bangladesh. moderate islam

NBR PANEL AT THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION

OF ASIA SCHOLARS (ICAS) 5:

APPROACHES TO ‘MODERATE’ ISLAM IN ASIA

August 3, 2007, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

NBR Panel at ICAS5, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, August 3, 2007

Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Asia: The Dynamics among

Islam, Muslim Identity, Politics, and Society in Asia

Organization of the Report

Report Preface: NBR at ICAS ....................................................................................................................... i Conference Panel Discussion Summary ....................................................................................................... v Summation of Country and Regional Reports—Tamara Sonn ..................................................................... 1 Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Southeast Asia—Fred von der Mehden ............................................. 20 Islam and Muslim Identity in Malaysia—Osman Bakar ............................................................................ 35 Southern Thailand Crisis—Imtiyaz Yusuf ................................................................................................... 46 South Asia Regional Assessment—Mohammad Rashiduzzaman ............................................................... 71 ‘Moderate’ Islam in Bangladesh—Iftekhar Iqbal ....................................................................................... 80 Being a Muslim in Contemporary India—Mohammad Talib ..................................................................... 96 Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Pakistan—Zafar Ishaq Ansari and Syed Akif ................................... 116 Moderate Islam in Eurasia—Michael Bishku ........................................................................................... 132 Moderate Muslims in Iran and the Challenge of Human Rights—Arash Naraghi ................................... 145 Moderate Islamic Activism in Uzbekistan—Alisher Khamidov ............................................................... 160 Appendix: ICAS5 NBR Panel Handout .................................................................................................... 176

Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Asia Conference Report: Preface

PROPRIETARY: NO REDISTRIBUTION WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH

APPROACHES TO ‘MODERATE’ ISLAM IN ASIA: THE DYNAMICS

AMONG ISLAM, MUSLIM IDENTITY, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY IN

ASIA

CONFERENCE REPORT

Report Preface


The National Bureau of Asian Research ii

NBR at ICAS

On August 3, 2007, NBR convened a team of regional experts at the International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS) 5 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to share findings from an NBR study exploring approaches to ‘moderate’ Islam in Asia, and the implications for the United States. Discussing the religio-political environments of countries across Muslim Eurasia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, NBR’s team of specialists provided invaluable “insider” perspectives on the diversity, challenges, and concerns of today’s Asian Muslim world. The regional location of ICAS 5 proved vital in producing a dynamic venue for debate and exploration of policy-relevant issues driven by “local” reactions and Asian viewpoints. Given ICAS’s position as one of the largest and most popular regional forums drawing the world’s leading Asia specialists, the conference provided immense opportunities for NBR to introduce itself to strategic regional audiences and build upon its extensive network of experts while incorporating new perspectives. ICAS: One of the World’s Leading Forums for Asia Specialists

Since 1998, ICAS has convened on a biennial basis, providing a unique opportunity for the world’s leading Asia specialists to meet and exchange ideas. ICAS was initially conceived as a transatlantic event, bringing together European and American Asia specialists. However, since the inaugural convention in Leiden, the venue for the conference has tended to be Asia-based, with its participants increasingly of Asian origin. The three previous ICAS conferences have taken place in Singapore (2003), Shanghai (2005) and Kuala Lumpur (2007). ICAS 6 will be held in Daejeon, South Korea, in 2009. The conference receives broad media coverage, both locally and internationally, while drawing support and participation from leading members of host country governments.1 On average, the conference brings together between one thousand and fifteen hundred participants from universities, non-profit and non-governmental organizations, as well as the private sector. The vast majority of participants, representing a range of disciplines, professions and institutions, is of Asian descent and offers invaluable “local” perspectives on various issues including development, energy security, politics, history, religion, ASEAN and international relations. NBR: “Outside the Beltway and Inside the Asia-Pacific” Perspectives

NBR’s institional mission is to inform and strengthen U.S. policy in Asia. Toward this effort, our programs employ a number of innovative approaches in research design and methodology with a particular goal to provide, to the extent possible, a unique “inside the Asia-Pacific” perspective on issues of key importance to U.S. interests in Asia. ICAS 5 proved a fertile ground for developing new perspectives and assessing “local” reactions to regional issues and trends, U.S. foreign policy, and perceptions of the United States throughout Asia. The Asia-based conference provided NBR with an invaluable window into the issues Asian communities perceive as most relevant to their interests. For instance, a recurrent theme of the NBR ICAS panel discussions on Islam in Asia was that the central questions concerning U.S. policy communities on this issue often differ from those shaping the decisions of Asian actors. 1 Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak opened ICAS 5.


The National Bureau of Asian Research iii

The prevailing perception of discussion participants was that, while the debate dominating U.S. policy circles tends toward the question of religion, the perceived threat of religious institutions and organizations, and the harmful casting of “good” against “bad” Muslims, religion in Asia is usually seen in a positive light and growing increasingly popular, with Islamic institutions and political organizations offering in most cases the only means of representation, public services and solidarity to members of marginalized Asian Muslim communities. NBR’s presence at ICAS strongly facilitated the institution’s capacity to filter such unique “insider” perspectives on key trends and developments in Asia toward better informing U.S. policy in the region. Informing and Networking: Broadening NBR’s Reach and Capacity

Through its panels and informal presence at ICAS 5, NBR took advantage of an unprecedented opportunity to introduce itself to regional specialists and institutions. NBR’s panels provided the ideal channel through which NBR could showcase its extensive pool of regional experts, professionalism and the competitive edge of its innovative research and in-depth analysis. NBR furthermore stood out at the convention as one of the few organizations with panels focusing on the policy relevance of its research for the United States. As such, NBR’s panels attracted and informed a diverse and select group of Asia specialists debating the terms of significant policy questions and the role of the United States in Asia. While ICAS receives extensive local and international media coverage, along with producing its own comprehensive literature on ICAS panels and participating institutions, conference participants also serve as informal reporters, introducing NBR to regional communities through their writings in Internet forums, blogs or local media. For example, one presenter who happened to be an NBR panelist published an article through a local Filipino newspaper discussing NBR and the relevance of “moderate” Islam in Asia. Such representation serves to further NBR’s competitive reach into Asian communities while disseminating NBR-inspired discussions and perspectives.2 While at the conference, the NBR team was able to attend several panels and presentations, assessing the potential of outstanding specialists and institutions for becoming partners and contributors to future NBR projects, thus strengthening NBR’s extensive regional experts-network. As ICAS is one of the world’s largest and most popular forums for Asia scholars, the convention consistently draws some of the brightest and most talented experts in the field. Since returning, the NBR ICAS 5 team has developed an extensive portfolio of Asia experts and regional institutions from among the phenomenal conference participants, greatly expanding NBR’s AccessAsia database and pool of researchers, project mentors and potential Asia Policy contributors. NBR’s ICAS 5 Panels: Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Asia

NBR hosted three panels at ICAS 5, with each panel including three regional specialists and one US-based expert serving as the panel’s chair. The regional panelists presented reports on the following Asian countries: Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand (Southeast Asia); Bangladesh, India and Pakistan (South Asia); Iran, Turkey and Uzbekistan (Eurasia). All of the panelists were of Asian origin, thus providing NBR with the unique “local” perspectives which drive more

2 See Amina Rasul, “Islam and extremism,” The Manila Times, August 5, 2007, http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2007/aug/05/yehey/opinion/20070805opi7.html.


The National Bureau of Asian Research iv

powerful and effective policy discussion. This report provides a summary of the conference panel discussions, followed by papers prepared for the final project report.

Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Asia Conference Report: Discussion Summary



AMONG ISLAM, MUSLIM IDENTITY, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY IN

ASIA

CONFERENCE REPORT

Summary of NBR Panel Discussion at the International Conference of Asia

Scholars (ICAS) 5, August 3, 2007, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia


The National Bureau of Asian Research vi

Executive Summary

Summary

The search for faith and community throughout the Muslim world has intensified in the last decade. Home to over 65 percent of the world’s Muslim population, Asia has become a formidable battleground for the “hearts and minds” of Muslims. Increasing radical violence throughout Asia has been accompanied by the growing popularity of Islamist parties, which often provide Muslims with their only means to power and solidarity. Key Findings

• Muslims throughout Asia believe that the West (and the United States in particular) is waging war against Islam and the Muslim world. The search for “moderation” recalls times when colonial powers harnessed “liberal” Muslims to endorse imperial claims.

• There is a strong demand throughout all levels of Asian society for a greater role of religion and restoration of Islam’s golden past. With slight exceptions, however, Islamist parties remain weak at the polls, and few Muslims give serious support to calls for an Islamic state or return of the Caliphate.

• Islamist groups—the overwhelming majority of which advocate non-violent means—often provide Muslims with the only source of public goods and services, along with a sense of community, pride, and protection.

Policy Implications

• The United States must be conscious of the influential role played by the Internet and media sources in bringing together distant communities while highlighting the apparent “double standards” of the United States and the negative outcomes of the war on terrorism.

• Jettisoning policies based on the notion of “good” and “bad” Muslims and recognizing Islam’s diversity is critical in promoting mutual understanding and building confidence among marginalized Muslim communities.

• Extremist groups often use religion to legitimize their roles in conflicts that are ultimately ethnic in origin. The conflict and its remedy are thus far removed from the inherently non-violent origins of Islam and its institutions.


The National Bureau of Asian Research vii

Introduction

The search for faith and community throughout the Muslim world has intensified in the last decade. Home to over 65 percent of the world’s Muslim population, Asia has become a formidable battleground for the “hearts and minds” of Muslims adapting to the quickly changing environments wrought by globalization and modern technology. Many of Asia’s Muslims live on the peripheries of society, contesting limited access to public services and representation. Muslims view the war on terrorism—as well as attempts by other state regimes to exploit the “terrorist” threat—as unjust discrimination. Increasing radical violence throughout Asia has been accompanied by the growing popularity of Islamist parties, which often provide Muslims with their only means to power and solidarity. This situation highlights both the widening gulf between the West and the Muslim world as well as fundamental misunderstandings of Islam. On August 3, 2007, NBR convened a team of experts from the region at the International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS) 5 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia to share findings from an ongoing NBR study that both explores these various manifestations of Islam in Asia and assesses policy implications of current trends for the United States. Discussing the religio-political environments of countries across Eurasia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, the team provided invaluable “insider” perspectives that illuminated the diversity, challenges, and hopes of today’s Asian Muslim world. The conference proved a fruitful venue for debate and further exploration of these questions of critical relevance to the United States. Key trends and policy implications discussed at the conference are highlighted in this report.

Key Trends in Muslim Asia

Foreign Policy and its Discontents

Muslims throughout Asia believe that the West (and the United States in particular) is waging war against Islam and the Muslim world. The majority of Asian Muslims believe that the United States is violating the very democratic standards that it promotes throughout the Muslim world. The Bush administration is perceived as unduly influenced by Christian fundamentalists, supporting totalitarian regimes for geopolitical gain, and egregiously violating civil liberties. Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of the American public is seen as promoting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan while condoning civilian casualties. The U.S. search for “moderate” Islam is also viewed by many Muslims as simply another expression of these double standards—connected to the time when colonial powers sought out “liberal” Muslims to help endorse their imperial claims. Muslims, however, naturally perceive Islam as being inherently moderate. For the West to then seek moderation reveals an implicit ignorance of the faith and its followers. In many Muslim communities, attempts to enforce “official”, pliant versions of Islam are perceived as malicious schemes to destroy the integrity and history of these communities. Thus, simple policies that position “good” Muslims over “bad” Muslims effectively alienate these communities and strengthen the appeal of Islamist and radical rhetoric.


The National Bureau of Asian Research viii

Nostaliga for a “Golden Past” and Sense of Community

Asian Muslims are often members of marginalized communities, treated as second-class citizens. This denigrating socio-economic position, compounded by general perceptions of unjust oppression and discrimination from both local governments and the West, is often at odds with collective imaginings of Islam’s “golden past” and its privileged place among world powers. The general spirit of Muslim minority communities is pessimistic. Micro-credit initiatives, such as Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank, and the efforts of non-governmental organizations in building civil society are often viewed with skepticism and suspicion. Although few would seriously call for the return of the Caliphate or support an Islamic state, there has been an overall demand throughout all levels of society for a greater role of religion—witnessed by a rise in outward piety and pressure for Islamic educational reform. With the rise of the Internet and more efficient means of communication, there has been a growing sense of community and shared suffering among Asia’s Muslims in connection with the rest of the Muslim world. Islamist groups and radical leaders are exploiting community contempt for the global war on terrorism by harnessing emotions and galvanizing sympathy for extremist causes. Rebellion of the Excluded

Radicalism is on the rise throughout Asia. Regional experts often interpret radicalism, which promises solidarity and power to groups on the fringes of society, as the “rebellion of the excluded.” Minority Muslim ethnic groups throughout Asia—such as the Muslim Malays of southern Thailand and Moros of the Philippines—use religion to legitimize their contestations of authority over fundamentally ethnic problems. As such, there is no easy solution in which “moderate” Islamic forces might effectively resolve questions of radical ethnic violence. These issues demand an entirely separate approach including a more equal distribution of wealth and robust socio-political integration. The “Islamist” Alternative

The Muslim world is vast and diverse. Though most Muslims condemn acts of extremism and violence, all groups—traditionalists, fundamentalists, moderates, and extremists—share common concerns. Local governments are generally seen as incompetent in distributing public wealth and integrating peripheral communities or, alternatively, as violently suppressing or otherwise isolating their respective Muslim communities. Many Islamist groups—both radical and non-violent groups—often provide Muslims with public goods and other services, along with a sense of community, pride and protection not to be found elsewhere.

Implications for Policy

Broadened access to information accompanied by growing sense of injustice

Internet access and efficient means of communication are on the rise throughout Asia. Although modern technology has provided Muslims with a broadened sense of community, media sources highlight negative results of the war on terrorism, while projecting a contemptuous and hypocritical image of the United States. The United States is perceived as promoting a policy of double-standards, attacking Muslim values and Islam in general. The United States must be cautious of its image and policy projection among Asia’s Muslim communities.


The National Bureau of Asian Research ix

Encouraging appreciation for diversity

The Muslim world is diverse; it is not monolithic and should not be parsimoniously divided between its “good” and “bad” elements. Recognition of this diversity—by both the United States and local state governments—is critical in building mutual understanding and confidence among marginalized communities. In many cases, Islamic institutions and political organizations provide marginal Muslim communities with the only available resources for education, social justice, and representation. Reflecting general public opinion, the overwhelming majority of these socio-political groups condemn acts of violence and radical extremism. Containing and silencing such groups facilitates the further marginalization and radicalization of Asia’s Muslim communities. Redefining the question of religious radicalism

The United States must be cautious when diagnosing the causes of violence in Asia. Extremist groups often use religion to legitimize their roles in conflicts that are ultimately ethnic in origin. The conflict and its remedy are essentially far removed from the inherently non-violent origins of Islam and its institutions.

Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Asia Summation—Tamara Sonn



AMONG ISLAM, MUSLIM IDENTITY, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY

Summation of Country and Regional Reports

Tamara Sonn

Tamara Sonn is the Kenan Professor of Humanities in the Department of Religious Studies at the College of William and Mary. She has a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations. She is the author of numerous books on Islam, is the past president of the American Council for the Study of Islamic Societies, a member of the academic advisory council for the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University, a board member at the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, and a member of the editorial boards of Muslim World, American Journal for Islamic Social Science, and several other journals. Dr. Sonn is also a senior editor of Oxford Islamic Studies Online, and editor-in-chief of Religion Compass, an online-only journal that publishes original, peer-evaluated, state-of-the-art surveys of current research from across the entire religious studies discipline.


The National Bureau of Asian Research 2

Executive Summary

Summary

Opposition to United States (and British) foreign policy is shared throughout the Muslim world by Islamists, secularists, moderates, and extremists, as is the desire for good governance and economic opportunity. Mainstream or “moderate” Muslims and Islamists, however, disagree sharply with radicals over the question of how to achieve their goals. Added to moderate Muslims’ concerns over good governance and economic opportunity is the very existence of extremists. Yet they believe that religious extremism breeds on a number of factors that are out of their control.

Key Findings

• Moderate Muslims advocate good governance, characterized by transparency, respect for human rights, and inclusiveness.

• Moderate Muslims believe their governments must provide basic services and economic opportunity.

• Moderate Muslims share with radicals the perception that “the West”—in particular, the U.S. and U.K.—are opposed to Islam, a perception fueled by memories of colonialism and ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as continued support for non-democratic governments of Muslim countries and for Israel despite its violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 (calling for withdrawal from occupied Palestinian and Syrian territory).

• Moderate Muslims believe that religious extremism can be challenged effectively only through lawful means.

Policy Implications

• Identify and engage “moderate” Islamist groups to support social, political, and economic reform.

• Encourage democratization through the use of economic incentives. • Encourage and support poverty reduction in order to improve education. • Initiate conflict resolution measures in Iraq and Afghanistan, and address key foreign

policy issues of concern across the Muslim world, especially the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, through consistent application of international law and U.N. Security Council resolutions.



Introduction Since the beginning of the war against terrorism, United States government officials have carefully distinguished between radical and moderate Islam. As President Bush put it, “Our war is against evil, not against Islam.”3 There is general agreement that a key characteristic distinguishing radical from moderate Muslims is the radicals’ willingness to use violence to achieve their goals. Beyond that, however, there has been little specificity regarding other characteristics that identify “moderate” Islam. The goal of this project was to gain an understanding of the key concerns and attitudes of Asian Muslims who might be described as ‘moderate’. To access the perceptions of moderate Muslims, we commissioned a series of focus group “listening sessions” in Eurasia (Turkey, Iran, and Uzbekistan), South Asia (Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India), and Southeast Asia (Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines). These focus group sessions, conducted in the first six months of 2007, were supplemented by “virtual interviews” (telephone interviews and conferences) and examination of scholarly publications. Perspectives of Muslims in Philippines were presented in a single session with religious scholars in July 2007. As well, a profile of Muslims in Indonesia was presented by area specialist Fred von der Mehden of Rice University, and the views of moderate Muslims in Malaysia were presented by Malaysia specialist Osman Bakr. Our overall objective was to gain an understanding of the ongoing transformations within Muslim communities and the implications of these transformations for United States relations and engagement with Muslim Asia. Analysis of the findings of the focus group sessions, “virtual interviews,” and scholarly reports reveals a number of dominant themes. Moderate Muslims in Asia are generally insistent that mainstream Islam is “moderate,” as ordained by the Qur’an and the example of Prophet Muhammad (the Sunnah), and evidenced by pre-modern history. As a result, Muslims throughout Asia are concerned about growing religious extremism. Yet they believe that the primary causes of extremism are beyond their control. Those causes include the failure of governments to provide good governance, characterized by transparency, respect for human rights, and inclusiveness; and the failure of governments to provide basic services and economic opportunity (governmental inefficiency and corruption). While ‘moderate’ Muslims reject violence as a means to achieve these goals (as well as on the recommended extent of social reform, particularly in the area of women’s rights), they share with radicals negative perceptions of “the West”—in particular, the United States and the United Kingdom. Those negative perceptions stem from specific U.S. and U.K. foreign policies, including the ongoing military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, support for non-democratic governments of Muslim countries, and support for Israel despite its violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 (calling for withdrawal from occupied Palestinian and Syrian territory). Moderate and radical Muslims also share the perception that the West is opposed to Islam (or even trying “to destroy Islam”), a perception fueled by memories of colonialism and intensified

3 Office of the Press Secretary (20 September 2001). http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html



by current policies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Israel-Palestine. Indeed, moderate Muslims believe these policies undermine their own efforts and strengthen the positions of radicals. Finally, moderate Muslims believe that religious extremism can be challenged effectively only through lawful means. The following report summarizes key observations and trends derived from the focus groups sessions, interviews, and reports, and concludes with a discussion of the implications of those observations and trends for U.S. relations and engagement with Muslim Asia.

Key Observations and Trends

Mutual Misperceptions

There appears to be a marked disparity between perceptions of Islam in the United States and the self-perceptions of Muslims in Asia. Participants in numerous focus groups expressed consternation over the use of the phrase “moderate Islam,” seeing it as a reflection of the West’s profound misunderstanding of Islam. They believe the West assumes Islam to be inherently radical. Thus many project participants were eager to explain that mainstream Islam is by nature moderate. Some participants insisted that the phrase “moderate Islam” is, in fact, redundant. The consensus among the participants in Pakistani and Bangladeshi focus groups, for example, was “that there can be a ‘moderate Muslim,’ not ‘moderate Islam’ since…Islam is an essentially moderate religion.” (Iqbal) This view was supported theologically (the Qur’an identifies the community it seeks to establish as a “moderate” or “median community,” ummat al-wasit), and historically (based on the experiences of Egyptian Christians, Spanish Jews and Indian Hindus living under Islamic sovereignty throughout the Middle Ages with security and religious freedom, for example, compared with that of religious minorities—particularly Jews—in Christian societies). At the same time, there is disparity between America’s self-image and Asian Muslims’ perceptions of the United States. Many focus group participants expressed perceptions of the West as hypocritical and belligerent. Some described the United States as radical, extremist, fanatic, and fundamentalist. In Pakistan, for example, one focus group coordinator summarized concerns frequently voiced in this regard:

• The West should put the question to itself first. Where in the Muslim world were

fanatics in positions of decision-making? On the other hand, in the West, especially in the U.S., decision-making ranks were bustling with fundamentalists who were increasingly bringing their faith into the long separated Caesar-Church divide!

• Recent polls had revealed that 85% of the western population approved of civilian killings, under whatever pretext or logic, while only 45% of the Muslim population approved this course of action!

• Throughout Europe, the borderline right wing fascist parties were in the ascendant. This was in sharp contrast with the Muslim world. (Ansari, Akif)

No source was provided for the findings of these “recent polls.” However, in the course of the argument, particular note was made of the erosion of civil liberties in the United States. The



perceived erosion of civil liberties in the United States after September 11th was taken as a reflection of immoderate values, rendering the search for “moderate” Islam by U.S. policymakers somewhat ironic. The coordinator of another focus group in Pakistan, comprised of well-educated and middle- to upper-income people from Pakistan’s largest city, observed a similar reaction, describing the use of the term “moderate Islam” as causing an “uproar, with several participants becoming incensed and outraged.” Perhaps the most commonly expressed perception, however, was that the West in general, and the U.S. in particular, views Islam with contempt, at best. Some focus group participants believe that this perceived contempt for Islam results from simple ignorance on the part of Westerners, who assume that the actions of extremists reflect mainstream Islamic views. Other respondents believe contempt for Islam reflects arrogance on the part of Americans. Most significant—and most characteristic of radicalized Muslims but shared by many moderates, as well—is the perception that the West is attempting to destroy Islam. This is a view that was first expressed by the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-i Islami ideologues in the mid-20th century, who explained this agenda in terms of the West’s awareness of the inherent strength of Islam and the power of Islam to thwart Western countries’ imperialist schemes. The claim that the West is engaged in a campaign to destroy Islam has been revived by militant ideologues in the past two decades. Participants in focus groups expressed concern that ongoing military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan lend credibility to this claim, to the extent that it has begun to appear in the rhetoric of even such localized movements as those seeking redress of minority community grievances in southern Thailand and southern Philippines. As a result of these perceptions, focus group participants throughout Asia expressed suspicion of the motives of the West in attempting to identify voices of “moderate Islam.” In the context of repeated efforts by colonial and post-colonial powers to establish “official” Islam—a pliant and controllable variety of Islam suited to the goals of non-democratic governments' goals—some participants expressed concern that the NBR “Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Asia” project’s title betrayed a similar political agenda. For example, the coordinator of four focus groups comprising 26 individuals in Karachi observed that, when confronted with questions about “moderate” Islam, participants were reluctant to participate in discussions “on a topic and issues that they considered part of a highly political—even conspiratorial—Western/Christian agenda and not unbiased intellectual research, notwithstanding the involvement of respected local personalities associated with various esteemed institutions.” (Ansari, Akif) This perception was intensified when it was revealed that the research had been commissioned by a U.S.-based organization. (Ansari, Akif) Again, specific policies such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as support for non-democratic government both within and outside the Muslim world, were described as strengthening these suspicions. Similarly, a number of participants expressed suspicion that their own governments are using “religious extremism” as an excuse to suppress legitimate opposition to authoritarianism, as seen for example in Uzbekistan.



Diversity in Islam and Islamism

Focus group participants stressed the importance of recognizing the broad range of viewpoints among Muslims and within Islamist movements. “Islamists” in general use religion as a primary frame of reference in making socioeconomic and political decisions. At its most basic level, Islamism, or political Islam, is an ideology calling for replacement of secular legal systems—many of which were imposed by European colonial powers in the 19th or early 20th century—with Islamic ones. But the establishment of Islamic—Shari’ah-based—legal systems need not be considered threatening to modernist (or Western) values of pluralism, democracy, and human rights. Islamism is diverse. Its expressions range from “conservative” or “traditional”—advocating implementation of traditional interpretations of Islamic law, to “reformist”—calling for reinterpretation of laws, based on foundational Islamic sources (the Qur’an and Sunnah), in accordance with the needs of modern society. For example, the electoral success of Turkey’s currently dominant AKP is based on the party’s platform of social justice, economic development, and transparency in government. Despite the fears of secularists, the AKP government has not imposed religious rules, such as prohibition of alcohol in restaurants. The AKP’s support for the right of women to wear headscarves in public schools is considered a matter of human rights, violated under Kemalist regimes.4 The AKP government has begun to integrate state and civil society, in the view of Professor Bishku, and “has the potential to do the same for the gender gap through confronting patriarchy with modernist Islam.” (Bishku) People interviewed for this project, cutting across all social matrixes of Turkish society (class, gender, and state/civil), agreed that “there has been a liberalization in economic, cultural, and political arenas as well as gender relations in Turkey in recent years,” and all agreed “that the AK Party … had been a factor in this regard.” (Bishku) It is noteworthy, for example, that the AK Party, unlike its predecessors, supports Turkey’s entrance into the European Union, with all the requisite social and political reforms. Even in Iran, where all public discourse is Islamic, diverse approaches to social and political issues are evident. A survey of recent publications reveals at least four tendencies: Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Messbah Yazdi and Ayatollah Ali Jannati, for example, both among the 86 members of the elected Assembly of Experts (empowered by the Iranian constitution to elect, supervise and, when necessary, replace the Supreme Leader), represent a tendency fully committed to traditional Shi’i Islamic categories and norms and opposed to change or reform. Other traditional scholars, such as Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, view modern conceptions of human rights as consistent with traditional Islamic values. Unlike their conservative colleagues, the traditional scholars consider the differences between traditional Islamic discourse which stresses human duties and divine authority, and modern discourse which stresses inalienable rights and human autonomy, to be a minor point. Modern opponents of reform—including reform in human rights—and motivated largely by opposition to the West, are represented by the current President Mahmud Ahmadinejad.

4 Prime Minister Erdogan sends his daughters to university in the U.S., presented as an example of a country that respects human rights, so that they may be free to wear their scarves to class.



Scholars advocating human rights views, such as Abdul Karim Soroush, Mohammad Mojtahed Shebesstari, Mostafa Malekiyan, and Mohsen Kadivar, like all Islamists ground their arguments in Islamic sources. But for these scholars, it is critical to distinguish between Islamic sources—the Qur’an and Sunnah—and human interpretations of them. The latter, they believe, are subject to rational analysis and revision consistent with current and changing circumstances. The popularity of this perspective is indicated by the landslide victories of former President Mohammad Khatami (1997 and 2001) and the grassroots popularity of Nobel Peace Laureate Shirin Ebadi, both outspoken proponents of democracy and human rights, including the rights of women and minorities.

Islamist groups in Uzbekistan also range from moderate to radical. Project participants acknowledged that HT and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) may be “radical” (calling for the overthrow of the present secular government by peaceful means) and “extremist” (calling for the use of violence to replace the government), respectively, but many believed the influence of HT and IMU has been exaggerated by the government to justify repressive measures against all Islamist groups, including moderate ones that have emerged in various regions to address economic needs unfulfilled by the current government.

In Pakistan, focus group coordinator Dr. Ansari identified five major issues on which Islamists express views ranging from conservative to progressive: gender (including the rights of women to education and employment), minorities’ rights, cultural (including the permissibility of popular entertainment and fine arts), political (including citizens’ rights to privacy and whether or not religion is a private issue), and legal (particularly the status of traditional Islamic laws regulating punishment for specific crimes, interest, and apostasy). While focus group participants agreed on the need for reform in these areas, “as soon as the advocates of moderation…tried to translate the concepts into action, conflict immediately arose.” (Ansari, Akif) With 50 years of post-independence stability, despite its multi-ethnic and religiously diverse profile, Malaysia is “one of the most successful religio-political orders in the Muslim world.” (Bakar) Although the officially Muslim government guarantees religious freedom, it strongly discourages interfaith debate as a potential source of conflict. However, increased economic prosperity and social mobility has resulted in an increase in interfaith marriages and conversion from Islam. Both of these tendencies strain traditional approaches to Islam and increasing debate between conservative and progressive groups. Mutual Misperceptions Are Undermining 'Moderate' Islam and Fostering Extremism

Focus group participants in some countries expressed concern that the West’s lack of respect for and misperception of Islam and Muslims—its failure to recognize the essentially moderate profile of mainstream Islam—is, in fact, fostering the growth of extremism. Extremist rhetoric often plays on insults to Islam—the religion and its Prophet—as seen in such as the work of Salman Rushdie (along with its recent valorization through knighthood in the U.K.) and the Danish cartoons which caricatured the Prophet—and calls to avenge the honor of Islam. In the context of economic and political impotence, such appeals can give a sense of empowerment through the vision of a chastened enemy and a revitalized worldwide Islamic caliphate.



