traditio canonica and legal tradition

Traditio Canonica and Legal Tradition

Lorenzo Cavalaglio

between and potestas magisterii

Canonical tradition as hermenutical criterion. 6. Law and tradition.

Sommario: 1. La tradizione e il diritto canonico. 2. La tradizione nella storia della Chiesa, tra e potestas magisterii. 3. La tradizione canonica nella

legale. 5. La tradizione canonica come criterio ermeneutico. 6. Diritto e tradizione.

Abstract. Nel descrivere il ruolo della traditio canonica

quale sia il suo rapporto con con le tradizioni giuridiche esistenti. Verrà così ad essere confermato l’arricchimento reciproco tra diritto canonico e cultura giuridica e l’essenza strettamente giuridica del diritto canonico. In diritto canonico, il termine “tradizione” si riferisce sia alla Tradizione della Chiesa sia alla tradizione giuridica

con quello dell’esperienza giuridica; e un altro, riconducibile alla teoria generale, che si occupa del diritto stesso in quanto tradizione. Il risultato dell’analisi sarà la

canonica, essendo di per sé una tradizione giuridica, può sostenere ogni giurista che anela a sottrarsi al giogo del legalismo.

Monitor Ecclesiasticus, CXXIX (2014), 377-408

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1. Tradition and Canon Law

consists in the way in which «il diritto canonico, organizzando la vita e l’attività della Chiesa, è stato interpretato (autorità), commentato (dottrina) e applicato (prassi) nel corso dei secoli»1

in accord with canonical tradition». So that, laws having a content or concerning a subject already present in the ius vetus (in a large

too).However, even if this work will obviously consider positive

law, it will not offer only a general description of the possibilities and

Least of all, it will exclusively verify if the space reserved to it in this

of normative texts) is greater or lesser than the importance it had in 2 tradition

canonica relation with existing legal traditions, and, most of all, if (and how) it can still be a model and not only have a theoretical (or historical) importance, but also play a more important role, both in canonical and comparative scholarship.

So that, an implicit assumption about the role of canon law towards history and interpretation of legal systems will be indirectly

reciprocal enrichment between canon law and legal culture in

1 P. VALDRINI, Comunità, persone, governo. Lezioni sui libri I e II del CIC

2

time passed since they were published has not changed the modernity of their H. PREE La norma de interpretación del can.

, in Ius canonicum G. COMOTTI, La canonica traditio come criterio d’interpretazione del C.I.C. Note in margine al

, in S. GHERRO (ed.), Studi sul primo libro del Codex Iuris Canonici,

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general. On the one hand, actually, the importance of canon law for contemporary legal experiences is based not only in the concrete contents that it historically gave to different systems, but also in the possibility to be an integrated model of science and practice, of rules

state systems . On the other, that relation prevents scholars from ontological difference between canon law and other

systems, even if its peculiarity is still clear and has to be correctly

ecclesiastical organization and its essential hetero-determination. On legal essence of canon law; result

of a complex historical evolution and of an undeniable systematic “fusion”4.

We have to keep in mind that the traditio canonica has formed and still lives in constant relation with other legal experiences (since its initial formation in Roman institutional system, then in the admirable age of ius commune, up to the modern and various contrast with the hegemonic claims of national laws and of the

which was always biunivocal, institutions, notions, mentalities , but

3 Cf. P. GROSSI, Diritto canonico e cultura giuridica, in C. FANTAPPIÉ (ed.) Scritti canonistici

di regole e di cànoni; è, innanzi tutto, una certa mentalità giuridica che, in quanto tipicissima e peculiarissima, in quanto sprovvedutamente costruita da scienza e

4 Cf. J. PASSICOS, Droit canonique et droit comparé ajourd’hui. Renouvellement d’une problématique?, in Revue internationale de droit comparé

canonique fait appel aux notions fondamentales de tout droit et comment il les

systèmes apparaîtra dans toute sa dynamique, tandis que l’on evitera les confusions

droit canonique loin du domaine juridique».5 J. PASSICOS,

Droit canonique et droit comparé ajourd’hui, civil sur le droit canonique est indéniable. On la rencontre principalement dans le

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decisively contributed to the development of great contemporary legal systems, ultimately representing «un lièvito per tutta la civiltà occidentale»6.

Anyway, we do not want to offer a detailed analysis of

be discovered, because – it is easy to understand – it would be an impossible task for this essay. On the contrary, after having explained

of the Church and in its relation with the general notion of “legal tradition”. In both cases, this comparison will lead to the analysis

contents. Actually, in canon law the term “tradition” refers, in its most

interesting meaning7 Tradition of the Church, unavoidable element of its nature and primary foundation (together with the Sacred Scripture) of the eternal deposit of the Faith, as it is interpreted and adapted (but not changed, because unalterable) by the Magisterium8; or to the legal tradition of the

domaine des solutions d’ordre technique, mais aussi sur le plan des principes (la technique est rarement neutre!) qui régissent les institutions».

6 P. GROSSI, Diritto canonico e cultura giuridica7

C. IZQUIERDO, «Tradición de la Iglesia», in J. OTADUY – A. VIANA – J. SEDANO (dirr.), Diccionario general de Derecho canónico, VII, Pamplona,

traditio) o como adjetivo (traditum)», but «de estos, solamente doce tienen relación con el sentido teológico-canónico de tradición». In the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches the canon corresponding to can. 6, § 2 of the CIC is can. 2, which refers to ius vetus and does not use the word traditiohowever, it is useful to remember the meaning that CCEO gives to the term “rite”,

spiritual and disciplinary patrimony, culture and circumstances of history of a distinct people, by which its own manner of living the faith is manifested in each Church sui iuris».

8 Y. CONGAR, La Tradition et les traditions, Paris, 2010, is still unequalled about this subject and we will often refer to it. Anyway, in the last years, especially because of the renewed debate about Second Vatican


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essential complement of its (necessary) social form, and that, even in the awareness of the continuity of its structure during the centuries,

However, canonical tradition, being indeed a legal tradition, can (and ought to) be examined in two other areas, “external” (or,

one, typical of comparative law, more or less coincident with that of legal experience (or culture), alongside other legal cultures with

and another one, wider and ascribable to general theory, which deals with law as tradition, that scholars have constantly and necessarily to keep in mind.

perspectives in which the complex notion of tradition canonica can be understood and used.

