thou shall not protest!'': multi-institutional politics, strategic nonconfrontation and...

‘‘THOU SHALL NOT PROTEST!’’:

MULTI-INSTITUTIONAL

POLITICS, STRATEGIC

NONCONFRONTATION AND

ISLAMIC MOBILIZATIONS IN

TURKEY$

Mustafa E. Gurbuz and Mary Bernstein

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the divergent reactions of the two most prominentTurkish-Islamic movements to a crisis in the Parliament that centered onan elected Deputy’s right to wear the headscarf. After the crisis, theNational Outlook movement protested, while the Gulen movement became

$An earlier version of this work was presented at the 50th Annual Convention of the

International Studies Association, New York City, NY, February 15–18, 2009. The authors

would like to thank Said Arjomand, Mary Burke, Noel Cazenave, Davita Glasberg, Andrew

Junker, Maura Kelly, Ahmet Kuru, Lester Kurtz, Charles Kurzman, Nancy Naples, Kristine

Olsen, Natalie Peluso, Zeynep Sahin, Etga Ugur and especially Sharon Erickson Nepstad for

their useful comments and criticisms on earlier drafts; and Serhan Erol for archival research

help at the National Library in Ankara, Turkey.

Nonviolent Conflict and Civil Resistance

Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, Volume 34, 63–91

Copyright r 2012 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited

All rights of reproduction in any form reserved

ISSN: 0163-786X/doi:10.1108/S0163-786X(2012)0000034007

63

more conciliatory. Drawing on the Multi-Institutional Politics model, weargue that conflicting views on the nature of domination explain thedisparate forms of collective action taken by the two movements. Weintroduce the concept ‘‘strategic nonconfrontation’’ as a type ofnonviolent strategy to help understand the Gulen’s movement’s actions.We expand the nonviolent civil resistance literature by arguing thatstrategic nonconfrontation as a form of nonviolent resistance onlybecomes visible when we move beyond an exclusive focus on state powerto understand the ways in which multiple systems of authority and powerare constituted in society and perceived by activists. We analyze thediscourse in newspapers produced by the movements in order to examinehow each movement understood and defined the target of action and howthat influenced their subsequent strategies.

Keywords: Social movement strategy; multi-institutional politics;Islamic social movements; civil resistance; nonviolence; power

In 1999, Merve Kavakc- ı of the Virtue Party and Nesrin Unal of theNationalist Action Party were elected to the Turkish Parliament. The onlycatch was that each woman wore a headscarf. The secular Turkish stateviews wearing the headscarf in public domains as a symbol of politicalIslamism, a direct threat to Turkey’s secular democracy. After her election,Unal, with her party’s backing, declared that she would remove herheadscarf while in Parliament. In contrast, Kavakc- ı announced that shewould not do so. On May 2, 1999, what we refer to as a ‘‘crisis’’ moment, a‘‘covered’’ Kavakc- ı appeared in Parliament to take her oath of office. In herown words:

For about 40 minutes, my colleagues in Turkey’s parliament shouted at me: ‘‘Get out!

Get out!’’ Their cries paused briefly when then Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit raised his

hand and pointed in my direction. ‘‘Put this woman in her place!’’ he screamed. I sat still,

stiff, and appalledyEleven days after that appearance in parliament, I lost my Turkish

citizenship (Kavakc- ı, 2004, p. 66).

Kavakc- ı’s party was banned a year later due to Kavakc- ı’s alleged crime oftargeting the secularist regime, and a split within the Islamist NationalOutlook movement, which had been linked to the Virtue Party, resulted.Soon after, the liberal wing of the Islamist National Outlook came intopower in 2002. Thus, the Kavakc- ı crisis came to symbolize the split within

MUSTAFA E. GURBUZ AND MARY BERNSTEIN64

the National Outlook movement, often called the ‘‘transformation ofpolitical Islam’’ in Turkey (C- avdar, 2006).

All Islamic groups defended Kavakc- ı’s right to wear the headscarf beforeMay 2nd. After the crisis, heartened by Kavakc- ı’s refusal to remove herheadscarf, thousands of pro-Islamic students rallied in universities forfreedom to wear the headscarf and about 161 students were arrested inthe demonstrations. Protest activism and sit-ins in universities were organ-ized by the National Outlook movement, whereas the Gulen movementdeliberately avoided engaging in protest behavior and criticized theconfrontational tactics of the National Outlook. In other words, the Gulenmovement became more conciliatory after the crisis on May 2, although ithad initially defended Kavakc- ı’s right to wear the headscarf after theelection and, like the National Outlook, had challenged the secular Turkishstate for decades.

Did the Gulen movement become timid after the May 2nd crisis ordid it simply miss an opportunity to protest? What does this event tell usabout the varieties of Islamic movements and their disparate nonviolentapproaches to politics? In this paper, we explain the different responses ofthese most prominent Turkish-Islamic movements to the Kavakc- ı affair. Weemploy the multi-institutional politics (MIP) model (Armstrong &Bernstein, 2008) to expand the literature on social movement strategies,arguing that activists’ perceptions of the nature and meaning of dominationshould be considered an important part of a movement’s strategicorientation (Downey, 2006; Downey & Rohlinger, 2008).

We illustrate that whether or not social movement actors view domi-nation as being anchored primarily in the state or in other institutions,explains the disparate forms of collective action taken by the two move-ments. We introduce the term ‘‘strategic nonconfrontation’’ as a type ofnonviolent tactic to explain that the Gulen movement’s strategies were notsimply designed to avoid conflict, but, consistent with the MIP model, arosefrom a broader view of how power is constituted in society and that theGulen movement’s decision was both strategic and goal-oriented. Finally,we expand the nonviolent civil resistance literature by arguing that strategicnonconfrontation as a form of nonviolent resistance only becomes visiblewhen we move beyond an exclusive focus on state power to understand theways in which multiple systems of authority and power are constituted insociety and perceived by activists.

We analyze the discourse in newspapers produced by each movement inorder to discern how each movement understood and defined the target ofaction and how that influenced their subsequent strategies. The next section

Multi-Institutional Politics and Strategic Nonconfrontation 65

provides a brief history, followed by a literature review and the results ofour analysis.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In 1996, the National Outlook movement’s political party, the WelfareParty, came into power. Responding to the perceived increase in power of areligiously-based political party, the secular establishment’s routine opposi-tion (Bernstein, 1997) to the National Outlook became more organized.After the February meeting of the National Security Council in 1997, themilitary indirectly intervened in politics by putting extreme pressure on thegovernment to implement policies that would secure the secularist regimefrom ‘‘irtica’’ (religious reactionism). What came to be known as ‘‘thepostmodern coup’’ or ‘‘the February 28th soft coup,’’ ushered in a period ofpolitical turmoil and increasing surveillance of religious life in Turkey thatcontinued until 2001. Soon after the coup, in June 1997, Prime MinisterNecmettin Erbakan, leader of the Welfare Party, was forced to resign.Authorities began to enforce the headscarf ban strictly and more than10,000 women students in Istanbul alone chose to leave their universitiesrather than stop wearing the headscarf. In response, many studentscompleted their university education abroad, while others opted to wearwigs while on university premises (Akbulut-Kuru, 2011; Gurbuz, 2009).

