions at ministerial level

can help to divide responsibilities among multiple

agents, dedicating portions of effort to each

subunit of the defense establishment.

To insure that the alternatives chosen by

subunits is adhered to over time demands of an

integrated project of demand, force design provide a

systemic perspective in support of decisions

regarding preemptive additions or contraction in the

military inventory based of forecasted demands of

military capabilities required for the desired level

of efficacy; the exploitation of better integration

and synergy among component parts of the military

system in order to maximize its efficiency; and

exploit economies of scale and scope that compete on

the basis of price in order to assure economy within

acceptable levels of risk.

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MILITARY CAPABILITY

Common sense, capabilities are understood as the

quality of being able to use of be used in a

specified way.11 However, for specific force design

purposes, a military capability is the potential

ability of force components to perform a defense

task under specific pre-determined conditions, with

an expected degree of success.

Military capabilities are designed to fulfill the

demands of the use of force for political purposes,

having no intrinsic value – their value derives from

the assessment of success in its intended use and

has, therefore, a political nature. The above

statement is crucial for force design, because it

casts light on the fundamental question: how much is

enough? Providing the understanding that the only

acceptable answer for this question results from the

political priorities for defense; which allows

developing criteria to pair wise anticipated tasks

with requirements of quantitative and qualitative 11 Ganer B. The Oxford Dictionary of American Usage and Style. New York: Berkley Books, 2000. pp. 57

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dimensioning of force components under resource

constraints and acceptable level of risk.

The nature of these capabilities – instrumental

in the practice of violence under state authority -

define individualizing competencies defense

components have to acquire and circumscribes its use

within the political realm. Therefore, military

capabilities are not absolute values that could be

measured in terms of such things as the currently

available quantity of military assets, the number of

military personnel, and the possession of weapons.

Their value results from the assessment of the

potential ability of successfully perform defense

tasks in the pursuit of politically defined

objectives.

Structure of relationships

Military capabilities emerge in the functional

relationship of force components and operational

tasks. This functional outline of military

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capabilities determines its relationships with force

structure and concept of employment12.

Figure 1 depicts a general overview of elements

that converge to produce military capability as

currently found in the literature13. Force structure

defines the size, type, dimension, and stationing of

military assets. The performance of its components

depends on how they are organized, equipped,

trained, upgraded, maintained and supported.

12 The literature of force planning uses the term strategy as a synonym for concept of employment. This paper will use the latter to develop the capability construct, reserving the former to translate the use of combat for the purpose of war, in association with tactics, the use of force components in the engagements.13 For an in-depth discussion of defense planning, see, for example, DAVIS, P. K. e KLALILZAD, Z. M. A Composite Approach to Air Force Planning. California, EUA: RAND Corporation, 1996. DEWAR, J. e BUILDER, C. H. Assumption-based Planning. California, EUA: Rand Corporation, 1993. HAFFA, R. Jr. Planning U.S. Forces. USA: NDU, 1988. KAUFFMANN, W.N. Assessing the Base Force: How Much is Enough. Washington, DC. EUA: Brookings Institution, 1992.

Support MaintenanceTrainining

Support MaintenanceTrainining

Military Assets Military Assets

ObjectivesObjectives Missions

Operations

Missions Operations

Force Components

Force Components

Force Structure Concept of Employment

Operational Structures

CapabilitiesCapabilities Operational Tasks

Operational Tasks

Policy Guidelines

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Figure 1: Structure of relationships

Force components are the functional aggregation

of force structure elements in combat and associated

support structures accordingly to practiced

doctrine.

The concept of Employment is a set of articulated

decisions that express the prioritization of

missions and operations, relating them with a

political logic. Objectives are elements, either

material or insubstantial, that must be worked over

through operations, in order to provide an intended

benefit that contributes to a specific mission.

Tasks are required actions to achieve objectives,

towards which there is some sort of opposition or

threat.14

Countries have their defense assets (number and

size) stationed or deployed in military bases.

14 These concepts will be retaken further on in this paper. Here they are stated with the purpose of supporting arguments to explain the nature of military capabilities.

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However, these assets are not in themselves military

capabilities. It is meaningless to say, for example,

that Brazil’s aircraft carrier São Paulo is a

military capability. It is only an asset. Brazil’s

military capability reflects the scale and scope of

tasks that force components, where this asset might

be integrated, could perform with expected degree of

success.

One alternative of military capability for Brazil

could include the São Paulo in a force component to

contribute to defend Brazil’s sovereignty in the

Amazon area (defense objective), aiming to deter

international greed for the Amazon forest. The

resulting capability is conditioned by the

readiness15 degree of its component air wing, the

degree of training of its crew, and the ability to

sustain continuous operation for an extended period

of time.

The Aircraft Carrier São Paulo is based in Rio de

Janeiro, taking approximately 4 days to deploy (non-

stop) to the Amazon area, requiring the support of

15 At this point, it is proposed to understand readiness as the performance required to accomplish a mission with expected degree of success.

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other assets with the technical ability for

replenishment at sea – tanker ships, in this case,

to refuel the escorts of the São Paulo. Similarly,

these tanker ships are not also in themselves a

military capability. Replenishment at sea is only a

technical requirement; the derived military

capability is the ability of the Brazilian Navy to

support continuous operation of its sea assets.

Brazil’s required military capability to defend

its sovereignty in the Amazon Area, exploring the

combat possibilities of air wing of São Paulo

aircraft carrier in a force capable to escort a

convoy transporting Army troops and material to the

region, would only be constrained by the

availability of tanker ships, if its defense posture

(relating the concepts of employment with force

structure), would demand short reaction time,

whereas keeping the São Paulo stationed in the Naval

Base of Rio de Janeiro (imposing non-stop deploy and

therefore requiring replenishment at sea).

If Brazil decides to station/deploy the São Paulo

to a northern naval base (changing force structure),

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it would produce a higher operational response tempo

for the Amazon Area with fewer demands of

replenishment at sea, with the compromise of

reducing the responsiveness of that force component

(integrating the São Paulo) to anti-submarine

operations within a context of maritime warfare to

protect the national flow of petrol in the South

Atlantic. This would change Brazil’s defense

posture, signaling a higher commitment to defend the

Amazon Area and, at the same time, would impose the

necessity of developing expensive shipyard

facilities in the northern region of the Country, in

order to provide repair facilities to this extremely

complex ship.

The required technical, fiscal and political

costs would have to be weighed against the

effectiveness of a reduced operational tempo

associated with the lower demands of replenishment

at sea. In addition, since the Army troops and

material that the São Paulo would convoy to the

Amazon Area would be held in Rio de Janeiro, the

decision of re-deploying this asset to the northern

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region should take into consideration the technical

characteristics and operational requirements of

Brazilian Army’s assets, increasing coordination and

control demands.

Referring to cost-effectiveness analysis, Brazil

could have decided, instead of convoying Army troops

and material using a force component integrated by

the Aircraft Carrier São Paulo, to use near-the-

shore maritime routes under the umbrella of the

Brazilian Air Force aircraft (changing the concept

of employment). In this case, the same task – to

protect the military flow of troops and material –

would be accomplished with other force components

and associated operations, without significant

changes in the defense posture.

The extensive list of possible alternatives

derived from Brazil’s case reflects the complexity

of force design. The mission potential of military

capabilities results from the assessment of task-

force functional aggregations to achieve assigned

objectives with force structure components.

Similarly, Mexico faces force design problems with

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its two oceans; Argentina with Chile and

Falklands/Malvinas; Venezuela with Suriname borders;

Colombia with its internal conflict; to mention just

a few other cases.

Having outlined the purpose and several trends in

force design, it remains to present its operational

definition. Force design is a system of decisions

aiming that the proper set of effective and

efficient military capability is economically

identified, developed, organized, fielded, and

supported. Whitin this operation definition, design

is related to a proposed solution to a perceived

problem, presented with necessary and sufficient

details to guide a course of action and evaluate its

outcomes, and the force as composite of military

capabilities explored to attend defense requirements

in response to security demands.

FORCE PLANNING

The specific and limited purpose of force

planning within force design is to determine the

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quantitative dimension, organization, and spatial

distribution of military assets in association with

a specific concept of employment for a determined

theatre of operation.

Force planning has different approaches that

might include more or fewer components and

processes, depending on the aggregation criteria

ruled by specifics doctrinal understanding. Force

design does not dispute these aggregation criteria

or doctrine16; on the contrary, it recognizes these

efforts as a valid procedure to rationalize the

planning process, having as a reference the

guidelines it provides.

An example might help to clarify the distinction

between force design and force planning. Force

design might determine US capability requirements

for protecting America’s interests in Central and

South America, assuring combat efficacy against any

specific country or regional coalition, and

providing sea control and airspace interdiction

against drug trafficking and illegal immigration.

16 For an example, see Kent G. A Framework for Defense Planning. California: RAND Corporation, 1989.

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The purpose of force planning for the Caribbean

Basin Theatre of Operation specifically, would

determine how many X surveillance aircraft and Y

patrolling surface vessels based in Norfolk (VA) are

required to deter and prevent illegal air and

maritime traffic under strict rules of engagement

limiting the use of force. Force planning would also

determine the command and control requirements

associated with an operational structure for these

air and maritime assets to assure the required

operational tempo. In addition, force planning would

consider the redeployment of old surface patrol

vessels from Norfolk to Guantanamo (Cuba) to reduce

transit time, allowing fewer ships to perform the

same tasks. It would also consider that the

redeployment of these old patrol ships near the

theatre of operation would contribute to lesser its

aging rate until faster and less fuel consuming

combat ships could be developed and stationed back

in Norfolk. Force planning also considers what

changes in the concept of employment these new

assets might demand and determine how many new ships

33


would be necessary and how enhanced air surveillance

detection aids (radar, for example) could reduce the

number of required surveillance aircraft.

During these processes, Force Design would shape

new rules of engagement and instruct Force Planning

about the changing defense roles and missions in the

Caribbean Basin, which would determine new tasks and

evolving readiness and doctrine requirements,

conditioning the specification, development and

deployment of these new assets. Force design is,

therefore, the instance of reference for force

planning. It provides planning guidance while

incorporating operational alternatives as a

condition of possibility for its designing purposes.

Although with complementary purpose, they do not

fuse into one all encompassing process. Force Design

is the master of force planning; recognizing that

its servant would makes its designing requirement

feasible. When these roles are inverted, or force

design simply does not exist, force planning starts

imposing limits to political alternatives. Politics

will do what the military says it can do and it can

34


do what it thinks should be done: the military

becomes the master of policy.

FORCE DESIGN ENVIRONMENT

The complex interrelationship between the

problems force design faces must be viewed and

understood against the background of the political

structure of the society in which they occur,

although this may not always give us a clear

understanding of every detail. Current mechanism to

enforce defense reform range from reorganization

acts, assuming the structuring principle that legal

boundaries can create conditions for effective

defense reform, to political guidelines provided by

defense policy or “white papers”. The question,

therefore, of what kind and what amount of

information is need head into the devilish question

of functional relevance. Applying these

considerations, the most import feature in analyzing

the force design environment is to ascertain the

35


place at the hierarchy of defense decision-making

from which its actions are guided.

Force design processes are related to defense

ministry functions, being deeply permeated with

settled and routinized situations and decisions in

situations that have not yet been subjected to

regulation.

Karl Mannheim, quoting the Austrian sociologist

and statesman Albert Schäffle, pointed out that: “at

any moment of social-political life two aspects are

discernible – first, a series of social events which

have acquired a set pattern and recur regularly;

and, second, those events which are still in the

process of becoming, in which in individual cases,

decisions have to be made that give rise to new and

unique situations”17. This distinction developed to

qualify the difference between the routine affairs

of state and politics, also apply to qualify

ministerial functions in the realm of administration

and the realm of politics. Notwithstanding the

boundary between these two classes is rather

17 Mannheim, K. Ideology & Utopy: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge. London, UK: Hancourt, 1936. pp.112.

36


difficulty, a set of enduring characteristics is

present in the ministerial functions18:

To be the prime instrument for assuring

civilian control over defense alternatives.

To represent the nation’s defense

requirements and advise on the implications of

proposed alternatives.

To balance military expertise and

administrative-fiscal viewpoints on formulating

defense alternatives

Force design contribute to this ministerial

functions because it demands the explanation of the

assumptions that support the formulation of military

capability requirements, and determine making

explicit the articulating links between military

capability requirements and defense objective

demands, integrating and assessing those

assumptions, requirements and objectives with a

political logic.

18 Some of these functions are reflected in Huntington’s perspective of the “Departamental Structure of Civil-Military Relations. Huntington, S. P. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press: 2000. pp.428-455.

37


This is not without problems. For example, the

analysis of the definition of capability presented

by the Joint Pub 1-02 can explain a chain of

unexpected consequences of force design concepts in

the environment and vice-versa. This publication

defines military capability as: “The ability to

execute a specified course of action (a capability

may or may not be accompanied by an intention)19”.

This view transforms military capability in a self-

sufficient ability to perform operations. When

military instrumentality becomes dissociated from

political goals, it allows military control of

policy alternatives, jeopardizing the prerogatives

of popularly elected governments to decide upon

defense alternatives.

Richard H. Kohn suggests evidence for this trend

in the US:

“The U.S. Military is now more alienate from its

civilian leadership than at any time in American

history, and more vocal about it. The warning signs

are very clear, most noticeable in the frequency

19 USA, Department of Defense. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 9 April 2002). pp.62.

38


with which officers have expressed disgust for the

President over the last year… Divorced now from

broad parts of American society, the military,

increasing Washington-wise, was determined never

again to be committed to combat without the

resources, public support, and freedom on the

battlefield to win… The military had accepted

“downsizing” and reorganization, but not changes

that invaded too dramatically the traditional

function of each of the individual armed services,

or that changed too radically the social composition

of the forces, or cut too deeply into combat

readiness, or otherwise undermined the quality and

ability of the military to fullfill its

functions”.20

One of the undisputed givens is that armed forces

are still a major player in national politics both

in the US and in the region, with influence through

expenditures, investments, and savings in the

economy and social environment to which they belong.

Thus, designing defense capabilities is an

20 Kohn, R.H. Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations. In The National Interests. Spring 1994, pp.3-17.

39


influencing factor in the national and international

arena.

Zackkrison’s21 study of the roles and missions of

the armed forces of Argentina, Brazil, Chile,

Colombia, and Peru, brings a unique perspective to

force design environment:

Argentina has the most distance between the

arguments, with civilians generally debating the

need for armed forces and the military successfully

lobbying the government for money to maintain

international multilateral operations.

Brazil has the largest armed forces,

adequately funded, but has no real sense of missions

and not enough public support to push a specific

agenda.

Chile has perhaps the best funded military in

the region, and the best defined set of roles and

missions, but faces just enough public hostility

that the future after General Augusto Pinochet’s

departure is a big question.

21 Zackrison, J.L. Drawdown to Instability: Defense Budgets and Mission Glide.

40


Colombia has the most urgency in defining an

adequate role for its armed forces because of the

threat to national survival at the hand of the

Marxist insurgents and drug traffickers.

Peru faces the popular perception of having

lost a recent border skirmish against a much smaller

military, an increasing threat of insurgency, and

pressure from the armed forces for more funding and

better military equipment.

These facts should be understood in the

constantly changing configuration of experience in

which they actually lived. Notwithstanding, they

give an example of the ever- flowing stream of

trends that shape force design environment.

The measure of the relevance of this trends have

need of an analytical model that can assure that the

result to be achieved with force design do not

become detached from the environment it belongs. It

is needed to model the components and relationships

of military capabilities understanding that the

constituting characteristics of the whole will

41


emerge through the relationships of the individual

characteristics of its component parts.

The goal is to understand not just the function

of individual military assets, doctrine, tasks,

objectives, but to learn how all of these components

interact within capabilities possibilities hoping

then to use this information to generate more

accurate defense planning methodologies that will

help to unravel the complexities of defense reforms

and the underlying mechanisms that provoke

inefficiency.

MODELING MILITARY CAPABILITIES

In order to design capabilities, first it is

required to understand that capabilities are a

measure of the resulting ability of force component

arrangements to perform a range of tasks. The

performances of these arrangements being depend on

the performance of its component parts and the

stability of its relationships. Secondly, it its

required to comprehend that abstraction is the first

step toward a model because it allows pointing out

42


and organizing aspects of the reality as the object

of analysis. As Bunge22 presents, “ abstraction is

indispensable not only to apply causal ideas, but

also to permit either empirical or theoretical

investigation.”

Both provisions were included in the formulation

of the construct of capabilities depicted in figure

2. This construct identifies military capability

components, stating its precise meaning with the

description of its basic qualities, delineating the

outer edge of its component against the context they

pertain. That means giving significance to the

abstracted object of analysis, defining its

variety23 as pertaining to a system24. 22 Bunge, M. La Causalidade: El Principio de Causalidade en la Ciencia Moderna. trad. Aernan Rodrigues. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Sudamericana, 1959. pp 189.

23 Variety is a concept developed by Ross Ashby within the Theory of Cybernetics. It is used to explain the distinguishable conjuncts, regardless of the order in which they appear, necessary and sufficient to describe the essential characteristics of the systems at the required level of abstraction. ASHBY, W Ross. Introduction to Cybernetics. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 1970. Chap. 7.24Ludwig von Bertalanffy, who introduced the General Theory of Systems in 1925/6, provides the concept of system: a conjunct of interacting elements. The defense components are a system because they possess a mutual dependency and complementary relationship: the performance of the whole depends on the performance of its component parts. Bertalanffy, von L. Teoria General de los Sistemas: fundamentos, desarrollo, aplicaciones. Trad. Juan Almela. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1968, pag. 38.

There are authors, such Bertalanffy himself, who recognizes that the founder of Theory of System would be W. Kohler, with his work Die Phsischen Gestalten in Ruhe and in Staionaaren Zustand. Erlangen, 1924. Notwithstanding, the literature credits Bertalanffy for developing the Theory of System because Kohler’s work is restricted to applying the concept of system to biological phenomena, restricting its amplitude. For applications of the Theory, see Bertoglio, J. Introduction a la Teoria General de los Sistemas. México: Limusa, 1982. This theory provides an investigative methodology that could be synthetically described as: take the reality as it is presented, examine its component systems and enunciate valid regularities presented.” This methodology was named empirical-inductive. For a critique of the theory and investigation methodology, see Ashby, W.R.

43


The capability construct is an ideal25 model with

two purposes. The first purpose is to abstract the

complexity of the empirical reality in necessary and

sufficiently analytical variables; and explaining

how these variables interact, contract and maintain

relationships that enable a required capability to

be obtained. The second purpose is to explain the

sensibility of military capability to changes in the

security and defense environment, providing

assessment criteria of its efficiency, efficacy and

economy in adapting, modernizing and transforming

the defense sector in response to changes in the

security environment. The sensitivity analysis of

General Systems Theory as a New Discipline. EUA, General System, 3, 1958, pp. 1-6. Ashby proposes an opposite approach, named deductive: instead of studying the system in a progressive form, from inferior to superior levels of abstraction, he recommends taking the conjunct of all conceivable systems and reduce them to a unique system of acceptable dimension. Luhmann, N. Power. Toronto: John Willey & Sons, 1979, proposes interpreting a macro system – society as the most complex macro system - using the deductive methodology. He aims to eliminate the main restriction of Bertalanffy’s approach that in macro system the distinction between the surrounding environment and the objected system under analysis becomes blurred. Luhmann’s theory wasn’t completely accepted because it cannot be applicable to others fields that have more restricted objects of analysis. 25 Ideal models, according to Weber, are theoretical models resulting from a selective process that blocks some elements from the reality and explains its content unequivocally. Ideal models do not exist as part of the reality; they are only a proposition of a hypothetical relationship of elements abstract from that reality. Weber, M. Ensaios Sobre a Teoria da Ciência. Paris: Plon, 1965. pp.76. Ideal models are not a description of the reality, because they retain only some of its aspects, representing relevant aspects of the totality that are regularly presented in the object of investigation. They are not also an average term of the reality because ideal models do not emerge from quantitative notion. Popper converges to Weber’s understanding of ideal models and explains its utility in preventing contradictions and impreciseness when theorizing upon selected aspects of reality. Lévis-Strauss has a different interpretation of ideal model. According to him, an ideal model is a simulacra, a relational conjunct that simplifies reality in order to explains the totality of the phenomenon. See Bruyne, P. Herman, J. and Schoutheete, M. Dinâmica da Pesquisa em Ciências Sociais: Os Polos da Prática Metodológica. 5 ed. trad. Ruth Joffily Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves. pp. 48.

44


military capability to changes in the security and

defense environment requires making explicit

possible forms of its relationships and logical

consequences. That means supporting hypothesis

formulation and explaining its elements of

refutation.

The capability construct, as an ideal model – in

the sense o logical -, is not a hypothesis and,

therefore, can be neither true nor false but valid

or not valid depending on its utility for

understanding reality26. That means that it has its

own conditions of possibility; it contains its own

principle of constitution, encapsulating a conjunct

of defined predicative, arbitrarily created

accordingly to the necessity of the investigation,

that can be used – or not – as an instance of

reference to compare empirical data drawn from the

reality .

The construct models capabilities as an open

system. It assumes a flow of materials, information,

etc. from and to the surrounding environment,

26 Bruyne, P. Herman, J. and Schoutheete, M. Dinâmica da Pesquisa em Ciências Sociais: Os Polos da Prática Metodológica. 5 ed. trad. Ruth Joffily Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves. pp. 48, 182.

45


implying that its variety assumes different values

in time, as well as the relationship between its

component are dynamically reconfigure, whereas

keeping the system in a uniform state27. This

explains the characteristic of military capabilities

to retain its efficacy while its components are

reconfigured. It will also explain the limits and

possibilities of adaptation, modernization and

transformation trends.

Pragmatically, the construct will help in problem

definition in force design: what will (and will not)

be considered as inputs and outputs. This entails

defining the scope of the expected alternatives,

what procedures will be followed in generating and

evaluating alternatives, and in selecting the

alternatives to recommend to political decision.

27 The concepts of “closed and open system” are part of Bertalanffy’s General Theory of Systems. A system is defined as closed when it can be considered in an equilibrium state independent of the surrounding environment. Chemistry, for example, deals with physical-chemical reactions in isolated recipients; and thermodynamics affirms that its laws are only applicable to closed systems. Opens systems have in their animus the governing factor towards higher states of order and organization. This paper uses the same characterization for capabilities, having adaptation, modernization and transformation as trends to higher states of order and organization. The biologist Driesch uses this description to characterize a system of living organisms. A uniform state is achieved when an open system is in equilibrium. Closed systems equilibrium is dependent of the initial conditions. The final concentration of a chemical product depends on the initial concentration of its components. However, in open systems, uniform state is achieved based on the systems own parameters, and therefore is independent of its initial conditions. Drischel, H. Formale Theorien der Organization. Halle: Nova Acta Leopoldina, 1968, pp. 136, in Bertalanffy, von L. Teoria General de los Sistemas: Fundamentos, Desarrollo, Aplicaciones. Trad. Juan Almela. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1968. pp. 40.

46


Figure 2: Capabilities construct

Military capabilities alternatives are a

particular manifestation of a (intended) stable

relationship of three conjuncts28 of elements: the

conjunct of force components, the conjunct of

regulating factors, and the conjunct of concepts of

employment, all interacting with each other in

unique ways.

28 M.D. Mesarovic explains the concept of conjunct as the individualizing properties that provide to some type of cluster of elements within the environment its quality as system components. Each conjunct is, in itself, a system, defined by particular analytical criteria used to isolate them from the rest. Mesarovic, M.D. Foundations for a General System Theory. New York, USA: John Willey & Sons, 1964. pp. 1-24.

47


The concept of employment, force components and

regulating factors are mutually determined elements

of capabilities. The first assures the proper

relationship of tactical possibilities, strategic

alternatives and political goals. The second

determines the proper quantitative and qualitative

dimensioning of military assets and organizations,

being enabled by interoperability, jointness,

command, control, communications and computing (C4)

possibilities. The regulating factors link both

force components and concepts of employment,

assuring the external coherence of military

capabilities with the political will and internal

coherence between its component parts. By examining

these complex interactions, it is possible to shed

more light on how they alter defense reforms

possibilities.

THE CONJUNCT OF FORCE

The conjunct of force emerges in the articulation

of A) military assets possibilities, B) operational

48


structures, and C) its enabling elements, which will

make tactics and strategy possible.

