recovering understanding in the right way

Recovering Understanding in the

Right WayBachelor Thesis

Daniel Coposescu

1003781 – A 033 541

[email protected]

DANIEL COPOSESCU – 1003781SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty – WS 12/13Velislava Mitova

180027 SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty

Dr Velislava Mitova – WS 2012/13

Institut für Philosophie

Universität Wien

Plagiatserklärung

Hiermit erkläre ich, dass ich die vorgelegte Arbeit selbstständig

verfasst und ausschließlich die angegebenen Quellen und

Hilfsmittel benutzt habe. Alle wörtlich oder dem Sinn nach aus

anderen Werken entnommenen Textstellen und Gedankengänge sind

durch genaue Angabe der Quelle (einschl. Seitenangabe, exakte URL

usw.) – in Form von Fußnoten oder In-Text-Zitationen

– gekennzeichnet. Dies gilt insbesondere für Quellen aus dem

Internet, die unter Angabe von Autor/in (soweit recherchierbar),

Titel (sofern vorhanden), genauer WWW-Adresse und Zugriffsdatum

auszuweisen sind. Mir ist bekannt, dass auch nur einzelne Fälle

von Plagiat zur Nicht-Bewertung der gesamten LV führen und der

SPL gemeldet werden. Des Weiteren versichere ich, dass ich diese

2

DANIEL COPOSESCU – 1003781SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty – WS 12/13Velislava MitovaArbeit noch an keinem anderen Institut zur Beurteilung vorgelegt

habe.

Coposescu

Daniel

Wien, 28.02.2013

3


Table of Contents

0. Introduction

4

I. Zagzebski’s Recovery of Understanding

6

II. Phil the Healer and Two Problems

11

III. Factuality

13

IV. Coherence

16

V. Coherence and Factuality

19

Bibliography 21

4


0. IntroductionIn her paper ‘Recovering Understanding’, Linda Zagzebski

traces the historical progress of epistemology to argue for the

reintroduction of the concept of understanding in the forefront

of epistemic investigation. Zagzebski sketches an account of

understanding based on Platonic and Aristotelian deliberations

and also distinguishes the notion from knowledge. Concurrently,

she attempts to show that the weight ascribed to the concept in

academic debates depends on periods of historical preoccupation

with countering skeptical arguments. Zagzebski then proposes that

virtue epistemology already has the tools to recover the value of

understanding.

The strategy employed in the essay consists first in

reconstructing a theory of the nature of understanding from the

writings of Plato and Aristotle, who, according to Zagzebski,

represent an a-skeptical period in epistemology, and are thus

unconcerned with justification. From the former, she identifies

understanding as a cognitive state that has its roots in the

mastering of a practical skill (a techne), that is, a non-

cognitive endeavor. Since the acquiring of such a techne renders

one an expert over an entire field, the object of understanding

cannot consist in individual propositions, but rather ‘involves

seeing the relations of parts to other parts and perhaps even the

relation of part to a whole.’ (Zagzebski, 2001/241) Consequently,

understanding aims at representing and grasping certain ‘non-5

DANIEL COPOSESCU – 1003781SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty – WS 12/13Velislava Mitovapropositional structures of reality’. This state allows one to

become reliably successful across the field of expertise of the

skill and for this reason understanding is a property of

character, rather than of a proposition (as opposed to

justification, which is a property of the latter). Insofar as the

success component implies the possibility of failure, skepticism

can also be applied to understanding, but, according to

Zagzebski, only regarding the infallibility of the success test,

which is straightforwardly provided by results within the

practice in question, and is an internal matter.

Following these considerations pertaining to the nature of

understanding, Zagzebski proceeds to differentiate the concept

from knowledge. Though understanding sometimes presupposes

knowledge, it does not do so necessarily. The former can obtain

in the absence of the latter and understanding can be hindered by

focusing on truth. This is because understanding often aims at

simplification in order to achieve its purpose of

comprehensiveness, as opposed to the exactness of truth. Finally,

understanding cannot be achieved without transparency, that is,

the awareness of the state having obtained.

In this paper, I will argue that Zagzebski’s account of the

nature of understanding as ‘the state of comprehension of

nonpropositional structures of reality’ (Zagzebski, 2001/242)

faces two main problems. I will call the first one the success

problem, which relates to the tension between construing

6

DANIEL COPOSESCU – 1003781SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty – WS 12/13Velislava Mitovaunderstanding as a conceptually non-propositional state and the

success criterion. Using Jonathan Kvanvig’s distinction between

propositional and objectual understanding, I suggest that testing

the success of understanding sometimes depends on a propositional

form of understanding, and thus that the latter cannot be thought

of as an exclusively non-propositional state. The second problem

is a metaphysical one, and it concerns the complications

regarding the structure of reality that arise from Zagzebski’s

thesis. As acknowledged by the author, the theory seems to force

us to assume that, in understanding, we construct non-

propositional representations of reality rather than grasp

already existing structures, which will prove implausible once I

have established the success problem. In establishing a solution

for these two issues, I will offer arguments for thinking about

understanding as having a constitutive, though not exclusive,

propositional component. This amounts to claiming that

understanding cannot be construed as essentially non-

propositional, as Zagzebski takes it to be. I subsequently

propose that we follow the considerations of Kvanvig and Wayne

Riggs and think of understanding in terms of coherence instead of

comprehensiveness, which allows one to avoid committing to

questionable metaphysical claims and offers a stronger account of

the value of understanding.