Amidst this turmoil, the April 18, 1999 general countrywide electionsresulted in the election of Nesrin Unal and Merve Kavakc- ı, two women withheadscarves, for the first time in modern Turkish history. What produced atense public debate was not the election of covered deputies, but thepossibility of having covered women in Parliament. The mainstream massmedia, comprised of predominantly secularist writers and commentators,started a campaign against wearing the headscarf in Parliament andreported on whether the new members comply with the law. In mediainterviews, Unal replied that if she absolutely had to, she would uncover herhead, though she preferred not to. Yet Kavakc- ı, a computer sciencegraduate from the University of Texas, declared that she would neitherremove her headscarf nor resign (Shively, 2005).

On May 2, 1999, the opening day of Parliament, the Turkish NationalAssembly witnessed an incensed fight over Kavakc- ı, a 31-year-old womanwearing a headscarf with stylish eyeglasses and a long skirted, moderntwo-piece suit. The overwhelming majority of men and women deputiesstood up in line, clapped their hands for 40 minutes, screaming ‘‘Out, out,


outyMerve out, ayatollahs to Iran,’’ until the session was adjourned. Someshouted, ‘‘Turkey is secular, will remain secular’’ (Gole, 2002, p. 178). Theevent concluded with the removal of Kavakc- ı from Parliament withoutletting her take the oath of office (Hurriyet, May 3, 1999).

The crisis, however, did not end with Kavakc- ı’s removal, because therewas still a possibility that Kavakc- ı would attend upcoming meetings to takeher oath as a duly elected deputy. Turkish president Suleyman Demireldeclared that Kavakc- ı was an ‘‘agent-provocateur’’ whose ‘‘turban’’ wasdifferent from the Anatolian headscarf worn by people in the countrysideand symbolized the Islamic ‘‘fundamentalism of Iran’’ and Afghanistan.Demirel also warned that Kavakc- ı should not attempt to take the oathagain (Sabah, May 5, 1999).

On the basis of Demirel’s accusations, state prosecutor Nuh Yukselindicted Kavakc- ı for dividing the nation by religion, allegedly ‘‘seeking toincite hatred based on religious differences,’’ a violation of the constitution.Three days later, Turkey’s chief anti-Islamist prosecutor, Vural Savas- , fileda case with the Constitutional Court to outlaw the Virtue Party on thecharge that it was seeking to put Turkey under Islamic rule. In hisindictment, Savas- extensively focused on the Kavakc- ı incident (C- emrek,2004, p. 57) and called the Virtue Party a ‘‘malignant tumor.’’ Savas- statedthat Kavakc- ı embodied ‘‘the Islamic threat’’ and Islamists were ‘‘sucking theblood of the secular state like a vampire’’ (Aydıntas-bas- , 1999).

The court case filed against the Virtue Party made the Kavakc- ı issue a real‘‘crisis’’ within the Party. One of its most admired deputies and VicePresident of the Party, Aydın Menderes, resigned, condemning the Party’sconfrontational strategy. Menderes’ resignation and the turmoil within theVirtue Party were covered in the Turkish media for days. A large group ofreformist deputies explicitly stated that they were planning to split off andform their own party, if the public prosecutor succeeded in banning theVirtue Party.

Headscarf ban protests in universities escalated after the crisis to includethousands of pro-Islamic students, many of whom were arrested andsubsequently charged with attempting to overthrow the country’s secularregime. After the protests in Malatya, for example, the State Prosecutorsought the death penalty for 51 individuals and demanded up to 15 years injail for other protestors on lesser charges (Radikal, June 2, 1999). Massprotests on May 8 and 9 at Tehran University in Iran supporting Kavakc- ıfurther strengthened secularist claims that Kavakc- ı was a foreign agent ofHAMAS and Iran, working to overthrow the Turkish secular regime(Hurriyet, May 10, 1999). When it became clear that Kavakc- ı had American


citizenship, she was stripped of Turkish citizenship on May 15th (Hurriyet,May 16, 1999).

Given the significance of the Kavakc- ı crisis in Turkish political history,why did the Gulen and National Outlook movements react so differently tothe crisis after Kavakc- ı was denied the oath of office, when both movementshad previously supported her? How can we account for the variety ofnonviolent strategies in which social movements engage?

LITERATURE

According to Tugal (2009, p. 436), one of the few issues where TurkishIslamists take to the streets concerns issues of religious liberties such asveiling in the universities. Given the severe repression with which streetprotests were treated in Turkey through the 1960s and 1970s and then againafter the military intervention in 1997, the fact that Islamists demonstratedwhen the issue at hand was the veil attests to the issue’s importance. Yet theGulen movement avoided entering a symbolic battle at a time when a moralshock (Jasper, 1997) emerged in the polity that could be used to mobilizeactivists. Given the symbolic importance of the headscarf, the NationalOutlook’s emphasis on demonstrations makes sense, but the GulenMovement’s decision not to demonstrate becomes puzzling.

The social movement literature has not been well poised to analyze thedivergent strategic choices of nonviolent activists under semi-democraticregimes. Tugal’s (2009) research shows that new social movement theoryand political process theory are unable to explain Islamic movements inTurkey because such movements are aimed at transforming everydaypractices in order to transform the state. Tugal (2009) contends thatstrategies are generally aimed at civil society, rather than the state, but thatone of the effects may be state transformation. Similarly, Bayat (2009)argues that new generations of Islamists in the Middle East have a moresophisticated view of state domination, producing a variety of forms ofresistance. Thus, there is a growing need to analyze the variety of forms ofnonviolent strategies.

We argue that the literature on social movement strategies has paidinsufficient attention to examining how activists’ understandings of powerinfluence their strategic choices. We show that the literature on civilresistance has focused disproportionately on challenges to state power,leaving institutional challenges under-analyzed. Drawing on the literatureon culture and social movements and the MIP model, we argue that scholars


must pay attention to how activists understand power in order tounderstand their strategic choices. We develop the concept of ‘‘strategicnonconfrontation’’ as one form of nonviolent resistance that only becomesintelligible with a broader understanding of power.

In their study of how environmental groups interpret the politicalenvironment, Carmin and Balser (2002) argue that political ideology is keyto understanding social movement strategies, but they only focus on thestate. For Carmin and Balser (2002), ideology has to do with whether asocial movement organization views state power from a neo-Marxist orliberal perspective. This ideology, then, determines whether groups engagein direct action aimed at the state (for the neo-Marxists) or pursue moreinstitutional tactics (for the liberals), which are also aimed at the state. Theauthors do not look at how groups understand power more generally, nordo they question the centrality of the state as the locus of activism.