A) Military Assets

Military assets are the means effectively used to

accomplish assigned tasks and the means necessary to

provide efficiency and sustain the tactical effort

for a certain period. For analytical purposes, each

military asset has three component elements: 1)

military hardware; 2) personnel; and 3) protocol of

operations29.

1) Military hardware

Military hardware is the machinery and equipment

of war, such as tanks, aircraft, ships, rifles, etc.

The identifying criterion for including an element

in the conjunct of military asset is its sufficiency

for a specific purpose. Such is the case with a war

ship, with its sensors, weapon systems, engines,

damage control systems, communication and command

centers integrated into a single platform with the

purpose of providing task efficiency.

29 For a typology of military assets, see Brzoska, M. et. al. Typology of Military Assets. Bonn, Ge: Bonn International Center for Conversion. Paper 16. April 2000.

49


A Boeing 747 initially conceived for civilian

airlines might become a military asset as a troop

transport; a merchant freighter may become a tank

carrier or an ordinary SUV may be converted into an

armed scooter. On the other hand, if it is

considered aircraft, warships or tanks originally

conceived as war-machines, the question would be

what are the distinguished features that typify a

corvette, a frigate and a cruiser other than their

size and weaponry? A corvette with sophisticated and

powerful weaponry might overcome a frigate in an

artillery duel, but the overweigh of this weaponry

could restrain its speed and performance, allowing

the frigate maneuver fast to overcome its weakness.

Similar propositions could be posed to the entire

war arsenal with its composing typology of fighters,

bombers, aircraft carriers, tanks, guns, etc.

Clearly, not only their aptitude to fly, navigate or

off-road traffic empowers these material components

as military assets. What defines these material

means as military assets is their ability to provide

tactical efficacy. However, because resources are

50


always constrained, efficacy should be associated

with efficiency. An efficient combat asset, for

example, will perform tasks with less fuel, which is

transformed into a wider deployment range or longer

periods on station without replenishment.

In other words, the criteria to define a military

mean is whether it is able to provide an

identifiable contribution to the required task,

being a lever of influence in the outcome. Military

assets are defined using four combining criteria:

Mobility and staying power: the ability of

military means to deploy and maintain continuous

operations. Mobility and staying power can be

enhanced by new transportation and communications

technologies.

Offensive and defensive firepower: offensive

firepower regards the ability to damage (neutralize

or destroy) adversaries’ fighting ability by

attacking targets such as missile launch sites,

airfields, naval vessels, command and control nodes,

munitions stockpiles, and supporting infrastructure.

51


Offensive firepower includes but is not limited to

physical attack and/or destruction, military

deception, psychological operations, electronic

warfare, and special operations, and could also

include computer network attack. Defensive firepower

seeks to affect the adversary’s ability to achieve

or to promote specific damage against our assets. It

includes all aspects of protecting personnel,

weapons, and supplies while simultaneously employing

frequent movement, using deception and concealment

or camouflage.

Sustainability: the ability to perform

tactical actions until successful accomplishment or

revision of the tasks.

Tactical Flexibility and Versatility: the

ability to adjust assets configuration to confront

changes in the environment, laying out a wide range

of interrelated response paths.

2) Military personnel

Military personnel are considered in force design

in its qualitative and quantitative dimensions. The

52


qualitative dimension of military personnel

translates both its total combat efficiency and the

individual ability to assess complex situations

making and implementing decisions within the domain

of their professional expertise, with reasonable

expectation of success. The quantitative dimension

of military personnel deals with the required mix of

active, reserve, professional and conscripts to

effectively operate, deploy, and maintain material

means required to attend a set of concepts of

employments.

The common trend in personnel reforms, supported

by most scholars as a by-product of the end of the

Cold War, has been downsizing the military and a

complement of civilians. This is a monumental

decision that has to be carefully throughout in its

impacts. David McCormick30 summarizes its

complexity:

“Judging the appropriateness of an army’s

downsizing objectives is more complicated than it

might appear. The logic behind each of the four

30 McCormick, David. The Downsized Warrior: America’s Army in Transition. New York: New York University Press, 1998. pp 75-76.

53


primary objectives – protecting quality, shaping the

force, sustaining personnel readiness, and

demonstrating care and compassion – is persuasive.

An officer corps of exceptional quality is obviously

crucial to a dynamic and effective military

organization, even more so given the uncertain

challenges of the post-Cold War era. Maintaining

promotion opportunities and enhancing professional

development opportunities as a means of retaining to

performers seems reasonable, too, especially since

downsizing organizations often lose their most

valued performers. Similarly, there is an obvious

and compelling need for shaping the officers corps

by precisely identifying the individuals with the

specific skill and expertise needed in a downsized

organization and for distributing officer cuts

across the entire officer corps…Sustaining personnel

readiness is also a reasonable objective. Personnel

readiness in the aggregate is a telling indicator of

the alignment between cuts in force structure and

cuts in personnel, two activities that should

ideally go hand in hand. Thus, personnel readiness

54


allows the army to gauge how effectively it is

managing this aspect of downsizing. In addition, at

the unit level, reasonably high levels of personnel

readiness are necessary for effective unit training

and operations. And, personnel readiness obviously

has significant implications for the army’s wartime

capabilities. Finally, a caring compassionate

approach to downsizing is justified on moral as well

as practical grounds. From a moral perspective, it

has traditionally to those who loyally serve. And,

as noted earlier, fair and compassionate treatment

of downsizing victims affects the attitudes and

performance of those who remain and influences an

organization’s ability to recruit new members.”

In the US case, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld

believes that the military's personnel management

system might be a Cold War relic that encourages too

many service members to stay for 20 years, too few

to stay thereafter, and most members to scurry

between assignments at a pace harmful to unit

cohesion and to families. 31

31 Tom Philpott. Military Update: Longer Careers, Fewer Moves: Two Of Rumsfeld's Tougher Goals. http://www.militarylifestyle.com/home/1,1210,S:1100:1:1187,00.html. (June 19, 2002).

55

http://www.militarylifestyle.com/home/1,1210,S:1100:1:1187,00.html


3) Operational protocols

Operational protocols are the instructions of how

to operate efficiently those material means,

exploring their technical characteristics to

maximize task effectiveness. An operational protocol

for five similar surface ships to deploy in calm sea

aiming sonar detection of low speed submarines would

recommend a pattern of simultaneous turning to have

a detection probability of 80%. Another protocol of

operation for the same class of ships operating in

rough sea would recommend another pattern for a 60%

detection probability32.

More efficient protocols of operations can be

developed by applying computational routines to a

generic “model”, modifying its parameters to make

military assets to satisfy performance requirements

appropriated to a wide variety of conditions, or to

make them to perform existing tasks better, or to

implement tasks never before performed.

However, one of the most difficult and expensive

activities of modern armed forces is exactly making 32 For methodological processes of developing operational protocols, see NAVAL WAR COLLEGE. Naval Operations Analysis. (2. ed.). Annapolis, EUA: NWC Press, 1989.

56


efficient protocols of operations. It demands

sophisticated centers of operational analysis and

complex processing. For this reason, not all

countries can afford such centers. The problem,

therefore, is that they might employ newly acquired

military assets with obsolete operational protocols,

virtually neutralizing their efficiency. However,

since they do not have such centers, they do not

realize their necessity, or simply deny this

problem. The error, therefore, is circular, with

increasing costs of acquiring and maintaining

technologically sophisticated assets with

diminishing returns in terms of effectiveness.

When defining the military assets conjunct, the

relevant variable is the tooth-to-tail ratio of

fighting assets to its supporting components.

Fighting assets are designed to maximize combat

ability relatively to foreseen opponents. Supporting

components are designed to assure the maintenance of

the cutting edge of fighting assets. The fighting

tooth needs refueling and ammunition supplies to

maintain combat ability. Without supplying vessels,

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tank aircraft, depots and bases, the fighting

ability would be severed to the point of impairing

task possibilities. In US, for example, the fighting

tooth has required deployment of only 4% of active-

duty personnel33.

The conjunct of military assets, therefore,

includes both its cutting edge and its supporting

device categories. Training and motivation of

military personnel, the internal military

organization, communications systems, logistical and

other systems all may enhance or prejudice military

capability because they possible impact on the

possible tooth-to-tail ratio.

B) Operational Structures

The conjunct of operational structures creates

the ability of military assets to perform operations

in support of required tasks. They are designed,

therefore, to attend command and control

requirements, articulating military assets in order

to get task efficacy through the efficient

33 The Paradoxes of post-Cold War US Defense Policy: An agenda for the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. Project on Defense Alternatives, Briefing Memo # 18 5 February 2001. http:://www.comw.org/pda/0102bmemo 18.html. . pp. 5. (8/28/2001)

58


performance of the parts. Its role is to make the

conjunct of military assets present in a military

capability become more than the sum of the parts.

For analytical purposes, operational structures have

two distintive components: 1) Combat structures, and

2) Support Strutures.

1) Combat structures

Combat structures allow parts of the conjunct of

military assets to be detached and deployed to

specific tasks, allowing expansion of the number of

possible tasks that the conjunct might perform.

Therefore, the synchronization of detachment and

reincorporation of those parts maximizes the

potential ability of military assets to accomplish

the envisaged concept of employment.34

2) Support structures

Support Structures are designed to fulfill two

simultaneous demands. The first refers to the

maintenance of military effort in time. In this

34 See Department of the Army, United States of America. 1986 US Army Field Manual 100-5, blueprint for the AirLand Battle. Washington DC: Brassey’s (US), Inc, 1991. To identify the impact of combat structure in force structure and warfare see Deichman, P.F. der. Spearhead for Blitzkrieg: Luftwffe Operations in Support of The Army: 1939-1945. New York, USA: IVY Books, 1996. Diechman’s book is also relevant to see the functional role of doctrine in the relationship of combat structure and the conjunct of military assets.

59


case, the purpose of support structures is to

provide the adequate logistical flow to maintain

both military means in their optimum technical

performance, and personnel adequate supplied in

order to assure the continuous validity of

operational protocols, providing for the expected

performance of military assets. The second demand

imposed on support structures is to prepare the

conjunct of military assets to attend operational

requirements. In the first demand, support

structures are articulated with combat structures,

timely linking, for example, depot resources with

theatre demands. In the second demand, support

structures group military assets by types and

classes, seeking a gain in scale in maintenance,

repair and training.

Decisions regarding military assets and the

organizational design are highly dependent on the

degree of require jointness, as well as on decisions

regarding how force components are deployed,

interconnected and specialized.

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C) Enabling Elements

The range of possibilities provided by military

assets in response to tasks depends on the 1)

interoperability of their component parts, and 2)

the possibilities created by command, control,

communication, and computing. Together, they

contribute to achieve and jointness synergy.

1) Interoperability

Interoperability defines the degree of

compatibility between force components that permits

them to work together to produce expected tactical

results. It explores technical features incorporated

in military assets to perform operations.

Interoperability is a technology function. It

depends on a systemically integrated conjunct of

knowledge and instructions that fulfill or create

specific demands of force designing, and guide the

production possibilities of defense products and

processes though proper techniques35.

35 Literature offers a variety of definitions of techniques within an unresolved discussion about the difference with technology. Longo defines technology as the organized assemblage of all scientific, empiric and intuitive knowledge used in the production and commercialization of goods and services; and techniques as the purely empirical and intuitive knowledge. Longo, W.L. O Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico do Brasil e suas Perspectivas Frente aos Desafios do Mundo Moderno. Belém: UNAMA, 2000. pp. 11,12. For Morais, technology is derived from the

61


Technology differs from techniques in

continuously reconstructing and transforming itself,

having as reference all previous knowledge, whereas

techniques are specific knowledge circumscribed in

time and space oriented to use or produce required

products and processes. Technology supports the

presumption of certainty that force components will

produce expected results to tasks demands, and

determines the transforming rules of knowledge into

force components possibilities36.

2) Command, Control, Communications and

Computing (C4)

evolution of techniques. For him, techniques refers to Paleolithic, Neolithic, medieval or even modern humankind creative behavior used to provide human necessities though the transformation of the environment; and technology refers to more recent practice of objective human creativity. Morais, R. J.F. Ciência e Tecnologia. 2.ed. São Paulo: Cortez & Morais, 1978. pp.102. Munford has the same understanding of Morais regarding techniques: “through technical improvements we create a new environment and highly organized new behavioral standards that have attended human necessity of living in a orderly and predicable world”. Munford, L. Arte e Ciência. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1986. pp.14. Jacques Ellul has an inverted perspective of the concepts when he says that technology regards naïve activities oriented toward perfection; and techniques as the contemporaneous mentality oriented to efficiency as a supreme goal. Ellul, J. A Técnica e o Desafio do Século. trad. Roland Corbisier. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1968. pp. 445. Buzan sees in the technology the most important factor in determining the nature of military alternatives and means of force, isolated from political influence. Buzan, B. Strategic Studies: Military Technology & International Relations. London, UK:MacMillan Press, 1987. pp.7. Häbermas, on the other hand, thinks that technical reasoning does not abandon its political content. Habermas, J. Técnica e ciência como Ideologia. (trad. Arthur Morão). Lisboa, Portugal: Edições 70, 1968. pp. 46. 36 For a historical perspective of the composition and influence of technology upon force design, see: Macksey, K. Technology in War: the Impact of Science on Weapons Development and Modern Battle. London, UK: Armour Press, 1986. Creveld, M. van. Technology and War: From 2000 B.C to the Present. New York, USA: Free Press, 1991. Dupuy, T.N. The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare. Fairfax, USA: Hero Books, 1984. Jones, A. The Art of War in the Western World. New York, USA:Oxford University Press, 1987. O’Connel, R.L. Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons and Aggressions. London, UK: Oxford U.P., 1989. MacNeill, W. The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Forces and Society Since A.D. 1000. Chicago, USA: The University of Chicago Press, 1982.

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Command and Control, Communications and Computing

assure the processes transaction of operational and

support structures in a logical fashion, being an

integral part of force structure manifested in

military capabilities. They can lead to fewer

changeovers in force components and tasks to produce

required military capabilities, reducing cycle time

without changing military effectiveness or

increasing military effectiveness using lesser-

sophisticated conjunct of military assets. As the

size of force components increases, it can exploit

more and more tasks, but it also becomes

increasingly complex to select the C4 system that

makes it possible to provide effectiveness at a low

total cost/risk ratio and at the same time assure

interoperability37.

Properly identified, C4 requirements lead demand

growth of military capabilities with preemptive

actions to exploit current deployment of military

assets considering its different degrees of

37 For a in-depth discussion of Command and Control, see Weisman, R.M.L. A Conceptual Model for Military Command and Control. Ontario, Canada: University of Ontario,UMI Dissertations Services. 1992.

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readiness tailored to expanding or contracting tasks

demands within a specific concept of employment.

THE CONJUNCT OF CONCEPTS OF EMPLOYMENT

The conjunct of concepts of employment define a

set of articulated decisions that express the

prioritization of objectives and its translation

into tasks requirements having operations as its

linking factors, whereas relating all of them with a

political logic.

In the US case, for example, the Navy has put

emphasis on network-centric operations, the Air

Force moves towards becoming an expeditionary force,

the Marines’s continuing experiments with concepts

such as Desert Warrior and Urban Warrior, and the

Army’s recently announced effort to develop medium-

sized brigades with increaded responsiveness38.

A) Objectives

Objectives are functionally sufficient

descriptors of foreseeable demands of the use of

force for political purposes. Each one encapsulates

38 Davis, P. Tranforming Military Force. California: Rand Corporation, 2002. pp. 231. http://www.rand.org/ contact/personal/pdavis/MR1306.1.sec6.pdf . (Mar/20/2002).

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a comprehensive content that justifies its

individuality and permanence, supporting the

assumption that during the processes force design

guides those demands of force will not change.

There are five implicit premises in this

formulation. First, that the objectives, once

selected, are necessary and sufficient to achieve

the predetermined purpose. Second, that the

processes are logically articulated. Third, that if

those objectives were achieved, the envisaged

initial purpose would be accomplished. Forth, that

its formulation and execution are bounded by some

degree of sufficient rationality. Fifth, that during

the processes, the objectives and the rules of

transformation will not change.

These premises support the proper linkages

between national interests and defense capabilities

towards higher states of effectiveness, efficiency,

provided four conditions:

Intelligibility: the denotative content of

objectives are clearly defined and understood.

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Feasibility: objectives are achievable within

the realm of practical possibilities and logical

reasoning.

Assessment possibility: the results are

measurable either quantitatively or qualitatively.

Compatibility: the effects are part of a

chain of causality addressing defense requirements

Intelligibility is the requirement for the proper

developing of plausible hypothesis related to a set

of accepted values and principles; and for clearly

communicated results. Assessment Possibility is the

requirement for determining the consistency of the

proposed objectives and its sensibility to changes

in the threat environment.

Attending intelligibility and assessment

possibility requirements are relevant to prevent

three common risks in defining defense objectives.

The first risk is making static a dynamic process.

The second, is that objectives, as Lodi39 put,

convey solutions in terms of re-scaling existing 39 Lodi conclusions are taken for business strategic planning methodologies. However, his analyis and conclusions can be transposed to force design because both fields explore similar articulating logic and general concepts. See Lodi, J.B. Admininstração por Objetivos: Uma Crítica. São Paulo: Pioneira, 1972. pp.25.

66


capabilities, increasing or downsizing, thus

restricting the emergence of new capabilities based

on different internal logic for rearranging force

components. Finally, objectives tend to focus on the

short term.

Compatibility is the enable of strategic

possibilities. It assures that the resulting effect

of operations – manifested in tactical use of

military assets in the engagements – might be

articulated toward the political goals though a

cascade of linked results.

B) Tasks

Tasks are a set of intended actions or desired

effects of the application of force towards specific

defense objectives. They are the building blocks of

the concept of employment, defining the intention

for using force components in a chain of linked

tactical actions, expecting that the aggregated

outcome of this chain will contribute to achieve a

cascade of intermediate objectives having at its top

the defense objective.

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The political logic that links objectives and

tasks can be understood with the comprehension of

its relation with 1) Defense Missions and 2) Defense

Roles.

1) Defense missions

Defense missions are the assemblage of tasks

within the scope of an intended purpose. Each

mission is related to a specific outcome, in the

form a hypothetical combination of assumptions and

chains of future developments that serve as a

reference for the diagnosis of current and required

tasks. Defense missions are, therefore, a

proposition of reality aiming to anticipate

possible, probable and plausible contingencies where

the uses of military capabilities are considered.

Determining and prioritizing missions are a prime

political decision found in a set of compromises

seeking to reconcile, and where possible, to balance

conflicting questions of value. Once defined, they

orient the bulk of national effort towards the

political use of military capabilities in defense

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related tasks. At least three important

characteristics are common to the use of the term

mission:

a) Time horizon: it defines a time horizon

for the anticipated impact of the tasks required to

carry out its mandate.

b) Focus: it required concentration of

effort on a narrow range of pursuits reducing the

resources available for other activities.

c) Chain of causality: in requires a series

of decisions supportive to one another following a

consistent pattern.

2) Defense roles

Defense roles are generic descriptors of the

nature of the effect, cause or consequence of

applied military capabilities in defense tasks.

Defense roles are usually categorized as nation

building, diplomatic, combat, constabulary, and

police; reflecting the different political rules and

legal framework that bounds defense tasks.

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Nation building roles shape defense tasks towards

the social and economic development of the state

under democratic governance, civil law and economic

rules of market regulation. International law and

treaties bind diplomatic and combat roles in peace,

crisis and war, asseverating Clausewitz’s conclusion

that war is the continuation of policy with the

introduction of means of force. The importance of

diplomatic roles lies in the fact that nations judge

potential adversaries in terms of its military

responsiveness, reliability, consistency, and, most

of all, unity: unity of purpose, unity of effort,

and unity of action40. Constabulary and policy roles

are oriented to the maintenance of order and

enforcement of regulations, under national or

coalition legal mandate.

The priorities of defense roles reflect the

mandate of politics in defense issues. The

importance of clearly defined defense roles is the

assignment of functions for defense, making it

accountable for its results. Military capabilities

40 Foster, GD. The Postmodern Military: The Irony of "Strengthening" Defense. Harvard International Review; Cambridge, Summer 2001. pp. 24-29.

70


acquire fighting, diplomatic, police, or

constabulary roles depending on doctrine, the way

they are organized, deployed, trained, sustained,

commanded and controlled. The required status of

each of these requirements are assessed taking into

considerations topological characteristics of

possible areas of operation, national and alliances

fiscal and production possibilities to sustain

existing capabilities or incorporate others during

the course of operations. This, in turn, will

require a sustained degree of readiness41

articulated with expected tempo of the military

operations.

The relationship of objectives, roles and

missions, having tasks as its linking elements,

define a matrix of cross impacts.

Objectives

A B C D

Mission 1 TasksTasksTasksTasks A Roles

41 The concept of readiness will be retaken further on. Here, it is proposed to understand it as the degree of preparedness for a specific purpose.

71


2 TasksTasksTasksTasks b

3 TasksTasksTasksTasks c

4 TasksTasksTasksTasks d

Figure 3: Cross-Impact matrix of objectives,

tasks, missions, and roles

Strategy links tactical intended results with the

purpose of defense through a political logic; and

use tasks, missions and roles to both instruct its

formulation and assess its results.

Canada offers an example of the relationship of

mission, objectives, and tasks42:

Defense Mission:

Defend Canada and Canadian interests and values

while contributing to international peace and

security

Defense Objective:

42 Canada. Defense Planning Guidance 2001 – Chapter 2 – Strategic Directions. http://www.vcds.ca/dgsp/dgp/ dgp2001/chap2e.asp. (Jun/01/2002).

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To conduct surveillance and control of Canada’s

territory, aerospace and maritime areas of

jurisdiction. This Defense Objective will be met by

Defense Tasks:

1. Protecting Canadian sovereignty through

surveillance and control of Canada’s territory,

airspace and maritime areas of jurisdiction; and

2. Mounting an immediate, effective and

appropriate response for the resolution of terrorist

incidents that affect, or have the potential to

affect, national interests.

Tasks determine the chain of operations and

actions [tactical] expected to be accomplished to

achieve an objective. Defense mission instructs

strategy formulation establishing the validity of

linked task results for defense objectives and

security goals. Defense Roles provide parameters to

assess the degree of efficacy of these valid results

to the envisage success defense and security policy

determine. That means that strategy completes itself

in the tactical possibilities and in the political

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determinants; having no significance isolated from

any one. Finally, it should be kept in mind that

objectives, roles and missions are enormously

sensitive issues, for they means fiscal resources.

C) Derivative elements

Derivative elements mediate the process of

desegregating tasks attending both the criteria

formulated based on 1) Intelligence, Surveillance,

and Reconnaissance (ISR), and 2) the practiced

categories of operations. Together, they offer the

criteria for developing guidelines for making

decisions about the employment of the force

components, reflecting how decision-makers define

the hierarchy of tasks and describe through missions

their understanding of the country’s requirements of

security and defense.

1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance (ISR)

ISR ensures that threats will be detected well in

advance. Asymmetric threats, for example, such as

information and terrorist attacks, are more

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difficult to predict than large-scale conventional

attacks, and therefore have significantly less

strategic warning associated with them. The response

to asymmetric attack, however, is unlikely to

trigger the requirement for national mobilization of

conventional forces. As a conclusion, readiness

requirements that anticipates a longer period of

increasing tension marked by hostile activities,

warning indicators and instances of crises prior to

the outbreak of a conflict, may be undertaken with

the expectation of warning time prior to the

emergence of a threat necessitating mobilization.

2) Operations

Operations are doctrinarly defined actions taken

in the pursuit of defense tasks, such as convoying,

combat air patrol, interdiction, reconnaissance, and

replenishment at sea. These actions inevitably

involve a degree of coordination; nonetheless, they

need not necessarily result in either desired or

desiralbe results.

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The assemblage of practiced operations are

doctrinally defined and categorized, varying from

country to country and time to time accordingly to

the practiced conceptual system used to determine

those categories and the criteria used to allocate

operations within each category. Currently, the

general trend is to define two broad categories for

operations: one reflecting the bulk of the required

warfare effort against a specific type of assets

(submarine warfare, mine warfare, etc.); the other

reflecting required supporting actions to provide

efficiency of the operation in the first category

(replenishment, surveillance, intelligence, patrol,

etc.).