Section I will present a detailed summary of Zagzebski’s

account of understanding, as elaborated in her paper ‘Recovering

Understanding’, with particular focus on the arguments relating

7

DANIEL COPOSESCU – 1003781SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty – WS 12/13Velislava Mitovato the nature of understanding according to the author. In

section II, I will explain what the success problem and the

metaphysical problem consist in through a skeptical scenario, and

how these issues follow necessarily from Zagzebski’s

considerations. In section III, I will introduce the account of

Jonathan Kvanvig and describe how it can be used to develop a

theory of the nature of understanding that is immune to the

skeptical scenario, by defending the claim that understanding is

constitutively propositional. Section IV will elaborate the role

of coherence in my proposed definition of understanding, again

drawing influence from Kvanvig. Finally, I will bring in Wayne

Riggs’ considerations as further support in showing why coherence

and propositions are co-constitutive of understanding.

I. Zagzebski’s Recovery of UnderstandingZagzebski’s aim in her essay is to show how contextualizing

the historical developments in epistemology offers an important

criterion for determining the focus of philosophical

investigations. Inasmuch as skepticism was perceived as a serious

threat to the possibility of knowledge in some periods, the

central concept in epistemic debates has been that of

justification. However, this has caused valuable notions such as

understanding to be neglected and Zagzebski calls for a return to

a-skeptical traditions, typified by Plato and Aristotle, in order

to recover the plurality of epistemic values. Influenced by

interpretations of Plato’s episteme, translated as understanding,8

DANIEL COPOSESCU – 1003781SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty – WS 12/13Velislava Mitovashe proceeds to elucidate the nature of understanding as a state

of comprehending the non-propositional features of reality by

identifying three main characteristics: understanding results

from the mastering of a practical skill which gives one the

status of an expert over a certain field, it has the grasping of

part-whole relations as an object, and it aims at representing

the world in a non-propositional way. I will now describe this

account in more detail.

In illustrating that Plato was not interested in knowledge

as justified true belief, but rather in understanding, Zagzebski

first introduces the term techne, as it is present in the Platonic

dialogues. Techne is the basis of what is called expert knowledge

and of wisdom, and is in essence a practical skill, to be

mastered by an agent. The content of the skill may vary from

carpeting to science but for Plato the object is always the same:

knowledge of the good. Since acquiring a techne implies this sort

of knowledge and aims at every aspect of the object in question,

one becomes a highly reliable source of information regarding the

content of one’s particular skill. This fact is ultimately

demonstrated in one’s ability to provide a Socratic definition of

the good at which the techne aims. Therefore, acquiring such a

skill provides the agent with understanding of its nature and

object, which constitute a field of expertise. This cognitive

state is however based on a partly non-cognitive endeavor, the

specific practical elements that make up the techne.

9


This, according to Zagzebski, already gestures at a second

feature of understanding, namely, the fact that it targets the

relation between different parts and/or between the part and the

whole of a field. It is not singular propositions or facts that

allow one to have understanding of the skill in question, but

rather the way in which these combine and relate to each other

within and with the whole that they make up. Accordingly, one

does not, for example, understand the Second World War by simply

demonstrating knowledge of the timeline of the battles without

being acquainted with the complex political, social and economic

factors that build up the context of the events and how they

influenced subsequent actions. The same goes for scientific

theories. Once these connections can be properly explained, the

techne has been mastered and one can claim understanding, an

aspect which hints at the link between understanding and

explanation. As already mentioned, part of what constitutes

understanding in a Platonic sense is being able to sufficiently

define the nature of and the good produced by one’s techne (the

‘elenchus test’). Thus, the ability to provide an explanation can

be considered part of the success test of having achieved

understanding of something, together with the internalist

10

DANIEL COPOSESCU – 1003781SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty – WS 12/13Velislava Mitovacondition of being reflexively aware of being in a state of

understanding.

