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1/16

Sorry or he

conditionofhis

document.

almost

idn't

put

n

on hesystem,

ut

t is

an

mportant

ork;

and f

l

didn't o

t

I would

be doing

omething

ess

mportant

t

the moment.

Steve

Bayne

.

www.hist-analytic.org


2/16

WADSWORTH

STUDIES

IN

PHILOSOPHICAL

CRITICISM

Alexander Sesonsheand, Noel Flemi.ng,

Edi,tors

HUMAN

UNDERSTANDING:

Studies

n

the

philosophy

of

David

Hume

J

META.MEDITATIONS:

Studies

n

Descartes

PLATO'S MENO:

Texr

and

Criticism

META.MEDITATIOT{S:

Studies n Descartes

edircd

b1

Alexander

Sesonsfr'e

nd

Noel

Flerrting

UNIVERSITY

OF

CALIFORNIA'

SANTA

BARBARA

Wadsuorth.

Publish'ing

Cornparyt'

nc'

BELMONT'

CALIFORNIA


3/16

COGITO,

ERGO

SUM:

INFERBNCB

OR

PERFORMANCE?*

f aahoHinti,kha

rv

2n

l.

Cogito,

crgo sum as a

problem.

The

fame

(some

would

say the no-

toriety)

of

thc ntltgc cogito, ergo fl,rm makes

one

expect that scholarly

industry hns

147.

::

Scc c.g.

L. BlancheqLes ant4cddents u

"Je

pense,

onc

e

suis"

(Paris,

1r)20);

iricrrnc

Gilson,

Etudes ur Ie r6le de a

pensie

midi6,uale dns

a

Cogito,

Ergo

Sum

5

Augustine's

anticipation.

t cannot be denied,

of

course, hat

the sim

larities

are

striking.

One may wonder, howevcr,

whether they are

a

there

is

to the matter.

Perhaps

here are also dissimilarities

betwee

Descartes

nd

Augustine

mportant

enough o

justify

or at least o

ex

plain

the

one's reluctance

to acknowledge

lrc cxtent

of

the

other

anticipation.

But we cannot

tell whether

thcrc is more ro

Descarte

cogito,ergosum han there s to St. Augustinc's irrilar argumentbe

fore

we

can ell exactly

what

there s to the

cogittt:lrgrrmcnt.

If

there are important

differences

betwccn

l)cscartes and

hi

predecessors,he

questionwill alsoarise

whcthcr

sonlc

of

thc

anticipa

tions

are

closer han

others.

For instance,

Descartcs

orrkl have

oun

the

principle

n St.

ThomasAquinasas

well as

n

St. Augustine.

Which

of

the

two

saints omes

loser o

the cogito, ergo

sum?

3.

What

is the relation

of

cogito ta sum?

Whnt

kind

of topica

questionsdoes

cogito, ergo

sum

give

rise

to?

Onc

of rlrc rnost

m

portant

questionss undoubtedly

hat

of

the logical

orrrr

of

l)cscrrrtc

inference.

s it a

formally valid inference?

f not, wh:rc s krgical

wrong

about tl

But there

s an even

more fundamental

uestion

lrlul tltcsc.

)oc

Descartes's

ictum really

express n inference?

Thrrt it tkrcs s sug

gestedby the

particle

ergo.

According to Descartes, owcvcr, lry

sry

ing cogito,

ergo sa.m e

doesnot logically

(syllogisticrlly)

tlctlucc

szr

from

cogito but

rather

perceives

ntuitively

("by

^

sirnplc lcf of nrcn

tal vision")

the self-evidence

f

sum3

Similarly,

Dcscartcs

r.crrsionr

says hat

one'sown

existences

ntuitively obviouswithorrr

Irringing

n

cogito

asa

premise.a

ometimes'he

ntimates

hat

his

"first

llrirrciplc"

really

the

existence f his

mind-and not the

principlc

ro$ittt,

crl4

sum,by

means

f

which

this existence

s

apparently

dcdrrce

l.b

)nt.chc

formulates he cogito

principle

Ls

ego cogitansexisto

withorrt

rrsirrg

he

word.ergo

at all.6

But if it is true

that the

Cartesian

ictum does not

cxprcss n

inference,

equally

perplexing

questions

re bound to

arisc. Nor orrly is

SCEuttres

e Descartes,

ublished

by

C,

Adam and P. Tannery

(1, tris,

ttr)7

1913),

VII,

140;