Across the spectrum of operations, small-scale

contingencies are the dominant trend in the current

defense environment, expanding its limits toward

war-like operations and diplomatic actions. The US

uses nine categories for smaller-scale

contingencies, which are defined as the range of

military operations: 1) beyond peacetime engagement

but short of major theater warfare; 2) opposed

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interventions; 3) coercive campaigns; 4)

humanitarian intervention; 5) peace accord

implementation; 6) follow-on peace operations; 7)

interposicional peacekeeping operations; 8) foreign

humanitarian assistance; 9) domestic disaster relief

and consequent management; 10) no-fly zone

enforcement; 11) maritime intercept operations; 12)

counterdrug operations and operations in support of

other agencies; 13) noncombatant evacuation

operations: 14) shows of force; 15) and strikes.

These categories and the criteria to allocate

contingencies in each one of them have been a focus

of debate, making it a major issue in the post-Cold

War era to offer a public rationale for capabilities

needed to handle the full range of contingencies

without putting undue strains on budget and

political possibilities.

Combined as derivative elements of the capability

construct, ISR and operations attend four basic

purposes:

1) To collect authoritative information about

the security and defense context;

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2) To provide criteria to identify required

tasks to be performed (application domain

decomposition);

3) To orient representational abstractions for

those tasks; and

4) To define interactions and relations among

objectives and tasks to ensure that a) constraints

and boundary conditions imposed by context are

accommodate, b) identify data to be collected and

appropriately addressed, and c) control the flow of

information that allow the derivation of tasks be

stopped or restarted, assuring that the scope and

scale of tasks are represented with discernible

details.

THE CONJUNCT OF REGULATING FACTORS

Regulating factors are the arsenal of normative

instructions linking the requirements of the

concepts of employment with the possibilities of

force components. This arsenal comprises A)

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Doctrine, B) Readiness Guidelines, and C) Rules of

Engagement (ROE).

A) Doctrine

Doctrine is the acerb of experiences and

practices that guides the selection of operational

protocols, instructing the individual and collective

use of military assets towards higher levels of

efficacy and efficiency, and exploring operational

and support structures to perform military

operations43.

Doctrine is associated with tactical success,

while operational protocols are associated with the

technical performance of military assets. Military

commanders are expected to have the moral courage to

discard a doctrinal recommendation based on its

professional experience and even intuition, when

they perceive that current doctrine will not produce

the expected tactical success in the novel situation

he/she confronts. Operational protocols provide

guidance, but it is the ability to interpret its

43 For a discussion on military doctrine, see Drew, D.M and Snow. D.M. Making Strategy: An introduction to National Processes and Problems. Maxwell, Alabama: Air University Pres, 1988. pp.163-174.

79


adequacy and translate it into tactical success that

makes a general a master of war.

B) Readiness

Readiness is defined as the level of preparedness

for personnel and materiel to respond to considered

tasks. The time assigned to a force component to

reach the readiness level is the time required to be

fully manned and equipped at organizational

strength, including training and logistics stocks

necessary for the operations or actions assigned.

Readiness requirements are specified at three

levels: 1) tactical, 2) structural and 3)

mobilizational.44

1) Tactical Readiness

Tactical readiness determines the level of

training and maintenance necessary for timely

deployment of military assets. It explores

operational and support structure possibilities to

accomplish a predetermined range of tasks with

44 See Betts, Richard. Military Readness: Concepts, Choises, Consequences. Washington, DC. EUA: Brookings, 1995.

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expected degree of success and acceptable level of

risk.

Higher degree of tactical readiness, either to

prepare to immediate deployment or simple to

communicate political intentions, demands military

assets be kept in higher state of alert with its

systems energized and manned, causing personnel

fatigue and increased rate of material damage. In

turn, personnel fatigue and higher maintenance

demands burdens the support structures, stressing

the logistics possibilities to the point that the

degree of expected tactical success can not anymore

be maintained.

2) Structural Readiness

Structural Readiness determines military

organizational architecture and logistic

requirements to avail, when demanded, large scale

and higher periods of tactical readiness, either

increasing the range of possible tasks or

diminishing risk probability. However, structural

readiness has its costs. Higher degree of structural

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readiness immobilizes capital and resources for

future actions, inherently creating inefficiency.

Maintaining large repair facility mostly inactive

and enormous logistics structure are expensive;

similarly, structural readiness demands a top heavy

military personnel structure based upon the

assumption that it is more difficult and time

consuming to prepare officers than soldiers. In

addition, structural readiness bets on time for

bolstering military capabilities.

3) Mobilizational Readiness

Mobilizational readiness determines priorities

for the conversion of the peace time social,

technologic, industrial and economic national

possibilities into military assets and support

requirements to avail and maintain tactical efforts

through the organizational and logistic

possibilities created by the structural readiness.

Mobilizational readiness also has its costs, mainly

in terms of preparing and maintaining an inventory

of conversion possibilities.

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The proper balance of tactical, structural and

mobilizational readiness requirements reflect

concept of employment possibilities and the

assumption of time available for deploying military

capabilities and the efforts to sustain that effort.

Location decision also impacts in readiness

alternatives. This balance, therefore, changes as

the concept of employment changes. US readiness

spending per person in uniform, for example,

averaged 22 percent more (in inflation-adjusted

terms) during the Clinton years than on the eve of

the 1990-1991 Gulf War45.

C) Rules of Engagement

Rules of engagement are directives delineating

the circumstances and limitation under which the use

of force would be initiated, continued and ceased.

These rules have a political nature with two

mutually complementary dimensions. The first one,

judicial, refers to the limitations imposed by

domestic and international law, in peace and war, to

45 The Paradoxes of post-Cold War US Defense Policy: An agenda for the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. Project on Defense Alternatives, Briefing Memo # 18 5 Feburary 2001. http:://www.comw. org/pda/0102bmemo18.html. Downloaded in8/28/2001. pp. 5

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the use of force. The second one, functional, refers

to the limitations imposed by the defense roles.

The choices regarding the degree of readiness

required depends of the size, location, and

specification of force components possibilities, the

spectrum of anticipated tasks made possible by

practiced doctrine and authorized by the ROE,

complemented by an understanding of the interaction

among these decisions. All issues related to force

designed are centered in these elements. The optimal

size of a given military is only possible to be

assessed affixed to its political determinants and

costs possibilities, the construct of capabilities

make explicit the tradeoff among the required

elements to produce this optimum.

The functional merit of the construct is in

reducing all military capabilities to the same

components abstracted into an ideal model;

recognizing that the difference among actual

resulting capabilities is directed by the scope of

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its components and the relationship they establish.

The assumption here is that if the total parts

constituent of a construct and its relationships are

known, the nature of the whole is derivable from the

nature of the parts. The result determines a common

nature for all possible emergences of capabilities

belonging to the same system of knowledge.

The number and qualitative dimension of

personnel, the number of levels of organizations,

the characteristics of the technology employed, and

the articulation of tasks into mission within the

concepts of employment are all import determinants

of this an ever changing optimum. They are a

function of the political determinants for defense,

making military capabilities a living with changing

composite of relationships, whose linkages are

enacted by two inner factors: Jointness and C4I-SR

(Command, Control, Communication, Inteligence,

Surveillance, and Reconaissance). These factors

provide the “animus” of a military, allowing the

mechanisms at work within the capabilities to

attempt to improve continually its relationship to

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produce the optimum levels of force and procedures

over time to enforce required tasks.

Jointness

The most succinct definition of jointness is that

offered by Gen Colin Powell, former chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff: “We train as a team, fight as

a team, and win as a team46”. Jointness is a major

factor that contributes to capability potential. It

is the idea of unity of effort and acting

accordingly. In the end, how integrated force

components are poses the essential question to

jointness, to encompass organizational expediency

requirements and statutory jurisdiction alike.

The current emphasis on jointness is on the

establishment of rules and conventions that allow

efficient control of military operations through

established mechanisms. Incremental demands for

jointness have created demand for flexible military

capabilities in their composition, generating raids

for new appropriations (operations and maintenance).

46 Joint Forces Quarterly. Summer 1993, pp 5. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/jfq0301.pdf. (Jun/18/2002).

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Force design sees this demand as a reactive-

corrective measure to improperly devised

capabilities. From the perspective of force design,

jointness determine the degree of integration of

force structure requirements and tasks possibilities

since its conception. Relatively homogeneous service

operational doctrine does not provide an indication

as to the degree of jointness if dissociated from

jointly designed capabilities.

Interoperability stems from good functioning and

close coordination of all force components in the

effort of providing adequate operational efficiency.

Decisions regarding technology in interoperability

are incorporated in specific pieces of assets

equipment, the degree of automation and the

connection between different equipment. Whereas

jointness depends on assuring cohesive operations

for extended periods with a focus in how best to

support task accomplishment.

Jointness, as a requirement of force design,

derives from the stability of those patterns of

relationship required to produce a capability, which

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implies in the ability of its components to store

its own program of integration, devised for

operations that could last the range of combining

tasks, without reprogramming.

C4I-SR

Command and control, communications and

computers, are enabling elements of the force

components, which are linked through doctrine to

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance,

constituting the enacting mechanisms C4I-SR,

designed to provide support for the employment of a

capability according to its specific operational

requirements. C4ISR is seen as an adaptative control

system seeking to influence selected aspects of an

operating environment, supported by a variety of

information systems47. Its functionally progresses

across the full range of possible tasks, directing

and monitoring operations at the joint and combined

level and supporting effective end-to-end

management. This includes space and terrestrial

communications, improved interoperability and joint 47 Alberts, D. et al. Understanding Information Age Warfare. Washington, D.C.: CCRP Publication Series, 2001. pp. 136.

88


capabilities, and automated information integration

to ensure that commanders are provided with the

information they will require.

Jointness and C4I-SR are influent factors in

facilitating the composite of relationships required

to produce a military capability. This two elements

exist in a continuum of interdependecies across the

spectrum of possible capabilities, configuring a

process support system of factors, which orient,

develop and constrain the dynamic organization of

military assets, operational organizations,

objectives and tasks in order to provide different

kinds of capabilities. Such system can be thought of

as a code of rationalization operating to articulate

interrelated processes limiting the variance of a

military capability.

Those codes are formulated as a set of accepted

rules and values that mediate the relationship

between military assets, operational structures,

objectives and tasks, adapting itself and

influencing that relationship in response to changes

in the technological horizon and in the intellectual

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superstructure that define security and defense

requirements. And, therefore, need to be reevaluated

periodically.

Jointness and C4I-SR enforce complementarities

and inhibit proprieties that produce antagonisms

between different structuring criteria used to

articulate military assets, operational

organizations, objectives and tasks. They provide

the principle of organization for the defense

construct.

Force components and the concept of employment

possess different structuring criteria. The former,

integrative, relies on technical performance of

individual assets and their degree of

interoperability to cluster elements, ranging in

size from single units to major aggregation, with

their upper limit circumscribed to the armed forces

total numbers. The latter, derivative, has its

origin in the collective goal of defense objectives,

desegregating in a hierarchy of subordinated

objectives, accordingly to practiced organizational

90


structure and criteria for allocating

responsibilities.

Force components are structured underlying an

ability to perform a task required to achieve a

politically oriented objective in observance of

prescribed rules of engagement. Because resources

are always limited, force structure and force

components seek to maximize efficiency, although

with different parameters. Force structure maximizes

efficiency through economy of scale, whereas force

components aim for economy of scope. The former

tends to concentrate military assets to optimize the

industrial production and repair potential of depots

and shipyards; the latter tends to maximize tasks

with fewer assets.

Determining and assigning defense tasks takes

into account force components potential within the

scope of practiced doctrine, the practiced degree of

readiness and the limits imposed by the Rules of

Engagement. Readiness, doctrine and ROE regulate the

way military assets are organized, deployed and used

to carry out assigned tasks. Doctrine is rooted in

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military experience, whereas determining readiness

requirements is primarily a political decision that

reflects task priorities. The resulting effect of

the interaction of doctrine possibilities and

politically defined readiness requirements

determines the proper quantitative dimension of

military assets and its relation with operational

and support organizations, assuring the internal

coherence of military capabilities: the degree of

integration, synergy and completeness of force

components’ state and relationship throughout time.

However, assuring internal coherence of military

capabilities is not sufficient. It is also necessary

to assure external coherence, measured as the degree

of consistency between force structure possibilities

and alternative uses of the military assets.

The external coherence of military capabilities

is enforced through rules of engagement, in the form

of prescriptive instructions establishing the limits

of use of force for the achievement of military

objectives. Its ultimate goal is to assure the

proper relationship between the use of force and

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political will in order to produce mission efficacy,

considering both the resulting benefits and its

opportunity costs.

To achieve external coherence demand changing the

pattern of decisions over time to react to status

quo-enforcing mechanisms used to assure internal

coherence. This causes a conflict between force

components search for stability and political search

for task-flexibility. The balance among this

competing trends is always contingent, providing the

characteristic forms and nature of military

capabilities.

FORMS AND NATURE OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Military capabilities assume an active form when

forces are effectively mobilized, deployed, and

engaged to achieve a purpose defined by their tasks.

In this form, the assessment of their potential

success is conditioned by technical and

incommensurable factors as endurance, maintenance,

leadership, and weather. All these factors can

affect the expected outcome of the engagements

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changing the pre-condition where military

capabilities were designed. The art of the generals

is reflected in their ability to assess these

changes and adjust capabilities to reassure their

expectations.

Military capabilities assume a latent form when

its perceived value (translated as expected degree

of tactical, strategic and political success) is

considered only in the possible outcome of

engagements thought in the minds of the conflicting

actors, creating deterrent or compelence effects.

Deterrence effects are generated in two ways. By

means of denial, when aimed to prevent conflicts,

inducing the perception that the eventual use of

force would be opposed by a substantially powerful

defense. And that this defense could generate

unacceptable damages to the attacking party, whereas

subjecting it to a counterattack with plausible

expectations of disassembling its combat capability,

imposing the peace that its opponent considered

desirable. Or by retaliation, when intended to

prevent the start of the opponent action by making

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evident that the attacked party would even retain

retaliation capability, and that this residual

capability would still ensure an unacceptable level

of destruction to the attacking party. Compelence

induce the reversion of an already initiated action

towards the initial situation, or towards other

situation still acceptable. Deterrence and

compelence, from a conceptual point of view, are

like opposite sides of a coin, linked by an internal

logic sustaining the credibility/plausibility of

potential military capabilities as suitable for

political purposes.

Active and latent capabilities either alternate

or coexist in the full spectrum of violence, which

ranges from a simple armed observation to major

conflicts involving all available resources,

operating simultaneously in the tactical, strategic

and political domains, according to the intended use

of force in the engagements for the purpose of war,

and in the use of combats for political purposes.

The relationship of military capabilities to the

spectrum of violence, explicating its simultaneous

95


impact in the tactical, strategic and political

domains, prevents the common error of seeing

capabilities breaking down into isolated segments

according to quantitative dimensions of military

assets employed (either in its latent or active

form). The error lies in segregating tactics from

strategy, and introducing a technical (or

technological) dimension into the tactical,

strategic, policy relationship.

The nature of military capabilities reflects the

nature of the relationship between tactics,

strategy, and politics, with its categorization

subordinated to the taxonomy used for tasks. This

connection entails tactical, strategic and political

capabilities to reflect the relationship of tasks in

the tactical, strategic and political realms;

tactical military capabilities provide the ability

of military assets to perform tactical tasks that

strategic military capabilities will explore for

political purposes.

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Two patterns – convergent and divergent - emerge

as tactical and strategic possibilities from the

relationship of force components (FC) and tasks (T).

The divergent pattern emerges because of the

ability of the same force component to provide

different military capabilities, exploring their

integrated assets technical features and

organizational architectures in response to

different tasks, although with different

expectations of tactical success.

A Colombian force-component, for example,

integrated by infantry, artillery, engineer,

logistics, command, and air wing components, may

assume both:

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

FC

FC

FC

FC

FC

FC

FC

FC

FC

FC

FC

FC

FC

FC

Divergent Pattern Convergent Pattern

Figure 5: Divergent and Convergent Patterns

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a) The capability to hold in force, for 20

hours, a superior Venezuelan military capability on

its eastern border. Ground combat and close air

support operation would be sustained until forces

stationed near Bogota could be mobilized and

deployed to the border (20 hours requirement). The

task of defending the eastern border contributes to

the defense objective of detering Venezuelan

aggressive actions and, should deterrence fail, to

provide mobilization time to gather forces for

counter-attack.

b) The capability to prevent FARC’s guerrilla

action on the eastern border (same region). To

suppress guerrilla action to acceptable levels would

demand intelligence gathering and random patrolling

associated with police-type operations. There is no

specific time limit imposed by logistic re-supply

and the attrition might be expected to be low

because the FARC are not powerful in that region.

A trained mind could provide a reasonable success

assessment of the Colombian military capability in

both situations. This mind would be computing a

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nexus of interrelated variables (readiness,

organization, doctrine, ROE tactics, elements of

weather and terrain, expected attrition levels,

training, logistics, leadership, etc.) that underpin

those force components to perform both tasks. This

mind could summon these capabilities simply

expressing theirs asset components; but only because

it has already integrated all those variables into a

declaratory value.

A conceptual error takes place when this

declaratory value of military capabilities is

expressed as the nominal dimension of force

structure elements only, reducing capability to its

assets components. The error is to take effects per

one causal factor only. Military capabilities are

not intrinsic characteristics of military assets;

they are reconvened in the dual relation of assets

with their enabling factors and of those with

objectives integrated into tasks.

The convergent pattern emerges as possibility of

the same task to be accomplished with different

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force-components, with specific expectations of

tactical success.

In the above example, the task to defend the

eastern border of Colombia could be accomplished

either by that mentioned conjunct of assets, or by

another one, also derived from the Colombian force

structure, as a centered in a light tank brigade

supported by helicopters.

These two patterns reaffirm the understanding

that aircraft carriers, destroyers, tanks and

aircraft are only military assets; and squadrons,

battalions, etc., are only organizing structures for

these assets. A capability emerges in the

relationship of these assets to a specific task,

when an aircraft carrier with its escorts or an

aircraft wing with its tankers, or a battalion with

its combat service support, are considered to

perform specific operations aiming a desired

political effect. Denying this logic would both

assign an intrinsic political value to military

assets, refuting the subordination of the war to

policy, and providing leeway for military autonomy

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in deciding what assets to have and defining its

intended political purposes.

There is, therefore, no military capability

independent simultaneously of political, strategic

and tactical considerations. Military capabilities

breed each time military assets are assembled and

oriented with a political purpose to act in force.

When it is said that a country has the capability to

control its borders or deny the use of the sea, or

deter an adversary, or gather intelligence, or

patrol its economic zone, it is assumed that it has

ability to assembly a conjunct of military assets

with a specific political purpose translated intos

defense objectives. Once this animating purpose is

removed, military capability ceases to exist, given

place to assets’ technical possibilities only.

EVALUATION OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES EFFECTIVENESS

Military capabilities are made of a political

tissue and can only be measured through political

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criteria. When a capability is dissociated from its

political intention, the use of force become

dissociated from its political purpose. The

unwillingness to accept this paramount aspect has

led to a common error in evaluating military

capabilities effectiveness - to take criteria that

suggest itself; that is, a tendency to measure what

a capability can do rather than what it should do.

Once this pitfall is realized, and preconceived or

early ideas about the solution are given up, three

ways of assessing capability effectiveness can be

formulated.

The first way is goal attainment - the extent to

which the instrumental role of military capabilities

in military actions, does, in fact, contribute to

the state's political aims. The second is the extent

to which military capabilities contribute to the

effective management of political perceptions. The

latter is especially important because military

capabilities are ingrained in the creation and

projection of the national image, supporting the

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construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of

defense policies in support of national interests.

On another level, the perceptual dimension of

strategic effectiveness reflects the fact that the

military not only possesses capabilities and

performs functions but also projects a certain image

of itself. Reorienting the use of military

capabilities, and thus transforming their image,

contributes to the promotion and protection of a

conception of security. Thus, military spending must

be balanced between providing for defense objectives

and contributing to national development,

considering that when resources are diverted from

other critical national needs to support mammoth and

unrealistic military needs, security is diminished

rather than strengthened.

The third assessment criterion is sustainment,

defined as the ability to maintain operational

effectiveness, measured in days of operations at

anticipated usage rates at the expected operational

tempo. Force components will normally maintain

sufficient supplies of combat commodities such as

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ammunition, fuel and rations for a limited number of

days of operations at the tactical level. Support

organizations will expand the number of days with

supplies in theatre, and mobilizational process will

provide the stocks required to sustain operations

beyond this point. Sustainment is, therefore, the

effect and consequence of readiness possibilities

and operational demands within a determined

framework used as a reference for assessment.

These three ways of assessing capabilities

effectiveness demand mechanisms for its execution

phased with the design and implementation cycles of

defense alternatives. The recommended choice would

be a permanent assessment system, with standardized

mechanisms that feedback its results into the

defense system. Other alternative, instead of not

assessing at all, would be to phase this assessment

with presidential elections, within the defense

reviews process. Although this type of interval

assessment (or any other criteria used to determine

intervals) might be at least a precautionary action,

defense reviews are expensive and cause some

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instability in the defense sector that wave out into

the industry of defense, foreign policy and even

into the government itself.

CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE CONSTRUCT OF

CAPABILITIES

No matter how the construct of capabilities

strive to maintain standards of scientific inquiry,

determining its components and establishing its

relationships cannot be turned into an exact

science. Expert judgment will always be relevant in

deciding what interrelations between components to

choose as relevant, and in analyzing and

interpreting the results. The demands of this

construct, particularly in an environment

highlighted by political uncertainties, are

magnified by the highly specialized nature of

military capabilities, at the same time that its

condition of possibility are advanced by

technological developments.

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The objective of the construct is primarily to

recommend – or at least to suggest – rather than

predict. Thus, it is like to engineering, for the

purpose of using its results to make defense

alternatives effective, efficient and economic. Such

an approach typically stressess the selection of a

scheme – a framework – for carrying out possible

alternatives, in which the difficulty lies precisely

in deciding what ought to be done, not simply in how

to do it.

Learning to use such construct provides expertise

to assess structural relationships among force

components and tasks, systematically addressing them

to enhance the likelihood that the appropriate

decisions will be made.

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PART 2

FORCE DESIGN FRAMEWORK

Section two presented a conceptual model for

military capabilities. However, it is necessary to

translate the complex relationships of the processes

involved in force design, providing a conceptual

framework that organizes the variables involved.

Such a framework is offered in the hope that it will

bring some assistance for force design and,

ultimately, for defense reforms, contributing to the

formulation and implementation of an effective

military.

The force design framework is a conjunct of

knowledge presented in the form of propositions and

assumptions logically ordered, assumed as valid for

investigating problems-type with expectations of

obtaining a stable anticipated solution-type. The

logical ordering of its components is provided by

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the axiology used, which emphasizes the existence of

a common set of concepts derived from the construct

of capabilities.

A framework is conceptually different from a

methodology. The former is an abstraction of the

intended desired effect of processes within the

complex of relationship to which they belong. It is,

therefore, eminently relational and explicative.

Whereas the latter is a hierarchy of processes

required for achieving some desired effects

specified by the framework it refers. Methodologies

are, therefore, eminently prescriptive, oriented to

the selection of techniques that can perform the

required procedures it determines48.

There is a conceptual hierarchy among frameworks,

methodologies and techniques, progressing downwards

with decreasing degrees of abstraction and

increasing degrees of specificity. A framework is

associated with designing, meaning the development

of guidelines with logically necessary details for

its comprehension as an articulated set of decisions

48 For a detailed discussion of the distinction between construct, framework, methodologies and techniques, see Lakatos and Marconi (1995, 17, 81).

108


oriented to a clearly defined purpose, and with

logically sufficient details to verify whether the

outcomes it promotes fulfill the objectives which

that purpose instructs. Methodologies49 are

associated with planning, meaning a hierarchy of

articulated procedural instructions. Techniques are

specific ways of performing an action implying

precise deliverables at the end.

Figure 6 depicts the force design framework and

its components logic blocs – Cogitare, Prospicere,

Renovatio50 whose purpose is to specify the scope

and scale of military capability, translating them

into force alternative requirements in association

with the condition for its intended use.

