AMERICAN PUBLIC UNIVERSTIY SYSTEM

Charles Town, West Virginia

EXAMINATION OF THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES AND EFFECTS OF TALIBANINCLUSION INTO AFGHANISTAN POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the

Requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

In

INTELLIGENCE STUDIES

By

Charles Martin Russo

Department Approval Date: June 3, 2012

The author hereby grants the American Public University System the right to display these contents for educational purposes.

The author assumes total responsibility for meeting the requirements set by United States Copyright Law for the inclusion of any materials that are not the author’s creation or in the public domain.

© Copyright 2012 by Charles Martin Russo

All rights reserved.

2

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my wife and family. Without her

patience, understanding, and support, the completion of this work

would not have been possible. To my family and children, for

whom I dedicated my life and career to help ensure their safety

at home from those who wish us harm.

3

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Two decades after I started a career in the intelligence

field, I never thought it would last as long as it has and taken

me places I never thought possible. I want to thank all those

Naval Intelligence Officers; to my fellow enlisted sailors who

were next to me through thick and thin. I also want to thank

those Professors who asked the hard questions and answered ones

just as difficult presented by me. To my mother and my father

4

who gave me unconditional support and encouragement throughout

the years.

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

5

EXAMINATION OF THE POTENTIAL CONSEQENCES AND EFFECTS OF TALIBANINCLUSION INTO AFGHANISTAN POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

By

Charles Martin Russo

American Public University System, 3 June 2012

Charles Town, West Virginia

Professor Cline, Research Professor

After a decade the Taliban has remained elusive and at times

seemingly triumphant at gaining momentum and perceived strength,

continuing to be a formidable resistance to the Afghan

government, U.S. and coalition forces. Unconventional warfare

conducted solely by Special Forces and Central Intelligence

Agency Special Operators early on was not as effective as it was

wanted to and the use of conventional warfare with a smaller

force has not proven to be affective in routing out the Taliban

as a foe, bring peace and stability to the people of Afghanistan.

Since 2003, the United States has waged Counter-Insurgency

Operations or COIN to keep the Taliban in check and relative

peace and stability to the population.1 It is a wonder how this

6

loosely knit band of individuals has been able to continue to

have a large impact on the Afghan nation.

The Taliban was unseated from power in less than a month’s

time by US Special Forces in October 2001 soon after the

September 11th 2001 attacks upon the United States.2 Yet, the

Taliban continues to be a force, politically and militarily that

is still a constant threat to peace in Afghanistan. But many

political powers from around the world believe that in order to

achieve piece in Afghanistan it will take including the Taliban.3

The use of historical events and patterns can be used to predict

potential outcomes and consequences in Afghanistan, if the

Taliban were to reach a political settlement with the Government

of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and were included

politically in Afghan affairs.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I.

INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................8

8

Scope..................................................................................................................................9

Significance of Study.......................................................................................................10

Outline of Research Paper................................................................................................12

II. LITERATURE REVIEW.................................................................................................13

III.

METHODOLOGY...........................................................................................................19

Research Questions...........................................................................................................19

Theoretical Framework.....................................................................................................20

Research Design………………………............................................................................21

IV. THE TALIBAN................................................................................................................23

V.

DISCUSSION...................................................................................................................27

Elaborated Case Studies....................................................................................................29

9

Case Study 1………………………………………………………………………..…....30Case Study 2………………………………………………………………………..……31Case Study 3……………………………………………………………………………..32Outcomes for Regional and Global

Partners.....................................................................35

Policy Implications............................................................................................................39

VI.

CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................41

VII. NOTES…………………………………………………………………………………...43

VIII.

BIBLIOGRAPHY..............................................................................................................47

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

“Half my country was destroyed by 23 years of war.”

10

-Mullah Mohammad Omar, Taliban

Commander, 2001

After a decade the Taliban has remained elusive and at times

seemingly triumphant at gaining momentum and perceived strength,

continuing to be a formidable resistance to the Afghan

government, U.S. and coalition forces. Conventional warfare and

stabilization operations have not proven to be effective in

routing out the Taliban as a foe. It is a wonder how this group

of individuals is able to continue to have a large impact on the

Afghan nation and its neighbor, Pakistan. The Taliban was

unseated from power in less than a month’s time after the

September 11th 2001 attacks upon the United States.4 But time and

again the Taliban has been able to regroup, gain strength and has

held a foothold in parts of the country pre-9/11 according to

Major General Michael Flynn.5

Many political leaders in the world believe that the only

way to achieve a peaceful end to the conflict in Afghanistan and

longevity of stabilization is to include the Taliban into the

political fabric of the government.6 But what are the potential

11

outcomes of reaching a political settlement and peace deal with

Taliban leaders? One can ponder all the plethora of potential

outcomes to only be left with numerous possibilities in the end.

Scope

Pakistan creates a challenge for the United States, NATO,

and other coalition forces such as International Security

Assistance Forces (ISAF) to engage the Taliban on different

fronts, both head-to-head, militarily and ideologically. U.S. and

coalition forces are not able to engage the Taliban beyond the

Afghanistan border into Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal

Areas (FATA) and the North West Frontier Provinces (NWFP). On a

continuous basis, the United States and Afghanistan National Army

forces pursue the Taliban into Pakistan’s FATA where they enjoy

relative safety even from Pakistani Military forces.7

12

Research shows that the Taliban continues to have an impact

on the safety of Afghanistan’s population and more pointedly the

current seated government. The research and case studies for

this paper offer only some of the potential political

consequences of a political settlement with the Taliban are but

only a few of the possibilities that lay head for the people and

the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRA).

The outcomes are of the worst likely cases as there is little

evidence to show that the Taliban or any of these elements are

ready to lay down their arms, renounce violence, respect the

constitution and actively participate in rebuilding the Afghan

nation.

Significance of Study

13

Since October 2001 and the rooting out of religious students

as the ruling power of Afghanistan, there has been steadfast

fighting of an insurgent war against the Taliban. The country of

Afghanistan has been in constant turmoil. A decade later and

what is a seemingly endless conflict with Taliban insurgents in

the Afghan-Pakistan region drudges onward. If the global

community is to look forward for the long-term stability of

Afghanistan, what are some of the possible outcomes to the future

of Afghanistan and its people? What would a political settlement

with the Taliban have for the GIRA and people of Afghanistan?

Would the political settlement be the beginning of causing a

civil war? Would the region once again be a haven for Islamist

extremists and terrorists bent on the destruction of the West and

increase the instability of the South Asian region.

Research to date does not fully answer or predict what an

answer may be for Afghanistan, and what future lays ahead for the

people of Afghanistan if the GIRA were to fail or collapse. It

does not lend to the way that the Taliban would govern or how it

would impose its version of justice upon the population and land

of Afghanistan. If the Taliban were to take power and rule

14

Afghanistan what infrastructure would remain that is currently in

place? Infrastructure such as water, power, basics needs and

security could be degraded if not all together disappear based on

the Taliban’s history of how it once ruled Afghanistan. Would

the world continue to once again step into Afghanistan to set up

a less restrictive regime and try once again for a democratic

one? Would a civil war ensue and plunge the country into

previous decade’s chaos?