This view was particularly evident among participants in focus groups in Pakistan. In a survey of some 70 people from a cross-section of Punjabi society, reflecting diverse religious, educational, and professional backgrounds, there was broad agreement that disrespect and disapproval of Islam expressed in Western media sources has polarized Muslim society, undermining the position of moderates and compromising efforts to promote reform. Reciprocally, perceptions of the West’s contempt for Islam are strengthening the position of extremists who claim to defend the dignity of Islam. The term “crisis” was used more than once to describe this dynamic. As one focus group organizer summarized, “There was a general agreement on the evident polarization of our society and violence between the groups of ‘Westernized’ rejectionists and religious/political extremists. The ‘ultras’ are no more a minority forming only a tiny wart on the face of the worldwide attempt to revive Islam….The extremes have broadened and the middle ground has become increasingly enfeebled, giving way to wide-scale confusion and dislocation.” (Ansari, Akif) In other words, the West’s failure to distinguish between moderate and radical Muslims strengthens the argument of radical Muslims. This view was expressed in Iran, Bangladesh, and the Philippines, as well as Pakistan. The Negative Impact of United States Foreign Policy

The research conducted for this project reveals a broadly shared concern among Muslims in Asia that the growth of religious extremism is fostered by disrespect of Islam expressed in the West. But there was also general agreement that the core issues fueling this growth include the ill effects of Western foreign policy, primarily that of the United States. Focus group coordinator Zafar Ishaq Ansari, director general of the Islamic Research Institute at the International Islamic University in Islamabad, traced the origins of extremism in Pakistan to the United States’ “arming and funding of anti-communist” Mujahideen in Afghanistan and simultaneous empowering of former military dictator Zia ul-Haqq, through whom the support was channeled, just as the Islamic regime in Iran was supporting resurgent Shi’ism.5 But radicalism has been exacerbated since 9/11 as a result of the perception that the West not only disrespects Islam but is also attempting to take control of the Muslim world. While he number of extremists—defined as those who resort to violence—is estimated to be relatively small, the emotional appeal of pride in the dignity of Islam, and the call to avenge the suffering of the oppressed is strong, particularly among those least empowered politically and economically. These emotional appeals engender opposition to the countries whose policies are identified as the cause of that suffering—the U.S. and U.K., as well as the Muslim rulers who cooperate with that foreign policy, either directly or indirectly. As Dr. Ansari summarized, there is:

5 This refers to the period in the 1980s when the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan and the United States, in response, supported the Afghan resistance fighters and the foreign fighters who came to assist the Afghan resistance. The resistance forces in Afghanistan were known collectively as the Mujahideen. U.S. support for the Mujahideen was funneled through Pakistan's military dictator at the time, Gen. Zia ul-Haqq. After the departure of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, many of the Mujahideen, including foreign fighters, went on to support Muslims in other conflict regions, including Kashmir, Chechnya, and Bosnia; some remained in Afghanistan and eventually constituted the core of al-Qa`ida. For background, see Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004); and Mary Anne Weaver, Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan (New York: Farrar, Staus and Giroux, 2002), and



“ . . a heightened sensitivity of Muslims throughout the world towards what is generally seen to be the hegemonistic agenda of the West—primarily the U.S.—for global domination. In the post-9/11 world, Muslims generally feel at the constant receiving end of American and Western foreign policy backed up by the readiness to use an assortment of sanctions with its horrendous military machine which is perceived by vast sections of Muslims to be the cause of most of their troubles from Iraq to Afghanistan and Darfur to Palestine. With a long list of double standards from Guantanamo and ‘extraordinary rendition’ to profiling and simple prejudice, research studies like the present one can hardly be expected to remain unaffected by the mindset of the victim which immediately sets off a defense mechanism of denial.” (Ansari, Akif)

Concern over U.S. foreign policy was expressed even in the most stable and tolerant of the countries under review. In Malaysia, for example, the focus group coordinator summarized: “Focus groups are generally critical of the United States foreign policy especially in the Middle East. However, they make quite clear that they are not opposed to the U.S. as a country.” Indonesia is another example. With the largest Muslim population in the world, Indonesia is a viable democracy displaying “a wide-ranging heterogeneity of belief and practice.” (Mehden) Indonesia’s politics are dominated by secular parties, and its largest Muslim parties support moderate platforms. Yet in recent years “groups with radical Islamic violent agendas such as Dar ul Islam and , more recently, Jemaah Islamiyah and anti-Christian armed organizations such as Laskar Jihad” have appeared. (Mehden) While these groups lack broad support, “elements of their agenda do resonate with the Muslim community, i.e., there is significant public suspicion of Christian activities and antipathy towards American and Israeli activities in the Middle East.”(Mehden) Indirect efforts by the United States to control the Muslim world are seen in U.S. support for non-democratic governments in Muslim countries, including Pakistan, as well as Western support for countries that violate the rights of Muslim communities, such as India and Israel. Dr. Ansari noted that U.S. support for Pakistan’s non-democratic government makes Pakistanis “feel unjustly punished by U.S. and Western policies combating extremism and promoting the war on terror.” (Ansari, Akif) These policies undermine the credibility of moderate Muslim voices calling for pluralism and respect for human rights, including the rights of women and minorities. For example, when asked about women’s rights, while the majority of Pakistan focus group participants agreed that Islamic texts guarantee these rights, culture and custom often intervene, particularly in rural, tribal, and feudal areas. Moderate Muslims believe that such violations of women’s rights must be addressed, and that inculcating proper understanding of Qur’anic values would be effective in doing so. However, in the context of United States support for non-democratic government, moderate Muslims’ efforts are distracted from such domestic issues and absorbed by efforts to restore democracy. In any case, in the Lahore focus group, “most scholars” believed that Islam’s record on the issue of women’s rights compares favorably to “the lackluster performance in the West up



until the modern times (even the example of Cambridge University’s denying admission to female students until not long ago).” (Ansari, Akif) The majority of Islamist participants evinced suspicion about the West’s concern for women’s rights, “relating it to the [W]estern agenda.” They implied that the West's advocacy of women’s rights in Pakistan was actually part of the West’s effort to replace Islamic values with secular ones. Similar patterns appeared in response to discussions of religious pluralism. That is, there was general agreement that Islam respects the rights of religious minorities and has a better record in this regard than the West. But again, the theme of the West’s campaign against Islam came to the fore. As the Karachi focus group coordinator put it, “A great outburst took place when it was (voluntarily) revealed that the research had been commissioned by a U.S.-based organization.” The leader of the Karachi focus group reported the widespread perception that “all the elements of the conspiracy had come together,” explaining that Western criticism of Pakistan’s record on women’s rights and pluralism was part of “the West’s onslaught against Islam.” Further, the president of Pakistan and the coordinators of the NBR “Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Asia” project were perceived as acting as U.S. agents in the campaign to undermine Islam. (Ansari, Akif) Lahore focus group leader observed with concern that, under the impact of Western support for Pakistan’s undemocratic government, Islam’s inherent pluralism is being undermined. He noted a growing tendency even among mainstream Muslims to believe that Islam superseded Judaism and Christianity and is “therefore the sole truly valid religion on earth.” While the tendency is balanced among the majority by the “tolerance which Islam makes obligatory towards Judaism and Christianity and the Qur’anic praise of truly believing Jews and Christians,” (Ansari, Akif) participants acknowledged that extremists regard non-Muslims actually as non-believers. Again, the strength of this group is growing as a result of attitudes expressed and policies supported by Western powers that are perceived to be anti-Islamic. Intolerance in some madrassas was also described as related to Western foreign policy. Most respondents believed that madrassas are run by teachers with “narrow interpretations of Islam and holding sectarian biases,” thus creating a general environment that promotes intolerance. Some, however, claimed some madrassas directly teach religious intolerance, but characterized this intolerance not as Islamic as such, but rather geared toward motivating students to fight defensive wars against the enemies of Islam, on the one hand and, on the other, castigating the Pakistani government for failing to provide adequate education and therefore leaving poor parents no alternative but madrassas. Another example of United States foreign policy indirectly encouraging extremism was found in the Bangladesh focus group sessions. Bangladesh focus group participants reported that supporters of radical groups “such as Jamaat ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) or Harkat ul-Jihad ul-Islami (HUJI)” are relatively few. Yet the appeal of Islamist parties has grown over the past decade, and frustration over rampant corruption and suspicion that the problems in Bangladeshi politics stem from foreign intervention fuel this growing appeal and create the potential for further radicalization. (Iqbal) Despite massive foreign aid (over $40 billion since 1971) and the presence of countless NGOs, poverty remains among the highest in the world and corruption is rampant. Focus group coordinators noted the tendency to associate these two



phenomena causally: “The majority of respondents across all the focus groups believe that the country’s politics and economics are greatly influenced, if not outright determined, by foreign actors.” (Iqbal) These foreign actors include NGOs and even the Grameen Bank (although it was founded and is headquartered in Bangladesh), who are perceived as introducing un-Islamic elements, such as interest-bearing loans, into Bangladeshi society. The analysis of Islamic attitudes in Iran provides an interesting example of negative attitudes toward United States foreign policy among moderates. There is broad diversity in interpretations, ranging from traditionalists who oppose human rights as articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Right, to modernists who support the UDHR. Those who take the modernist approach express opposition to U.S. foreign policy, both toward Iran and the region in general, but not toward the United States as such. Scholars in this category reacted negatively to what they perceived as the politicization of human rights by the U.S., arguing that sanctions have proven counter-productive and expressing concern over possible military intervention. Concern about the negative impact of United States foreign policy was also expressed among Muslim minority communities, for example, in India. Muslims have long felt discriminated against in India, and the government’s 2006 report on the social, economic and educational status of the Muslim community of India (the “Sachar committee report”) provided evidence that supports this perception, including lower literacy rates, and higher unemployment among Indian Muslims. Participants noted that anti-Muslim discrimination had been fomented by India’s “Hindu right-wing political party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP),” for example, when the party passed the 2000 Religious Buildings and Places Bill in Uttar Pradesh geared toward limiting the construction of mosques. (Talib) However, participants reported increased discrimination since 9/11, particularly in the form of intense scrutiny and police raids of madrassas. Numerous focus group participants cited anecdotal evidence of systematic discrimination against Muslims’ efforts to establish and support educational institutions, such as state failure to issue permits and delaying or decreasing grant aid. This increased discrimination was widely attributed to the War on Terror.” As an Open University in Delhi professor put it, “[T]he U.S. and its war on terror turned out for the BJP as a kind of ‘gift from the heaven.’ In the specific context of Indian Muslims, the BJP drew out a legitimacy-label to justify its discriminatory policies towards the Muslims.” (Talib) In Thailand, where ethnically diverse Muslims comprise 5-7% of the Kingdom's 65 million people, many are Thai-speaking and integrated into the country's pluralist framework. However, the Muslims of the south—perhaps 70% of Thailand's Muslims—self-identify as Malays and demand autonomy. A history of “brutal suppression and containment policies, as well as the double standards perceived in United States support for suppressive regimes while advocating democracy and the protection of human rights” has engendered strong mistrust and some radicalism among “Malay Muslims.” (Yusuf) Similarly, director of the Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy Dr. Amina Rasul-Bernardo reports that radicalization “has been aided by the consequences of the Western interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the unresolved Palestine situation.” (Rasul-Bernado)



The Need for Good Governance and Economic Opportunity

Focus group participants across the region agreed on the need for good governance and respect for civil, political, and human rights, and economic opportunity and development. All want good governance, measured in terms of respect for human and civil rights, transparency, efficiency, inclusiveness and responsiveness, economic opportunity; and development. Failures in these areas throughout the Muslim world have generated widespread opposition to existing governments, and account for the birth and proliferation of Islamist groups—the “Islamic alternative.” The claim that the roots of radicalization lie in political and economic deprivation is supported by observations, noted by many focus group participants, that radical groups often attract members by providing economic and other opportunities, such as educational, and social safety nets unavailable or inaccessible in the broader society dominated by social elites. This was the case with the earliest Islamist group, the Muslim Brotherhood, established in Egypt in 1928, as well as with Palestinian and Lebanese Islamist groups including Hamas and Hezbollah. Today, the phenomenon is evident in Uzbekistan, for example. As journalist Alisher Khamidov reports, mainstream Islamic associations, such as Akromiya, attract support because they fulfill needs ignored by government, particularly economic needs. Unlike many of its neighbors, Uzbekistan lacks energy wealth; its citizens suffer severe economic hardships as well as political repression. But until 9/11 the US ignored Uzbekistan, and since 9/11 the West has shown more concern with radical Islam than with the political and economic privations that nurture it. Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), calls for replacement of the secular government with an Islamic one, although HT advocates peaceful methods while IMU rationalizes the use of violence. While the majority of Muslims in the Philippines—roughly 5% of the Republic’s population—are moderate, radicalization remains a problem due to prejudicial treatment at the hands of the Christian majority and the “negative impacts of globalization.” (Rasul-Bernardo) Despite an overall moderate approach to Islam throughout Southeast Asia, and significant economic progress in many areas, Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy director Dr. Amina Rasul-Bernardo concludes, “There is a real and present danger for radicalization of Muslim communities in South East Asia, home to most Muslims in the world, especially in the context of their marginalization and unaddressed grievances.” (Rasul-Bernardo) Describing extremism in the impoverished Muslim regions of the southern Philippines, for example, where communities that never integrated into the Spanish or American cultures imposed by colonialism, Dr. Amina Rasul-Bernardo explains the appeal of Islamism as a “rebellion of the excluded, which feeds on the frustrations of impoverished peoples living on the margins of an unattainable consumerist world.” Briefly, “The radicalization of Muslim communities is rooted in the need to survive—physically as well as culturally.” (Rasul-Bernardo) Moderate Islamist groups express populist, often mainstream, opposition to unpopular governments. This is certainly the case in Turkey, for example, where the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is an Islamist party that has gained broad acceptance (as its 2007 electoral victory—47% of the vote—indicates) because of its support for democratic governance and general liberalization, including press freedom, in contrast to previous military-backed



secular governments. Significantly, in this context, as Eurasia regional expert Michael Bishku observed, religious extremism is not a problem. However, in countries characterized by continued failure to achieve the goals of good governance, particularly in contexts of severe repression of human rights, radicalization is indeed problematic. Bangladeshis across the political and religious spectrum are frustrated with rampant poverty and corruption in the country. …Bangladesh is among “the most aid-fed countries in the world,” recipient of over $40 billion since 1971 and host of some 3000 NGOs, yet poverty, landlessness, unemployment, malnutrition and lack of education remain rampant, with around 50% of the population below the poverty level. And while the democratic transition in 1991 ended military rule, the political climate has not improved. Focus group leader Iftekhar Iqbal of the University of Dhaka, observed that even though they used differing terminology, both Islamist and secular Bangladeshis cherish goals of “good governance, elimination of corruption, tolerance for minorities, implementing an efficient education system, and separation of [the] judiciary [from the executive wing of the government].” (Iqbal) Attempts to Suppress Islamist Organizations Are Counterproductive

Because Islamist organizations are increasingly perceived as the most responsive—in some cases, the only—institutions representing populist political and economic goals, attempts to suppress them are ineffective. Again, the example of Turkey’s Islamist parties is instructive. Turkey’s National Order Party (NOP) was established by 1970 under the leadership of Necmeddin Erbakan, with a platform of development, strengthening Turkey’s economy, and restoring the country’s Islamic roots, overt expressions of religion having been proscribed by the secular, militarist post-World War I Kemalist government. The party’s anti-secularism was declared illegal and the party was dissolved following the 1971 military coup. But the party reestablished itself as the National Salvation Party in 1972 and proceeded to compete successfully in parliamentary elections and participate in coalition governments. Following another military coup in 1980, all political parties were disbanded. The Islamist National Salvation Party reconstituted itself again in 1984 as the Refah Party. Refah’s popularity continued to grow and again it competed successfully in local and national elections during the 1990s. But again the military exerted pressure, and the party was banned in 1998 due to the party’s anti-secularism position. The same year the party re-emerged as the Virtue Party, competed in elections, and was banned yet again in 2001. All the while, the party’s base has continued to expand, from provincial small-businessmen to the newly urbanized working poor, to students and the upwardly mobile middle class, and including diverse ethnic groups, women, and non-Muslims. The strength of the Islamic tendency in Turkey is reflected in the fact that there are now two Islamist parties. Conservative former Virtue Party members, including Erbakan, founded the Felicity Party, while reformists formed the currently dominant Justice and Development Party (AKP), led by Recep Tayip Erdogan. Given the populist roots of Islamism and its resilience, attempts to suppress Islamist organizations tend to be counterproductive. The contrast between Turkey and Uzbekistan illustrates this point. As noted above, despite repeated efforts by the military-backed government to do away with Islamist opposition since 1970 in Turkey, there are now two active and popular



Islamist parties. The AKP has become mainstream, and its success in fostering political and economic liberalization has precluded the development of radical tendencies in Turkey. On the other hand, radical Islam is problematic in Uzbekistan, where the post-Soviet government followed its Soviet predecessor’s model, attempting to control Islamist opposition discourse by sponsoring “official” Islam and silencing other voices. The autocratic government of Islam Karimov prohibits all unofficial Islamic publications and ruthlessly suppresses all opposition, including Islamic. This ruthless suppression has given wide berth to radical Islamic organizations such as the IMU, established in 1998, calling for overthrow of the government. Again, the lack of good governance and economic opportunity has given rise to Islamist opposition, despite efforts to silence it. Indeed, such efforts have contributed to radicalization. As Bishku concludes, “[G]iven the autocratic nature of the government, radical Islam has grown since independence and can pose a threat to the state. It has benefited from poor economic conditions and the absence of institutions that allow for adequate political expression.” (Bishku) A similar pattern was observed in Bangladesh, where “the rise of post-1971 pro-Islamic and anti-Indian sentiments… came in the wake of the Bengali nationalists outlawing the quintessential Islamic parties….” (Rashiduzzaman) Bangladesh’s suppression of political activists was also described as driving opposition groups underground and potentially radicalizing them. The radical Harkat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islam (HUJI), which has its roots in the Afghan anti-Soviet jihad, was mentioned as an example of a group radicalized through suppression of opposition voices, along with Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), which developed only in the late 1990s. Another example of radicalization through suppression, noted above, is found among some Malay Muslims in Thailand.

Conclusion and Policy Implications

The Importance of Foreign Policy

It is essential to recognize that electronic communications make it impossible to control the media image of the U.S. Official government spokespeople are no longer our exclusive interlocutors; Internet connectivity makes it possible to access even the most arcane material from virtually anywhere in the world, package it, and pass it on in any number of forms. Thus, for example, one focus group participant in Pakistan presented a surprising bit of “data” about U.S. education. In an effort to describe American bias against Islam and implying a double standard in Western governments’ concern about the curriculum of Islamic schools, he noted that “Green Mantle”—an adventure novel (whose actual title is Greenmantle) few Americans have heard of, published in 1916 and ranking 635,519 in sales on Amazon.com as of July 22, 2007—is “a common school book in the West!” (Ansari, Akif) Derogatory comments about Prophet Muhammad made by televangelists in the wake of 9/11, like the Danish cartoons, are recycled and electronically promulgated endlessly, as are the results of questionable surveys indicating antipathy toward Islam on the part of Americans. More importantly, in the era of fortress-style embassies, it is essential to recognize that U.S. foreign policy and its impact on Muslim populations is our first line of communication. Political and diplomatic rhetoric aside, the U.S. is judged on the basis of the consistency of its policies and the well-being of the communities affected by its policies. Support for or cooperation with



non-democratic governments severely undermines the credibility of claims to support democracy, just as support for some countries that violate international law undermines efforts to enforce international law elsewhere. In short, policies that result in widespread civilian suffering in the Muslim world, regardless of the rationale, are perceived as contempt for the value of Muslim lives. Furthermore, public statements of respect for mainstream Islam, such as President Bush’s assertion that Islam is a religion of peace, ring hollow in the face of continued support for governments that violate human, civil, and political rights, and isolation of Islamic opposition groups that support democratic ideals and human rights. In other words, contempt expressed for those who condemn unjust policies—even if they are described as Islamic radicals or extremists—is perceived as contempt for Islamic values. Moderate Muslims are concerned about the rise of radicalism among Muslims. But they believe that its sources lie outside their control. Improved and expanded communication with Muslim populations, through foreign policies consistently based on respect for human rights, democratic principles, and rule of law, combined with incentives to alleviate poverty and improve education, are viewed as most effective means to counter the growth of extremism. As summarized by Osman Bakr, professor emeritus at the University of Malaya:

[E]xtremism and violence associated with Islam either arise from a distorted understanding of Islam or are politically motivated. In particular [moderates] feel that Muslim extremism against the U.S. may be contained by both correct education on Islam and a just U.S. foreign policy toward the Islamic world. (Bakar)

Similarly, Philippine focus group coordinator Dr. Amina Rasul-Bernardo reports that the 33 leading religious scholars with whom she consulted agreed that:

“ . . when people feel they have no control over their lives, that their desperate situation is unsolvable, they turn to the first person offering them a target on which they could blame their misfortune. The frustrated and oppressed turn to religious leaders. If they turn to the extremists who purport to speak on behalf of Islam and who advocate violent confrontation, then no amount of propaganda can remove that anger. We need to emphasize that the struggle for democracy must be a collaboration between and among Muslims and non-Muslims, minority or majority groups, who are all advocates of the politics of inclusion and living in open societies.” (Rasul-Bernardo)

Pakistan focus group leader Dr. Zafar Ansari synthesized viewpoints that were echoed throughout Muslim Asia: “Poverty reduction and economic uplift are the real routes” to improved education and, with it, promotion of Islam’s essentially moderate views.” At the same time, “[T]he United States must also realize that the way to an enlightened Muslim population begins with an end to their persecution….[T]he U.S. should consequently withdraw from Muslim areas and countries and end all aggression against Muslims. The U.S. must also stop supporting illegitimate regimes in the Muslim world….” (Ansari, Akif)



As Southeast Asia regional coordinator Fred von der Mehden of Rice University concluded, educational programs in the Asia and the U.S. will promote mutual understanding, U.S. support for better trained police and intelligence in the religion will limit human rights abuses, and support for economic and political development, particularly in Muslim minority area, will help support moderate views among Muslims in Asia. “Yet, while these changes would not be simply cosmetic, they will not dissolve the negative perception of the U.S. without fundamental changes in Washington's policies in the Middle East.” (Mehden) That “negative perception of the U.S.” is the greatest threat to moderate Islam in Asia. Economic Incentives to Encourage Democratic Reforms and Human Rights

Many moderate Muslims advocate international support for local human rights movements. For example, insisting that only citizens of a country can change their own systems, Iranian scholars consulted for this project called for the use of economic incentives to encourage democratic reforms and respect for human rights. Participants also agreed that the United States and E.U. should use economic leverage to promote economic liberalization and rule of law, and “encourage cooperation between international aid organizations and moderate Islamic associations” (Bishku) to promote progress in human rights. Engage with Islamists

While project participants expressed a wide range of attitudes toward Islamist organizations, they generally agreed that the U.S. should encourage governments to expand political participation, including that of Islamist groups, and engage in dialogue to promote tolerance. Dialogue with various Muslim groups is deemed essential, in the view of many focus group participants, in order to “build bridges,” promote confidence, and gain an understanding of the diversity and dynamism of contemporary Islamic thought.

The example of Turkey is instructive in this regard. Liberalization has progressed with the support of mainstream Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP), approaching the requirements for full E.U. membership. Although traditional Islamists continue to stress women's subservient social roles and secularists continue opposition to wearing the headscarf in public institutions, women are increasingly taking leadership positions in the AKP-led bureaucracy, and many express the view that discrimination against women is cultural, rather than religious. Furthermore, the success of the AKP government has offset the appeal of the more anti-West Refah Party as well as that of radical Islamist groups.

There, for example, Western policymakers should encourage reform in Bangladesh, and engage “moderate Muslims” in their efforts against corruption, rather than working only with secular elements in society. Western encouragement of reform and engagement with moderate Muslims would strengthen reformist efforts, and “undermine the radical elements of society.” (Iqbal) Again, participants do not believe reforms should be imposed, but encouraged within the existing institutions, particularly educational. The goal is to develop excellence in education and employable graduates with a “shared understanding of public morality, civic responsibilities, citizenship rights and obligations, acceptance of diversity, and democratic processes.” (Iqbal) Engagement with and support for Islamic minority communities was also advocated, for example, in India. There, focus group participants called for fair treatment of Muslim



communities by the Indian government, particularly provision of high quality public schools, including exclusively girls’ schools to address the gender gap, and equal access to employment. In the Philippines, conference participants recommended continued federal and international support for human rights (including women’s rights) groups, education, healthcare, infrastructure, and economic development in the region. Similarly, focus group participants agreed that the U.S. should encourage the Thai government to return to democracy, continue the conciliatory policy of the current interim government, and promote multiculturalism in the South.



Appendix: Descriptions of Country-Specific Focus Groups

Bangladesh: Five focus groups discussions were held from January-February 2007, on issues of the culture of violence in Bangladesh politics, the nature of religious education in Bangladesh, and the role of micro-credit in promoting social development and women's rights. The focus groups included centrist-moderates (from public and private institutions with considerable focus on Islam, such as universities, Islamic banks and NGOs, and intellectuals) and right-leaning moderates (from mosques and madrassas, and the religious scholars involved in politics or community activities), but leaving out secular-liberals (Western-educated and trained policymakers, politicians, teachers, NGO representatives, and intellectuals) who are a minority but dominate civil society and influence governance. The first focus group included about 15 imams from the Bangladesh Imam Samiti, representing abut 250,000 mosques across the country; the second included 20 scholars, academicians, and journalists; the third comprised six members of Witness, “an organization of young female intellectuals and teachers;” the fourth consisted of faculty members from public and private universities in Dhaka; and the fifth included senior academics and students from both public and private universities in Chittagong.

India: Diverse viewpoints were accessed through “virtual focus groups” —telephone interviews with six individuals chosen “on grounds of long term familiarity with issues facing Muslims in India.” (Talib) These individuals organized focus group interviews in Aligarh (Uttar Pradesh), Jabalpur (Madya Pradesh), Mumbai (Maharashtra), Srinagar (Jammu and Kashmir), Patna (Bihar), and Delhi, between January and March 2007. The focus group interviews dealt primarily with issues of Muslim minority status, education, and religious tolerance. Iran: Diverse perspectives were accessed primarily through scholarly publications.

Pakistan: One hundred eight participants took part in focus group discussions in Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahoure (12, 26, and 70, respectively). The Islamabad session included a “very influential group of participants [who] undertook the discussion under the moderation of a TV broadcaster and former academic, Khurshid Nadeem.” In Karachi, four focus group sessions were held, including many government officers. Lahore focus group participants represented diverse walks of life, religious affiliations, educations, and professional backgrounds, “ranging from ‘secular liberals’ to religious groups of different persuasions (both Shiite and Sunni).” (Ansari, Akif) Observations regarding moderate Islam in the Philippines were presented by Dr. Amina Rasul-Bernardo, convener of the Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy, based on a June 2007 forum of 33 leading religious scholars from Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Zamboanga City, all areas with Muslim majorities. Owing to security concerns, information on Uzbekistan was gathered through interviews rather than focus groups, but the 33 interviewees represented a broad spectrum, including scholars (both independent and those affiliated with government institutions), NGO-affiliated human rights activists, state-approved Muslim authorities, journalists (some who work for the Uzbek government media and others who are freelancers working with Western media), business



people, students, government officials, and ordinary citizens, including two members of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). Thailand: Thirty focus group interviews were held over a period of two months in the deep south, the upper south, the central plains, and the north and northeast regions, providing a sampling of views from Thailand's ethnically and communally diverse Muslims. Participants included male and female scholars, community leaders, public and private university educators, imams, members of youth organizations, social activists, and representatives of official community organizations, and included men and women. Turkey: In January and February 2007 two focus group meetings were held with people identified as “opinion leaders sharing Islamic identity and/or sensibility and yet representing a cross section of Turkish society,” and diversity in class, gender, and state vs. civil society. Reports on Muslims in Malaysia were not gathered through focus groups, but rather present the findings of a scholar with long experience in that country.

Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Asia Southeast Asia—Fred von der Mehden




Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Southeast Asia: A Regional Assessment

Fred R. von der Mehden

Fred R. von der Mehden is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Political Science at Rice University. He served as professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin from 1957-1968 where he was director of East Asian Studies. From 1968-1998 he was Albert Thomas Professor of Political Science at Rice University, and is now Emeritus and a scholar with the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice. Dr. Von der Mehden has written extensively on Islam in Southeast Asia and has completed field studies in the region assessing attitudes in the area toward the Middle East. He holds a PhD from the University of California-Berkeley.



Executive Summary

Summary

This paper provides an assessment of the dynamics of religious change and approaches to moderate Islam in Southeast Asia, focusing on significant trends in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. The paper finds that the clash of ethno-religious identities in countries with Muslim minorities continues despite temporary peace-making measures. While there is growing support throughout Southeast Asia for a greater role of Islam in public life, this support does not usually translate into votes for Islamic parties. However, there has been an increase in radical Islamic organizations that have tapped into sectarian differences, economic and social inequalities, as well as rising popular sentiment to what is perceived to be the U.S.-led “war on Islam.” Key Findings

• It is difficult to be overly optimistic regarding the fate of Muslim minorities in most Southeast Asian countries. The poverty of minority Muslims, combined with reactions to encroaching majority populations, has exacerbated long-term ethno-religious divisions, while hindering pluralist solutions. Muslim minorities demand autonomy and the maintenance of ethno-religious identity.

• Throughout Southeast Asia there is considerable public support for a greater role of Islam in public life and a desire to see a more prominent place for the Sharia. However, this support does not translate into votes for Islamic parties, and what is meant by emphasis on the Sharia remains unclear.

• There has been an increase in both domestic and transnational radical Islamic organizations that have tapped into sectarian differences, economic and social deprivation, and popular reactions to what are perceived to be attacks upon Islam.

Policy Implications

• A significant problem for United States foreign policy is the consensus opposing U.S. actions in the Middle East throughout Southeast Asia. Washington is interpreted negatively with regard to its perceived favoritism towards Israel, involvement in Iraq, and aggressive confrontation with Iran. Many in the region see the “war on terrorism” as a “war on Islam” and there is strong suspicion of American motives. The U.S. must thus work to dissolve this negative perception of its policies in the Middle East.

• While there has been increased cooperation between the U.S. and Southeast Asian states in countering terrorism, some governments in the area see the “war on terrorism” as a means of controlling “undesirable” Islamic organizations and individuals.

• Emerging trends in Malaysia, where there has been an increase in the number of non Malays in the leading political parties, presage a wider dialogue over Islam. The implications of this change are significant, providing a model challenging existing patterns of leadership throughout the region. With more pressure to allow non Muslims to participate in debates about Islam, there will be concomitant pressure for interfaith dialogue. In this new environment, women will participate more fully in socio-political debates, and NGOs will press for their own agendas.



Introduction

During the last several decades Muslims in Southeast Asia have experienced considerable change in how they perceive their own religious identity and they have more actively involved themselves in the world-wide Islamic public discourse. There is a greater sense of what it means to be a Muslim, increased signs of piety and a new role in the public sector following their marginalization during lengthy colonial rule. Within this changing environment, the traditional pattern of conservative moderate Islam, which had dominated Islamic attitudes and behavior in the past, now faces external and internal challenges. These challenges have included new ideas from other parts of the Islamic world, Western values and materialism and the development of foreign and home grown radical Islamic movements. The following assessment of the dynamics of religious change and approaches to moderate Islam in Southeast Asia is drawn from reports and focus group analyses by Osman Bakar on Malaysia, Amina Rasul on the Philippines, and Imtiyaz Yusuf on Thailand along with discussions which took place in Kuala Lumpur at the fifth International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS). Additional material drawn from my own perspectives has been presented regarding the role of Islam in Indonesia with some reference to minority Muslim groups elsewhere in the region. In an effort to assess the changing role of moderate Islam in these countries, this analysis will compare the history and present status of moderate Islam in each country, the ethno-religious and political environment, and the roles of government, non-governmental organizations, and political and religious organizations. Finally, it will address future implications rising out of the challenges faced by Islam today and how these changes might affect United States foreign policy. Throughout this assessment, special attention will be given to those forces that appear to foster or hinder moderate Islam in historic and contemporary Southeast Asia. When analyzing “moderate” or “radical” Islam, several issues need to be addressed. The use of “moderate Islam” was questioned by many participants at the Kuala Lumpur Conference who expressed problems with the concept. “Radical” Islam has variously been characterized as opposition to religious or political pluralism, advocating or participating in violence in the name of Islam, supporting strict adherence to the Sharia, or combinations therein. Often “moderate” Islam has been the default position to whatever is classified as “radical” or “extreme” Islam or has reflected the political or religious position of the observer. Here, “moderate” is characterized by the acceptance of pluralism and rejection of violence as a means of achieving religious goals. It is also important to differentiate between whether we are observing how Muslims act or how Islam itself is interpreted. For example, the majority of Malay Muslims in one of the focus groups reflects these elements. Moderation to them encompasses balancing tradition and modernism, achieving Islamic goals in a peaceful manner and a willingness to work with other Malaysian communities. At the same time, moderation is used to describe Muslims, not Islam, which, according to the respondents is what Islam stands for. However, in all the countries under analysis there are small minorities of Muslims, particularly those influenced by Salafi beliefs and Muslim minorities in conflict with non Muslim majorities, who interpret Islam as rejecting religious and political pluralism.



Contemporary Background

The countries chosen for analysis are important for different reasons, although the Muslim minorities in Thailand, and particularly those in the southern part of the Kingdom and their counterparts in the southern Philippines, are illustrative of similar situations elsewhere in Southeast Asia. These minorities include the Arakanese in Myanmar, and Muslim minorities in Cambodia and Singapore. In most, but not all, of these cases there is a co-identity of religion and ethnicity. Sectarian tensions have led to significant violence in each case, with the exception of Singapore. Malaysia is a rare example of a majority Muslim population participating in a competitive political system containing significant other religious and ethnic minorities. Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world and today is a refutation to those who question the viability of a democratic system in a Muslim society. Historically, it has displayed a wide-ranging heterogeneity of belief and practice within Islam. Within this context, some background is necessary to understand the place of moderate Islam in the countries under consideration. Relations between Muslims and the majority Buddhist population in Thailand have not been without conflict, although conditions have varied depending upon geography, history and ethnicity. Thai Muslims, who account for 5-7% of the Kingdom’s 65 million people, can be divided between the 70% of them who live in the south and the rest who tend to reside in central and northern Thailand. The latter include descendents of South Asian, Chinese, Lebanese, Iranian and other Southeast Asian immigrants. They have tended to integrate more with Thai society and have remained relatively peaceful. These Thai speaking Muslims tend to live primarily in Central Thailand. The Muslim population of the south is both ethnically and religiously different from the rest of the Kingdom. These Malay-Muslims have been the targets of neglect and repression over the years. Although reforms during the last quarter of the twentieth century brought a brief respite in ethno-religious violence, recent years have seen a resurgence of conflict. In the Philippines, Muslims compose approximately 5% of the Republic’s population and are concentrated in the five southern provinces of western Mindanao, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Basilan and Tawi-Tawi. There are also Muslims in other provinces of Mindanao and the Manila area. Although the American colonial administrators encouraged Muslim solidarity, there were strong anti-colonial feelings against them and their Spanish predecessors. After independence, Muslims in the south came under increasing economic pressure from Christian Filipinos and have suffered from poverty and land displacement. For example, on the island of Basilan, 71% of the population is Muslim, but three quarters of the land is owned by Christians. The two provinces with the highest levels of Islamic violence are ranked 73rd and 76th of the Republic’s 77 provinces in terms of development, according to the United Nations. Malaysia is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society with 60% of its 26.9 million population Muslim (and largely Malay), 20% Buddhist, 9.1% Christian, and 6.3% Hindu. Malaysia seeks to present itself to the world as an example of modern moderate Islam operating within a system that displays political stability, inter-ethnic and inter-religious peace and economic progress. Islam is the state religion, but the Malaysian Constitution guarantees freedom of worship to other



religions. Violent religious conflict has been rare in the country in recent decades, although radical Islamic elements have been present. Approximately 88% of the Indonesia’s population of 240 million is Muslim and the rest primarily Christian, Buddhist and Hindu. Indonesia presents the anomaly of a society often described as tolerant and flexible in religious attitudes and behavior, but one, which has experienced serious outbursts of religious violence in the post-World War II years. On the one hand, its Sufi-influenced beginnings, syncretic interaction of pre-Islamic and Islamic elements and largely non-radical religious leadership have framed a tendency toward moderation and pluralism. At no time in post-independence Indonesia has Islamic radicalism dominated the political or religious systems of the Republic and the largest elected political Muslim parties have presented largely moderate platforms. On the other hand, the archipelago has seen groups with radical Islamic violent agendas such as Dar ul Islam and, more recently, Jemaah Islamiyah and anti-Christian armed organizations such as Laskar Jihad. Today, Indonesia is a parliamentary democracy dominated by secular political parties, but with a population that both supports contemporary democratic values and seeks a greater role for religion in their society. The question then arises as to why these different patterns of attitudes and behavior have developed. Several, often interrelated, factors appear responsible.