49 For other understandings of methodology, see Jolivet, R. Curso de Filosofia. 13. Ed. Rio de Janeiro: Agir, 1979. pp.71. Bunge, M. La Ciência, su Método y su Filosofia. Buenos Aires: Siglo Veinte, 1974. pp. 55. And Cervo, A. L. e Bervian, P. A. Metodologia Científica. 2.ed. São Paulo: McGraw-Hill, 1978. 50 Latin terms are used to avoid existing – and segmented – understanding of current practices and terminologies.

109


Figure 6: The force design construct

The architecture of decisions component of this

framework define a set of operational processes

through which military capabilities requirements are

conceived, developed, and produced to assure timing

and effective relationships between force components

and tasks, and, ultimately, those reasons that

justify the existence of armed forces.

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These operational processes, it is relevant to

notice, are instrumental to the purpose that each

logical block determines. Therefore, they can be

arranged/combined accordingly to the organizational

structure and practiced methodologies/techniques

that each country adopts. The goal of the force

design construct is to provide a reference for

selecting those methodologies and techniques,

arranging/combining processes within a common and

articulated purpose. Different arrangements can be

articulated and processes can be mixed and matched

to build defense alternatives.

Operational processes are servants of the

purposes that each block determines; however, this

is not always observed. If the academic curricula of

war colleges in the Hemisphere is taken as an

analytical reference, assuming that the practice of

force design will follow the conceptual teaching

developed in these schools, it will be observed that

this logic is usually inverted, making processes the

master of purposes; determining whatever they

produce as valid outcomes of a designing goal.

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Despite the intention of these institutions to

teach at graduate level, this logical inversion

makes its endeavor doctrinaire, teaching what to

think instead of how to think. Until academic

curriculum reflects the logic of force design,

force-planning techniques will prevail as tools to

enforce services doctrine and parochialism, serving

only as instrument to corroborate results already

determined by traditions and customs. There is no

joint education unless force design philosophy

becomes instrumental in designing the curricula of

military schools.

COGITARE (Reflect about)

The Cogitare block defines an articulated system

of decisions aiming to interpret and transform

intended political purposes into defense objectives

that could be pragmatically achieved though rational

actions and available means. To achieve its purpose,

this logical block determine what are the valid

rules of transformation of information, products and

processes required to achieve defense objectives;

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and orients the formulation of evaluating criteria

for the relationship between those objectives, the

transformation processes and its outcomes.

The literature51 summons this purpose into two

generic procedures: political-strategic evaluation

and defense policy formulation, oriented to define

the intended use of force, to establish a set of

sustained political objectives that comes out from

the intercourse of security and defense interests

and commitments, and a set of self-relied design

guidelines to instruct the development and

evaluation of military capabilities.

The problem, one should recognize, lies within

these procedures through which political objectives

are defined and the legitimacy that the designing

guidelines absorb in the process of its formulation

and implementation to represent defense demands. In

recognition of the importance of conceptual, as well

as for reuse of the conclusions obtained from these

operational processes, the Cogitare Block offers the

51 See, for example, Lewis, K. Khalilzad, Z. M. and Roll, R.C. New-concept Development: A Planning Approach for The 21st Century Air Force. California, EUA: RAND Corporation, 1997. Fox, R.J. The Defense Management Challenge. Boston, EUA:Harvard Business School Press, 1988.

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Security and Defense Matrix as a basis for judgment

about the appropriateness of data for all conditions

not specifically tested.

The Security and Defense Matrix

Security and defense52 are commonly used terms

permeated with discordance. They are incorporated

into scholarship and statecraft, but there is not an

agreed consensus on its meaning, resulting from

distinctive usages taken arbitrarily from historical

contexts, analytical criteria or functional

purposes.

For force design purposes, a state of security is

a perceived or intended state of equilibrium between

a desired way of life and forecasted threats to

statecraft, organizations and means that accounts

for the feasibility or maintenance of that

equilibrium53. Defense alternatives are the possible

52 The epistemological question of what defense and security are is an ontological problem, being out of the force design realm. The answer for this question would provide an explanation for its nature. For force design functional purpose, the relevant is the concept of defense as practiced by each country (each one being a particular manifestation of a general phenomena), how it evolves, and how this evolution influences the conceptualization and development of military capabilities. Other disciplines deal with these ontological questions, establishing a theoretical and practical relationship between force design and other areas of study. 53 Another common understanding of security translates the police role of providing material and individual safety; commonly referred as public security. This is a restrictive and limited

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assemblage of human, material, organizational and

information resources developed, sustained and used

by the States aiming a desired state of security.

Each perceived and intended state of security is

a transitory situation in which there is a

collective agreed upon expectations. The expression

of national intended state of security breeds in the

political realm and pertains monopolistically to

empowered government. It is a matter of politics

that some states of security are preferred

(prioritized) to others; and it is a matter of

policy whether certain defense alternatives are to

be banned entirely in view of the intended security

state. Alan K. Simpson explains the nature of

politics which domains force design: In politics

there are no right answers, only a continuing series

of compromises between groups resulting in a

changing, cloudy and ambiguous series of public

decisions, where appetite and ambition compete

openly with knowledge and wisdom. That's politics54.

understanding of security.

54 Alan K. Simpson, the former U.S. senator from Wyoming who holds the Lombard Chair at the John F. Kennedy, School of Government at Harvard University http://globetrotter. Berkeley.edu/conversations/ Simpson/simpson4.html (24/11/01).

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http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/Simpson/simpson4.html

http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/Simpson/simpson4.html


The definition of defense alternatives in

association with possible security states reflects a

mutually complementary relationship: each endeavored

defense alternative changes security goals as it is

accomplished; whereas each state of security exists

in the present and extends into the future subjected

to feasibility of capabilities and acceptability of

risks55 derived from the selected defense

alternative.

Force design demands defense alternatives be in

accordance with the political goals and priorities

of each State reflected in its intended stated of

security. The nature of security goals and the

effects of the instrumentality of defense

alternatives find a common denominator in politics,

providing coherence for the assessment of their

relationship.

The range of security states and associated

defense alternatives establish two spectrums of

possibilities defined by their logical extremes. 55 For a discussion about the “state of security”, see Lippman W. U.S.Foreign Policy. Boston, EUA: John Hopkins Press. 1943, pp. 51. Wolfes us.es Lippmans concepts to review the Defense Policy of the USA. Wolfers, A. “American Defense Policy”. Baltimore, EUA: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965. pp. 3. For the application of the term in the context of policy formulation, see Proença, D. and Diniz, E. Política de Defesa no Brasil: uma análise crítica. Brasília: UNB, 1998. pp. 55.

116


Security states spectrum

This spectrum of

possibilities is defined

between the Broad Security and

Narrow security states

Defense alternatives

spectrum

This spectrum of

possibilities is defined

between the Broad Defense and

Narrow Defense

Broad Security describes a

state of equilibrium were

individuals perceive

themselves with freedom to

access information, products

and processes they consider

proper to foster their

development, express their

political preferences and

decide about the social and

economical organization

required to produce it,

feeling satisfied with the

results.

Broad Defense encompasses

all available human, material,

organizational and information

resources everything that

States can use to protect

itself from external attacks

and domestic insurrection,

including but not limited by

the Armed Forces

instrumentality.

Narrow Security describes a Narrow Defense defines

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state of equilibrium not

menaced by eminent possibility

of having to wage an external

war or confront an internal

convolution for its

maintenance.

restrictively the instrumental

capability of the Armed Forces

to conduct wars only in the

pursuance of the intended

state of security.

The range of security and defense significances

between its logical extremes defines four quadrants

depicted in the figure 7.

(1)

Broad Security

Broad Defense

(2)

Narrow Security

Broad Defense

(3)

Broad Security

Narrow Defense

(4)

Narrow Security

Narrow Defense

Figure 7: Security and Defense Matrix

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Quadrant (1) and (4) brings together the logical

extremes of security and defense, contrasting the

exclusiveness and inclusiveness criteria in their

relationship. Exclusiveness shortens security state

to one qualifying criteria only: the absence of war;

whereas inclusiveness widens security states towards

an imprecisely defined and all encompassing common

good. In quadrant (1), Broad Defense alternatives

are inclusive of everything that contributes to

obtain security, whereas security is everything that

brings defense to be unnecessary. In quadrant (4),

Narrow Security state is exclusive of any other

parametric variable than war; whereas Narrow Defense

alternative is defined exclusively in terms of the

required armed forces to provide the understanding

of security it is associated with. In the quadrants

(1) and (4), the distinction between military

function and responsibilities become blurred with

national governance. In quadrant (1), defense merges

in security; and in quadrant (4), security merges

into defense.

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In quadrant (2), the instrumental role of the

military comes dingily close with national

governance, entailing the military control of

politics. Quadrant (3) produces the opposite effect,

distancing to meanness the military role in

politics. In the left side of the diagram, were

Broad Security is the common denominator, force

design leans toward the support role of military

capabilities, whereas in the right side the combat

role is the prominent variable to consider in force

design. In the upper side of the diagram, were Broad

Defense is the common denominator; the tendency is

to balance functions of the armed forces among

multiple axes; whereas in the lower side, combat

becomes the leading trend in defining armed forces

roles and missions.

Inside these four quadrants, a spectrum of

transitory states is defined. Each one of these

states gaining its individuality and permanence

though an assemblage of defense objectives that

translates into pragmatic intentions (missions) a

political will. Defense missions, therefore

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integrate objectives that represents the position of

each specific country its position in the Security

and Defense Matrix.

When the relationship between defense alternative

and the intended security state is reduced near to

quadrant (1) one, military capabilities become an

instrument of national development towards the

envisaged common good, forcing the bulk of military

capabilities to lend towards, for example, disaster

relief, where a combat role is not required. When

those objectives translate the relationships near

quadrant (4), military capabilities become war

oriented.

The variance of this relationship between defense

alternative and security states within these four

quadrants – like a metal ball attracted by four

magnets - is pushed and pulled by the combining

effects of political military relations and

interagency dynamics. The former refers to the

political identity and prerogatives of the military

as a political actor within the defense policy

formulation process. The latter refers to the

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organizational cultures and interests that shape the

same process.

Civil-military relations and interagency

cooperation are specific field of study, each one

with its own analytical framework and working

hypotheses intermingle with force design regarding

its ability to explain and predict defense

objectives outcomes and trends. Civil-military

relation and interagency cooperation will explain

and anticipate possible tendencies of defense

policies in a web of competitive priorities

alternatives, attitudes and preferences. In this

context, the task of force design is to structure

and manage itself so as to mesh with, reinforce, and

enhance defense capabilities, being capable to help

think about what the priorities are, because if

resources are diverted to low-priority objectives,

some capabilities that are really important simply

will not get done.

The political environment continually forces

countries to reevaluate their understanding of

security and the concept of defense, adjusting their

Bolivia

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priorities in force design accordingly.

Understanding the national preferences, and their

implications for decision patterns (and biases) in

the formulation of defense objectives is a

prerequisite to realizing the full potential of the

security and defense matrix. As an example, two

notional charts are presented with the estimated

position of hemispheric countries in this diagram in

the early 70’ and 200256.

56 To develop these notional charts, the following aspects were considered: a) the type of government; b) military forces deployed abroad; c) internal conflict involving military forces or policy; d) active and latent borders disputes; e) the inclusion/exclusion of police forces within the structure of the armed forces; f) civilian or military ministry of defense; and g) the attribution of constabulary tasks to the armed forces or policy (federal policy/gendarmerie/coat guard). All variables were equally weighted from – 5 to + 5 for defense and security (-5 Narrow, +5 Broad). Aggregated results were plotted using the standard deviation (the center of the matrix = 0,0 defense - 0,0 security). The analytical value of the results is circumscribed to its notional purpose only, limited by the analytical limits of a single valuator and the arbitrary aggregation criteria used.

(2)Narrow Security

Broad Defense

3)Broad SecurityNarrow Defense

(4)Narrow SecurityNarrow Defense

(1)Broad SecurityBroad Defense

(2)Narrow Security

Broad Defense

3)Broad SecurityNarrow Defense

(4)Narrow SecurityNarrow Defense

(1)Broad SecurityBroad Defense

1970

Haiti

Honduras Nicaragua

Pananma Uruguay Dom. Rep.

Guatemala USA Canada Peru Ecuador Uruguay

Mexico Paraguay

Colombia Costa RicaBrazil Venezuela

Chile Argentina

Colombia Costa Rica Panama

Dom.Rep. Nicaragya

Honduras Peru Ecuador Uruguay

Guatemala

Haiti Argentina Venezuela

Paraguay

Canada

Mexico

USA Chile Brazil

2002

Figure 8: Notional chart for selected countries

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Contrasting these two charts, it would be

possible to correlate the position of those depicted

countries in the early 70’ with the influence of the

Soviet threat, border disputes and internal

conflicts. These were primary forces shaping the

concept of security and defense toward the right

side of the Security and Defense Matrix, were Narrow

Security is dominant.

In the early 2002, Colombia is isolated in the

upper left corner of the chart, struggling to solve

its internal conflict using not only the military

but also all possible resources available, as

reflect in the Plan Colombia. Costa Rica and Panama,

formally without armed forces, tend explicit and

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emphatically to a concept of wider defense. Paraguay

still has a strong perception of the influence of

its Armed Force in providing security goals,

although moving fast to a wider concept of defense.

Brazil’s maintain a declaratory posture of do not

directly involve the military in functions and roles

other than its professional combat orientation,

being kept in the lower part of the matrix of

security and defense, where narrow defense is

dominant.

One can dispute the particular position of a

specific country in the charts. However, two aspects

are undisputed. First, the understanding of security

and the concept of defense evolved, pressed by the

perception of the treaty environment. Venezuela is a

remarkable example, with its 1999 Constitution

imposing the armed forces a role in the development

of the country. Second, there is a marked clustering

of countries widening its concept of defense to

include other roles and function to the armed

forces, adjusting the design of its military

capability alike.

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The latter aspect provides an indication of

possible convergence of a group of countries towards

Broad Defense alternatives and Security State’s

alike. Whether this imply or not a more peaceful

world is arguable, Broad Security shifts the

emphasis of force design from war oriented roles of

the armed forces to support functions and activities

like disaster relief and law enforcement (a

constabulary role). Furthermore, it provides an

indication that the geographical/regional approach

becomes an inadequate criterion for foreign policy

formulation, when the use of force might be

considered as an alternative, such as in regional

security or defense alliances.

In a globalized world, developing foreign policy

based upon countries geographic positioning is not

anymore a valid criterion. It is not only contrary

to evidences of others and more important clustering

criteria; it lacks efficacy and harasses national

indigenous perception of their willingness to auto-

determination.

126


Whereas the latter aspect - clustering tendency

of countries - might impose changes in foreign

policy formulation, the former aspect is paramount

for force design. It implies that each country will

transform its own concept of defense reflecting how

it perceives the nexus of threats molding his

desired security state. Threats, therefore, are the

parametric variable in force design. They are

anticipated relationship of possible events required

for that an undesirable result or consequence

happens. Force design identify and assess threats in

order to find out whether they have influence or

modify military capabilities ability to attend

defense objectives.

The adequacy of the policy formulation process

can only be judged accordingly to its functional

sufficiency in providing guidelines for force

design. Its formulation is driven by the legacy of

past practices, the inertial factors derived by the

nature of object it orients the conception, and from

the ambient where defense takes is purpose. There

are, therefore, no principles for designing defense

127


objectives; its craft cannot be reduced to

enforceable rules. This is warning for those

practitioners who search for objective-making

principles and a precaution for those who try to

conceptualize its component processes relationships.

It must be borne in mind that the task of policy

formulation is the bulk of a creation and

prioritization of stable and viable defense

objectives able to capture the position and trend of

each country regarding its understanding of security

and concept of defense. Whatever compromises this

process might entail; engineering defense objectives

cannot fail to fully consider its practical

achievement taking into consideration civil military

relations and the interagency bargaining process.

That implies that force design can neither escape

things political when it seeks to affect policy nor

when it seeks to be supported by policy.

When policy formulation does not play its

functional role in identifying adequate defense

objectives, the results are defective capabilities

inarticulate with strategies and inadequate

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organizational structures that do not provide

required jointness.

One hypothesized chain of events could explain

how a defective defense policy concurs for the lack

of internal and external coherence and sufficiency:

defense purposes are not clearly defined, provoking

vague and even conflicting objectives; without

clearly defined objectives, the responsibilities of

States’ agency become blurred. Interagency conflicts

tend to stovepipe processes accordingly to their

operational procedures and institutional goals. The

resulting products of these stovepipe processes

become inarticulate and even conflicting.

When a defense policy is defective, wasteful use

of national resources tends to occur. The US

experienced this situation in the 1960’s with

duplication of projects within the Armed Forces when

five over imposing and simultaneous U.S projects for

nuclear capabilities were simultaneously developed.

The democratic institutions may suffer alike from

defective defense policy because of the guidance

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vagueness provides excessive autonomy for the Armed

Forces to define its own missions. Brazil’s Defense

policy of 1989, for example, although recognized as

an important contribution, was very much criticized

for its vagueness. Beside, in the worst case, the

State’s own existence may be threaten because a

defense policy fails to provide the adequate

capabilities or conveys the wrong message, changing

the fragile equilibrium of peace.

PROSPICERE (Look ahead)

The prospicere block purpose is to provide

referent scenarios for both evaluate the validity of

policy guidelines and current capabilities, and

anticipate future capabilities requirement. Its

primary function is to serve as the mechanisms by

witch objectives are transformed into detailed

capacity requirements. This is an epistemological

necessity of a framework oriented to develop

hypotheses about the future. The variety of

component elements of these hypotheses depends on

two factors: dimensions of complexity and time.

Dimensions of complexity regard the numbers of

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chains of events considered to represent objected

hypothesis of future. The wider and complex the

objected hypothesis, the bigger the probability of

chains of events present differentiated logic.

Longer the time ahead considered bigger the

bifurcation of chain of events. The combined effect

of these two factors can generate such a number of

chains of events that can end up conflictive.

The Prospicere block provides the Diagram of

Futures as “authoritative” information about the

domains that future defense capabilities are to

address. It provides plausible representation of

contexts and references to sources that define tasks

possibilities, ensuring that these sources do not

employ contradictory assumptions or factors.

The Diagram of Futures

Force design deals with uncertainties. March and

Simon57 propose three categories of uncertainty: 1)

unacceptability of alternatives, when the

57 March, J.C. and Simon, H. A. Teoria das Organizações. 2.ed. trad. Hugo Wahrlich. Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1970.

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distribution of probability between alternatives is

not know; 2) incompatibility of alternatives, when

the distribution of probability between alternatives

is know, but one cannot decide about the most

favorable one; and 3) unpredictability of

alternatives; when the distribution of probability

that relates choices and outcomes is unknown. Davies

and Klalilzad58 categorize uncertainty as

programmed, when one is able to recognize its

possibility but not its time-occurrence; and

catastrophic, when one cannot anticipate either its

nature or its time-occurrence. Force design

categorizes uncertainties accordingly to ends, means

and the relationship between ends and means.

Uncertainty of ends

The uncertainty of ends reflects the fact that

defense objectives may emerge, disappear of

transform at the same time force is threaten or

used, conditionally changing the desired end state

for what these threats and uses were intended for.

58 Davies, P. K. and Klalilzad, Z. M. A Composite Approach to Air Force Planning. California, EUA: RAND Corporation, 1996. pp.6.

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Uncertainty of means

The uncertainty of means reflects the spectrum of

possible forms that acts of force may assume pending

on the relationship of the components of the force

and the permanency of these relationships over time.

Each form derives from the (re) configurations of

constituent elements of the force, exploring the

integrative and derivative patterns of military

capabilities, qualitatively changing its expected

tactical efficiency and effectiveness. In addition,

those possible configurations reflect: a) the

evolving production structures and technological

horizons of States; b) and the interdependency of

factors that define and prioritize allocation of

national resources between defense and other States

interests.

Ships, aircraft, combat organization, and other

military assets, only receive their purpose as means

of force when incorporated into political

determinants. These determinants possibilities lend

to the force its nature as States’ will and explain

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why it is never an end in itself. Uncertainty of

means, in force design, is, therefore, an attribute

of tactics, having in its possibilities the building

blocks of strategies aiming anticipated ends.

Uncertainty of the relationship between

means and ends

The uncertainty of the relationship between means

and ends regards the use of engagement outcomes for

political purposes. Each relationship intending an

anticipated concept of employment that reflects the

nature of forecasted conflicts in which it will

develop itself.

The convertibility of means into ends, whereas

means and ends are changing, entails an spectrum of

conflict possibilities ranging from simple unarmed

observations to situations where an adversary has to

be completely de-armed and submitted to the will of

its adversary.

The evolving nature and relationship of mean and

ends explains the limits of a spectrum of conflict

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with predetermined category, and challenge the

concept of escalation as a single line progressing

from present to future. Military capabilities

emerge, and keep its existence in this end-means

uncertainties.

Force design deals with ends, means, and its

relationships simultaneously, taking its cross-

impacts in conjunct with considerations about

required changes in functions, responsibilities, and

institutional organization of defense. The practical

implication of this challenge is the building of

armed forces with unity of purpose, unity of effort,

and unity of action for effectively wielding power

in support of national will. When different clusters

of assets, for example, can provide the same degree

of tactical success for the same task, there is an

indication of redundancy in force structure

components. This redundancy might be either

intended, when associated with multiple and

simultaneous similar tasks; or undesirable, being a

warning for improper force design.

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These three types of uncertainty reflect the

clausewitzian construct. Uncertainty of ends is

about politics, uncertainty of means about tactics

and uncertainty of the relationship between means

and ends about strategy. In the same way, one cannot

distinguish tactics, strategy and politics except

for analytical purposes; these three types of

uncertainty cannot be separated. It is under this

understanding that the concept of event has to be

acknowledged.

Events

Schwartz59 gives meaning to events as “the

building blocs of forecasting”. Events help reducing

the complexity of decision-making under uncertainty,

isolating discrete elements and establishing its

links in a trend that emerges in the present,

progressing into the future. On the other hand,

Bunge60, analyzing those links, concludes that

events are an abstraction of reality, an arbitrary

simplification of reality.

59 Schwartz, P. The Art of The Long View. London, UK: Cunerry, 1991. pp. 32.60 Bunge, op. cit. 1959. pp. 187.

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Force design recognizes both the utility and

limits of events. From an ontological perspective,

events are a defective selection of expected

attributes of the future. Each event derives from

many others in an infinite progression, from which

one extract only those that are currently judge as

important. Therefore, any suggestion that

forecasting should take into consideration all

events do not correspond to the logical

possibilities of current human capability of

identifying and linking events. There will always be

interconnections rich in important that would not be

properly recognized or considered. Notwithstanding,

from a methodological perspective, events are a

necessity. They support the formulation of

hypothesis about the future, for what they are a

research and analysis imposition. The methodological

rigor of force design demands recognizing this

necessity and its limits, in the same way others

fields of science does. The validity of any

conclusion based on events is limited by the

expectation of its no vulnerability. Under this

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understanding, events can be categorized in four

terms61.

Dependent Events

Dependent events are those events that appear,

disappear, or change when researchers add, remove,

or modify other events. They are, therefore, the

factor or propriety that is effect, result, or

consequence to what was manipulated.

Parametric Events

Parametric events are those events required for a

determined result or consequence to happen. They are

selected and manipulated in order to find out

whether they have influence or modify dependent

events.

Relational Events

Relational events establish a test factor for the

limits of inference and expectation. Relational

events are assumptions that incorporate into force

design the ability to make explicit its own limits.

They demand when hypothesizing through abstracted

61 This categorization uses criteria presented in Lakatos, Eva and Marconi, M. A. Cientific Methodology. 2 ed. São Paulo: Atlas, 1991. pp.172.

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elements of reality, to make results relative with

its measuring criteria. That is, to make clearly

discursive what surges from intuition and analysis;

allowing assessing equally valid arguments whereas

averring their validity as function of its utility.

The role of relational events can be expressed in

a simple formulation: if the assumption turns out to

be vulnerable, the relation between parametric and

dependent events is corrupted, and inferences

derived from this relation are no longer valid. In

this role, relational events fulfill the fundamental

demand of force design: that the accurateness of

measurement refers to the sensibility of measuring

method and take into consideration conditions of

permanence of the object under measure for the

stability of derived conclusions.