Zagzebski’s considerations clarify why such an agent is seen

as an expert: one becomes a reliable source of information for a

domain, not just because one knows individual facts, but because

one understands how they interrelate and make up the totality of

the domain. Furthermore, one is also reliably successful in

achieving the goal of the techne in question. A footballer who

understands his practice is expected to demonstrate his or her

understanding on the pitch, in the multitude of situations that

can arise, just as a medicine student that grasps his subject

matter must demonstrate his or her comprehension in the

application of what he or she has studied. So the goal of the

skill is not necessarily an epistemic one.

Zagzebski consequently speaks of a success component of

understanding that can be tested quite unambiguously by checking

whether the goal has been achieved, whether this consists in an

adequate explanation or in the concrete results of the techne. The

success component is thus simply defined by the skill. The same

applies to the explanation, where it is required. There is no

universal formula of an explanation, but rather whether an

explanation is up to standards is to be determined within the

practical skill and by its goals. Furthermore, a requirement for

the state of understanding to obtain that Zagzebski identifies,

which she calls the

11

DANIEL COPOSESCU – 1003781SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty – WS 12/13Velislava Mitovainternalist condition. While elaborating the differences between

understanding and knowledge, she argues that the former is

necessarily reflexive, in that one cannot understand something

without being aware of having achieved this state. As opposed to

knowledge, where the appeal to factors outside of one’s self

cannot be avoided due to the claim to truth, understanding is a

matter of internal awareness. This conscious transparency enables

one to demonstrate understanding from internal resources and is

thus constitutive of the state. It is also why Zagzebski

conceives understanding as a trait of character, not of a

proposition.

For Zagzebski, it now becomes obvious that grasping

relations is not (purely) a matter of propositions: ‘One’s mental

representation of what one understands is likely to include such

things as maps, graphs, diagrams, and three-dimensional models

(...)’(Zagzebski 2001/241). This form of reasoning helps the

agent not only to achieve understanding himself, but also to

illustrate the highly complex content of the techne in an

accessible way when offering explanations. An example of such

non-propositional reasoning is Sewall Wright’s slope-metaphor for

the adaptive genetic mechanisms of populations. Zagzebski argues

that offering such visual images as analogies is part and parcel

of the type of thinking that is necessary for understanding.

Assuming that reality is structured, representing these

structures need not be propositional. Given examples such as the

one mentioned above, musical elements, works of art, and so on,

12

DANIEL COPOSESCU – 1003781SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty – WS 12/13Velislava MitovaZagzebski argues that we have ample reasons to deny that ‘the

proposition is the only form in which reality can be made

intelligible to the human mind.’ (Zagzebski 2001/242) This

metaphysical point which Zagzebski makes is founded on the

premise that, whether or not structures are imposed on reality by

the human mind, it is improbable that these structures are

exclusively propositional in nature, in light of the examples

above. Moreover, a further epistemic point seems to be that

representing certain features of reality non-propositionally as

understanding requires improves one’s comprehension of them

beyond what could be achieved through descriptive sentences. This

assertion relates to the ways in which one can represent the

world, and it suggests non-propositional representations

sometimes offer a better or more accurate image of reality than

sentences do.

This construal of the nature of understanding raises some

metaphysical issues, as acknowledged by Zagzebski, regarding the

relationship between mind and world. The structures of reality

mentioned can either be inherent to the world itself, independent

of the human mind,

which tracks and reproduces them cognitively, or the

representations that one builds can be imposed on reality as a

way of representing it to oneself. While further distinguishing

understanding from knowledge, Zagzebski implies that her account

tends to support the latter position (Zagzebski, 2001/250;

13

DANIEL COPOSESCU – 1003781SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty – WS 12/13Velislava Mitovafn.14). Because a theory, which conventionally aims at imparting

understanding, purports to represent reality, multiple competing

theories can claim an equally accurate representation of the same

structure. For example, a different image-based explanation of

the adaptive mechanisms of populations could be just as

successful in imparting understanding of the matter as Wright’s

slope-metaphor mentioned earlier. Epistemology itself offers

another example of equally valuable, yet competing theories.

Zagzebski mentions the raft and the pyramid, which represent ‘two

main models of justified doxastic structures’ (Zagzebski,

2001/243), coherentism and foundationalism, respectively.

These developments have two implications. The first is that

understanding cannot be a form of knowledge. If understanding

were a subclass or form of knowledge, then two or more mutually

exclusive theories (which aim at understanding) could not be

equally valuable or accurate in their representations. Saying

otherwise would suggest that there are two different ‘knowledges’

about the same object. However, this being the second

implication, it now seems that this plurality of options in

representing an aspect of the world’s structure requires one to

concede that, in understanding, one imposes a certain

construction of the mind on reality. Subsequently, there cannot

be any claim as to whether the represented structure actually

exists objectively. Zagzebski mentions that this is not a crucial

point in her account, as even admitting that understanding always

implies knowledge in order to avoid denying the thesis of an

14

DANIEL COPOSESCU – 1003781SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty – WS 12/13Velislava Mitovaobjectively structured reality would not pose a problem for her

conception of understanding. Moreover, it would strengthen her

claim for the concept of understanding to be taken more seriously

in epistemology.