While there is a fair amount of literature discussing the

Taliban and the other groups that make up the larger Taliban

struggle for the gaining of Afghanistan as a caliphate state, the

literature is only able to give the audience a sense of what has

been attempted and accomplished thus far, nothing is stated as

possible policy assessment to the future of Afghanistan or its

current democratic government. Furthermore, no direct research

data can be found on the political consequences to the current

seated government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, if a

political settlement were reached in Afghanistan.

15

Outline of Research Paper

This research paper is divided into several parts. First, a

literature review will provide a survey of existing knowledge.

16

Namely, it will discuss the insurgency within Afghanistan and

what the viabilities are of a political settlement in the future

with the Taliban, but not potential outcomes of Taliban

participation in the Afghan government. These themes have been

included as they are critical to providing context behind the

case studies presented and are important to the conclusions of

this study. Second, the research approach and methodology will

be discussed. In brief, this research paper explores a number of

case studies and thereby demonstrates that potential outcomes of

including the Taliban or coming to a peaceful solution are not

likely to have positive outcomes for all involved. Third, a

number of case studies will be discussed that will demonstrate

the possibilities. Final section is the ending with discussion

and conclusion of the impact of Taliban inclusion into a peace

deal and political settlement.

Three elaborated case studies are presented that made

extensive use of primary source records to ensure that the facts

that are stated are grounded in historical evidence. Much of the

rigor of this study derives from the fact that including cases

that closely mirror plausible future scenarios in Afghanistan has

17

obviated the often-difficult problem of case study selection.

Finally, the case studies will be used to show the potential

outcomes of including the Taliban or coming to a peace agreement

with Taliban leaders in order to include them in Afghanistan’s

political arena. A number of conclusions for national security

strategists’ are drawn, and the policy implications for

Afghanistan and the United States of this study are discussed.

Chapter II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Volumes of written material exist pertaining to the war in

Afghanistan and the continuing conflict between the Taliban and

the western world. While these volumes give narratives at length

and tell a compelling story of how the world arrived at this

place in time, what all of them fall short on is, what are the

possibilities for peace and stability for future generations of

Afghanistan. What happens if the current government of

Afghanistan, set up primarily by the United States, were to

18

falter if the Taliban succeeds in retaking the seat of

government? In review of materials that attempt to speak to the

political consequences, each had not reached the point of making

a definitive prediction of where the future of Afghanistan leads

if the Taliban were to become a political influence and what

consequences there would be for regional and global partners.

Barakat and Zyck (2010) examined the insurgency within

Afghanistan and what the viability of a political settlement with

the Taliban would be. The authors argue that despite the

deterioration of security, the possibility for a political

resolution appears increasingly likely due to the decreased

cohesion among the Taliban-led insurgency.8 The material the

authors provide are what a compromised settlement with the

Taliban would look like, but do not answer the question(s) of

what would the political consequences be if the Taliban once

again take power. The authors only discuss the quickest way to a

settlement of the conflict with the Taliban and how to come to

that settlement without discussion of future effects on the

Afghan nation and its regional neighbors. They ignore any future

19

possibilities, both political and economic and their outcomes for

Afghanistan, regional neighbors and global partners. The authors

obtained their findings through international agencies reports,

statistics, research journals and periodicals as well as

government reports. Other findings were found through U.S.

government officials and historical data. The authors placed

weight in the 1971 declassified document of then Ambassador to

Afghanistan, Roger G. Neumann in which the situation is much like

present day. They offer no qualitative or hard evidence in which

to base their facts for the viability of a political settlement

with the Taliban. Their study leaves open a lot of room for

speculation and conjecture of a potential settlement with the

Taliban or peace deal.

Bergen (2011) examined through research of Afghan and its

demographics that defeat of the Taliban is plausible in the

future. According to the author reconciliation with elements of

the Taliban are possible through negotiations and a political

settlement.9 What is not answered is what the consequences are

for Afghanistan and the current government if the Taliban is not

20

defeated. The author discusses how to bring the Taliban into the

current government and not the possibility of what it would be

like if the Taliban were not defeated politically and militarily.

The author shows through quantifying information how the security

situation has improved for the population over the past 10 years.

Findings were developed through research and interviews by the

author.

Biddle and Thier (2010) discuss the original plan for a

post-Taliban Afghanistan which had called for nation building and

for it to be done rapidly.10 The authors state that the Karzai

government lacks the legitimacy and capacity to effectively run a

national government. Authors examine three models of post-

Taliban governance, centralized, decentralized and mix-

sovereignty. The conclusion is that Afghanistan is not

ungovernable, but the authors push for the decentralized

democracy model. Findings in this report were found through U.S.

government officials and historical data, but the authors lack

any kind of a bibliography that lists references and sources.

The authors use a historical background to establish how they

21

define what would be successful for Afghanistan. This study

lacked in qualitative and quantitative information. Authors

reported about three models, spending more than half of the study

on the decentralized method rather than equal parts for the

reader to make an informed decision.

Cole (2009) discusses the international interventions in the

fight against the Taliban over the past decade. Furthermore, the

author examines the political and economic developments not only

in Afghanistan, but the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in

Pakistan and the political policies affecting the government of

Afghanistan.11 Without support from Afghanistan’s neighbors and

other regional and global partners, the government will continue

to be threatened and unless U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) continues investing in reconstruction long

term vice military operations, Afghanistan will remain stagnant

and the Taliban a threat. The author obtained findings through

international agencies reports, statistics, other research

journals and periodicals as well as government reports. Findings

were found through U.S. government officials and historical data.

22

The author dives into past historical issues as a way to look at

a way ahead.

Fettweis (2009) describes the contents of Ambassador James

F. Dobbins (2008) book After the Taliban: National-Building in Afghanistan and

the efforts to build a functioning state in Afghanistan.12 The author discusses

the high-level and complicated negotiations shortly after the

fall of the Taliban in 2001 and those areas that discussions had

fallen short. Areas needing more detailed discussions: The

involvement of the Taliban in reconciliation and the construction

to rebuild the nation of Afghanistan. The author obtained

findings through another author’s book and periodicals which do

not lend significant credibility in answering the potential

outcomes in Afghanistan.

King (2010) through close observation of U.S., NATO and

Afghan National Army and its Security Forces illustrates through

his assessment of the counter-insurgency operation “Hamkari” that

was meant as a priority for political gain against the Taliban

located in the Kandahar region of Afghanistan.13 The author asks

23

the question “Does the west understand the complexities of Afghan

society and what is it that the ISAF must do to engage power-

brokers in order to confer to the Afghan people the vision of a

centralized state?” The author does answer, what can be the

future of Afghanistan, albeit very one sided, and lacks how the

international community and more pointedly the Afghan government

will prevail. Also missing was the impact of a settlement with

the Taliban and the effects on regional countries and

international partners in the rebuilding of Afghanistan.