The Philosofhical Worhs

of Descartes,

rans.'by ii. S. llulrlnn

and

G. R. T. Ross

(London,

1931),

I, 38. In the sequel,

lrcse'crlitionr rvill

lrc

referred to as AT and HR,

respectively,with

Roman-numerals cferrirrg to

vol-

umes.Normally I

shall

not

follow Haldine and Ross's

ranslation,howcvci'; I slrtl

make use of the existing ranslations

notably

of those

by N, I(ernp Srrritlr

rrrl by

=rather


4/16

52

Meta.Meditations:

Studies

n Descartes

the

particle

ergo then

misplaced;

he word

cogito is likewise out of

place

n a sentencewhich only serves

o

call

attention

to

the

self-evi-

denceof sum.

But

is

the

word cogito perhaps

calculated o express

he

fact that

thought is needed or

grasping

ha;t

sum

is

intuitively evident?

Was it

perhaps

an ndication of the

fact

that

intuition was

not for Descartes

n

irrational event but an act of

the thinking mind, an

"intellectual

intui-

tion," as t hasbeenaptly expressed??ven f

this is

part

of

the mean-

ing of the word, the

question

will

remain

why Descartes

wanted to

stress he fact in connection rryith

this

particular

insight.

The

same

point

would equally well apply

to most

of

the other propositions

of

the Cartesiansystem;

and

yet

Descartes

does

not

say,

for example,

cogito, ergo Deusert n the way

he

says

ogito,

ergo sum.

Clearly the word cogito

must havesome

urther

function in Des-

cartes's

entence.

ven if the sentence

did not express

syllogistic

in-

ference, t expressed omethingsufficiently

like

an

inference

to

make

Descartes all his

sentence

reasoning

ratiocinium),8

refer

to exPress-

ing it as nferring

(inferre),s

and

call

sum a conchtsion

conclusio).1o

As Martial Gueroult has trenchantly summedup the problem: "lo

Descartes

se refuse ) consid6rer e Cogito

comme

un

raisonnement.

.

. . 2" Pourquoi s'obstine-t-il

alors au moins

trois reprises

Inquisitio

aeritatis,

Discours,Principes)

pr6senter

e Cogito

sous

a forme

qu'il

lui d6nie?"11

Since he word

cogi.to

s

not dispensable

nd since

t is not

iust

a

premise

rom which the

conclusionsum

s deduced,

he

relation

of

the

two

becomee

problem. One

of

the

main objectives

of

this

essay

s to

clear

up their relation.

4.

Cogito, ergo sum as

a logical nf

erence,But can

we be sure

hat

Descartes's

ictum does not express

a logical

inference?

n many

re-

spects t seems lausible o think that it does. ts logical form seems

quite

easy o define. n

the sentence

I

think"

an individual

receives

an

attribute; or a modern

ogician t is

therefore

of the form

"B(a)."

In

the sentence I

am," or "I

exist," this

same ndividual

is

said to

exist.

?

L.

J.

Beck,

The Method of Descartes

(Oxfoid,

1952), ch.

iv.

8

AT

X,

523;

HR

I,

324.

e

AT VII,

352;HR 11,207;

f

'

AT

III, 248.

ToPrincipid

philosophiae

,9; AT VIII' 7;

HF.1,222; cf.

AT II, 37, and

AT

v,147,

11

Martial

Gueroult,

"Le

Cogito et

la

notion

'pour

penser il faut 6tre,"'

Cogito,

Ergo Sum

53

How

can one represent

such

a sentence ormally?

If

Quine

is right in

claiming

hat

"to

be is to be

a valueof a bound

variable," he

formula

"

(Ex) (x

=

4) serves

he

purpose. nd evcn f hc s not

right in

genera

in

this

particular casehis

claim is obviously

itrstified:

"4

exists"and

"there exists

at least

one ndividual

identical wirh a" are

clearly synon-

ymous. Descartes's

ictum

therefore seems o bc

concerned

with

an

implication

of

the

form

(1) B(a) = (Ex) ( r= a) .

Descartes

erceiveshat he

thinks; hence

he obtnins hc

prcrniseB(a).