In the final part of the paper, Zagzebski offers some

thoughts on what the value of understanding might consists in,

given her deliberations. She also supports virtue epistemology as

the most suitable theory for recovering and integrating

understanding and encourages the widening of the scope of

epistemic investigation beyond that of propositional knowledge.

As already mentioned, Zagzebski makes the intuitively plausible

claim that theories aim to further understanding and this must

also be the case in epistemology. Understanding therefore already

seems to be tacitly valued and this speaks in favor of making the

concept an explicit matter of enquiry. Since recent developments

have made it clear that knowledge requires something more than

justified true belief, there is good reason to think of

understanding as part of this additional necessary component.

Virtue theories, as presented by Zagzebski, can provide an

adequate theoretical framework for such an investigation, insofar

as they tie justification to the virtuous character.

According to Zagzebski’s own account of intellectual virtue,

knowledge is the result of true belief produced by an epistemic

virtue. Such virtues are a character trait of the agent and can

give rise to more than propositional states. As she has already

15

DANIEL COPOSESCU – 1003781SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty – WS 12/13Velislava Mitovadefined understanding as the property of a character, not a

proposition, Zagzebski takes this to be a legitimate reason for

the claim that virtue epistemology has the tools to do justice to

the value of the concept.

As, in Zagzebski’s opinion, ‘Epistemology is dominated by

the information model of knowledge’ (Zagzebski, 2001/247), which

places propositions in the center of attention, most theories

cannot make proper sense of understanding, precisely because it

is non-propositional in nature. But if we think of knowledge in

terms of true belief produced by an epistemic virtue, then

knowledge itself has a non-propositional aspect to it (since

virtues are not sentences and beliefs themselves). This is where

understanding and knowledge can come together, a link which the

concept of virtue can aid in explaining. Essentially, the

argument is that the definition of knowledge can remain neutral

regarding its object (whether it is propositional or not), and,

the importance of understanding in epistemology having been

established, placing the concept in the context of virtue theory

can have beneficial results. Zagzebski suggests that there may

even be virtues that are specifically conducive to understanding,

thus highlighting the importance of ‘[aiming] to understand how

understanding relates to knowledge and the other objects of

epistemological study.’ (Zagzebski, 2001/249) However, she makes

no further claims on the matter, and remains satisfied with

showing the advantages of thinking of understanding in terms of

virtue epistemology.

16


II. Phil the Healer and Two ProblemsI take Zagzebski’s main purpose in ‘Recovering

Understanding’ to be the re-establishing of understanding as a

central concept in epistemology and that her sketch of the nature

of understanding serves to draw attention to the depth of

unprobed territory, rather than to provide a fully worked out

account of understanding and its value. However, I will argue

that the thoughts she does offer on the concept raise two issues,

one regarding the success component of understanding and another

that edges us towards a questionable metaphysical assumption. But

these problems can be avoided by construing the nature of

understanding differently and I will attempt to show that there

is no harm in claiming that understanding necessarily has a

propositional component, but is not reduced to it. In this

section, I will introduce the two problems and demonstrate how

they cannot be avoided if we continue to think of understanding

in exclusively non-propositional terms.

First, let us look at what I have called the success problem

of Zagzebski’s account. Recall that she places understanding

under the success condition, which is defined within the confines

of the techne in question: in other words, whether the goals of

17

DANIEL COPOSESCU – 1003781SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty – WS 12/13Velislava Mitovathe practical skill have obtained. Now consider a healer, Phil1,

who is convinced that he understands medicine. Incidentally, he

has studied medicine for number of years and is quite well

informed of the subject matter. However, he has also acquired a

firm conviction that superstitious rituals, chants and magic

potions are the factors which ultimately heal the patient. By

some stroke of luck, a friendly Spirit takes notice of Phil and

decides to offer him help in his attempts to heal. Every time an

ill person requires his services, Phil performs his ritualistic

song and dance, and uses his magic potion but, unawares to him,

it is the friendly Spirit who heals his patients.

It appears we are forced to concede that Phil successfully

passes the test of understanding medicine. All the criteria are

present: inasmuch as the goal of the practice of medicine is to

heal people, he reliably achieves this end, without arbitrarily

fixing it himself. Let me explain this. First of all, Phil is

reliable in completing his task in the full sense of the term.

Many take reliability to be a non-accidental matter, and our

healer is obviously not accidentally achieving his aims, as it is

a given that the friendly Spirit will always help him to heal the

sick, having

grown quite fond of Phil, despite the latter having no clue of

this fact. Second of all, Phil is reliably accomplishing the

1 I owe the example of a healer and its relevance to the discussion at hand tomy fellow student Abungwo and to the subsequent debate about the scenario inclass.