2. Tradition in the history of the Church, between depositum and potestas magisterii

(moral, political, legal, religious or even behavioral) , to which a social group refers, attributing them a more or less bounding meaning, can surely be described as a permanent feature of mankind10

especially about ecclesiastical magisterium.9 It is commonly known that the origin of the notion is to be found in the

Greek term “paràdosis”, transmission, deriving from the verb “paradìdonai”, to transmiss. H.P. GLENN, La tradition juridique nationale, in Revue internationale de droit comparéand traditioce qui nous vient du passé et ce serait une confusion néfaste, malgré l’étymologie du mot, de la confondre avec le processus de traditio, qui n’est que la trasmission de la tradition, ou avec l’action contemporaine aussi ‘traditionelle’ qu’elle porrai l’être».

10 According to H.P. GLENN, La tradition juridique nationale, 271, indeed, «on

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even if it always keeps a strong link to this objective foundation11,

is, together with Sacred Scripture, one of the two sources of divine Revelation12.

starts with the Church itself, i.e. with the communication by Jesus Christ to the Apostles of a body of truths to be transmitted to the world; actually, we can say that at the beginning it coincides with the teaching given by the Founder to his disciples and by them, with the apostolic succession, transmitted from one generation to another. Since the beginning, anyway, tradition does not only consist in a body of truths, but even in moral, liturgical and administrative rules, with

giving different importance to each category

ne peut pas éliminer la tradition comme phénomène parce que, dans sa forme générale, elle n’est autre chose que la mémoire humaine», so that «le monde humaine sans tradition, sans mémoire et sans record des accomplissements des ancêtres, serait un monde animal». A.T. KRONMAN, Precedent and Tradition, in Yale Law Journalhumanity, because «only human beings inhabit the world of culture, and so only they can realize this special, individual-preserving form of immortality. But by the same token, as inhabitants of the world, only they are subject to the obligation to keep it up, and only they are linked, across the generations in joint projects of

world in which neither gods nor animals appear».11 Cf. C. IZQUIERDO, «Tradición de la Iglesia», 622 rightly reminds that «la

tradición de la Iglesia no es una realidad inédita, sino que se apoya en el sentido

de humanidad».12

il “deposito della Fede”». F. DELLA ROCCA, « », in Novissimo Digesto Italiano

13 In the classical manual of G. DEVOTI, Institutionum canonicarum Libri IV, Traditio vel divina, vel humana est.

Divina autore habet Deum ipsum, humana ecclesiarum rectores, hoc est apostolos, vel eorum successores episcopos […] Hinc humana traditio vel apostolica, vel

humanae traditiones ecclesiae disciplinam respiciunt, mutantur ab ecclesia,


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reasons, together with its universal range (both in space and time), 14, but it always

assumes different shapes.We cannot offer here a complete analysis of the development

of the concept, and especially of its controversial relation with the

even in a work that cannot (and does not want to) be theological, we

progressive shift towards an “authoritative” meaning. Because of the

to understand the notion of traditio canonica.Now, we can say that in the precise moment in which the

transmission of the teachings of Jesus Christ was not committed to those who had immediately received it, but to their successors, tradition became “depositum

adjustment to differen epochs and events . At the time, tradition is not

cum id ejus utilitatis, aut necessitatis ratio postulatth century, with some

F. DELLA ROCCA, « », 470 distinguishes between a tradition that he calls «divina quando custodisce e tramanda verità derivanti immediatamente da Gesù Cristo o divino-apostolica quando si riferisce

umana (o puramente ecclesiastica) se

giurisdizione». More recently, C. IZQUIERDO, «Tradición de la Iglesia», 624 notes that «no siempre se puede distinguir con absoluta claridad lo que es elemento de

canónica puede incluir elementos de tradición apostólica). Es claro que la tradición apostólica reconocida como tal en la Iglesia es normativa para la fe, en tanto que las tradiciones eclesiales gozan de un estatus diferente».

14 Cf. C. IZQUIERDO, «Tradición de la Iglesia

y la misma liturgia de la Iglesia; el ordenamiento jurídico de la Iglesia; el arte

de los teólogos de las diversas epocas; el testimonio de la santitad en la vida de los cristianos, así como los diversos carismas suscitados por el Espíritu Santo a lo largo de la historia; el magistero de la Iglesia».

15 But this stability of the deposit, as Y. CONGAR, La Tradition et les traditions,

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a formal principle, an authoritative criterion different by the object of transmission itself, but the rule of faith “is” the truth itself, and not its

not appeared yet (actually, it is the entire Christian community which protects and guarantees the authentic transmission of the deposit), the idea of apostolic succession is already strictly linked, «comme sa condition, son moyen et sa garantie, à l’apostolicité de doctrine»16.

In the Middle Age, indeed, a certain instability begins to appear between the idea of objective rules and that of the Church itself as rule

th century canonists start to change substantially their theories on this subject, which apparently preserves its continuity with precedent interpretations. Anyway, up to

characterized by their divine origin and apostolic transmission.

emerges only after 16th century, and consolidates precisely in (and in

to forget the quod of dogma, i.e. of what has to be transmitted and then believed, in favor of the quoteaches it in a binding way. So that, «au lieu de concevoir la tradition en référence au passé, on tend à la voir en référence au magistère actuel de l’Église s’exprimant dans la marche du temps»17.

même assez clairement le contraire – que le Saint-Esprit cesserait d’actualiser, d’expliquer, dans la trame de l’histoire, d’une vraie histoire, le sens ou le contenu inépuisable du dépôt».

16 So that, «la succession légitime des responsables d’Églises est la garantie d’une authentique tradition». Y. CONGAR, La Tradition et les traditionsP. GROSSI Alle origini del concetto di persona giuridica in diritto canonico, in C. FANTAPPIÉ (ed.), Scritti canonistici«caro a tutta l’Apologetica questo concetto di Paràdosis come deposito prezioso ricevuto dagli Apostoli e fedelmente conservato dalla comunità attraverso la ininterrotta serie della gerarchia episcopale».