If

(l)

is true,

he

can vse modus

ponens

o

corrclrrtlc h;rt he

exists

Those who

want to

interpret the

Cogito as a logicnl irrfcrcnce

may

now

claim that

(1)

is in fact

true, and even ogicnlly

provnblc;

or

is

not

B(a)>

(Ex)(x=a&B(x))

a

provable

ormula

of our lower

functional calculi?

Arrrl docs

nor

this

formula

entail

(l)

in

virtue of

completelyunproblcrrrnric

lirrciplcs?

t

may seem hat an affirmative nswermust be givcn t


5/16

54

Meta.Meditations:

Studies

in Descartes

But even

f we

make

his

allowance,

here remain

plenty

of difi-

culties.

As we

saw,

Descartes

ometimes

enies

hat in

ti"

cogito

^rgr-

ent sum

is

deduced

.rom

cogito.

But

on the

view

we are

criticizing

the argument

s

a deduction.

The view

is herefore

unsatisfacrory.

It

is also

unsatisfactory

because

t does

not

help

us to

unierstand

the

role of

the

cogito

argument

n

the

cartesian

system.

n so far

as

I

can

see, t docs

not,

for

example,

help

us to

appreciate

he

conse-

quences

Descartcs

wantcd

to draw

from

his first

and

foremost

nsight.

The gravcstobjcction,however, till remainso be made. t may

be_shown

hat thc

provabiliry

of

(l)

in the

usual

systems

f functional

calculus

(quantificrtion

theory)

has

nothing

to do

with

the

question

whether

thinking

crrtails

cxisrence.

n attempt

to interpret

Deicartes's

argument

n tcrrns

of the

provabfity

of

(l)

is thereforl

bound

ro

re-

main

fruitlcss.

By this

I

mcnn

the following:

if

we have

a closer

look

at the

qFstems f

logic

irr

which

(l)

can

be

proved,

we

soon discover

that

they

arc based

on

imporrant

existential

presappositions,

s have

else-

where

called hem.tn

fh.y

make

more

or les

tacit use

of the assump-

tion

that

all thc

singular

erms

with

which

we have o deal really refir

to

(designatc)

s.nrc

actually

existing

ndividual.l'

In our

example

his

amounts

o

nssuriling

hat

the

term

which replaces

n

(1)

muslnot

be

mpty.

But

sincc he

term

in

question

s

"I,"

this

is

just

another

way

of

saying

hnt

I

exist.

t turns

out,

therefore,

ghat

we in

fact

decided hat

the

sentence

I exist"

is true

when

we decided

that

the

sentence

I

think"

is

of

the

form B(a)

(for

the

purposesof the

usual

systems

of

functional

loglc).ls

That

we

were

then

able

to infer

(Er)

(x

=

a)

from

B(a) is undoubtedly

rue, but

completely

beside

he

point.

.

It

is

lxrssible

o

develop

a

system

of logic

which

dispenses

ith

thc

cxistcutial

presuppositions.lT

f in

such a

iystem

we

could infer

"I

exist" fronr "I rhink"-i.e. (Er) (x = a) from B(a)-it would be

r{

In

"llxistential

Presuppositions

and

Existential

Commitments,,,

foarnal

of

Phllotophy,

LVI

(l9t9),

tzs-ijl.

Itr

All the

singular

terms

(e.g.

lirmes

or

pronouns)

which

in

an application

mry bo nubstit-uted

or

a free individual

variable

are assumed

o

do

soi iod as

a

conlc(llrcncc nll

the free

individual

variables

have

to behave

like

singular

rerms

which

rcnlly

posscss

reference

or

"bearer."

vulearlv-,teferend').

ttt(if.

Leibniz'

incisive

remark:

',And

to

iw i think,

theiefore

I

ow.

ls not

propcrly

to provc

exisrence

by

thought,

since

to'think

and

to bi ttrintinc

is

rhe

crnrc

rhirrgi

nnd

to say, Iam

thinking,

is

already

to

say, / arrz,,

Nouaeaui

Essais,

u. by A.

(i.

l ,nngley

La

Salle,

U.,1949),IV,

7, ec.7).-

lTSrrch

Cogito,

Ergo

Sum

highly relevant to

the

question

whether thinking

implies existence

Descartes's ense.

ut this we cannot

do.