18

DANIEL COPOSESCU – 1003781SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty – WS 12/13Velislava Mitovagoals of medicine, set within the practice itself (that is,

healing), so he cannot be accused of setting ends according to

his own whims.

Not only that, but Phil can also explain his grasping of how

the parts relate to the whole of his endeavor: his chanting

invokes ancient spirits which then inhabit the body of the sick

person, cleansing it of disease. Furthermore, he seems to be well

aware of this comprehension. Thus, he ticks all the boxes for

passing Zagzebski’s success test. And yet, do we want to say that

he understands medicine? I think the answer is a clear no.

The problem has taken shape. If we insist on defining

understanding as non-propositional in nature, then we have no way

of distinguishing between such scenarios and cases of genuine

understanding. The success criterion is clearly met, yet there

seems to be something missing in order for it to represent a true

test of whether one has understood the object in question, or

whether one hasn’t actually done the necessary work, despite the

positive results. Phil offers explanations relating to his

rituals and potions, and how they affect the health of his

patients, but the fact that it is the friendly spirit that

continuously causes the recovery shows that Phil does not

understand medicine and what is necessary for restoring health.

It is important to draw the conclusion that being non-

accidentally reliable at attaining the goals of the techne in

question is not sufficient for achieving understanding. More is

necessary for this, specifically, this reliability must obtain in

19

DANIEL COPOSESCU – 1003781SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty – WS 12/13Velislava Mitovathe right sort of way for the concept of understanding to retain

any kind of credibility. I propose that condition can only be

satisfied by conceptually linking understanding to true

propositions, and denying the claim that nature of understanding

is non-propositional. This is a preliminary remark, which I will

attempt to substantiate in the following section.

I now want to bring in the metaphysical problem of

Zagzebski’s account that I mentioned earlier. She concedes that,

on her view, one cannot avoid taking a specific side in the

debate about the relation between mind and reality. Since

theories aim at understanding, and the latter is non-

propositional in nature, aiming at representing some part of the

world non-propositionally, there can be competing, yet equally

viable theories in play. From this, it follows that theoretical

efforts impose certain structures on reality, without these

structures being in existence objectively. If the world were

objectively structured, then theories would attempt to track this

construction as accurately as possible and it would thus be

impossible for two or more account to be qualitatively equal.

But we have now seen, through the example of Phil the healer

that understanding must consist in more than just reliably

satisfying the goals of a practical skill, while being internally

aware of this state. In order for us to avoid the scenario, I

have suggested that understanding always has a propositional

20

DANIEL COPOSESCU – 1003781SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty – WS 12/13Velislava Mitovacomponent, a necessary condition for it being connected to truth.

If I am successful in proving this in what follows, Zagzebski’s

position regarding the equal value of conflicting theories about

the world becomes untenable. Because the accounts (in aiming at

understanding) would have to be based on true propositions, they

would be evaluated on this basis and it would be impossible for

them to conflict. Their propositional foundations would either

contradict each other, in which case one or both would

necessarily be false, or else there would be none such clash.

III. FactualityThe previous section has drawn attention to the importance

of providing evidence for the claim that the nature of

understanding is propositional, though not exclusively so. As we

have seen, Zagzebski’s success test for understanding leaves the

account vulnerable to skeptical scenarios and I have hinted at

the possibility of linking the concept to truth in order to be

able to fend off such attacks. A first intuition in the direction

of making understanding a matter of propositions is that the

latter are by definition a matter of truth or falsity. But the

claim has yet to be proven. For this purpose, I will briefly

present the thoughts of Jonathan Kvanvig and Wayne Riggs on the

subject of understanding in this section and explain how they

relate to my claims. In what follows, my strategy will be to make

the notion of coherence, rather than Zagzebski’s idea of

comprehensiveness, central to understanding.

21


In the final chapter of his book ‘The Value of Knowledge and

the Pursuit of Understanding’, Kvanvig argues that the concept of

understanding is more valuable than knowledge, as understanding

consists in more than the value of its subparts, something which

cannot be said about knowledge. Having already established that

knowledge cannot be ascribed more value than that of its

constitutive parts, he highlights understanding as the more

valuable epistemic goal.

Kvanvig also aims to establish the nature of understanding.

He first delineates the uses of the notion that he will focus on:

propositional and objectual understanding. The former refers to

understanding that something is the case (a discrete

proposition), the latter has something akin to a subject matter

as its object. It is important to note that both these instances

of understanding are factual, in that they presuppose the truth

of the propositions or the reality of the domain understood (as

opposed to non-factual uses, which Kvanvig dubs ‘hedging’).