Ethno-Religious Environment

Islam in Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia exists in different historic religious, ethnic and political environments, which have framed attitudes and actions. However, there is considerable similarity between experiences in the southern parts of Thailand and the Philippines. The more multi-ethnic Thai Muslims of Central and Northern Thailand define themselves in religiously reinforced terms. They tend to avoid interacting with Thai Buddhists on religious terms, but do interact in social contexts. Popular Muslim views perceive Thai Buddhists as kafirs– unbelievers, and mushirik–polytheists. However, there is a “live and let live” attitude, while their southern counterparts do not overlook what they see as sharp religious distinctions. The factors responsible for the weakness of moderate Islam in southern Thailand is largely to be found in the ethno-religious divisions within the region. The conflict is an old one which began after the annexation of the southern largely Malay and Muslim provinces at the beginning of the twentieth century. Tensions and violence have ebbed and flowed ever since. While attitudes favoring peaceful co-existence have their historic adherents among both Thai Buddhists and Thai Muslims, the conflict’s primary source continues to be found in the interaction of religion and identity on both sides. The Thai Buddhists see little distinction between their culture and Buddhism and historically have favored policies of integration rather than multi-culturalism. The Malay Muslims of the south see co-identity in Malay ethnicity and their Islamic religion. They tend not to participate in Thai Buddhist social culture because it contains Buddhist attributes and hold fast to their religion as a core to their identity. Past patterns of Thai government neglect and suppression have weakened moderate Muslim elements and fostered violent reactions over the decades. More recently dissension led to the extensive use of coercion by the government of former Thaksin Shinawatra. This resulted in violent incidents causing large-scale death and injury among Muslims such as those at the Krue-Se mosque in April 2004 and Takbai in October



of that year. Muslims saw these as government sponsored massacres while Thai authorities characterized the Malay Muslim opposition as “bandits” or “terrorists.” Within the Thai Muslim community there also exist divisions, although they have not precipitated the violence experienced between Muslims and Buddhists. There are two schools of Islamic jurisprudence, the Shafi, associated with the Malay Muslims, and the Hanafi, practiced among Chinese and Indian Muslims. There is also the presence of the Wahabbi or Ahl as-Sunnah who follow a more puritanical form of Islamic interpretation. More recently, there has been a growth in Shia influence, particularly following the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. This has brought strong opposition from the majority Sunnis and fear within the Thai government of external radical power. In addition, recent decades have brought a growth in Wahabbi influences. Imtiyaz Yusuf sees six types of politico-religious influences among Thai Muslims: 1) the integrationist attitudes of both the Khanu kau (traditionalist) and Khana mai (reformists)

of the Thai speaking Muslims in the upper South, Central and Northern Thailand; 2) the integrationists and separatist attitudes among Khna Tua (traditionalists) of the Malay

speaking southern Thailand; 3) the pro-dialogue and pro-integration Islamic ideological attitude of religiously puritan

Wahabbis replacing the Kaum Muda (reformists) among the Malay speakers of the south; 4) the non-integrationist Islamist militant perspective of the neo-Wahabbi; 5) the radicalized Islamist Shafite perspective among Malay militant youth represented by

those who died in the Krue-Se mosque and also separatist youth such as Pemuda; and 6) the non-integrationist view of the secular Malay nationalist separatists.

In the Philippines there has been a tendency for Christian Filipinos to look upon Muslims as backward. Amina Rasul notes a survey from August 26, 2006 showed that a third of Filipinos have negative opinions of Muslims and another survey found that 55% of Filipinos think “Muslims are prone to run amok,” 47% “think that Muslims are terrorists or extremists,” and 44% believe that Muslims “harbor hatred toward non-Muslims.” Unlike Muslim minorities in Thailand, the Arakan area of Myanmar and Singapore, Muslims in the southern Philippines have the same Malay ethnic base as the majority, but have tribal and dialect differences. However, they view Islam as an integral part of their ethnicity. This co-identity helped to form the basis for Muslim nationalism and separatist sentiment in the name of “Bangsamoro,” a nation based upon Moro ethnic religious identity. Over the years a number of Moro organizations have arisen to demand greater rights and equity for Muslims. The most prominent of these have been the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) which split from the MNLF in 1977, and the more recent extremist and often violent Abu Sayyaf group. Rasul reports upon increased radicalization and insistence upon outward manifestations of piety, driven by Middle Eastern funded activities and reactions to Western actions in Afghanistan and Iraq and the on-going Palestinian problem. On the other hand, past Filipino governments initially sought assimilation. In the face of increased Muslim dissatisfaction, Manila offered concessions including efforts to recognize elements of Islamic law, and the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. A number of peace agreements have been concluded over the years, but not all parties have



accepted their terms. These conflicts involving Muslim minorities must not be seen as simply religious in character. Differences in faith interact with issues of economic deprivation, government neglect and suppression, ethnic conflict and historic disputes. Malaysia’s more moderate pattern is, in part, a reflection of the desire to maintain a semblance of a competitive democratic parliamentary system within a multi-cultural society. The focus groups show a Muslim population that see themselves as peaceful, prepared to interact with other communities in the nation and living in an open and progressive environment. The British left Malaya, later Malaysia, with a Westminster style system, that has been somewhat limited by government efforts to dampen opposition and division. However, as will be addressed in detail later in this paper, parties do matter and from the achievement of independence in 1957, the government has been ruled by an inter-ethnic inter-religious coalition. The necessity of appealing to its mixed Malay, Chinese and Indian membership in order to obtain parliamentary majorities has required compromise and moderation. Any government effort to enforce a radical Islamic agenda would crack the coalition. Thus, Malaysia’s cultural pluralism within a competitive party environment has fostered official religious moderation. While the majority of the Indonesian people do not reflect the inter-religious divisions found in Thailand and Malaysia, its Muslim population has historically varied markedly in belief and practice. This has ranged from the deep penetration of pre-Islamic influences among Muslims in Java to the stricter adherence to conservative patterns in places like Aceh. Also, while most Indonesians are of Malay origin, they have historically been divided upon linguistic and ethnic lines. Given these divisions, pre-war nationalists looked to Islam as the one unifying element against colonial authority, and sought to limit internal religious differences. Cultural proclivities historically also fostered more religious toleration and flexibility. However, recent factors have strengthened stricter adherence to Islamic practice and there has been an increase in elements antithetical to religious toleration. Malaysian and Indonesian Muslims may be divided roughly into four types: 1) the so-called traditionalists who follow a variety of traditional customary values and

practices, but who accept a degree of religious pluralism. Sharia is supported at least symbolically;

2) traditionalists who support through non-violent means traditional Sharia law and question pluralist values;

3) neo-modernists who have a more universal view of the role of Islam, rejecting narrow interpretations of the Sharia and emphasizing personal and public ethical behavior; and

4) Islamists that include both violent and non violent elements. They seek an Islamic state and reject religious pluralism.

The Role of Government Policies

Thai government policy has both aided and hindered Islamic religious moderation in the post-war era. In the initial decades after World War II, southern Thailand tended to be neglected and Muslims were largely poor and powerless. The south was not a target for government sponsored development programs and had a weak economic infrastructure. In this environment rural Malay



Muslims remained highly conservative and isolated from external influences while a minority in southern urban areas began to organize to resist Thai authority. However, starting in the 1980s a variety of reforms were instigated which dampened opposition and a significant number of moderate Muslims began to take leadership positions at the local and national level. In the past several years, repressive government reactions to often externally influenced opposition in the south have reinforced resistance. Official policies may be changing again. Following the military coup against Prime Minister Thaksin in September 2006, the government of ex-general Prime Minister Sarayud Chulanot has sought greater conciliation and dialogue. However, security has yet to improve and mutual suspicion continues. In the Philippines both colonial and post-colonial policies have exacerbated difficulties in Muslim areas. As previously noted, American policies aided in reinforcing Moro identity and initial post-independence government support for Christian movement into Muslim land has been a basis for Muslim anger. It is true that in recent decades Manila has made numerous concessions to Muslim demands for recognition of Moro religion and customs and the need for greater autonomy. However, these agreements have often foundered upon problems of implementation and Rasul points to continued corruption and inefficient government which have hampered efforts at development. It is also true that, like Thailand and Myanmar, local demands for recognition of a separate Muslim identity can easily run counter to central government sentiment towards a national identity. The Malaysian government has employed both the carrot and stick to foster religious moderation. It has publicly espoused a modern and moderate interpretation of Islam. Under former Prime Minister Mahathir an “Islamization policy” was promulgated to integrate Islam and modernity and was employed by the government to strengthen its ties to the Muslim population. Recently, in the name of “Islam Hadhari,” literally meaning “civilizational Islam,” Badawi has emphasized human development in contrast to Mahathir’s stress on economic and technological development. This policy was apparently to deemphasize political Islam and weaken the idea of an Islamic state. The phrase “Islam hadhari” has caused considerable controversy within Muslim circles. Public relations actions such as calling for all religions to join religious celebrations of all major faiths and support for religious toleration are common. At the same time, in the name of religious harmony, the government has sought to suppress activities and statements that could lead to religious animosities. The state supports education in Islam in public schools where it is a required subject for Muslims. A plethora of restrictive policies such as the much criticized Internal Security Act have been used to control suspected “trouble makers or religious extremists.” The state has also discouraged non-Muslims from participating in debates on Islam, limiting the establishment of organizations seeking inter-religious dialogue and has hindered discussions of important issues surrounding inter-marriage, apostasy and conversion involving Islam and other important issues that have risen with increased social mobility and modernization. While the states in Malaysia supposedly have power over Islamic affairs, the federal government has increasingly sought to coordinate policies and programs. Not only has it become more prominent in assuring conformity in religious personnel qualifications and executing Islamic policies, but it has sought to “supervise” Islamic beliefs and practice. So-called “deviant” beliefs have been brought under scrutiny and questionable foreign influences curtailed. In Osman



Bakar’s words, “it is important to note that of all nationally organized and administered Islamic beliefs and practices in the Islamic world Malaysian Islam is arguably the most monolithic and the most state-regulated.” Until the last years of the New Order period, the Indonesian government discouraged a public political role for Islam and, instead, emphasized the state ideology, the Pancasila (Five Principles) that gave legitimacy to all the country’s major religions. At the end of the New Order the government publicly sought to foster a state sponsored Islamic role while elements of the military privately supported Islamic anti-Christian sectarian organizations. The present democratic regime tends to present a largely secular agenda, but the parliament has also shown a willingness to listen to its Islamic constituency on popular religious issues. The state has long supported religious education in public schools for all faiths dependent upon their representation in each institution. This has reinforced a common interpretation of Islam and helped to weaken local variations. State religious institutions and supervision have never been as well developed as they have been in Malaysia. However, the political and religious establishment condemns “deviant” interpretations of Islam.

The Role of Political Parties

Since the 1980s, Muslim politicians have fully participated in the Thai political system and produced a Foreign Minister and other national political figures. They have largely supported integration within the Thai political system, but have not shown the ability to control sectarian violence of recent years. There have been efforts to build Malay-Muslim political parties in the southern provinces, but these undertakings had little success. It can be argued that party politics at the national level were a factor in Prime Minister Thaksin’s hard-line approach to southern Malays as he sought to consolidate his power. Given the competitive political system that has characterized Malaysia, it is important to assess the role of political parties with Muslim constituents and their contribution to moderate Islam in the country. As Osman Bakar has noted, the Islamic policies of these parties have been the most important shaping force of Malaysian Islam in the past five decades. The two main players have been the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), the dominant member of the ruling national coalition since independence, and the Islamic Party (PAS), along with its predecessors, which has been UMNO’s chief Islamic rival and has controlled individual state governments over the years. UMNO has traditionally been a Malay Muslim party, but now includes non-Muslims from ethnic Thai communities in states bordering Thailand, a small Malaccan Christian constituency and indigenous ethnic groups in Sabah in north Borneo. UMNO has to face its Islamic rival, PAS, for votes at the state and national level and thus must compete on a host of ethno-religious issues. It has continuously presented itself as the chief guardian of the Malay Muslim. Under former Prime Minister Muhammad Mahathir, UMNO gave greater emphasis to Islam, but has defined Islam as a force for change and modernization and a defender of moderate Islam against radical interpretations, domestic and foreign. PAS has reflected a more traditional approach to Islam and its government in the state of Kelantan has been criticized for its position on women and other social issues. It has underscored



the need to establish the Sharia in the state and nation. While it at one time championed Malay-Islamic nationalism and an Islamic state, more recently it has reached out to non Muslims, and includes non Malay Muslims as members. Both PAS and UMNO support democratic institutions and recognize the need to cooperate with other communities if they are to govern nationally. However, both PAS members and some UMNO backbenchers have not always shown strong support for religious and political pluralism and disagree on the means of power-sharing with non Muslims. Elected Indonesian Islamic political parties have continuously presented moderate agendas since the founding of the Republic. The first national elections in 1956 resulted in two Muslim parties, Masyumi and Nahdatul Ulama, obtaining about one-fifth of the parliamentary seats each. Both had moderate platforms and represented more modernist and traditionalist constituencies respectively. Both supported democratic values and neither had a radical religious agenda. The next democratic elections to parliament did not take place until 1999 and 2004 when democracy was reinstated in the Republic. The four major Islamic parties together received less than 20% of the vote and more secular parties have dominated parliament. The Islamic parties have tended to be weak in organization and leadership, the exception being the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or PKS). The PKS is seen by some as the forerunner of a more aggressive Islamic party organization, although its success in 2004 can in large part be tied to its anti-corruption crusade. Weakness in representation has not meant that Islamic issues have failed to be implemented, as other parties have recognized the importance of reaching out to a relatively conservative Muslim constituency. However, it is important to note that Islamist parties with radical Islamic agendas have not shown electoral success and popular support for Islamic causes have not translated into votes for Islamic-oriented parties.

The Role of Political and Religious Leadership and Organizations

What role does national political and religious leadership play in determining religious perspectives in the sample countries? Thailand is a centralized system with political and administrative power centered in Bangkok. Thus, Thai policy towards Muslim minorities in the Kingdom comes largely from civil and military authorities in the capitol, with the caveat that local civil-military elements have acted independently, at times to the detriment of the Muslim community. This was apparent during the Thaksin administration when the Prime Minister called for severe measures against what he considered to be dangerous Muslim opponents, but local military and police were responsible for individual acts of violence which exacerbated the situation. Present conciliatory moves towards Muslims in the south are the result of regime change in Bangkok. Unfortunately for the Malay Muslims, their leadership is fragmented and there are sharp differences on the direction to be taken regarding relations with Thai authorities and the acceptance of integration with Thai society. While independent NGOs have been very important in Thailand for decades, at this point they appear to have comparatively little impact on the conflict in the south. In her paper on the Philippines, Amina Rasul reports on a June 2007 council of ulama from several Muslim provinces. The majority of the 33 participants asserted that Islam does not instigate violent extremist behavior. According to them, extremism has been aided by Manila sending Moro mujahideen to fight in Afghanistan. However, only three saw extremism on the



rise in their communities. These ulama did not see themselves as playing a major role in countering extremism, claiming their lack of resources did not empower them to set up an alternative network of leadership. The ulama did believe that their role could be fortified, particularly through education and strengthening the madrassas (which they believed were not being sufficiently supported by the Department of Education). While there was general agreement that more cooperation was needed between local communities and the government, but there was obvious distrust. Rasul notes that these ulama were from Muslim majority communities and might not reflect the views of their counterparts in minority areas. The long-term dominance of UMNO and the national coalition has meant that both central government and most state government policies regarding Islam have been determined by the ruling coalition in general and UMNO in particular. The exceptions have been when opposition parties have ruled states and even then the central government has sought to contain what it considers to be extremist views. As previously noted, under Prime Minister Mahathir there were efforts to give greater role for Islam in public life, introducing Islamic banking, asserting the government’s role in administering the Islamic establishment and lending strong support to Islamic symbols. His successor, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, has continued to promulgate the importance of Islam to the Muslim community since taking power in 2003. However, both men and their predecessors constantly reiterated the importance of a moderate approach to Islam and the necessity of respect for religious pluralism and have been forceful in their rejection of radical and violent Islamic expressions. Indonesian national leaders have varied markedly in their interest in and interpretations of Islam. A more secular approach and the influence of Javanese syncretic interpretations were apparent in religious policies of the country’s first president, Sukarno, and President Megawati Sukarnoputri, his daughter and president under the revived democratic system, and President Suharto, leader of the New Order. Their relations with Islamic parties and leaders were not always cordial. The first elected president after Suharto’s fall was an Islamic scholar and party leader who has long espoused inter-religious dialogue and political reform, but health and political factors limited his ability to direct policy. The present popularly elected President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) presents himself as a moderate Muslim. In many ways, these leaders reflect the diversity that is Islam in Indonesia. Contemporary Islamic party leaders have tended to be moderate in tone, have not displayed strong organizational capabilities and have not shown the ability to appeal to large enough constituencies to win the presidency, which is now by direct popular vote. Both Malaysia and Indonesia have seen a major expansion in NGOs in the last two decades and many have been important in shaping Islam in both countries. A significant number of these organizations have been involved in missionary activities within the Muslim community itself as they have sought to increase its adherents’ understanding of Islam. More traditional organizations and their leaders have opposed some of the most active of these groups. What follows is a brief analysis of four groups that have extolled moderation, appealed for religious tolerance, and help to explain the dynamics of change in these two countries. Each at one time or another has faced negative reactions of the political and bureaucratic establishments. ABIM (Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia) was founded in 1971 by later Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. It has emphasized Islamization of knowledge, political activism,



education and inter-faith dialogues. Its founder early on rejected over-emphasis on strict Sharia restrictions and called for an understanding of the social and egalitarian foundations of Islam. ABIM’s interest in the Islamic revival in the Middle East and South Asia made it suspect in government and conservative Islamic circles. Its 50,000 membership today has a nationwide network of schools, colleges and medical clinics. It has been an important intellectual contributor to the Islamic dialogue in Malaysia. Recently, Anwar Ibrahim has called for an end to the country’s affirmative action program, which has targeted aid to Malays and other indigenous people. SIS (Sisters in Islam) was founded in 1988 and has been a long-time champion of women’s rights within an Islamic framework. Although it is probably the most well-known women’s organization in Malaysia, it has gone beyond seeking equality for women to demanding more general support for justice, equality and democracy. Its leadership has been targeted by the conservative Islamic establishment and has faced a wide range of charges of adhering to anti-Islamic interpretations. The role of women in public life is growing and their present dominance in the student bodies of Malaysian tertiary institutions have led to expectations that women will be an increasingly important future force in education and other sectors. The Muhammadiyah was founded prior to World War I and is the second largest organization in Indonesia, claiming 29 million members. It is a modernist organization that has sought to integrate Indonesian Islam with the modern world, primarily through its focus on education. It has established medical clinics and schools from pesantren to universities throughout the archipelago. Given its roots in Egyptian modernism it has rejected Sufism and syncretic elements of Indonesian Islam. While there have been tensions with the country’s Christian community, the Muhammadiyah has long supported democracy and religious tolerance. It has never been a political party, but members have joined Islamic parties over time. Nahdatul Ulama (NU), claiming 30 to 35 million members, is Indonesia’s largest organization. Founded in 1926 by Javanese ulama, it is a rural-based group, which has espoused a traditional approach in opposition to Muhammadiyah and more secular-nationalist organizations. The NU has established a major network of schools, clinics, orphanages and other social services. Historically, it has been accused of poor organizational skills, questionable relations with the Dutch colonial administration and Suharto regime, and an overly conservative agenda. More recently it has eschewed party politics, although members did join the Muslim National Awakening Party and other parties. Under the leadership of later President Abdurrrahman Wahib (Gus Dur), Nahdatul Ulama espoused democracy, discourse with other religions, and religious tolerance. Its conservative religious base has meant that not all NU members support this moderate agenda. These organizations reflect movement toward a more moderate and pluralist Islam to counter the sectarian violence that is found in many parts of Southeast Asia. This agenda has faced opposition from within some of these organizations as well as from radical Islamic groups that reject democracy, tolerance and inter-faith dialogue. However, they play an important role in framing the Islamic discourse in their countries.



Future Projections

It is difficult to be overly optimistic over defusing tensions involving Muslim minorities in most countries in Southeast Asia in the immediate future. There have been numerous examples of temporary respites in violence in both the Philippines and Thailand only to have peace broken by one side or the other. In both cases the poverty of the Muslims, combined with encroaching majority populations have exacerbated long-term religious divisions. Central government programs to ameliorate these issues have foundered on internal political pressures in the majority community, demands for national integration, and Muslim minority stress on maintaining their religious identity. In the case of Thailand, Imtiyaz Yusuf notes the juxtaposition of Muslim demands for cultural, ethnic and religious identity and the unwillingness of the Thai government and populace to take the practical measures necessary to restore security. Problems that faced the small Muslim community in Cambodia (less than 1% of the population) in the past generally no longer exist because the minority has been so diminished by death and exile. Recently Cambodian Muslims have been accused of going to southern Thailand to join Muslim insurgents. Peace agreements of the 1990s have not been fully implemented in the southern Philippines and religiously-based violence continues. Government forces in Myanmar are seeking to forcefully integrate, exile or eliminate the Muslim Rohinga in Myanmar. There has been a significant diaspora of Muslims from Myanmar. Only Singapore, with its strong economy and political structure, has been able to limit minority dissatisfaction to institutionalized political opposition. Osman Bakar’s report presents an interesting set of trends and possibilities for Malaysia’s future that presage a wider dialogue over Islam. He sees an increase in the number of non Malays in both UMNO and PAS which will weaken the traditional pattern of Malay-Muslim co-identity in these organizations. The ramifications of this are significant including challenges to apostasy restrictions and present patterns of leadership. PAS will have to become more pragmatic. With more non Malay-Muslims involved, new issues would be raised such as the promulgation of a Chinese-Muslim identity. With more pressure on Malays to allow non Muslims to participate in debates about Islam, there will be concomitant pressure for interfaith dialogue. In these discussions women will also be participating more fully and NGOs will press for their own agendas. Bakar thus sees an expansion in the type of actors involved in issues surrounding Islam. While both PAS and UMNO will retain some form of Islamic policy, there will be important debates on the role of political Islam, Islamic identity, the role of Islam in seeking economic justice and the role of women. Like other Muslim societies, Bakar sees Malaysia facing a contest between conservative and progressive interpretations of Islam with pressure on the religious establishment to reflect pluralism and diversity. There appear to be many manifestations and anomalies facing Islam in Indonesia. At the political level, there is general support for democracy within the Muslim community, yet, there is caution regarding undue influence of Christian and Chinese minorities. There are also small Islamic minority groups who reject religious and political pluralism. While these minority groups do not have wide support for their violent methods, elements of their agenda do resonate with the Muslim community, i.e., there is significant public suspicion of Christian activities and antipathy towards American and Israeli activities in the Middle East.



There is little doubt that Islamic extremism in Indonesia has expanded its activities in the past decades, but is foundations have important historic foundations. These include anti-Christian attitudes, which have roots in Christian support for the Dutch colonial regime, post-war radical movements such as Dar ul Islam and clandestine support given to violent radicals by elements of the Indonesian military. The most violent of these elements showed anti-Christian and Salafi influences. However, the economic crisis of the late 1990s was also responsible for instability and scape-goating. It has been argued that democracy made it more difficult to control these activities and organizations as politicians worried about antagonizing constituencies. There is also considerable public support for a greater role of Islam in public life and a desire to see a more prominent place for the Sharia. However, this does not translate into votes for Islamic parties and what is meant by emphasis on the Sharia remains unclear. Indonesia has gone through considerable political, religious and cultural change in a relatively short time and remains a work in progress.

Concluding Remarks and the Role of the United States in Southeast Asia

There are several major interacting challenges facing the development of moderate interpretations of Islam in Southeast Asia. The clash of ethno-religious identities in countries with Muslim minorities continues to raise tensions and hinder pluralist solutions. Demands for assimilation or integration into the majority community conflict with Muslim minority calls for local autonomy and the maintenance of ethno-religious identity. Past hopes of reconciliation have frequently foundered. There has been an increase in both domestic and transnational radical Islamic organizations that have tapped into sectarian differences, economic and social deprivation and popular reactions to what are perceived to be world-wide Western attacks upon Islam. Anti-pluralist interpretations of Islam can limit public discourse and challenge the role of women, non Muslims, and those with differing religious ideas. What impact calls for a greater role of the Sharia will have remains to be seen as versions of these demands vary from strict traditional interpretations to more symbolic understandings. At the same time there are organizations and individuals who are attempting to expand the role of moderate Islam in Southeast Asia. Where the domestic democratic political process has been allowed to play out, radical Muslim parties have been unable to dominate the political landscape.

The division between moderate and radical Muslims in Southeast Asia does not always provide a clear set of policy alternatives. Much of the previous discussion has related to how to manage increased radical Islam in the region. There is a degree of common agreement between Southeast Asian governments and the United States. There is no question that the U.S. supports the maintenance of stable economic and political regimes in the region and that radical Islam can be a destabilizing force. This was apparent when the Bali and Marriott bombings had an adverse impact on Indonesia’s tourism and investment climate. It is also true that there has been increased cooperation between the U.S. and Southeast Asian states in countering terrorism, although some opposition elements in the Philippines question U.S. military involvement in the islands and Jakarta and Washington do not always agree on specific terrorism cases. It also



should be noted that some governments in the area see the “war on terrorism” as a means of controlling “undesirable” Islamic organizations and individuals. However, a significant problem for United States foreign policy is the consensus opposing U.S. actions in the Middle East among politicians and the public and moderate and radical Muslims. Washington is interpreted negatively with regard to its perceived favoritism towards Israel, involvement in Iraq and aggressive confrontation with Iran. This unease and opposition is apparent from numerous public opinion polls and the comments of political leaders. Many in the region see the “war on terrorism” as a “war on Islam” and there is strong suspicion of American motives. In this climate radical opposition to the U.S. finds ready empathy from other elements of the Muslim community, blurring the division between radical and moderate. In a recent publication, I made several proposals to help to ameliorate this negativity.6 These recommendations include educational programs in the region and in the United States, support of police and intelligence programs in the region, helping to provide a better trained and disciplined military that can operate more effectively and limit human rights abuses in the area, and aid to state governments to provide more meaningful economic and political development activities, particularly in Muslim minority areas. Yet, while these changes would not be simply cosmetic, they will not dissolve the negative perception of the U.S. without fundamental changes in Washington’s policies in the Middle East. Given present political realities, such shift in opinions is unlikely in the near future.

6 Radical Islam in Southeast Asia and its Challenge to U.S. Policy (Houston: Baker Institute, 2005).

Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Asia Malaysia—Osman Bakar




Islam and Muslim Identity in Malaysia: Trends and Transformations

Osman Bakar

Osman B. Bakar is professor emeritus at the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur. Prior to this, he was Visiting Professor and Malaysia Chair of Islam in Southeast Asia with the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding. Since 1995, Osman bin Bakar has served as the Deputy Vice Chancellor/Vice President of Academics and was the first (1992) and present holder of the Chair of the Professor of Philosophy of Science at the University of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur). Dr. Bakar’s research interests include Southeast Asian Islam, particularly Malaysian-Indonesian Islam, contemporary Islamic thought, and Religion and Science in the Islamic Context both Classical and modern. He teaches courses on Contemporary Islam in Southeast Asia, Religion and Science in Islam, and Dialogue of Civilizations.



Executive Summary

Summary

This paper argues that Malaysia, enjoying 50 years of post-independence political stability, inter-ethnic and interfaith peace and economic progress, is one of the most successful religio-political orders in the Muslim world. While Islam is the state religion, the constitution guarantees freedom of worship to religious minorities. However, there is strong caution toward religious minorities and discouragement of interfaith debates on religious topics that may lead to disruptive conflict. There are, however, a number of newly arisen Islamic NGOs seeking to bridge the gap between Malay Muslim and non-Muslim communities, as well as promote women’s rights and empowerment.

Key Findings

• Malaysia’s unique management of religio-ethnic pluralism involves Malay Muslims sharing political power with non-Muslim ethnic groups.

• The state is quick at ‘nipping in the bud’ potential sources of religious tensions and conflicts. Authorities tend to suppress open discussions and debates on sectarian or interfaith issues that would lead to religious animosities for fear of violent religious clashes and conflicts.

• There are no forums or organizations for promoting interfaith understanding, cooperation and discussion among community members of issues of common concern. Non-Muslims are discouraged from participating in discourses and debates on Islam even though Islamic policies are bound to affect the non-Muslim community.

• However, despite ‘Islamization’ policies, increased social interaction and social mobility has led to a corresponding rise in interfaith marriages, conversions and ‘apostasy’ from Islam. Malaysia has yet to resolve this very important interfaith issue.

• The issue of a more equal distribution of economic wealth among the various ethnic groups of the country remains divisive, with the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) demanding affirmative policies protecting Malays and other bumiputeras. Many Malays still remember the country’s worst ethnic riots in 1969 erupted mainly because of Malay dissatisfaction with their disadvantageous economic position vis-à-vis the non-Malays.

• There has been a noticeable rise in Islamic NGOs over the last decade. This development in Islamic civil society organizations reflects an increasing religious awareness among Muslim communities and the demonstrated need to advance Islamic practices and values. Such NGOs promote interfaith and inter-ethnic relations as well as the protection of human rights and women’s empowerment.

Policy Implications

• The contest between conservative and progressive interpretations of Islam is growing more intense in Malaysia. While the state discourages interfaith dialogue and discussions of topics potentially challenging its authority and the state’s religion, the educated public and increasing number of civil society organizations pose potential avenues for open debate and social reform.



Introduction

Malaysia is a Muslim-majority country with its Muslims accounting for 60% of its 26.9 million people. The next largest religious group is the Buddhists (20%), followed by the Christians (9.1%) and the Hindus (6.3%). In Malaysia there is a close identification of religion with race. The great majority of Muslims belong to the ethnic Malay group, while most of the Buddhists are ethnic Chinese, and most of the Hindus ethnic Indians. The majority of Christians come from the indigenous ethnic groups (non-Malay bumiputeras) in the states of Sarawak and Sabah in Borneo, although like the Muslims, they are unevenly distributed in all the major ethnic groups in the country. Malaysia of the Last 50 Years

Malaysia is well-known internationally as a developed Muslim country enjoying 50 years of post-independence political stability, inter-ethnic and interfaith peace, and economic progress. Undoubtedly, it is one of the most stable and peaceful religious and socio-political orders in the Muslim world. Its ‘moderate’ approach to Islam is generally admired among both Muslim and non-Muslim nations. Islam is the state religion, but the constitution guarantees freedom of worship for other religions. This constitutional provision was one of the major items in the ‘social contract’ agreed upon by the nation’s founding fathers representing all the major ethnic and religious groups. The presence of many temples, pagodas, and churches, apart from the more numerous mosques, provides clear signs of this freedom of worship. Malaysia’s management of ethnic pluralism may be unique, but the mechanism put in place has proven to be working relatively well. Its guiding principle involves the Malay Muslims in a sharing of political power with its various non-Muslim ethnic groups. Malaysia’s relatively long period of political stability owes much to this unique mechanism of ethnic and, by extension, religious power sharing, which while ensuring Malay Muslim political dominance, allows the overwhelmingly non-Muslim non-Malays to continue to outclass the Malays in educational and economic achievements. Another source of Malaysia’s political stability is its Westminster-style parliamentary democracy and its unique monarchy. The country’s political system is the fruit of a marriage between its reformed Islamic monarchy and Western democracy borrowed from Britain. Popular democracy has taken deep roots in the political consciousness of Malaysian Muslims. Structurally, political Islam in Malaysia can be said to have reached a certain level of maturity and stability. A good sign of this is the fact that since 1957, the Malay Muslims have settled for a two-party system to represent their interests. The two parties in question are the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and the Islamic Party (PAS). UMNO has ruled the country since independence, making it the only Muslim political party to have won popular democratic national elections in more than half a century. PAS, only slightly younger than UMNO, has served and functioned mostly as an opposition party. Over the years, it has won a few state elections, but it has never wrested control of the Federal government. However, it was part of the coalition government ruling Malaysia from 1974-1979. PAS has earned the distinction of being the most democratic of all Islamic political parties in the Islamic world with an Islamic state agenda.



