Chapter 7

Nurhaci's Names

Nicola Di Cosmo Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton

Nurhaci, the celebrated founding father of the Qing dynasty, is a fi gure whose historical dimension is both multifaceted and stratified. The historical sources themselves, many of which have been the object of imperial revision and censorship, together with historians' interpretations of the rise of the Manchus, account for the multiple routes of approach to Nurhaci's biography and record.

The Qing-centered view, based on works such as the Huang Qing kaiguo fangliie, provides a linear narrative that focuses on the protagonists of the rise of the Manchus and their exploits (Hauer 1926). The figure ofNurhaci, Qing Taizu, enjoys pride of place, as his rise to greater and greater power is pre ented in a manner consistent with an idea of logical progression from tributary status to independence and then to conquest. This view is painted with layers of revisions, censorship, and reorganization that the sources underwent after the establishment of the Qing dynasty in 1636, down to the Qianlong period in the second half of the eighteenth century.

A second historiographic strain, perhaps best represented in Western scholarship by Frederick Wakeman's Great Enterprise, draws substantially from late Ming sources and from the writings of Ming loyalists and intellectuals (Wakeman 1985). Thi is a narrative focused on the Ming side, which, by exposing the Ming court's divisions, factions, and incompetence, largely attributes the loss of China to the Ming government's inefficiency and inability to respond to the crises that beset the country in the 1630s and 1640s. From this perspective the Manchu conquest appears as an act of opportunism, linked to the perennial problem of Chinese dynastic history that holds the weakness of the south responsible for allowing northern barbarians to enter and conquer China. Nurhaci's role, then, is

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confined to that of the borderland strongman, or, in Franz Michael's words, of 'feudal lord,' who was successful in unifying the Manchurian tribes with various means including cunning, violence, and deceit, but was not ultimately responsible for the Manchu conquest (Michael [1942] 1965: 41).

A third strain concerns the recovery and analysis of pre­Qing Manchu, Mongolian, and Chinese sources. 1 For its own nature, this work has focused on the critical appraisal of information gleaned from later Chinese-language or bilingual sources on the basis of pre-conquest materials such as the Jiu Manzhou Dang (Chiu Man-chou Tang, 'Old Manchu Archives' hereafter CMCT).2 This type of work and orientation has yet to produce a general narrative of the Manchu conquest, but has been most effective in clarifying aspects of institutional history (the Banners, the army, the bureaucracy) and political relationships (such as those between Manchus and Mongols, or Manchus and Koreans). 3 Mostly, this line of work has served to demystify standard narratives derived from the later Qing sources, and to reveal interpolations and anachronisms, more than to forge a new theory of the Manchu conquest. It has also added an important layer of facts not reported in the Chinese sources, such as the description of the early 'khanate' ofNurhaci in the territory of the Jianzhou Jurchen.4

Moreover, a cursory examination of 1980s histor­iography from the People's Republic of China shows that the figure of Nurhaci and his role in history have gone through a major shift in the last two decades of the twentieth century. 5

Rigid categories that tended to brand historical figures with

1 See, for instance, the pre-Qing sources published in Stary (ed.) 1996. 2 There is a vast literature on the early Manchu historical sources. See the classic work by Kanda 1980: 71-94. For an extensive survey see Crossley and Rawski 1993: 63-102. 3 On Manchu institutional history during Nurhaci's reign, see Linke 1982. 4 Among the most influential sources, we ought to mention the report of the Korean envoy Sin Ch'ung-il. On this see Stary 1984: 323-59. 5 An early article that marked a shift in the appreciation of Nurhaci as a historical figure was Yan Chongnian 1977: 61-70. In some articles Nurhaci was even described as a 'Manchu hero ': see Li Hongbin 1980.

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shallow interpretations based on 'class origin' and social status gradually changed to allow a greater sophistication of analysis. A series of important articles on his military and political thought, social reforms, as well as his genealogy and education have since been produced, together with several monograph-length biographies (Yan 1983; Teng 1985; Yehenala 1997; Gu 2000). However, the meaning of Nurhaci's various Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese titles, and the way in which they could be placed in relation to his political rise are not topics that have received much attention.