17 Y. CONGAR, La Tradition et les traditionscannot innovate the truths of faith or even reveal presumed “new” truths, but can only faithfully preserve and expound the


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It essential to note that a fundamental role in this process is played not only by the always growing (theological, political and above all legal) conscience of its governing power that the Apostolic See acquired, but even by the (legal, too) development of its authority on Christendom and its institutions. Another factor was the evolution of legal and canonical studies, which gave to that changing the theoretical and practical basis18. So that, it is possible

of canonists have contributed to determine a new conception of sovereign authority, that could easily (and was strongly required to) be applied to the Church and the Pope. Actually, since 14th century

th century, together with the

.

a passive repetition, but permits to examine it more closely, and adapt it to the new demands of history and society, under the exclusive control of ecclesiastical authority. F. DELLA ROCCA, «pertanto il magistero della Chiesa che dà validità ai vari strumenti della tradizione, del cui contenuto dommatico anche oggi, come ieri, è solo la Chiesa che dà un

18 It is the opinion of Y. CONGAR, La Tradition et les traditionsest passé de l’idée de manifestation et service de l’action transcendante et actuelle

hiérarchique. On est passé d’une interprétation de certains textes dans un sens d’anthropologie spirituelle ou de dons charismatiques, à leur application comme énoncés de prérogatives juridiques appartenant au pape».

19 Cf. P. OURLIAC – H. GILLES, problématique de l’époque. Les sources, in G. LE BRAS (ed.), Histoire du Droit et des Institutions de l’Église en Occident

fortes qui servent l’autorité et façonnent la société ecclésiastique de façon à en faire leur oeuvre – une oeuvre qui appellera dans la plenitude de son développement la

J. GREENBERG – M.J. SECHLER, Constitutionalism Ancient and Early Modern: The Contributions of Roman Law, Canon Law, and English Common Law, in Cardozo Law Review,

and English common lawyers thought and wrote about the nature of power and

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It is clear in this evolution (not only, but) fundamentally legal 20

“power” of magisterium (potestas magisterii) active in dogmatic

the objectivity of the to the subjectivity (inherently, or better essentially authoritative) of the Magisterium21, on the other

Codex22 answer the need for normative clarity and legal certainty.

altamente ierocratico»of a (legal) power of magisterium made it leave its pluralistic and composite nature, which characterized it up to the Middle Age and let it assume those subjective and hierarchically binding notes that

munus docendi

authority. Often motivated by jurisdictional disputes between the papacy and secular rulers and secular rulers and their magnates, the educated elites forged their political ideas from legal materials and expressed them in legal languages».

20

Y. CONGAR, La Tradition et les traditions

21 G. ALBERIGO, Elezione, consenso, ricezione nell’esperienza cristiana, in ID., La Chiesa nella storiaafferma sempre più un’accezione del “magistero” non come l’atto di insegnare, ma come il ceto che ha la prerogativa esclusiva di tali atti, il papa e, subordinatamente, i vescovi, donde la distinzione tra una ecclesia docens e una ecclesia discens».

22 P. GROSSI, , in C.

FANTAPPIÈ (ed.), Scritti canonisticiuna frettolosa scorsa della sua articolazione, è il Codice segnato da un sentimento

confermando l’ordo sacer al Codice come alla fonte che – più di ogni altra – era in grado di garantire il

effettivamente universale».23 Cf. P. GROSSI


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“reception” of the traditio, could have been described as «un nuovo anello che semplicemente si aggiunge alla plurisecolare catena

24, it is undeniable that the adoption of the form of the Code itself entails in some ways the adhesion to its implied ideology, «tendenzialmente globale, autoreferenziale (non bisognosa cioè di motivazione espressa), e proveniente da un’autorità per certi aspetti assoluta» .

In both cases, the simple and authoritative (and sometimes 26, and of the Code

not uncertain), commented and taught in a pluralistic way by scholars, assemblies, Faculties, and Princes in concert (or in contrast) with Popes and Bishops27. Of course, the reasons are many and different

24 Cf. P. GROSSI, Novità e tradizione nel diritto sacro (dall’uno all’altro , in C. FANTAPPIÈ (ed.), Scritti canonistici

Codex

di vita – di quanto il Codexsessantacinque anni».

25 Cf. P. GHERRI, , Città del Vaticano, École de l’Exégèse are «le

due rotaie dell’unico binario su cui il moderno Ius(sum) degli Stati accentratori

26

favorevoli, tende a realizzare un monopolio assoluto, quasi cancellando la memoria del policentrismo dottrinale che aveva alimentato ininterrottamente lungo la storia della chiesa un equilibrato e fecondo dinamismo nel rispetto del valore conclusivo del espresso dalla ». G. ALBERIGO, Dal bastone

, in ID., La Chiesa nella storia, 248.

27 According to Y. CONGAR, La Tradition et les traditions«agissait plutôt, dans l’antiquité chretienne, comme instance judiciaire suprême dans une Église dont les assemblées d’evêques formulaient habituellement les règles de vie; puis, au moyen âge, comme modérateur et juge souverain de la

au XIII, XIV et XV siècles, le rôle fort important des universités, en premier lieu de celle de Paris». On this point, see the useful considerations of J. M. GRES-GAYER, The Magisterium of the Faculty of Theology of Paris in the Seventeenth Century, in Theological Studies

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term the phenomenon presents substantially similar characteristics in 28, representing also the defensive reaction of the Church

against the pressing modernity and the synthesis of their encounter .We shall see now how this double passage, not without

reciprocal connections, affected the nature and the (current) practicality of canonical tradition.

CH. LEFEBVRE – M. PACAUD – L. CHEVALLIER, L’époque moderne , in G. LE

BRAS (ed.), Histoire du Droit et des Institutions de l’Église en Occident, XV, Paris, G. ALBERIGO, Dal bastone alla misericordia th

century the magisterium enters «nell’ambito che da secoli era stato riconosciuto alla elaborazione teologica e agli organi di gestione e di controllo che essa stessa

Y. CONGAR, concetto di teologia cristiana, Città del Vaticano, 2011, 287-288, reminds, since 17th century «un fatto notevole anche dal punto di vista della teologia è la morte delle università come centri di pensiero originale; esse sono assorbite dalle querelles del gallicanesimo, del giansenismo o vanno in discredito nel tentativo di addomesticare il giuseppinismo».