The Islamic policies of UMNO and PAS have been the most important shaping forces of Malaysian Islam in the last five decades. The two policies are both different and similar, and both have been evolving in response to changing both national and international challenges. PAS views UMNO as a ‘secular’ Muslim party, but the party always has an Islamic policy that equates Islam with modernization and economic development of the Muslim people. It emphasizes Islam as a social force for scientific, technological, and economic advancement. PAS’s Islamic policy, on the other hand, is more oriented toward traditional goals. It is primarily aimed at making Malaysia an Islamic state, by which they mean a state implementing and enforcing Islamic law in its totality. Both parties have evolved over the decades to become more ‘Islamic’ in their outlooks and policies as the Muslim electorate progressively displays its Islamic sentiments and its assertiveness over the issue of Islamic identity. The fierce competition between them for Muslim votes, as democracy requires them to do, and thus attempts to appear before the Muslim community as being more Islamic than the other, culminated in Mahathir’s 2001 proclamation of ‘Malaysia is already an Islamic state!’ While the two parties differ on many aspects in their approach to and emphasis on Islam, they are united in defending Islam as the state religion and protecting the Malay-Muslim identity. In the constitution, ethnic Malays are defined as being Muslims. But they have also grown more moderate in their dealings and relations with the non-Muslim populace, again a dictation of popular political democracy. Both have come to realize that, in a democratic Malaysia with a large non-Muslim minority, they could not come to power and govern by themselves. Sharing and cooperation among the country’s diverse ethnic and religious groups have become an accepted fact in contemporary Malaysia’s political culture. Malaysia provides an interesting case study of how democracy has tended to moderate Muslim politics. Dialogue

While Malaysia may be said to have an ‘enlightened’ and pragmatic policy on inter-ethnic cooperation and peace, it does not have one on interfaith understanding and peace. True enough, Malaysia has been spared religious strife and conflict in the last 50 years. It is also true that Malaysians of different religious groups have interacted with each other peacefully in their daily lives—educational, business, political, and the workplace—but all these achievements have nothing to do with some well-defined policy on interfaith understanding and cooperation that the government of the day had put in place and enforced. There has never been such a policy. Other factors have contributed to the absence of interfaith conflicts in Malaysia. First, credit goes to the nation’s political leaders, who have made frequent appeals to Malaysians to maintain interfaith tolerance in the country. In fact, every time a religious festival takes place, top leaders not only send congratulatory messages to the religious community in question to mark the occasion but also appeal to members of other faiths to join in the celebration. It is now common to see community leaders and ordinary Malaysians inviting guests to their ‘open house’ gathering, as part of their religious celebration that includes neighbors and friends from other faiths. It is now an integral part of modern Malaysian culture. Second, the government is quick at ‘nipping in the bud’ potential sources of religious tensions and conflicts. Authorities tend to suppress open discussions and debates on sectarian or interfaith



issues that would lead to religious animosities for fear of violent religious clashes and conflicts. They are ever ready to resort to the use of the much criticized Internal Security Act, which allows detention without trial, as they, in fact, have done before, to arrest suspected ‘trouble-makers or religious extremists’ with the view of containing the outbreak of religious hatred and animosity. As a result, people feel discouraged and are afraid to venture into interfaith arguments and debates. It is not surprising, therefore, that until now there has not been a single forum or organization that regularly gathers community leaders of all the religious groups for the purpose of promoting interfaith understanding and cooperation and discussion of issues of common concern. Interfaith dialogue is yet to take roots in Malaysian society. Non-Muslims are discouraged from participating in discourses and debates on Islam. But the Islamic policy of the UMNO or PAS-led government, even when it is meant only for Muslims, is bound to affect the non-Muslim community in one way or another. Many non-Muslims are in fact duly concerned about the practical implications of the government’s Islamic policy for their respective religious communities. Even without the official Islamic policy such as Abdullah Badawi’s present ‘Islam Hadhari’ and, previously, Mahathir Mohammad’s ‘Islamization Policy,’ there are enough interfaith issues that need to be resolved arising especially from mixed marriages, religious conversions, and apostasy from Islam. Increased social interactions brought about by modernization and its attending social mobility has led to an increase in such marriages and religious conversions or apostasy. Malaysia has yet to break new ground in resolving this very important interfaith issue. Interfaith dialogue would help Malaysia in breaking a new ground. Islam and the Economy

In Malaysia, the impact of Islam extends to the economic domain. The issue of a fairer distribution of national economic wealth among the various ethnic groups is a divisive one. UMNO, the dominant partner in the coalition government, wants the affirmative policy to help Malays and other bumiputeras acquire ownership of at least 30% of the national wealth to be continued after three decades in which the policy failed to deliver its goal. Under Mahathir’s Islamization policy, both for religious and economic reasons, the government introduced Islamic banking and financial economic institutions. These institutions have benefited both Muslims and non-Muslims. However, apart from the establishment of these institutions, the role of Islam in the economic salvation of the Malay Muslims has not been until now given due emphasis. However, with various strategies, it is quite likely that in the coming decade Islam will feature more prominently in the nation’s perennial debate on the economic plight of the Malays. For a growing number of well-educated Malays, Islam is now seen as the last savior to deliver Malay economic goals. The stakes are high. Many Malaysians still remember the country’s worst ethnic riots in 1969 erupted mainly because of Malay dissatisfaction with their disadvantageous economic position vis-à-vis the non-Malays.

Major Players in Contemporary Malaysia Islam In examining trends and possibilities in the developments of Islam in Malaysia, we need to look at the major organizational players that are currently shaping the life and thought of Muslims and their community. In the previous section, I provided a summary of the major achievements of



Islam in Malaysia and the kind of challenges, old and new, it has been facing. These achievements and challenges would provide a good basis for studying trends and possibilities of Islam in Malaysia for the next one or two decades. In this section, I list organizational representatives of major Muslim groups which have contributed to make Malaysian Islam what it is now. Most of these groups have been around for a long time on the Malaysian Islamic scene. A few arrived only less than a decade ago. What these groups think and do about Islam now is going to influence the kind of trends and possibilities in Malaysian Islam that we are going to see in the next decade or so. Of course, there will be developments in the rest of the Muslim world that are also going to impact the development of Malaysian Islam. Political Parties UMNO was established in 1946 to unite the Malays in their struggle for independence from colonial rule and to fight for Malay-Muslim interests in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Malaysia. It has consistently presented itself as the guardian of Malay-ism and Islam, while displaying the commitment to share political power and economic wealth with other ethnic and religious groups. From the time of independence in 1957 until now it has been the dominant partner in the multi-ethnic coalition government. It is considered as one of the largest Muslim organizations in the world. Most of its members are Malay Muslims but it has non-Muslim members coming from the minority ethnic Thai community in the country’s northern states bordering Thailand, the small Christian Portuguese community in Malacca, and the indigenous ethnic groups in the eastern state of Sabah. With this mixed membership, UMNO is no longer a purely Malay or Muslim party despite its name. With Mahathir taking over UMNO’s leadership in 1981, UMNO became more ‘Islamic’ in its policies. Mahathir championed Muslim interests both at home and abroad throughout the Muslim world. At home, his Islamization policy was admired by Muslims and criticized by non-Muslims, and it had a great impact on the development of Islam in the country in practically every domain of public life. After Abdullah Badawi took over in 2003, he introduced a new Islamic policy, which is known as Islam Hadhari, literally meaning ‘civilizational Islam.’ Badawi’s primary motive in introducing this policy was apparently to deemphasize political Islam and to diffuse the divisive issue of Islamic state. PAS was formed in 1951 following the break away of the religious wing (the ulema group) of UMNO from the party. Its members are all Muslims as required by the party’s constitution. PAS has never won a general election at the federal level. At the state level, however, it won the states of Kelantan and Trengganu more than once. It is presently governing Kelantan, the only Malaysian state to be ruled by the opposition. In fact, in Kelantan it performed better than UMNO, having won more of the state’s elections than UMNO did. In 1974 it was invited to join the national coalition government under Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, which it accepted. However, differences with UMNO forced it to leave the coalition in 1979. Right from the beginning, PAS has championed Islamic rule for Malaysia. Until 1979 when a new brand of Islamic leadership inspired by the Iranian Islamic Revolution took over the reins of PAS, the party also championed Malay-Islamic nationalism. Starting from early 1980s the party championed the Islamic state under the rule of the ulema. In the spirit of ‘universal Islam’ it denounced all forms of nationalism as un-Islamic. In its view, UMNO is secular and nationalist.



But in relation to its past, it has become more liberal in a number of areas. It opened its membership to non-Malays who are Muslims. In its outreach to the non-Muslim community, it has created ‘Supporters of PAS Clubs’ from among the ethnic Chinese and Indians. It still does not allow non-Muslims to become members. Its government in Kelantan is seen as more liberal than UMNO’s government in respecting the cultural and religious rights of the minority non-Muslim communities in the state. In other areas, such as treatment of women and gender issues and entertainment, PAS has been widely criticized as being too conservative and suppressive. The Religious Establishment Malaysia’s religious establishment is complex. This stems from the fact that Islamic affairs are a state matter over which the federal government has no right to interfere. The sultan or raja is the head of Islam in his state.7 In five other states without sultans/rajas, the king is the head of Islam. Due to these independent religious establishments, the administration of Islam in Malaysia has been plagued with conflicting religious rulings and bureaucracy. There are mechanisms in place for the coordination of Islamic policies and administrative practices of the various states, but their effectiveness has been questioned. There is also the religious establishment headed by a minister at the Prime Minister’s Department. In its present set up, it is known by the Malay acronym JAKIM (Department of Islamic Development). Since it is concerned with the administration of Islamic law in Kuala Lumpur and the federal territory as a whole, it is the most visible of the religious establishments. Together, these religious establishments have been entrusted with the task of executing the government’s Islamic policy and administrating Islamic law which mainly regulates Muslim marriages, divorces, inheritance and religious education, and conversions to Islam as well as apostasy. But the religious establishments are also ‘supervising’ Muslim beliefs so that Muslims do not deviate from the official Malay-Muslim creed. Undoubtedly, they are a powerful institution with much sway over the lives and deaths of Muslims. And it is important to note that of all nationally organized and administered Islamic beliefs and practices in the Muslim world Malaysian Islam is arguably the most monolithic and the most state-regulated.

Islamic Civil Society: The NGOs

Islamic NGOs have increased in the last decade or so. There is an increasing awareness in the Muslim community, especially among the educated youth, of the need to establish voluntary organizations dedicated to the advancement of Islamic life and thought. As far as Islamic activities are concerned, the real turning point in the ascendancy of Muslim activism through NGOs was in the 1970s in the wake of Islamic revivalism sweeping the Muslim world. For this section of the report, we selected four Islamic NGOs that are influential and highly visible in contemporary Malaysian Islam—Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM), Malaysian Chinese Muslim Association (MACMA), Malaysian Reform Fellowship (JIM) and Sisters in Islam (SIS). ABIM (Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia)

ABIM was established in 1971 as a youth organization dedicated to the propagation of Islam as a complete way of life. Its most famous founding member is Anwar Ibrahim, a former Deputy 7 There are nine such states.



Prime Minister, who was President from 1977 until 1982 when Mahathir recruited him into UMNO. ABIM’s appeal to youths and students lay in its stress on making Islam relevant to all aspects of life. It brought a fresh vision of Islam to not only the Muslim community but the whole country. It grew to become the most influential youth organization in the 1970s and 1980s. It set new trends in Islamic dress culture, particularly among women, intellectual discourses with an emphasis on the Islamization of knowledge, Islamic education with its holistic approach, political activism, female activism and interfaith dialogues. ABIM’s Islamic activism had impacted many facets of Malaysian Islam. Today, with more than 50,000 members, it had a nationwide network of schools, colleges, medical clinics (and a hospital in Kuala Lumpur) and relief task force. MACMA (Malaysian Chinese Muslim Association)

MACMA was formed in 1992 with the main objective of providing an umbrella organization for the growing number of Chinese Muslims in the country so that they might become members of an organized Chinese Muslim community. It also caters to the welfare of Chinese Muslims in all aspects, including their spirituality. As both Muslims and ethnic Chinese, MACMA seeks to play the role of a cultural bridge between the Malay-Muslim community and the non-Muslim Chinese community. MACMA’s leaders are well-educated and successful professionals, including a few active in politics. The organization has nationwide branches. It is likely to grow in strength and influence in years to come. Its members are the most suited to explain Islam to the Chinese people. JIM (Malaysian Reform Fellowship) JIM was established in July 1990 as an Islamic missionary and social organization dedicated to the development of Islam and society. Like ABIM, it has state and district branches throughout the country. Its more than 8,000 strong membership is mainly comprised of professionals, the new generation of Malaysia’s middle class, many of whom are Western-educated. As an Islamic organization, it shares many traits with ABIM. In a number of areas of Islamic activities and concerns, the two groups seem to be cooperating well. Today, in many areas of social, educational and welfare work, JIM seems to be better organized and more successful than ABIM. SIS (Sisters in Islam) SIS was formed in 1988 but only registered as an NGO in 1993. Its main objectives are to promote the rights of Muslim women within the framework of Islam and to create public awareness, and reform laws and policies on issues of equality, justice, freedom, dignity, and democracy in Islam. It also seeks to eliminate injustice and discrimination against women by changing practices and values that regard women as inferior to men. Its membership is small, comprised of female Muslim professionals, but its dynamism makes it today the most visible female organization in Malaysia. Its frequent media appearances help to enhance this visibility. It is active in publicizing discriminatory practices and abuses against women. SIS came into prominence in the light of new global discourses on the place and role of Islam in the new century. The most prominent issues in these discourses are those of democracy, women’s rights, and religious freedom in the context of a religiously pluralistic society. The



group participates actively in these discourses both at national and international levels. Its vocal stance on these issues has also placed it at odds with other Muslim groups. From the point of view of many Malaysian Muslims, SIS’s ‘minority’ interpretation of the Qur’an on issues of gender equality has invited the greatest controversy. But SIS has left an impact on Malaysian Islam, especially on women’s issues, and it looks like it is going to influence trends in the development of Islam in the coming decade.

Trends and Possibilities

Together, UMMO and PAS, as traditional representatives of the Malay-Muslim community in politics, the religious establishments, as regulators of Muslim social life, and ABIM, MACMA, JIM and SIS, as representatives of Malaysia’s Muslim civil society, may be regarded as the major shapers of trends in the development of Malaysian Islam in the next decade. In this section, I list some of the trends and possibilities for Islam in Malaysia. First, UMNO’s non-Muslim membership is going to increase. In consequence, UMNO is likely to revise its traditional stand regarding the identification of ethnic Malays with Islam. Changing circumstances would make it difficult for the party, despite opposition from PAS, to continue defending the current Islamic law disallowing Malay Muslims to leave Islam. There will be stronger pressure from more lobby groups, not just SIS, on the government to abandon its law on apostasy. But there will be a tough fight. ABIM and JIM are going to oppose any move to legalize apostasy. Second, PAS will become less ideological vis-à-vis issues of the Islamic state and instead will become more pragmatic. It will recruit more members from among the non-Malay Muslims and more supporters’ clubs from the non-Muslim community in order to create a new image for itself that would be more acceptable to non-Muslims. Its brand of leadership is likely to change from the more conservative type of the ulama to a professional and intellectual type of leadership. This trend has been seen in the last party elections when a leader of the latter type was voted into the number two position. This change would pose a new challenge to UMNO who has been used to dealing only with PAS’s traditional type of ulama leadership. Third, both UMNO and PAS will continue to have some form of Islamic policy. There could be two different Islamic policies with different emphasis and directions in such areas as education, economics and foreign relations. The ultimate religious source of these policies is one, namely the Qur’an. But there could be different interpretations of what Islamic development means. If the Muslim electorate is presented with two Islamic policies and makes their choice in a democratic election, and this freedom of choice is to be repeatedly exercised in future elections, then Malaysia would emerge as a Muslim country with an interesting model of ‘Islamic democracy.’ To the extent that political Islam is an inevitable challenge to non-Muslim voters, they would also have to exercise their preference. This means also non-Muslims will be forced to participate in arguments and debates on Islam. Fourth, there will be more pressure on the Malays to abandon their stand of not allowing non-Muslims to participate in discourses and debates on Islam. Malay Muslims cannot, on the one hand, wish to see Islam playing an important role in Malaysian public life and, on the other hand,



prohibits or discourages non-Muslims from discussing Islamic policies that are bound to implicate them. ABIM, JIM, and SIS would not oppose the idea of non-Muslims participating in such discourses, but they would insist on some guidelines to ensure that debates do not violate religious sensitivities. Fifth, new developments in social interactions among the different ethnic and religious groups would necessitate interfaith dialogues. The government is now discouraging such dialogues unless these are conducted under its watchful eye. But pressure from the public—NGOS in particular—for dialogues will grow simply because new social problems will arise from mixed marriages, divorces, religious conversions and apostasy. People would like to see more emphasis on cultural approaches to these problems than on the legal. Sixth, women and gender issues are going to feature more prominently in discussions on Islam. Women are going to outperform men in practically every field, particularly education. Today in every university in the country more than 60% of the students are females. Soon this will also be the case with the academic and administrative staff in universities. This female majority would mean women are going to dominate every sector of public life. Clearly, the religious establishment would be forced to review and change its current policies and practices regarding the appointment of females to religious positions such as those in Shari’ah courts. A review of traditional interpretations of Islamic law seems inevitable. Seventh, debates on Islamic identity will intensify in the coming years. Traditionally, the issue of Islamic identity is synonymous with the issue of Malay-Muslim identity. Islam in Malaysia has been traditionally seen through the eyes of the Malays. But as non-Malays embrace Islam in increasing numbers their ethnic backgrounds differing from the Malays would introduce new elements in the understanding of Islamic identity. MACMA wants to create ‘a Chinese Muslim ummah’ in Malaysia with its Chinese mosques. Implicit in these ideas is the acknowledgment that the Chinese Muslim identity does not coincide with the Malay Muslim identity. The recent controversy in the media surrounding the intention of Chinese Muslims to build their own mosque provides a good example of a trend in Malaysian thinking on diversity within Islam. Eighth, socio-economic issues resulting from the increasing gap between the rich and the poor within all ethnic groups will alter the basic parameters of the traditional national debate on distribution of economic wealth. The emphasis would change from ethnic to moral and ethical considerations. Right now, Anwar Ibrahim is leading the movement which calls for this change of emphasis. He is calling for the end of affirmative actions on ethnic grounds favoring the Malays. In other words, the factor of Islam as a social force for socio-economic justice transcending ethnicity and religiosity will feature more prominently in the national debate over the distribution of wealth. Indications are that PAS would outshine UMNO in this new economic debate. Finally, as in the rest of the Muslim world, the contest between the conservative interpretation of Islam and its progressive interpretation will intensify. As Malaysia becomes more developed and more open to outside influences especially from the West, re-thinking the role of Islam in public life becomes inevitable. The Muslim community will be divided into two groups—conservative and progressive. The religious establishments will be confronted with new problems. If UMNO



remains in power, political considerations will force it to exert pressure on the religious establishment to adopt new policies and practices that better reflect pluralism and diversity within the Muslim community and throughout the country.

Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Asia Thailand—Imtiyaz Yusuf




Southern Thailand Crisis: Ethno-Religious and Political Dimensions

Imtiyaz Yusuf

Imtiyaz Yusuf is head of department and lecturer in religion at the Graduate School of Philosophy and Religion, Assumption University, Bangkok. His research interests include Islamic studies, religion, and Islam in Southeast Asia.



Executive Summary

Summary

This paper reports on the current status of Islam in Buddhist Thailand, especially in relation to the ongoing conflict in southern Thailand. The paper finds that the southern Thailand conflict is not purely religious in nature but rather an ethno-religious conflict emphasizing the ethnic dimensions of religious identity. The paper finds that the majority of Thai Muslims see no contradiction between their Muslim identity and status as Thai citizens. However, Malay Muslims feel differently, demanding independent status. Despite welcoming gestures of the state toward pluralism and minority rights, the southern conflict is spilling over, threatening Buddhist-Muslim relations throughout the country. Key Findings

• Thailand has successfully managed to produce a national Thai identity based on commonality of language, socio-cultural tolerance and assimilation with a growing economy. Yet underneath this public face lies a variety of religio-cultural identities positioned along ethnic lines.

• The Thai Muslim community is a varied. Broadly, there are two types of Muslims in

Thailand: the Thai-speaking integrated Muslims and the Malay-speaking Muslims of the deep south demanding autonomy. Both of these groups interpret Islam differently, with the former seeing itself as part of a Buddhist multi-religious country where Islam is the religion of a minority community. The latter views Islam as secondary to a larger ethno-linguistic identity in a part of the country which is historically distinct from Thailand.

• As such, the ongoing conflict in southern Thailand is not purely religious but rather an

ethno-religious conflict which emphasizes the ethnic dimension of religious identity. Policy Implications

• Thailand is a dynamic country in Southeast Asia which has successfully integrated a substantial portion of its Muslim population. But further action is required to integrate Thailand’s southern Malay Muslim population which privileges its ethno-religious identity as distinct from that of the majority Buddhists. Integrating the southern Malay Muslims will help contain the spread of radical Islam threatening state and regional stability.

• A strong distrust marks Malay and other ethno-religious minorities’ relations with the

state after a history of brutal suppression and containment policies, as well as the double standards perceived in US support for suppressive regimes while advocating democracy and the protection of human rights. While calling for Thailand’s return to democracy, the US could profit through promoting multiculturalism in Thailand. Such steps will help remove apprehensions that the US is engaged in a global religious war against Islam.



Introductory Background

Thailand is a constitutional monarchy currently ruled by an interim government led by Prime Minister Sarayud Chulanont. The interim government was installed by the Council for National Security (CNS) led by General Sonthi Boonyaratkalin who led a military coup against the elected Thaksin Shinwatara government in September 2006. The coup leaders cited the following reasons for staging of the coup, viz., corruption, national disunity in light of unrest in the south, nepotism and abuse of power as well as insults made to the monarchy. In terms of religious demography, Thailand is majority Buddhist with Islam as a minority religion. Thailand is currently facing separatist violence in its southern ethnic Malay-Muslim provinces. The Thai political system has been described as a constitutional monarchy in the form of a ‘secularized Buddhist polity’ with a ‘stable semi-democratic’ political system.8 Thailand follows the communitarian democracy model, ‘a ... process ... characterized by stability, peace and order, the upholding of shared moral and cultural values, and the priority of communitarian interests.’9 This model has allowed the Thai Muslims to define their own communal development. Meanwhile, their relation with the Buddhists is that of mutual religious coexistence without socio-religious interaction or inter-religious dialogue. Since the adoption of the model of constitutional monarchy in 1932, the Thai political system has undergone major shifts, advances, and setbacks along the democratic path.10 These shifts were influenced by the roles of the military, bureaucracy, ethnic groups such as the emergent Chinese middle class and the Thai Muslims. The 1992 political uprising was seen as marking the end of military rule; however, this military rule reemerged in September 2006. Since 1992, Thailand has embarked upon, ‘a political system in which the military and bureaucratic forces largely determine the role as well as the mode of participation of the non-bureaucratic forces.’11 It is a system in which the Parliament ‘is only now becoming a new source of power, struggling to institutionalize its legitimacy.’12 But this process of establishing the legitimacy of the Parliament has been disrupted many times in the past history due to military coups, and more recently, in September 2006 when the military overthrew the democratically elected Thaksin government and suspended the 1997 constitution which was the most democratic in spirit, also known as the ‘peoples’ constitution.’ The present military leaders have promised elections by the end of 2007. At present, Thailand is at the cross-roads of determining the future trajectory of Thai democracy.13

8 Chai-Anan Samudavanija, ‘Thailand: A Stable Semi-Democracy,’ in Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: ASIA (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 1989), 340. The term ‘secularized Buddhist polity’ is borrowed from Somboon Suksamarn, ‘Buddhism, Political Authority and Legitimacy in Thailand and Cambodia,’ in Trevor Ling, ed., Buddhist Trends in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), 127. 9 Chai-Anan Samudavanija, Thailand: State-Building, Democracy and Globalization (Bangkok: Institute of Public Policy Studies, 2002), 36. 10 For a good recent historical study of Thailand, see, Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, A History of Thailand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 11 Chai-Anan Samudavanija, Thailand: State-Building, Democracy and Globalization, 136. 12 Ibid. 13 Thailand will have a public referendum on the new draft constitution on July 6, 2007.



John Embree’s theoretical characterization of Thailand as a ‘loosely structured social system’ is still largely true. According to Embree this system is marked by individualistic features such as: a loosely integrated culture allowing diverse individual and communal behavior patterns; loose integration of society; bureaucratic grace represented by prolonged process of execution; lack of regularity, discipline and regimentation and no sense of industrial time is still largely true.14 And this characterization also applies to the Muslim component of Thai society whose difference from the Buddhist majority is mainly religious dissimilarity rather than cultural. As a Southeast Asian country, Thailand has successfully managed to produce a national Thai identity based on commonality of language, socio-cultural tolerance and assimilation with a growing economy. Yet underneath this public face lies a variety of religio-cultural identities positioned along ethnic lines. In a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country with a total population of 65 million people,15 the Thai Muslim population is about 5 million, making approximately 7.5% of the population.16 Seventy percent of Thai Muslims reside in the south. The spread of Thai Muslims all over the country represents the variety within Thai Islam which is further internally divided along ethnic lines and also, more recently, along sectarian lines following the arrival of Islamic puritanical trends from South Asia, the Middle East and other countries of the region. Recently, a Thai Shia Muslim community has also emerged. The Muslim community of Thailand is a varied. There are two types of Islam in Thailand, i.e., the integrationist which is practiced in the provinces extending from the upper south to Chiangrai in the north, and the volatile and un-integrated Islam in the deep south with its different variants. Both types interpret Islam differently: the former see itself as a part of a Buddhist multi-religious country where Islam is the religion of a minority community, while the latter views Islam as a part of an ethno-linguistic identity in a part of the country which has been incorporated into Thailand.

Research Framework and Methodology: Focus Groups

First, a note about the usage of the term ‘Thai Islam’ in this project. The officially coined term ‘Thai Islam’ is seen as ethnically offensive especially by the Malay Muslims of the south due to its imposition from Bangkok after the declaration of the ‘Patronage of Islam Act’ of 1945. Hence the deep southerners refer to themselves as ‘Malay Muslims.’ But the term ‘Malay Muslim’ has ethnic, regional and sectarian limitations for it overlooks the other sections of the Thai Muslim community spread across the country that are of different ethnic, provincial and even theological backgrounds from those in the deep south. Therefore, I prefer to use the term ‘Thai Islam’ and ‘Thai Muslims’ when referring to the general profile of the Muslim community of Thailand and make reference to the ethnic variety within this community when discussing its provincial context by using terms such as ‘Malay Muslims’ for those residing in the deep south and ‘Thai- speaking Muslims’ for those residing in the territory between the upper south and other regions of the country.

14 John F. Embree, ‘Thailand: A Loosely Structured Social System,’ in American Anthropologist, Vol. 52, No. 2 (April-June 1950): 181-193. 15 ‘Thailand Fact and Figures,’ in Bangkok Post Economic Review Mid-Year 2005, 36. 16 Michel Gilquin, The Muslims of Thailand (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2005), 41.



A total of thirty focus group interviews were conducted over a period of two months in the following provinces and regions of Thailand, viz., the deep south (comprising Narathiwat, Yala, Pattani), the upper south (Songkla, Satun, Nakorn Sithammarat and Phuket), the central plains (Bangkok and vicinity), the north (Chiangmai and Chiangrai) and the Northeast (Khon Kaen, Kalasin, Sakon Nakorn and Udon Thani). There were two reasons for choosing these provinces. First, most of the studies about Islam in Thailand focus only on the deep south, portraying the situation as if there is no presence of Islam in the other parts of the country, and hence the need to highlight the geographic spread, ethnic and sectarian variety within Thai Islam. Second, to obtain a picture of cross-country Muslim views about identity, multi-religious coexistence and the sectarian divide within the Thai Muslim community and the conflict in south Thailand. The focus group interviewees comprised Muslim scholars, community leaders, educators at public and private universities, mosque imams, members of youth organizations, Muslim social activists, women representatives and those involved in official community organizations such as the Provincial Islamic Councils in southern, central and northern parts of the country. The objective of the focus group interviews was to find out Thai Muslim opinions about the following issues:

• ethnic, religious and civilian identities; • Muslim-Buddhist relations and religious pluralism—what Muslims can do to promote

pluralism in Thailand; • religious and sectarian divisions within the Thai Muslim community; • the sources of separatist ideology among Thailand’s southern Muslims, and the attitudes

of other sections of the Thai Muslim community toward the conflict in the south; • Thai Muslim attitudes toward state and government policies; and • measures which need to be taken by the government to promote security.

Background: The Peoples of Thailand

Thailand is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country where cultural diversity exists throughout the country. This is evident from the ethno-linguistic and religio-cultural diversity within the Thai kingdom. In geographic and linguistic terms, i.e., in terms of the variety in Thai dialects, Thailand can be divided into four zones: the north, the northeast, the central and the south.

North

The population of northern Thailand is made up of 16 different ethnic groups differentiated by occupation, language, ethnicity and religion. Occupationally, they engage in high-land, swidden types of farming, or are wet rice producers following different traditional religions and are of different ethnic origins. The dominant ethnic group is that of Tai speakers or the Tai Yuan, also known as khon muang; the others are the Tai Yai (Shan), Tai Lue, Tai Khun and Tai Yong. The Tai tribes came from south-west China. In the north, there are also the Karen speakers who came from Burma or Myanmar. The Tibeto-Burman speakers originated in Tibet, comprising the Lisu, the Akha and the Lahu. And then there are the Haw from Yunnan who speak a Sinitic language which is different from Mandarin. Finally, there are the Hmong and the Yao tribes who also came from



China, and are Meo-Yao speakers. The Tai Yuan dominate the upper north and also reside in the provinces of Sukhothai, Tak and Uttaradit. The Karen, Akha. Lahu, Yao, Lisu and Hmong reside in the lower and upper north provinces, while the Siamese Tai dominate the lower north. The Tai speakers are Theravada Buddhists. They are politically and hierarchically conscious, and dwell in the lowlands where they live sedentary lifestyles and engage in irrigated rice farming. The non-Tai groups are non-sedentary. While they are not politically centralized, they do respect hierarchy. Among the Haw from Yunnan there are the Hanafi Muslims as well as followers of syncretic Chinese and Buddhist religions. The others are animists of which the Yao also have Taoist beliefs and many Karen are Christians.

Central

The first inhabitants of central Thailand consisted of Mon and Khmer speaking peoples. They were followed by the Tai tribes among whom the predominant were the Siamese Tai. The Khmers came to Thailand and Cambodia in the 13th CE while the Tai tribes came from China in the 6th CE they displaced animist Austro-Asiatic speakers of numerous tribes then present in the region. The Khmers dominated the area and their language, beliefs and political systems were the basis of human daily life until displaced by the Tai. Today these people call themselves Thai, formerly they were known as Siamese. The Tai established dynasties through intermarriage with the indigenous elite Mon communities. The Siamese/Thai emerged from a web of political and kinship relations with the Mon to form new power connections in the west of the Khmer Empire and as far south as Nakhon Si Thammarat on the Malay Peninsula. These communities were further mixed by the introduction of captives of war, slaves and forced migration of people or whole communities. The Tai mixed in communities shaped by hundreds of years of Khmer rule, with its Brahmanist traditions and political and administrative concepts, so that over time these Tai developed distinctive characteristics. The contemporary Cham, Khmer, Pagan and Chinese referred to them as ‘Siam.’ Having Mon and Khmer origins as well as Tai, they have different physical features and they borrowed a lot of Brahmanical beliefs which were passed on by the Khmer. Hence, Thai Buddhism is intermixed with Brahmanical rituals especially in the royal court. Another significant migration group here is the Chinese, many of whom mixed into the local communities, while the Karen, the largest minority ethnic group, live in the mountain region along the Burmese border. The Muslims of central Thailand include the Chams who fled at the end of the Champa Empire in the 15th CE because of the Vietnamese invasion. Originally the Chams were Hindus, today they are Sunni Muslim of the Shafi school. Some of the Chams combine Islamic religion with beliefs and rituals of a Hindu-Buddhist origin. Traditionally, the Cham followed a matrilineal descent system which is now replaced by a patrilineal system following orthodox Islamic influences.