Control Events

Control events are those intentionally

neutralized to prevent that its occurrence translate

a logical obstruction for designing capabilities. An

extreme situation of control event would be the

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possibility of disappearance of men. Less extreme

examples are more difficult to establish, although

more important, as the continuation of the system of

states and the role of force as a political

instrument.

The mechanics of forecasting

Forecasting mechanics can be made explicit using

the relationship between events. Its goal is to

describe with some degree of confidence, the most

likely future strategic environment, in the form of

design scenarios:

Control events are established in order to

neutralized uncertainties that would preclude force

designing; a set of relevant parametric events are

stated and hypothetical chains of future

developments are established converging to dependent

events. Finally, relational events are established

to provide evidence of a possible vulnerability of

these hypothetical chains, depending on the change

of the state of parametric variables or the

occurrence of others events not neutralized. If

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forecasting is established above authorized

conditions of relational events, they mean nothing

and are an error.

Parametric events establish three types of link:

projection, prospective and prosficcion. The

importance in recognizing these types is to

preventthe transitivity between phenomena of

distinctive nature.

Projection and the projective horizon

Projection is explained by the Theory of

Causality, formulated by Bunge62, as a causal

relation that can be empirically verified. Temporal

series, for example, are projections. Chains of

projection link present facts to future events

through a tendency depending on two factors: how

much can be retreated to capture the necessary

information to construct temporal series, with the

identification of its periodicity; and the selection

of the appropriated technique to construct and

interpret these series.

62 Bunge, op. cit. 1959.

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According to Wright63, projection validity can

only be claimed upon parts of future, and not upon

the future as a totality. The time-limit of these

parts define the projective horizon.

The projective horizon delimits a temporal

context where practices from the past ascertain

regularities that impose a degree of inertia to

changes. Therefore, although the projective future

is not absolutely undetermined; it is also not

unique in its determination, in the sense that the

course of the present would be derivative of a set

of rigid and inexorable causal laws. The projective

future has, indeed, some degree of freedom, but this

degree is restricted, being subjected to the

possibilities authorized by regulatory elements of

the construct of capabilities, which will determine

the limits of adaptation in defense reforms.

Force design assumes that in this part of the

future that projection is utile there is a dynamic

equilibrium – said homeostatic equilibrium – between

the demands of defense and the defense system. The

63 Wight, M. International Theory: The Three Traditions. London, UK: Leicester U.P., 1994. pp.11.

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time length of the projective horizon – and

therefore the continuity of the homeostatic

equilibrium – is determined by the expectation that

some aspects of the past will continue in the

future. The assumption of continuity, as stated by

Makridakis64, which depends on the availability of

sufficient information about the past. In The Medium

Age, for example, the projective horizon established

a temporal context extremely long, derived from the

relative inertia of warfare practices derived from a

relative stability of costumes, techniques and

production capacities (feudal structure). Present

projective horizons are much shorter, with a

diversified variation caused by the acceleration of

technical developments enhancing tactical

possibilities65.

The risk in force design is the auto-compensation

of elements, artificially enlarging the projective

horizon; structure and budgets proceedings,

production capabilities and military bureaucracy,

64 Makridakis, S.G. Forecasting: Planning and Strategy for The 21st Century. London, UK: Free Press, 1990. pp.9.65 For warfare practices in the Medium Age and its relation with feudal structure, see Howard, M. War in European History. London, UK: Penguin, 1983.

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for example. Within this horizon, warfare practices

are determined by a grammar that produces no

comparative advantage between forces under the same

state-of-the-art.

The accepted degree of dispersion of projections

translates the level of risks politics is willing to

accept. This acceptable level of risk establishes

the limits of the projective horizon and it is for

determining its occurrence that projective

assumptions are constructed. This understanding

contradicts that of Chuyev and Mikhaylov66, who

suggest as prediction interval the medium time

between weapons systems cycles of development and

acquisition. It is conceivable that the development

of a complex and time length weapon system could be

artificially precluding changes, imposing inertia to

tasks and missions for which that weapons system is

inadequate or inefficient.

Projection has its problems. First, as expressed

by Henry Kissinger, because it projects the familiar

66 Chuyev, Y. and Mikhaylov, Y. Soviet Military Thought.nr.16: Forecasting in Military Affairs. trad. DGIS Multilingual Section Translation Bureau – Secretary of State Department – Canada. Moscou, URSS.: Washington, D.C., EUA: U.S Government Printing Office, 1980. pp.4.

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into future. Second, because it induces an

incremental changes in defense capabilities,

inhibiting creativity and precluding peripheral

vision that should be used for rethinking the rate

and form of these changes. The conclusion is that

projections make analysts see only what they

illuminate; but, due to its nature, they cannot

illuminate their own discontinuities.

Prospective and the prospective horizon

The conceptual foundation of prospective is the

Theory of Propensity as explained by Popper67. He

presents the concept of propensity as the

probabilistic outcome derived from a condition of

possibility posed by a conjunct of probabilities

that are neither fully empirically supported nor

totally tested.

The prospective does not fill empty spaces in the

chain of events; it creates probable alternatives,

each one presented as a relationship that confirms

the following with regressive degrees of certainty.

67 Popper, K.R. A Lógica da Pesquisa Científica. trad. Leonidas Hegenberg. São Paulo: Cultrix, 1972.

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The judgment of new occurrences is a function of

previous judgments. Prospective is concerned more

with the structure of the conditional relation

between present facts and future events than with

the accuracy of the premises. Therefore, prospective

does not restrain itself to what effectively may

happen in the future, but is concerned with possible

events that could happen under probable conditions.

The prospective, in fact, present a story where some

data are occult, but assume that this story is

sufficiently coherent to infer conclusions.

The prospective differs from the projection in

the morphology of the chain of events. Projective

alternatives disperse from a common origin in the

present within a cone of possibilities authorized by

the links of causality. Prospective alternatives

derive along the path, creating a tree-like

structure; each new branch being judged accordingly

to the qualification of its pertinence to envisaged

ends.

The prospective horizon delimits a temporal

context where the regularities observed in the past

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condition the future together with a set of

significant parametric variables that could alter

the chain of events. The limit of this horizon is

given by the possibility of prospective assumptions

become vulnerable. Vulnerable prospective

assumptions condition defense alternatives by

turning obsolete doctrine, readiness requirements

and strategic concepts. It signals a qualitative

change in the forms and means of war: it heralds an

on going revolution in military affairs, which

determines the possibilities and limits of

modernization in defense reforms.

Prosficcion and the prosficcional horizon

The concept of prosficcion emerges within force

design as a methodological requirement. The Theory

of Probabilistic Induction, in Reichenback68 terms,

explains Prosficcional links between parametric

events. It allows explaining the induction of

probability of truth where the links are

68 Reichenbach, H. Experience and prediction. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 1938. Kaplan says that the probabistic induction is based on the notion that exists an expectative of truth in chains of events if the links of thinking sequences were sufficiently strong and the links sufficiently short. Kaplan, M. Decision Theory. Massachusetts, EUA: Cambrige U.P., 1996. pp. 235, a indução probabilística fundamenta-se na noção de que existe uma expectativa de verdade se as ligações entre elos das seqüências de raciocínio forem suficientemente fortes e as cadeias suficientemente curtas.

147


sufficiently strong and the sequence of events

sufficiently short.

Prosficcion uses a plan of concepts accepted in

the present to think in different categories of

concepts and its logical arranges in the future.

Prosficcional links varies without preconceived

plans, measuring standards, or statistical

tolerances. It accepts temporal bifurcation to

propose and explore logical relationship and create

new possibilities. Its limits are the plausibility

of alternatives – the possibility of its existence

-, which is a marked subjective limit. Prosficcion

produces thought experiments aiming to explore

logical extremes of possible futures. It is not an

attempt of predicting the future; it is a research

of possible innovations through questioning ends,

means, and its relationships using an illustrated

mind. The different between prosficcion and mere

guest – wherever illustrated the last could be – is

a contrast that gives sense to acquiring knowledge.

Mach69 calls this knowledge Phantasie-Vorstellung –

69 Apud. Bunge, M. Intuition and Science. New York, EUA: Prentice Hall, 1962. pp.77.

148


derived from pure reason, but not its substitute –

that is manifested when is necessary to make

apparently conflicting alternatives to be concurrent

in their utility.

Prosficcional parametric events are intuitively

conceived. The choice of its expression of synthesis

is informed by functional considerations of

representatives of the conceived object and by the

informed judgement of its feasibility. There is no

denial of the intuition phenomena as part of

creative action. Although its probation is a

controversial issue in the realm of philosophy, its

epistemological functionality is accepted as an

attribute of method in science. It is utile for

advancing knowledge though the critic of false or

non-existing problems70 .

Moles71 provide the limit of a temporal context

defined by prosficcion: the distance of coherence,

the limit of propagation of causal truth. The

important is not what is over these limits, but what

70 Bruyne, P. et al. Dinamica da pesquisa em ciências sociais: os polos da prática metodológica. 5 ed. Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves. 1991. pp. 57. 71 Moles, A. As Ciências do Impreciso. trad. Glória Lins. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1995. pp.125.

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it circumscribes. The distance of coherence

determines the limits of transformation alternatives

in defense reforms. Over this limit, the mind cannot

intuitively believe in the proposed chain of events

and see growing changes of contradiction in parts of

the cognitive process. Within these limits,

prosficcion see links between events that otherwise

would not be evident though projection or

prospective lens. Terraine72, for example, concludes

that I Word War trench phenomena were not evident

though a projection from past trends neither from

prospective formulation but though intuitively

conceived links between the new industrial

production possibilities and evolving forms of war.

In the same line, Clark (1993,83) quotes la Guerre

au vingtième siècle as evidence for the trenches73.

The ordainment of dependent events is done within

three reference axes: time, acts of force and

topology, creating the foundation for looking ahead

72 Terraine, J. The Smoke and the Fire: Miths & Anti-Miths of War: 1861-1945. London, UK: Leo Cooper, 1992. Cap. XIX.73 For further examples, see Dyson, F. Mundos Imaginados. São Paulo: Scharcz, 1998; and Malone, J. O futuro ontem e hoje. trad. Ricardo Silveira, Rio de Janeiro: Ediouro, 1997. Prosficcion can be siphon out in Clark, I.F. Voices prophesying war: future wars, 1763-3749. New York: Prentice Hall, 1993. pp.224-262.

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guided by a coherent and articulated set of concepts

ensuring that scenarios which will be extracted do

not employ contradictory assumptions or factors.

Time

The first ax is the time line. It superimposes

the three project horizons – projective, prospective

and prosficcional. All chains of events, and

therefore the three horizons, start from the same

point in the present, but have different length

depending on the particular form that the relation

between events is established. These horizons

represent distinct expectations that their related

chains of events have as qualities that hold the

past; coexisting on this first ax until projective

Time

Acts of ForceTopology

Figure 9: Space of Capabilities

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assumptions make projective chains vulnerable, or

prospective assumptions make propensity chains

vulnerable, or prosficcional assumptions have

determined the limit of coherence of forecasting.

Projective assumptions establishes criteria for

evaluating the acceptance of dispersion of temporal

series; prospective assumptions establishes a

reference for judging the acceptance of preserving

propensity based relationship between prospective

events; and prosficcional assumptions are used for

judging limits of validity of induction of truth in

inductive links. Together, these assumptions are

used to establish the conditions of possibility of

force design alternatives, regulating, respectively,

adaptation, modernization and transformation

possibilities.

Reality entwines together these three horizons.

The diagram of future isolated them for analytical

purposes only. Making these three horizons explicit

allows resolving the apparent paradox of force

design, expressed by the simultaneous necessity of

military capability requirements to be sufficiently

152


stable for planning purposes and sufficiently

dynamic to take into account a continuous process of

change in the environment force design environment.

The coexistence of these three horizons refutes

the traditional assumption of a unique and

continuous horizon, with a hierarchy of segmented

elements: short, medium and long time intervals.

These intervals say nothing but a pseudo-scientific

category imposed upon uncertainty. In other terms,

an error – that improperly transfers to a not

verifiable category the impreciseness of the process

of defining forecasting limits.

It was explained that procurement is not a proper

criterion for establishing forecasting horizons in

force design. Clearly, assuming an “a priory” force

design horizon is not only an epistemological but

also a methodological mistake, entailing inevitably

a highly imperfect process. The fragility, for

example, of a directive stating 12 years as force

planning horizon is evident with the question: why

not 13, or 15 or 20?

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The specification of the time length for force

design, and therefore the limits of forecasting, is

an integral part of the process of designing defense

alternatives, limited by relational events

(assumptions) which offer criteria for assessing the

vulnerability of the proposed scenarios.

Force design horizons are defined by the

possibility of considered assumptions being

vulnerable. They demand making explicit data that

otherwise would be implicit. They impose

transparency in expected capabilities, and provide

control and oversight of budgeting and management

through required performance indicators clearly

articulated with political goals. Finally, they

contribute to national development, since onerous

political and financial costs of defense reforms can

be rationally explicated as necessary, and not

automatically derived from budgeting cycle or

electoral periods.

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Topology

The second ax distinguishes particular topologic

contexts contained in the dependent events that

provide specificity to forecasted conflicts.

Topologic is used in a wider sense; it implies not

only the traditional partition of land-sea-air

segments, but also space, informational and

cybernetic segments alike.

Acts of force

The third ax distingue the nature of forecasted

conflicts. Dunningan and Macedonia74 offer a

perspective though which those acts of force could

be considered. Creveld75, as well as Dunningan and

Nofi76, Belamy77, Simpkin78, Grove79 and Brown80 also

offer their perspectives. All provide situations

where the natures of future acts of force are

anticipated. The problem, therefore, is not the

74 Dunningan, J. F. and Macedonia. R.M. Getting it Right: American Military Reforms after the Vietnan to the Gulf War and Beyond. New York, USA: Willian Morrow and Company, Inc., 1993.75 Creveld, M. van. The Transformation of War. New York, USA: The Free Press, 1991.76 Dunningan, J. F. e Nofi, A.A. Shooting Blanks: War that Doesn't Work. New York, USA: Willian Morrow and Company, 1991.77 Bellamy, C. The future of Land Warfare. New York, USA: ST Martin's Press, 1987.78 Simpkin, R.E. Race to the Swift; Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare. New York, USA: Brassey's, 1985.79 Grove, E. The Future of Se Power. Annapolis, EUA: Naval Institute Press, 1990.80 Brown, N. The Future of Air Power. New York, USA: Holmer & Meier, 1986.

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existence, or not, of distinctive natures of these

acts, but how to translate them into patterns. That

is exactly part of force design.

These three axes create a space named space of

capabilities81. Each segment of this space is

recognized by its functionality to force design

purposes, and thus defined as a valid scenario

subjected to the linking codes of its events

(projective, prospective and prosficcional). The

structure of the rules of these codes is explained

by its functional interdependency with the

formulated scenario (what technique was used, for

example, for deciphering the code of tendencies).

Particular rules of auto-development determine

the peculiar structure of each formulated scenario,

this rules being external to the causal nexus of

events. That means that the techniques for

81 The use of this term “space of capabilities” mimics the term space of phase used in the Theory of Complexity denoting a multidimensional set of variables that represents the characteristics of a point in a complex system. But it also recognizes its similarity with space of combat used by the USA as a doctrine. See USA. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations. EUA, 1995. It also has similarities with the term scenario-space created by Davies, P. and Finch, L. Defense Planning for the Post-Cold War: Giving Meaning to Flexibily, Adaptiveness, and Robustness of Capability. California, EUA: Rand National Defense Research Institute, 1993. As well as the same term used by Bennet, B et al. Theater, Analysis and Modeling in an Era of Uncertainty. California, EUA: Rand Corporation, 1994.

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developing scenarios should not interfere in the

development of the chains of events.

Each particular area in the diagram of future –

each space of capabilities – animates a scenario,

providing the required reference for force design to

create a full-spectrum of capabilities that could

dominate future battlefields; in whatever nature

they might emerge.

Scenarios

Scenarios are hypothetical interpretation of

combining missions at a specific time and space with

previously determined purpose. As an intellectual

representation, the scenarios can be seen as a draw

in a canvas made by a light bean. The distance of

the canvas from the lamp (time effect) will

illuminate more or less details (dimensions of

complexity). Forecasting explains the internal

structure of the bean – the chains of events; it

allows anticipating shadow patterns and colors, but

it says nothing about the projected draw.

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Because of the diversity of decisions that must

be made over time based on scenarios, an organizing

framework that groups them into categories is

useful.

War scenarios encompass missions that demand

the violent use of force either offensively or

defensively. In spite of many efforts, there is no

acceptable war categorization and no legitimacy in

adherence to past practice and usage in warfare.

Political objectives vary as well as commitments to

use force as an alternative to compel the enemy to

do our will. Politics ordains the exercise of force

in the clash of weapons and wills, endeavoring

adversaries to bound for the peace it intended, when

it decided to use force in order to achieve its

objective; whereas tactical results inform policy

alternatives.

Crisis scenarios anticipate a situation where

both means and the intention of violent use of force

are limited, this limitation being contingent and

temporally determined in accordance with values,

customs and practices implicitly recognized and

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accepted by the parts in conflict. Mission in crisis

scenarios are oriented either to actions of

presence, performed in a routinely way, with

concealed and indirect intentions or though mission

carrying deliberate exercise of limited force.

Luttwak calls the latter suasion, with the

approximate meaning of coercion. In both forms,

crisis missions’ aims to evoked specific reaction by

means of deliberately planned and executed actions

or signals82.

Environment shaping scenarios aims to prevent

either crises or war though the manipulation of the

perception of benefits and priorities of using force

for political stability, economic development and

social welfare. The emphasis in environment shaping

missions is on molding patterns of thinking or

behavior, where it is assumed that the desired

resulting effect will come though the system of

values of the target state.

Disaster relief scenarios depict after-effect

missions in the case of natural disaster, or

82 For a discussion about crisis and crisis management, see Raza, S. Crises e Manobra de Crises Internacionais Político Estratégicas. in Aeroespace Power Journal, Spring 2002.

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missions related to the prevention and reaction for

search and rescue of material and lives. The use of

military capabilities to fulfill task requirements

of disaster relief scenarios emphasizes the

peacetime use of the command and control and the

logistics components of force structure, exploring

its permanent organization and usually adequate

degree of readiness.

Law enforcement scenarios define missions

related with public security, borders control

(immigration and custom), and counter-narcotics.

Defense law enforcement missions support, substitute

or complement police activities.

As implied by these different categories, an

effective conceptual system is not necessarily one

that promises the maximum perfection in developing

scenarios, but rather one that fits the needs of

force design, striving for consistency of the

representational entities being sought through the

relationships of events. Translating events into an

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appropriate collection of scenarios requires a solid

epistemological foundation to ensure they are

supportive of force design goals and functions.

The Diagram of Futures identifies the component

elements of these representational entities within

the domain of its assumptions needed to ensure that

capabilities specification in the next logical block

– Renovatio – fully satisfy the requirements of the

use of force for political purposes, allocating

specific tasks in each category with the definition

of its relative importance and occurrence.

One of the most critical functions in force

design is to define the scenarios that will be used

to size the force and offer a public rationale for

this decision. In the US case, for example, for the

past eight years, the primary criterion for sizing

conventional forces has been two nearly simultaneous

Major Teather Warfare (MTW) and Forward Presence

(for naval forces). Critics argue that these

scenarios are problematic for three reasons. “First,

despite important differences between then, both

scenarios are cases of aggression involving large

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armored invasions on land, but not every plausible

MTW would take this form. Second, different MTW

scenarios might involve different endstate

objectives. Whereas one case might involve restoring

the international border between victim and

aggressor and imposing a sanctions regime, another

might involve removing the aggressor from power,

ushering in a new regime, and helping to restore

post-conflict stability. Third, the two canonical

MTW cases do not represent the full range of

challenges that the U.S. military could face in the

futre – even the near future- such as more capable

regional foes employing antiaccess strategies to

thwart U.S. power projection”83. These critics

suggest the need for new planning scenarios for the

U.S. The diagram of futures offers the conceptual

foundations for its development with associated

methodologies, like for example “Capabilities Based

83 Flournoy, M. A. (Project Director). Report on the national Defense University – Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group. Washington, D.C. Institute for National Strategic Studies, November 2000. pp. 11. For other criticisms of the two-MTW, see Krepinewich, A. D. in The Botton-up Review: An assessment. Washington, D.C. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, 1994. O’Hanlon, M. Rethinking two War Strategies. Joint Forces Quarterly, nr 24. Spring 2000, pp. 11-17. For a defense of the of the two-MTW, see, Secretary of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review. Washington, D.C: Government Printing Press, May, 1997, pp. 12-13.

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Planning” with a proposed framework developed by

Paul K. Davis, David Gompert and Richard Kugler84.

It is worth recovering here the definition of

defense missions: the assemblage of tasks within the

scope of an intended purpose in the form a

hypothetical combination of assumptions and chains

of future developments that serve as a reference for

the diagnosis of current and required tasks. Defense

missions are, therefore, a proposition of reality

aiming to anticipate possible, probable and

plausible contingencies where the uses of military

capabilities are considered. Scenarios are the

foundation of missions; and should not fusion

dependent events. On the contrary, they must prevent

a cause and causality relationship between ordains

of different nature. This is a relevant conceptual

aspect of the diagram of futures, since there is not

a theory that supports the fusion of chains of

events of different nature. As Allport85 explains in

84 Davis, P. et al. Adaptativeness in National Defense: The Basis of a New Framework. California: Rand Corporation, 1996. http://www.rand.org/publications/IP/Ip155/. (Jun/12/2002).85 Allport, F.H. Theories of perception and the concept of structure. Londres: John Wiley & Sons. 1955. pp.622.

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http://www.rand.org/publications/IP/Ip155/


1956, chains of events of different nature, although

always related, are distinct and must not be

interchanged or substituted. Stevenson and

Inayatyllah86 said the same thing 43 years late when

they affirm the epistemological necessity of

explicating premises in studies about the future,

making explicit distinct chains of significance

hidden in the scenarios.

This is exactly what the diagram of futures

prevents. Moreover, when the diagram of futures

recognizes dissimilarities in chains of events, it

avoids taking the expectation of time length of the

longest chain of events as the expectation of time

validity of the resulting scenario. Coherently, it

takes the expectation of vulnerability of the

shorter horizon, derived from the vulnerability of

its related relational events (assumptions), as the

assessment criteria for the expectation of validity

of the resulting scenario.

The diagram of futures circumscribes a field of

possibilities that is neither undefined (although it

86 Stevenson, T.and Inayatullah, S. "Future-oriented Writing and Research". Futures. V.30, Feb. 1998. pp. 2.

164


may be unknown in parts) nor unlimited (relational

events provide those limits). The scope and

dimension of this field derive from the possibility

of blocking the variety of events, whereas

possessing the articulating logic for dependent

events that wasn’t blocked. This limit constrain and

determine what are valid and non-valid decision in

force design allowing the acquisition of the real

stage of the force though the confrontation of

defense political objectives with the possibilities

offered by the technology, conditioned by resource

allocation priorities and assessed degree of

acceptable risks.

It is the collective pattern of decisions based

on parcels of the diagram of future that determine

concepts of employment, ascribing strengths and

weakness of current and future military

capabilities. These strengths and weakness are the

direct result of the pattern of decisions pursued,

typically viewed as structural in nature because of

the difficulty of reversing them and the fact that a

substantial investment is required to alter or

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extend them. This latter aspect has led defense

reforms to rely primarily on fiscal resources for

reviewing structural decisions. This diagram of

future deny this logic, explaining the necessity of

interrelated decisions regarding the capability that

is incorporated within each of the projective,

prospective and prosficcional arena are taken,

considering how their cumulative impact can

contribute to defense objectives.

RENOVATIO (Reengineer)

The Renovatio block of the Framework is the

designer way of identifying capabilities profile,

presenting its most noteworthy characteristics;

decompose this profile in capabilities requirements

and translate them into programs demands and budget

requirements. In a broad sense, the purpose of this

block is to facilitate the allocation, coordination

and utilization of fiscal, material, human,

organizational and information resources. It assures

implementation dependency of theses resources,

making certain a fundamental traceability link

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between designing requirements and implementation,

integrated in a composite of defense reform

requirements.