This particular angle seems especially significant in light of recent research on Qing ideology and rulership. From the pathbreaking study by David Farquhar onwards, we now appreciate much more clearly the fact that Manchu imperial power -institutional, political, and symbolic- was based on a composite structure of ritual, religious, and ideological elements converging into a complex representation of imperial power, in which various strains can be identified: Chinese, Buddhist, Mongolian, Manchurian, and perhaps generically 'Inner Asian. ' 6

If we accept this as a distinctive and unique mark of Qing . rulership, we need to ask when these different facets began to take shape.

In general, it is with the Qianlong emperor that scholars see the full blooming of consciously expressed multiple forms of rulerships, yet it is clear that his less flamboyant predecessors too, and in particular the Kangxi and Y ongzheng emperors, sought to represent their authority in multiple ways and according to discrete idioms of power (Crossley 1992). If the Qianlong reign attains the most elaborate forms of prismatic and multifaceted rulership, it is legitimate to wonder whether this feature of Manchu rule resulted from a process begun with the conquest of China, or rather represents the end point of an evolutionary progression that has its roots in the very origins of the formation of Manchu power. In other words, can we find, at the time of the rise of Nurhaci, traces of a political agency that

6 Farquhar 1978: 5-34. On the 'multicultural' representation of the Qing court and imperial power, see the collection of studies in Millward et al. 2004.

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may reveal, albeit in rudimentary and embryonic form, elements of the distinctive idiom of power that we see in its mature form in the high Qing period?

Pamela Crossley in her book The Manchus presents an interesting argument that, for the first time in the English language, evaluates the significance of Nurhaci (in her spelling, Nurgaci) as a historical figure (Crossley 1997: 47-74). She sees him as an 'enigma' defined by three myths: that of the 'Avenger,' that of 'Individual Supremacy,' and that of the 'Great Enterprise.' To sum up her argument, the myth of the 'avenger' refers to the famous 'Grievance' according to which one of the key motives behind Nurhaci's will to wage war against the Ming was his desire to avenge the deaths of his father and grandfather, responsibility for which was attributed to the Ming. The myth of individual supremacy refers to the notion, in standard narratives, that Nurhaci was from the beginning the uncontested leader of the Manchus. According to Crossley, political responsibilities continued to be collegial and shared with his immediate family members. The third myth, that of the Great Enterprise, refers to Nurhaci's intention to conquer China, which Crossley rejects by arguing that the maximum extent ofNurhaci's political ambition was to create a regional kingdom in Manchuria and Liaodong. While I must admit reservations as to whether Nurhaci as a historical figure can be characterized in such a manner, I believe Crossley is correct in identifying different strains to his historical persona, and to point to later constructions emerging from Qing historical narratives. Aspects of Nurhaci 's feats are consciously promoted to present a teleological view according to which his actions led to the glorious outcome celebrated by later Manchu emperors, descendants of Nurhaci himself. Yet this perhaps mythical, perhaps simply 'doctored,' historical narrative does not completely replace (or erase) the actual process through which Nurhaci fashioned his state and progressed on the path towards greater political power. It is within this process that the symbolic representations of power need to be recognized, especially relying upon contemporary sources.

There is no question that the hagiographic picture painted in later sources is fashioned in a way to honor and revere a political as well as familial ancestor. But denying that picture

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and critiquing its sources should not obfuscate the fact that political power was present and represented in Nurhaci's own time. Moving, therefore, beyond the assessment and recognition of the historical myths associated with Nurhaci, it is necessary to define how they came to be constructed, that is, on what, if any, historical reality they were based. Historians have often moved into the territory of early Manchu history walking backwards, without truly turning away from the images coming to us from the later Qing period. If, on the other hand, we attempt to read

urhaci's role in history in a manner coherent within his own age, and based preeminently on contemporary sources, the issue of later manipulations can be contained and isolated.