Maloney (2010) examined the campaign from 2006 to 2009 and

the possibilities of negotiations with the Taliban. The authors

explain that “the Taliban” is not a singular entity, but dealing

with something much more complicated.14 The author describes the

groups involved in the insurgency against the Afghan government

and differentiates between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. The

authors only offered a brief opinion, though a very conservative

view, that the Karzai government could only reach a partial

negotiation with a small fraction of the Taliban. The author

obtained findings through journals and periodicals and only

24

stated conclusions that those materials had previously pointed

out.

Moreau and Sami (2010) examined the strategy used by a U.S.

Military Officer who served in Afghanistan concerning security

and the strategy for defeating the Taliban.15 The author does

show evidence through direct dialogue with Taliban unit

commanders who speak about their resolve and waiting out American

forces and their eventual withdrawal. In explaining the strategy

of defeating the Taliban, the author does not given potential

courses of action the Taliban insurgents could use. The author

also does not delve into the potential outcomes of the future of

Afghanistan or the current government administration. The author

obtained findings through Defense Department briefings and

strategies publicly outlined and interviews with Taliban

commanders in the field to draw their conclusions.

Roashan (2011) examines the state of security of Afghanistan

and the political, social and economic situations. Dr. Roashan

is careful to not directly bring the Taliban’s name into

25

consideration, but loosely talks about the worsening security

situation and that no resolution has come to fruition with the

exception of laying blame to the current administration.16 The

author does not offer solutions to engagement of terror forces

within Afghanistan and only opinion as to why Afghanistan is in

its current state of instability.

The research study by Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn (2011)

argues that reaching a negotiated settlement to the Afghan war is

becoming increasingly difficult; a problem it argues is partly

due to the mistaken assumption that the Taliban and al-Qaeda are

a united terrorist syndicate.17 Furthermore, the research

discusses the possible outcomes of separating the two

organizations and the implications of doing so regarding a

political settlement with the Taliban. What the research does

not answer, but is similar to, is what would happen in

Afghanistan if the Taliban were to be defeated entirely or

brought into the folds of the current seated government.

26

Chapter III

METHODOLOGY

Purpose Statement

27

Since 1996, the Taliban has held a profound influence on the

politics and peoples throughout Afghanistan and to some extent

Pakistan. According to a U.S. Intelligence assessment released

in early 2012, warns that the Taliban has not yet abandoned the

goal of reclaiming power in Afghanistan and their position to re-

impose the harsh Islamic rule.18 The purpose of the study is to

identify some of the numerous and potential outcomes of including

the Taliban into the Afghan government and the potential

consequences and affects upon Afghanistan, Pakistan, regional

neighbors and global partners.

Research Questions

The central aim of the study is to examine the full-range of

potential outcomes of Taliban participation in Afghan politics

and the correlated impact of these outcomes on the regional and

global partners with the current Afghan government. To achieve

this objective, the following sub-questions will be considered:

How might internal security and infrastructures stabilize?

How will the Taliban act as political party in support of

country?

28

Would the Taliban be successful in imposing its interpretation

of Islamic Law?

How is Afghan foreign policy likely to be affected by each

outcome?

How are Afghanistan’s neighbors such as Pakistan, Iran,

Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan likely to respond to possible events

in Afghanistan?

What are the implications of each scenario of possible outcomes

and US foreign policy?

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Postinternationalism theory was the primary framework used

during the research study. Postinternationalism is a term

coined by academic James Rosenau to describe "an apparent trend

in which more of the interactions that sustain world politics

unfold without the direct involvement of states".19 According to

the definition, postinternationalism bares an emphasis on the

role of non-state actors, the existence of international norms as

well as the process of globalization, and the existence of intra-

state (rather than interstate) violence. As such a

29

postinternational approach rejects many of the tenets of realist

approaches to international relations theory though it accepts

that international politics is anarchic.

According to its definition, the theory of

postinternationalism is that time is marked by profound and

continuous transformations and turbulence. The turbulence within

Afghanistan’s past, speaks directly to how Afghanistan and its

people have lived. The population of Afghanistan and that of

Pakistan in the North West Frontier Province have lived in a

postinternationalism state for 11 years. The theory continues

its definition in that the hypothesis is, Afghanistan current

government will continue on its current path in conflict and that

individuals will have to be ready to engage in collective action

around a common interest if Afghanistan is to emerge from

perpetual conflicts and have a successful political outcome. In

researching other studies within the parameters of this research

study, question and hypothesis, postinterationalism theories or

other theories and models close to it were not found to have been

used.

30

RESEARCH DESIGN

The research design is straight forward. Deductive

methodologies will be used in the conduct of research to come to

a conclusion. The research methodology, qualitative primarily

will be applied in broad and general theories to the situation in

order to make predictions about possible future events in

Afghanistan. The inferences made in the conclusion are only to

stand as possibilities and not formal absolutes.

Variables

Other methods within the research included dependent and

independent variables. The dependent variables within the

research are: noting the success of defeating Taliban; democratic

government failure; Infrastructure and security collapse as

possible outcomes and/or effects of political settlement with the

Taliban, and regional countries interests in Afghanistan

politics. The independent variables: such as the non-state

actors; al-Qaeda, Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),

31

Taliban external groups and other outside parties such as Iran

and Pakistan.

These independent variables were taken into account when

collecting data from sources such as reports from various

international affairs journals and periodicals; Jane’s Military

Journals, Security Management Practice Database; International

Security and Counter Terrorism Research Center; Security

Defense/Security Studies and interviews with U.S. military

officials. Potential cognitive biases identified during research

were in the form of social and cultural bias. Others included

anchoring and framing of the researcher. Methods used to

mitigate those identified biases were in the form of

brainstorming processes to ensure that ideas or thoughts

concerning research were not falling into those two categories.

Testing of hypotheses was that of questioning the data

collected and analyzed through both quantitative and qualitative

methods. The data collected assisted in answering the question

of what the possibilities there are with regards to Afghanistan’s

future as a Democratic Islamic Republic and its population at

large.

32

33

Chapter IV

The Taliban

In order to understand what intricacies there are to any

political settlement with the Taliban, a brief history should be

understood of what is Taliban. The Taliban came into existence

as an Islamic militant and political group that had ruled

Afghanistan (large parts) from 1994 until is was defeated by U.S.

and Afghan’s Northern Alliance in October 2001.20 The Taliban

have been formed as a group of young Koranic students, which

emerged from refugee camps within Pakistan, primarily Pashtun,

but included other ethnic groups but were exclusively Sunni

Muslim.21 It has been widely alleged that the Pakistani military

and ISI provided support to the Taliban.22 During that time only

three other countries recognized the Taliban diplomatically;

Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates.