Kvanvig consequently defines understanding as ‘the grasping of

explanatory and other coherence-making relationships in a large

and comprehensive body of information.’ (Kvanvig 2003/192) This

is meant to show that, although the notion typically implies

knowledge, to understand something is to go above and beyond

simply knowing, to an internal appreciation of the coherence

between these different data. Consequently, and similar to

22

DANIEL COPOSESCU – 1003781SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty – WS 12/13Velislava MitovaZagzebski’s arguments, Kvanvig thinks of understanding in terms

of part-whole relations, not individual pieces of information.

Indeed, it seems that Kvanvig himself sees understanding in

an essentially non-propositional light when he speculates that

the propositional sense in which we use the term may be an

abstraction from the objectual use, which cannot be reduced to

something’s being the case. But I would like to argue that there

is a sense in which understanding is always propositional,

constitutively but not exclusively so.

In my opinion, the only way to solve the success problem is

to emphasize the propositional basis of all forms of

understanding. In other words, to use Kvanvig’s terminology,

objectual understanding always implies propositional understanding.

This move is necessary for connecting the success of having

achieved understanding with truth. The Phil scenario has shown

that insisting on the non-propositional nature of understanding

makes it hard to distinguish between accidental and non-

accidental instances of having understood something. But if we

require true propositions to be a constitutive part of having

achieved the state, I believe we can avoid such problems. This is

the sense in which we can say that a number of propositions form

the foundational basis of the cognitive state of grasping that is

characteristic for understanding.

23


Take the act of studying as an example, which surely aims at

achieving such a state (amongst others perhaps2). A student will

begin by amassing a (limited) number of true propositions before

even beginning to think about understanding his subject matter.

To stick to the case of medicine, think of the enormous amount of

individual terms and propositions one must literally memorize

before attempting to grasp the way they interrelate and hang

together to build the techne one is trying to master.

Regardless of whether the reasoning employed in representing

these relations may itself be non-propositional (anatomical

illustrations are of course essential to any student of the

science), I believe this propositional foundation is

indispensible and crucial for understanding and abstracting from

it gives rise to skeptical scenarios such as the one above

because it neglects truth. This is because such thought

experiments show how one can reliably (and non-accidentally so)

satisfy both the success condition while demonstrating internal

transparency. But drawing attention to the necessary

propositional aspect of understanding, expressed Kvanvig’s

condition of factuality, can help us distinguish between the case

of Phil and genuine understanding, with a success component

2 I make this remark because one could argue that studying some mass ofinformation has knowledge as an end. However, I take it that studying alwaysat least implies achieving understanding, even though it may not be itsconstitutive goal.

24

DANIEL COPOSESCU – 1003781SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty – WS 12/13Velislava Mitovaredefined to include true propositions as a condition for

understanding to obtain.

At this point, it may be objected that Kvanvig uses this

condition of factuality in a completely different manner and, far

from supporting my claim, actually suspects all propositional

forms of understanding to be abstractions from the paradigm of

objectual understanding, which is non-propositional. Thus, my

usage of his concept to support the partially propositional

nature of understanding is unjustified. My reply to this would be

firstly that Kvanvig himself does not explicitly support this

possibility, but rather gestures at it shortly, mentioning it as

a point he does not intend to press. Secondly, I would dispute

the argument that, because understanding does not have single

propositions as its object, it is therefore a non-propositional

endeavor. All that claim establishes is that understanding is not

exclusively a matter of propositions, a statement I have no intent

to deny. All I am sustaining is that understanding necessarily

has a constitutive propositional basis that links it to truth,

not that the state is

exhausted by this aspect. Furthermore, if the factuality Kvanvig

speaks of is not located in propositions (at least partially),

then I find it difficult to see what is left to consider. However

much objectual understanding means comprehending an entire

subject matter (not just individual propositions), and this must

25

DANIEL COPOSESCU – 1003781SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty – WS 12/13Velislava Mitovabe a matter of fact, the factuality of even this form of

understanding seems to me best located in propositions. Again,

this does not amount to saying that propositions are sufficient for

objectual understanding.

So far, I hope to have established that there is less reason

to insist on an exclusively non-propositional construal of

understanding than at first sight. This works both ways of

course, and the considerations certainly don’t imply that

understanding is simply a matter of propositions. But I want to

emphasize the complex nature of the concept by arguing that

understanding consists of both propositional and non-

propositional elements, with both playing an equally important

role, a matter which I will bring up again at the end, regarding

the value of understanding.

We have not yet solved the scenario of Phil the shaman. One

could object that, as I have stipulated, Phil has studied

medicine and arguably has a quite sufficient basis of true

beliefs for understanding to obtain, even though there are

obviously some false ones in the mix as well (his conviction that

it is his ritual and potion that heals the patient). Far from

solving the success problem, it seems the reformulated success

condition has reinforced the appearance that Phil understands

medicine, despite our intuitions to the contrary. To address this

new development, I will now move on to the concept of coherence,

as present in Kvanvig’s account and also introduce some relevant

considerations offered by Wayne Riggs.