To begin, we may question in what ways Nurhaci began to build his power. Was he just another ambitious aristocrat? Did he ever dream of establishing a dynasty? Was he driven only by a generic enthusiasm for military action and war? Any of these questions poses the problem of how he stated, represented, exhibited, or broadcast his real power and his ambitions to greater power. From these questions stems my intention to examine the 'names' and titles attributed to Nurhaci in contemporary sources, and see whether we can find telltale signs that identify for us at least the type of leader that he was, the power he wielded, and how this was constructed and represented over time.

Early references to Nurhaci report his proper name only in Korean and Chinese sources, while in Manchu he is referred to as an aristocrat, a beile ('prince') carrying the personal title of sure beile, meaning 'wise prince.' This is a title of nobility, but not especially meaningful in political terms or unique. His younger brother Surhaci was addressed as baturu beile (heroic prince), which surely was not a lesser title. The term beile in itself simply indicates that the holder belonged to the nobility, probably with political authority over a certain territory and people. The extent of that authority cannot be understood, however, by looking at the title alone. In fact, one of the difficulties presented by the study of early Manchu history consists of matching the various titles attached to the names of Mongol and Manchu leaders with the actual extent of their political and military power.

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In the Korean and Chinese sources of this early period, that is from the 15 80s to 1606, Nurhaci is not referred to by any significant title. Sin Ch'ungil, the Korean envoy who visited Nurhaci's court in 1596, refers to him occasionally by his full name, Nuerhachi :tzJZ~~Jlir$, which in Korean pronunciation is rendered as Noahapchok (Stary 1984: 347). More often, however, in his report we find less appealing names, such as the first syllable nu :tzJZ, which is always rendered with the Chinese character for 'slave,' and the character qiu-@! to form the Korean reading Noch'u. The character qiu, which means 'tribal chieftain,' is sometimes replaced by the less appealing zei M (bandit). Whether qiu was even understood as an actual title is unclear, but renderings such as Nu qiu, which could be read as 'slave chieftain,' or Nu zei, 'slave bandit,' must have appeared to contemporary readers as singularly unflattering. The same form of the character nu followed by qiu appears also in the report by the Korean war prisoner Yi Minhwan, Chaekchong lllok (;ffifrcp B~ Zhazhong Rilu), which was written around 1620.7 We may therefore conclude that Koreans referred most often to Nurhaci in internal reports by his personal name in some abbreviated form.

In Chinese sources of the W anli period such as the biography of Nurhaci reported in the Chou Liao Shuohua (~~ .PJtiJ, he is referred to as the 'Eastern Barbarian Nurhaci,' 'Dongyi Nuerhachi' (*~:tiJZ!R,o;S"$) (Heuschert 1996: 53-6; Miranda 1996). Does, then, the lowly manner of appellation that we find among Koreans and Chinese in this period reflect any notion of political power, or lack of it?

If we look beyond the name at the reports themselves, we see that the Korean envoys indicated that Nurhaci's power was not that of an average, run-of-the-mill Jurchen aristocrat. In 1596 his domain was distinguished by its extensive military and economic organization and impressive architecture. His authority appeared far-reaching. His political status, again from the descriptions gleaned from Korean and Chinese sources, was

7 In his translation of the Chaekchong lllok, Erling von Mende translates Nu qiu as 'Hauptling Nurhaci.' See von Mende 1996: 111-55.

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higher than that of other Jurchen leaders, and, within Nurhaci's clan, higher than that of most, if not all, of his family members.

Some light on the reality of the extent of his political power can be shed by the titles granted him as special honors by the Ming emperor. In 1589 he received the title of dudu qianshi (1\m~~$), that is, Assistant General-in-Chief, and in 1595 the top rank of Tiger and Dragon General, hulong jiangjun )jE'jJ~~ lj[. Both ranks were specific to the frontier, and represented a political contract between the Ming court and the recipient that bespoke of an exclusive and trusting relationship, granted privileges within the tribute system, and ensured political and even military support in the region. His rise on the ladder of the Ming system of frontier diplomacy provided Nurhaci with real political and diplomatic power, not just symbolic currency.