The

truth of

a

sentence

f t

form

(1)

turns entirely

on existential

presuppositions.

f

they are

giv

up, the

provability

of

(1)

goes

by

the

board.

My

point

may

perhaps

be

illustrated

by

meansof

an exam

consrructed or us

by

Shakespeare.

amlet did

think a

great

ma

things;

does t follow that he existed?

5, Descartes'semptation In spite of all this, tl'rcrcare passag

Descarteswhich seem o suppoft the interpretation undcr

criticism

do

not

want

to

deny

that it

expresses

ne of. hc thirrgs

)escartes

h

more

or

lessconfusedly n mind when

he fbrmuhtcd lris famous

d

tum. But it is important

to realize hat this interprctntion

is dcfcctive

important respects. t does not

help

to elucidatc

n nrry way

somc

Descartes'smost explicit and most careful

formulations. It is

at bes

partial

interpretation.

One can seewhy

some nterpretation like thc onc wc

ltnvc

bc

criticizing attracted fi"r""tt"r. It

gave

him what

must

hnvc scctnc

very usefulway of defending is own doctrinesand of silcncingcr

cism. He could always

ask:

How can it possib ly

be tmc of sornc

that he thinks unless

e exists?

nd if

you

challenge hc prcrrrisc

h

he s thinking

(why

cannot he all-powerful

malin

gtnic

nttl


6/16

56

Metu-Meditations;

Studies

in

Descartes

Did

Descartes

earize

hat

it

is

misguided

o

represent

his

insight

n

the

wav

we

hrl:

b:"-tt

air""rrr"gi'rt

is

very

diffcurt

to

ter.

cer-

ainty

e

.".,

,:11r:g

;

{ry.

ii"t

r.".,

..o

h^u"

"ii"dl

r,o*.u.r,hat

on

this

interpretation

the'""riairu'"r

his

argument

depends

essen-

ially

on

existential

pt.*pp"rii#.

i.,

when

he

tried

to present

his

f;111il:T::ff::,r,,

n;dedu;;;"-

,

,g.o_.rricar,,

ronir,

e

uied

,,uzecan;;;"t{id:{d"..}:',-t*,il11',X;;*:{,;if

",iUy:;

ntis)" AT vII, 16.6; -fl lt,-iii.?r,-i,

,r"r._ent

s

an

he

more

e-

arkabre

since

t

prima.

acie'.rtirr"ai.r-

whar

Descarres

ays

n

the

hird

Meditation

ibout,t;;;

.

.".-"l"rro*.0

only

in

themsitves,

and

ot

as

referred

:"

,:T.

-_other

hing,,,

namely

if,r,

,,iilf

cannoq

trictry

speakins,

e..farse."

t;rr;;";"dicts

the

plain

facl

rhar

we

an

think

of

(nientaty

"""ria.rj"i.iJ-"s,

or

princi

Hamret,

u.irhout

hereby

commiming

ourselves

"

."irr"i"i"g

that

they

exist.

he

fact

arso

emains

att",

o.r"".resresorted'to

the

interpreta-

ion

we

have

been

.crilicjzing

ffiry

in

his

more

popurar

writ-

ngs'

As

Guerourt

noticed,

n.

a?.,

""a'r.ro*

to

it

in

the

Meditationes.

is

most

explicit

usg

o{

ii

o."ul,

io"n))nrr"n" de la a6rit6,in a dia_

oguewhose idactic

"t

rt*i-irr'ffi

particurarry

-p-nrrir"a

uy

rnesr

assirer.le

.r""ri.Jr

*rrr

"-li"r

rr*r"r*ii"r;fTh:

cogito

rgumenr,

otabty

hose

n

tn"

uiiii)ti""*

.;;-;ri*;,piiioropuo,

eem

o

presuppose

difierent

"r.rpro"rlro

or

n"

".fi,rri"o .,"',.

-

6'

Existentiar

inconsistency.

In

order

to

understand

this

second

nterpretation

of

the

Cogito

*"

n"""

;;;":

a

closer

rorr.

",

,i"

rogi"

f

Descart.s's

amed

argument.