The leader of the Taliban Movement was and is continued to

thought to be, although in hiding since the October 2001 U.S.

invasion, Mullah Mohammed Omar also called the Commander of the

34

faithful.23 Mullah Omar led the group and was seen at first by

the Afghan population as trying to restore law and order to the

country. But it was not long until the Taliban had disarmed the

population and instituted Sharia or Islamic law.

The Taliban imposed the strictest interpretations of Sharia

Law.24 The Taliban believe Sharia law or Islamic as their

guiding principles, which is based on the Deobandi Islamic

teachings, which influence the Taliban in the rationalization of

their actions as well as their decisions.25 These are the

fundamental principles of the Taliban and their reasoning for

pushing away all Western influence. While Taliban's practices

seem extreme to westerners and their beliefs that they instill on

their own society of Afghan people seem harsh, their beliefs had

gained popularity among the people in Afghanistan in the early

1990’s.

Westerners see the Taliban as brutal, extremely violent and

oppressive to its population. What westerners fail to see through

the eyes of the Afghan people was the elimination of corruption.

The Taliban restored relative peace to parts of Afghanistan they

ruled in by thwarting rival warlords and from catching Afghan

35

society in the crossfire of warlordism. In order to do all this,

the Taliban instituted strict adherence to Sharia law in their

interpretation.26 Under Sharia law, it does not allow for

political parties or the participation in them. The Taliban

banned ever day activities such things as music, dancing, the use

of the internet, and flying kites; all were seen as western

influences and non-Islamic. In order to achieve this level of

strict adherence the Taliban used public executions, and other

harsh punishments to ensure individual compliance.

Women's rights through the Islamic law are actually very

well protected traditionally from 1973 until 1996, when the

Taliban ruled over Kabul.27 It was at this time that the Taliban

denied those protections, closing schools for women, eliminating

women from the workforce, limiting medical treatment as well as

the freedom of movement without male accompaniment. The Taliban

has deep roots in Afghanistan society, as well as strict

adherence to Islamic traditions, thus making it one of the

greatest challenges to conquer.

The efforts by the United States and by Afghanistan to re-

integrate members of the Taliban are said to be a slow process

36

and of limited impact. While some members of the Taliban may be

willing to negotiate with Afghan representatives, there are still

differing levels of Taliban leaders and members to contend with

that some may still be willing to fight on further rather than

reach a political solution.28 They have to realize that a hard

choice is needed to be made in order to have stability in

Afghanistan.

FIG129

The Quetta Shura Council is the theoretical body of

leadership of the Taliban. The council acts as a governing body

37

for the Taliban as a whole, but does not necessarily mean that

all Taliban leaders will adhere to orders emanating out of the

council since it is not a standing army.30,31 The Taliban lacks

any mass and anything past basic weapons, but it continues to be

difficult to stop them as a force. In 2006, it was thought that

there were two separate factions at this time within the

Taliban.32 That one faction was wanting to ramp up its

conventional activity, while the other part of the faction took

the view to be more cautious but no less violent than the

other.33 It is thought that if the Afghanistan government were

to be successful at negotiating with the Taliban, it may only

partially affect the overall insurgency and not stop individuals

or local opportunists from using the name of the Taliban. It

would be these opportunists that would continue to attack the

population of Afghanistan.34

Taliban leadership to date has shown no real interest in

issuing orders of a cease fire. Orders to all levels of Taliban

commanders and fighters to lay down their arms, renounce

violence, respect the constitution, and participate in the

reconstruction of their country has not been issued. It is the

38

absence of these orders or instructions, that shows the Taliban

continues to have one goal in mind and that is, to rule

Afghanistan once again as it had in the 1990’s and to reinstitute

its harsh rule.

39

Chapter V

DISCUSSION

With the case studies presented, it is possible to follow

the evidence to some conclusions. This section will first

address to this paper’s original thesis statements, and then

explore several additional points that emerge from the historical

narratives. First, it will be shown that potential outcomes of

inclusion of the Taliban into Afghan political circles could have

devastating end results in trying to balance the order amid the

Taliban. Second, the effects of Taliban rule on the people of

Afghanistan, its neighboring countries, regional partners, and at

large to the global structure through a historical perspective.

Third, additional conclusions will be drawn from the case studies

presented. Finally, some concluding remarks will be provided

that summarize the conclusions of this study.

The Balance of Order amid the Taliban

The Taliban in Afghanistan is a highly insular, inward

looking movement. What leadership it has is concerned mainly

with the political and social order of Afghanistan.35 The

40

problem with the Taliban as it currently stands is that there is

no centralized leadership. The Taliban consists of like-minded

individuals focused on a like-minded cause, but with different

agendas. Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Taliban’s leader, has shown

no desire to politically share power in Afghanistan's future.36

The Taliban's leader Omar has not been seen in Afghanistan since

at least 2002 and thought to be in Quetta, Pakistan.

The Taliban cannot agree to negotiations, in that it refuses

to admit Afghan government representatives to any discussions

with the United States, and that it is keeping Pakistani

representatives from attending as well. The Taliban have yet to

embrace a confidence building measure, such as renouncing any

violence or cease-fires in Afghanistan.37 The absence of any

Taliban representatives to Bonn I or Bonn II conferences shows

the international community that the Taliban had not been

excluded, but rather the Taliban did not want to be a part of the

conference or that there is no agreed upon centralized

representation by the Taliban.38 Another problem that may arise

within the Quetta Shura Council is that it may not consider

objectives of the allied Haqqani network or the local Taliban

41

leaders or commanders in Afghanistan.39 The Taliban is already

opposed to democracy in principle as it is seen as a purely

western concept. The Taliban believes that Islam will always be

central, and that ethnicity and nationalism are to be

secondary.40

The other issue with the Taliban is that it's in a state of

assured safe haven in Pakistan because of its independent

political deal with ISI. Without ISI support, the Taliban would

not be as strong as it has been for this long and have the

ability to sustain resistance, according to Bruce Riedel.41 If

the Taliban are to be negotiated with then the Afghan government

must address the external support that the ISI have been giving

the Taliban.

42

Elaborated Case Studies

An examination of the potential outcomes including the

Taliban into a political settlement with the Afghan government

has been a topic of discussion for individuals and government

bodies over the past 11 years. But it has not been until the

last two years that no credence has been given to the

possibilities of what would happen to the Islamic Republic of

Afghanistan and its current government. The question remains

does including the Taliban lead to a more stable Afghanistan? Or

that by including the Taliban, who could gain strength, and

ultimately attempt to take control of the central government by

force, cause a civil war? Plunging Afghanistan into a civil war

seems to be the most viable outcome if the Taliban were to be

given a stake hold in the Afghan government without getting a

popular vote.

In February 2009, according to the U.S. Defense Secretary

Robert Gates was quoted as saying42;

43

“If there is reconciliation, if insurgents are willing to

put down their arms, if the reconciliation is essentially on the

terms being offered by the government, then I think we would be

very open to that. We have said all along that ultimately some

sort of political reconciliation has to be part of the long-term

solution and Afghanistan.”