Nurhaci used Ming support chiefly for two purposes. First, to render himself immune to accusations of prevarication and violence as he attacked and subjugated fellow Jurchens. Acting with the endorsement of the authority conferred by the Ming titles .enabled him to justify such operations as aiming to maintain order in the region. Second, he sought to monopolize, through his higher status, the licenses that allowed access to the immensely profitable border trade. The role of Nurhaci as a 'commercial hero' as well as a military hero is indeed still celebrated in Manchu folklore , especially in relation to the ginseng trade. 8 Hence, we might say that at the turn of the century Nurhaci's real power was possibly reflected more accurately by the ranks he acquired outside his own political milieu. On the other hand, these titles remained to a large degree purely ceremonial and did not translate into any visible rise in status either within Jurchen political society, where Nurhaci remained a beile, or in the references found in the Chinese and Korean sources. In fact, by this time Nurhaci had not revealed his ambitions by seeking especially grandiose titles, and it is possible that his power within Jianzhou Jurchen society was constrained by a system of communal or at least consultative

8 See, for instance, Flitsch 1999: 353-75. On Nurhaci 's commercial ventures, see Teng Yao 2002: 37-44.

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leadership in which his family members and other aristocrats held a level of authority that had to be formally preserved.

A shift with profound implications occurred in the twelfth month of the Julgiyan marin year (Ch. bingwu p;j Lf ; December 1606-January 1607), when Nurhaci acquired the title of kiindiilen qayan from a delegation of Qalqa Mongol leaders.9

In later Chinese sources, with a degree of obfuscation, this is rendered as shenwu huangdi t$:lf:.t~W, or Holy Martial Emperor, but this translation does not properly reflect the Mongol term, which means 'revered,' or 'honored' emperor (khan). 10 Though this is the first time the term qayan (emperor) appears as part of Nurhaci's title, it soon came into general use in all Mongol­language correspondence and appears to have been adopted by all Mongols.

The acquisition of the term qayan, equivalent to the Manchu han, set Nurhaci, in regard to diplomacy and political relations with the Mongols, apart from and above other Jurchen leaders, including his family members. In this sense, it is politically meaningful. Arguably it was Nurhaci's investiture with a high Mongol title that entitled his son and successor, Hong Taiji, to retain the Mongol title of khan, as he was known among Mongols as secen qayan ('wise khan,' sure han in Manchu). In other words, the title given by the Mongols to Nurhaci at this relatively early stage of his 'career' helped insure that his family continued to hold a high hereditary rank among the Mongols. The long-term consequence of this event was that in the eyes of many Mongol leaders Nurhaci could be placed on an equal standing with Mongol rulers such as Ligdan Khan, who was hostile to the Manchus and nurtured the political project of unifying all Mongols. Even more importantly for Nurhaci's immediate political goals, the Mongol title of qayan could be used to secure a place of honor among the Mongols through select marriages with the most powerful families of the aristocracy. Moreover, oaths and alliances made with other

9 Qing Taizu Wuhuangdi Shilu, vol. 2, p. 28; Manzhou shilu 3.6a. 10 Daqing Taizu Gaohuangdi shilu 3.9b. See also Hummel [1943] 1970: 598.

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political leaders could be negotiated from a position of higher ta tus.

At this point in time, in 1607, Nurhaci therefore appears to have gained Chinese and Mongol titles that were politically more meaningful, in the sense that they reflected more accurately the growth of his power. That is, Nurhaci 's symbolic ratification of political power appeared first outside the Manchu linguistic milieu and outside the Jurchen body-politic.

The main Manchu-language source for this period, the Jiu Manzhou Dang, reports Nurhaci's Manchu titles in 1607 as sure han as well as sure ki:tndulen (or kundulen) han (Mongol kiindiilen qan) (CMCT I: 6, 8). 11 This is an important shift because it transfers the title han, superior to beile, from the Mongol into the Manchu context, while retaining the Mongolian kiindiilen in the Manchu title.