28 After all, as C. FANTAPPIÉ, Chiesa romana e modernità giuridica, II, Il Codex iuris canonici che tra l’ecclesiologia propria dell’istituzione e l’ordinamento canonico corre un

29 Cf. P. GROSSI, Chiesa romana e modernità giuridica (a proposito di un’opera , in C. FANTAPPIÈ (ed.), Scritti canonistici

Cinquecento ai primi del Novecento, l’incontro/scontro fra la Chiesa Romana e, appunto, la modernità con le sue scelte novatrici, le sue invenzioni politico-

che è appariscente e che è violento – v’è un processo storico – che è, invece, sotterraneo, che non è vistoso, che è però sottilmente pervasivo – di assorbimento delle impostazioni moderne all’interno dell’ordinamento giuridico canonico, con il risultato di alterare parecchio il tradizionale modo di concepire il diritto entro i


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both from a substantial and from a methodological point of view, the recall of the historical heritage of the Church has to be comprehended. A strictly legal object, actually, concerning the body of principles and institutions, which, in the continuity of the development of the Church itself, characterized and determined its comprehension in

. Neverthless, it would be wrong to think that the combination of the two terms causes only a relation between genus speciesreciprocally determine themselves, in a mutual relation of meaning

hand, as it is evident, it is only the “canonical” tradition that has to be considered, i.e. the one determined in relation with the legal system of the Church, its application and construction; on the other, in the heritage delivered to commentators by centuries of development of canonical system, only the contents (rules, principles, customs) which correspond to a constant application, i.e. to a shared “tradition”, can represent a hermenutical criterion according to canon 6, § 2, CIC

.Actually, the regulation of the relation between canonical

tradition and positive law was much more articulate in canon 6 of traditio”, but considered three

different circumstances, depending from the general rule according to which the Code, except for appropriate innovations, contained the law that had been applicable up to the moment (“Codex vigentem huc

30 According to H. PREE, «Tradición canónica», in J. OTADUY – A. VIANA – J. SEDANO (dirr.), Diccionario general de Derecho canónico, VII, Pamplona, 2012,

jurídicos así como de normas jurídicas que representan, desde la antigüedad, la autocomprensión jurídico-canónica de la Iglesia».

31 In the same sense, H. PREE, «Tradición canónica«la palabra traditio canonica en el sentido de que no se pueden

quellos que conforme a una larga tradición han pasado a formar parte del derecho de la Iglesia, es decir – en la medida en que se trata de contenidos de la doctrina y

(constans)».

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usque disciplinam plerumque retinet, licet opportunas immutationes

the canons that completely contained the ius vetusinterpreted according to this one, and according the construction of the probati auctores (“Canones qui ius vetus ex integro referunt, ex veteris iuris auctoritate, atque ideo ex receptis apud probatos autore

which partially coincided with ancient law had to be interpreted ex iure antiquo only for that part (“Canones qui ex parte tantum cum veteri iure congruunt, qua congruunt, ex iure antiquo aestimandi sunt; qua discrepant, sunt ex sua ipsorum sententia diiudicandi”); no. 4 said that, in case of doubt about differences, ancient law had to be followed in any case (“In dubio num aliquod canonum praescriptum cum veteri iure discrepet, a veteri iure non est recedendum”).

substantially new system, but simply to organize according to modern standards the huge amount of legal material, different in its origin and authority, belonging to the tradition . So that, in the (many) cases in which the rules of the Code substantially corresponded to the ius vetus, they had to be interpreted according to canonical tradition or the construction made by probati auctores.

instead with the decisively innovative goal of carrying out the

32 Actually, H. PREE, «Tradición canónica», 427-428 notes that «era intención

jurídico, cuya cantidad había aumentado enormemente, la selección (dejando de

excepción – una acomodación conceptual a las circunstancias actuales y ellena lagunas en la legislación vigente hasta el momento». P. GROSSI, Novità e tradizione nel diritto sacrocanonistica, è una legislazione posta al termine di un gigantesco imbuto storico a

orientalium recipitur vel accommodatur, praecipue ex illo iure aestimandi sunt».


391

directives of Second Vatican Council . It is true, actually, that the new Code did not want to create a rift with tradition, both ancient

, but in the discussion about the

imposing excessive limitations to the possibility of construction of the canons, the opportunity to free doctrinal references by a more or

auctoritates, and a more general idea about the continuity of the system, which was thought to be guaranteed by

quatenus ius vetus referunt, aestimandi sunt ratione etiam canonicae traditionis habita”) expresses these proposals in a text which is

the insertion of the expression “traditio canonica” (never appeared

presence of the preposition “etiam”, which «sembra sottolineare come l’utilizzazione dell’esperienza giuridica pregressa non debba ritenersi, per i canoni riproducenti il diritto anteriore, un criterio di interpretazione esclusivo» ).

33 According to G. COMOTTI, La canonica traditio come criterio di interpretazione del C.I.C.Giovanni Paolo II non vi è traccia della “presunzione di conformità” dei propri disposti alla disciplina previgente, che invece si poteva facilmente evincere da quello promulgato da Benedetto XV. Per il nuovo codice assume piuttosto

legame la Costituzione Sacrae disciplinae leges fa discendere, infatti, una non meno importante regola ermeneutica, la quale obbliga a far sempre riferimento, nella interpretazione dei disposti codicistici, all’immagine di Chiesa espressa dal magistero conciliare».

34 So that, R. CASTILLO LARA, Discorsodel nuovo Codice di diritto canonico, in Communicationesthat it, «per la sua giusta comprensione ed interpretazione, avrà sempre bisogno del ricorso al Codice Pio-Benedettino e a tutta la ricca tradizione canonistica della Chiesa, specialmente a quello che giustamente è chiamato ius classicum».

35 G. COMOTTI, La canonica traditio come criterio di interpretazione del C.I.C., 114.

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About the new formulation of canon 6, it is important to note that, unlike other rules contained in the general norms about sources of law, which always refer to “leges” (e.g., canons 17ff. about interpretation refer to “leges ecclesiasticae”), it refers only to “canones huius codicis”; so that, it is possible to conclude that the rule can still be applied to laws extraneous to CIC, but only in an analogic way.