Descartes,s

ormurations

in

the

Aledita_

iones

and,

lsewhere

TSSgst

hat

his

,"roti

_"y

u"

"*p*rr.J

iy'r"yinghat

it

was

mpossibt"

nit:ni-

*

a'."yit,

,rrrt.nc".

one

w^y

irtwhich

,?"#::,'"".',:lX,i::-diF.t'.'iii.:"r.nr,*,"iilliebeen

n.r"i*.J-n;r;;1tt-"ot

exist'"

As

a

preliminary

o

o*-r*ay

or

tt..t,,,"i..;ffi

f

;T:q::::::;::+;:?ff

l*i;S:Ll[

ould

not

have

maintai".a'rrra

i"rr*

;til*

our

o

be

closely

erated

o

the

easons

hy

he

asserted

r,"

fo._.i

iir

"_

rigt

t.

What,

hen,

are

h.r.

r."rorr;f

##;.reral

characteristic

f

the

entence

De

Gau'e

does

not

.*irr"

-"L.rr

it

awkward

or

De

GauIIe

o

asse*

tl2o

I

shall

uy

to

formulrt.

iii,

g"rr.r"l

"h"r""terisJc,ny

Cogito,

Ergo

Sum

57

sayine

that

it

is

existentially

nconsistent

or

De

Gaulle

to

assert

(to

;;;i

ini,

,."..n"e.

The

notion

of

existential

nconsistency

may

be

a"n"'.a

as

follows;

let

p

be

a sentence

and

a

a

singular

term

(e'g'

a

name,

a

pronoun,

or

a

definite

description)'

We

shall

say

that

p

is

existentiaity

nconsistent

or

the

persoireferred

to

by a

to

utter

rf

znd

only

if the

longer

sentence

(2) "P;

and

4

exists"

is

inconsistent

in

the ordinary

sense

f

the

word)'

In

order

to-avoid

our

own

obiections

we

must

of

"oottt

require

thlt

thc

notion

of

ordi-

nary

inconsisrency

which

is

used

n

the

definition

involves

no

existen-

;i;i'p;;pp;sitiois.

Provided

that

this

is

the

casc,

wc

may

write

(2)

more

formally

as

(2)',

"p

&

(Ex)

(t

=

a)-"

(As

the informed

reader

has

no

doubt

already.^1ntiT1'^Ye

should

really

use

quasi

uotes

nstead

f

double

quotes

n

(2)

and

(2)")

-*

'A

;ti;"i

tlforr""t".ion

of

the

definition

shows

hnt

thc

notion

of

existentialnconsistencyeally formulates general cilsotlwlty ccrtain

,i"r"-.r,*

are mpossidle

o

defend

although-the

sentcnces

y mcnns

of

*tti.n

they

are

m"de

m"y

be

consistent

nd

ntelligiblc'

nsentl.:-f

lty-

ing

that

1i;

is

incorrsistJnt,

e

could

have

said

hat

p

cntrrils

d

docs

,ro-t

"*irti

(without

the

use

of

any

existential-presupposirions

lut

otherwise

n

the

ordinary

sense

of entailment)'

Uttering

stlcll

il. scn-

tence,

,

will

be lr"ry

a*k*"rd

for

the

bearer

of

a: it

mcnns

rtnlrrlrg

a

,r"a"-"rr,

which,

if

tme,

entails

hat

its

maker

does

not

exist'

It

is mportan

to

rcalize

hat

the

ills

of such

statuments

nnnot

bc

blamed

on

the

sentences

y means

of

which

they

are

madc'el.

n

fnct'

the

notion

of

existential

ntonsistency

cannot

be applied

nt

nll

ttt

scn-

tences.

As we defined he notion, it is a relation between scntenccond

21

t mav

be wonh

while

to recall

here

the

distinction

betwcctl

0

ficlltctlcci

"o

o*.r"r"i,?ii'r,-"i"-.r..

A

sentence

s

of

course

a

grammaticnl

.cnlity

tltrtt

i"uoi"a,

no

reference

to

any

particular

utterer

or any

particular

tlmc

()t

lltttrtlll('c'

An

utterance

, ,r,

"u"tJ-?l

"p"L"rt-""t1

that

may

6e'specified

by.spccifyirrg

tlre

;;J;;ce,

the

speaker,

nd

the

occesion

n'which

he

makes

his utterrrrrcc'

--':-

U*;""1

or

i""irtiirr"

*tt."tt""'

(with

prima-facie

fact-strtitrg

intcnt)

"r.