North-East

The Tai speaking tribes are more predominant in the northeast. They are known as the Issan or Lao Issan peoples. Linguistically and culturally they are the same as the Laotian people, the only difference being that they live in different countries. The Issan language is closely related to that of the Tai Yai and Tai Yuan of North Thailand and the Shan state of Myanmar. It has also borrowed words from Pali, Sanskrit and Khmer. The majority of the Issan are Theravada Buddhists. Issan Buddhism is intermixed with animistic beliefs in spirits or kwans. Islam has a tiny presence in the region. Thai Muslims here are immigrant Pathans from Pakistan-Afghanistan and migrants from other regions of Thailand.

South

Thailand’s south is divided into the upper and deep south.

Upper South

The upper south provinces include Chumphon, Surat Thani, Patthalung, Nakorn Si Thammarath, Songkla, Phuket, Krabi, Phangnga, Ranong, Trang and Satun. It is inhabited by the southern Tai people who are Buddhist and have a distinct dialect known as Pak Tai, and also by Thai speaking Muslims of Malay ethnic background. There are religio-cultural differences between these groups.

Deep South

The deep south comprises the provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat inhabited by Malay speaking Muslims following the Shafi legal school. They are the majority in the region. Alongside the Malay Muslims are the Thai Buddhists who are a minority. The Malay Muslims call themselves ‘orae nayu’ (Malay Muslim) who ‘kecek nayu’ (speak local Malay) and are different from ‘orae siye,’ the ethnic Thais who are Buddhists. They feel offended when referred to as ‘Thai Muslim,’ a term which they interpret ethnically for, according to them, Malays cannot be anything other than Muslims just as Thais are always Buddhist. Malay Muslims also see the term as an indication of forced assimilation by the Thai state while Muslims in other regions of Thailand do not take it as an offense when referred to as ‘Thai Muslim.’

Islam in Thailand

Islam came to Thailand from three directions: south, central and the north. It first arrived in southern Thailand in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries C.E. when it was brought by Arab traders.17 Islam arrived in central Thailand during the Sukhothai (1238-1365) period when Persian, Arab and India traders visited Siam. These traders were also present in the court of Ayudhya (1350-1767). The Cham Muslims migrated to Ayudhya due to the collapse of the Champa kingdom in 1491. Indonesian Macassar Muslims settled in Ayudhya following the Dutch conquest of Macassar between 1666–1669 C.E. The Indian, Bengali and Chinese Muslims arrived in the north of Thailand between the 1870s and 1890s respectively.18 The establishment

17 Raymond Scupin, ‘Thai Muslims in Bangkok: Islam and Modernization in a Buddhist Society’ (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1978), 1–2. 18 Suthep Soonthornpasuch, ‘Islamic Identity in Chiengmai City: A Historical and Structural Comparison of Two Communities’ (Ph. D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1977), 37–75.



of the new capital of Bangkok in 1782 by King Rama I of the Chakri dynasty saw the settlement of Iranian, Indian, Pakistani, Cham, Indonesian, and Malay Muslims in different locations of the country.19 Islam in Thailand operates in three configurations defined by history and location. First, the ethnic Malay-speaking Muslims practice in the provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat of the deep south. These southern Muslims make up about 80% of the total Thai Muslim population of about 5–7 million. Secondly, the integrated ethnically Malay but Thai-speaking Muslims practice in the province of Satun and upper South such as Songkla, Nakorn Si Thammarat, Phuket, Krabi, and Phangnga. Third, the multi-ethnic Thai speaking integrated Muslims are located in the central Thailand provinces of Bangkok and Ayudhya and also north and northeast Thailand. This group comprises Muslims of Persian, Malay, Cham, Indonesian, Indian, Bengali, Pathan, and Chinese ethnic backgrounds.20 These migrant Muslims from neighboring countries came to settle in Thailand for economic and political reasons. They also fled religious persecution at the hands of the communists in China and the nationalists in Burma. There are also Thai converts to Islam either through marriage or religious conversions. The first type of Islam has been largely resistant to integration within the Thai polity while the second and third types have been integrative. Thus the Thai Muslim community is made up of two groups: the ‘native/local Muslims’ and the ‘immigrant settler Muslims.’ Hence, there is ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and political variety within the Thai Muslim community. The ‘immigrant Muslims’ of Thailand also belong to different Muslim sects. For example, Persian Muslims belonging to the Shia sect served at the court of the Ayudhya Kingdom in different official capacities.21 The majority of Thai Muslims belong to the Sunni sect but this is also a small Shia community belonging to the Imami, Ismaili and Bohra/Mustali Ismailis, sub-groups from within the Shia sect.22 Overall, the Thai Muslims make up the largest minority religious group in the country, thus making them ‘a national minority rather than as a border minority.’23 One may say that Islam in Thailand has two main local narratives distinguished by the geographic areas they occupy within the territory of the kingdom of Thailand. First, the ethnically Malay speakers of the deep south compose the majority Muslim population and second, the multi-ethnic Thai speaking Muslims residing in the different regions of the country make the minority. The two groups converge as adherents of the same religion but diverge when it comes to giving prominence to ethnicity and language over other forms of identity. This distinction is not based on differences in doctrine but

19 Scupin, ‘Thai Muslims in Bangkok,’ 19–29. 20 Raymond Scupin, ‘Cham Muslims of Thailand: A Haven of Security in Southeast Asian,’ JOURNAL Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs 10 (1989): 486-491. Also Seddik Taouti, ‘The Forgotten Muslims of Kampuchea and Vietnam,’ JOURNAL Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs 4 (1982): 3–13. See also Soonthornpasuch, ‘Islamic Identity in Chiengmai City.’ Also David Wilson and David Henley, ‘Northern Comfort: The Contented Muslims of Chiang Mai,’ Bangkok Post Outlook Section, January 4, 1995, 33, 40. 21 Raymond Scupin, ‘Islam in Thailand before the Bangkok Period,’ Journal of Siam Society 68 (1980): 55–71. 22 See Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam ‘Ismailiya’ and ‘Shi’a.’ And Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987). 23 Omar Farouk ‘The Muslims of Thailand’ in Lutfi Ibrahim, ed., ISLAMIKA (Kuala Lampur: Sarjana Enterprise, 1981), 97–121.



in the practice and lived experience of the Islam and the country. In other words, the difference lies in being a Malay-speaking or a Thai-speaking Muslim. The main distinction between the two sections of Muslims in Thailand is that the southerners are mono-ethnic while the others are multi-ethnic; this difference also affects their cultural orientation. The Malays are attached to Malay culture and resistant to the Thai social and cultural practices, while the non-Malays practice a synthesis of Thai social culture combined with Islam as religious belief and practice. In terms of political views, the southern Malays have also participated in the Thai political process. Some sections among them aspire for self-determination, while the Thai-speaking Muslims who are less in terms of numbers are well integrated into the Thai political process at the national level. The Malay Muslims of south Thailand, like those in Malaysia, give primacy to their ethnic identity and view their life experience from within the context of the local practice of Islam. Thus the ritual, mythic/narrative, experiential/emotional, ethical and legal, social, material and political aspects of life are all interpreted and perceived through the lenses of ethnic identity. Here ethnicity and religion are intermixed, both of which are perceived through an ethnic perspective. In such a perspective, ethnicity is the defining characteristic of a group’s identity which sets it apart from others. Ethno-religious perspective also serves as the foundation for the interpretation of nationalist and religious aspirations of the group. This combination of ethnicity and religion often results in explosive conflicts in the political arena to which there are no easy solutions. For example, the ongoing southern Thai conflict has assumed this stature.

Findings from the Focus Group Interviews

Ethnic, Religious and Civilian Identities

In Thailand there is an unending and contested internal debate about ‘Thai-ness’ which I am not going to enter into here. The Thai view of culture as defined by ‘Thai-ness’ has evolved since 1932, marking the end of the overthrow of absolute monarchy, and 1939 when the country was changed from Siam to Thailand. Michael Kelly Connors divides this development into six phases. First, beginning in 1932 Thailand initiated, ‘a policy of cultural security aimed to create productive and nationally identified citizens. At times, elites have used cultural policy to modernize subjects, often with the self-conscious aim of creating citizens who can contribute to economic growth. At other times, policy has been more security focused, aimed at creating citizens who identify with the nation-state. These two aspects of culture policy have often been linked, the emphasis shifting back and forth over time.’24 The second stage in the evolution of Thai-ness was seen during the first period of Phibun Songkram’s rule (1938-1944). During this stage, ‘the pendulum was swinging toward condemnation. Beginning in 1939, a number of regulations and decrees (rathaniyom, literally ‘state preference’) were issued to discourage inappropriate dress, betel nut chewing, and loitering, among other things. These were to be replaced with a range of desirable ‘modern’

24 Michael Kelly Connors, ‘Hegemony and the Politics of Culture and Identity in Thailand,’ Critical Asian Studies Vol. 37, No. 4 (2005): 527.



behaviors … In 1942, the Culture Act established a National Culture Council to oversee the compulsory thrust of culture into Thai society. The Act defined culture as those characteristics that expressed development and order, national unity, and the morality of the people, and it covered such things as wearing appropriate dress, abiding by ethics and manners in public places, orderliness around the home, and honoring the nation and Buddhism. People who failed to abide by the new culture were to be fined.’25 Phibun’s second term as Prime Minister (1948-1957) saw a modification in his cultural policy. ‘He established a Ministry of Culture in 1952 and, with his leadership now precariously poised between different cliques, he attempted to generate popular support by anchoring his rule in neo-traditionalist forms of legitimacy based on the pho khun (paternalistic) tradition of kingship. He elevated his role in the promotion of Buddhism by putting himself at the center of preparation for the twenty-five hundredth anniversary of Buddhism.’26 The third phase was during the military regime of Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat (1958-1963). ‘From the late 1950s to the early 1970s, the military dictatorship promoted traditional notions of benevolent kingship and the central place of Buddhism in Thai identity.’27 The fourth phase began with the October 1973 overthrow of the military regime. This phase ‘involved the establishment of state agencies working on identity and culture, such as the National Identity Board (1980) in the Office of the Prime Minister and the National Culture Commission (1979) in the Ministry of Education. This process of re-hegemonization had two aims: first, to expand the meaning of Thai culture and identity so as to integrate broader social forces into more pluralized notions of Thai-ness; second, to ideologically rehabilitate the monarchy.’28 This process laid stress on the recognition and accommodation of local cultures, local accents, display of local dress and local knowledge about health, agriculture and social wisdom.29 The fifth phase took place in 1980s and 1990s and was marked by the expansion of the role of political parties, reduction in the role of the military and bureaucracy and thrust for liberalization. ‘This opened the space for liberal understandings of Thai nationalism, which stressed diversity and democracy, to emerge more forcefully.’30 The sixth phase began with the Thaksin Shinawatra government (2001-2006), witnessing the emergence of ‘newly internationalized Thai capitalism’ marked by ‘Sino-Thai cultural forms and identity among Thailand’s vibrant capitalist and petty capitalist class knocking on the door of Thai-ness.’31 This phase ended with the military coup against Thaksin in September 2006. This phase marked the beginning of the adoption of a peaceful dialogue in the Muslim south under the interim government of Prime Minister Sarayud Chulanont, replacing Thaksin’s approach of resolving the conflict through the use of force. Thai Muslims have responded to the above mentioned process of building Thai-ness in different ways. The Malay Muslims of the deep south have resisted it on ethno-religious grounds while those from the upper south to the north, including the northeast, have integrated with Thai-ness 25 Ibid., 528. 26 Ibid., 529. 27 Ibid., 529. 28 Connors, ‘Hegemony and the Politics of Culture and Identity in Thailand,’ 530. 29 Ibid., 530. 30 Ibid., 531. 31 Ibid., 532.



both in terms of language and culture, but resisted it on the grounds of religious difference. Generally, the Thai Muslims distinguish between the religious and the politico-social aspects of Thai Buddhist political culture. They accept the political and social aspects of Thai culture but resist its religious dimension. Hence, the Thai Muslims practice Islam in the Thai context in reified terms in order to distinguish it from the religious dimension of Thai Buddhist culture. Thailand did not undergo a process of colonial modernization but has always functioned on traditional politico-religious paradigm, hence both the Malay as Muslims and Thais as Buddhists here speak of themselves in religiously reified terms which shapes their self-understanding and attitude towards each other. Such conceptualization plays an important role in shaping and determining identities, religiosities and attitudes towards the state. Thus, these two reified conceptualizations of the religious worldview have come been contest in the case of Siam in the past and the modern Thailand of the present. Data from interviews for this study indicated that while the Muslims of the deep south give priority to their ethnic identity of Malay-ness, the Thai Muslims residing in other provinces do not view ethnicity as a primary identity marker, but rather they view Islam as their primary identity marker distinguishing them from the majority Buddhists and others in the country. This is a recent development, i.e., the ‘ethnification’ of religious identity, similar to patterns noticed in other Muslim minority communities such as those in Sri Lanka, Myanmar and even some Muslim sections of the UK and the US where Muslims give preference to their religious identity over other identity markers.

Thai Muslim-Buddhist Relations and Religious Pluralism

Since Thai culture and Buddhist religion function as a composite unit without lines of distinction between cultural and religious matters, the Thai Muslims do not participate in Thai Buddhist culture because it contains Buddhist religious elements. Hence, the Thai Muslims prefer to maintain and assert their Islam based religio-social culture. Thai Muslims draw a line between the religious rituals and social practices of the Buddhists. They avoid the former but do not mind participating in the latter. In other words, Thai language and identity tend to blur ethnicity and religion. Thais mix the religious and cultural components in the evolution of religion and institutions. The same can be said about Malay language, ethnicity and religion. Educated Thai Muslims view Buddhism with its concept of Dukkha (suffering) and seeking of nirvana (enlightenment) as offering a methodological approach to life. In their view, the popular Thai religious beliefs in spirits and demons are strange and unwise. On the other hand, the educated Buddhists view Buddhism as philosophical and scientifically superior to Islam. In their view, Islam’s belief in monotheism makes it philosophically inferior and unscientific. At the popular level, Thai Muslims see Buddhism as the religion of kufr (disbelief in God) and shirk (polytheism). They view Thai Buddhists as kafirs (unbelievers) and infidels and mushrik (polytheists).32 These two concepts are scorned by the Qur’an and opposed vehemently by the

32 This is different from a learned Muslim view about kufr and mushrik. Muhammad Asad, a translator and an exegete of the Qur’an, comments that the meaning of the terms kufr and kafir in the Qur’an are determined by the meanings these terms had in Arabic language during pre-Islamic times and their meanings cannot be equated to ‘unbeliever’ or ‘infidel’ in the restricted sense. Rather, ‘a kafir is ‘one who denies [or ‘refuses to acknowledge’] the



prophet Muhammad. As a result they adopt and apply a literal understanding of Quranic passages which talk of the conflict between Tauhid, i.e., monotheism, vis-a-vis kufr and shirk in the Thai context, without applying the tools of historical criticism. Hence, in charged conflict situations as in south Thailand, some Thai Muslims view the Thai Buddhists as najis (unclean, immoral and faithless) engaged in kufr and polytheism who are to be opposed with jihad, or war. Such a view is the result of power politics and lacks the knowledge of classical Muslim scholars of Islam’s view regarding Buddhism. Such a stance contributes to intensifying conflict by giving it a religious color. Some of the Muslim interviewees opined that in view of the contemporary appeal of materialism which is spreading rapidly through the phenomenon of globalization within Thai society, the appeal of Buddhism is in decline. This is exhibited by a perceived decline of social morality and spread of moral corruption in Thai society. The respondents did not blame this on the teachings of Buddhism but on the loss of religious appeal in contemporary Thai society. Hence, Thai Muslims prefer to maintain and assert their Islam-based religio-social culture. Thai Muslims draw a line of demarcation between the religious rituals and culture practices of the Buddhists. They avoid the former but do not mind participating in the latter. This is especially evident at joint political and social ceremonies in semi-secular Thailand, most of which have religious aspects. Thai Muslims tend to refrain from participating in these functions. However, if they are physically present they do not join in any activity. For example, at official ceremonies conducted at various ministries, a Muslim cabinet minister would allow his Buddhist deputy participate in the religious ceremonies conducted at the ministry. This also happens at various other functions where the Muslim students do not participate in official religious ceremonies because of the religious fear of committing shirk. The Muslim dilemma here is that the line demarcating religious and cultural matters in semi-secular Thailand is often very thin. On the other hand, Thai Muslims cherish the religious freedom they enjoy in Thailand for the state does not place restrictions on Muslim religious practices and cultural activities. Being a religious minority, Thai Muslims have initiated several activities relating to the maintenance and promotion of Muslim religious and cultural activities. Thai Muslim and Buddhist social relations in provinces of the country other than the deep south run according to the principle of ‘live and let live.’ There are good neighborly and social relations between the Buddhists and Muslims. Yet, there are also strict lines of religious demarcation between the two communities. In the case of the South, the state of Buddhist-Muslim relations are presently at a low level of trust due to recent violence leading to the killings of both Muslims and Buddhists including monks.33 The present state of relations is

truth’ in the widest, spiritual sense … irrespective of whether it relates to a cognition of the supreme truth–namely, the existence of God–or to a doctrine or ordinance enunciated in the divine writ, or to a self-evident moral proposition, or to an acknowledgement of, and therefore gratitude for, favors received.’ Muhammad Asad, The Message of the Qur’an (Gibraltar: Dar al-Andalus, 1980), 907. The term shirk mean ascribing divinity to anything besides God and ‘is not confined to a worship of other ‘deities,’ but implies also the attribution of divine or quasi-divine powers to persons or objects not regarded as deities: in other words, it embraces also saint-worship, etc.,’ or, ‘overstepping the bounds of truth,’ Ibid., 110, 160. In the case of Buddhism, kufr would imply overstepping nirvana. 33 ‘Buddhists, Muslims on path to mistrust and fear,’ The Nation, March 13, 2004, 6A; Sanitsuda Ekachai, ‘What can the generals have been thinking?’ Bangkok Post, August 5, 2004, 11; ‘Buddhists tell PM they live in fear,’



tense; many Buddhists have sought safety by moving to live in the temples. Interviewees were aware of this state of relations and believe that the only way to restore trust between Muslims and Buddhist is by bringing an end to violence on both sides. But this will not happen anytime soon. Overall, Thai Muslim and Buddhist attitudes toward religious pluralism are based on the notion of religious co-existence. Inter-religious dialogue and mutual social engagement between the two communities are minimal. It is not surprising to find Buddhist temples and Muslim mosques located side by side. Several Thai Muslim politicians in various provinces have been elected to the Parliament or local and provincial bodies from majority Buddhist constituencies. Overall, there are good neighborly and social relations between the Buddhist and the Muslims in nearly all parts of the country except the south. Both often engage in common social and cultural activities, yet there are also strict lines of religious demarcations between the two communities. In Buddhist Thailand, the Buddhist Sangha, i.e., the order of the monks headed by the Supreme Patriarch, plays a central role in defining religious practices. Unfortunately the Thai Sangha has not given official recognition to inter-religious dialogue initiatives between different religious groups in Thailand largely due to the fear that some groups may have a hidden motive of conversion or creating social dissension under the guise of dialogue.34 Thus, though Thailand is a multi-religious country, religious pluralism here means side by side coexistence of religions, not mutual interaction and dialogue. Building of religious pluralism will require a change of attitude towards inter-religious dialogue within the religious institutions and the promotion of religious studies in the academia whereby students may study courses in world religions, not just the religion of one’s ethnic identity as is the current practice.

Religious and Sectarian Divisions within the Thai Muslim Community

Hanafi and Shafi’i, the two major schools of Islamic jurisprudence, are both present within Thai Islam. The Shafi’i are the majority and they are identified with the Malay ethnic group. The Hanafi school is practiced among the Chinese and sections of the Indian Muslims in Thailand. There is also the presence of the Wahhabi or Ahl as-Sunnah also known as kaum muda (in Malay) or khana mai (in Thai), i.e., those who prefer to follow a more puritan form of Islamic religious interpretation, ritual and social practice.35 The puritan influence is now spreading throughout the various parts of the country except in the deep South where Islamic practice is rooted in the Shafi’i school and traditional Islam identified with Malay ethnicity, also known as kaum tua (in Malay) or khana kau (in Thai). The kaum muda or khana mai and kaum tua or khana kau, also known as the Wahhabis and non-Wahhabis, were introduced in Thailand around twenty years ago. Initially, it aroused a lot of tension and conflict within the community which has now subsided, leading to a spirit of religious co-existence. Currently, there is more tension between the Sunni-Shia factions of Thai Muslim society which are discussed below. On the

Bangkok Post, November 8, 2004, 1; ‘Violence doesn’t spare even peace-loving Buddhist monks,’ Bangkok Post, January 4, 2005, 4. 34 Parichat Suwanbubbha, ‘Interreligious Dialogue: Old Liquor in Standard New Bottles,’ Prajna Vihara Vol. 5, No. 1 (2004): 165. 35 The puritans in Thailand are offended when referred to as ‘Wahhabis.’ They prefer to refer to themselves as ‘Ahl al-Sunnah.’



political front, the Islamic reformism of Thai-speaking Muslims favors political integration within the Thai Buddhist polity in the spirit of ‘live and let live.’

Rise of Salafi-Wahhabi Reformism among the Thai-Speaking Muslims

Salafi reformism, associated with Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1838–1897), Muhammad Abduh (1855–1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935), reached Bangkok in 1926 with the arrival of an Indonesian Muslim scholar by the name of Ahmad Wahab. Ahmad Wahab was a reformist Muslim who had studied in Mecca before his return to Indonesia and subsequent exile to Thailand. Ahmad Wahab was exiled to Thailand by Dutch authorities due to his involvement with the reformist Muhammadiyah movement and its political movement Sarekat Islam in Indonesia.36 In Bangkok, Ahmad Wahab, along with like-minded Thai Muslims such as Direk Kulsiriswad (d. 2005) and others, formed the Ansorisunnah association in the 1930s and also the Jamiyatul Islam in the 1950s. The religious influence of Ahmad Wahab’s reformist activities within Thai Islam spread to the Thai-speaking Muslims of Chiangmai and Chiangrai in the north and Pak Prayoon in Phatthalung province and Nakorn Sithammarat in the upper South. The Indian-Pakistani Islamic reformist movements associated with Maulana Abul Ala Maududi (1903-1979) and his Jamaat-e-Islami and Maulana Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi (1913-1999) and his theological seminary of Nadwatul Ulama in Lucknow, India, also had a simultaneous influence on the Thai speaking Muslims. Several young Thai students acquired their religious education in the theological schools associated with these two Indo-Pakistani movements. Meanwhile, Thai Muslim youth established the Young Muslim Association of Thailand (YMAT) in 1964.37 The Salafist Islamic reform along with Tabligh Jamaat activity which had arrived from India started working at the grassroots level in different provinces of Thailand setting the direction for religio-social reform of Thai Muslim society along puritan lines.38 Inspired by modernist ideas yet being religiously puritan, the Thai reformists were critical of the local folk Islam with its Hindu and Buddhist accretions and the practice of taqlid (blind following). They called for a return to the original sources of Islam, i.e. the Qur’an and the Sunnah. They published Thai translations of the Qur’an, such as the one by Direk Kulsirisawad, and produced reformist/puritanical literature both original and in translation from foreign languages, which lays stress on assuming a puritanical Islamic identity. As the Thai reformist writings and publications spread among the Thai-speaking Muslim community, it led to a split and clash between the khana kau (traditionalist) and khana mai (reformist) sections of the Thai-speaking Muslim community.39 Both criticized each other’s practice of Islam as being less authentic.

36 Scupin, ‘Thai Muslims in Bangkok,’ 19–29. 37 Raymond Scupin, ‘The Politics of Islamic Reformism in Thailand,’ Asian Survey, Vol. 20, No. 12 (December 1980): 1, 223–35. 38 Ernesto Braam, ‘Travelling with the Tablighi Jamaat in South Thailand,’ ISIM Review 17, (Spring 2006): 42-43; Barbara Metcalf, ‘Living Hadith in the Tabligh Jamaat,’ The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3 (August 1993): 584–608; Muhammad Khalid Masud, ed., Travellers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jama’at as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000). 39 Scupin, ‘Islamic Reformism in Thailand,’ 1–10.



In the 1970s, the spread of the Saudi petro-dollar sponsored Islamic resurgence led to the emergence of Thai Salafi reformism along with Saudi Wahhabism resulting in the gradual marginalization of the khana kau section of the Muslim community. Several young Thai Muslims from nearly all regions of the country acquired their religious education at the Salafi-Wahhabi religious universities in Mecca and Medina and the Abu Bakr University in Pakistan. Rise of the Salafi-Wahhabi Reformism among the Malay-Speaking Muslims of Southern Thailand

Pattani in southern Thailand has a special place in Southeast Asian Islamic history. Apart from its commercial importance in the past, Pattani has also been a seat of Islamic learning famous for its scholars and pondoks.40 The first instance of Salafi-Wahhabi reformist ideas coming to southern Thailand is associated with the personality of an Islamic cleric, Haji Sulong, who was a Malay Muslim reformist and political activist educated in Mecca. Upon returning to Pattani in 1930 he engaged in the reform of the Malay Muslim community and represented Malay Muslim interests by seeking political autonomy within a federal system as proposed by the then Thai Prime Minister Pridi Phanomyong.41 Since his death in 1954 under mysterious circumstances, Haji Sulong has become a symbol of resistance to the Thai state. Islamic resurgence has been a continuous phenomenon among the Malay-speaking Muslims of southern Thailand until today. Islamic resurgence in southern Thailand, combined with ethno-religious nationalism, led to different political attitudes towards the question of this community’s relationship with the Thai state. These attitudes have ranged from pro-integration, based on the recognition of the distinct Malay Muslim ethnic identity within the state, to separatism. Islamic resurgence in southern Thailand was the result of local and external influences. Several southern scholars came under the influence of Islamic resurgence trends from across the Muslim world leading to the emergence of local reformist trends. The arrival of reformist thought to southern Thailand led to divisions within the local Muslim community along the kaum muda (reformist/puritan) and kaum tua (traditionalist) lines, causing cultural dislocations within the community. The majority of southern Malay Muslims practice the kaum tua tradition of Islam which is identified with Malay ethnic identity and the Shafi’i school of thought. They resist the Salafi-Wahhabist tradition of puritanical Islam as being un-Malay and foreign to their identity. After Haji Sulong, another important southern Thai reformist was Abdullah Chinarong, also known as ‘Abdullah India,’ who was a graduate from the Nadwatul Ulama seminary in India. Abdullah Chinarong represented the kaum muda tradition and preached actively in the 1970s. He set up a school named Rongrian Islam Prasanwit. But his influence did not last long due to his incorporating of modernist practices, such as watching TV, which were seen as lax by the locals. Meanwhile, the Tabligh Jamaat and YMAT also started operating in southern Thailand by adopting Malay as the language for their communication in the south. 40 Mohd. Taib Osman, Islamic Civilization in the Malay World (Kuala Lumpur and Istanbul: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka and The Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture, 1997); Peter G. Riddell, Islam in the Malay-Indonesian World (London: C. Hurst & Company, 2001); Azyumardi Azra, The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia (Honululu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004). 41 Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand (Bangkok: Thai Khadi Research Institute Thammasat University, 1985), 146–65.



The beginning of the Salafi-Wahhabi assimilation through the sponsor of the Saudi government which in the 1970–80s ‘embarked on a systematic campaign of promoting Wahhabi thought among Muslims living in the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds,’42 impacted southern Thailand through the rise of a local Salafi-Wahhabi movement with the aim of establishing pure Islamic society through religious activism and proselytism. Wahhabi reformers such as Dr. Ismail Lutfi and his Yala Islamic College, which is sponsored by Saudi benefactors, have engaged in undertaking the puritan reformation of the Malay Muslim community in the South through proselytism.43 This is evident in Dr. Lutfi’s concurrence with the main features of Wahhabi puritanism which are rigid literalism, intolerance toward differences, insularism, supremacist psychology, proscribing women’s movements, opposition to rationalism, and a hostile attitude towards artistic expression.44 There is much compatibility between Wahhabism and the Malay Islam of southern Thailand. This is found in their shared parochialist and ethnocentric worldviews. Wahhabism lays stress on Arab ethnocentrism which is’completely at odds with Islam’s universal message.’45 Abdul Wahab, the founder of Wahhabism ‘held the old ethnocentric belief that only Arabs can represent the one and true authentic Islam …was declaring the particulars of Bedouin culture to be the one and only true Islam and then universalizing these particulars by making them obligatory upon all Muslims … in reality Wahhabism was a pro-Arab nationalistic movement that rejected Turkish dominance over Arabs under the guise of defending the one true Islam. Fundamentally, while the Wahhabis of the eighteenth century took the culture of the Bedouins of Najd and universalized it into the Islam, the Wahhabis of today take the culture of Saudi Arabia and universalize it into the singularly true Islam.’46 Hence, there is much similarity between the way in which Saudi Arabs practice Islam in the Middle East and how the Pattani Muslims, influenced by Wahhabism, practice Islam in southern Thailand. The latter read and apply Islamic sources in a way that supports Wahhabi-Malay cultural understandings and biases. Such insularity reduces Islam to an ethnocentrism that betrays the universality of the Islamic message. Interestingly, Lutfi shuns violent separatism and takes a pro-dialogue stand with the Thai state, laying stress on Thai recognition of the Malay-Islamic identity of the southern Muslim population. Lutfi’s stand also differs from that of other religious school teachers, or ustaz, who have been inspired by the religious zealotry and the militancy of the neo-Wahhabist movements such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

42 Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), 87. 43 Dr. Ismail Lutfi prefers to refer to his movement as, ‘ahl as-Sunnah,’ i.e., the way of the tradition of the prophet Muhammad. The term Wahhabi is used here for the purpose of identification. 44 El Fadl, The Great Theft, 86. 45 Ibid., 54. 46 Ibid., 52-53.



The Shia of Thailand

The Imami Shia Persians came to Siam in the mid-seventeenth century. They not only engaged in trade but prominent personalities such as Shaikh Ahmad Qomi even served as the Minister of Foreign Trade at the court of Ayudhya. Qomi also managed the Ayudhyan navy and the maritime trade as part of his professional expertise. Shaikh Ahmad Qomi was appointed as the first Chularajmontri or Shaikh al-Islam of Siam by the Ayudhyan King Phrachao Songtham (1611-18). The first thirteen Shaikh al-Islam of Thailand were descendants of Shaikh Qomi. The first Sunni Shaikh al-Islam of Thailand, however, was appointed only after the passage of the Patronage of Islam Act in 1945. The Safavid Shah Suleiman I (1666–1694) sent an embassy to the court of King Narai (1657-1688) of Siam in 1685 which returned to Iran in 1688. The embassy account is recorded in the chronicle Safina’i Sulaimani written by Ibn Muhammad Ibrahim, secretary of the mission.47 It reports the power and activities of the Persian community in Ayudhya. Beside the Persian Shias there were also Imami Shia from India in Thailand. The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran led some Thai Sunni Muslims to convert to Shiism and this trend is a gradually growing process. However, there is a strong Sunni opposition to this trend. Presently, there are a lot of tensions between the Sunnis and Shia with members from both sides declaring each other as heretics. For the most part, the Thai Shias are well integrated into Thai society. Their perspectives about religious issues in Thailand are rooted in the universal message of Islam rather than being based in sect or ethnicity.

Moderate Muslims of Thailand

The Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen has commented that, ‘the frantic Western search for ‘the moderate Muslim’ confounds moderation in political beliefs with moderateness of religious faith. A person can have strong religious faith—Islamic or any other—along with tolerant politics.’48 This means that a Muslim can pursue liberal politics without ceasing to be a Muslim. Islam does not command or prohibit liberalism. It depends upon a person’s freedom of choice to pursue moderate or radical politics which too is determined by many factors such as class, gender, profession, language, science, morality and politics, not merely religion. If a moderate Muslim is a follower of mainstream Islam then the majority of Thai Muslims fall into this category. As followers of Islam and Thai citizens, they have participated in the Thai democratic process, respect the law and religious diversity, and oppose terrorism and violence. At the same time, they demand respect for human rights and abstention from violence in all instances of conflict be it in the south of Thailand or in Bosnia, Palestine, Afghanistan or Iraq. In this the Thai Muslims draw inspiration from the example of the Prophet and the following verse of the Qur’an:

O mankind! We created you out of a male and a female and have made you into nations and tribes, so that you might come to know one another (not that you may despise each other). Verily, the noblest of you in the sight of God is the one who is most deeply conscious of Him. Behold, God is all-knowing, all-aware. (Qur’an 49:13)

47 John A. Kane, translator, The Ship of Sulaiman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). 48 Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), 15-16.