26


IV. CoherenceIn ‘Knowledge and Understanding’, Kvanvig claims that

understanding is not a subclass of knowledge, and does not

necessarily imply it. Kvanvig argues that we should not confuse

the condition of factuality with the conclusion that

understanding always involves knowledge.

According to him, understanding simply does not focus on

truth in the same way as knowledge does. Firstly, though one can

know a body of information just as one can understand it,

achieving the latter state will result in explanations that do

not focus on individual truths of said body. Rather, ‘once we

move past its factuality, the grasping of relations between items

of

information is central to the nature of understanding.’ (Kvanvig,

2003/197) Secondly, truthfully answering questions (including

counterfactuals) about one’s object of understanding is more or

less final proof that one has accomplished such a grasping. As

long as the condition of factuality is satisfied, it makes no

sense to be skeptical about understanding in the same way it is

common with respect to knowledge. Concerning the latter concept,

Gettier cases have shown epistemic luck is a real possibility.

Note that, if I have succeeded in making it plausible that

factuality implies some measure of propositional presence, this

indicates exactly why such a move is a remedy for the Phil

27

DANIEL COPOSESCU – 1003781SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty – WS 12/13Velislava Mitovascenario, as it makes understanding immune to this form of

skepticism.

A third important distinction between understanding and

knowledge is the fact internal grasping of coherence among the

items of information that characterizes understanding is not

vulnerable to objections as the coherentist notion of

justification is. A number of paradoxes have been offered that

damage coherentism, which states that a belief accomplishes the

status of justification only if it is mart of a coherent set. The

Preface Paradox, for example, makes it possible to rationally

hold inconsistent beliefs: one has good reason to believe both

that one’s book contains only true statements and that there are

likely mistakes contained therein.

In response, coherentists have suggested the notion of

compartmentalizing beliefs. According to Kvanvig, this

essentially means that an agent typically forms distinct

compartments of beliefs within the whole of his belief system.

For a minimal justification to obtain, it is necessary only that

there is coherence within each individual compartment. This

theoretically allows the agent to hold inconsistent beliefs as

long as they are not part of the same compartment, although the

effect is a diminished justification of the total belief system.

Accordingly, the belief that there may be editing mistakes

contained in a book (as expressed my a conventional statement in

the preface) is part of a different compartment than the belief

28

DANIEL COPOSESCU – 1003781SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty – WS 12/13Velislava Mitovathat one has published only true, well-researched propositions.

Consequently, no incoherence obtains.

For Kvanvig, this theory faces problems of its own, such as

the fact that believing one is infallible and adapting one’s

beliefs to this statement is seemingly preferable to maintaining

coherence within compartments at the expense of the coherence of

the whole system. Since it is presumably better to increase one’s

overall justification by ensuring coherence among the

compartments, believing oneself to be infallible and adapting all

individual beliefs within the compartments with this conviction

would be the optimal choice.

In short, Kvanvig thinks coherentism about justification

cannot successfully counter the objections it faces. But things

are different where coherence in understanding is concerned.

Kvanvig points to the object of understanding (a large body of

information) to show that compartmentalization is always at play

in understanding, as one is never preoccupied with a single

proposition. He illustrates this through the understanding the

Relativity Theory (Kvanvig, 2003/195), which already represents a

compartment, not a single proposition. Worries about

inconsistencies between different levels do not apply here as

each cluster of data is taken separately and independently when

focusing on understanding. In spite of these specifications, not

that Kvanvig’s deliberations only establish that understanding

does not necessarily imply knowledge and at times seem to support

29

DANIEL COPOSESCU – 1003781SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty – WS 12/13Velislava Mitovathe idea that propositional representations are essential to

understanding. Again, I stress that I am not suggesting any sort

of reduction of understanding to propositions or propositional

understanding, only that these are indispensible elements for the

concept.

Let us return to the case of Phil the healer to see if we

now have the tools to adequately counter the scenario. I have

tried to explain why understanding is necessarily, but not

exclusively propositional in nature. This is because the

condition of factuality, which we have seen to be crucial, is

carried by propositions. But I had also specified that Phil has

studied medicine and thus knows true propositions about the

practice of healing. Yet we still do not want to grant him

understanding of the field. We now seem to have identified the

‘right way’ in which understanding needs to be achieved. It is

located neither exclusively in true propositions, nor in mere

coherence, but both act as conditions for success. Employing

Kvanvig’s terms again, in the Phil scenario, there is simply a

lack of coherence within the compartment in question: the medical

information is incompatible with the beliefs about witchcraft and

rituals. Even though Phil inadvertently saves people on a

reliable basis with the help of the friendly Spirit (satisfying

the goal of the techne) and is convinced of his state of

comprehension, his false beliefs and the inconsistency they give

rise to deny him genuine understanding.