Downey and Rohlinger (2008) develop a more sophisticated approach tounderstanding social movement strategy. They argue that social movementshave a strategic orientation, consisting of two dimensions: first, strategiesdepend on the depth of challenge – that is, the extent to which the movementseeks fundamental social change. Second, strategies depend on the breadthof challenge, which is the extent of activist support required to participate inthe movement. They argue that ‘‘consensus’’ movements require broad sup-port but not much effort from activists and will tend to engage in moderatetactics. Conversely, more radical organizations will have shallower support,require a committed cadre of core activists and engage in more conten-tious tactics to achieve more challenging goals. Thus, movements will beconsistent in strategies based on their general strategic orientation.

Recent studies, however, challenge the assumption that more radicalsocial change requires more contentious tactics by pointing out thedifferences between Western democracies and semi-democratic or author-itarian political contexts (Schock, 2005; Zunes, Kurtz, & Asher, 1999).According to Ash (2009, p. 376), civil resistance has helped to ‘‘redefine therevolution since the 1960s.’’ In fact, a comprehensive comparison of theimpact of nonviolent tactics with the impact of armed insurgency (arguablythe most contentious of tactics) illustrates that nonviolent tactics are moreeffective at securing changes in regimes, ending occupations, and securingself-determination (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Chenoweth & Stephan(2011) point out that nonviolent campaigns can have quite radical goals –after all, what is more radical than overthrowing a regime – yet requirebroad participation. In short, breadth and depth can combine in a varietyof ways.


While the dimensions of Downey and Rohlinger’s (2008) framework maynot apply directly to non-Western contexts, the idea that movements have astrategic orientation provides a useful starting point for understandingsocial movement strategies. Following Armstrong and Bernstein’s (2008)MIP approach, we argue that in order to understand the strategic choicesthat social movements make, scholars must understand how activists graspthe nature of domination. The MIP model argues that power is not onlyvested in the state, but in multiple institutions as well. This power issymbolic and material. Furthermore, the MIP model argues that activistsmust make decisions about which institutions to target and what types ofgoals (cultural, political, institutional, and mobilizational) to emphasize (seealso Bernstein, 2003). Finally, Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) suggest thatgrievances themselves should not be taken for granted, but, must beexplained. Therefore, we analyze how exactly the Gulen and National Out-look movements defined the target of action and how that affects sub-sequent strategies. We also examine how each movement assesses power as adimension that affects their strategic choices, thus providing a role for agency.

From the perspective of political process theory (McAdam, 1982), theGulen movement’s failure to mobilize appears to be a missed opportunity ora failure to mobilize – what Lofland (1993) termed timid, polite, or deraileddissent. By avoiding confrontation with the state, the Gulen movementappears to be accommodating the secularist state and abandoning its ownagenda and commitment to women’s right to wear the headscarf in publicplaces. Downey and Rohlinger (2008) make similar assumptions in theirview that more radical organizations will engage in more contentious tactics.So, turning away from the state or becoming involved in educationalprojects are examples of strategies that have less depth and are not aimed atbroader social change. However, unlike Lofland (1993), Downey andRohlinger (2008) acknowledge that such tactics can be both incremental anddevelopmental aspects of social change.

Downey (2006) maintains that non-contentious strategies can have animportant impact on subsequent movement emergence, and thus, should notbe neglected or dismissed as derailed dissent. In his study of intergrouprelations before the civil rights movement, Downey (2006) finds a variety ofstrategic orientations, such as community service or public education. Heargues that each of these ‘‘consensus-oriented’’ activities is linked to morecontentious activities. However, we suggest that such forms of resistancemay be geared toward changing institutions, culture, or social practices;therefore, it is possible that targeting the state may not be the ultimate goalof activity that appears to be ‘‘consensus-oriented.’’ The ‘‘consensus’’


activity may in fact be targeting something other than the state and need notbe linked to other contentious strategies.

In this paper, we challenge and expand understandings of such ‘‘timid’’ or‘‘polite’’ tactics (Lofland, 1993). Drawing from the MIP perspective(Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008), we argue that in assessing a movement’sstrategic orientation (Downey & Rohlinger, 2008), scholars must assess thepossibility that activists hold a broader understanding of power thatincludes non-state institutions, cultural practices, and other forms ofregulation (e.g., Bernstein & De la Cruz, 2009; Klawiter, 2008; Nepstad,2004b). If activists do not see power as vested solely in the state, theirdecision to avoid confrontation with the state may simply be a strategiccalculation to challenge other manifestations of power and oppression andto pursue social change through non-state avenues.

Understanding how power operates has been central to the literature oncivil resistance. Sharp (1973, 1990), arguably the most important figure forunderstanding nonviolent activism and its relationship to power (Martin,1989; Roberts, 2009), argues that power should be understood as pluralistand relational, rather than something that is monolithic, possessed uniquelyby rulers. In other words, it is not simply the state that holds power, butordinary people obey and consent to that power. Once they withdraw theirconsent and are willing to suffer sanctions, then the regime becomes vul-nerable because it will erode the sources of political power (i.e., authority/legitimacy, human resources, skills and knowledge, ‘‘cultural, religious,and ideological factors’’ (Merriman, 2009, p. 19), material resources, andsanctions) that were needed to keep the regime functioning (Nepstad, 2011,p. 10; Sharp, 1990, pp. 16–17).

However, Sharp has been criticized for ignoring other types of power byfocusing too narrowly on state power and how people resist state power.McGuiness (1993) argues that Sharp ignores women’s experiences becauseof his assumption that power is consensual. According to McGuiness (1993)Sharp’s ideas about how to challenge power cannot be applied to patriarchalrelations between men and women because women are effectively non-citizens who do not consent in the first place. Furthermore, women arecontrolled by the sheer numbers of men and by tactics such as sexualviolence. Thus, withdrawal of consent from patriarchy may not be a viablestrategy. Martin (1989, pp. 216–217) argues that Sharp focuses too much onthe ‘‘ruler-subject dichotomy,’’ and thus, ignores phenomena such as ‘‘thepower relationships associated with capitalism.’’ Martin (1989) andMcGuiness (1993) contend that these other forms of power that structuresocial relations require analysis, and therefore, cast doubt on the idea that


consent–withdrawal will produce significant change in these areas. Withouta clear oppressor, Sharp’s consent model of power becomes less useful.

Building on these critiques, we claim that the focus on the state obscuresan understanding of strategies targeting non-state institutions, practices,systems of knowledge, and cultural norms.

The literature on culture and social movements provides a unique vantagepoint on the issue of power and strategy. Snow (2004) argues that socialmovements are challenges to structures of authority and often to multipleauthorities. Such structures include, but are not limited to, the state. Infact, movements routinely target non-state authorities as well as multipleauthorities (Van Dyke, Soule, & Taylor, 2004). Polletta argues that weshould conceptualize movements as challenges to institutional authorityand that culture should be thought of as the ‘‘rules or schemas for doingthingsy’’ (2004, p. 169). We suggest that cultural schemas become animportant part of a movement’s strategic orientation. In our case, we arguethat perceptions of domination are significant cultural schemas for socialmovements. As we will demonstrate below, challenging the secularism of theTurkish state through avoiding confrontation and instead targeting civilsociety is ultimately aimed at transforming secular authority throughtransforming everyday practices. Thus, the extent to which power is seen asvested in the state is of critical importance for understanding social movementstrategies.