On the contrary, the interpretation of the expression “quatenus ius vetus referunt” is very easy. We have to refer to all laws preceding the new Code and to consider not only the quotation of the ancient law or the literal concordance with traditional rules or customs, but even the “substantial” concurrence, i.e. the presence of a substantially reference to them . Actually, the importance of the term “quatenus”

) the conservation of preexisting law, but considers it only if current canons (expressly, or, more frequently, substantially) refer to it.

Even the expression “aestimandi sunt”, already used by CIC

law, needs to be analysed. It is neither a mere “comprehension” of the canon (it would need the term “intelligere”), nor an “interpretation” in a strictly legal sense (the appropriate verb in this case is “interpretari”, which implies anyway a creative act, or at least an option among different possibilities of construction), but an “evaluation”, not only of the weigh of canonica traditio in that

36 But, as H. PREE

si existe una transmisión literal o meramente conceptual del derecho antiguo no puede venir dada únicamente por el texto del canon que deba interpretarse, sino

37

contrary to new regulation (as canon 6 expressly said), and its promulgation is G.

TARELLO, Storia della cultura giuridica moderna U. PETRONIO,

C. FANTAPPIÉ, Chiesa romana e modernità giuridica, Milano, 2008.


393

case, but of the actual range of the ius vetus in the new context. Actually, it is not a simple “transposition” of ancient law in new canons, but a “reconsideration” of its contents and practicability in the current system, in order to better understand and apply new canons themselves .

4. Canonical tradition as legal tradition

Neverthless, the most important expression of canon 6, § 2 is

and their importance. In the “ecclesiastical” tradition, i.e. in the rules governing the life of the Church, there are institutions, rules, decisions, opinions which contributed to build the structure of the ecclesiastical system and, in many ways, go on regulating it. More, they represent the result of a centuries-old development of canon

Church, but they determine its application and lead its evolution.traditio

canonica for contemporary legal scholars. It does not forget positive law (in this particular case, the limits that canon 6, § 2 establishes to hermenutic relevance of ius vetus), but it exceeds those borders,

both a safeguard for the interpretation of current rules and a limit for the integration of them, so that scholars and practioners can and necessarily have to explicate and apply solely in the framework of the fundamental principles of the Church.

appear very easy in a strictly legal perspective, because they can

38 «La expresión aestimare

juzgar valorandodel aestimare no es (solamente) el elemento de la tradición canónica que aparece

H. PREE

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historical and methodological point of view. Neverthless, this search ought not to be extremely extended, in order to avoid that the legal

coming from the tradition. Indeed, it is true that the notion of tradition is «molto ampia, non certo limitata alle consuetudini in senso stretto, ma estesa agli usi in genere nonché alla giurisprudenza, alla prassi della Curia e alla comune e costante dottrina cui fa espresso rinvio il

, but surely oral

40), are not included in the reference of canon 6, § 2. Moreover, if one would say

immediate relevance for law, the clarity of interpretation should be seriously threatened and the certainty of law itself consequently compromised41.

However, the selection criteria of traditio canonica are not formal, i.e. they do not imply a particolar activity of promulgation or “recognition” by some authority, but objectiveprinciples of the Church, the general rules of the law (Regulae iuris, etc.), unavoidable notions and institutions of canon law (hierarchical principle, the necessity of a free will in marriage, etc.) are surely a part of it, whereas temporary rules or passing solutions, and

archdeacon in the organization of dioceses) are not.canonica traditio

legal materials of canonical tradition and the period in which they appear, stand out, and begin to be transmitted, but especially in which they are “comprehended” as a tradition and then “acknowledged”; 2) consequently, the possible role of previous orientation and, in some

39 Cf. P. VALDRINI, Comunità, persone, governo40 P. GUERANGER, Institutions liturgiques, Paris-Bruxelles, 1878, I, 1 said that

liturgy is «l’ensemble des symboles, des chants et des actes au moyen desquels

41 ius traditum, o lo que es lo mismo, de la tradición jurídica, puede ser útil para la historia del derecho, pero no

H. PREE,


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ways, of selection that legislation (i.e., authority) has in order to decide the real operating place of tradition itself.

From this point of view, it is evident that canonical tradition (actually, every tradition) becomes important and has effects on the application and interpretation of law through an ex post evaluation, based not only on the continuity of some solutions, but also on their large sharing among scholars and practitioners. A rare institution, an isolated judicial orientation or a theoretical study that is even brilliant, but not accepted by most of the scholars ought not to be considered “traditional”, even if they could have been considered rational,

canonical tradition followed different paths, they were not decisive in its evolution, and they cannot be considered a posteriori a part of it42.

So that, it is easier to understand how the legal system of the Church is the result of a centuries-old development of doctrinal studies, judicial opinions, institutional actions, that its current

Indeed, the intimate relation between canonical system and its past directly descends from its nature of legal tradition .

Actually, even if some legal experiences (those of Civil Law

others (those of Common Law, essentially based on the importance of judicial precedents) periodically mark, through new statutes, a hiatus with the pre-existing legal order, every legal system (canon law, as well as state laws) is per se a legal tradition. Indeed, a legal system is not only an orderly body of rules and institutions, but a

42 Cf. P. VALDRINI, Comunità, persone, governoexpression traditio canonica «implica la necessità di far riferimento a contenuti giuridici che conformemente a una ‘tradizione’ siano entrati a far parte del diritto canonico o la cui presenza sia storicamente “costante” nella scienza giuridica ecclesiale».

43 As H. PREE

ya hace mucho tiempo, a los cuales corresponde un (auctoridad actual) con base en su autoridad interna y/o historica, y que han sido transmitidos con continuidad hasta el presente».

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complex set of historical, social, political, even anthropological factors which characterize it as a cultural product, in the largest sense of the expression44.

Certainly, law can be deemed as a cultural fact, but we have to consider that «diversamente da questo, sia in grado di produrre di effetti ulteriori – costitutivi e distributivi – capaci di incidere pervasivamente sulle esistenze dei singoli»legal rules, indeed, consists even (or better, especially) in a positive regulation of social relations, with a reciprocal implication more than a passive subordination.