Active decomposition of capabilities

Active decomposition is carried out for breaking

capabilities into subparts that relate to functional

possibilities among its multiple components. The

construct of capabilities is vital for this process,

explicating what the components of capabilities are

and what are their possible relationships through

the tactical, strategic and political realms, while

assuring its relationship with tasks demands and its

integration into mission requirements. This is not

without difficulties.

Decomposing capabilities is a complex function

with no widely accepted principles for determining

minimum levels of fidelity. The fundamental aspect

of decomposing capabilities is not to produce

independent elements that must interface with each

other. Instead, capabilities are decomposed into

dependent producing units which all interface

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directly to each other and to the context they

pertain. Such process is called active

decomposition, because, to a larger extent, defining

capabilities requirements for a parcel of the

diagram of futures will interact with other

requirements for other parcels.

The pervasiveness of this requirement is not

always appreciated, abstracting capabilities

requirements away from the supposed domains of its

application. To be effective, military capabilities

requirements must support, through a specific and

consistent pattern of decisions, the tasks being

sought by force components. For example, decisions

to increase tactical readiness would be very

different if the desired capability were

instrumental for a concept of employment dedicated

to a scenario that emphasizes long-term

mobilization. Similarly, research and development

decisions as the selection of technologies to be

pursued, whether to be high professional/weapons

system intensive rather than a conscript/labor

intensive personnel structured military.

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Central to active decomposing of military

capabilities are both a model that abstracts

capabilities components and relationships and the

supporting techniques articulated into a

methodology. The former was offered in the

capability construct and the diagram of futures. The

real problem lays in the latter, rooting

multifaceted drawbacks, inefficiencies and

inadequacies.

There is an array of methodologies associated

techniques; most of them raised in realm of

operational analysis/system analysis87, such as

finite element simulation, difference equations or

execution rules, evolving into sophisticated

procedures exploring information technology (IT).

However, currently, there is no validated set of

techniques capable of acquiring knowledge of the

real-time state of the cross-impact of actively

decomposing capabilities, recognizing the coming

together of its individual outcome. Currently, the

best results are provided through gaming/simulations

87 Quade, E. S. and Boucher, W.I. System Analysis and Policy Planning. New York: American Elsevier Publishing Co, 1968.

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supported by system analysis (with its inclusive

subordinated techniques and analytical tools),

exploring IT in processes active modeling to gather

data, search for patterns and display results.

Peter Perla, in a seminar work about the “Future

Directions for War Gaming”, express that:

“To deal with constant change in the geopolitical

and military environment, policymakers, strategists,

analysts and operators are all looking for means to

overcome the clouds of uncertainty that obscure the

future. As defense budgets decrease, it becomes more

critical than ever to identify new technological,

operational, and political directions that will

become most profitable to pursue. As truly

integrated joint operations become the norm rather

than the exception to the rule, the Armed Forces

must find the tools to help them fit together

seamlessly – doctrinally, technically, and

operationally… But wargaming is not a panacea. It is

only one tool – albeit a powerful one – among many

that we can employ to explore the changing world.

When used appropriately it can contribute to an

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understanding of where we are and where we should

go. In particular, it can help build truly joint

forces from the capabilities of various service

components. Misused or overused, wargaming can

dangerously lead us to self-fulfilling prophecies

and delusions of self-proclaimed messiahs.”88

How the characteristics of capabilities subparts

are defined determines the accuracy and precision of

programming and resource allocation. The greater the

separation between subparts, the easier is for

configure specific needs of assigned objectives.

However, carried to its extreme, it can lead to the

separation of parts that should be dedicated to a

common objective, hampering the relationship among

parts and compromissing the outcome.

It cannot be overemphasized that it is the

pattern of decisions actually selected with the

diagram of futures, and the degree to which that

patterns supports objectives representative of the

countries’ position in the matrix of security and

88 Perla, P.. Future Directions for Wargaming. Washington, D.C: Joint Forces Quarterly: Summer 1984, pp. 77-83.

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defense, that constitutes the base for devising the

required military capabilities.

Programming

Programming is the process by which force design

assures a conscious appraisal and formulation of

activities to carry out capabilities requirements

(decomposed into its functional subparts) and that

required resources are allocated effectively and

efficiently in the accomplishment of defense tasks.

As a practical matter, programming serves to needs

of management control, dedicated to be a translator

between expected capability outcomes and associated

budgets.

Programming processes are found in many

activities other than force design. Engineer

explores its logic for meaningfully scheduling

production activities. In force design, programming

is fundamental for linking capability requirements

to budget possibilities, providing the homomorphism

from a set of intentions to a similar system of

fiscal and production possibilities. Programming is,

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therefore, an agent of transformation of one set

(force components) into another (budget) that

preserves in the second the interrelations between

the members of the first set. Projects then

implement initiatives for the modification,

enhancement, or development of to meet programs’

requirements and interfaces. Some projects may

develop the technical infrastructure and some may

develop fiscal management functionalities.

Programming is forked into two complementary

actions. The first refers to program engineering:

the definition of a set of programs, each one

comprising entities and processes that must be

present to accomplish specific capabilities

requirements identified through the process of

decomposition. The second, control management,

refers to phasing the prioritization of programs

over time, assuring that their outcome attends

strategic demands of military capabilities.

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A. Program Engineering

Given the importance of programming, it usually

takes a sequentially approach, based on a series of

discrete programs and its component projects by

which decisions can be analysed, evaluated, and

implemented as needed and affordably possible. Such

an approach, named program engineering, makes

efficient the use of resources and reduces the

likelihood that important details will be

overlooked.

Program engineering decisions are made about the

level of aggregation of entities and processes

requirements appropriate to assure specific

capabilities requirements, determining whether its

outcome be represented as a single entity, as a

composite of subsystem entities, or a composite of

composites of ever smaller entities (to whatever

level of aggregation is needed for the purpose of

force design). These decisions are taken in

attendance of three principles:

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The aggregation criteria influence how

the problem is attacked and how a solution is

shaped.

Every program may be expressed at

different levels of precision.

No single program is sufficient to refer

to all military capabilities.

These principles suggest that program engineering

is essentially a craft that has not yet matured into

methodologies. As programs grew in size and

complexity, following the diversity of demands of

capacities for the post-Cold War with new threats

and emerging technologies, attitude towards

programming changed. Instead of meticulously codes

for programming and rigid categories, force design

increasingly distend projects component of programs

in an array of capability-packages. Just as

dwellings are built with standardized fittings,

programs integrated by capability-package projects

are built out of modular, interchangeable elements.

This is not only good engineering practice; it is

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the only way to make something the size of a defense

system work at all.

Programs content may assume several forms related

to the type of budget practiced. For example: a

program-budget will have programs as descriptors of

goals (measurable results activities and actions -

constants); a performance-budget89 will have

programs communicating performance information. The

US Coast Guard, for example, set as its Performance

Goals for National Security: Reduce drug flow by

denying maritime smuggling routes, Reduce

undocumented migrants from entering via maritime

routes, Eliminate illegal EEZ encroachment, Achieve

and sustain complete military readiness, Provide

core military competencies.

Program engineering is called upon to deal with a

conversion process that change or combine resources

to obtain a desired output typically addressing the

following issues:

89 US Department of Transportation, United States Coast Guard. Budget Estimates – Fiscal year 2002. pp.5

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1. The definition of the capability to be

produced and its desired output level determined by

the required degree of readiness, practiced doctrine

and enforced rules of engagement.

2. The production facilities and

technology required to produce military assets, the

mix of their protocols of operations and the tasks

that will not be required of the military assets.

3. The interrelationship between these

military assets and other military assets as well as

maintenance levels, and operation and deployment

policies to be adopted.

4. A provision for the subsequent

expansion or contraction of the program considering

other programs that might be schedule.

5. The overhead defense functions,

processes and procedures to be followed and its

control systems.

Standard procedures are seldom applicable in such

process because defense program engineering results

in unique customized products. While it is important

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to understand the differences between defense

programs and civilian programs (usually

characterized by continuous flow processes like for

example oil refineries), it is also necessary to

recognize that both are subjected to the same

constraints imposed by technology.

Once the program is clearly defined, it must be

evaluated along financial dimensions, considering

its cost-benefit as well as events that would cause

a change in the common set of assumptions taken for

this analysis across all programs. This evaluation

should also consider the impacts of potential

failure to develop the capability assumed in the

financial analysis of each option.

The major objective of program engineering is to

define appropriate measures of individual

capabilities, as well the set of capabilities as a

whole. Such measures must take into account the

considerable uncertainty as to the functionally of

resulting capabilities to defense objectives.

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B. Control Management

Programming is supported by control management

initiatives expressed as a series of linked actions

dedicated to govern the choice of programs, its

production schedule and performance evaluation which

would place each decision in the context of a

sequence of such decisions as they define and

implement the selected alternative of force design.

For this reason, control management does not

consist simply of a line drawn to indicate different

dates in which a capability will be needed. It

requires a policy statement defining what kinds of

capabilities are to be provided in conjunction with

specific projective, prospective and prosficcional

scenarios describing their likely evolution over

time.

Control management is fundamental in determining

the scope of representation of the linkage between

program component requirements and budget

possibilities over time. For this purpose, it

develops a milestone that supports reasonable

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judgment about the affordability of required

capabilities minimizing costs duplication and

overlap. In addition this milestone provide a

meaningful perspective of future force components,

providing a comprehensive relationship between

designing assumptions (implicited in forecasting)

and intended capabilities allowing critical analysis

about overestimation of requirements and

underestimation of costs.

This milestone schedule programs components in

order to provide coherence and articulation among

parts functionally conceived. It gives significance

to programs components outputs within defense,

forcing designers to evaluate priorities and measure

risks, taking into account the degree to which

various constituencies within the defense system

support its implementations. Its most important role

is to provide a set of specific capabilities

required over time to attend defense objectives,

rather than define a simply time frame for

developing military assets for existing concept of

employment in existing scenarios. A planning process

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of this milestone is creatively defined and should

consider three significant aspects:

1) How individual programs are related

directly to military capabilities priorities in each

project horizon (projective, prospective, and

prosficcional) with an explicit definition of the

assumptions that will change that relationship.

2) The phasing of programs and projects

over time presents a broad variety of options. These

options should be evaluated in terms of the overall

performance of the defense system and not only on

the performance of a specific major program.

3) The selection of an option should fit

into the overall pattern of decisions contained in

the integrated project for defense, addressing the

full set of military capabilities need to support

defense objectives.

In developing this milestone, force design is

confronted with the need to make changes that render

existing force components, concept of employment or

regulating factors obsolete. These changes are

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enforced through a variety of ways. The most obvious

is reducing investments, which will delay replacing

old equipment, or allowing the performance of force

components to deteriorate by reducing maintenance.

Other, less obvious, is persistently replacing

assets based on the same technology.

A compelling justification for the usefulness of

force design is that programming decisions cannot be

made on a decentralized basis. They should be

integrated through a guidance provide by an

integrated project of defense with appropriated

criteria to measure the interaction of various

resource constraints and the overall efficiency with

such resources should be consumed.

This necessarily implies the definition of

defense objectives within the context of the

security and defense matrix; some assumptions to

develop the diagram of future and select the

scenario to be employed as proactive tools for

achieving long-term goals; and the expect production

of force components over time according to expect

tasks requirements, assuring that the proper set of

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military capabilities are made available within

fiscal constraints and political determinants.

The development of these requirements demands

making explicit those designing elements,

assumptions and driving forces, providing the

necessary transparency to the designing process

through with politics enforces its control over

military decisions. Using the three horizons make

easier to identify the types of decisions required

for each program and highlights the needs of proper

resource allocation.

Resource Allocation

Resource allocation is deciding how to allocate

human resources, production and fiscal resources

among various competing programming outcome

possibilities.

Human resource allocation is about the assignment

of qualified personnel that oversee the complexities

of force design providing the crucial linkages

between production possibilities and fiscal

resources within which schedules are developed and

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modified as the programs proceed and develop. The

acquisition and deployment of valuable human

resources should be well integrated with control

management requirements in order to strength the

defense establishment ability to identify and

negotiate acquisition opportunities, fighting

unwelcome fusion of projects an divesting lines that

are inappropriate for the envisioned goals. The

ultimate function of skilled human resources in

force design is deliberating critical decisions that

involve complex technological and capability

requirement tradeoffs, cutting though the

complexities of scheduling activities while standing

aloof of the details, moving quickly in

repositioning production resources either to

orchestrate a takeover or a divestment.

Production resource allocation is just as

important as human resources allocation, exercising

interaction among industrial possibilities and

operational functions. It consist of creating a

pattern of decisions that affects the manufacturing

of military assets, and should be reflective of

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policy with careful attention to the potential

interaction and driving forces within the national

and international defense industrial base. If

properly allocated, production resources can play a

unique role in defining, supporting and enhancing

the success of a defense project, operating in

concert with all its functions.

Budgeting is the process of deciding about fiscal

resources allocation that maximizes the efficacy of

programs, the efficiency of programs engineering and

economy in management control to assure that the

outcome of these processes – the required military

capability – attend the objectives they should

serve.

One test of budgeting appropriateness which

aspires more than specialized technical competence

in a restrict domain of accountability is its

ability to comprehend the political environment in

which it is developed. Petrei90 presents two central

approaches explaining how public budgets are

prepared:

90 Petrei, H. Budget and Control. Washington, D.C: Inter-American Development Bank/The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. pp.3, 15.

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“One school of thought believes that the state

intervenes to increase overall satisfaction and

operates on the basis of an aggregate utility

function (that is, the sum of the individuals

utility functions of members of the society). The

other school of thought believes that the budget is

the product of political forces guided by voluntary

exchange among individuals and that, to perfect a

budget, one must understand that political process”.

After discussing those schools of though, Petrei

concludes:

“… several methods can be used to decide what

measures to take. Decision-makers, or people

involved in preparing and evaluating alternatives.

Some analysts have tried to quantify various

objectives, but these efforts have never gone beyond

a theoretical exercise that is probably too

complicated for everyday use. In most cases,

compromise is the solution: those who opt for a

particular alternative know that in order to achieve

their objective they must sacrifice one or several

other goals of economic policy. Decisions generally

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take the form of a political option in which actors

engage in trade-offs to achieve their objective…thus

the budget must be put into perspective, and the

need to use it in harmony with other instruments

must be recognized.”

Whichever measure is used of the appropriateness

of the budget, once defined it becomes a surrogate

for all of the resources required to meet

programming requirements at desired readiness

levels.

Distinctly from decomposing capabilities, program

engineering and production planning, budgeting has

an array of best practices that provide guidance for

its development, presentation and communication. The

inability to sustain this claim gravely compromises

force design outcome. In the US, although accounting

categories existed for preparing and presenting

budget requests to Congress, there is not uniformity

among the services and other Government

Institutions. The US. Coast Guard (subordinated to

the Department of Transportation), for example

practices performance-budget, whereas the Services

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(subordinated to the Department of Defense),

practice program-budget.

When a ceiling budget drives the design of

capabilities, fiscal resources allocation tends to

be equated between Services, leaving them alone to

identify defense requirements. When it occurs, the

Government abdicates its prerogatives of specifying

how, when and for how long its instrument of force

should be used. The outcome is the risk of each

Service to procure material accordingly to its own

perspective, promoting the absence of

interoperability with statements of requirements

detached from empirical assessment of concrete or

potentials threats.

Since there is no specified political purpose for

the instrumentality of the use of force the military

offers, the coherence between military capability

and defense objectives are at stake; and because the

budget was evenly distributed, balancing the force

becomes the implied policy (equity often serve as

the rationale for justifying bad policies), with the

services pledge of assuring interoperability though

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more resources, retrofitting the process virtually

guaranteeing perpetual shortfalls in the funding of

“requirements” and inducing what is described as the

“disciplinary gap”.

Lewis Kevin91 and Builder92 describe this gap. The

Armed Forces required financial resources over and

above what would be necessary whereas planning

current alternatives with less. The difference among

requested and provided resources becomes a debt the

Government has with the Military. When the debt is

paid, the military tends to expand abnormally or

improperly its infrastructure; resulting

inadequacies are evidenced when the State faces a

crisis: current military capabilities drive

political possibilities, forcing strategic options

that could be neither desired nor appropriate.

The budget orients strategic preferences,

constraining and compressing programs alternatives

by fiscal realities, whereas programs express hard

choices and accepted major risks derived from 91 Lewis, K. "The Disciplinary Gap and other Reasons for Humility and Realism in Defense Planning". in New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethink How Much is Enough. ed. Paul Davies. California, EUA: RAND Corporation, 1994. pp.21.92 Builder, C. H. Military Planning Today: Calculus or Charade? California, EUA: RAND: 1993. pp.93.

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adopting a parcel of the space of capabilities and

associated concepts of employment in response to

defense objectives.

Programming is a composite of processes, being an

utterance of political intention towards required

capabilities and possibilities. It constitutes an

intervention in the background of force design,

growing out of resource allocation possibilities

that regulate the kinds of programs that will be

accepted, specifying, in advance, how and where

breakdowns in capabilities will be accepted,

creating or banning military assets, organizational

structures, doctrines, etc., that will show up in

everyday practice.

In programming, force design is doing more than

asking what can be built. It is engaged in a

reflection about what defense capabilities are and

what they can be, creating the tools to actions that

will bring then forth. In order to define the

resources force design might use, it looks backwards

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to the trends that has formed current capabilities

and looks forward to as-yet-undeveloped adaptation,

modernization and transformation of military

capabilities, maintaining or/and bringing forth

different kinds of commitments, opening up a space

of communicative actions, within the context of a

network of interests, concealment and resistance.

Translating defense requirements into budget

demands requires time and management perseverance to

ensure literally hundreds of decisions mutually

supportive. It is the collective pattern of these

decisions that determines the integrated project for

defense. Because of the diversity of these decisions

that must be made over time, an organizing structure

is for its superintendence.

Defense Superintendence

Decomposing capabilities, programming and

resource allocation follow a logic pattern regulated

by its own results; each one stimulated and derived

from the other. As programming is developed to

satisfy capabilities requirements, inconsistencies

191


among requirements and lack of balance among

requirements (some very lax and others stringent in

similar area) become apparent. Although budgeting

should follow programming, it may begin before its

completion because of different federal budgeting

and appropriations cycles. Budgeting may reveal

problems with programs requirements, especially if

there has not been a rigorous validation of

requirements before initiation of development, or if

program-engineering practices have not been employed

adequately. Programming may review inconsistencies

where the budget developer is left to his own

initiative about what the capabilities the programs

should generate.

This shows just how these three processes are not

truly neutral, that their substantive content

affects the independence of the purposes they serve.

In conjunct, they belong to an elaborate complex of

related activities that crystallizes around a common

goal of superintending the allocation of defense

resources. Its major management objective is to

remove bottlenecks to expand or contract over time

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capabilities possibilities without major new

investments. It depends, therefore, on the time

horizons that are appropriate for the capability

programming naturally linked to the duration of the

projective, prospective and prosficcional segments

as defined temporally by the vulnerability of

projective, prospective and prosficcional

assumptions.

The superintendence of defense networks processes

on a vast scale, managing knowledge information in

order to influence the powers that control it. Its

great need is to make work together all operational

processes, expanding and contracting their

relationships as the needs develops. Because of its

role, the superintendence of defense resources

allocation is what makes the concept of system to

emerge from the interrelation of operational

procedures.

Systems, as explained, are a conjunct of elements

in interactions where the performance of the parts

conditions the performance of the whole. Defectives

operational procedures and defective linkages

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between operational procedures are the prime causes

of disjunctive decisions, contributing for stovepipe

capabilities, shortfall, or redundancy in fiscal

resources allocation. In sum, the goal of

superintending the allocation of defense resources

is to make processes functions effective, reflected

in tree aspects: the speed of problem solving; the

accuracy of problem solving and the adequacy of the

solution proposed to the problem depicted. The

defense superintendence exists as a system only if

each agency or department of the ministry of defense

is engaged and adopts a common set of goals and

convergent planning procedures governed by common

concepts and frameworks across all the defense

establishement.

The efficiency with which resources are utilized

provides a measure of the success of defense

superintendence, demanding a performance review

system to provide evidence that the proposed

investments will be properly used. This system has a

larger share in providing transparency in defense

issues, assuring that the required data is provided

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to attend control and oversight requirements, while

assuring that the processes involved in identifying,

developing, organizing, fielding and supporting

military capabilities are properly accomplished

effectively, efficiently and economically.

This installment is even more prominent in making

as explicit as possible the costs and consequences

of defense decisions; insisting upon the use of the

best practices for systematically validate

capability requirements, ensuring that deficiencies

uncovered are corrected with appropriate

modifications, and compelling a rationale for

defense expenditures fully integrated and balanced

with defense programs.

The predictability of defense superintendence

results refers to intrinsic uncertainties (such as

the amount of resources required and programs

lifetime) and extrinsic uncertainties that might,

for example, drive a program to be discontinued if

key assumptions become vulnerable. To reduce

uncertainties, based on the expected values of the

different variables defining program engineering,

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control management, and resource allocation, defense

superintendence demands a stock of knowledge to deal

with the generation of alternatives that might

control selected aspects of the diagram of future,

the development of criteria through which those

alternatives would be able to be compared, the

assessment of these alternatives, and the correction

of the process and its outcome based on the result

of this assessment. Defense superintendence manage

information, through which it maximizes the

efficiency with which it plans, collects, organizes,

controls, disseminates, uses and disposes of its

information, and through which it ensures that the

potential value of intelligence is identified and

exploited to the fullest extent.

Foundered on the incremental development,

iterative refinement, and ongoing evolution of

process description, defense superintendence assures

that the nature of the finished integrated project

of defense – the object of force design – emerges

from a process of developing shared interpretation

of capabilities requirements among the parties

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involved in decomposing capabilities, programming

and budgeting, who must wrestle with hard choices

about how to allocate limited resources to provide

defense and advance national social and economic

interests.

Defense superintendence constantly offers

enduring patterns that can guide force design

processes as they progress through the defense

organizational structures. The magnitude of the

importance of organizational structures for force

design was encapsulated in 1982 by General David

Jones’s testimony to U.S. Congress, when he said:

“We do not have, currently, an adequate

organizational structure. It is not sufficient to

have resources, dollars and weapons systems; we

should also have an organization that allows us to

develop the proper strategy, the necessary planning

and an effective fighting capability”93.

The requirements for defense superintendence

change constantly, organizational structure change

only with great deliberation and much effort. Yet,

93 (verify text– in Locher, 1999,13)

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it is essential to ensure that defense

organizational structure allows the best decisions

be formulated, reflecting national requirements for

defense rather than separate, often differing,

perspectives of military services, or preferences of

bureaucratic servants in the ministry of defense, or

been influenced by industrial forces external to the

ministry of defense.

Defense superintendence is supported by oversight

process expressed as imposition that regulates

budgeting procedures to enforce practices of

accountability and codes of conduct over fiscal

expenditures to assure the proper allocation and use

and of public funds. Its function is to regulate the

proper linkages between programming milestone

expected outcomes, commitments, and procedures. In

this role, defense oversight crafts provision and

assist the assessment of results with the final goal

of assuring fiscal economy within legal boundaries.

To design defense alternatives, allocate and

manage fiscal and human resources that will traduce

those alternatives in force components, defense

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ministries are bounded for the necessity of

translating defense superintendence requirements

into methodical processes – to make practical

theoretical determinants.

Defense superintendence sets in motion the

actions required to deliberately regulate and direct

changes in military capabilities, but they do not

thereby make all desirable things possible. The

value of this set of actions is that it helps to

understand the purposes and meaning of reform

actions, helping to set in place the proper amount

of effort to overcome the problems involved in

designing and marshaling military capabilities.

The resulting effects of defective defense

superintendence are brokered layers of normative

orientation (policy guidance, planning guidance,

fiscal guidance, etc.) offering little guidance to

determining objectives and formulating scenarios,

and with little relevance to decomposing military

capabilities, programming and budgeting. Because of

vagueness and incomplete information, services make

choices that they believe best attend corporate

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vision and best satisfy service needs, resulting in

stove piped capabilities. Enthoven and Smith explain

the American Defense Services stove piping processes

in the context of the Cold War: “In 1961, the

airlift, the sealift, the bases, the prepositioned

equipment, the planned deployments and the readiness

was the responsibility of a different group of

people in the Defense Department. The elements were

seen as separate and unrelated entities”94.