In 1614 the Mongol-derived title sure kUndulen appears together with a new title, genggiyen han (enlightened emperor). The word genggiyen is a Manchu term first found in the context of a marriage between one of Nurhaci's son and a Mongol maiden of the Jarud (Jarayud) tribe; it was used as a sort of translation of the Mongol kundulen (MBRT I: 40; CMCT I: 87). The exact title here is amba genggiyen han, or 'great enlightened khan,' and it is repeated twice, both times in the context of marriage agreements. There is no immediate cause that I can see for the sudden appearance of this title. However, based on the time and circumstances, it may just be that Nurhaci chose to increase his own prestige and position in his diplomatic relations with the Mongols by using a genuine Manchu term preceded by a mba, 'great.' After this date there is a certain volatility in Nurhaci's titles, whereby both sure kundulen and genggiyen continued to be in usage. On one occasion we also find sure amba genggiyen han rendered as sure genggiyen han in the Manwen laodang (CMCT I: 129; MBRT I: 56).

Only in 1617, when Nurhaci was 59 sui of age, did the term genggiyen han replace the now possibly obsolete sure

11 Note that the first occurrence of this title is also reported in the new­script version of the records, the Tongkifuka sindaha hergen-i dangse (Manbun Roto, MBRT) as sure kundulen han (MBRT I: 1).

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kundulen han (MBRT I: 76). A rare late recurrence (tenth month of 1619) of the term kundulen appears in the title kundulen genggiyen han, used in the context of Mongol-Manchu relations in a document treating the diplomatic agreements between Nurhaci and Qalqa nobles (MBRT I: 196-9). This retrospective use of the term kundulen may have been for political reasons, given that it was first granted to Nurhaci by a group of Qalqa aristocrats.

It is possible that the shift to genggiyen reflects the new political phase, which opened with the foundation of the Jin (or Latter Jin) dynasty in 1616. More important, however, seems to be the Manchu term abkai fulingga, or 'Mandate of Heaven' (Chinese tianming ~$), allegedly chosen by Nurhaci as his reign title in 1616, but which appears to have been used as an actual reign title only in 1625 (CMCT IV: 1953).

As Professor Bischoff remarked, no Chinese emperor would ever use such a title (Bischoff 1998: 59). And in fact, Nurhaci did not do so either. The retrospective use of the reign title was the product of a later re-writing of the sources. What is, then, the origin of this term? We need to go back to a title for Nurhaci that we find in the Jiu Manzhou Dang, that is, abkai fulinggai banjiha genggiyen han, 'the enlightened khan born by heavenly design' (CMCT I: 449; MBRT I: 161). As a personal title, this is quite extraordinary. No longer an indication of status and political power, it is a 'theoforic' title with large symbolic and ideological implications. The passage in which this title is reported is also significant for its date, the seventh month of the fourth year of rule of Nurhaci as head of the Jin dynasty, that is 1619. I have not been able to find in the Jiu Manzhou Dang or other source a title that includes the word abkai fulingga prior to this date. 12 The particular significance of this date, in my view, is that it occurs only a few months after the battle at Mt. Sarhu, in which Nurhaci, with numerically inferior forces, defeated the huge army sent by the Ming to 'smite' the rebellious barbarian. It seems to me that it should be possible to trace back to this particular and crucial event, the epochal defeat of the Ming at Mt.

12 Yan 1983: 158. See also Elliott 2005: 63, note 3.

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arhu, a conceptual shift towards an ideological use of title and name symbolism.

Why do I think that the victory at SarhU, not the founding of the Jin dynasty, should be identified as the turning point? A constant aspect of Nurhaci 's propaganda, put forth to both Manchu and Mongol partners as well as to enemies, is that he presented his military victories as a demonstration that he had been favored by Heaven. Enemies and even potential allies are often plainly insulted for not understanding that Nurhaci wins because he is in the right, and therefore Heaven favors him (Kara 1970: 17-23, note 37). This way of reasoning and claiming the high moral ground after the fact is neither original to Nurhaci as an Inner Asian leader, nor really limited to Inner Asian politics. Victory itself might have been seen as the final proof that Heaven was in fact supporting Nurhaci, thus prompting the acquisition of a new title befitting the event. This would be a logical conclusion after the inflammatory anti-Ming declaration uttered on May 7, 1618. The seventh 'grievance' mentioned by

urhaci as he was throwing the gauntlet to the Ming, expressed this theory eminently well: 13