Some of the interviewees responded to the question about living with Buddhists by remarking that Islam respects religious pluralism and for this they draw inspiration from the example of the Prophet Muhammad’s community in Medina which was already a religiously pluralistic community. The majority of Thai Muslims like the followers of other religions in Southeast Asia prefer to settle conflicts through negotiations and dialogue. In their view violence and confrontation is to be avoided at all costs. In this they are influenced by the teaching of the Qur’an as applied in the peaceful Southeast Asian milieu where religious tolerance is an important value of social life. In my observation, the social ethic of Islam in Southeast Asia is much influenced by its Sufi orientation and encounter with the tolerant religions of Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism which shun violence as the first option, preferring mutual coexistence. The same trend is found in Southeast Asian Christianity. In other words, a religion’s violent or non-violent orientation adopted by its adherents is influenced by the social milieu in which it operates. The discussion in other parts of this paper have stressed that conflict in southern Thailand is not religious but ethnic. Similarly, the Thai Muslims of today have largely overcome the tension between the traditionalists and the puritans, with both the sides coming to accept coexistence without condemning each other. Thai Muslims and Buddhists have come to accept each other’s religious identities and coexist together. Viewing the situation from a comparative perspective, I often conclude that the difference between the Middle Eastern/Western confrontational and contesting relationship of the three Abrahamic religions and the non-confrontational and non-contesting relationship between the Abrahamic and Asian religions in Southeast Asia are largely shaped by the local history of religions and their perspectives about social relations. Recent tensions between Southeast Asian religions are largely the result of importation of confrontational theological perspectives from outside the region. Hence, the geographic and social location of religion plays an important role in shaping religious theologies. The moderate Muslims, Buddhists and Christians of Thailand hold moderate views about inter-religious relations. In this they all are strongly influenced by the local social ethic which stresses mutual co-existence instead of conflict and confrontation. In other words, theologies of violence, confrontation and war between religions are the products of the socio-political environment in which the religions exist.

The Sources of Separatist Ideology among Thailand's Southern Muslims and Attitudes

towards the Southern Thailand Conflict

Mention of Islam in Thailand normally means focussing on the south of Thailand. The ongoing conflict in southern Thailand is not purely religious but an ethno-religious conflict which emphasizes the ethnic dimension of religious identity. This conflict has turned deadly. As mentioned earlier, the Muslims of southern Thailand view their identity in ethnic and religious terms, which means that, in their view, they are first Malays who are Muslim by religion. Actually, such ethno-religious reference to identity is found not only among the Malays of Thailand but is also present in the case of other ethnic groups in the region such as the Thais,



Burmese, Achenese, Javanese, Balinese, Filipinos and the immigrant Chinese, where each group stresses first the ethnic dimension of its identity which is then tied to a religion, be it Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity or Taoism-Confucianism. Analyzing the ongoing events in southern Thailand from the ethno-religious dimension underlines the need to understand how the Malay Muslims of southern Thailand perceive their identity in ethnic and religious terms. It is a matter of fact that the Malay Muslims place strong emphasis on the ethnic aspect of their adherence to Islam. This in fact influences their interpretation of Islam in local political and social contexts. Hence, the Malay Muslims of southern Thailand view national integration as entailing their own cultural disintegration for, according to them, Thai Buddhism and Malay Islam belong to two different cosmological orientations.49 ‘They do not want to be integrated into the Thai state. They do not want to lose their religious and cultural autonomy. If the Thai state is the manifestation of the Buddhist cosmology, the Malay-Muslim does not want to be a part of it.’50 The largely ethnic orientations of the Thai Buddhists and the Malay Muslims have been described as ‘closed systems.’51 Such a phenomenon results in the ‘ethnification’ of religious identity whereby both the Malay as Muslims and Thais as Buddhists refer to themselves in religiously reified terms which in turn shapes their self-understanding and attitude towards others. Such conceptualization plays an important role in shaping and determining identities, religiosities and attitudes towards the state. These two conceptualizations of the worldview have come into contact and contest especially in the case of ancient Siam and modern Thailand. The southern Thai conflict began as resistance by the members of the dissolved Pattani Sultanate against the Thai state. During 1970s it evolved into nationalist irredentism and has currently taken an ethno-religious form with strong emphasis on Malay-Muslim identity. The separatist movement in southern Thailand is based on the call of Malay Muslim nationalists for the separation of Pattani. Initial political movements formed to support this cause were: Association of Malays of Greater Patani (GAMPAR); Patani People’s Movement (PPM) between 1946-1959; Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP); Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN); Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and Barisan Bersatu Mujahideen Patani (BBMP), which were formed during the 1960s.52 From the 1980s to 1990s new groups emerged, viz., Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), which is suspected of being behind the current insurgency,53 Pemuda, a separatist youth movement; Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP), established by Afghan veterans in 1995, and Bersatu or New PULO, an offshoot of PULO.54 49 Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case study of Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand, (Bangkok: Thai Khadi Research Institute Thammasat University, 1985), 8, 12. 50 Ibid., 13. See also, Surin Pitsuwan, ‘The Cosmology of the Southern Conflict,’ in Understanding Conflict and Approaching Peace in Southern Thailand, Imtiyaz Yusuf and Lars Peter Schmidt, eds., (Bangkok: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2006), 281-293. 51 Donald Tugby and Elise Tugby, ‘Malay-Muslim and Thai-Buddhist Relations in the Pattani Region: An Interpretation,’ in The Muslims of Thailand Vol. 2, Andrew D. W. Forbes and Sachchidanand Sahai, eds., (Gaya, India: Center For South East Asian Studies, 1989), 73. 52 W.K. Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990), 62-70, 97-113. 53 ‘Top Separatist Goes Unnoticed,’ Bangkok Post, May 17, 2007, 1. 54 International Crisis Group, ‘Southern Thailand Insurgency, Not Jihad,’ i, available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_east_asia/098_southern_thailand_insurgency_not_jihad.pd



The Muslims in the three deep southern provinces view the present conflict as a demand for recognition of the ethnic, language and religious identity of the southern Malay Muslim community. This demand is made through calls for self-determination, local autonomy and even separation using both political and non-political means. The two recent incidents of the Krue Se jihad of April 2004, leading to the death of 107 Muslims who were the members of a local mystical-militant group, and the Takbai incident which occurred during the month of Ramadan and coincided with the October 2004 incident in which a total of 86 Muslims died, have now become part of the southern Malay Muslim memory.55 The state of Buddhist-Muslim relations in the deep South is presently at a very low level of trust. The on-going unrest in the South is now taking on a religious color marked by indiscriminate attacks, mistrust, mutual suspicions and tensions. However, there are differences of opinion within the general Thai Muslim community towards the on-going conflict in the South of the country. Thai Muslims in the rest of the country who were interviewed for this study view the conflict in the deep South as deriving from the unique history of the region and concerns with the majority Malay ethnic Muslim community of the south. The majority of those interviewed living in provinces other than the deep South are ready to help the southerners learn about how Muslims can coexist with others in a peaceful manner. In their view there are both personal and community benefits to such coexistence, as well as for the general image of Islam. They also sympathize with the suffering of the southerners but do not view the conflict as jihad or as being justified by religion. According to them the southern situation does not fulfill the shurut, or preconditions for jihad according to Islamic law which are: that there are aggressive designs against Islam, general oppression, or the state prohibits the practice of Islam; there are concerted efforts to eject Muslims from their legally acquired property; and that military campaigns are being launched to eradicate the Muslims. In the view of the non-southerners the conflict in the south is about ethnicity and not religion. It is a political problem which needs a political solution and they do not offer any kind of support to the southern insurgency. All the interviewees agreed that the Thai state offers enough religious freedom for the practice of Islam as a religion and culture. In fact, the religious freedom available to the Thai Muslims may not be available in some Muslim countries. As such, Thai Muslims cherish the religious freedom they enjoy in Thailand.

f. See also, International Crisis Group, ‘Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup,’ Asia Report No. 129, March 15, 2007, 6, available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_east_asia/129_southern_thailand___the_impact_of_the_coup_web.pdf. 55 Imtiyaz Yusuf, ‘The Ethno-Religious Dimension of the Conflict in Southern Thailand,’ in Understanding Conflict and Approaching Peace in Southern Thailand, Imtiyaz Yusuf and Lars Peter Schmidt, eds. (Bangkok: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2006), 169-190.



Muslim Attitudes toward State and Government Policies The majority of Thai Muslims see no contradiction between their religious affiliation with Islam and their status as Thai citizens. In fact, many are proud of it and feel free to identify with their national status. They view the role of being a good citizen as being compatible with the social teachings of Islam. Thai Muslims have also enthusiastically joined the 2006-2007 celebrations honoring King Bhumibhol’s 60th year of ascension to the Thai throne. Being a religious minority, Thai Muslims have initiated several activities relating to the maintenance and promotion of Muslim religious and cultural activities. However, in the deep south there are demands for the recognition of ethnic, linguistic and cultural identity of southern Muslims and addressing of their political complaints with a sense of justice.

Thai Muslim integration into the political system is reflected through the number of Muslims politicians who have contested and won elections for local provincial and national Parliamentary seats in the Buddhist majority or mixed constituencies across the country—not only in the south but including northeastern provinces such as Yasothon, Ubon Racthani and Surin. However, in the deep South there are demands for the recognition of the unique ethnic, linguistic and cultural identity of Malay Muslims while addressing their political complaints with a sense of justice. Hence, they often refer to themselves as Malay-Thai Muslims. Over the decades, the Thai government has also adjusted its policies to the religio-cultural demands of the Muslim community. For example, Muslim women are allowed to wear the hijab, or Muslim headscarf, in pictures for official documents such as identity cards and passports, at official places of work, etc. The government has also facilitated travel arrangements for the Thai pilgrims to the annual Hajj in Saudi Arabia, granted official holidays in the south for the celebration of religious festivals such as the ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha. The state has supported the organization of annual official Mawlid celebration (i.e. the birthday of the Prophet) and grants halal certification of products from Thai food industries. Furthermore, the government installed and recognizes the office of the Chularajmontri, or Shaikh al-Islam, as the official head of the Thai Muslim community, including the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand and the Provincial Councils of Islamic Affairs, to manage Muslim affairs at the national and provincial levels. The political engagement and expressions by Thai Muslims from all over the country, especially in relation to their religious, cultural, and group concerns both at the national and international levels, have been expanding over the decades. Amidst all the political developments pro-democracy Thai Muslims have acquired their own political space which has over the years allowed them to express their cultural and religious concerns on the Thai political stage. The Thai Muslim minority participated in the national political process the country’s democratic and non-democratic eras. This engagement has earned Thai Muslims recognition within the political system. Thai Muslim politicians have represented different political parties in the various Parliamentary elections. Thai Muslim politicians representing Muslim majority constituencies of the south have long been concerned about developmental problems facing



Muslims such as: educational amelioration, economic progress, cultural-religious freedom, and political recognition. The political engagement of Thai Muslims has also undergone transformation since the recent rekindling of the democratic process in 1992. In 1988, the Malay speaking politicians from the south formed the Wahdah political faction whose priority was to address developmental problems facing the Malay speaking Muslim community. It has been described as an ethnic movement seeking to realize the interests of the Thai Muslims from within the political system.56 The Wahdah saw itself as an independent political group ready to support any political party that promises to pay special attention to developmental issues and problems facing Thai Muslims. Since its inception, it aligned itself with the New Aspiration Party (NAP) established in 1990. The Malay-speaking members representing the Wahdah obtained cabinet posts following the elections of 1992, 1995, 1997 and 2001. Following the resurgence of southern insurgency in 2004 and the Wahdah’s alignment with the ruling Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party responsible for its handling of the southern crisis during the Krue Se and Takbai incidents, the Wahdah lost all its seats in the 2005 Parliamentary elections. They were all won by Muslim politicians from the Democrat Party. The Wahdah faction resigned from the Thai Rak Thai party after the recent 2006 coup which marked the end of Thaksin regime. In the aftermath of the southern conflict, there is now a talk of forming a Muslim political party that will address the grievances of the southerners. But this move initiated by a former politician of the TRT party may not be welcomed in the south. Overall, this move seems to have fizzled out after the 2006 coup. The recent military coup led by the Thai Muslim General Sonthi Boonyaratkalin may be a more positive factor towards resolving the conflict. During the Thaksin regime, General Sonthi was the first to propose talking with the insurgents but he was sidelined. General Sonthi and the interim Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont have recognized the need for dialogue with the separatists. They have also recognized the role of the former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir in contacting the separatist leaders for peace talks with the Thai officials.57 It is expected that the interim government will pay more attention toward resolving the conflict in the South using dialogical method with the local Muslims. One such effort is the post-Thaksin government’s proposal to revive the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC), a civilian-military-police task force which played a crucial role in offering a forum for dialogue between the locals and the authorities but was dissolved by Thaksin.58 The revived

56 Suria Saniwa bin Wan Mahmood, ‘De-Radicalization of Minority Dissent–A Case Study of the Malay-Muslim Movement in Southern Thailand’ (Master’s thesis, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang: Malaysia, 1998). 57 ‘Rebels signal they may talk to end unrest,’ Bangkok Post, October 5, 2006, 1; ‘KL promises not to interfere in South,’ Bangkok Post, October 8, 2006, 3; ‘Authorities seek two key rebel leaders,’ Bangkok Post, October 12, 2006, 2; ‘Southern insurgents want to hold talks: Mahathir,’ The Nation, March 18, 2006; ‘KL may host negotiations with militants,’ Bangkok Post, October 14, 2006, 4; ‘PM: Talks the only way to end strife,’ Bangkok Post, May 22, 2007. 58 ‘SBPAC successor name agreed,’ Bangkok Post, October 17, 2006, 3.



SBPAC under its new name of Southern Border Provinces Development Center (SBPDC) will in the aftermath of two years of violence play a crucial and a newly designed role towards resolving the southern conflict. It should work toward changing the prevalent hostile attitudes between the Thai Buddhists and Malay Muslims in the south to one of mutual acceptance and trust, building cooperation in managing their political and social affairs together.59

Promoting Security: The Government’s Role

Since the revival of the southern Thai conflict in 2004, the then Thaksin government used extensive force in dealing with conflict and security issues in the south. The violent incidents of the Krue Se mosque in April 2004 and the Takbai in October 2004 have led to the further escalation of violence. As of February 2007, 2088 people had died in the ongoing conflict.60 The current interim government established after the military coup of September 2006, led by Prime Minister Sarayud has taken a conciliatory approach in resolving the conflict. The interim Prime Minister has offered a public apology to the southerners for the mistakes committed by the previous government and has opted for dialogue with the local Muslims.61 But in spite of this, the security situation has not improved, violence is increasing and there are now more intra-Malay Muslim killings taking place than before. Many Malay Muslims who are government officials, such as village headmen or teachers, and those suspected of being government informants have been attacked or killed by the insurgents. While working with local leaders in building security can be one measure, it is unclear as to where the loyalties of the local leaders lie—with the government or the separatists? Furthermore, as the number of victims rises amidst daily killings, bombing and attacks on the public and security personnel by the insurgents continue, the conciliatory and pro-dialogue policy of the interim government has come under severe criticism both in the public and press.62 Recent events have also witnessed an increase in the role of Malay women and children who now come to the streets to protest the arrests of suspected insurgents. This form of protest is a new phenomenon not noticed before, and requires the establishment of special women police unit to negotiate with women protesters. Deep southern Thailand is in turmoil. It seems that it will take more time and the situation requires more effective practical measures, such as allowing the option of self-governance and recognition of the cultural diversity within the country before security can be restored. The government should undertake efforts to build trust among the local population by working with local religious, political and social leaders, promoting civil society campaigns against drugs and promoting peace and education. The government should accept the cultural diversity which exists in relation to the Malay Muslim community, and it should take practical measures to recognize religious freedoms of the southern Muslims.

59 ‘Experts hail revival plan for SBPAC,’ Bangkok Post, October 28, 2006, 1. 60 ‘Soft Approach in the South Failing,’ The Nation, March 19, 2007. 61 ‘Surayud apologizes for the government’s abuses in south,’ The Nation, November 3, 2006, 1. 62 ‘A failure on all fronts in south,’ The Nation, May 12, 2007; ‘Harsh realities mar peace efforts in south,’ The Nation, May 16, 2007.



The National Reconciliation Commission recommended in its 2006 report undertaking practical measures at individual, structural and cultural levels to build peace and security. Among its recommendation were suggestions to use the local Pattani Malay dialect, also called Jawi, as an official language and setting up Islamic courts and taking other legislative measures which will allow the local community to manage its own resources in keeping with its religious beliefs and cultural values.63 Unfortunately, the report was shrugged off by the then caretaker government of Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra and still remains unimplemented.64 Meanwhile, the situation in the south of Thailand is worsening dramatically.

Conclusion

Broadly, there are two types of Muslims in Thailand, i.e., the integrated Thai-speaking Muslims and the Malay Muslims of southern Thailand who distance themselves from the Buddhist majority state, demanding autonomy. Since the 1980’s the Thai government has undertaken several measures to accommodate its Muslim population into mainstream society and has succeeded in this effort as seen through the attitudes of those who identify themselves as ‘Thai Muslims,’ but there are still sections who perceive themselves differently, along ethno-religious terms. The unassimilated are inspired by the contemporary politicization of religion, engaging in ‘ethno-religious nationalism.’ They participate in ‘regional or subnational reactions and resistances to what is seen as an over centralized and hegemonic state...to achieve their own regional and local socio-political formations.’65 The field research for this study indicates six types of politico-religious influences that impact the southern Thai Malay Muslim attitudes toward state and society, as follows: 1. the integrationist attitudes of both the khana kau (traditionalist) and khana mai (reformists)

of the Thai-speaking Muslims of the upper south, central and northern Thailand; 2. the integrationist and the separatist attitudes among the kaum tua (traditionalist) of the

Malay-speakers in southern Thailand; the current separatists are identified with the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-Coordinate) which has been active since 1990, engaging in the recruitment of a new and younger generation of separatists;66

3. the pro-dialogue Islamic ideological attitude of religiously puritan Wahhabis led by Dr. Ismail Lutfi and others representing the kaum muda (reformist) among the Malay-speakers of the south;

4. the non-integrationist Islamist militant perspective of the neo-Wahhabists inspired by al-Qaida and the Taliban of Afghan veterans such as GMIP (Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani);67

63 Kavi Chongkittavorn, ‘Much expected from NRC report on becalming south,’ The Nation, March 13, 2006. 64 ‘Government shrugs off NRC final report,’ The Nation, June 7, 2006. 65 Stanley J. Tambiah, Levelling Crowds Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 16. 66 ‘Top separatist goes unnoticed,’ Bangkok Post, May 17, 2007, 1. See also, ‘Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup,’ Asia Report No. 129, International Crisis Group, March 15, 2007, 6, available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_east_asia/129_southern_thailand___the_impact_of_the_coup_web.pdf. 67 International Crisis Group, ‘Southern Thailand Insurgency, Not Jihad,’ 4.



5. the radicalized Islamist-Shafi’ite perspective among the Malay militant youth represented by those who died in the Krue Se jihad and also the separatist youth movements such as Pemuda;68 and finally,

6. the non-integrationist view of the secular Malay nationalists separatists. Islam in southern Thailand is currently undergoing difficult times. The tense situation on the ground is causing immense strains on Buddhist-Muslim relations throughout the country. The Thai Muslims residing in the upper south, central, north and northeastern parts of the country appreciate the freedom of religion they enjoy in the country and see no problems with being identified as Thai citizens: they see compatibility in being a Muslim and a Thai citizen at the same time. The current interim government which was installed following the September 2006 coup has changed the state’s strategy for dealing with the unrest in the south. It has apologized to the public and adopted a conciliatory and dialogue-based approach instead of using force as was done by the Thaksin regime. Yet, the southern Thai conflict does not show any signs of abating. Instead, the conflict is becoming deadlier. The only positive way to solve the conflict is through implementing the recommendations of the National Reconciliation Commission. On the other hand, the state’s recognition of cultural diversity within the country, especially in relation to the south, will go a long way in calming the southern unrest. The state should also undertake measures allowing for broader decentralization or self-governance in the restive deep south within the parameters of the Thai constitution. On the international front, Thailand should solicit help from Malaysia for the latter has ethnic and religious relations with the Malays of southern Thailand. Malaysia also possesses the necessary expertise in several areas concerning Muslim development and integration of minority communities which can bring much benefit to the southern Thai Muslims. Most importantly, Malaysia as a neighbor has much at stake in Thailand’s current crisis which could easily spill over its international borders. Malaysia is already offering its offices in building contacts and developing dialogue between the Thai government and the insurgents. Most importantly, the next central government formed after the 23rd December 2007 elections should continue with the conciliatory approach initiated by the current interim government until the state wins the trust of the southern Malay Muslim populace, but this will not happen anytime soon.

68 Ibid., 4.

Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Asia South Asia—Mohammad Rashiduzzaman




Moderate Islam in Asia: South Asia Regional Assessment

Mohammad Rashiduzzaman

Mohammad Rashiduzzaman is Associate Professor of political science at Rowan University, New Jersey. He has a PhD in political science from the University of Durham, England, where he was a Commonwealth Scholar, and did post-doctoral work in international studies as a Ford Foundation funded visiting senior fellow at Columbia University. Dr. Rashiduzzaman’s areas of specialization include comparative politics, international relations, U.S. foreign policy, and Asian politics. He has written five books, and frequently contributes to refereed journals and newspapers. He has received several research grants and also consulted for a number of international development projects funded by the United Nations and the World Bank in Bangladesh. Funded by the US Institute of Peace, he is currently conducting research on the 1997 Peace Accord and peace building efforts in Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT).



Executive Summary

Summary

This paper provides an overview of approaches to “moderate” Islam in South Asia, focusing on the countries of Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh. The paper finds that, despite reports to the contrary, South Asian Islamist groups continue to draw low turn-outs at the polls. South Asian Muslims often feel unjustly discriminated against by the U.S.-led war on terror, and state-driven “anti-terrorist” initiatives which indiscriminately target Muslim communities. The paper calls for a more nuanced understanding of Islam in South Asia, and appreciation for the diversity of this religion which is far from monolithic. It calls for support of moderate Islamic groups, who champion non-violent solutions to the region’s conflicts, and demand larger roles in established political, economic, and cultural institutions.

Key Findings

• South Asian Islamist groups continue to have low success rates at the polls. The strength of political Islam in South Asia is often exaggerated by state governments for ulterior political agendas.

• Many South Asian Muslims feel that the U.S. and the West have “unjustly punished” Muslims in the war on terror. South Asian Muslims often express frustration with the “double standards” of U.S. foreign policies which target some Muslim countries while supporting the “illegitimate regimes” of others.

• Anti-Muslim communal forces, particularly in India, exploit the U.S.-led war against “extremist Islam,” while state leaders use the “threat” of Muslim terrorists as a means to harness power and support. So-called Islamic militants, including moderate groups and potential partners espousing non-violent solutions, are targeted and banned from participation in mainstream politics.

Policy Implications

• The Islamic world is far from monolithic. It is critical to understand the enormous diversity of the South Asia’s Muslims and their potential impact in the domestic, regional, and international spheres. “One size fits all” approaches to South Asian Muslim politics will ultimately fail in the war against extremism in South Asia.

• South Asian Muslims widely resent the designation of Islamic religious schools as “factories” of fanaticism and terrorism since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Curtailing madrassa resources while pressuring schools to limit their student population and community participation are interpreted as assaults against these respected Islamic institutions.

• Islamic groups have expressed desires for greater political participation in South Asia. Groups that promote non-violence and are willing to work through established political mechanisms should be given broader encouragement.

• Muslim volunteer organizations and mainstream NGOs should be brought together with their secular counterparts to develop universal goals throughout South Asia. Such interaction will strengthen the capacity of “moderate” Islam in the region, while fostering an environment of open dialogue and cooperation in resolving the region’s communal and religion-based conflicts.



An Overview on South Asian Approaches to “Moderate” Islam69

No easy labeling or one fixed paradigm would be the cure-all for understanding the South Asian Muslim’s political and social postures. For any viable policy initiatives towards South Asian Islam, it is critical to understand the enormous diversity of the region’s Muslim political and cultural postures and their impact in the domestic, regional and international terrains. “One size fits all” attitudes for grasping South Asian Muslim politics will not work for confining the apparent extremists in the Indian sub-continent. Indeed, an incremental approach backed by deliberations and numerous studies might better facilitate the US interactions with the Muslims in South Asia, as elsewhere. It would be prudent to evolve a cultural, diplomatic and educational approach to combat the evident challenges of Islamic extremism. There is an acknowledged sensitivity problem even about the terminologies to be used about what the US might like to know about the Muslim communities though such efforts are seemingly non-controversial, and even academic in nature. All the three NBR experts from India, Bangladesh and Pakistan reported from mild to furious reactions to the term “moderate” Islam. The sensitivities in the Muslim South Asian communities should be taken into consideration in the backdrop of simmering Muslim discontents over the US Middle East policies in general but lately more focused on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US and most Western countries have expressed apprehensions about the traditional madrassa education in South Asia’s Islamic schools. No doubt, there is an old debate about the quality and content of education in the madrassas across the Muslim countries. However, there are resentments about designating the Islamic religious schools as “factories” of fanaticism and terrorism since the terror attacks on 9/11. In India, the Islamic religious networks came under security radar long before the US became a victim of terror attacks. For the local political establishments as well as the Western policymakers, the madrassa education issues raised by the NBR experts deserve serious reading for any worthwhile debate on the expected reforms in the madrassa education. Otherwise, widespread denial of resources to madrassas and pressures to limit their student population would be deemed as an assault on the old and cherished Islamic institutions. In their national confrontations with their liberal challengers, the conservative Muslims have argued that the secularists have selectively targeted mosques, madrassas, ulama and their fatwa giving authorities to beat down Islam as a viable political force. In India, mosques, madrassas and Islamic charities have been suspected as fronts for Pakistani agents. As a spill over from the US-declared war on terror, mosques, madrassas and Muslim charitable activities in Pakistan,

69 The overview part of this presentation is partly drawn upon two of my previous publications: “The Liberals and the Religious Right in Bangladesh,” Asian Survey, November, 1994; “The dichotomy of Islam and development: NGOs, women’s development and fatawa in Bangladesh,” Contemporary South Asia, November, 1997.



Bangladesh and India are, for sure, feared as conduits of terrorists and channels for their international funds. Contrary to the popular Western perceptions, the Islamic world has different strands of practicing Muslims, sometimes preoccupied with contrasting cultural tides albeit influenced by local conditions and circumstances. Muslim religious leaders and their cohorts in public life are visibly fed up with the intrusive efforts to dividing their community in terms of the practice and intensity of their faith. While that pluralism ought to be accredited by the Western political and intellectual outfits, the Muslim world has nearly the same obligation to recognize that diversity and respect different political and intellectual postures. It is almost a decade since a Bangladeshi Islamist leader castigated the “non-fundamentalist” Muslims as “bastards” and he was forced to retract his statement under growing public pressure. To deal with such extreme views on Islam is not a unilateral obligation of the Western governments; indeed, they ought to be resolved internally—through a process of politics, persuasion, education and societal give and take. What may be taken as an external intervention to resolve internal schisms of the Muslim world would surely exacerbate the fault line between the “secular Muslims” and the “religious Muslims.” The conflict between Islam and liberal forces could affect the democratic process and economic development in South Asia. To be sure, the reassertion of political Islam in non-Arab Muslim majority countries needs to be examined seriously without dismissing the phenomenon as little more than the unscrupulous use of religion by the fanatical mullahs. Undeniably, the Bangladeshi secular elites are influential in politics, civil society, academia, and the media. But the liberal and secular elites often overreact to any kind of Islamic ascendancy in Bangladesh politics. Over the last ten years or so, the Jamaat-i-Islam gained some political ground and other smaller Islamic groups have also been noticeable in the Bangladeshi political arena. But their combined vote banks have not yet exceeded 10% of the electorate even by liberal estimates. So, the strength of political Islam in South Asia is often exaggerated by its internal contenders as well as the outside observers for respective political reasons. Though the so called Muslim fundamentalists are the most visible components of the Islamic “religious right” in the three South Asian countries under examination here, and even though some of those groups and individuals have been charged with militant activities, they do not hold a monopoly over Muslim politics in the region. There is a valuable lesson to be drawn here not only by the North American and European media, but the secularly-inspired civil society in South Asia should also acknowledge this reality. Only then, the presumed “moderate Islam” or “moderate Muslims” could legitimize themselves in the Muslim-majority countries and also in the non-Muslim world where huge Muslim minorities exist. More importantly, the so-called moderate Islamic forces could then have the chance to operate through mainstream politics. More than a political confrontation, religion has taken a front seat as a cultural challenge in South Asian countries including India, which is otherwise a politically secular state. Of course, the Muslim cultural embers have ignited in both Pakistan and Bangladesh, two Muslim-majority countries, as well as the nations where the Muslims are among the sizeable minorities. Sadly,



those Muslim cultural embers have been hijacked by the Islamic militants opposing their domestic regimes and perceived Western hegemony throughout the Muslim world. The rise of the post-1971 pro-Islamic and anti-Indian parties in Bangladesh came in the wake of the Bengali nationalists outlawing the Islamic parties and also deleting all kinds of traditionally respected Muslim symbolism from public life. None of the pre-1971 Islam-oriented parties had any significant prominence in former East Pakistan following the defeat of the Muslim League in 1954. After the 1975 violent coup that killed Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the father of the nation to millions in Bangladesh, the succeeding regimes sought to re-conceptualize Bangladeshi identity by recognizing the “Muslimness” of the multitude of its people. However, it was not acceptable to all those who stood for a purely secular state and the non-Muslim minorities, who perceived the phenomenon as a breach of the Western democratic tradition of separation of state and religion. In recent years, the liberal political parties in Bangladesh faced a nagging question: are the “moderate” Muslims turning their back on them? What is obvious in Bangladesh is a kind of de facto accommodation between the largest mainstream liberal/secular parties and those who are assumed to be moderate Muslims. Well known as it is, the bulk of the Indian Muslims work through the secular Indian National Congress Party, and even sometimes with its leftist cohorts, although Hindu-Muslim violence periodically rocks India’s civil society. The dispute between those who don’t want to sacrifice their Muslim identity in politics and the secularists who resist any such inclination is well known. And this dichotomy is likely to continue throughout South Asia in the near future. There are reports of external resources available to the militant Islamic factions in South Asia, a disturbing trend to the local secular establishments as well as the United States which is engaged in a global confrontation against terrorism. From time to time, fanatical bloodsheds stun India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, for which the Islamic militants face most blames. Yet, the Islamic extremists in Bangladesh are not controlling mainstream politics, a point which is worthy of serious attention and further studies. The Islamic fundamentalists are yet to come up with clear alternatives to the Western democratic institutions and pluralist political process familiar in South Asia. They need to avoid denouncing those who hold liberal and pro-Western views. However, there are strong indications that most moderates within the Islamic right want to work out a pragmatic blending of Western democracies without sacrificing their cherished Islamic heritages. To identify the approaches of “moderate Islam,” it is important to comprehend the cultural logic of the Islamists against their liberal compatriots and try to resolve the acrimony through mutual respect and accommodation. In the on-going debate between the liberals and the Islamists, there is a discernible view that the Western-style secular democracies have failed to take root in Muslim countries because the political, social, historical, and religious interactions are not identical with the North American and European experiences.



Finally, political Islam in South Asia is, time and again, identity-led politics, although theology and its interpretation could indeed play a crucial role. The Islamic scriptures are often reinterpreted in the struggle for political space, as we have seen in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. More as a convenient political tool, the past is revived, either as orthodoxy (or the so called fundamentalism) or the “golden yore” to gain a sway in contemporary political battles. “We need to go back to the past in order to meet the challenges of the present,” is more a slogan of those who are known as radical Muslims. The challenge is to temperate such voices by non-coercive measures—tolerance, education, mutual understanding, and respect, which are by no means easy tasks.

Key Findings

Below are a few of the key findings from the South Asian country reports presented at the International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS) 5, Kuala Lumpur, 2007. India

Professor Talib examines the divergent sources of perceived religious intolerance and faith-based discrimination in India. The religious prejudices are discussed in the context of madrassa education, the Indian Muslims’ perceived economic marginalization, and the well-known indictment of institutionalized discrimination against the Muslim minority of the largest South Asian nation. Professor Talib skillfully depicts the sense of insecurity among the Muslim minority in India, a concern not identical with the basic challenges that usually rattle majority Muslims in Bangladesh and Pakistan, two of its closest neighbors with long historical and cultural links. The Indian Muslim community’s key goals include their efforts to fight discrimination and establish their rights as Indian citizens. Broadly speaking, the issues of the Indian Muslim minority communities were examined in light of the military and diplomatic upheavals which have followed the ghastly 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. The public oratory that has gone along with the US-led war on terror has been unwittingly caught up in the communally charged Indian politics, very often spearheaded by the Hindu nationalists collectively led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Such rhetoric has been worrisome for the Muslim minorities who live in the riot-prone areas where Hindu-Muslim clashes frequently haunt the political terrain. There is an obvious isolationism of the Indian Muslims—demonstrated, in part, by Muslim mahallas (residential clusterings), and even by madrassas and mosques. To Professor Talib, such clustered Muslim neighborhoods constitute a minority mechanism for self-defense and survival in vast and sometimes hostile non-Muslim communities. With working democratic institutions, India uses the national political institutions—parliament, elections, power, patronage, etc.—to induce the Muslims into mainstream politics. Even the extremists fighting separatist rebellions in parts of India are periodically engaged in dialogues with both carrots and sticks. India has a vast security and intelligence apparatus to fight the Muslim militants and separatists.