In this perspective, it is clear that, through the notion of “legal tradition”, canon law shows its nature, that of a set of positive

anchored by the peculiarities coming from its history and in any case “commensurable”, being a way of cultural transmission, to different legal experiences with which it was in relation in the past or is now confronted (i.e., is “compared”).

way of selecting and transmitting socially relevant information46;

44 J.H. MERRYMAN – R. PÉREZ-PERDOMO, The Civil Law Tradition. An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Europe and Latin Americathe term implies, is not a set of rules of law about contracts, corporations, and

tradition. Rather it is a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the nature of the law, about the role of law in the society and the policy, about the proper organization and operation of a legal system, and about the way law is or

the legal system to the culture of which it is a partial expression. Itputs the legal system into cultural perspective».

45 G. MARINI, La costruzione delle tradizioni giuridiche nell’epoca della globalizzazione, in www.comparazionedirittocivile.it, 7.

46 H.P. GLENN, La tradition juridique nationale, 271 correctly notes that

l’information par la mémoire, par l’écrit, par un supporte magnétique, et s’il n’y a pas un processus de capture, l’entropie de l’information du monde continue. C’est la capture de l’information qui permet l’origination d’une tradition. Ensuite, une tradition peut se construire, mais son fonctionnement n’est pas simple. S’il y a eu capture de l’information, comme point de départ, il faut qu’il y ait ensuite traditio,


397

so that, we cannot ignore that the possibility of a comparison with different traditions is inherently linked to its development and mode of operation. It is not diminished or reduced by this comparison,

experience cannot be imagined as a closed system, impenetrable

the contrary, being a living tradition, it consists of a modality of transmission and reproduction of normative information, and in its formation and dialogue with other traditions it models, perfects and perpetuates itself.

Canonical tradition, being a legal tradition, is normative, basing its foundation on a process of selection of transmitted information, notions, and operative modalities, but is also complex, being essentially “polyvalent”, because it is open to heterogeneous

contrary, it allows us to understand even in canon law how much the

construction of a legal system, determining its characteristics and differentiating it from others.

5. Canonical tradition as hermenutical criterion

can encounter the more or less penetrating intervention of the authority. From a practical point of view, this is especially evident in a moment in which the legislator wants to promote an innovation of the system, as it occurred with the creation of the new Code. Of

law, but it represents, however, an attempt to adapt the legal system of the Church to the new image offered by Second Vatican Council. First, it tried to go beyond the ecclesiological framework of the pio-benedictin code47

une transmission, pour qu’une tradition ait la possibilité d’être vivante».47 As G. COMOTTI, La canonica traditio come criterio di interpretazione del

C.I.C., 127 says, «la profondità e la complessità dei dati in seguito emersi dalla

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in dealing with ius vetus.

exclusive reference to the auctoritas of ancient law in interpreting new canons substantially expressing ancient rules, but even in the case of discrepantia with old rules compelled not to distance from them. Only when the legislator’s intention of departing from canonical tradition was clear, new canons had to be evaluated “ex sua ipsorum sententia” (canon

New canon 6 starts from completely different premises. Canons not only have to be evaluated also with a reference to canonica traditio, but the absence of all presumptions favoring the continuity of the law compels to judge, dealing with a dubious rule (of the Code), if and howtask has to be made according to general criteria proposed for all ecclesiastical laws by canon 17 (as we said, the rule expressed by canon 6, § 2 is subordinated to them). Only after this evaluation,

et contextu considerate», and when doubts about the meaning of the canon would persist, it should be possible to refer to traditio canonica.

Actually, this conclusion seems to be excessively reducing. Not only because, from a formal point of view, it suggests an undue superiority of the hermeneutical criteria suitable for ecclesiastical laws on a principle prescribed for general norms (the place of canon 6 in the Code is important, but not decisive), but especially because legal tradition (and furthermore, canonical tradition) does not only clarify the meaning of a legal rule in case of interpretative doubt,

e vastità delle prospettive che si aprivano anche per la riforma della disciplina ecclesiastica, dimostrarono poi, in termini sempre più chiari, come la revisione del Codice avrebbe dovuto svolgersi “iuxta consilia et principia ab ipso Concilio statuenda». Even clearer the opinion of P. GROSSI, Novità e tradizione nel diritto sacro

traduzione in termini giuridici di buona parte dei lavori conciliari».


399

but immediately contributes to its determination. Indeed, it cannot

it has to be determined according to the place given to a norm in the system, both in a synchronic and in a diachronic sense48.

understood only in a substantial and larger perspective, i.e. through the unavoidable consideration of the law of the Church inside

the conclusion of Second Vatican Council, cannot indeed (and actually, does not want to) depart from legal tradition of the Church,

notam ), in referring to canonica

traditio clearly expresses both the natural placement of canon law in history and its intrinsic continuity. As every legal system, being itself

the preservation of its own identity and the necessary adjustement to circumstances, but more than in the other legal systems, in canon law this search for proportion is necessary because of its nature, that of an ecclesial law, which realizes the vocation of the Church in the history. So that, canon law must not be conceived as a sort (or a subspecies) of theological system , but it is important to note

legal. Canons dealing with

48 Cf. G. COMOTTI, La canonica traditio come criterio di interpretazione del C.I.C.,

dimensione storicistica, pretendendo di prescindere completamente dai presupposti

49 According to P. GHERRI, , 187 «ciò che s’intende per “de-teologizzazione” non è una inutile, quanto assurda, eliminazione

P. GHERRI, Lezioni di teologia del diritto canonico, Città del Vaticano, 2004.

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for the comprehension of ecclesiastical laws in current system and

historical dimension of the law of the Church and its unavoidable link, realized precisely through traditio canonica .

From a hermeneutical point of view, this indissolubile relation traditio canonica to avoid

possible drifts in interpretation, which paradoxically could originate ,

actually, represents in a certain way its own weakness.

different legal experiences, its varied nature expose the process of accumulation and selection of information, of which it is composed and in which it develops, to the evident risk of choice. Choosing is never a neutral option, especially if some contradictions lie inside the contents that tradition itself offers to commentators (actually, this is not a rare event

50 In this sense, according to H. PREE

special norm of transmission of the law (Rechtsüberleitungsvorschrift).51 According to G. MARINI, La costruzione delle tradizioni giuridiche

nell’epoca della globalizzazione, 8 «la tradizione giuridica sembra infatti in grado di cogliere ed esprimere meglio certe caratteristiche come la mutevolezza, la dinamicità e la porosità che oggi tendono a comparire anche all’interno delle più classiche unità di analisi». H.P. GLENN, La tradition juridique nationale270 notes that «pour rattacher le système à ses fondements, au lieu de séparer les

droit, seule la notion de tradition captant à la fois le raisonnement historique et comparatif et son produit contemporain».