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On to the metaphysical problem, it is now clear that

Zagzebski’s example of two competing representations of reality

being equally accurate does not hold. This is because

understanding has been shown to be conditioned by true

propositions, which no longer supports

the assumption that we impose representations of non-

propositional structures on reality. Rather, the opposite view

becomes more plausible, as understanding seems to aim at tracking

existing structures of reality as faithfully as possible. The

support for this is the condition of factuality on the success of

understanding.

V. Coherence and FactualityUntil now, my aim was to establish the constitutive part

propositions play in the nature of understanding, employing the

concept of coherence as support. In closing, I would like to

introduce some thoughts offered by Wayne Riggs in his article

‘Understanding “Virtue” and the Virtue of Understanding’. This

might be useful in reaffirming the equally important parts that

coherence and factuality play in understanding, underscoring the

value and complexity of the state.

Like Zagzebski, Riggs also connects understanding to virtue

epistemology and argues that some intellectual virtues aim

specifically at understanding. In his theory, he attempts to

31

DANIEL COPOSESCU – 1003781SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty – WS 12/13Velislava Mitovademonstrate the value of epistemic virtues by showing how they

aim towards the highest epistemic end (wisdom), and so derive

their value from it teleologically, not instrumentally. Riggs

establishes his claim by first proposing a teleological

interpretation of such virtues, inspired by Aristotle: anything

that aims at the good derives its value from its focus,

irrespective of whether it achieves its goal. Since some

epistemic virtues obviously target understanding, not truth,

truth and knowledge cannot be the sole epistemic ends available.

However, the truth, knowledge, and understanding constitute the

intellectual goal of wisdom. Since intellectual virtues aim at

the aforementioned concepts, they derive their value

teleologically from the ultimate intellectual end.

While distinguishing understanding from knowledge, Riggs

identifies coherence as the main trait of the former state, or

‘the appreciation or grasp of order, pattern, and how things

“hang together.” ’ (Riggs 2003/217) This sounds similar to

Kvanvig’s own considerations on the nature of understanding. But

I want to draw attention to Riggs’ conclusion that understanding

must involve true belief, even though it cannot be reduced to such

propositional matters.

While showing that understanding also aims at the highest

epistemic end (thus accounting for its value), he suggests that

32

DANIEL COPOSESCU – 1003781SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty – WS 12/13Velislava Mitovatrue belief and coherence are both constitutive of understanding.

According to Riggs, ‘neither the virtues directed mainly at truth

nor the virtues directed mainly at coherence are sufficient alone

to achieve understanding.’ (Riggs 2003/224) Coherence alone

allows for absurd conspiracy theories to count as understanding,

while merely aiming at true beliefs neglects the fundamental

characteristic of the concept. But true belief is by definition a

proposition, and this shows that it is constitutive of

understanding as a necessary, but not sufficient component. This

is compatible with Kvanvig’s account, as he sees the

understanding as the grasping of coherence-making relations among

a body of information. This information, as we have seen, is

propositional in nature, and just as we cannot reduce

understanding to this data, neither can we make the opposite move

and declare it a matter of non-propositional representation. A

crucial part of understanding is lost in this way, and it can

cause problems as illustrated by the scenario of Phil the healer.

Understanding involves both truth and coherence, both

propositional and non-propositional representation, an

interaction within a cognitive state that makes full use of our

abilities as epistemic agents and explains the satisfaction we

obtain from achieving it. Riggs’ examples of how unfruitful

coherence becomes without truth, and vice-versa, make an

important point regarding the concept of understanding and its

analysis. I hope to have shown that it is counterproductive to

reduce the concept to a single central feature, be it

33

DANIEL COPOSESCU – 1003781SE Knowledge, Truth and Duty – WS 12/13Velislava Mitovapropositions, coherence, or non-propositional representations.

Understanding seems to combine all of these notions and this

would certainly speak in favor of Zagzebski’s call for more

serious academic attention to it.

In conclusion, this account can also explain why

understanding is valuable. If I am right in saying that

understanding always consists in both propositional and non-

propositional components, then this speaks in favor of the

complexity of the state and also, perhaps, why it is more

valuable than knowledge.

Bibliography

Kvanvig, Jonathan L., The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of

Understanding, Cambridge

University Press, New York 2003

Riggs, Wayne D., Understanding ‘Virtue’ and the Virtue of Understanding in De

Paul, Michael;

Zagzebski, Linda, Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and

Epistemology,

34


Oxford University Press, 2003

Zagzebski, Linda, Recovering Understanding in Knowledge, Truth and Duty:

Essays on

Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue, Oxford University

Press, USA 2001

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recovering understanding in the right way

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