,*iJ

"*"-pt",

"f

tiiiiiriri.

(lt

"

term

doeinot

seem-especially

ho'py,

lrttt

i';hillt;;;f

i;;;"-il

;ppears

to

be

rather

widespread.)

A

statctttcttt

s rtt

event

(an

act)

occurring;;[;;;;"out

"o"**t'

Usirally

it is a sPecctr'nt:t

'f

n

on

that.

For

our

purposes

a st{tcnrcrrt

rr'y


7/16

58

Meta-Meditations:

Studies

in

Descartes

a

singular

erm

rather

than

a

property

of

sentences.

he

notion

of

existential

nconsistency,

however,

can"often

be

applied

to

statements

in a.fairly

narural

sense.

n

order

to

specify

"

,tii"rn"rrt

we

have

to

specify (inter

alia)

the

sentence

ttered (t

y,

q)

and

its

utterer.

If

the

latter

refers

to himself

by

means

of the

singni"r

term

& when

he

makes

his

statemenr'

we

may

say

that

the

notiori

appries

o the

statement

f

and

only

if it

applies

o

4

in relation

o &.

A

simple

example

will make the situation crear.The sentences

"De

Gaulle

does

not

exist"

and

"Descartes

does

not

exist"

a.re

not

in-

consistent

or

otherwise

objectionable

any

more

than

the

moot

senrence

"Homer

does

not

exist."

None

of

them

is

farse

for logicar

rasons

alone.

whar

would

be

(existentiaily)

inconsisrenr

would

be

the

at-

tempt

of a

certain

man

(De

Gaulle,

Descartes,

r

Homer,

respectively)

to

use

one

of these

sentences

o

make

a

$atement.

uttered'by

some-

body

else,

he

sentences

n

question

need

not

have

anything

#o'g

o,

even

strange

about

hem.

It lies

close

at

hand

to

express

his

important

feature

of the

no-

tion

of

existential

nconsistencyby

me"ns

of'a

term

which

has

ecently

"ligygd

wide currency. The inconsistency (absurdity) of an existen-

tially

inconsistent

statiment

can

in

a

sense

e

said

ao'b"

of

[r4or*n-

tory

(pefiormative)

character.

t depends

n

an

act

or

"performance,,,

nlmely

on

a certain

person's

act

of-uttering

a

sentence'(or

of other-

wise

making

a statement);

t does

not

depen"cl

olery

on

the

means

used

for

the

purpose,

hat

is,

on the

..rrt"rr""

which

is"

being

uttered.

The

sentence

s

perfectly

correct

asa

sentence,

ut

the

,tt"tript

of a

certain

man

to

utter

it

assertively

s curiorr-sly

ointless.

f

one

of these

days

should

eadin

the

morning

paper,

"T/hele

s

no

De

Gaulle

any

more,,,

could

understand

what

is

belng

said.

But

no

one

who

knows

charles

de

9"*":""11 *tp

be-ing

puzzled

by

these

words

if they were utteredby De Gaulle himself;

he

only

way

of

making

sense

f ihem

would

be

to

give them

a nonliteral

meaning.

-

we

can

here

see

how

the

existential

nconsistency

of De

Gaulre,s

fictional

utterance

(as

well

as

the

inconsistency

of

oiher

existentially

inconsistent

statements)

mani.fests

tself.

Normally

a

speaker

wants

his

hearer

to believe

what

he

says.

The

whore

"l"ngo"g6-game',

of fact-

stating

discourse

s

based

on

the

assumption

hai

ttrls

ii normally

the

""::.By:

nobody

can

make

his

hearer

believe

hat

he

does

nor

""lrt

Uy

telling

him

so;

such

an

anempr

s rikely

to

have

he

opposite

esult.