52 As H.P. GLENN, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law,

conglomeration of data, organized around a basic theme or themes, and variously described as a “bundle”, a “toolbox”, a “language”, a “playground”, a “seedbed”, a “ragbag” or a “bran-tub”». M. KRYGIER, Law as Tradition, in Law and Philosophy,

respond to them; real traditions which wreak their effects unnoticed; historically spurious traditions in which people believe and to which they are deeply attached».

53 Cf. H.P. GLENN, La tradition juridique nationale


401

some elements over others, can be evaluated either in a perspective of “organic” evolution (as if tradition itself could grow because of progressive accumulation, substantially casual or not predetermined anyway, of materials, opinions, decisions, rules) or from a different point of view, that of a voluntary (and then, for instance, even ideologically oriented) predilection of some characteristics over others by scholars and commentators .

It is true that tradition cannot be descrive as an autonomous “organism”, without stressing the decisive role of the jurists that determine it, but it is not correct to imagine it as a simple “depot” of notions, from which jurists can always take different solutions, depending from the necessities of the moment.

development (that is institutional, practical and doctrinal) inside the impasse

between an almost “mechanistic” and an implicit “ideological” idea of the process of “construction” of the legal tradition, addressing their capacity (we could say, their “conscience” ) of “being at service” of the tradition itself and not exploiting it through the manipulation of its contents.

At the end, we have to agree with the opinion of those canonica traditio could not be a

is «de la normativité contradictoire au sein de chaque tradition et la tradition “tolère et unit” en même temps, les contradictions. La logique de la tradition est donc par sa nature polyvalente; elle constitue non pas un champ non-contradictoire de sens, mais un champ contradictoire de sens. Elle n’est pas systèmique».

54 Cf. G. MARINI, La costruzione delle tradizioni giuridiche nell’epoca della globalizzazioneprocessi selettivi», but «pur essendo di solito presentata nella prospettiva organicistica, nelle vesti cioè di una lenta, progressiva e spontanea evoluzione, la sua rappresentazione tende a selezionare fra i vari elementi che la possono

55 D. KENNEDY, sociali e tradizione nazionale nel diritto privato europeo, in Rivista critica del diritto privato

to deconstruct the legal discourse, seen as a form of rhetoric in which legal practice founds itself in a “discursive dimension”.

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binding hermenutical key, limiting its effects (only) to the cases of interpretative doubt in canons referring to ius vetus ; on the contrary, we have to assert its nature of general principle, which expresses in legal rules and realizes in the concrete practice of the Church

necessary canon of interpretation in the case of (explicit or implicit) reference to ancient law, but it also marks and expresses the “enduring legal nucleus” of the canonical system , favoring an effective comprehension in the light of the historical development of its principles, rules and institutions and promoting its evolution on a sure and coherent basis.

6. Law and tradition

cannot stop at the obvious consideration of the fact that every legal system lives, in its interpretation and application (and even in its continuous innovation, that cannot disregard preexisting normative, judicial and doctrinal elaboration), of a constant and unavoidable relation with the past; rather, in order to assert that law is per se tradition we have to look at peculiar characteristics of tradition and law as social practices.

Among the elements which are present in every kind of tradition, past (or the connection, real or

believed as true, with it); its current normativity, i.e. the importance

its formation, and its sociality, i.e. the fact that it was formed and trasmitted in different generations (or believed as such), because it

56 Cf. G. COMOTTI, La canonica traditio come criterio di interpretazione del C.I.C.canonica traditio qualora il contemporaneo esperimento dei criteri elencati dal can. 17 e dalla costituzione di promulgazione del Codice dimostri con certezza che il legislatore abbia voluto staccarsene».

57 H. PREE, «Tradición canónica», 621.58 It consists, as M. KRYGIER, Law as Tradition

traditional social practice», so that «traditionality is to be found in almost all legal systems, and not as a peripheral, but as a central feature of them».


403

cannot exist without continuity in time and metaindividual nature .

the present, but tradition is “institutionalized”, i.e. received, selected,

make some texts, practices, even opinions sometimes, worthy of consideration for the present and (even if in a different way) binding for people who act in it. So that, it is correct to note that in legal systems we can see a repercussion of the past in the present, but also the presence of the past, selected for current

60.

is offered by law exactly in the interpretation of the texts coming from tradition itself. If, in general, materials derived from tradition have to be comprehended and constructed inside the tradition to which they belong, this hermenutical method is binding in the law (in canon law, we saw it with the ius vetus and canon 6, § 2). A jurist

59 «A tradition is not merely the past made present. It must have been, or be thought to have been, passed down over intervening generations, deliberately or otherwise; not merely unearthed from a past discontinuous with the present. A

M. KRYGIER, Law as Tradition, 240. U. MATTEI – A. DI ROBILANT, International style e postmoderno nell’architettura giuridica della nuova Europa. Prime note critiche, in Rivista critica del diritto privato

ma su una catena di trasmissione che si estende di generazione in generazione. Esso non guarda al presente, né è proiettato al futuro, piuttosto, è radicato nel passato».

60

trying to understand and predict the effects of law on his activities, are not engaged in disinterested forays into legal history, though they may be deeply concerned with the legal past. On the contrary, this past is treated as though it were a vast storehouse to be searched for solutions to present problems». M. KRYGIER, Law as Tradition, 248.

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preserves its authonomy in using and applying the meaning of legal rules that he found thanks to the comparison with tradition, but he cannot escape this comparison, because the text, the rule and even the jurist himself necessarily belong to that tradition.