The Pashtun tribe within Afghanistan and Pakistan maintain

dominant residency, primarily in Kandahar and for the most part

in Southern Afghanistan (Fig1 above), where there are

approximately 12 million Pashtun’s living. In the past the

Pashtun’s used intimidation of minority tribes such as Uzbeks,

Tajiks and Hazaras and kept them away from polling places.43

What would change in Afghanistan if the Taliban were to be

included in the political fabric of Afghanistan? There are many

possible outcomes to a political settlement with the Taliban, but

nonetheless, the Taliban cannot be dismissed if there is to be a

peaceful and stable Afghanistan.

Case Study 1:

The first case study will focus on the consequence of

including the Taliban into the Afghan government without a peace

44

agreement, will ultimately throw the Afghan government into a

tail spin and the Taliban will take control by force, the

government and land of Afghanistan. If this event were to

happen, the Taliban would have potentially undone all that the

international community had built over the previous 11 years.

The country of Afghanistan plunged into a civil war and a return

to pre-October 2001 U.S. invasion conditions. Rather than see a

return to power by the Taliban, non-Pashtun individuals would

consider a civil war as an option.44

According to reports in early 2012 members of the Afghan

National Army were already forging alliances secretly with

Taliban elements.45 This type of alliance threatens to undermine

the Afghan government and its ability to maintain control. Some

Afghan National Army and Security Forces’ commanders have

admitted to working alongside local Taliban leaders. According

to some news reports, it is an Afghan commander and a Taliban

leader who shared intelligence about military operations and

planned to ambush a NATO supply convoy and divvy up the proceeds

at a later time.46

45

According to the 2012 National Intelligence Estimate or

NIE, warns that the Taliban leaders have not fully abandoned the

goal of reclaiming power as well as re-imposing harsh rule once

again upon Afghanistan.47 This assessment raises doubts about

any success for the political settlement to be brokered between

Kabul and the Taliban. According to U.S. government officials,

the Taliban is refusing to admit an Afghan government

representative to the discussions between the U.S. government and

Taliban elements.48 Furthermore, there is no indication that the

Taliban are ready to settle for a goal short of total control

over Afghanistan.

Case Study 2:

In the second case study, it is proposed that the potential

outcome would be no change in the current security situation as

it stands; political infrastructures, Afghan national government,

and the Taliban would cohesively govern within restrictions and

constraints of the constitution. That the security situation

would be maintained by Afghan National Security Forces and the

potential for fractured Taliban elements would continue to

conduct violent actions against government forces and the

46

population.49 Infrastructure would continue to slowly be

developed and that the government would continue to function with

political elements of the Taliban included.

It is thought any negotiations with the Taliban would be

with a centralized group or individual representative of a large

centralized collective group. According to Peter Bergen, who

believes that any negotiation would be with several groups of

Taliban, not one cohesive group and that any peace deals would

have to be made on both sides of the border - Afghanistan and

Pakistan.50

The Taliban throughout much of 2005 through 2009 entered

into several peace deals, with Pakistan, showing that no change

would come from including them into a larger peace deal with the

government of Afghanistan.51 Some of the peace deals brokered

between the Pakistani government and the Taliban in 2005 and 2006

and then again in 2009 only allow the Taliban to regroup and

establish a stronger foothold in an area in order to seize more

territory later.52

47

Case Study 3:

In this case study it is proposed that including the Taliban

as a functional partner in the Afghan government, the changes in

regional partnerships such as Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan

and Iran would change how the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is

dealt with negatively, due to the threat of dealing with Taliban

members.

Pakistan both politically and militarily is one of the

largest supporters of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.53

There is a perspective from Pakistan that a government, such as

Afghanistan could be favorably disposed toward Pakistan and that

the threat from the Taliban would not be allowed to spill into

Pakistan.54 It is Pakistan's wish that Afghanistan would be able

to defeat the insurgency as a whole and contain the Taliban

threat, while reconciling with elements of the Taliban to be

brought into the political mainstream.55 What Pakistan has

realized is that its security does not primarily come from

within, but certainly comes from Afghanistan. What Pakistan does

48

not want is an Islamic extremist group such as Al Qaeda or the

Taliban conducting intelligence or military operations from

Afghanistan and undermining Pakistan's security.56

Other regional countries have the same concerns as well and

they feel that they would not benefit as greatly in investing in

Afghanistan if elements of the Taliban held political power.

Iranian concerns are held in the same manner, but would see to a

lesser extent, the Taliban as a threat over U.S. presence in

Afghanistan on their border. Further concerns are the

possibility of peace is thought to be within grasp due to middle

and low level Taliban no longer wishing to fight and that due to

Taliban recruitment at an all-time low would bring individuals

from the battlefield, thus giving reconcilable elements the

chance to enter into the peace process.

Potential Outcomes and effects for Pakistan

With the return of the Taliban to a legitimate political

standing in Afghanistan, Pakistan has the potential to also be

taken over by extremist. Pakistan has been able to balance its

political standing with the population and with the world.

49

Pakistan as well has to be part of a larger strategy, such as a

hammer and anvil. While the hammer seems to be U.S. military and

ISAF in Afghanistan, Pakistan should operate against the Taliban

on its side of the border.57 Pakistan plays a large part in

Afghanistan’s political affairs. When it comes to negotiations

with the Taliban, Pakistan too should play a part in that it will

affect its political standing with both Pakistani society and

Afghanistan.

For Pakistan, the collapse of Afghanistan could lead to the

possibilities of becoming a safe haven for terrorist groups.

Once again, like Al Qaeda, someone who is intent on destabilizing

Pakistan and toppling a government who is also a nuclear armed

country. This would ultimately be more costly and more harmful

in the long run.58 Does Pakistan’s fear that if the Taliban were

to continue in the region of the North West Frontier Province, or

Federally Administered Tribal Areas that the Taliban might take

over the government of Islamabad? Due to the Pashtun tribal

presence in Afghanistan and largely in the North West Frontier

Province and its proximity to Afghanistan, Pakistan will remain

50

in a quandary until it severs ISI external support ties with the

Taliban.

Pakistan acts as a very high influence in Afghanistan

political affairs. What has tarnished international community

views of Pakistan is its past and continued support to the

insurgency through the ISI. What Pakistan can use as a positive

influence in Afghanistan’s affairs is its geographic proximity

and Pashtun links. Pakistani goals are for a non-hostile,

Pashtun-dominated state that limits Indian influence and provides

Islamabad long-term, stable economic benefits.

51

Potential Outcome and effects for Global Partners: Russia, China,

India, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan as well as other Central

Asians.