I defeated the Hada tribe, which was granted to me by Heaven. The Chinese emperor intervened and forced me to free them, who were then attacked and defeated by the Y ehe tribe. Under Heaven the men of every country fight, but those who have sinned against Heaven are defeated and perish, those favored by Heaven win and live. Is there a law that makes those killed in battle live again, or that returns the prisoners? The Emperor of a great state established by Heaven - [doesn't he then become] the supreme Lord of all countries? Why should I alone be placed outside this divine law? The Hulun tribe joined forces to attack me, and because they started the war, the Hulun sinned against Heaven, but Heaven favoured me. How can this Chinese [Ming] emperor oppose Heaven by supporting the Yehe people who are

13 On the Seven Grievances (in Manchu, nadan amba koro), see Meng Sen 1977: 62-76; Oshibuchi Hajime and Toda Shigeki 1934; Stary 1988: 43-55.d

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hated by Heaven, thus judging right what is wrong, and wrong what is right?

Nurhaci feels that he cannot be excluded from this divine law because he is an 'equal partner' in politics with the Chinese emperor. Yet the true hierarchy between supreme leaders was established by Heaven. Nurhaci needed a victory against the Ming to prove his point. This happened in 1619, which justified the acquisition of the 'theoforic' title of khan born 'By Heaven's Design,' to stress that he was indeed favored by Heaven more than the emperor of China himself. In propaganda terms, this is a brilliant turn that goes to show both the progression ofNurhaci's success, and the confirmation that Heaven had all but abandoned the Chinese emperor. At the same time, one cannot exclude a religious explanation, as Nurhaci may have also seen in his portentous victory a 'numinous' experience that justified, and to a certain extent called for, a sacral definition of his kingship.

The acquisition of a title by heavenly design should not, however, be confused with the later tradition that linked Nurhaci himself with the origin myth of the imperial house and the legend of the divine birth of the supposed progenitor of the Aisin Gioro clan Bilkuri Yongson, as this was a product of Manchu propaganda dating after N urhaci' s death (Matsumura 1977; Crossley 1985).

If there is any logic in the ways in which Nurhaci's titles changed, this seems to lay in a gradual accretion that is not entirely consistent with the way in which his political power grew. He was more than a beile when he was called beile, but less than a khan when he acquired that title. And only four years after he founded his new and independent Jin dynasty (Aisin gurun), if my hypothesis is correct, he put Heaven into his title.

I propose that we might see in this process the true model, albeit in rudimentary, or embryonic form, for the later polyvalent rulership which became one of the hallmarks of Qing imperial rule. In Nurhaci's titles' accumulation, and their semantic shifts, we can see already the formation of a concept of composite emperorship, which would later be enriched with the religious and ritual symbolism of the Buddhist and Confucian traditions.

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The later historiography, especially the one carried out under imperial auspices, tried to erase the earlier phase, especially where titles that seemed to originate from outside the Manchu political contexts were concerned, as they would point to a less than linear progression and to an asymmetry between titles and political standing. Such an asymmetry was pointed out, in relation to the titles received from the Ming in the early period (and the reference is clearly to Nurhaci), by the Qianlong emperor m his preface to the 1786 edition of the Kaiguo fangliie: 14

The Yuan, who originated in the northern desert, and the Taiqing, who originated in the shores of the Eastern Sea, have never been related to China. Although we did occasionally receive official titles from the Ming, these titles after all only served to restrain our name and bind us. Such titles of ministers were no better than [those of] village headman or temple priest.

In addition to making the political claim that the Qing were from the beginning quite separate from China, this statement may be revealing of at least one aspect of the evolution of the political representation of Nurhaci's power through the changing quality of his titles. Titles received from the Ming were not deemed to be important because the true legitimacy of the Qing came . from the challenge expressed when Nurhaci consciously became the Enlightened Khan Born by Heavenly Design. The trajectory from tribal chieftain to khan was internal to the Mongol-Manchu political context, and quite in opposition to China.