After having highlighted the complex and varied nature of legal tradition and the role that scholars and commentators have in its construction and continuous update and amendment, we have to deal now with one of the most insidious aspects that this hermeneutical perspective offers to contemporary jurist. Indeed, considering the formation of tradition and its retrospective evaluation, there is the risk (which is, in part, even an explaining necessity) that the attention is «tutta presa dalle narrative, dai modi in cui gli interpreti inquadrano e descrivono la realtà, dalle visioni del mondo delle quali essi si servono nel tentativo di offrire una rappresentazione della società e di ciò che ne assicura la legittimità»61. So that, the analysis could be based on the inherently rhetorical nature of the law, and on the deliberately persuasive (then, potentially ideological) characteristic

linguistic device, used to justify some opinions.Actually, the law undeniably consists in an interpretative opus,

which continuosusly changes62; so that, it could be useful to deal with this question with a different approach , in order to give back to the law its peculiarity, that of a language, i.e. a relational structure of intersubjective relation, not a mere shell of a behavioral nucleus, describable in forms derived by (more or less) exact sciences.

Actually, the recovery of the linguistic dimension allows us

61 G. MARINI, La costruzione delle tradizioni giuridiche nell’epoca della globalizzazione

62 An “exercise in interpretation”, according to R. DWORKIN, A Matter of Principle

63

bibliography about this movement, but a useful (critical) introduction is R. POSNER, Law and Literature

J. BOYD WHITE, What Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature?, in Harvard Law Review

J. BOYD WHITE, The Legal Imagination. Studies in the Nature of Legal Thought and Expression


405

to stress the strict correlation between the law as social practice and the expressive structures in which the legal discourse operates, through the contribution of all people committed in its application.

legal interpretation on practical solutions given to the members of a certain socio-political community, with all due consequences (respect of the ratio of legal rules, self-restraint, prospective evaluation of practical results derived from interpretative options).

So that, thinking the law as tradition could make us look at legal language, according to this perspective, as an expressive form of an image that has its roots elsewhere, i.e. in the society and in the ideologies, which shape its “connective tissue”. In sum, an interpretative community, which is itself “created” by the legal text (and does not only “create” it).

Indeed, a literary text establish an individual relation with the reader64, whereas a legal text, in addition to that, is even a way to create a community among readers, because law is inherently “further”; it creates relations, situations, and institutions, it permits and prohibits, i.e. creates a society .

In describing legal system as a product continuously recreated through the assignment of meaning by jurists, it is possible to prevent the failure of the hermeneutical procedure, inevitable because of the indeterminacy of meanings of the text itself. Indeed, when we deal with a legal rule (or a judicial decision) we cannot forget that even radical changes in the interpretation of the text anyway remain inside

tradition).However, the actual conundrum (substantial, more than

hermeneutical) consists in the relation between these contents deriving from tradition and the current intervention of the jurist, who

64 Finally building, with the always-different relation of the people with the text, the ideal “reader”. U. ECO, Postille a “Il nome della rosa”, in U. ECO, Il nome della rosa

costruire, attraverso il testo, il proprio modello di lettore».65 See J. BOYD WHITE, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature,

in Texas Law Review

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could “invent” a tradition, instead of “discovering” it66.So that, in the way in which the jurist approaches the

“institutional history” of a certain legal text, we should necessarily read its personal construction, and its cultural and ideological assumptions. Consequently, according to a typical postmodern prospective67, law should be interpreted as a tradition in which all stories are invented (i.e., not simply “discovered”, but constructed under pressure of some practical need). Actually, no story is really invented; because, in order to make the results of interpretative activity recognizable as a product of that system, terms and arguments used in interpretation (rectius, its language) could not forget the assumptions common to that circle of people (the legal community) whose cultural and ideological boundaries the author himself shares.

and stability, through the openness of the hermeneutical process to plural, not indiscriminate meanings, thanks to the implicit limit of the system itself. Because of the interpretative community in which it lies, in order to go on existing in its constitutive vincula ( , sacramentorum and ecclesiastici regiminiscanonical tradition can accept an “evolutive” idea of the law, but if (and only if) possible changes are based on continuity and oriented to

66 For the expression “invention of the tradition” the reference article is E. HOBSBAWN, Introduction. Inventing Traditions, in E. HOBSBAWN – T. RANGER (ed.), The Invention of Traditiontradition is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past».

67 Cf. G. MINDA, Teorie postmoderne del diritto, Bologna, 2001, 11 reminds

stile intellettuale che riconosce e accoglie le contraddizioni e i paradossi che esso stesso rivela nelle condizioni, nelle estetiche e negli stili intellettuali tradizionali. Il postmodernismo allude a qualcosa che si oppone a un’identità stabilita; rende problematici proprio quella forma e quel discorso usati per annunciare la propria esistenza, senza cercare di offrire una teoria o un discorso alternativi».


407

further and metalegal aims, to which the entire canon law system is

boundaries limit a determined and untouchable context; the complex interaction between legal text and interpretation cannout occur outside that context, and legal discourse has to happen necessarily inside it.

traditio canonica, the idea of

implosion of the system because of uncontrolled hermeneutical operations, substantially ideological and potentially anti-realistic, with the necessity to determine the founding (and consequently, “delimitative”) principles of tradition itself. So that, also the interpretative method can be described as a never-ending procedure for shaping a community around rules inherited from tradition through legal language, bound to it and through it adapted to new situations.

as legal tradition can be considered in a different context. Nowadays, legal positivism is still widespread and becomes nihilism68

criticizing, then in demolishing every extralegal founding of the norms; sometimes, pushed by capricious ideologies, it overturned - in a few years’ time - thousands-years old institutions, which were deeply rooted in history and human nature. Canon law, through its clear continuity with history of law and its constant reference to superior principles and not to the temporary lex, can help to oppose this new, current reduction of law to positive rules, of licit requests to aggressive claims, of opinion to ideology.

emancipation from the present through history

68 Cf. N. IRTI, Nichilismo giuridicorestano che incessante produzione e consumo di norme. Le quali perseguono bensì

non sa “perché” e “verso dove” muova».69 According to P. LEGRAND, Comparative Legal Studies and the Matter of

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interpretation of current rules, making them compare their studies with history and general principles of the Church (adding value to their work of analysis of canons). It can also support every jurist who

to the example of canonical tradition, law (every law) can ultimately remain ius.

Authenticity, in Journal Comp. Lawthe past can be a means of drawing one out of oneself, of constituting oneself as historical being – which, as far as law’s subjects are concerned, entails the opportunity of escaping from a positivistic strategy of world-making predicated on the exclusion of the uncontainable».

traditio canonica and legal tradition

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