The

Cogito,

Ergo

Sutn

59

Iomrtically"

means

here

something

ike

"{91

melely

logical

reasons"')

,l'his

destirctive

effect

is

of

couise

conditional

on

the

fact

that

the

Ircarer

nows

who

the

maker

of

the

statement

s,

that

is,

that

he

identi-

lics

he

speaker

s

he same

man

he

uttered

sentence

s

about'

In'a

special

case

a self-defeating

ttemPt.of

this.kind

can

be

rnade

withoirt

saying

or

writing

anything

or.

doing

anything

to,TpT-

,,f,i..

f"

iryittg

,6 tri"t

"

others-beliive

something

must

normally

do

something'wliich can be heard or seen

or

felt'

But

in

trying

to-

make

myself

bJlieve

something

here

is

no

need

to

say

anything.aloud

or to

write'anything

on p"p"i.

The

performance

hiough

w6ich

existential

inconrirtlt"y"r.ir.,

can in

this

case

be

merely.nl.lttcmlt

to

think-

nlor"

"".oritely,

an

attemPt

to

make

oneself

bclicvc-that

one

does

not exist.22

This

transition

from

"public"

speech-acts

o

"privfttc"

thought-

acts,

however,

does

not

afiect

the

essential

eatures

of

d-rcir

ogic.

The

reason

why

Descartes's

ttempt

to

tbink

that

he docs

n


8/16

60

Meta-Meditations:

Studies n

Descartes

In

a

frequently

occurring

special

case

such an

omission

s not

only natural

but almost

nevitable.

t is the

case n

which the

speaker

refers

to

himself

by

means

of the

first-person

singular

prorroo'n

,I."

This

pron_ounnevitably

refers

to

whoever

happens

o

-be

speaking.

The

specification

inconsistentor

. . . to

utterl'therefore."i,tc"r

to

the-tautology

"inconsistent

or

whoever

happens

o

be speaking

o ut-

ter," and-may

herefore

be

omitted

almost

always.

n

a special

case, he

notion of existential nconsistencymay therefore be definedfor sen-

tencessimpliciter

and

ot

only

for ,"nt"n".,

thought

of

as being

ut-

tered

by

some

particular

speaker.

These are

the

sentences

hich

con-

tain

a first-person

singular

pronoun.

The

existential

nconsistency

of

such

a sentence

will

mean

that

its

utterer

cannot

add

"and

I exist"

without

contradicting

himself

mplicity

or

explicitly.

-

There

are

purposes,

owevel,

for

whiCh

t may be

misleading

o

forget

the

specification.

Forgetting

it

may be dangerous

ince t lEads

one

to

overlook

the

important

similarities

which obtain between

exis-

tentially

inconsistent

entences

nd

existentially

nconsistent

tatements.

In a

perfectly

good sense,existentially nconsistentsentences re alr

right

as

sentences.

hey

may

be

said to

be consistent

and

sometimes

even

significant (e.g.

when

they

occur

as

parts of more

complicated

sentences).

According

to

their

very definition,

existentially-

ncon-

sistent

sentences

re

not

so much

inconsistent

as

such

as

absurd for

anyone

o utter.

Their

(existential)

nconsistency

s therefore

of

per-

formatory

character

exactly

in the

samesense

as hat

of the existen-

tially

inconsistent

tatements.

he

only difference

berween he

two lies

in

the fact

that,the

latter

are inconsiitent

for some

particular man to

make

while

the former

are

inconsistent

or anyone

1o utter.

The in-

consistency

of existentially

nconsistent

sentences

means

hat whoever

tries

to

make

somebody anybody)

believe

hem, by

so doing,

helps o

defeat

his

own

purpose.2s

uch an attempt

may

take the form

of utter-

ing

the

sentence

ssertively;

or it may

take

the form

of trying to

per-

suade

neself

of the

truth

of the

sentence

n

question.

In

the

same

way

as

existentially

inconsistent

sentences

defeat

themselves

hen

they

are

uttered'or

thought

of, their

negations

erify

themselves

when they

are

expressly

uttered

o,r

otherwise

professed.

such

-sentences

may

'therefore

be

called

existentially

self-verifying.

,,I

Cogito , I l rg ,o

Sun

6

8. Descartes'snsight.

Now

rvc

ltrtvc rt 'rtr ' l t t ' .1

r

point

where

w

cnn express

recisely

he import

of l)csc:tt ' t t 's's

rrsiglrr

or

nt least o


9/16

62

Meta-Meditations:

Studies

in

Descartes

been

ess

misleading

or

Descartes

o

say,

"I

am n

that I

think,,,

or

.,By

thinking

I

perceive

my

existence,"

han

to say,

',I think, therefore

I

am."