However inarticulate and conflicting, defense

superintendence justifies the existence of

bureaucracies that creates its own assessment

criteria though organizational and procedural

mechanisms. This inertia preclude the defense sector

react to new demands posed by the evolving political

environment and its internal elements adjust defense

objectives to installed assets and organizations.

Finally, self-sufficient capabilities become

inarticulate with political purposes and assumptions

are created to sustain that inadequate relationship,

in an effort to validate the status quo of the

94 Apud, Haffa, R. Jr. The Half War: Planning U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces to Meet a Limited Contingency, 1960-1983. Colorado, U.S.A: Westview Press, Inc. 1984. pp. 147.

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current strategy and force structure. This status

quo, once justified, provide the rational for the

policy.

These serious questions increase the difficulty

of force design, directly influence the alternatives

of adapting, modernizing and transforming the

defense sector, creating bothersome discontinuities

where coherence and harmonic transients for defense

change are required. The key function of the

Renovatio block in force design is deciding about

the requirements and priorities of adaptation,

modernization and transformation.

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PART 3

ADAPTATION, MODERNIZATION AND TRANSFORMATION

In the exploding uncertainties of the information

technology era, defense superintendence compels goal

attainment and processes integration preventing them

to scatter, travelling at an accelerated rate

farther from its purpose of integration, evaluation

and assimilation of required changes in defense

capabilities. These responsibilities are harmonized

into three simultaneous patterns that explain armed

forces adaptation, modernization and transformation

as alternatives constituents of defense reforms, in

an interplay between current possibilities and

future uncertainties in constant redefinition.

Although adaptation, modernization, and

transformation cannot be isolated from one another,

except in most extremes conditions, it is important

to recognize its analytical requirements because

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they differ for different parts of a defense policy

that evolves simultaneously through the projective,

prospective and prosficcional horizons.

Adaptation

Adaptation seeks to maximize the efficacy of

military capabilities through changes in the

relationship of existing defense components and

using existing military assets more efficiently.

Adaptation possibilities are a function of the

enacting factors, implying that these factors

determine the variance of possible military

capabilities. Within these limits, adaptation

explores interoperability, jointness and C4

(enabling elements) to establish alternative links

to integrate military assets and operational

structures, as well as it derives alternative tasks

to fulfill defense objectives exploring the range of

possibilities provided by the derivative (ISR and

operations) elements. The combining possibilities of

these integrative and derivative structuring

criteria are regulated by the scope of doctrine,

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readiness requirements, and rules of engagement

(regulating factors).

Adaptation possibilities are limited to the

projective horizon. Within these limits, emphasis is

on better results from force planning, efficiency in

defense resource allocation and management, and

better control and oversight practices associated

with structural reorganization to respond to new by

making quick and effective changes in how they are

organized and operate. However, improvements sought

through adaptation only might be proven grossly

insuffficient, degenerating into a costly series of

actions that fail to secure cumulative improvements,

attacking causes rooted in modernization

requirements.

In essence, adaptation believes that by confining

force components to its existing forms and shapes

provide the required military capabilities to

respond effectively to the need of particular tasks.

A defense system that defines itself in this way

often finds it very difficult to venture outside the

dominant orientation of current concepts of

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employment, since they incorporate implicitly, if

not explicitly, judgments as to the importance of

operational functions in achieving defense goals;

establishing strong mind-sets as real constraints

for change.

Modernization

Modernization replaces aging weapon systems and

changes the dimensional characteristics of force

structure components, creating other rearranging

possibilities of military capabilities that would

not exist. The final size (dimensional requirements)

and scope (possibilities created though the reform

of defense components without a dimensional

modification) of force structure components define

the range of tactical possibilities in response to

defense objectives. However, the validity of

possible military capabilities is only retained

valid as a function of its utility in relating the

outcome of tactical actions with the political

purpose that initially oriented its assignment.

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Modernization changes the variance of military

capabilities exploring demonstrated technologies

within the prospective horizon. The act of

modernization often is seen as propelled by

procurement of sophisticated - state of the art -

technologies. Yet, its effectiveness can be enhanced

through relatively less expensive technologies that

increase interoperability and jointness so that

assets from all services become better able to work

together, or through measures to increase

operational readiness.

Modernization only, however, may fail to see

opportunities for larger gains by means of

possibilities geared to new ways of thinking.

Further, particularly in a fast changing

technological environment, modernization can be

dangerously myopic insofar as the actions taken to

achieve gains may acquire a momentum that is

difficult to reverse.

In essence, modernization seeks patterns of

diversification closely interrelated with the

predominant system of concepts and planning

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framework, reflecting a preference to concentrate on

a relatively narrow set of changes rather than

spread broadly over many.

Over time, the ability of the armed forces to

compete on the basis of technological superiority

only may become eroded, tending to make military

capabilities less effective when confronted with the

need to make changes that render existing ways of

thinking technology obsolete.

Patterns of exploring technology has the tendency

to make designers to react in predicable ways.

Capabilities born of usual circumstances become the

norm creating imitative designs with reducing

returns in performance bonuses for changes in force

components able to cut through the competitive

defense environment. Despite the appeal of more of

the same, when the frontier is gone, one must

develop ways of thinking that nurtures new

technologies, organizations and processes that

prevents dampening the innovativeness of

capabilities that might be brought by

transformation.

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Transformation

Transformation changes patterns of thinking force

design, creating new assessing parameters of

efficiency and efficacy. Transformation seeks to

create a differential of capability against

competing forces, making obsolete all previous

capabilities, regardless of its efforts of

adaptation and modernization. As Defense Secretary

Donald Rumsfeld told students Jan. 31 at the

National Defense University: Transformation is

“about new ways of thinking … and new ways of

fighting."95

Transformation elects uncertainty over

predictability and unsettled relationship among

force components and defense tasks in place of a

proven efficient structure. The investment in

leadership is likely to be higher, and some time may

elapse before a net benefit is obtained. However,

when these benefits are sensible accrued, they make

obsolete existing force components and even

intuition in creating tasks possibilities. A 95 Garamone, Jim. Flexibility, Adaptability at Heart of Military Transformation. American Forces Press Service Washington - Feb 1, 2002. http://www.spacedaily.com/news/milspace-02b.html

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striking feature of these results is a differential

of military capability that enhances the defense

ability to develop new alternatives or improve the

uniqueness or quality of existing possibilities.

The qualitative and quantitative dimensions of

transformed military capabilities demand rethinking

not only specific technologies incorporated in

products and processes, but also doctrine and

organizational culture with its implication in

tactical, strategic and political possibilities

alike. In the prosficcional horizon, new forms of

defense organizations and weapons systems will be

less prone to be characterized as “purely” military

with their own shortcomings, and so on, with no end

in sight.

Transformation, therefore, is more than exploring

aspects of demonstrated technologies derived from a

revolution in military affairs (RMA). It goes beyond

the rhetoric of changes and gradual advancements in

incorporating new assets or revising tasks.

Transformation excites imagination, encouraging

“outside the box” thinking needed to respond to

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unexpected challenges with a menu of choices to do

anything different. It causes the rupture of the

anemia stemming from the lack of innovative vitality

in defense thinking and derogates the lethargy of

conceptual systems and analytical frameworks who

have not actively explored ways to improve their own

ability to produce transformed military

capabilities.

The role and importance of transformation is a

third factor influencing force design alternatives,

through which defense confronts changing

opportunities. In essence, transformation is an

attitude toward assuming a competitive pattern of

decisions to keep up with uncertainties. This need

tends to take precedence over established

competitive advantages creating other dimensions of

effectiveness.

Transformation actions, however, should not

ignore the possible risks and costs of attempting to

create a variety of options and to retain as much

flexibility as possible, disregarding relatively

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simple adaptation and modernization rules for coping

with complexity and uncertainty.

Adaptation, modernization and transformation

processes develop simultaneously over time; each one

regulated by different factors and affecting

specific components and relationships of force

design components. Neither the diagnosis of

situations nor the choices of action for dealing

with them are rigidly prescribed and determined by

only one of those three processes. The complexity of

military reforms is in the simultaneity in time and

space of those three processes, combining

tendencies, propensities, and daunting prosficcional

challenges.

Adaptation, modernization and transformation

serve to shape policy maker’s effort to engage in

rational processing to the complexity and

uncertainty that are the characteristic of defense

reforming. Determining which programs should be held

constant for a given period become a difficult

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problem because it involves tradeoffs between

immediate needs in adherence to past practices and

focus the effort in those areas where competitive

advantages are promised in the future. The evolving

demand of old and new tasks posed by the threat

environment is not easily followed by military

capabilities.

Defense reforms are, currently, greatly addressed

to correct the lag between new defense objectives

and existing military capabilities. The choice of

adaptation, modernization and transformation demand

tradeoffs that a designer has to make. By its

nature, transformation is destructive, whether in

the form of personnel skills, programs, budgeting

systems or force components. It may require unique,

tailored organizational structure that cut across

traditional defense segments, disrupting

responsibilities and cannibalizing military assets.

Modernization is readily adaptable to existing

tasks, fitting with existing segmentation of force

components and concepts of employment. Adaptation is

relatively well know and predictable facilitating

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cost reduction through streamlined procedures that

affords maximum use of existing facilities,

processes and procedures.

It is a matter of policy that the selected force

design alternative reflects an attempt to stay ahead

of demanded defense in adding capabilities; or it

may prefer to lag behind, trading-off present

adaptation possibilities to future transformed

technology. Such choices reflect important aspect of

force design: when capabilities are to be added or

reduced, in conjunction with the sizing of such

changes, and how they are expected to affect defense

overall effectiveness.

Although coexisting in the present, adaptation,

modernization and transformation progress into the

future with different motions and patterns, each

one, simultaneously, affecting and being affected by

changes in the others, in a futurist process of

experimentation that creates its destiny at the same

time it develops its own valuation criteria.

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The greater the capability provided in the

projective horizon, the greater the likelihood of

multiple tasks and the ability to faster deployment

requirements without the prejudice of overtime and

the disruption resulting from the need to reschedule

force components; however, unused capability is

expensive. One reason a country might be willing to

incur this cost is that such surplus would make it

possible to respond to unexpected demand surges,

like those of crisis that suddenly appears. The

greater the capability provided in the prospective

horizon, the greater the expectation to match, as

nearly as possible, anticipated demands. This

decision would also build time to develop programs

expected to be fully utilized, for example, in 7

years, if the lead time to develop force components

were five years, them control management might delay

building the new capability for about 2 years. The

greater the capability provided in the prosficcional

horizon, the greater the likelihood of making

potential adversaries find themselves stocked with a

large inventory of obsolete military assets. The

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risk of technological obsolesce increases if

capabilities are built before they are needed. This

same conclusion is applied by Hayes R. and

Wheelwright96 for the industrial arena:

“In many industries, major technological advances

occur with shocking suddenness. Although this is

particularly true of industries that depend heavily

on electronics or computer technology, no industry

is immune to such disruption. The technology of

plate glass production, for example, was completely

overturned in the lat 1950s when the float glass

process was introduced by Pilkinton Glass, Ltd., a

relatively small English firm. And the newspaper

industry, whose technology had been relatively

stable for more than 200 years (since Gutenberg,

according to some industry observers), experienced a

series of profound technological changes between

1960 and 1980 that made much of its traditional

production equipment and skills obsolete”.

The decision to adapt, modernize or transform,

accepting or rejecting some alternatives, signals,

96 Hayes R.H. and Wheelwright, S.C. Restoring our Competitive Edge: Competing Through Manufacturing. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1984. pp. 68.

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in a fundamental way, the kind of defense is

preferred, being both an input to defense reform

guidelines and an output to confront the continually

changing demands of the security and defense

environment. Although one alternative may be priced

higher than other, or may not offer the highest

efficiency, or the latest technology, they may work

if delivered on time, and the defense systems stands

ready to change its degree of readiness instantly to

ensure that any failure are corrected immediately.

It is up to the defense superintendence decide when

a capability reaches its final stages of usefulness

within a project horizon. It can be a period of

renewal, during which the force components continue

to adapt to lesser demanding tasks or of evolution

through modernization or to a more radical

transformation. Or it can be a period of

degeneration into a downward spiral that ends it the

extinction of useful capabilities for military

purposes, signaling the admission by defense

superintendence that it has failed to develop a

viable long-term set of capabilities and that it is

216


unwilling to make the investments necessary to turn

it into one.

The importance of considering three simultaneous

time horizons in force design is asseverated when

confronted with the risks of a linear forecasting

(one single forecasting horizon divided into short,

medium and long term). If linear forecast is wrong,

then defense not only may have enough or a shortage

of some capabilities, but also may incur the cost of

unused resources or the risks of not having adequate

capability. Alternatively, if linear forecast is

proved right in the short term, it precludes changes

based on the assumption that it will know exactly

what force components will be demanded and in what

quantities.

However, linear forecasting cannot provide

neither the same speed of response than the

concurring possibilities in simultaneous adaptation,

modernization and transformation, nor prevent

incurring the risk of obsolete inventory and the

cost of unused capital resources. Using three

simultaneous horizons in force design provide the

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tradeoffs between the speed of response and the

investment required, helping decide whether to hold

inventories in the projective horizon or provide

additional capabilities in the prospective horizon,

or to gain a transformed differential of

capabilities in the prosficcional horizon.

Consequently, slower response time for capabilities

with less committed investments does not imply

immediately in defense weakness. It may only signal

a decision to the least risk of inefficiency in the

present to the full necessary provision of

additional capability when demands are expected to

grow.

Adaptation, modernization and transformation can

be formidable competitive programmatic alternatives,

and a key to doing that is the development of a

coherent control management within defense

superintendence. It is important to recognize that

defense superintendence is a mean to an end: the

proper management required in order to carry out

policy decisions. The proper mix of adaptation,

modernization and transformation initiatives should

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be jointed conceived and directly linked to defense

objectives.

Repeated adaptation, modernization, and

transformation have a cumulative effect on defense

system complexity, and the rapid evolution of

technology quickly renders existing technologies

obsolete. Eventually, the existing force components

become too fragile to modify and too important to

discard. For this reason, force design must consider

adapting, modernizing and transforming these legacy

force components to remain viable. Understanding the

strengths and weaknesses of each possibility is

paramount to select the proper solution and the

overall success of a reformation effort reflected in

at least four two alternatives. An alternative that

competes of the basis of task-force flexibility

emphasizes its ability to handle nonstandard

contingencies. Smaller defense systems often make

this their primary basis for force design. Other

alternatives compete through their ability to juggle

force components to meet demands for simultaneous

tasks.

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It is difficult (if not impossible), and

potentially dangerous, to try to offer superior

performance along all dimensions of the diagram of

future simultaneously.

Short-term task-force flexibility simply

readdressing new tasks to existing assets has two

immediate consequences. First, the expected

efficiency is limited because those assets were

usually engineered with other operational

parameters. Second, as a corollary, their

maintenance requirements tend to increase, burdening

the defense budget. However, with decreasing defense

budget (because a Broad Defense concept would

prioritize other governmental areas), the required

increase in appropriations to support those new

maintenance demands would not be provided,

increasing the rate of damaged material. This rate

would burden other assets still operational to

fulfill the existing operational demands for using

the armed forces in the newly created tasks,

increasing the aging rate of material, thus

reinforcing a vicious circle. This is one the

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reasons of currently obsolescence and limited

operational readiness of military assets in most

countries: a task obsolescence that induces

exponential aging rate.

Developing countries without a defense industrial

base that could provide indigenously develop

material tailored to its needs face the alternative

of acquiring assets made available by opportunity.

However, rationally, if these materials were made

available, they are usually either at the end of

their life cycle, with higher and costly demands of

maintenance, or task obsolete. On the other hand, a

properly allocate production function makes economy

of scale to arise. Programs derive from many

different elements of total costs and over time most

of the relatively fixed costs of defense are

difficult to change quickly (salary, maintenance,

etc), increasing the volume of production will not

cause costs to increase proportionally.

The cross impacts of these conditions create a

chain of pair-wised force component-tasks

relationship crossing over the tactical domains,

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that find their assessment criteria in the demands

posed by defense objectives. Because of tactical

uncertainties, the more force components are

dedicated to perform multiple tasks (divergent

pattern), the more sophisticated and expensive their

technological requirements become in order to

maintain the same level of efficiency across the

range of possible strategies to fulfill evolving

defense objectives.

On the other hand, the alternative of task-

dedicated capability (convergent pattern) may

increase fighting efficiency; however, as capability

gains efficiency it loss flexibility to adapt to

others tasks that may derive from changing political

priorities or an evolving threat environment. Task-

dedicated capabilities increase the problems of

interoperability when military components belonging

to different tasks-dedicated capability category

have to be clustered in response to more complex and

demanding tasks. Interoperability requirements are

based on the assumption that a complex task can be

disaggregated into smaller components. In order to

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respond to multiple tasks, more dedicated

capabilities are required, increasing redundancies

and consequently reducing resource allocation

efficiency.

Technology alone – and more specifically,

information technology - however, is not sufficient

to cover all environment-determined elements of

efficiency. It is also necessary to consider the

human factor, which explicates some of the pragmatic

difficulties in determining, under a rational costs

and risks reasoning, required defense capabilities

aiming a desired state of security. Furthermore, it

is also fundamental consider the form and extent of

required jointness effort.

Beniger97 explains that obsolescence emerge in

defense when new technologies create unbalance

operational possibilities and information

processing. He calls this unbalance as Crisis of

Control. Chandler98 provides empirical data for that

hypothesis, when he explains the combined role of

97 Beniger, J. The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society. Cambridge, USA: Cambridge U.P. 1986. pp.87.98 Chandler, A.D. The Visible Hand: the Managerial Revolution in American Business. Cambrige, USA: Cambridge U.P. 1977.

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railroads and telegraph, in the context of the

Prussian War. These new technologies provided new

possibilities for the mobilization, deployment and

sustainability of huge amounts of personnel and

material, expanding the limits for size the as a

function of the production possibilities of the

State and the socio-demographic structure of the

population. Prussia Defense Reform of 1862 addressed

this changes though universal conscription

(Landwehr) centrally controlled by The Prussian War

Ministry, and the development of a military

organizational structure that could control the new

tempo of operations.

If Chandler data is abstracted and transposed to

the contemporary ambient, the crisis of control

emerges with new technologies influencing the

defense and security environment supported by a

variety of information systems that transforms

operational possibilities. This experience makes it

clear that National Defense Systems are being

transformed; that Hemispheric Countries are emerged

into designing defense alternatives to attend those

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new functional capabilities and new forms of

organizations required.

Although the phenomenon is recognizable, its

conceptual and practical treatment is defective,

allowing self-explanatory criteria be deliberated

created to explain others questions that requires

those criteria for its justification. The result is

a non-end circle of empirical generalizations that

do not solve any problem, but are considered a

solution anyhow because it carries the justification

for its own existence.

The problem of justifying technology requirements

is essentially the same as that of deciding upon

requirements for adaptation, modernization and

transformation within force design. After

formulating the problem and establishing assessment

criteria, it is feasible to examine alternatives for

accomplishing objectives, establishing the

anticipated impacts of technology in each element

component of the capability construct, and how each

one will affect the over-all performance of the

system. With this information, it is possible then

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to be able to determine the cost of technology and

its associated benefits, determining, given a budget

level, the scope and scale of reform that technology

drives in a specified time-length.

Specifying the scope of defense reforms through

the requisites of adaptation, modernization and

transformation requires a statement of missions,

objectives and its evolving possibilities as decided

in coherence within the cogitare and prospicere

blocks. Such a statement – the defense project - is

necessary not only to prevent direct competition

among defense components but alto to focus the

effort on programs that are likely to enhance

military capabilities. A given defense project might

achieve advantages using one of a variety of

approaches to produce innovation and unique features

or customize force components for selected tasks.

To be effective, such an approach must be

sustainable using the proper allocation of defense

resources taking into account forecasted changes in

the environment to fit selected segments of the

diagram of futures. To be efficient, such a project

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must support, through a specific and consistent

pattern of decisions (defense superintendence), the

capabilities being sought, making all subparts of

the defense system maximize its performance either

related to single functions or related to

subfunction to the overall goal of force designing.

That strives for consistency between objectives and

the capabilities being sough within the projective,

prospective and prosficcional horizons.

Force design provides an articulated pattern of

decisions with the primary function of planning and

managing the defense system, putting together the

set of force components that will enable carrying

out the tasks required to attend defense objectives.

Being able to move from the level of specific

decisions about procurement and acquisition to

defense objectives within the security and defense

matrix, and back again, is central to developing and

implementing effective military capabilities. The

notion is that force design can be a competitive

tool for the assemblage and alignment of decisions,

providing a cohesive guide to help defense reforms

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to attain a desired competitive advantage within the

projective, prospective and prosficcional horizons.

Clear priorities must be attached to each horizon,

and these priorities will determine how defense

positions itself relative to other state’s

priorities. Specifying and clarifying these

priorities in the first step in force design – the

purpose of the Cogitare block - since the assessment

of whether an integrated project of defense is

appropriated is whether it displays a consistent set

of decisions through the pattern of preferences it

makes over time.

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PART 4

A TEMPLATE FOR FORCE DESIGN

Force design framework compiles a complex

inventory of articulated processes aiming an

integrated project of defense. Clearly, no matter

how well crafted and managed these process are,

there is no guarantee that its result are precisely

right, but it can never be afforded to got it very

wrong.

The difficulty of mapping the relationship of

force components shows the need for a template that

better links them together with a functional

purpose. Such a template attempts to develop a

mechanism that allows decisionmaking to be more

closely reflected in defense alternatives.

The likelihood of defense effectiveness,

efficiency, and economy is greatly increased when

the elements presented in the template offered below

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are contemplated in the final project presented for

political scrutiny. Its usefulness is in developing

military capabilities across different time periods,

respecting the projective, prospective and

prosficcional circumstances and, therefore, allowing

any resulting defense alternative to adapt to

changing political preferences.

This template is not prescriptive; it is only a

reference, drowned from several force design

experiences currently developed, with emphasis on

that practiced in Canada and developed by the U.S.

Coast Guard. Some countries in the Hemisphere are

still struggling to produce a “defense white paper”

or equivalents “defense policy” or “national

security policy”, with the main goal of gathering

political consensus upon the necessity of an

integrated project of defense. This template

provides a perspective of what comes next.

The final document should provide a framework for

translating government direction into a capable and

efficient set of programs and associated budget that

deliver affordable and capable forces, and

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superintendence guidance to align the defense

planning cycle to its intended milestones. The

political nature of this project determines that its

results are limited by its logically necessity99.

Logical necessity derives from the perception of

functional sufficiency. There is not how to validate

the functional sufficiency of a defense project,

since the question of “which components are

sufficient?” is in the same category of “Is it

true”? Therefore, it is necessary to assess the

utility of this template as a function of the

perception of its comprehensiveness for its purpose.

This template is hardly a technique for defense

planning, for such a creation would be impossible.

This template develops a straightforward logic.

It demands a systematic investigation of the problem

and the relevant criteria for deciding among

alternatives that promise to offer a stable

99 Logical necessity does not confound itself with intuitive validity. The former admits the verifications of the necessary outcomes from what it determines, whereas the latter appears from habits and traditions, taking as reference regularities from the past, and do not have the ability to distinguish among valid and not valid outcomes. For further details, see Mitchell, D. An Introduction to Logic. London: Hutchinson University Library, 1962. pp. 155. Although intuition is admitted as a cognitive process in hypothesis formulation, it does not assure possible outcomes. For this specific distinction, see Goodman, N. Fact, Fiction and Forecast. 4 ed. Cambridge, USA: Harvard University Press, 1983. pp. 59-83 and pp. 196-8. This is a relevant distinction for the implementation of the template presented in this paper. Although intuition is admitted as a cognitive process admitted in hypothesis formulation, it is not taken as assuredness of possible outcomes.

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solution. Identifies alternatives accordingly that

attend the requisites posed in the three

simultaneous horizons – projective, prospective, and

prosficcional - and examines its feasibility.

Compare these alternatives in terms of its cost and

effectiveness, weighting the results against

acceptable levels of uncertainty, for which

assumptions are established to determine its

possible vulnerability. And measure the extent to

which the selected alternative attains the initial

purpose, translating its results in terms of costs

and risks100.