In 2010, President Hamid Karzai historically was able to

gain the trust of the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras in a peace

jirga, who feared that reconciliation with the Taliban would be

destabilizing to the country and once again marginalize them as

minorities.59 Each of the Central Asian countries has their

concerns with issues going on in Afghanistan. The bringing in of

52

the minority ethnic groups within Afghanistan gave regional

partners more of a sense of security and stability in

Afghanistan's future. Historically, anti-Taliban forces relied

heavily upon countries such as India, Iran, and Russia for

military aid. It was the loss of some of these influences that

pushed Indian influence out of Afghanistan and marginalized to

seek to stand and Iranian supporters. The Taliban during its

reign in the 1990’s is said to of massacred thousands of Shia

Muslims. The potential effects of outcomes for regional partners

are economic more than security. It's the vast amount of

natural gas that the country of Afghanistan sits on. It was

during the 1990’s that exploration into Afghanistan's natural

oilfields was done. In April of 2008 Turkmenistan, Afghanistan,

Pakistan, and India explored a natural gas deal which was signed

off and the involved spending of an estimated $8 billion in

building a pipeline.60

Taliban inclusion has consequences to the partnerships

forged over the past 11 years. Regional countries: Russia, China,

India, Iran responses to a political settlement or change in U.S.

role are always in flux within political circles and are referred

53

to as influencers. There are three levels of influencers; High,

Moderate and Low. Already discussed is Pakistan who is a “High

Influencer” in both terms of Afghanistan’s government and the

Taliban. Each country has various interests given their

political, social and economic links. The most consistently

stabilizing factor is a political settlement, whereas U.S.

military presence fuels Pakistani and Iranian malign activity.

However, U.S. withdrawal will likely prompt regional countries to

shift their support to their afghan constituencies and away from

the central government, incentivizing state fracture.

Participation in a political settlement would provide an avenue

for regional states and organizations to advance their interests

while still investing in afghan stability.

Like Pakistan; Iran has a high level of influence in a

political settlement as a regional partner of Afghan stability.

Iran has an economic interdependence with Afghanistan, political

and religious ties, and geographic proximity. The goal is a

stable state that provides Tehran economic benefit without

extremist Sunni influence or a U.S. presence.

Moderate Influencers

54

India is a moderate influence in Afghanistan. What

Afghanistan needs is investment and capacity building from a

partnership with India, thus creating a stable non-hostile state

that does not provide safe haven to anti-Indian terrorist groups

and allows for economic cooperation and growth for both

countries. In 2010, India signed a strategic partnership

agreement with Afghanistan that includes Indian military training

for Afghanistan Army Officers.61 It is agreements such as these

that expand India’s economic and political footprint in

Afghanistan.

Russia too is a moderate influencer in Afghanistan politics,

in that it has a long standing history of relationships with

former northern alliance; co-ethnic groups of the former Soviet

Union such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. What

Russia looks to see in a future partnership with Afghanistan is a

stable state that is not controlled by Islamic extremists or a

source of significant narcotics trafficking.62

China is a moderate influence and has celebrated over 50

years of diplomatic ties with Afghanistan and has a status as a

regional leader. China also enjoys the ability to offer closer

55

economic and political ties that benefit the nation of

Afghanistan.63 The effect for China with the current security

situation is a stable state that allows for resource

exploitation.

Low Influencers

The Central Asian countries are a low influence and do give

benefit of economic and some security initiatives to Afghanistan.

What the Central Asian countries are looking for as an effect of

Afghan stability is that Afghanistan is not controlled by Islamic

extremist groups. Continued relations and support between

countries will continue a collaborative growth for each.

Saudi Arabia is a low influence on Afghan and does have the

status as an Islamic leader; influence would increase if a

political settlement is reached. In 2008, Saudi Arabia was

responsible for the organization of talks between the Taliban and

the Afghan government.64 Saudi Arabia has the ability to act as a

valuable resource to both Taliban and outside players due to

their Islamic credentials and their willingness to recognize the

Taliban. The effect for Saudi Arabia is that it will see

Afghanistan as a stable state free of Iranian influence and al-

56

Qaeda ties. To the international community it is seen as

influencing regional cooperation.

There are many challenges with the regional countries that

surround Afghanistan. What they have in common are enduring

rivalries. Regional countries each have a competing security

interest in Afghanistan that supersedes their interest. The

spread of Taliban influence beyond what it currently is or the

influence it once held are both those security interests.

Regional neighbors each have an opposition to a long

standing U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. More

specifically, Pakistan and Iran view continued instability in

Afghanistan as preferable to a continued U.S. presence in the

region.65 Iran had the same view with regards to U.S. occupation

in Iraq and when the U.S. objected to Iran’s outright presence in

Iraq, it was seen as meddling, and that the United States would

only see it as a threat and continue its presence there. It was

then that Iran began to take a low profile approach.

Another challenge is the skepticism about the feasibility of

a political settlement with the Taliban. An agreement that is

not viewed by all sides as durable or enforceable will likely

57

prompt reactions by regional countries that could lead to state

fracture.

Mitigation Opportunities

Afghanistan governance and security force capacity building.

Bolstering the Afghan government could reduce some regional

incentives to interfere. Regional security cooperation

organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or

collective security treaty organizations participation could

build confidence among regional partners and increase their stake

in afghan stability.66 Cooperation on a political settlement by

regional countries would have a positive and lasting effect.

Regional involvement in the political settlement would increase

transparency and investment in the settlement outcome.

Destabilizers to Afghanistan

Iran will be concerned by Taliban resurgence and will

continue actions to undermine the U.S. presence in Afghanistan.

In addition to actions to undermine the U.S., Iran would likely

increase its non-kinetic support to former Northern Alliance

elements to ensure they are not marginalized by reconciliation

with the Taliban. All other regional actors will increase

58

material support to their constituencies (ethnic minorities such

as Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras) in anticipation of potential

state fracture. No other destabilizers can be seen in the

immediate aftermath of a peace deal with the Taliban. However,

regional actions, if the agreement appears fragile, would more

closely mirror the U.S. force withdrawal with no political

settlement scenario.

Policy Implications for the United States

The implications to the United States policy is that

Afghanistan would break down into anarchy or civil war, such as

seen in the 1990’s. This would have obvious consequences to U.S.

interests. The question for the United States in a political

settlement with the Taliban, would be is the Taliban willing to

serve and be consistent with the basic rights and interests of

Afghan population and its constitution? U.S. relations would be

successful, if a political settlement with the Taliban allowed

for Afghanistan to continue on its current track of being the

foundation of social and economic stability. There has been a

call to revise the Afghan Constitution in order to correct

perceived flaws that reportedly exist. Some of the desired

59

changing includes making the current structure of government more

decentralized to spread the power among many and change the

current banning of Taliban members to serve in public office and

security forces. The decentralization would make it more

compatible with the diverse social and cultural nature that

exists in Afghanistan.67

U.S. stance towards Taliban until 2010 was that of non-

negotiation. Although, the Taliban has never been listed by the

U.S. government as a terrorist organization, the policy was to

not negotiate with them. Under President George W. Bush, the

Taliban was designated and declared a “terrorist entity” by

Executive Order 13224.68 Within the Executive Order it was

recognized that under the United Nations Resolution 1267, the

Taliban were designated as a terrorist organizations and that the

United States Department of Treasury and Department of State were

to treat them as such. In 2011, the United National Security

Council unanimously voted in support of splitting the Taliban and

al-Qaeda list into separate lists.69 By doing so, it allowed for

negotiations to be happening if insurgents were to choose such a

path.