Professor Talib makes an important point for US policies toward Islam: the Muslim world needs to be understood for its diversity and complex internal dynamics. Indeed, this is also a message for the domestic leaders and civil society communities throughout the region. Otherwise, the US anti-terror policies towards the Islamic world, as Professor Talib concludes, run the risk of “beating blindly in the darkness.” Bangladesh

Dr. Iftekhar Iqbal warns his readers about irritations among Muslim communities stemming from attempts to discover “moderate Muslims.” Profilers using such terminology are seen as understanding Islam to be by nature radical and “immoderate.” Iqbal backs up this fear by showing how Muslims faced unfriendly stereotyping during the British Raj, and still complain about such predispositions in post-independent India. Dr. Iqbal also informs his readers that Bangladeshi civil society generally tilts towards secular liberalism and a customary distrust prevails between the secularists and the broadly identified Bangladeshi Islamists. Iftekhar Iqbal confirms the popularity of the internationally acclaimed Grameen Bank. The disputes between Islam and NGOs in Bangladesh, and possibly in other Asian countries, came to the fore when the NGOs including the Grameen Bank, BRAC, and others, were attacked by conservative Muslims, who often look upon those non-state actors as the cultural adversaries supposedly working as arms of a global anti-Muslim assault. Still, there are scopes of Muslim voluntary agencies and the mainstream NGOs working together on mutually beneficial social work and development projects. Not long ago, a section of the Bangladeshi ulama used divisive fatwas against them and their associates. Implicitly and explicitly, the pro-Western NGOs have also been criticized by orthodox Muslim leaders in the neighboring countries in South Asia. Pakistan

“Approaches to Moderate Islam in Pakistan” brings up a collection of divergent viewpoints on highly controversial topics for Pakistan and elsewhere in the Muslim world. The paper makes a challenging and valuable point, i.e., that traditional Pakistani society’s religious forbearance is quite different from the cacophony of militant cries that Western audiences routinely witness through the media. Some members of the Pakistani focus groups expressed striking disapproval against the concept of “moderate Islam.” A few members spoke out rather bluntly that the very terminology of this research was an implicit Western contortion. The very term of “moderate Islam” touched a “raw nerve” of the discussion groups, as Mr. Zafar Ishaq Ansari states. Ansari’s report attests that Pakistanis are not so much in favor of “women’s rights” as it is understood in the West. However, majority views on this sensitive topic varied from region to region in Pakistan. A number of observers also insisted that the “women’s rights” championed by the West and local NGOs really furthered a “foreign agenda.” Furthermore, a few participants pointed out that women’s rights were already recognized by Muslims even though they may not strictly follow the Western prescriptions and women still suffer from discrimination, conservatism, and unequal treatment.



The focus group participants generally agreed that Pakistani society has been going through a challenging time, and eventually a middle path between tradition and modernity will evolve. However, Pakistani respondents in this study felt that the US and the Western world “unjustly punished” Pakistan in the wake of their anti-terrorism policies since 9/11. At least a few of the participants expressed their anger towards US foreign policies—US wars against a couple of Muslim countries and Washington’s support for “illegitimate regimes” throughout the Muslim world. Most respondents supported religious tolerance and felt that acceptance of diversity of religions has improved in Pakistan. The Pakistani focus groups determined that traditional Muslim society in the country has practiced basic religious pluralism throughout history. The informants claimed that the Shia and Christian minorities were mostly living in peace, and the majority of them continued in their traditional professions. There was some agreement about the alleged links between traditional madrassa education and the widely circulated stories of religious bigotry, but there were disagreements on this topic as well. While the madrassas and various Islamic seminaries are seen as at times promoting rather narrow and limited interpretations of the Quran and the Sunnah, it is generally felt that the wholesale demonization of the madrassas is not acceptable. Suggestions came for civil society initiatives to establish madrassas with revised curricula—an initiative that may not be acceptable to the more orthodox interpreters of Islam.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

For the sake of a framework of analysis and a better comprehension of the problems under scrutiny, it is important to objectively define “moderate” Islam, whether it refers to South Asia, or other parts of the world. If we can accomplish that goal, it will be easier to draw a dividing line with those who are deemed extremists in the Muslim world. To be sure, there is a growing need for an international reappraisal of what the Western and non-Western communities know about Islam as well as its adherents in South Asia and elsewhere. This can only be done by a string of activities—seminars, workshops, international exchanges, historical, educational and cultural studies, both at the policymaking and civil society levels. In future studies, it would be helpful to avoid controversial phrases like “Islamic terrorism,” “war on terror,” “moderate Islam,” “Muslim militants,” and “Muslim fanatics.” Such terms are widely viewed as negative stereotyping of Muslims, particularly since 9/11. Whether these words are used by the US policymakers or articulated in the local political contexts, such terminologies foster great misunderstanding and tension. It is possible to envision the prevailing assumptions about “moderate Islam” in non-coercive and non-offensive manners. Frontal confrontations with practicing Muslims could be avoided by refraining from overstating the influence of mosques, madrassas, along with ulama and their fatwa-giving powers. It is possible to understand empirically how many of those Islamic institutions and the religious



leaders actually influence the vast Muslim communities in South Asia and devise appropriate initiatives for madrassa reforms and ulama education, if necessary. More often than ever before, the Islamic groups have expressed their desires for more political space in South Asia, as evident elsewhere. For the largest secular/nationalist parties in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, or for the Western establishments, it would be unwise to cast doubts on the religiously-oriented Muslim groups, many of whom are generally willing to work through established political institutions and eschew violence. In the pursuit of what is being promoted as moderate Islam, the Muslim religious leaders need to be included in all possible deliberations to promote a reconfiguration of Muslim politics. The Western scholars, observers, journalists, and political leaders ought to avoid insensitive expressions that might create a sense of fear about Muslim minorities in the Western and non-Western nations. Typically, the traditional ulama are bypassed by national governments while the Westernized development specialists and NGOs in South Asia do not attach any critical role to the religiously inclined groups nor are they recognized so much in civil society outfits. Future studies about Islam in South Asia should explore the role of the ulama in conflict resolution, peace building, women’s empowerment, and NGO-led development activities. Positive dialogues between the ulama and NGOs, and shared forums of reciprocal interests and ingenuity would not compromise the cardinal principles of a secular state. Both Westernized and religion-inspired (Muslim and non-Muslim) NGOs are most active in South Asia, especially in Bangladesh. Under fresh initiatives, the Islamic voluntary organizations and the mainstream NGOs could be brought together to determine universal goals and cooperative activities. Such measures would strengthen the capacity of the so-called “moderate Muslims,” reduce confrontation with their conservative challengers, and promote stability and peace. The time has come for an assessment of the post 9/11 anti-terror policies of the Western countries and their Asian allies. There ought to be an investigation into the prevalent belief that the US-led campaign against “extremist Islam” has been exploited by anti-Muslim communal forces, particularly in India, and incumbents attempting to stay in power by blaming the so-called Islamic militants and outlawing them from mainstream politics.

Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Asia Bangladesh—Iftekhar Iqbal




‘Moderate’ Islam in Bangladesh: Trends and Trajectories

Iftekhar Iqbal

Iftekhar Iqbal is an Assistant Professor of History at the University of Dhaka, where he received his BA and MA degrees. He holds an MPhil and a PhD in modern South Asian history from the University of Cambridge. He specializes in social and environmental history and Islamic institutions of Bangladesh. Dr. Iqbal is a Fellow of Cambridge Commonwealth Society and has recently been awarded a British Academy/ESRC Visiting Fellowship for conducting research on contemporary Bangladesh.



Executive Summary

Summary This report reviews “moderate Muslim” positions in Bangladesh on democracy, education, micro-credit, women’s empowerment and Western development. The report finds moderate Muslims to be pro-active rather than reactive, seeking to make positive achievements in the Muslim world slowed by years of military and suppressive rule and the events of 9/11. Research finds that the Muslim community vehemently opposes transnational terrorism and extremists working within Bangladesh who are generally motivated by perceived threats of secularism. It furthermore argues for extensive reform of the current education system. While Muslims support the initiatives of Grameen Bank and similar NGOs, they resent the perceived intrusion into Bangladesh society of Western development initiatives and meddling attempts at women’s empowerment.

Key findings

• There is much debate about the term “moderate Islam.” Participants feel that there cannot be a “moderate Muslim” or “moderate Islam” since, according to them, Islam is essentially a moderate religion.

• Most respondents attribute the continuum of political unrest and violence in Bangladesh mainly to abuses of government institutions and the way in which the democratic process has degenerated into a money-making machine.

• While democratic transitions since 1991 have put an end to autocratic and military rule, general persecution and suppression of political activists and opposition parties continue.

• While generally acknowledging injustices committed by the West against the Muslim world, respondents agree that extremists and transnational terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda neither represent nor serve the cause of Islam or Muslims.

• There is enormous diversity in the field of Islamic education in terms of ideology, government engagement, pedagogic approaches and institutional capacities that have contributed to the present regrettable state of education in Bangladesh.

• Respondents generally approve of the Grameen Bank; however, they claim that links between the bank and general public welfare are inconclusive, with a large portion of the bank’s profits going to foreign investors. They also resent the perceived “implantation” of women’s empowerment initiatives and intrusive Western development connected to the bank and foreign NGOs.

Policy Implications

• Moderate Muslims can play a more constructive role in redefining the parameters of Islamic discourse if they develop stakes in, and a sense of belonging to, civil society and the state. Western donors and policymakers would profit by redefining their policy of patronizing only the secular-liberal elements in society and the state by also engaging the moderates in these sectors.



Introduction Bangladesh occupies a unique position among Muslim countries in the current global debates on Islam and its relations to national public spheres. The country is sometimes considered a “cocoon of terror,” “haven” for fugitive Al-Qaeda terrorists, or a harbinger of the next “Islamic revolution.” However, this country is also depicted as a truly “moderate Muslim democracy.” In recent days, the success of the government in arresting and putting leading terrorists to justice and popular endorsement for such actions have made it clear that extremist outfits in Bangladesh are few and far between and that they draw no popular support from the society and the state. While this fact is a matter of relative relief, it is equally true that no serious attempts have been made to examine the “moderate” voice in Bangladesh. So far, within Bangladesh and beyond, the debate on “moderate Islam” seems to have been initiated by a number of academics, foreign policy experts, intellectuals and members of the civil society, who see Islam from a certain distance and tend to focus on reforming or “moderating” Islam and Muslim societies from the perspective of Western liberalism. Therefore, the search for and attempts to engage “Moderate Islam” remain one-dimensional and subjective. But if we are aware of the limits of the Western liberal approach to “moderate Islam”—which is also heavily informed by anti-terrorism rhetoric, i.e., moderate Islam is all that is non-terrorist—then what are the other faces and voices of “moderate Islam,” if there are any? This report attempts to answer this question in its broader connotation.

Research Framework and Methodology I wanted to gauge the above answer primarily through responses from five focus group discussions, held during January and early February 2007, on three specific issues. The first set of questions related to the culture of violence in Bangladesh politics. In particular, what did the respondents believe were the causes of political violence and what measures would be most effective in reducing it? The second issue related to problems, prospects and recommendations with regard to improvement of the religious education system in Bangladesh. The third issue concerned Dr. Muhammad Yunus and Grameen Bank. In particular, did the respondents believe that the expansion of micro-credit would promote social development in Bangladesh? Or, did the respondents believe that the promotion of women’s rights through economic empowerment would be an effective counter to forces determined to limit women’s public roles? Before setting out to hold the focus group discussions, my working hypothesis was that there were three broad categories of people in Bangladesh who are either participants to or keen observers of the debates on vital issues of national importance. The first set of people represents those who have completely secular perspectives on the affairs of the state. They include mostly western educated and trained policymakers, politicians, teachers, Western NGO representatives and secular intellectuals. These people—who can be loosely termed “secular-liberals”—are less in number but they currently dominate the civil society and influence governance in the country to a great extent. The second group of people may be categorized as “centrist-moderate” who would come mainly from different public and private institutions which have considerable focus on Islam, i.e., universities, Islamic banks, Islamic NGOs and



thinkers who are familiar with both Western and Islamic perspectives in different area of national life. A third category of people could be termed as “right-leaning moderate” having their stake in mosques as imams (who leads prayers), teachers and students in the madrassas or the ulama involved in politics or community activities. In selecting the focus groups in light of the above hypothesis, I left out the first category of people who I have referred to as “civil society” throughout this report. All respondents in the five focus groups were drawn from the second and third categories. One of the focus groups comprised about 15 imams from various mosques in Dhaka, who originally came from different parts of Bangladesh. They were members of the Bangladesh Imam Samiti, an apex body of the imams of Bangladesh, who could number as many as 400,000 from about 250,000 mosques across the country. The second focus group, with about 20 participants, was made up of scholars, academicians, and journalists of both print and electronic media. The third focus group invited six members of Witness, an organization of young female intellectuals and teachers. The fourth group was attended by faculty members from a number of public and private universities in Dhaka. The fifth focus group was organized in Chittagong, the second largest city in the country, and was attended by senior academics as well as students from both private and public universities. Apart from holding the focus group discussions, I interviewed a number of individuals and consulted national newspapers and secondary publications to corroborate or complement my experience with the focus groups.

One of the reasons why I made such distinctions between “secular civil society” and the “moderates” was to examine the critique of the emerging moderate voices regarding the role of civil society in the overall governance mechanism in Bangladesh. Bangladesh is one of the most aid-fed countries in the world. Since its independence in 1971, it has received about $40 billion in aid and loans. The development process, however, has not been commensurate to aid flow. There are questions about the motives and methodologies of about 3000 NGOs operating in Bangladesh, as well as those of governmental institutions and aid-fed intellectuals. This research project, therefore, offered an opportunity to examine the responses of those who have not been involved in the policy and governance mechanism but who might be interested in this. I faced two challenges in conducting the focus group discussions. One related to the psychology of the participants who were to talk about political culture in Bangladesh at a time when the memory of clashes between political parties and activists were still fresh. It was perhaps not unnatural that at that point in time the response to the democratic political process in the country would be apathetic or negative. But presently, public opinion regarding the democratic process could be more sympathetic. This position results particularly from the predicaments of the current non-elected caretaker government whose legitimacy is judicially challenged and which is making many policy related decisions although its only mandate is to conduct free and fair elections to promote a smooth democratic transition. The foremost challenge to the interviews, however, concerned terminology. I found that the respondents were not generally happy with the term “moderate Islam.” The responses from the focus groups regarding the term can be summarized into three categories of arguments: religious, historical and psychological. Since this is an important issue which the respondents



debated at length, I summarize these arguments in the following section before entering the central themes of this report.

Moderate Islam: Issues in Terminology

Religious Interpretation There are three broad issues involved with the term “moderate Islam.” One argument is that the use of this term rests on the assumption that Islam is essentially “immoderate” hence the need for “moderation.” The proponents of this idea argue that theologically, especially in the Quran and Sunnah, moderation or middle ground has been emphasized to such an extent that moderation is an absolutely essential part of Islam. They also argue that historical experiences of the Egyptian Christians, Spanish Jews or Indian Hindus show that non-Muslims lived in harmony with Muslims during periods of the latter’s political dominance. It is therefore felt that the term “moderate Islam” is a misnomer. Historical Interpretation A line of argument regarding the term is that the search for “moderate Islam” relates to colonial and postcolonial hegemony of the West. In the wake of the religiously-inspired agrarian resistance against early British rule in India, the later sought to create and rehabilitate a group of urban-based “moderate” interlocutors who would be loyal to and cooperate with the colonial rule. This class of native elites was created through an English education system designed to inculcate western liberal ideas. Thus the “extremism” of the Wahabis and their ilk in India as represented by, among others, Titumeer, Haji Shariatullah, Dudu Mian were faced by the “moderation” of Sir Syed Ameer Ali, Sir Syed Amad Khan or Nawab Abdul Latif. After decolonization and in the aftermath of the WWII, the Western policy of searching for moderation was replaced by a new search of jihadi zeal to counter the rising threat of Soviet-style socialism. Unfortunately, though the threat of communism receded, the jihadi zeal did not die away; it was rather fomented by the American policy in the Middle East since the first Gulf War. The brutal attack of 9/11 is a culmination of extremism at its worst. Therefore, according to this “historicist” critique of “moderate Islam,” America is continuing the British colonial search for moderation in a “neo-colonial” fashion to defend its interest in the Muslim world. Psychological Interpretation Thirdly, it is argued that moderation is contingent on a particular event or cross-currents of incidents. It is difficult to measure the moderation of a Muslim, or a follower of any other faith, at a given time. A person can be “moderate” today on a given issue, but may turn radical on the same issue later. Mental approaches to a given issue can change under changing circumstances, caused by both domestic and international factors. Incidents surrounding Rushdie’s Satanic Verses, images from the Gulf war in the media, Taslima Nasreen’s columns, Danish cartoons, the Pope’s remarks about the Prophet, or a local secular intellectual’s provocative statements with respect to Islam and Muslim institutions may cause a number of people to chant slogans, lead processions, burn effigies and even violence. With time, however, this tempo recedes. It is therefore futile to search for moderation among Muslims themselves while considering them the “extremist” agency that needs to be moderated; the focus should rather be on the events and issues that inform the contingencies of the Muslim mind.



The above debates in terminology among the respondents can be summed up in this way: it is felt that Islam as a religion is essentially moderate; hence the question of moderating it is futile. The term “moderate Islam” could be replaced by “moderate Muslims.” Thus, while this present research sought to examine the nature of “moderate voices” in Bangladesh, it also met with the problem of terminology. For instance, many respondents wondered where they would be placed in the continuum of moderation-extremism if they do not take up arms to launch an Islamic revolutions, do not bomb the alleged heretics, do not want to undermine the democratic experiment in Bangladesh, and do not support any form of suppression of women but, at the same time, are critical of both Western secular liberalism and certain Western policies toward the Muslim World. This obvious diversity of terminological interpretations and different sets of identity these Muslims attach to themselves made this research interesting. An examination of such moderate Muslims approaches to vital issues of current political culture, education and poverty, especially the micro-credit of the Grameen Bank, sheds important light on the way we understand Islam in the public sphere in Bangladesh today.

Politics and Political Culture

The Problem of Democracy

The democratic transitions in Bangladesh since 1991 have put an end to autocratic or military rules, but democracy itself has failed to bring about political stability. Persecutions of political activists and opposition parties along with street agitations rather than parliamentary dialogues have been dominating the political arena, until the proclamation of a national state of emergency in January 2007. To cite most recent statistics, in the year 2006 374 persons died, 20,000 were injured and around 40,000 arrested in the wake of political violence and counter-violence.70 A general consensus among the respondents across all groups is that the democratic process has degenerated into a money making machine. During general elections, party nominations are given to the candidates who could buy them at a huge price. For instance, in the run-up to the now-postponed general elections, nominations for parliamentary seats were sold at prices between $700,000 and $2,880,000. People spend money in the hope that when elected to power they could amply recoup the investment by using the state machinery to enrich themselves. Those in power, therefore, tend to resort to all sorts of corruption, including attempts to manipulate the electoral process. It may also be mentioned that not only nominations for parliamentary seats, but Ministerial portfolios are also sold. It is no wonder that the cabinet often becomes enormously big, comprising often more than 60 ministers, to accommodate the investors in politics, and consequently the range of corruption and abuse of power expands. Field-level political activists are mobilized by all political parties, either in power or in oppositions, in all kinds of institutional domains, including judiciary, administration, universities, trade unions, cultural forums, media, and even football clubs. Not surprisingly, it is political unrest, rather than election platforms, that becomes the hallmark of the last couple of years of a regime. In addition, there is a glaring lack of internal democracy within the two major political parties. Both the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) have become family enterprises, led by the daughter and the wife of the slain father and husband, respectively. Also, 70 The New Age, Dhaka, January 6, 2007, 6.



both Sheikh Hasina of the AL and Khaleda Zia of the BNP appear to be grooming their sons as prospective successors to the leadership of their parties. Thus, during the past 30 years, Bangladesh politics has revolved around an intense hostility between the three generations of these two rival political families. Foreign Intervention

The majority of respondents across all the focus groups believe that the country’s politics and policies are greatly influenced, if not outright determined, by foreign actors. It is assumed that a number of international donor organizations and countries, NGOs and multinational investors have vested interest in Bangladesh and that they try to influence a particular political group in power or potential contender for power to secure their interests. In the wake of the now-postponed elections, for example, ambassadors of several Western countries were seen quite busy meeting with different political groups and publicly expressing their preferences on the outcomes of the then on-going political negotiations. Some respondents believe that the almost daily comments on the media by foreign diplomats during the recent political crisis about the internal political process often complicated the situation. Several respondents believed that the major political parties often seek to legitimize or strengthen their own positions by appearing to be closer to some important external actors. There are, however, interventions from a number of respondents who suggest that the foreign interventions are becoming inevitable because of the lack of consensus among major political parties on retaining peaceful and dialogue-based political process. Social Issues Despite some tangible improvements in its human development index, Bangladesh remains one of the poorest countries in the world. About 50 percent of the population still remains below the poverty line while a small but politically influential minority gets incredibly wealthy.71 Among the visible social indicators associated with poverty are landlessness, impoverishment, rural out-migration, malnutrition and shortage of food supply, often caused by natural and man-made disasters. A large proportion of day-laboring, land-poor and landless people regularly march towards expanding urban areas for alternative livelihood. But the growth of cities has been specially linked to substandard living and strained livelihood alternatives for many. Mass movement of internally displaced and migrant people thus creates congenial conditions for social unrest and conflict, resulting in serious problems of governance. Women remain vulnerable in terms of their health, access to education and the traditional patriarchy with which they live. There is also a general sense of insecurity resulting from continued crimes and violence across the country. The situation is aggravated by lack of education and employment, with the current unemployment rate being 30 to 35 percent. It has been estimated that in the city of Chittagong, hartals (or strikes) of a destructive nature can be arranged through the mere amount of $2,800.72 The poor picketers can run havoc for their patrons in this port city that keeps Bangladesh afloat in global trade. The corrupt politicians’ success in exploiting people’s poverty and unemployment is also largely due to lack of education which could otherwise

71 According to UNDP”s 2005 estimate, the figure is 49.8. See, http://www.youandaids.org/Asia%20Pacific%20at%20a%20Glance/Bangladesh/index.asp. 72 This data was provided by a young university student at the focus group in Chittagong.



inform people of the ways in which they are manipulated. In addition, lack of social and legal justice as caused by corruption in different public service sectors, including the police and judiciary, often leads people to resort to violence to attain their desired goal.

What can be done about Political Unrest and Violence?

A majority of the respondents across the focus groups feel that the parliamentary democracy as practiced in Bangladesh may have to be modified for the sake of political stability. It is proposed, especially by some senior academicians, that party nominations for parliamentary seats should be given to those who are honest and dedicated to public service. It is also suggested that in addition to elected members, parliament should include a number of nominated people from various walks of life, including respectable ulama, members of the civil society and the military. In other words, permanent, non-political and neutral institutional arrangements need to be put in place to ensure proper checks and balances on possible misuses of power by political governments. Most participants in our focus groups were not very clear on the specifics of the constitutional changes, but they were quite emphatic about the need for some legal-institutional mechanism to check the politicians” unbridled pursuit of self interest. Another important remedial measure that was suggested by most participants across the focus groups was the separation of the judiciary from the executive wing of the government. A promise was made to do so in the constitution since 1972, but no government, either authoritarian or democratic, has sincerely attempted to make this a reality. People are satisfied that the current caretaker government is showing active interest in this matter. A young teacher from a private university suggested that a single term limit should be imposed for the senior most executive offices, a suggestion which was supported by all in the focus group. As mentioned earlier, civil society in Bangladesh is predominantly secular. Most of the respondents within the focus groups, who aspire to have an effective voice in the affairs of civil society, have little differences with their secular counterparts in their approach to making Bangladeshi democracy a success by good governance, elimination of corruption, tolerance for minorities, implementing an efficient education system, and separation of judiciary. The respondents, however, have their own terminology that appears to differentiate their morally-informed discourse from the secular-political reasoning of their secular-liberal counterparts. For instance, from the perspective of secular-liberal reasoning, a person who is “honest” and “able” should be reasonably entitled to vote. This stand of secular-liberal citizens is no different from the majority of the respondents in our focus groups who also believe that the vote is not only a right, but an amanat, a trust. A Muslim must vote for the right and honest person; and the elected should honor the voter’s trust placed on him. But the difference between a secular-liberal citizen and a “moderate Muslim” in the context of voting, for instance, lies in the fact that the later believes that if a person is truly religious and god-fearing, he or she automatically ceases to be corrupt or negligent to his or her official duties. Hence it would be natural to honor the voter’s trust. Such perspectives on morally-informed practice in democracy can be termed as the “Islamic social contract” which rests on the assumption that a ruler is elected by popular votes, but acts as a Khalifa (or Representative of God).



Secondly, most respondents in the focus groups, in particular the imams, suggested that the focus should not only be confined to policing and other coercive methods for keeping law and order, but also on dawah, or invitation to righteous works as ordained in Islam, at individual and social levels. Especially, they refer to the fact that politicians do not remember Allah in their thoughts and actions or probably they are not educated enough in Islam. In this context, a researcher in Islamic education suggested that the system of Isra of Malaysia can be introduced in Bangladesh. As explained by the respondent, most Malaysian Muslims, including the Prime Minister, undertake Isra, or Islamic classes, which take place every week throughout the country. Introduced by Mahathir Mohammad, this system has not only resulted in educating Muslims about their own religion, but it has also helped them learn how to live in peaceful co-existence with people from other religions and races. Respondents also believe that in emphasizing moral excellence, patriotism and the Islamization of society without clamors for “Islamic revolution,” the Isra system has contributed to the strengthening of the moderate Islamic tradition and democratic process in Malaysia. Thirdly, most respondents, especially the imams, feel that if the concepts of Islamic brotherhood and ummah solidarity are sincerely fostered, then the bloodshed and conflicts between members of different political groups will be reduced. They also believe that patriotism is part of a Muslim’s religious obligations and therefore a true Muslim would not do anything to harm national interest.

Education Educational facilities in Bangladesh are offered in both the public and private sectors. Both sectors have secular and religious streams at all levels. In the public sector, there are numerous general, technical and engineering institutions while religious education is provided through the Aliya system.73 In the private sector, religious education is offered through the traditional Quomi madrassas74 with a curriculum originating in colonial period, but a new stream of private madrassas is emerging which is different from both the Aliya and Quomi systems; its emphasis is on a synthesis between secular and religious subjects. The private sector also includes an exclusively secular stream which, at the secondary level, follows the syllabi prepared by the universities of Cambridge or London. At the tertiary level, there are private universities of secular and religious orientations, though the former are more numerous. It seems, therefore, that beyond the two categories of state and private sectors, there is a considerable diversity in the education system in Bangladesh. Most of our respondents believe that different streams of education with different languages of instruction and curricula produce students with different mind-sets and approaches to life, further narrowing the already fractured space for common citizenship and shared public sphere. The second major issue raised in the focus group discussions was that none of the streams was in a position to provide adequate education to students. The general stream of the public sector

73 The Aliya system represents the government-supported madrassas with a mixed curriculum of both traditional Islamic subjects and secular subjects. 74 The Quomi system represents largely unregistered private madrassas with core concentration on Islamic traditional learning.



is marred by problems of archaic teaching methods, lack of adequate funding, trained teachers and educational technology, inhospitable learning environments and incessant violence on the campuses. Students who graduate from such institutions are far from being well-rounded educated members of society. Curricula in the technical educational institutions—for example, in the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET)—is almost totally devoid of any liberal arts and social sciences foundation, and the students of liberal arts and social sciences lack even the basics of natural and life sciences. The need for a common core curriculum for all students at the college and university levels is rarely appreciated by the educational authorities. The result is a generation of graduates with a truncated worldview that tends to inhibit the understanding of socio-economic problems of the country with all their complexities. In the public sector Aliya madrassas, there are, of course, attempts to offer education in both Islamic and secular subjects, but the general impression is that these Aliya students, even after undertaking the secular half of their curriculum, are no match to the students of exclusively technical or general educations in the country. All respondents across the focus groups agree that there are hardly any Aliya students who can end up being engineers or doctors, though opportunities are gradually opening for them in non-specialized sectors. Questions were raised in our focus groups discussion whether an Islamic education system as instituted today in Bangladesh—and elsewhere in the Muslim world—could produce architects of the caliber who built the Taj Mahal or engineers who built irrigation systems centuries ago. In the private sector Quomi madrassas, students pursue a course of studies that prepares them to become religious scholars, preachers, madrassa teachers and religious functionaries. The curriculum, in fact, is not intended at all to produce graduates for the market place. However, respondents from focus groups of the imams believed that the graduates of the Quomi madrassas can play an important role in creating awareness of the moral responsibilities of citizenship and in the elimination of social ills since they are in contact with the community five times a day. By “community,” the respondents mean a particular population and a collection of families surrounding a mosque. The imams feel that their socially formative sermons delivered in the mosques and through informal contacts are not binding on the community; hence they work as the passive performers of rituals only. In this context they feel that they should be “empowered” to play an effective role in promoting Islamic ethics of governance and community development. By “empowerment,” the ulama refer to a condition in which they are consulted by the government administrative and representative bodies when the later engage with common citizens on relevant issues such as the prevention of crime, sexually transmittable infections, drug addiction or radicalism, for instance. With respect to educational reforms in Bangladesh, the focus group participants looked at the issue from both short- and long-term perspectives. It was suggested that it might not be possible to unify the different educational systems as they exist today in the short-term. Rather, each of the existing systems needs to initiate reforms within its own framework in the first place and, only after a certain level of educational excellence is achieved in their respective streams, measures should be taken for mutual accommodation of both the secular and Islamic curricula. It is not necessary, however, that exactly equal time and weight should be allocated to both religious and secular subjects; what is important is that students from both streams should



acquire the core knowledge and understanding of the other’s intellectual traditions and conventions, keeping in view the need for students to have a shared understanding of public morality, civic responsibilities, citizenship rights and obligations, acceptance of diversity, and democratic processes. At the same time, students of all streams should have equal opportunities for productive employment. From the long-term perspective, ideas on reforming the education system in Bangladesh are centered on a more generalized approach to education. Most participants agreed that the present secular education is godless and hence it leads to moral decadence and consequently social unrest. On the other hand, current Islamic education is heavily focused on fiqh (jurisprudence) and remains largely irrelevant to the larger Islamic concerns of social justice and a morally-based social order. What is needed, according to this view, is the fundamental restructuring of the traditional Islamic education system with a view to incorporate Islamic values of God-consciousness, compassion, equality, justice and social and economic welfare. A few respondents, particularly from the Islamic private universities, referred to the ideas of the “Islamization of knowledge” and “Islamization of education” developed by Ismail Raji Al-Faruqi and Syed Ali Ashraf, respectively. These two ideas complement each other as the former talks about transforming the epistemological foundation of secular education and the later focuses on the pedagogic approach to such transformations. The project of Islamization of education was developed through several international conferences resulting in the Mecca Declaration in the early 1980s. In Bangladesh, a committee of experts was formed in 1987 to implement the recommendations of the Mecca Declaration but no concrete measures have been taken so far. These respondents were of the view that Dr. Syed Ali Ashraf’s emphasis on the spiritual and moral foundations of education can provide a firm basis for cultivating values of compassion for the “other,” tolerance, and intra- and inter-faith harmony.