The MIP model was designed to pull these insights together in order torecognize that social movements target multiple sources of power, whichhave material and symbolic dimensions. By expanding an understanding ofpower, the MIP model provides a new lens on ‘‘what strategies and goals areintelligible’’ (Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008, p. 75). A key objective in thisperspective is to understand why challenges take the forms that they do.

In order to understand differences in strategies among the two leadingIslamic movements in Turkey, we develop the concept ‘‘strategic noncon-frontation.’’ Strategic nonconfrontation stems from a broad view of howpower is dispersed throughout society. Strategic nonconfrontation refers to amovement’s decision to avoid direct confrontation with authorities, whilepursuing the same goals through alternative avenues, such as (but notlimited to) challenging everyday cultural practices and the institutions ofcivil society, engaging in forms of ‘‘civil disobedience’’ that are not explicitlydefined as confrontational by authorities (although they may later beunderstood as being confrontational or challenging).

Our study shows that decisions about whether or not to engage in streetprotests depend on how activists define the target of critique and the relative


importance of the political structure in relation to other institutions. Weargue that strategic nonconfrontation should be understood as a form ofnonviolent action that stems from a movement’s understanding of power.

DATA AND METHOD

In order to explain the disparate strategic responses of the two movementsto the Kavakc- ı affair, we examined the Turkish print media coverage of theKavakc- ı crisis in the Milli Gazete and the Zaman from Kavakc- ı’s electionon April 18th to May 2nd when she was not allowed to take the oath ofoffice. Examining this time period enables us to understand the twomovements’ views on Kavakc- ı and the importance of the headscarf. Second,we examine the period from May 3rd to May 16th when Kavakc- ı wasstripped of her Turkish citizenship in order to see how the movements’assessments of the headscarf issue influenced subsequent strategies followingthe May 2nd crisis.

The Milli Gazete is produced by the National Outlook and the Zaman bythe Gulen movement. We chose these newspapers because, in Turkey,Islamic daily papers are crucial to Islamic movements and provide a windowinto movement beliefs and strategies. During the late 1990s, Islamic printmedia was especially significant in the production of cultural meanings andgroup consciousness (Yavuz, 2003, p. 105). At that time, the writers wereoften spokespeople and influential within the movements that sponsor thesepapers. Because of the tight link between movement and newspaper, welimit our formal analysis to the commentary that appeared in the politicalcolumns written by regular columnists, although we read all news storiesrelated to the headscarf issue. Furthermore, in the Turkish media, there is arelatively high volume of columns. Aldikacti-Marshall (2010, p. 579) notes,‘‘Opinions of columnists have higher status than news reporting. Somecolumnists are quite influential in shaping public opinion and setting thepublic agendayFurthermore, they do not need to be of the same opinionas other columnists at the same newspaper, but they have to support thepolitical position of the newspaper.’’ The strong relationship betweenmovement and newspaper means that the dailies can be used to providedirect insight into the workings of the movements.

These newspapers are also important for their ability to frame importantissues in Turkish society. Muslim activists often join collective readingsand discussions of the newspapers in coffee/tea houses, civil organizationsaround mosques, high school/college dormitories, and Islamic bookstores


(Tugal, 2002). These information-sharing networks create an intellectualspace in which the generation of shared meanings and cultural codes takesplace.

We also read the two mainstream secular print newspapers the Hurriyetand the Sabah, as well as two other Islamic dailies, the Yeni Safak and theYeni Asya. The Hurriyet is particularly important because it presents asecularist worldview that is vehemently against the Islamization of thecountry and is one of the most widely circulated dailies in Turkey. Wegathered the newspapers through the online archives of Hurriyet, Sabah,Milli Gazete, and Zaman. For missing online issues, we obtained hardcopiesof the Milli Gazete from the National Library in Ankara.

We conducted a discourse analysis of columns in the Milli Gazete andZaman. For the first time period, we included all columns that substantiallydiscussed elected deputies’ possible challenge to the regime (N¼ 28), whilethe second time period included all columns about the Kavakc- ı incident inParliament (N¼ 94) (see Table 1). We took a dual approach to analyzingthe data. Utilizing an ethnographic content analysis (Altheide, 1987), weread each article closely and let themes regarding the framing of theheadscarf emerge. Then, following the MIP model, we looked for anydefinition of the target – that is, views on who or what was responsiblefor the crisis. We also looked for any discussion of strategy or solutions tothe problem. This process allowed us to determine how the two movementsperceived shifts in the external political environment and how thoseperceptions influenced their strategies. In order to examine the effect ofexpectations of repression on strategies, we wanted to code for perceptionsof the likelihood of repression. However, we found no discussion of thispossibility. We did not find any other themes in our coding that discussedstrategy other than the ones we discuss. By using codes that weretheoretically grounded and developed prior to the analysis (Ragin, 1994)and allowing codes to emerge inductively, we address issues of reliabilityand validity (Stemler, 2001).

Table 1. Number of Articles Analyzed in the Study.

April 18–May 2 May 3–May 16 Total

Zaman 9 32 41

Milli Gazete 19 62 81

Total 28 94 122


Moreover, we recruited an independent coder to ensure intercoderreliability. The second coder analyzed 32 randomly selected articles (26%)of the original sample. The second coder was charged with two tasks: first,we familiarized her with our codes and asked her to code the articles basedon these codes. Second, we asked her to look for any other strategicconcerns that emerged in the data or alternative ways to define the solutionor definition of the target that we did not code for. The coder found noadditional themes. Banerjee, Capozzoli, McSweeney, and Sinha (1999)suggest these criteria for intercoder reliability: 0.75 and above indicatesexcellent agreement; 0.40 to 0.75 signifies moderate agreement; and, below0.40 illustrates poor agreement. Our result indicates 0.70 agreement with theoriginal coding. We then compared the areas of disagreement and were ableto agree upon a code, leading to a higher level of intercoder agreement.

The columns defined the target or the ‘‘enemy’’ in four different ways thatcan be placed on a continuum with secularism on one end and radical Islamon the other end (see Table 2). Any article that criticized the secular char-acter of the state or Kemalism as a state ideology was placed in the category‘‘Secularism.’’ We call the second category ‘‘Weakness of Islamists.’’1 Thesearticles expressed displeasure with the pro-Islamic Nationalist Action Partyfor selling out to the secularists by supporting their covered deputy’sremoval of her headscarf in Parliament. The third category, ‘‘Secularists andIslamists’’ castigates both secularists for their stance against the headscarfand Islamists who insisted on Kavakc- ı’s wearing the headscarf. Thesearticles claimed that the tensions created by the headscarf debate wereultimately damaging to Islamic actors. The fourth category, ‘‘RadicalIslam’’ criticizes the stance of the National Outlook movement thatsponsored Kavakc- ı’s Virtue Party. Articles in this cluster view Kavakc- ı’selection and the insistence that she wear the headscarf as a direct challengeby the Virtue Party to the secularist state.