60

The United States understands that without Pakistan, the

Taliban, Haqqani network will continue to have a safe haven in

Pakistan.70 This safe haven will give them a place to plan and

direct insurgency operations against Afghan and NATO forces.

Without Pakistan there is no resolution in the region and that

Afghanistan will have no stable future without a solid and

lasting partnership.71

Any negotiations with the Taliban must be tested and

determined that the outcome that is sought can be satisfied.

According to Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, when she stated

in a hearing before the U.S. Congress, that negotiations such as

these with the Taliban will be long.72 The Secretary also stated

that there were bilateral negotiations going on with Haqqani

network as part of the Afghan-led peace process that included the

Quetta Shura council led by Mullah Omar.73

61

Chapter VI

CONCLUSION

The topic research concluded that current level of knowledge

to what would be the political end state of the Islamic Republic

of Afghanistan if the Taliban as a political entity is not

defeated has not produced a feasible outcome. The ideology of

the Taliban would not find a place in Afghanistan has it once had

prior to the events of September 2001 and continues a decade

later not finding it. The Taliban’s ideology is in direct

conflict with the Constitution that now stands in Afghanistan.

Since December 2001, the United States, NATO and Afghan

military forces have been trying to root out the Taliban as a

62

political and military power within Afghanistan. There has been

constant fighting of an insurgent war between the Taliban and

what it perceives as an illegitimate and U.S. backed puppet

government. The country of Afghanistan has been in constant

turmoil, now into the 21st century and what is a seemingly

endless conflict with Taliban and insurgents in the Afghan-

Pakistan region drudges on. If the global community is to look

forward for the long-term stability of Afghanistan, and if the

government of Afghanistan were to give way to the Taliban’s

ruling members, the country and more largely the region could

once again be a haven for Islamist extremists and terrorists bent

on the destruction of the West, secluding the country and its

population from the rest of the international community.

Volumes of research material have been compiled over the

past decade and none thus far answer what the future holds for

Afghanistan. In the literature reviewed for this research this

researcher found that all of the material spoke to how to bring a

peaceful political end that would include the Taliban within the

government of Afghanistan. World leaders are optimistic that a

63

political settlement can be reach or peace deal negotiated with

the Taliban to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan.

There are many factors that influence the eventual outcome

of a political settlement with the Taliban. Unless the Taliban

acts as a whole organization and not act as a fractured group

with separate parts, only parts may agree and possibly spur

factions to continue the fight against the GIRA. The

possibilities of including the Taliban as a political party is

seen as unifying catalyst or bring about the possibilities of a

civil war. Many international community members see any

political settlement or peace deal with the Taliban as a whole or

with elements there of as a threat to their investments both

politically and economically.

Pakistan, liking it or not, is a major factor in

Afghanistan’s stability and plays a critical role in any

outcome.74 The United States and NATO look to Pakistan to

encourage the Taliban as well as other insurgent groups to

participate in the reconciliation process whether it is a peace

deal or political settlement. The Pakistanis have reason to be

64

concerned about being attacked from across the border and from

within their own territory.75

In the end, it will be up to the government and people of

Afghanistan to make the determination of accepting the Taliban as

a political partner. It will also be up to those in charge of

the Taliban and to the individuals who fight on the behalf of the

Taliban to be an active and positive participant. This

partnership will have to be a committed one that, in a

challenging environment, can be strengthened and to offer new

opportunities in order to avoid violence and chaos.

Chapter VII

Notes

65

1Chapter I Jones, S., (2008). Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Rand counterinsurgency

study ; v.4. (accessed May 29, 2012).2 Hayes, L., Brunner, B., and Rowen, B.. (2007). Who are the Taliban? Their

History and Their Resurgence. Retrieved June 17, 20113 Biddle, S., Christia, F., & Thier, J.. (2010). Defining Success in

Afghanistan. Foreign Affairs, 89(4),   4 Hayes, L., Brunner, B., and Rowen, B.. (2007). Who are the Taliban? Their

History and Their Resurgence. Retrieved June 17, 20115 Daily Times.com (2009). Afghan Insurgents returning to pre-9/11 haunts: US

Military. Agence France-Presse, 29 June 2009. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\06\29\story_29-6-2009_pg20_5. (accessed May 24, 2012).

6 Biddle, S., Christia, F., & Thier, J.. (2010). Defining Success in Afghanistan. Foreign Affairs, 89(4), 48-60. 

7 James, M., (2010). Taliban and al Qaeda Safe Havens in Pakistan Remain a Major Problem, and Other Af-Pak Review Issues., ABCNews.com, December 14, 2010. http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2010/12/taliban-and-al-qaeda-safe-havens-in-pakistan-remain-a-major-problem-and-other-af-pak-review-issues/ . (accessed May 14,2012).8

Chapter II Barakat, S. &Zyck, S. A. (2010). Afghanistan's Insurgency and the Viability

of a Political Settlement. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33(3), 193-210. 9 Bergen, P.. (2011). "Why Afghanistan Is Far from Hopeless." Time 177, no.

12: 50-51. 10 Biddle, S., Christia, F., & Thier, J.. (2010). Defining Success in

Afghanistan. Foreign Affairs, 89(4), 48-60.  11 Cole, J.. (2009). Pakistan and Afghanistan: Beyond the Taliban. Political

Science Quarterly, 124(2), 221-249. 12 Fettweis, C.. (2009). After the Taliban: Nation-Building in

Afghanistan. Political Science Quarterly, 124(2), 358-359. 13 King, A., (2010). "The Power of Politics: Hamkari and the Future of the

Afghan War." RUSI Journal,  December 1, 2010, 68.  14 Maloney, S. M. (2010). Can we negotiate with the Taliban? Small Wars &

Insurgencies, 21(2), 404-408.15 Moreau, R. and Yousafzai, S.. (2010). "Afghanistan Feels the Squeeze."

Newsweek 156, no. 26/1: 6.

16 Roashan, R. G. (2011). Imminence of Implosion. Institute for Afghan Studies (Jan) 2011.

17 Strick van Linschoten, A., Kuehn, F. (2011). Separating the Taliban from Al-Qaeda: The Core of Success in Afghanistan. Center on International Cooperation, New York University (Feb) 2011.

18

Chapter III Landay, J., & Youssef, N., (2012). Intelligence Report: Taliban Still Hope

To Rule Afghanistan.” McClatchy Washington Bureau. Retrieved May 22, 2012.

19 Rosenau, James, Turbulence in World Politics, Princeton University Press, (1990), p 6

20

Chapter IV “Taliban.” In The Oxford Dictionary of Islam., edited by John L. Esposito.