The template offers a description of

deliverables, in terms of its properties and

measures that affects force design, and points out

tradeoffs, benefits, risks and limitations that may

arise in various situations of use. Descriptions are

not meant to be comprehensive - each description

provides enough knowledge to know what questions to

ask in gathering more information. What it seeks is

to lay out the elements of the force design

100 For similar efforts, see, for example, McGin, J. et al. A Framework for Strategy Development. California, USA: Rand, 2002.

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framework in a logical and transparent way, in which

defense planning can display options and inherent

tradeoffs between the construct of capabilities

components, debating the merits of competing

choices.

I – COGITARE

This ultimate goal of this section is to provide

a general description and background of the project,

what was anticipated when originally conceived and

quality measures required.

1) Purpose of the project and the reasons for

its development, with an assessment of the

international and regional environment. Describe

commitments with considerations about trends that

might influence future developments and influence

the security and defense environment, including

technological, economic, political and social

aspects. This assessment must be in consonance with

the Defense Policy, expanding and detailing aspects

relevant to force design.

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2) Fiscal context. Describe conditioning

factors and critical aspects that might affect the

integrity of the defense programs, including

economic adjustments and additional funding required

for activities where the costs exceed an agreed

level. Portray the estimated total budget for future

years.

3) Military inventory, organizational structure,

defense superintendence procedures, explicating its

relation with military capability. This should

provide a clear audit trail on how military

capabilities achieve objectives; how readiness

requirements are maintained over time in face of

different concept of employment; and how demands for

operational tempo attend the most likely tasks.

4) Defense mission, objectives, and tasks.

Defines the nature and scope of the Ministry of

Defense responsibilities, the results it expects to

achieve, and the monitoring and reporting

requirements through which it will answer for the

authority vested in it. Anticipate changes in

mission, objectives and tasks in reaction to changes

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in the position of the country in the security and

defense matrix.

5) Consolidated defense challenges, with the

justification of the the reasons for a new project,

explaining why evolutionary adjustments in current

project (through adaptation, modernization, or

transformation) cannot attend those challenges:

detail vulnerable assumptions (parametric events of

former project).

II – PROSPICERE

The final goal of this section is to provide a

general description and brief background of

designing scenarios, recognizing that scenario is

right for every situation, and each scenario has

associated costs (monetary and otherwise).

1) Strategic vision and selected scenarios for

the projective, prospective and prosficcional

horizons with the statement of its assumptions and

considered time horizon. These scenarios span the

spectrum of conflict and describe operations

representative of those anticipated.

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2) Nature of operations, envisioned

commitments or far-flung operations that would

required the use of force with the description of

associated topological environments. Requirements

for readiness, sustainability, and deployability

will be derived from the scenarios in conjunction

with military objectives and tasks.

3) Description of anticipated ways the

scenarios might evolve and expected changes in the

nature of operations.

III – RENOVATIO

This section provides information and critical

assets that should be incorporate, systems that must

be updated continuously to reflect evolving

superintendence practices.

1) Concepts of employment and associated

operational tempo within each project horizon.

Linking guidance and attainable goals that should be

completed within the project horizons.

2) Changing guidelines. Sets objectives that

direct defense adaptation, modernization and

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transformation within the project horizons, and

assign responsibilities These changing guidelines

will direct decision-making across the whole range

of defense endeavors, orienting the harmonic

evolution of defense reform along the three

horizons, and instructing the derivation of

capabilities and programming with corporate

priorities and superintendence requirements.

3) Required capabilities and associated major

programs with associated performance indicators.

Major programs must reflect the attainability of

defense objectives and contain assigned leader

management service and accountabilities

responsibilities. Program description must include

component projects and its relationship, and

associated fiscal costs (current and future).

4) Force structure. It includes the

specification of all assets (combat, combat support

and combat service support units, all naval

combatant ships, and airforce fighter, maritime

patrol, maritime and tactical helicopter, and

transport squadrons, police and cost guard, etc),

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tied to readiness requirements and weighted against

the formation of units or/and re-deployment of

military assets. Military assets earmarked for

disposal. Personnel annual adjustments and

distribution priorities to balance current and

future operational effectiveness, and distinctive

required competencies. Numbers of personnel, by

occupation and rank, required to meet operational

requirements; recruiting, education, training, and

career management in order to sustain and renew the

skills and knowledge base. This includes the

established colleges, schools, and operational

training units.

5) Procurement Priorities. Procurement

Priorities provide guidelines linked to readiness

levels and expected operational tempo. It is not

expected that any capability will be lost or become

unavailable in any quantity for prolonged periods

due to the application of these priorities.

Procurement Priorities are designed to facilitate

services resource leveling, and the effective

apportionment of scarce resources. The underlying

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principle should be of cost-effectiveness and

utility (the ability to serve multiple functions and

critical tasks in practice).

6) Balance. Refers to the overall resources

deemed necessary, indicating the relative relevance

of projects and its relationships with demands of

adaptation, modernization, or transformation.

Results of sensitivity analysis with elements for

judging priorities and relative importance. Programs

are placed on a schedule, and the schedule is

compared to the fiscal possibilities, sequencing

fiscal years.

7) Macro planned resource allocations and

Milestone. Indicate significant defense spending (in

capital equipment, construction, procurement,

miscellaneous requirements, contributions to

pensions and other personnel benefit plans, etc.)

associated with a milestone providing guidelines to

generate, support, and maintain the forces required

to meet assigned tasks.

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8) Resource allocation priorities and

accountability structure. This are elements against

which reports and accounts for the resources

received and results achieved will be provided

(internally as well as externally to control and

oversight agencies and Congress). Provide

instructions and restrictions for transferring

capital funds and establishes priorities for the

funding approval and details on the budget

adjustments.

9) Superintendence requirements. This are

fundamental elements to develop, implement and

maintain force design process and technical

architectures required to provide the framework

necessary for advancing programming and budgeting,

including the manner it is to be progressively

employed as an enabler in support of operational

functions. Collectively these architectures,

together with the associated standards, are

essential for the effective acquisition, integration

and management of processes within a framework of

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reformation to meet defense requirements for the

present and into the future

10) Performance indicators and Risk Assessment.

Performance indicators are the reference through

which defense superintendence will monitor

performance against assigned tasks. Assessment

criteria with precise measure and control mechanisms

will permit the establishment of trends and provide

senior management the opportunity to provide

steerage. Measures and indicators should include:

Sustainability of operational Forces; Leadership,

Professionalism & Values; Resource Management; and

Contribution to national growth and social

development. Risk Assessment indicate consequences

whether portions of programs are not adequately

resourced attributable to project delays, unexpended

funds, account imbalances due to historical trends,

overestimation, as well as a variety of external

factors affecting revenue and timely expenditure.

Recommendations for changes to readiness levels and

the resulting effect on sustainment.

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The code for gluing together all these elements

is a coherent conceptual system and its articulating

logic. An adequate design in the final product

reflects an adequate code in the process of creating

it. However difficult may be the attempt,

rationality and prudence demand that the effort be

made.

Pre prevailing viewpoint in the above discussion

is that the cornerstone of force design is a

critical assessment of an appropriate measure of

requirements for adapting, modernizing and

transforming the defense system. On this view, force

design is essentially concerned with a decision

process with a twofold purpose: to provide necessary

information for a well-informed decision, and to

present this information in a concise and

intelligible form.

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PART 5

APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK

Looking across countries’ defense alternatives

within the framework helps to identify strategic

decisions and trends. To indicate this trend, this

section explores force design concptual system

(construct of capabilities and framework) to

differentiate Argentina, Chile, and Brazil military

reforms; and attempts to consolidate the problems

confronting Western Countries’ defense

superintendence.

Argentina, currently, focus on adaptation,

endeavoring to maximize efficiency with the

implementation of a planning, programming and

budgeting system within actual resources constrains.

Its emphasis on peace operations and its changes in

operational structures explore the enacting factors

to generate required capabilities, in response to

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new tasks posed by redefined defense objectives,

without significant changes in military assets. This

analysis provides the conclusion that Argentina is

willing to accept higher risks to its defense

objectives, assuming the maintenance of the

projective horizon for an extended period. Its

defense policy is clearly oriented to support this

goal, being dedicated to create confidence-building

measures with Chile and Brazil.

Chile and Brazil, currently, defense reforms

processes focuses on capabilities that could provide

continuous territorial presence and borders control,

assuring a degree of success in deterring and

protecting their countries. Both assume a large

prospective horizon where events could activate

threats currently dormant. Chile’s concerns are,

primarily, events that might change its relation

with Peru and Argentina or impact in its objectives

regarding the control of its National Air Space and

Oceanic Territory (Mar Chileno – Chilean Sea)101.

While Brazil’s concerns are, primarily, with a

101 Chile. Libro de La Defensa Nacional de Chile. pp.89,114,119.

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coalition that would threat either the Amazon area

or the its maritime flow of petrol and goods.

Brazil military reforms lend towards adaptation,

as an effect of its position in the inferior part of

the matrix of security and defense, echoing an

understanding (more traditional than rational)

initiated in its Escola Superior de Guerra (Superior

War College)102.

For Brazil, the current security environment do

not impose major changes in its defense objectives,

producing scenarios that emphasizes the continuously

validity of past practices. Brazil’s Ministry of

Defense faces a challenge in information management.

It still do not have a clearly defined force design

framework (reminding that force design finds its

purpose and instrumental functionality at defense

ministry level), but rather services force planning

methodologies, with results integrated (with some

difficulty and not explicitly defined criteria),

resulting in a tendency to stovepipe capabilities as

an effect of Service initiatives in providing its

102

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own force structure requirements. Jointness and

interoperability, although recognized as a

requirement, does not found support in a coherent

doctrine, and readiness requirements present a

conflict between operational and structural demands

because of the absence of an integrated concept of

employment: the Brazilian Army founds its designing

reference in a concept of employment that privileges

the Amazon area, whereas the Brazilian Navy holds

traditional missions in the South Atlantic.

The declaratory policy orienting the defense

reform process in Chile, although impulsed by

jointness requirements and interoperability at force

component levels and concept of employment, is

inertialized by service doctrines that still holds

its Navy, Army and Air Force looking for independent

actions. Going beyond Chile example, hemispheric

military systems are built around the services,

which are the depository of traditions and expertise

in matters ranging from doctrine formulation and

technical specifications. Not surprisingly,

246


modernization becomes accomplished within the

separated services.

Transformation, in most countries and

particularly in the US, has become an umbrella

rubric used for many reform-related activities. The

jury is still out on determining what exactly it

means and a good deal of groundwork has to be laid

before it could be agreed that a quintessentially

transformation action is gaining momentum. The US

has had a lengthy action on adaptation to new tasks,

revising its doctrine and organizational structure.

It has also attacked problems from a modernization

perspective, with the exploitation of state-of-the-

art technology; but truly innovative thinking about

defense alternatives has yet to be demonstrated.

Albeit some efforts toward adaptative joint command

and control associated with rapid decisive

operations based on joint strike force concepts

against critical mobile targets has been developed,

the US defense system has not yet pointed out

related changes in program categories, measures of

effectiveness to its department’s routinezed

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planning, programming, and budgeting system that

could make those efforts more than rhetorical

efforts.

Transformation is still a work in progress in the

US, with priorities clearly allocated to identify

how the Department of Defense might improve

leadership and department oversight in services and

joint organizations. The results might transcend

current force configurations and increase reliance

of information dominance, featuring smaller, leaner

and intelligent weapons systems.

The American expression of defense planning is

widely known by its acronym PPBS, for Planning,

Programming, and Budgeting System the Planning. This

system is initiated with a Defense Planning Guidance

published by the Office of the Secretary of Defense,

which translate the National Military Strategy

prepared by the Joint Staff in reference to the

National Security Strategy led by the National

Security Council through an interagency process.

Proposed programs by the services and defense

agencies, to attend those planning guidance in

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observance to fiscal guidance allotted separately

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, are

evaluated and adjusted to ensure compliance with the

strategic directions and other policy documents

creating the Future Years Defense Program. The

services and defense agencies repackage the first

two years of the Future Years Defense Programs into

appropriations format used by the Congress in

legislating the annual defense budget.

These processes, in the US case,. The PPBS has

served American needs since 1961, being installed by

former Defense Secretary Robert S. MacNamara and his

Defense Comptroller, Charles J. Hitch. Its

functional logic has the merit of providing

credible, managerial system during the relative

stable period of the Cold War. However, its

foundational concepts and articulating logic has

become complex and bureaucratic, resulting in lack

of clear rationality for the increasingly

undisciplined relationships of its components

parts103. 103 For a detailed discussion of how the U.S. Department of Defense develops military capabilities, see Kent, A.G. and Thaler, D.E. A New Concept for Streamlining Up-Front Planning. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, MR-271, 1993. Thaler, D.E. Strategies to Tasks: A Framework for Linking Means to

249


Henry Mintzberg concludes that PPBS "proved to be

an impediment to effective strategic thinking and

action, whether one favored hawkish military

strategies or dovish political ones"104. Although

the PPBS has become complex and cumbersome, with

countless critics claiming for its revision,

including Secretary of Defense Donald S. Rusfeld, as

he stated in January 2002 at the National Defense

University:

“The way the Department of Defense runs, the

budgeting system, the planning system is, broken. It

is not serving the department or the country well.

And yet it is inexorable. It just rolls along, like

the freight train coming from San Francisco with the

wrong things for New York. And there are plenty of

people who look at it and don't know it's wrong. I

sat in meeting after meeting, and people said,

"Well, that's the way we do it. This is how it

works. This is what it is." And, "Don't you

understand that the only way to affect that is to

Ends. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, MR-300-AF, 1993. kauffmann, W.N. Assessing the Base Force: How Much is Enough. Washington, DC. EUA: Brookings Institution, 1992.104 Henry Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning. New York: The Free Press, 1994. pp. 120.

250


reach back 2-1/2 years ago and load it properly?"

And of course my answer is, "Don't you understand we

didn't have -- we don't have 2-1/2 years to wait to

change? We need to get at it" 105.

Being able to move from the level of

methodologies and techniques is central to

developing and implementing effective military

capabilities. Albeit, it is surprising to discover

hemispheric countries endeavoring to emulate the

PPBS model in theirs defense superintendence

process. The model, for the US, albeit critics, has

its validity and utility, existing good reasons to

believe that it can be made to work effectively;

however, copying the model, with only a cursory

description of its general purpose and objectives is

doomed to fail, unless officials and senior defense

civil servants recognize the centrality of force

design in superintending defense, and its intricacy

with the organizational structure that supports its

development and evaluation.

105 Secretary Rumsfeld Speaks on "21st Century Transformation" of U.S. Armed Forces”. (transcript of remarks and question and answer period). National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., Thursday, January 31, 2002. http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020131-secdef.html. (Jun 2002).

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http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020131-secdef.html


It is difficult to overemphasize the uniqueness

of each country force design and associated

problems. There is relatively little systematic

research on the nature and consequences of these

problems, forcing, therefore, analysis to rely

largely upon impressionistic data in order to

discuss their importance. With this qualification in

mind, it is possible to consider the following list

of problems and issues found – although in different

degrees and shapes – in 14 hemispheric countries

analyzed106:

Reluctance in re-evaluate management

practices and resistance to force design, fearing a

transfer of power within the Ministry of Defense

from the services to the Minister and his force

designing staff, failing to effectively reshape the

military to meet future demands, whereas supporting

the existence of a culture that accepts redundancy

as synonym of security rather than inefficiency.

106 The countries were Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Dominican Republica, United States, Canada and Mexico. The data for this list was collected over one a half year in the Center of Hemispheric Defense Studies, with fellow students. The rules of no-attribution preclude mentioning specific sources. However, the registers are consistent with most of the ostensive literature, providing valid examples, and a useful reference for further research. The data is also consistent with the U.S. experience of the past decades, suggesting that most countries are manifesting similar problems and that they could profit from the U.S. lessons learned.

252


Official documentation on defense

superintendence and force design divergent from

actual management, planning, programming and

budgeting actions and routines, with a tendency of

budgeting followed by capabilities requirements

followed by defense policies, essentially reversing

the logic of force design.

Major decisions on force structure not

adequately identified with force design results and

defense acquisition systems focusing on a wide range

of relative near term, unconnected issues, rather

than specific outcomes related with decisions on

adaptation, modernization, and transformation linked

requirements.

Absence or inadequate criteria and organized

procedure for integrating and assessing programs,

translating its result into a budget that reflects

capability requirements, with a tradition of secrecy

preventing defense programs being criticized in open

forums.

253


Defense budget profile reflects appropriation

cycles, institutional determinants and spending

patterns, rather then defense capability

requirements to attend national objectives,

resulting in a sterile endeavor for bureaucratic

efficiency focusing on accounting procedures.

Existence of relatively inter-service

secretive bargaining manners to adjust the budget

before submission, with frantically attempt to

establish a “pre-approved” package in order to not

compromise services’ resource pre-allocated, with

consensus found in advocating more funds rather that

program reductions.

Vague or incomplete criteria for distributing

funding levels to the services, and imperfect

criteria for effective resource allocation, allowing

services make procurement choices that they believe

best satisfy their needs, resulting in military

capabilities either inappropriate for the defense

environment, inconsistent with the national

interpretation of security demands, or incompatible

with foreign policy demands.

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Defense budgets unrelated to concepts of

employment, with the latter dissociated from

requirements of defense infrastructure, logistical

support, and maintenance, producing major

limitations for force components to produce useful

outputs as capabilities.

Capabilities evaluation seemed less an effort

to determine current abilities to perform envisaged

task, than a means to justify current and

anticipated force structure. In this context,

readiness is not evaluated because of the absence of

guidance on what tasks force components were

supposed to be integrating to produce a valuable

capability, concurring to breaking down rational

linkages between current force structure and future

capability requirements.

Defense superintendence operates semi-

autonomously from national security decision-making,

failing to shape defense priorities thoughtful

debates on issues that affect national defense

capabilities.

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Defense budgets derived from a predetermined,

arbitrary ceiling rather than integrated programs

requirements, creating resistance to revisiting

prior decisions, and making only marginal

adjustments from an existing base, resulting in the

absence of flexibility for military preparation.

Programs priority are decided by compromise

rather than based on explicit criteria of capability

requirements and analytical tools, resulting in a

not fully integrated and balanced conjunct of

defense programs, with vested interests of defense

industry and services parochialism.

Lack of procedural discipline among officials

and defense civil servants in the daily activities

of defense superintendence, the absence of overall

organizing logic for force design and relative

indifference of senior national leaders with

security and defense risks associated with this

situation, other than those immediately and

explicitly related to fiscal resources.

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Force design purpose and functional

instrumentality atrophied with delayed decisions on

the position of the country in the security and

defense matrix, vague defense objectives that do not

serve as gauge against capabilities could be

derived, and tendency to lack of specificity and

delay in program developments.

Failure to adjust military and defense civil

servants education to overall demands of force

design and defense superintendence, perpetuating

many earlier defense customs force design is

intended to eliminate, creating a vicious circle

that deprives countries of needed efficiency,

efficacy and economy in designing force alternatives

and superintending its development, management and

assessment.

There are unknown conditions under which Western

Hemispheric Countries make their defense reforms

decisions. Although at different levels, the

complexity of decision-making is intensifying the

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demands for adopting force design practices and

concepts in the formulation of defense alternatives.

Generalizations from these findings must be made

cautiously, however, if allowed to persist, these

conditions would degrade armed forces’ ability to

defend their countries. Thus, as indicators, they

serve to convey the growing requirements for care in

the process of designing defense alternatives,

acting as a reminder of certain points already made:

major changes occurred in the security and defense

environment have intensified the sophistication

required for concepts dealing with forecasting; the

optimal allocation of resources depend on how the

problem is defined; decomposing capabilities,

programming and budgeting become intertwined

demanding timely decision; and the need for

ingenuity in hedging decision on adaptation,

modernization and transformation has grown over.

These aspects stress complementarities in

designing capabilities and the need of determining

how variations in the specifications of a particular

defense alternative affect the requirements of that

258


alternative for resources. The scope of the

discussion indicates the necessity of a guide for

allocating efforts to provide the kind of

information needed to be made available for

decision-makers.

259


FORCE DESIGN AS AREA OF STUDY

Throughout this paper, it was argued that force

design must take a proactive role in defining

military capabilities that are to be pursued with

defense reforms. It must communicate clearly to the

decision makers the constraints it operates under,

the abilities it can exploit within the three

simultaneous horizons (projective, prospective and

prosficcional), and the options available to it

(adaptation, modernization, and transformation). And

it seek collaborative relationships with other state

functions. While seemingly complicated, force design

can be a useful decisionmaking tool for developing

an articulated system of concepts exploiting

rationality to produce coherent defense alternatives

that could be judged with a political logic.

The focus of force design is defense reform,

eliciting that defense reform is not an end in

260


itself, but rather an action needed for reasons of

both opportunity and necessity. The complex

possibilities of arranging force components in a

stable capability solution offered to a perceived

problem are the challenges force design faces as an

area of study. The objects of its study are the

components and processes involved in the design of

military capabilities, the assumptions that supports

conclusions and its sensibility to changes in these

assumptions.

As result, a system of concepts and procedures

that makes useful those concepts in its own terms

are distilled, and made available to support

organizational reforms, to foster methodological

changes, and for the reconsideration of current and

future capability requirements. Theoretical concepts

and practical actions are mutually complementary in

the goal of producing a system of articulated

decisions aiming the conception and justification of

defense alternatives.

Force design is an area of study and field of

practical action delved into a complex of practices

261


and academic disciplines that interface with defense

issues. Military history, Defense Economics;

International Relations; Management and

Organization; Political Science; Military Sociology;

Operational Analysis – to mention just a few – are

part of this complex.

Force Design functionally adapts concepts derived

from these areas, whereas creating its own concepts,

integrating all of them in a theoretical construct

with its own hypothesis and methodologies. The

resulting theoretical construct configures an inter-

related nexus of propositions aiming to:

a) Research the field of force design and

instruct the search for solutions for the perceived

problems. A precise object of investigation helps

the identification of what is relevant to observe

and instructs the gathering of information. The

conceptual components of the theoretical construct

offer elements for developing plausible hypothesis

related to a set of accepted values and principles.

262


b) Assess those solutions found. The

assessment processes aim to identify the coherency

and the degree of relevance of the proposed solution

to the perceive problem, forked into two

complementary approaches: a theoretical approach

that research the logical consistency of the

proposed solution; and an empirical approach, when

it exams the consistency of the theoretical model

with the observed reality.

c) Contribute to clearly communicate

results. The efficacy of communication of force

design results derives from a clearly defined set of

terms.

What is important is the basic point that

deciding about defense issues cannot preclude a

solid theoretical base. Notwithstanding this

evidence, it is usual to have defense reforms

initiatives drowned by intuition into the diversity

and complexities of force design.

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Force design results – an articulated project of

defense - is a political issue. It express the

declaratory posture of the States regarding its

perception of a desired state of security, in which

its citizen’s values, way of life and expectations

are not threatened and, if it were, the State’s

willingness to apply force to assure its protection.

It this role, Force Design is servant of foreign

policy, carrying out messages that may range from a

vague statement towards peace to a firm commitment

to war. Moreover, Force Design may contribute to

internal politics, placating demands though a

declaration of intentions.

The two overarching roles of force design – to

guide the conception of defense capabilities and its

intended use, and to be a political instrument of

the State - are always linked. The former relates to

the necessity of classify and systematized before

foreseen and deciding about defense alternatives;

the latter refers to the disputed and uncertain

cross impacts of interests and perspectives aiming

an accord where alternatives get its purpose and

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toward what its results are oriented for. In the one

hierarchy and order is expected; in the other, self-

esteem to exercise independent decision is jealously

preserved from all authority.

These two tendencies are far from conflicting;

they are mutually supportive. Systematic ordeal

independence of decision, forcing politics to

explicit a stable goal force design needs to fulfill

its tasks; and force design prepares a field where

policy affords to exercise its guidance. Once a

project of defense is selected and empowered as

policy, it is considered as the source of almost all

guidance to conceive defense functions, roles and

missions, instruct its organizations, and explain

the limits of validity of roles, missions and

organizations as a function of changes in defense

functions resulting from differences in the security

ambient.

Because the results of force design – an

integrated project of defense – is so portentous,

this is an endeavor that must be guided wisely. The

construct of capabilities, the diagram of futures

265


and defense superintendence offer a set of concepts

and a framework that illuminates the possibilities

of reform the defense system in order to produce

better military capabilities, and should be judge by

this standard.

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