Each article that we coded also included a proposed solution for how tosolve the problems identified. We call the first category ‘‘ConstitutionalReform.’’ These articles envisioned the solution as challenging the under-standing of secularism in the Turkish constitution. Under the currentprinciple of laicism, following the French model, the Turkish constitutionbans religious symbols from the public sphere (Kuru, 2009). Remedies inthis category propose a more passive definition of secularism, similar to theUS model, that would tolerate religious symbols, and thus, end debatesabout where the public sphere ends and the private sphere begins (Kuru,2009). Other constitutional solutions included expanding freedom ofexpression. The second solution also sees the state as the target, but rather


Table

2.

ComparativeDistributionofColumnArticlesbyDefinitionoftheTarget

andProposedSolutions.

Number

(Percent)ofColumns,

April18–May2

Number

(Percent)ofColumns,

May3–16

Zaman

MilliGazete

Zaman

MilliGazete

Definitionofthetarget

Secularism

7(77.8%)

10(52.6%

)13(40.6%)

58(93.5%

)

WeaknessofIslamists

08(42.1%

)0.0

2(3.2%

)

SecularistsandIslamists

2(22.2%)

1(5.3%

)12(37.5%)

2(3.2%

)

RadicalIslam

00

7(21.9%)

0.0

Totalnumber

9(100%)

19(100%

)32(100%)

62(100%

)

Proposedsolution

Constitutionalreform

7(77.8%)

10(52.6%)

6(18.8%)

17(27.4%)

Partypolitics

08(42.1%

)4(12.5%)

25(40.3%

)

Reconciliationanddialogue

2(22.2%)

1(5.3%)

15(46.9%)

3(4.8%)

Nosolutionoffered

00

7(21.9%)

17(27.4%)

Totalnumber

9(100%)

19(100%

)32(100%)

62(100%

)

Columnsasapproxim

ate

Percent

oftotalcolumnsa

5%

13%

19%

44%

aTheZamanpublished

approxim

ately

12columnsper

day,whereastheMilliGazete

published

10columnsdaily.


than reforming the constitution, seeks change through ‘‘party politics.’’Articles in this category seek to unite pro-Islamic political parties inParliament in order to offer a stronger challenge to secularist policies. Thethird solution offers ‘‘reconciliation and dialogue’’ between Islamists andsecularists and educating future generations as the solution to the crisis. Thissolution calls for investment in long-term educational projects to raiseconsciousness and to gain power and legitimacy for Islam. In this way, theheadscarf issue itself would be depoliticized and, as society becomes moreIslamic, the headscarf issue would resolve itself. As we discuss below, clearpatterns emerged that helped to explain the differing approaches taken bythe two movements in the wake of the events of May 2nd.

FROM ‘‘INCIDENT’’ TO ‘‘AFFAIR’’: THE CRISIS IN

THE PARLIAMENT

All Islamic groups and their media outlets defended Kavakc- ı’s right toappear in Parliament wearing her headscarf. The Islamic print mediaunderscored the fact that there is no explicit statement against wearing theheadscarf in the Parliamentary legal rules of conduct (Yeni Safak, April 251999; Yeni Asya, May 2, 1999). The secularist opposition, on the other hand,noted that no woman had ever worn the headscarf in Parliament, and thus,it would be an explicit offense to the secular Kemalist ideology of theRepublic (Hurriyet, May 2, 1999). Many secularist commentators inter-preted the election of Kavakc- ı as an insidious Islamist plan by NecmettinErbakan, the banned leader of the Welfare Party, to test the secular stateitself (e.g., Yılmaz, 1999). Civil and military officials also joined the publiccontroversy. Newly elected Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, stated thatwearing a headscarf in Parliament was against the norms of the secularregime, and therefore, was unacceptable. In its monthly meeting of theNational Security Council, the election of Merve Kavakc- ı was the mostdiscussed subject matter (Radikal, May 1, 1999).

Political opportunity theory would generally expect similarly situatedsocial movements to react the same way to shifts in opportunity; we wantedto test whether perceptions of opportunity could account for the differentreactions. Since denying Kavakc- ı the right to wear the headscarf was agrievance or threat and, given the penchant of the Turkish state to repressprotesters, we expected that the movements might perceive the possibility ofthreat differently. Surprisingly, however, there was no discussion of thepossibility of state repression in any of the columns that we analyzed.


Drawing on the MIP model (Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008), we argue thatthe ways in which each movement assessed the nature of domination and therelative importance of cultural symbols, the state, and other institutions insupporting that domination (Bernstein, 2003) explains the difference intactics between the two movements. Because the Gulen movement had abroad analysis of power, it was able to shift its tactics after May 2nd toactively pursue women’s right to wear the headscarf in public places whileeschewing the state. The National Outlook’s view of domination as rootedin the state structured its response as well. We now examine the views of theNational Outlook and Gulen movements during the two time periods.

Before the Crisis: Collective Support for Headscarf Freedom

One possible explanation for the difference in strategies after May 2nd isthat the issue was simply less important to the Gulen Movement than to theNational Outlook. Data from the first time period suggests that this was notthe case. During this first time period, all of the columns in the twonewspapers supported Kavakc- ı’s right to wear the headscarf except onecommentary in the Zaman. For example, in criticizing the National SecurityCouncil’s involvement in the Kavakc- ı issue, one Zaman commentatorpointed to the secularist establishment as the root cause of major problemsin the country: ‘‘Turkey can no longer put up with this type of Jacobinsystem anymoreyThe system takes an ideological stance on almost everysingle issue, and as a result, perceives each situation as a struggle in which itfights with its own people’’ (May 2, 1999). Another commentator wrote, ‘‘Ifyou look at the legal codes that regulate the Parliamentary dress, there isnothing that bans headscarvesyThis discrimination in the name of the‘secular state’ demonstrates how impossible it is for all citizens to attainbasic rights and freedoms’’ (April 25, 1999). Columnists also emphasized thesymbolic importance of the headscarf, ‘‘Yes, Merve is a symboly She is asymbol that indicates how democratic the Established Order is! Each sym-bol functions as a litmus test to show the real face of the Established Orderto everyone’’ (May 2, 1999). Table 2 summarizes the data based on how thetwo movements defined the target and what they thought the proposedsolution to the impending or existing crisis for both time periods.

In the first time period, 78% of articles from the Zaman of the Gulenmovement defined secularism as the target while only about one-fifth (22%)blamed both the secularists and Islamists. These perceptions of the targetcorresponded to the proposed solution; either constitutional reform (78%)


or reconciliation and dialogue (22%). By contrast, just over half (53%) ofthe National Outlook’s Milli Gazete articles viewed secularism as theproblem and, therefore, constitutional reform as the answer. Approximately42% of the articles claimed that Islamists were too weak in their resistanceto secularist policies, while only one article (5%) suggested that bothsecularists and Islamists were to blame.