Oxford Islamic Studies Online, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2325 (accessed May 29, 2012).

21 Shoup, A., (2012). “Afghanistan and the War on Terror: The Taliban.” PBS Newshour. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/asia/afghanistan/keyplayers/taliban.html (accessed May 14, 2012).22

Nojumi, N., (2002). The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War and the Future of the Region. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 127. ISBN 978-0-312-29584-4.

23 Ibid24 Abrams, D., (2007). Hamid Karzai. Infobase Publishing. Pp 14 ISBN 978-0-7910-

9267-5.25 Maley, W., (2001). Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban. C

Hurst & Co. pp 14. ISBN 978-1-85065-360-8.26 Ibid27 U.S. Department of State. The Taliban’s war against women. Bureau of

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. Available from Internet. http://state.gov/g/drl/rls/6185.hm. (accessed April 13, 2012).

28 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Afghanistan: What is an acceptable End State, and How do we get there: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 112th Cong., 1st sess., May 3, 2011. 3, 21.

29 Shoup, A., (2012). “Afghanistan and the War on Terror: The Taliban.” PBS Newshour. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/asia/afghanistan/keyplayers/taliban.html (accessed May 14, 2012).

30 Landay, J., & Youssef, N., (2012). Intelligence Report: Taliban Still HopeTo Rule Afghanistan.” McClatchy Washington Bureau. Retrieved May 22, 2012.

31 Maloney, S. M. (2010). Can we negotiate with the Taliban? Small Wars & Insurgencies, 21(2), 407

32 Ibid, 40633 Ibid34 Ibid, 407

Chapter V35 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Al-Qaeda, the

Taliban, and Other Extremists Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 112th Cong., 1st sess., May 24, 2011, 20.

36 Ansari, M., (2011). The Bonn II Process: Taliban Inclusion Necessary, But Faces Obstacles (December 20, 2011. The Global Observatory, http://www.theglobalobservatory.org/analysis/181-the-bonn-ii-process-taliban-inclusion-necessary-but-faces-obstacles.html. (accessed May 14, 2012)

37 Landay, J., & Youssef, N., (2012). Intelligence Report: Taliban Still HopeTo Rule Afghanistan.” McClatchy Washington Bureau. Retrieved May 22, 2012.

38 Ansari, M., (2011). The Bonn II Process: Taliban Inclusion Necessary, But Faces Obstacles (December 20, 2011. The Global Observatory, http://www.theglobalobservatory.org/analysis/181-the-bonn-ii-process-taliban-inclusion-necessary-but-faces-obstacles.html. (accessed May 14, 2012)

39 Landay, J., & Youssef, N., (2012). Intelligence Report: Taliban Still HopeTo Rule Afghanistan.” McClatchy Washington Bureau. Retrieved May 22, 2012.

40 Siddique, A., (2011). “Study Says Window for Afghan Peace is Closing Quickly.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. http://www.reflr.org/content/study_says_windown_for_afghan_peace_is_closing_quickly/2301639.html. (accessed February 13,2011).

41 Abbas, R., (2012). Debate Rages Over U.S. Withdrawal From Afghanistan. Global Issues, www.globalissues.org/news/2012/03/24/13117 (accessed March 24, 2012).

42 Barakat, S. &Zyck, S. A. (2010). Afghanistan's Insurgency and the Viability of a Political Settlement. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33(3), 206.

43 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Relations. Afghanistan and Pakistan: Transition and the Way Forward: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 112th Cong., 1st sess., October 27, 2011. 18.

44 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Afghanistan: What is an acceptable End State, and how do we get there: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 112th Cong., 1st sess., May 3, 2011. 21

45 MSNBC (2012). “Report: Taliban, Afghan Troops Forge Agreement As NATO Prepares Draw-down.” 20 May 2012. http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/05/20/11776735-report-taliban-afghan-troops-forge-agreements-as-nato-prepares-draw-down?lite. (accessed May 20, 2012).

46 Ibid47 Landay, J., & Youssef, N., (2012). Intelligence Report: Taliban Still Hope

To Rule Afghanistan.” McClatchy Washington Bureau. Retrieved May 22, 2012.48 Ibid49 Maloney, S. M. (2010). Can we negotiate with the Taliban? Small Wars &

Insurgencies, 21(2), 40-408.50 US Congress51 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Al-Qaeda, the

Taliban, and Other Extremists Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 112th Cong., 1st sess., May 24, 2011, 5.

52 Ibid53 National Defense University (2010). An Interview With Husain Haqqani.

PRISM 1, no 4. National Defense University (accessed April 3, 2012).54 Ibid55 Ibid56 Ibid57 Riechmann, D., (2012). “Taliban, Afghan Neighbors Could Hamper NATO’s

Exit. Associated Press (22 May 2012).58 Ibid59 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Evaluating Goals

and Progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 23, 2011. 14-15.

60 Foster, J., (2010). Afghanistan: The TAPI Pipeline, and Energy Geopolitics(23 March 2010). http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=233:afghanistan-the-tapi-pipeline-and-energy-geopolitics&catid=103:energysecurityissuecontent&Itemid=358(accessed June 2, 2012).

61 Ansari, M., (2011). The Bonn II Process: Peace Unlikely Without Pakistan, December 20, 2011. The Global Observatory, http://www.theglobalobservatory.org/analysis/182-the-bonn-ii-process-peace-unlikely-without-pakistan.html. (accessed May 14, 2012)

62 Kimbrell, D., (2010). Understanding Russia’s Approach on Afghanistan, Pakistan. EurasiaNet.Org. June 25, 2010.

63 Reuters (2011). Factbox: Relations between Afghanistan and China. Reuters.com October 4, 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/04/us-afghanistan-china-fb-idUSTRE79325D20111004. (accessed May 24 2012).

64 Barakat, S. &Zyck, S. A. (2010). Afghanistan's Insurgency and the Viability of a Political Settlement. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33(3), 205.

65 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. 2014 and Beyond: U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, Part I: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs. 112th Cong., 1st sess., November 3, 2011.

66 Bailes, A., Dunay, P., Guang, P., & Troitskiy, M. (2007). The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 17. May 2007. http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/SIPRI-Shangai_Coop_Org.pdf (accessed May 23, 2012).

67 Biddle, S., Christia, F., & Thier, J.. (2010). Defining Success in Afghanistan. Foreign Affairs, 89(4), 48-60.  Retrieved June 16, 2011, from ABI/INFORM Global.

68 U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control. Executive Order 13224. Available from Internet. http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/terror.pdf. (accessed May 23, 2012).

69 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Evaluating Goals and Progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 23, 2011. 7.

70 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Relations. Afghanistan and Pakistan: Transition and the Way Forward: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 112th Cong., 1st sess., October 27, 2011. 32.

71 Ibid72 Ibid73 Ibid74 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Evaluating Goals

and Progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 23, 2011. 7.

75 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Other Extremists Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 112th Cong., 1st sess., May 24, 2011, 14.

Chapter XIII

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