The political meaning in the names, that which had helped Nurhaci secure a high status vis-a-vis Mongols and Chinese, was gradually overtaken by a different necessity, that of upping the political ante and invoking a higher status, that of a potential challenger to the Chinese throne. Whether Nurhaci intended to conquer the whole of China or just to carve out an independent kingdom for himself is beside the point, as his

14 Huang Qing kaiguofanglii.e, 'Yuzhj xu' (Imperial preface): la.

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policy had been one of gradual extension of his power according to what the circumstances allowed, but always in the direction of expanding his political sphere of action-by claiming full independence-as well as his territorial authority and military strength.

By confronting the historical process that generated this shift, we can trace an important aspect of Qing political culture back to the period of Nurhaci as a logical extension of his political strategy of seeking parity in foreign relations. Once it became clear, in Nurhaci's eyes, that Heaven had chosen to support him, that parity, reflected in names of superior rank such as han or qan/qayan, was turned into a bid to challenge the Ming. He became not a Son of Heaven, but a leader born by Heavenly design.

The names of Nurhaci reflect a historical process that, in its twists and turns, belies the linear progression represented in official Qing historiography. At the same time we ought to recognize that Nurhaci's timing in acquiring his 'titles, and his care in presenting them as 'confirmation' of an acquired right, power, status, and divine investiture, already contain that narrative in embryonic form and prefigure its mystification. The early titles only reflected a local chief, and even the Chinese titles, as the Qianlong emperor pointed out, were not significant. But the relentless aspiration to a higher political station by a series of bids for diplomatic parity gained _Nurhaci superior Mongol and Manchu titles. Manchu propaganda often resorted to the logic that Heaven favored those who did not sin against it, both to persuade other peoples (both Mongols and Manchus) to join them, and to justify after the fact the enslavement of their enemies by the force of arms. Yet this type of ideological pressure could only be predicated upon the condition of victory. Victory against China in 1619 propelled Nurhaci into a new order of political engagement that the new title, Enlightened Khan Born by Heavenly Design, confirmed and sustained.

Of course, the open challenge to China had already been launched with the establishment of the Latter Jin dynasty and with the promulgation of the 'Seven Grievances,' which was a real declaration of war. Both represented Nurhaci's political challenge to the Ming, but acquiring the title was the

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confirmation of the success attained by that challenge. The accumulation of titles then can be seen as a series of confirmations on an ideal path towards ever greater achievements. In this light, it is not surprising that the notion of sovereignty in the Qing dynasty is conveyed by and embedded in a panoply of images and titles. Each of them should be seen, I believe, not as a political artifact meant to present the Qing emperors as rulers within a multiplicity of traditions, but as a partial and discrete affirmation of a given achievement within a broader political process. Each instance of title proclamation or attribution, in other words, was not an opportunistic move but the seal apposed to a given, and already acquired, political meaning that received in this way recognition and ritual confirmation. To go back then to the question of the myths associated to the figure of the 'dynastic founder' in Qing historiography, we should say that probably the seed of at least some of these 'myths' was sown by N urhaci himself by a careful choice of titles that were marking as many political milestones.

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279

REPRESENTING POWER IN

ANCIENT INNER ASIA:

LEGITIMACY, TRANSMISSION

AND THE SACRED

edited by

I SABELLE C HARLEUX, GREGORY D ELAPLACE,

ROBERTE H AMA YON, AND SCOTT P EARCE

Center for East Asian Studies,

Western Washington University

© 2010 by Center for East Asian Studies Western Washington University

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior permission in writing from

the copyright-holder, or as expressly permitted by law.

Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Representing power in ancient Inner Asia: legitimacy, transmission and the sacred I edited by Isabelle Charleux,

Gregory Delaplace, Roberte Hamayon, Scott Pearce. p. em.

(Studies on East Asia ; v. 30) Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-914584-31-5 1. Power (Social sciences )-Asia, Central-History­Congresses. 2. Legitimacy of governments-Asia, Central-History-Congresses. 3. Asia, Central­Politics and government-Congresses. 4. Symbolism in politics-Asia, Central-Congresses. 4. Mongols­History-To 1500-Congresses. 5. Power (Social sciences)-Asia, Central-Terminology-Congresses. I. Charleux, Isabelle. II. Delaplace, Gregory. III. Hamayon, Roberte. IV. Series.

DS327.5.R465 2010

Manufactured in the United States of America