After the Crisis: Diversification of Islamic Movements

While the Zaman’s initial emphasis on secularism as the problem was 25%higher than in the Milli Gazete, suggesting that targeting the state wouldbe a proper solution, this view dropped by nearly half to 41% followingthe crisis of May 2nd. In contrast, the ire of the National Outlook shiftedfrom other Islamists’ being too weak (42%) to secularists (93.5%) afterMay 2nd, consistent with the movement’s support of demonstrations. TheGulen movement, on the other hand, appears to retreat after May 2nd,viewing the secularists (41%), radical Islam (22%), or both (37.5%) as theproblem. These findings illustrate that each movement defined the target inoverlapping ways, but with clear differences in their overall assessment ofwhat or who was to be held accountable.

The National Outlook movement, Turkey’s oldest political Islamicmovement, has passionately positioned itself as pro-right-to-wear, severelycriticizing secularist policies and sponsoring protests against the headscarfban. Furthermore, the National Outlook movement was closely associatedwith the Virtue party and worked to challenge state policies (Kuru, 2005).So, National Outlook activists viewed domination as resting in the secularstate and chose its strategies accordingly.

The National Outlook movement interpreted the Kavakc- ı affair as anexample of discrimination against Turkish Muslims by the secular regime.Kavakc- ı was compared to Rosa Parks of the US Civil Rights Movementand the idea of ‘‘black Turks’’ was widely discussed in Islamic print. TheMilli Gazete published extensively on the issue and also published speechesby Kavakc- ı and Virtue Party leader Recai Kutan. Kutan and Kavakc- ıargued that they did not expect such a massive reaction from politicalleaders, while condemning the Prime Minister for being the real ‘‘pro-vocateur.’’ Kutan claimed that there were no prohibitions in the law againstwearing the headscarf in Parliament and that the secularist elite infringedupon Kemal Ataturk’s famous dictum that was on the Parliamentary board:‘‘Hakimiyet Kayıtsız S-artsız Milletindir!’’ (The Sovereignty Unconditionally


Belongs to the People!). Kavakc- ı emphasized that she applied to the HigherElection Council wearing a headscarf and was elected as a veiled woman.Therefore, she was truly representing the people of Turkey, where 75% ofthe female population wears some form of headscarf (Milli Gazete, May 4,1999).

The Milli Gazete published letters to Kavakc- ı on a daily basis in order tounderscore public support for headscarf freedom. The paper observed thatKavakc- ı’s grandfather was an officer in the Turkish army during the War ofNational Liberation and declared that she was a ‘‘child of the Republic’’(May 4, 1999). The Milli Gazete also allocated considerable space to state-ments and demonstrations by Islamic civil and women’s rights organizations.

The overwhelming majority (93.5%) of the Milli Gazete columns after thecrisis were severely critical of the secularist regime. Headlines included harshverbal attacks on the Kemalist elite: ‘‘Fool Ignorants!’’ (May 5, 1999); ‘‘IsYour Sole Job to Provoke?’’ (May 10, 1999); and ‘‘Shame on You!’’ (May14, 1999). Likewise, some columnists’ articles were entitled provocatively as‘‘Laic Talibans!’’ (May 9, 1999) and ‘‘What kind of Prime Minister is He?’’(May 6, 1999). The significance of these headlines lies in their ability tosuccinctly represent the content of the columns (Alat, 2006; Aldikacti-Marshall, 2010).

The National Outlook’s critical stance was reflected in attitudes towardother Islamic groups as well. In his article, ‘‘They Sold Our CauseOut!,’’ S-evket Eygi of the Milli Gazete complained about the weakness ofMuslims: ‘‘Where are the fake rescuers and jihadists who should defendthe girls- who were offended, tortured, and suffered at the University gates-;in which hell they pursue their own profits’’ (May 4, 1999). Criticism ofIslamic groups in the column articles, however, were in sharp decline (3.2%)compared to the pre-crisis period (42.1%).

The most common solutions offered in the Milli Gazete were to form apro-Islamic pact in the Turkish Grand National Assembly throughdemocratic party politics (40.3%) and to support a change in the TurkishConstitution, which firmly defends the secularist regime (27.4%). Only threecolumns (4.8%) proposed reconciliation and dialogue, illustrating the focuson the state as a locus for change. More than a quarter of the columns(27.4%) were full of criticism but did not offer any remedy, suggesting aninability to see other ways to fight the issue and illustrating theirunderstanding of the configuration of power.

For the Gulen movement, the Kavakc- ı affair had worsened the headscarfissue. The hope for headscarf freedom was wiped out by the polarizationbetween the secularists and political Islamists. Commentary in the Zaman


daily after the Kavakc- ı crisis reflects the movement’s view that the escalationof conflict was futile and that the cause would be better served by thenonviolent strategy of reconciliation and dialogue. For example, theheadlines of the daily included: ‘‘The Crisis should not be Escalated!’’(May 4, 1999), ‘‘The Problem should be Solved: The Call for aReconciliation’’ (May 6, 1999), ‘‘Who Benefits from the Tension?’’ (May10, 1999), and ‘‘The Call to People of Malatya for Temperance’’ (May 11,1999). As days passed, the columns in the Zaman reflected double-edgedmoderate criticisms against both the Kemalist and Islamist parties (37.5%)and called for societal reconciliation (46.9%). ‘‘Although the differencesbetween the secular and religious lifestyles is not a problem for most peoplein public,’’ wrote one commentator, ‘‘militants are transforming thesedifferences into a fight between secularists and IslamistsyDespite hard-ships, we should try love instead of hate, reconciliation instead of fight, andtolerance instead of abhorrence’’ (May 11, 1999). Columnists emphasizedthe Gulen movement’s reconciliatory position: ‘‘We have an ‘alternativeposition’ that enables us to speak to the two sides and to question both ofthem; and since this kind of position is becoming more crucial for thenation, we will patiently pursue this path’’ (May 13, 1999).

Authors in the Zaman frequently noted that the National Outlook’spolitical strategies and ideological fight were futile attempts to solve theproblems of the Muslim polity due to the civil-bureaucratic establishment’shard-line secularist emphasis on symbolic order. Nearly 22% of all articleson the issue were harsh criticisms of radical and political Islamic move-ments. According to the commentators, oppressive state policies towardMuslims were the result of Welfare Party (precursor to Kavakc- ı’s VirtueParty) policies and the National Outlook’s bitter stance toward authorities.Columnist Huseyin Gulerce, for example, argued that the closure of Imam-Hatip (Imam-Preacher) middle schools and Qur’an courses as well as thestrict imposition of the headscarf ban in universities that occurred duringthe February 28th process were in direct reaction to the Welfare Party of theNational Outlook. Gulerce added that engaging in pitched ideological fightsand their symbolic expressions did not help Muslims’ positions in society;rather, these political attitudes made them worse (Zaman, May 4, 1999).