It

may

be worth

noting

that

one of

our formulations

was

closely

anticipated

by

St. Thomas

Aquinas

when he

wrote:

,,Nullus

pot.Jt

cogltare

se non

esse um

assensu:

n hoc

enim

quod cogitat

aliquid,

percipit

se esse" De

aeritate,

X, lZ,

ad

7).

The

peculiarity

of-this

relation

explains

Descartes's

acillation

n expressing

t in that'he

some-

times

speaks

f the

Cogito

as an inference

and

sometimes

s a rcaliza-

tion of the intuitive

self-evidence

f

its

latter

half.

Similarly

we

may now

appreciate

he function

of

the

word

cogito

in

Descartes's

entence s

well

as his

motives n

employing

it. It

serves

o express

he

performatory

character

of Descartes's

nsight; it

refers

to

the

"performance" (to

the

act

of thinking)

through

-tticn

he

senrence

I

exist"

may be

said o

verify

itself.

Foi this reaJon.

t has

a most

important

function

in Descartesi,

.rrt"n"".

It cannot

t" ,"-

placed by

any

arbitrary

verb.

The

performance

(act)

through

which

the

existential

self-verifiability

is

manifested

cannot be

any rbiuary

human

activity,

contrary

to

what

Gassendi laimed.

t

cannot be an act

of walking or an act of seeing. t cannot even be an instanceof arbi-

trarymental

activity,

say

of willing

or

of

feeling.

It

must be

just

what

we said

t is:

an attempt

to think

in the

sense

f making

myself believe

(an

attempt

to

think

cam

assensu,

sAquinas

put

it)

that I do not

exist.

Ffence

Descartes's

hoice

of the

word cogito.

This

particular

word is

ncit

absolutely

ndispensable,

owever,

or

the act

of ihinking

to

which

it

refers

could

also

be called

an

act

of doubting;

and Des-aftes

does

admit

thatJris

insight

is

also

expressible

y

dubito, ergo

sum

(in

Re-

chercbe

de a

a6rit6,

AT X,

523;

HR

I,324;

cf. alsoPrincipia

philoso-

phiae,I,7).

But

did

I not say

that

the

performance

hrough

which

an exis-

tentially self-verifying senrence erifies tself may aFo be an act utrer-

ing itl

Is this not

incompatible

with

Descartes's

use

of the word

cogito?

There

is

no

incompatibility,

for Descartes

says exactly the

same.

n his

second

meditation

on first

philosophy he

says

n so

many

words

that

the sentence

I

e{ist" is necessarily

rue

,,whenever

I uttef

it

or conceive

t in

my

mind"-"quoties

a

me

profertur, vel

mente

concipitur" (AT

VII, 25;

HR I, 150).26

introspection)

rather

vague.

Nor

does

Gueroult

rearize

hat

the loeical

aspect

of

Cogito,

Ergo

Sum

The

performatory

character

of l)cscnrtcs's

irtsigltt

PresuPPos

cl'raracterisiic

eature of

his famous

mcth(,(l

of

tkrttlrt which

has

fr

quently

been commented on

in othcr

colltcxls,

l)csc:lrtcs's

doubt

do

not consist n

the

giving

up of

all opiniorrs,

rts t skcptic's

tloubt

mig

Nor

is it an attempt

to iemove

certaitr

sltct'ilit'

s()ttlccs

of

mista

from our

thinking, like Francis

Bacon's.

lt rttttottttts

() lltl

active

tempt to think

the contrary of

what

we ttsurtl ly

rclicvc.

ior

this

rea

Deslartes

could claim

that in an

importnnt

lloittt

tlris

rrrtltc:r

loctrina

doubt

of his defeats tself. A

skeptic'spnssivc

krttlrt

'ottlt l

ttcvcr

do

The performatory

character

of Dcscilrtcs's

llrigllt

is

irr fnct

p

and

parcel-of

the

general

strategy

of

fuis

rcdttrti()

trl

tltsrlrdrntt

(

perhaps

ather

projiectio

ad absurdum.)

of

skcptit ' isrrr,

l ' lris

sl

rltcgv

6.onght out

very welt

by Richard

Popkin

in

lris tttpor'l

tnt

.u,ol' l

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