In challenging the approach of other Islamists, the Gulen movementillustrated its more expansive view of power and social change that includededucation. The Zaman reproduced Fethullah Gulen’s earlier articles thatcommented on populist Islamic strategies (May 5 and May 6, 1999). Gulenargued that Turkey, acting as a great nation, should prepare itself fortomorrow by producing profound plans and projects as well as nurturing


ideal generations, dedicated to serving their people. Gulen criticizedIslamists’ individualistic futile strategies that would further harm the futureof all Muslims in general, and the many volunteer educators who wereabroad. Gulen maintained that both non-action and action without disciplinemean ‘‘death’’ in different ways, implying that the National Outlook’sstrategy hurts all Muslims in Turkey.

The Gulen movement not only criticized the political Islam of theNational Outlook, but also denounced the secularist attack on Kavakc- ı.Such criticism, however, emphasized not religious rights but the totalitariannature of the state and the need for defending women’s rights in general. Inhis column, Nuh Gonultas- , for instance, claimed that the secular regime hada problem with women’s freedom from its very beginning, which isunacceptable in a Westernized nation (May 4, 1999).

Thus, the Gulen movement criticized both the Islamists and secularists,trying to find a balance between them. Almost half of the columns (46.9%)were devoted to the need for dialogue between the two camps and educatingnew generations for mutual cooperation as a solution. As one of thecolumnists maintained on behalf of the movement, they shall never be a partof this Kemalist versus Islamist fight, which was ‘‘full of struggle, feelingsof retaliation, passions of revenge, a lack of love, intolerance, and envy’’(May 13, 1999). ‘‘We repeat once again,’’ he wrote, ‘‘our revival as a nationwill be held by those who are kindhearted and compassionate through theirconsiderate actions, love and tolerance’’ (May 13, 1999).

DISCUSSION: ANALYZING STRATEGIC

NONCONFRONTATION

Why did the crisis of May 2nd result in a decrease in defining the target assecularists for the Gulen movement while leading to an increase in definingthe target as secularists for the National Outlook movement? Why did theGulen movement shift from emphasizing constitutional reform to reconci-liation and dialogue while the National Outlook became more divided aboutthe best solution?

One possible explanation for the difference in strategies is that each has adifferent ‘‘taste’’ for certain types of tactics (Polletta & Jasper, 2001). Thisscenario would view the Gulen movement as nonconfrontational onprinciple, having a set strategic orientation (Downey & Rohlinger, 2008),rather than shifting strategy according to issue. It was commonplace


knowledge in Turkish society that the two movements had different tacticalpreferences. On the one hand, the National Outlook movement hadorganized many protests over the years. The Gulen movement, on the otherhand, has a culture of nonconfrontation with the state by fostering anidentity for education, which is deploying its identity politically as a way toeducate rather than critique the practices and policies of dominant society(Bernstein, 1997). Yet, the Gulen movement also shows flexibility in tactics.For example, since the Kavakc- ı affair, the Gulen movement has engaged inboth confrontational approaches, in the case of the Ergenekon trial againstputschists in the Turkish bureaucracy and civil society (Cagaptay, 2010),and avoided confrontation, as in the case of the Freedom Flotilla againstIsrael (Lauira, 2010). In short, the Gulen movement is not ideologicallyopposed to confrontational tactics. Even having a taste or preference forcertain tactics over others does not provide a sufficient explanation for thatpreference. So why, given how vocally supportive the Gulen movement wasin its defense of Kavakc- ı, did it shift tactics after the May 2nd crisis?

Differences in the symbolic importance attributed to the headscarf byeach movement cannot explain the difference in tactics. The secularist elitesimbue the symbols of Islam, specifically, the headscarf, with considerablecultural power. As a result, maintaining a secular Turkish Republic meansmaintaining cultural control or hegemony, particularly in publicly fundeddomains (Gurbuz, 2009; Kuru, 2009). Therefore, the battle over symbols forthe secularists and for the National Outlook is highly charged. The symbolicbattle over the headscarf is also highly charged for the Gulen movement asevidenced by the emphasis they gave the issue immediately followingKavakc- ı’s election.

Another possible explanation is that the Gulen movement is seeking todistance itself from anything that can be associated with radical Islam,including the National Outlook movement. In the past, the Gulenmovement has successfully mobilized support among the Islamic factionsof the polity as well as the secular public (Turam, 2007). Therefore, in orderto sustain this support, the Gulen movement distances itself from theNational Outlook movement. After May 2nd, the movement did becomevery critical of the National Outlook movement, deciding not to supportthe protests.

The aforementioned explanation, however, implies that the Gulenmovement stepped aside in order to be able to negotiate better with thestate after the National Outlook protests were over, thus reaping the benefitsof the radical flank effect (Haines, 1988). This view misses the idea thatdifferences in strategy between the two movements reflect fundamental


differences in the movement activists’ cognitive worlds (cf. Eyerman &Jamison, 1991) and in how they view power and the nature of domination(Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008). Whereas the National Outlook viewsdomination by the secularists as hegemonic, the Gulen movement seespower as more dispersed in civil society. As we discuss below, part of theraison d’etre of the Gulen Movement is to transform everyday practicesthrough a broad program of education, a form of nonviolent protest.

Thus, in order to change the political structure as well as policiesregarding the headscarf ban, the Gulen movement consciously avoideddirectly confronting the secularist elite, believing that the politics ofengagement (see Turam, 2007) requires what we call ‘‘strategic noncon-frontation.’’ The renewed focus of the Gulen movement on reconciliationand dialogue (which more than doubled after May 2nd) is illustrative of thisview. For the National Outlook, on the other hand, defining the state as thetarget nearly doubled after May 2nd, accounting for 93% of articles.

Our concept of strategic nonconfrontation as a form of nonviolentprotest makes sense through the MIP (Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008) lens.We define strategic nonconfrontation as a movement’s decision to avoiddirect confrontation with authorities, in this case, the state, whilesimultaneously pursuing the same goals through other venues such as (butnot limited to) challenging everyday cultural practices and the institutionsof civil society, engaging in forms of ‘‘civil disobedience’’ that are notexplicitly defined as confrontational by authorities (although they maycome to be understood later as being confrontational or challenging). Thisstrategy of strategic nonconfrontation arises from an understanding ofpower as broadly dispersed throughout society. Strategic nonconfrontationbecomes what Blumer (1954) calls a ‘‘sensitizing concept,’’ alerting analyststo the possibility that movements may avoid confrontation not becausethey are waiting for a more auspicious time, but they may be taking actiondeliberately aimed at creating social change in other realms. Far fromderailed dissent (Lofland, 1993), strategic nonconfrontation is activism tar-geted at other institutions, culture, and social practices, that have histori-cally been below the radar of social movement scholarship (Armstrong &Bernstein, 2008).

By taking a broader view of power, we also expand the literature on civilresistance. Sharp (1973, 2000) posits that one part of nonviolent resistance isbuilding ‘‘pillars of support.’’ The idea is that these pillars will ultimatelyprovide a basis of support for civil resistance movements seeking to takepower (Merriman, 2009, p. 21). However, this view often remains state-centric and assumes a clear opponent. Viewing the Gulen movement’s


approach as creating pillars of support for an Islamic way of life from whicha movement could develop or challenge the state – neglects the idea thatthrough creating these pillars, social change is happening. In other words,creating such spaces is a challenge to everyday cultural practices and part ofa broad program of social transformation, which may ultimately influencethe state without being the direct goal. Such strategies only become visiblethrough an MIP lens. By expanding an understanding of power, certainnonviolent strategies become visible and enable us to better understandactivists’ strategic choices.

As we have shown, the Gulen movement takes a broad analysis of thereasons why society represses Islam and, accordingly, views responses tothat battle emerging in multiple frontiers. It sees the cultural symbol of theheadscarf as important and yet the promotion of Islam more generally isthe goal. That cultural change can take place not only through targeting thegovernment, but even more importantly, through dialogue and educa-tion, which leads the movement to focus on building other institutions inorder to reach its goals. In short, the Gulen movement sees power as vestedin multiple institutions, and therefore, can continue to advocate for changeeven when not engaging in visibly contentious politics. In contrast, theNational Outlook movement sees power vested primarily in the state anddoes not target other institutions. It is this difference in understandingpower and domination that leads each to choose different sites of battle.

These differing views of domination are reflected in where each movementstrategically developed and placed its resources. These differences are notcaused by disparate resources, but rather are a reflection of a particularstrategic orientation. The National Outlook was tied to a political party,while the Gulen movement was not. The Gulen movement has long seendebates over the place of Islam in society as multisited. Over the past threedecades, the movement has established cultural organizations, interfaithdialogue institutions, college student bodies, and hundreds of educationalcenters all over the world including research universities (Ebaugh, 2010;Esposito & Yilmaz, 2010; Yavuz & Esposito, 2003). This multisited strategyexplains why, after May 2nd, the Gulen movement shifted its emphasis awayfrom defining the target as the state and increased its emphasis onreconciliation and dialogue.

For Gulen movement activists, strategic nonconfrontation is a form ofnonviolent resistance, providing a base for challenging power. Since themovement perceives that the fight over headscarves has been exploitedby the power holders to de-legitimize Islamic mobilizations, the Gulensupporters challenge the system by avoiding confrontation.


An overwhelming majority of the Gulen movement’s female followershave adopted the headscarf as they embrace an Islamic way of life (Ozdalga,2003). While they avoid symbolic contention with the establishment, theteachers of the Gulen schools and the college women who are among theGulen followers have developed the idea that representing Islam by conductand good morals is the best way to serve the cause of Islam (Turam, 2007).Although wearing the headscarf has been an indispensable part of theireveryday lives, Gulen movement activists did not give up pursuing theircollege education under the headscarf ban. This collective nonconfronta-tional strategy was a result of their perception of the power structure inmodern Turkish society. Movement activists believe that if they give up theireducation, eventually the secularist opposition will become more educated,and thus, will be able to preserve their privileges at the expense of theIslamic community (Akbulut-Kuru, 2011; Yavuz, 2003, p. 197). Thus,ironically, their obedience to authorities and pursuing a college educationwithout wearing a headscarf has gained a new meaning of passive resistanceand civil disobedience. After the strict enforcement of the ban, the majorityof the Gulen movement activists started to wear wigs and hats in universitiesto cover their hair, and as soon as they were out of the school zone (i.e.,‘‘public domain’’) they continued to practice headscarf adoption. In thisway, they showed their anger and frustration at the ban. Therefore, a failureto demonstrate can be a form of strategic nonconfrontation and represents adifferent form of mobilization. In fact, extension of the headscarf ban insome universities to include wearing wigs (Gurbuz, 2009, p. 246) indicatesthat officials perceived these types of nonconfrontational challenges ascollective action (Turam, 2008).

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have argued that although the Gulen and NationalOutlook movements had similar responses to the election of MerveKavakc- ı, each movement engaged in very different strategies in the wake ofthe crisis of May 2nd. Consistent with moral shock theories, theories ofpolitical opportunity, as well as new social movement theory, the NationalOutlook movement engaged in radical protests designed to challenge thesecularist state. In contrast to the expectations of these various theories,however, the Gulen movement avoided direct confrontation altogether,calling instead for reconciliation and dialogue and for a general easing oftensions. Yet, we have argued that the avoidance of confrontation should not


be understood as a withdrawal from activism or an abandonment of socialchange efforts.

Drawing on the MIP model, we have shown that each movementperceived of the structure of power in different ways. While the NationalOutlook movement saw power as primarily vested in the state, and thus, thestate was the appropriate target, the Gulen movement viewed dominationas more dispersed and multisited, rather than centered around one source.It is this difference that accounts for the Gulen movement’s efforts todevelop a balancing strategy between Islamists and secularists. This suggeststhat in conceptualizing a movement’s strategic orientation, researchersshould also take into account its perception of power. We introduced theterm ‘‘strategic nonconfrontation’’ to describe the Gulen’s movement’schallenge to the secularist regime through targeting civil society and itsdeliberate attempt to prevent Islamic activists from becoming involved indirect clashes with state elites. Expanding an understanding of powerbeyond the state contributes to the literature on civil resistance by makingvisible nonviolent strategies that would not otherwise be taken into account.

Our research has several implications for the study of nonviolent Islamicmovements. First, nonviolent activism refers to a broad range of formsof collective resistance and it is imperative to analyze the variations ofnonviolent strategies in order to conceptualize the changing nature ofIslamism, especially after the ‘‘Arab Spring.’’ Nonviolent strategies, are notmonolithic; and conceptualizing the variety of nonviolent Islamic move-ments is important for understanding the transformation of political Islamin Turkey. The Gulen movement’s strategy against the secularist regime, asKuru (2006) highlights, has provided a new perspective on democracy anddialogue in the conservative democracy movement, which generated the firstIslamic rooted party (Justice and Development Party, AKP) that supportsthe European Union membership process.

Second, in comparing two nonviolent Islamic movements’ perception ofpower and domination, our work contributes to the growing literaturethat emphasizes the importance of cognitive approaches in studying non-violent activism (Kurtz, 2005; Gurbuz & Purkayastha, 2009). Nepstad(2004a, 2004b), for example, demonstrates how life perceptions of diversereligious movements matter in their approach to violence and nonviolence.By examining two nonviolent Islamic movements that have similar lifeperceptions in terms of religious worldviews, we extend Nepstad’s analysisto include perceptions of political domination.

Third, the concept strategic nonconfrontation suggests the idea thatnonviolent social movement strategies involve more than just protest and


demonstrations. Limiting research to a focus on such visible strategieshinders our ability to understand the strategic calculations of movementsand may lead to misinterpreting non-protest action as inaction or passivism.As described above, Gulen movement activists believe that engaging instrategic nonconfrontation as targeting civil society through reconciliation,dialogue, and education provides a way to transform everyday conscious-ness, practices, and the state.

NOTE

1. Today, the Nationalist Action Party, MHP, is not a pro-Islamic party inTurkish politics. Yet, in the 1990s, the party explicitly employed an Islamicdiscourse.

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