Grameen Bank, Poverty, and Women’s Empowerment

There is a general sense of approval and appreciation of the Grameen Bank and Dr. Muhammad Yunus among the respondents across the focus groups. They have, however, developed a critique that refers to the political economy of globalization and a deeper sociological reality at home. Questions have been raised as to whether the decision to award Dr. Yunus and his organization a Nobel Peace Prize was made on political grounds or on objective considerations based on his accomplishments. Although Grameen Bank, along with other major actors in micro-finance, is hailed for their success in reducing the level of poverty in some sectors, the link between Grameen micro-finance and general public welfare and peace remains hazy. For instance, reference has been made to the fact that in the last 30 years of the Grameen Bank’s career, neither poverty reduction nor internal political stability has been adequately archived. The ambivalent ground on which the Peace Prize has been awarded to Dr. Yunus has led many of our respondents to suspect a strong connection between development work in Bangladesh and Western economic interests. Some participants were critical of the way Western notions of development and women’s empowerment have been insensitively implanted in Bangladesh through the NGOs in general and the Grameen Bank in particular. While the Nobel Peace Prize for Dr Yunus has been a



matter of great national pride for most Bangladeshis, regardless of their political affiliations, it has also generated a heated debate among the majority of the participants across the focus groups on the efficacy of micro-credit as a means to the alleviation of poverty and on the ideological underpinnings of such an approach to the problem of underdevelopment. The issue of foremost importance to our participants was that of interest. Not only the higher interest rate charged by the Grameen Bank, which in compound rates can soar up to 70%, but also the methodological viability of the current interest-based poverty-eradication drive was questioned.75 The idea that the poor are “bankable” and that they are willing and able to “return” the money they borrow does not mean that micro-credit is an alternative to capitalism; it is yet another folded hand of capitalism which Dr. Yunus has so successfully stretched, as one professor of Finance at the University of Dhaka suggested. Many focus group participants claimed that a large portion of the profits of Grameen Bank go to the original foreign investors through its many corporate sister concerns. Such suggestions are mainly made by academics and intellectuals across the focus groups who refer to the example of Telenor, a Norwegian telephone company which owns about fifty percent of the share of Grameen Phone, a sister concern of the Grameen Bank. It is held that even if Grameen Bank no longer depends on foreign investment, it is now emerging as a corporate epicenter with multifaceted operations in Bangladesh as well as in other countries. It is also claimed that although the poor women are considered owners of the bank, the bank’s profits and dividends, expected to be about $150,000,000 this year,76 are not distributed among its members. The profits are put into a fund for use during natural disasters, but Grameen is not well known for its relief activities during natural disasters, as several respondents in the focus group in Chittagong reported. Grameen is also criticized on grounds that its own corporate development and prosperity far exceeds that of its clients. Moreover, even in areas where the bank has been operating for quite sometime, the level of poverty has not been perceptibly reduced. Such critical assessments led a significant number of our respondents to maintain that Grameen, as well as other micro-credit organizations, seeks to perpetuate a system in Bangladesh where a state of “sustainable poverty” exists from which capitalism can continue to draw profits. A female respondent, with working experience in both micro-credit programs and Islamic banking, especially criticized the Grameen Bank with regard to its approach to the “empowerment” of women. The woman argued that, in actual practice, women are not only insufficiently empowered, but also become doubly burdened by the way they are engaged in micro-finance within Bangladesh society. The woman, along with respondents from Chittagong and Witness, alleges that male family members often force their wives or daughters to take micro-credit and then use it on their whims. On the other hand, when women take loans on their own and are unable to repay the money in timely installments, they take recourse to the male members of their family, leading to domestic conflicts. Some participants opined that the easy availability of micro-credit for women might have given rise to polygamy among poor men who take advantage of “two potential borrowers” at home. It is also the case that women are not always sure what to do with the small amount of money borrowed, since Grameen

75 There were debates about the interest rates levied by Grameen Bank. The highest that a few respondents identified were 70%. A majority of the respondents, however, believed that the rate would be between 35-50%. 76 Personal interview with chairman of Grameen Bank, Mr. Tabarak Ali.



officials have no specific suggestions except that they would return to collect repayment on due dates.

From Micro-Credit to “Islamic” Micro-Credit?

“Islamic micro-credit” is an emerging concept. There is not much difference between Islamic micro-credit and other micro-credit systems prevalent in Bangladesh, except that the former is interest-free. “Islamic micro-credit” can be based on zakat and karze hasana, two terms that denote Islamic concepts of charity and lending. While zakat is 2.5% of the total annual wealth of a person which must be given to the needy as a religious obligation, karze hasana refers to any amount of interest-free loan. It is estimated that the total value of zakat could be about $570,000,000 per year.77 A majority of our respondents believe that Grameen Bank’s acceptability, popularity and long-term future will depend on the way it sensitizes itself to the Muslim’s attitude toward interest, women’s empowerment and overall well-being of the general people. In this context, a section of our respondents in the focus groups, especially those from Islamic NGOs, have made references to “Islamic micro-credit.” From our discussion, we have learnt that no serious attempts have so far been made by the government or any organization to tap the vast resources from this pool of socio-religious capital. In recent years, however, a number of organizations, apparently inspired by the Grameen model, believe that interest-free micro-credit could be financed by zakat and karze hasana. So far, the Islami Bank Bangladesh with about 100 branches and the UK-based NGO Muslim Aid with its 25 branches deal with such “Islamic micro-credit.” A number of individuals have also started operating on this basis in different parts of the country. Research shows that in the areas where such programs have been started, conventional micro-credit programs are losing clients. It may also be noted that recently BRAC, the largest NGO in the country and a major micro-finance organization, has introduced interest-free micro-credit to about 100,000 families on an experimental basis. One of the distinguishing features of the newly emerging Islamic micro-credit is that it focuses more on the mutual participation of men and women in the family than on the women alone. The idea is to encourage enterprises that involve the entire family. Islamic micro-credit, although offered predominantly to women, nevertheless encourages joint ventures on the part of the husband-wife team. In both cases, the male partner is principally held responsible for the repayment. Secondly, the proponents of Islamic micro-credit believe that in Bangladesh women are socially and economically vulnerable not only because they do not have access to credit, but essentially because the social and material security that Islam offers to them remains unrealized. They believe that besides addressing the problem of credit availability, legal and institutional measures need to be taken to protect women”s rights given to them by Islam in matters of marriage, divorce and property inheritance.

77 This is a conservative but highly speculative estimate which is based on savings in the banks of Bangladesh. There are other informal zakat-sectors which are excluded in the estimate. The value of karze hasana is definitely a lot bigger.



Conclusion and Implications

Through this research, it has been possible to discern the distinct voice in which the “moderate Muslims” have expressed their views on vital issues of education, democracy and micro-credit based efforts to overcome poverty in Bangladesh. This distinct perspective can best be understood if we keep in mind two other perspectives, i.e., those of the Islamic extremist-militant minority, and the so-called “civil society” in Bangladesh which is apparently informed by Western secular ideas and practices of development and governance. With respect to the recent revival of Islamic radical activism, the observations of the participants in our discussion sessions can be viewed at both global and national levels. While the respondents acknowledge the existence of certain injustices to the Muslim world at the hand of the West, they believe that the actions pursued by international radical groups like Al-Qaeda are reactionary and, in any event, do not serve the cause of Islam or Muslims. Regarding the extremist groups operating specifically in Bangladesh, most participants believe that they are informed more by domestic socio-economic realities than by developments in the Middle East or by Western interventions elsewhere. For instance, for the globally active extremists, the prime targets have been Western military forces, businessmen, tourists and diplomats. In the case of Bangladesh, the targets have been those institutions at both government and non-government levels which are perceived as pursuing “failed” attempts to govern or develop the country, i.e., judges administering justice in legal courts or NGOs engaged in socio-economic activities. According to the participants in our focus groups, therefore, international radical groups are informed more by political developments, while the radical activities within Bangladesh are more directly informed by the perceived threat of secularization of the social, culture and governance mechanism. This trend has been prevalent ever since the country’s first constitution, drafted in 1972, accepted secularism as one of the four fundamental principles of the republic. In recent years, however, it seems that religious conservatism is swaying due to the rise of secular cultural manifestations (e.g., unruly celebrations of 31st December or “indecently” dressed girls in the media), secular economic arrangements (e.g., interest-based micro-credit) and secular education affecting the moral regime of Islam.

Most participants in our focus groups believe that the supporters of radical groups in Bangladesh such as Jamaat ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) or Harkat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami (HUJI) are very few and that it is possible to permanently contain them. They believe that the links between the local and the global extremist organizations are more of a historical coincidence taking place in Afghanistan or isolated negotiations at some educational institutions in the Middle East than that of practical cooperation within a sustained international network. The moderates believe that threats from such groups can be prevented if the government remains vigilant through its intelligence and security forces. A majority of the participants also felt that mainstream Islamic political parties, traditional ulama operating in mosque-based community activities and the Tabligh Jamaat, with its spiritual approach to life, should be engaged to undermine the radical elements of society. One interesting response relates to the question of alleged links between mainstream political parities, like Jamaat-i Islami Bangladesh, and radical groups. A few respondents from the group of intellectuals and



academics suspected that Jamaat might have indirectly supported radical activities by remaining passive for a considerable time when they were sharing power with the BNP. A counter argument presented in this context was that the responsibility may be attributed not to Jamaat itself, but to those who have been frustrated by Jamaat’s abandonment of the idea of “Islamic Revolution” in favor of “Constitutional Islamism.” Like their counterparts in civil society, the “moderate Muslims”—if we may call them by this name—who participated in the focus group discussions, are unequivocally opposed to all forms of terrorism. Both groups want transparent, efficient and honest practices in politics and administration; both want an education system that is aimed at producing socially responsible and productive citizens; and both want a strong foundation for the national economy and social welfare of the people. The only subtle dividing line that exists between the members of civil society and moderate Muslims is that the latter want Islamic values to inform public policies, whereas the secular elements and groups would like to achieve the same objectives by invoking the Weberian notion of rationality. It seems that the respondents across the focus group generally aspire for a more significant role in governance and participation in civil society. This aspiration is not necessarily a reaction to the perceived US role in the Muslim world; it arises from a consciousness that the natural development of Muslim societies was thwarted or discontinued by the colonial interventions for centuries and that it is time to recoup the lost opportunities. The pro-active rather than reactive emerging moderate voice, as represented in the focus group discussions, therefore, is informed by historical consciousness and self-confidence. In this context it is important for Western policymakers to identify and engage moderate Muslims. It is also important to locate and nurture the areas of national importance in which the moderates could effectively contribute not only to counter the extremist forces within their societies but also to build bridges of mutual understanding between Islam and the West. There is no notable organization in Bangladesh that can work as a platform for research and interaction among the moderates. Lastly, in terms of national priorities, there seems to be much more in common between the Muslim moderates and secular liberals than generally recognized. However, I found the Muslim moderates more willing to engage the secular liberals than vice versa. As the responses from five representative focus groups reveal, such moderates are in the minority and they feel alienated both from the secular liberals and Muslim extremists. The moderate Muslims can play a more constructive role in redefining the parameters of Islamic discourse if they develop stakes in, and a sense of belonging to, civil society and the state. Postscript:

Since conducting the focus group sessions in January through mid-February 2007, there have been some noteworthy changes in Bangladesh. At the time of the interviews, most participants emphasized the following concerns: that there be an end of corruption in Bangladesh government and politics; separation of the judiciary from the executive; containment of the radicals; engagement of religious leaders in social and community activities; and a high-power permanent body which would monitor governance, law, and order of the country. Some of these suggestions



seem to have been addressed by the caretaker government. The government has strengthened the Anti-Corruption Commission which has been investigating major corruption related cases including those of two former prime ministers and their several cabinet members, secretaries of the government, and leading businessmen. On 1 November 2007, the judiciary of the state started working independently with the Supreme Court. Such an act implies that the Bangladesh legal system is to function, at least theoretically, free from government control from now on. Regarding the containment of radical activities, the government has executed the spiritual leader and leading activists of the notorious Jamaatul Mujahidin Bangladesh, and the drive for eliminating extremist outfits continues. Most significantly, the government seems to have also engaged religious leaders and institutions in state and community activities. The Ministry of Religious Affairs has taken up a program to reduce poverty through zakat contributions, an option which was discussed in our focus group meetings. As a starting point, cattle and sewing machines have been distributed. Initiatives have been taken to involve teachers, businessmen, imams, as well as local journalists, in such productive zakat projects.78 A positive approach to constructively engage Islamic values and institutions in social sectors is also reflected in the recent decision of the Ministry of Religious Affairs to reintroduce the Islamic Foundation Award for substantial contributions in the field of social services, original research, and publications in Islam. It has been reported that the Bangladesh Mosque Mission will work for increasing mosque-based awareness on the prevention of fraudulent voting practices while helping government in its attempt to prepare voter lists which will include voter photographs. The imams have promised to create public awareness about this campaign through Friday and regular sermons in the mosques throughout the country. The government has agreed that such community support would be incorporated in the present reform program. The Mosque Mission has offered this help to the government voluntarily and the election commission has accepted their offer. It is hoped that such support will prove fruitful during the national elections which are to be held by the end of 2008. No wonder that recently the chief advisor of the caretaker government urged the imams to help establish democracy in the country. In a recent development, in Chittagong, for instance, imams are saving 7.5 million taka for the state by taking up the responsibility of switching off the street lights after fazr (dawn) prayer. This also means that the imams are helping to fight against the misuse of electricity.79 In their Friday prayers, the imams are also making the public aware of the need for immunizing children. A program devoted to training the imams on social and health issues taken up in 1999 has been carried out since by all succeeding governments including the present caretaker government. The project, jointly carried out by the UNFPA and the Islamic Foundation Bangladesh, has trained about 37,000 imams in various fields, including nursing, child health, safe motherhood, dowry and child marriage, gender equity, awareness against social crimes and terrorism, and prevention of HIV/AIDS.80 These developments represent a shift in the national polity that seeks to engage rather than alienate its religious leaders and institutions.

78 Jai Jai Din, 6 July 2007. 79 Jai Jai Din, 5 October 2007, p.1. 80 For details on this matter, see www.unfpa-bangladesh.org/pdf/success_02.pdf.

Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Asia India—Mohammad Talib




Being a Muslim in Contemporary India: Education, Society & Faith after 9/11

Mohammad Talib

Mohammad Talib was formerly a professor of sociology at Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. He is currently a fellow in “Anthropology of Muslim Societies” at the Oxford Centre for Islamic studies and the Institute of Social and Cultural Anthroplogy, University of Oxford, Oxford. His research interest in the area of anthropology of Islam focuses on the institutions of religious education and spiritual practices among Muslims in India as well as UK. Dr. Talib”s publications on Islam/Muslims in south Asia appear as chapters in Imtiaz Ahmad, ed., Divorce Among Muslims In India (2003); Christian W. Troll, ed., Muslim Shrines in India (2002); Muhammad Khalid Masud, ed., Travellers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jamaat as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal (2000).



Executive Summary

Summary

This paper assesses the diverse sources and impact of religion-based intolerance and discrimination among Muslim communities in India. The paper discusses the relationship between Islamic education and intolerance in addition to outlining the current state of education and reform initiatives. The paper finds that madrassas and institutions of Islamic education, generally offering community services and goods not provided by the state, receive undue blame for the events of 9/11 and the continuing war on terror. The paper finds that the state discriminates against Muslims as a minority religious community, obstructing their paths to obtaining loans and economic well-being. Key Findings

• Respondents feel that madrassas seldom produce intolerant, violence-conducive atmospheres. The groups furthermore argue that madrassas throughout the country are unscrupulously grouped together as one and receive undue blame for the actions of a few, unrepresentative schools and radical ulema. The sheer imperative of existing as an institution creates networks of amiable co-operation with the local economy and society.

• Madrassas are seen as serving as instrumental religio-ethnic support bases providing necessary community services which cannot be obtained through government supported channels. Madrassas are thus seen as countering institutional discrimination in matters of everyday life.

• Religion-based discrimination evokes defensive responses among Indian Muslims, resulting in the formation of concentrated Muslim populations. Such moves produce ethnic enclaves that are distanced from mainstream society and government services.

• Respondents discussed acts of discrimination that fuelled a continuous sense of victimization among members of the Muslim communities over matters of housing, employment and admissions to educational institutions, especially the universities.

• The respondents believed that Muslim integration into Indian economy shows poorly in “regular” salaried jobs in the government and private sector. Muslims are predominantly self employed, and live off the customary artisanal skills or engaged in petty trade and commerce.

• From this vantage, Muslims feel even more disadvantaged than the scheduled castes and tribes and, consequently, suffer from limited access to bank credit. The groups argued how majority of Muslims are not good candidates with banks in matters of the grant of loans. This is largely on account of a relative absence of an institutionalized anchoring of their employment.

Policy Implications

• Indian Muslims, as represented by the survey participants, suffer from a general sense of alienation and victimization which has been exacerbated by the events of 9/11 and the continuing war on terror. Broader integration of the Muslim community within civil society could strengthen community confidence to carry out self directed reform initiatives in Islamic education and approaches to religious pluralism. This aspect is evident in reforms in madrassa education in south India particularly the state of Kerala.

• The interviewees pointed out that government support for vocationalisation of education and skill development relevant to local economies would go a long way in overcoming economic marginalization.



Introduction

Indian Muslims constitute 13.4% (138.19 million) of the total population of India. The Muslim population is more urban (17.3%) than rural (12.0%). The issues of minority communities continue as points of focus in public debates, policy initiatives, and the political agenda. The national census of 2001 presented for the first time population data along religious categories. This census provided a more accurate description of Muslim discrimination, social exclusion, and marginalization. The communal prejudice against Muslims, largely spawned by right-wing Hindu political organizations, carried two elements, i.e., viewing Muslims as “foreigners,” and “anti-national,” as well as “pampered” or “appeased.” The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), predecessor to the present ruling congress party, has a tendency to judge pro-Muslim sympathy as “appeasement” to win voter support in political representation. Events of ethnic politics and violence coupled with economic marginalization have exacerbated issues of Muslim identity, security as well as economic and social integration. The 2006 report on the “Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India,” popularly known as the Sachar committee report,81 is a landmark in research on Indian Muslims. The report provides an empirical basis to focus on issues of identity, security, and equity facing Muslims in India. The analysis of the Muslim situation represents a shift in official attitude. It is a shift from treating Muslim issues as relevant only for a marginal community, to viewing the plight of Muslims as a national concern. The Sachar report offers some salient features of the status of Muslims in India which provides a relevant background to our present research. The educational backwardness is evident in the literacy rate among Muslims which is far below the national average.82 The disparity between the educational status of Muslims and that of other religious groups is significant. However, the data shows the educational needs among Muslims to be growing. The unemployment rate among Muslim graduates is the highest among religious communities.83 The pool of eligible population for higher education is increasing rapidly for the marginalized scheduled castes and tribes than for Muslims. Contrary to the popular perception that the majority of Muslim children are sent to madrassas (or Islamic seminaries) for religious education, the report shows that a mere 3-4% of all school-age Muslim children are enrolled in madrassas. One reason for the misconception that the majority of Muslim children attend madrassas is because observers do not distinguish between madrassas and maktabs. The former provides full time religious education culminating in a degree; the latter is part-time, elementary Islamic education, usually supplementing mainstream secular education.

81 This report can be found at: http://minorityaffairs.gov.in/highlevel.pdf. 82 The Sachar report draws upon the data of the 2001 census: “The literacy rate among Muslims in 2001 was 59.1%. This level is far below the national average (65.1%),” 52. 83 The above report quotes from the Census 2001 data: “the Work Population Ratio (WPR) for Muslim males of all groups in India was 47.5% as compared to the average of 51.7% for all religious communities. For Muslim women the WPR was only 14.1% as against the national average of 25.6% (Census of India, 2004, xvi – xvii).



Muslim workers are usually self-employed, especially in the urban areas. They are poorly represented in the spheres of regular and salaried employment. In this respect Muslims are even more disadvantaged than the scheduled castes and tribes. Muslims have poor access to bank credit. The average size of credit available to Muslims is meager as compared to other religious groups. Muslims are poorly represented in schools, health facilities, and banks. They also receive comparatively less attention in the sphere of public services.


For this study, I have used the “virtual focus group”84 interviewing method which is a variant of the conventional focus group methodology. Six key individuals (age group 40 to 55 years) were selected on grounds of long term familiarity with issues facing Muslims in India. The key individuals are engaged in research and communication, as well as practical-institutional programs of education and social welfare among Muslim communities. The key individuals who were in contact with me over the telephone, in turn, put together 4-6 individuals for the focus group interviews who were familiar with the concerns and programs related to the Muslim communities in different states of India. The key individuals organized the focus group interviews in the cities of Aligarh (UP), Jabalpur (Madhya Pradesh), Mumbai (Maharashtra), Srinagar (Jammu and Kashmir), Patna (Bihar), and Delhi. One university lecturer in Calicut (Kerala) was not part of any focus group but provided valuable feedback to the responses of all other groups. This lecturer’s input is crucial in distinguishing the status of Muslims in the southern state of Kerala with that of Muslims in north India, specifically in matters of Muslim education and its reform. The participants in the focus group interviews could hide behind the anonymous cover of telephonic communication. The absence of face-to-face interaction seemed helpful for the frankness of the responses. However, my absence from the group screened from me a rich visual field of body language and other non-verbal cues of the respondents. The present report puts the views of the principal researcher, also the report writer, in the introduction and the footnotes. Various reports and articles confirming or refuting the views of the interviewees are also put in the footnotes when necessary. The main body of the present text represents the results of the focus group interviews.

The Questions

The following key questions were posed during the focus group interviews:

• Do you believe there is a correlation between Islamic education and religious intolerance in India?

84 I have benefited from Michael Bloor, et. al., Focus Groups in Social Research (London: Sage Publications, 2002), Chap. 5, “Virtual Focus Groups. Another reference that helped bridge the limitations of telephone focus groups: Richard A. Krueger and Mary Anne Casey, Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2000), Chap. 10: Modifications of Focus Groups.



• How would you characterize Islamic education in India? Do you recommend support for reforms in Islamic education? Do you recommend increased support for secular schools, particularly in rural areas?

• Do you believe there is a correlation between economic marginalization and communal hostilities in India?

• How would you characterize Muslim integration into the Indian economy? Would you recommend increased economic assistance to Muslim communities?

• Knowing that micro-finance has empowered women in Bangladesh, would you support micro-finance as a means to empower India’s Muslim poor?

Islamic Education and Religious Intolerance in India

9/11, Radical and Moderate Islam in India

Various respondents during the course of the focus group interviews invariably referred to the events of 9/11 when providing a background to recent events where religious groups were targeted for spreading communal tension. In each focus group interview, the question of the madrassas was raised as a possible factor in the promotion of radical Islam and intolerance.85 Some of the respondents pointed out that the Islamic educational institutions have come under a shadow of continuous doubt, without demonstrable evidence, largely due to aggressive U.S. foreign policy following 9/11. Supporting their positions, the respondents made references to the behavior of the government’s security agencies conducting raids on madrassas in search of “extremists” or materials used in inciting violence or communal disturbances. Some respondents believed that in accusing any given madrassa all madrassas were “automatically” grouped together as if the religious seminaries were all connected. One respondent, a graduate from a madrassa but employed in a secular and modern school, said, “Different madrassas are not linked to each other as my head is to my limbs. The government’s own institutions, its universities, and ministries are internally connected and follow instructions from each other. Madrassas are not like that.” The above view that linked up state vigilance against the madrassas following 9/11 was contested by some of the other respondents. Some of these respondents disagreed with the view that the United States and 9/11 hold the key behind the “high handedness” India showed toward all madrassas. The description of the behavior of the state officials was related to incidents of police raids on madrassas in search of incriminating evidence. Some of the responses revealed different perceptions. A sociology researcher in Delhi had a different take on the issue: “I don’t agree with the view. We need to do a more careful scrutiny of events in the Indian context.” He explained his point as follows: “A couple of years before 9/11,

85 For media reporting on the raids on madrassas, see Zafar Anjum’s “To Kill the Mockingbird,” August 5, 2003. For an understanding of the self-perception of madrassa teachers, see the case study by A.U. Khan and Z.H. Anjum, “We don’t produce terrorists, we feed and educate poor children.” Both articles appear in: http://www.chowk.com/show_article.cgi?aid=00002229&channel=university%20ave. Various terms used for radical or intolerant Islam were: “mazhabi junoon” (religious passion), “inteha pasandi” (extremism), “purtashaddud lah-e amal” (violent course of action). The words used for moderate Islam were “mazhabi rawadari” (religious tolerance), “mazhabi mayana rawi” (religious moderate way) or aitedal pasandi (predisposition for moderate behavior).



the NDA government driven by the Hindu right-wing political party, the BJP, was already fomenting the communally charged situation in Kashmir, UP, and parts of Gujarat. In May 2000, during the state assembly budget session, the BJP government in Uttar Pradesh cleared the “Religious Buildings and Places Bill.” The bill made it legally binding for a group to procure a permit from the state government before building a place of worship.” A self-employed trader in photo frames from Meerut said, “There was nothing wrong with the bill in itself. But it was clear that the state had one expectation from the minorities and another from the majority communities. To put it bluntly, this discrimination was to curb the construction of mosques, while temples mushroomed without any legal check.” Another journalist from Mumbai explained how in the following weeks, in May 2001, the NDA government banned a Muslim organization, Deendar Anjuman, for their alleged role in bombing churches in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh.86 A management graduate from Rampur did not agree with the ban: “What a blatant demonstration of double standards! It was not the Muslim but Hindu right-wing organizations that were desecrating and damaging the Christian places of worship.” This was the time when the BJP was leading the state governments in Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Gujarat, and Goa. During that time, every act of violence against minorities was reported so that the attacks would not be considered as communal in nature. Clearly, this tendency did not augur well with the religious minorities, especially the Muslims and the Christians. A principal of school in Uttar Pradesh said how in May 2002 the government of India issued a confidential letter to various secretaries of state governments to verify the antecedents of madrassas applying for state grants. The state departments were instructed to ensure that the applicant madrassa was not indulging or abetting in anti-national activities.87 A social worker from Lucknow clarified, “There’s nothing wrong with the central government’s directive. On the face of it, every government should doubly ensure that the tax-payers money is not wasted on institutions indulging in weakening the country. However, this was merely a façade. As the event following it corroborated, it was the Muslim community that was being singled out. During the time, the Congress chief minister of Madhya Pradesh issued a rejoinder to the government’s letter in the following words: “It appears that the institutions being singled out and the sense that is sought to be conveyed is that these are potentially anti-national. This, in my opinion, does grave harm to the secular fabric of our country.”88 The sociologist returned to the earlier point: “In this background, after 9/11 when the U.S. State Department brought the issues of religious freedom and matters arising out of the war on terror, the NDA government got further emboldened in what it was already doing to consolidate its own vote bank. From now on, the directive from the United States provided an international stamp to

86 For the background of Deendar Anjuman, see Yogindrer Sikand’s Between Dialogue and Conflict: The Origins and Development of the Deendar Anjuman (1924-2000) at, www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1478-1913.2002.tb03743.x. For the organisation’s description of the issue after the ban, see B. Murlidhar Reddy’s “Deendar Anjuman to challenge ban,” in The Hindu, Monday, May 7, 2001, http://www.hinduonnet.com/2001/05/07/stories/01070009.htm. 87 This measure is documented in Teesta Setalvad’s article “Minority Education: Does the Indian State Really Encourage the Growth of Liberal and Modern Elements within its Largest Religious Minority–the Muslims?” in Communalism Combat, August-September 2005, year 11, No. 109-110. 88 Quoted in Mushirul Hasan, “The Madrassas in India,” The Hindu, May 21, 2003.



what was already taking place in the national context. The NDA’s policy towards religious minorities found a new authorization and a fresh legitimacy.” In the view of one course writer with the Open University in Delhi, the U.S. and its war on terror turned out for the BJP as a kind of a “gift from the heaven.” In the specific context of Indian Muslims, the BJP drew out a legitimacy-label to justify its discriminatory policies towards the Muslims. After 9/11

The respondents were asked of their views on the manner in which the government officials behaved towards the functionaries of Muslim organizations in general and madrassas in particular after 9/11. Two instances were brought out during the course of discussions that describe how the security agencies raided madrassas in Barmer and Pokhran in the border areas of Rajasthan. They are as follows:

Incident One: Barmer

In December 2001, the central government’s Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the state police raided Jamia Islamia Darul Uloom, a madrassa in Barmer in the state of Rajasthan.89 The state’s contention was that the madrassa in question was turning into a “breeding ground” for religious fanaticism. The landlord in Barmer pointed out how the madrassa had been in existence for the last one hundred years. He said, “In a small place like Barmer, nothing remains secret in a public institution. If a security matter was seriously compromised by the madrassa, then, it wouldn’t have remained an underground matter. So why were the police and security department in a great rush to raid the madrassa? But what did they draw out? Nothing. They did not give even a word of apology!” The respondent’s underlying anger was evident. Incident 2: Pokhran

This incident is similar to the above encounter where a madrassa was picked up just because it happened to be located at a sensitive place named Pokhran where India exhibited its nuclear power by carrying out two explosions. The place is also close to the international border between India and Pakistan. The Madrassa Islamia Darul Uloom in Pokhran,90 established in the early 20th century, now found itself in the position of a suspect. The police sought a list of the students and staff and even probed into the sources of funds. The head of the madrassa said that the madrassa patronized a middle-school with secular subjects and employed a few non-Muslim teachers. The madrassa also maintained a public hospital which provided maternity services to people from all communities in the town. In the Shekhawati belt, the local police have carried out a survey in Sikar district to find out the number of madrassas and have objected to the presence of teachers and imams in mosques from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. A university lecturer in Delhi questioned the legal validity of the behavior of the police: “How could the police restrict the movement of people from one state to the other in the same country. As free citizens, we can’t be labeled as outsiders if we prefer to work in any state in India where we are not born.”

89 This incident involving the madrassa in Barmer appears in an article: “Madrassas as Scapegoats: the purported global campaign against terrorism led by United States has resulted in a new crisis for madrassas in Rajasthan.” The article may be accessed from: http://www.islamicvoice.com/december.2001/community.htm. 90 “Madrassas as Scapegoats.”



A social work professor commented that the seeming “international compliance to the need to fight out terror” was a cover for the BJP to be able to say that their discriminatory attitude vis-à-vis the Muslim community had nothing to do with them. A university lecturer in Calicut (Kozhikode) found few parallels to the above description in south India especially in Kerala state. For him, neither 9/11 nor the 2002 Gujarat violence produced any social or political disorder similar to the event of the demolition of the Babri masjid (mosque). However, the hanging of Saddam Hussein provoked anger and strikes among people cutting across various religious and political affiliations. One head of a medical college in Trivandrum had put up a picture of Saddam Hussein in his office with a caption “Saddam Rakthasaakshi” (martyr). The lecturer pointed out that this gesture was ironic in so far as the supporters of the posters were also those who pursued medical degree in universities in the United States.

Islamic Education and Religious Intolerance

One of the objectives of the discussion groups was to discover sources of religious intolerance in India. The participants were asked to mull over different possible sites which might promote communal intolerance among Muslims in India. How much of such intolerance, in their opinion, had a religious and/or ethnic basis? Were instances based on social or economic differences? I wanted to know the opinion of the respondents about the possible correlation between madrassas and intolerance Muslims expressed towards groups and communities that differed in religious beliefs. Group discussions began by looking into the role of madrassas in producing a specific culture within and around the institution which differed sharply from the groups and communities in the neighborhood belonging to different religious beliefs. “A madrassa caters to the need of the Muslim population. The culture it produces is what is demanded of it from its constituency. To say that this culture automatically gives rise to social tensions with other communities is not a correct observation,” said the sociologist who has worked on other research projects on madrassas. Some of the participants highlighted the aspect of one madrassa where, as an institution, it catered to everyday needs such as services related to lodging. This service consisted of the ancillary economic services around a madrassa supportive of individuals who may not necessarily be Muslims. Ancillary madrassa services include electricity, water supply, building repair and refurbishment, supply of grocery and kitchen goods, medical services, launderers, tailors, stationary and bookshop—in short, a developed local market and the associated range of contractors and sales agents in constant interaction with a madrassa. The physical enclave of madrassas has roots in the local society whose communal composition is a mixture of Muslims and non-Muslims. The enclave has stakes for reasons of everyday survival in the maintenance of law and order. “The sites in India found notorious for being communal riot-prone are, interestingly enough, not the madrassas and their neighboring localities,” said a journalist from Lucknow.



Madrassa Graduates

From here, in order for the group to think over the possibility of madrassa graduates promoting an “insular” and “divisive” worldview in their post madrassa roles, I wanted the group to tell me where the madrassa students go upon graduation. The participants noted two directions which a madrassa graduate is likely to follow after completing studies. One route takes the graduates to roles within religious organizations such as mosques or another madrassa elsewhere. There is another set of students who return to the work their ancestral craft offers them. Some of the graduates perform a part-time role as disseminators of religious knowledge in fulfillment of the religious needs of the community. A school teacher from Chandpur explained that local imams provide particular Quranic and hadith resources for physical and psychological ailments as well as organize the customary rites and supplications in the life cycle ceremonies.91 One participant pointed out that not all graduates of the madrassas use religious knowledge and world-views to support institutions and the cultural life of the community. This section of the madrassa graduates follows a completely different trajectory. The Urdu journalist further explained how a large number of such students go in for self-employed ventures in trade and commerce as well as occupations relevant to the local economies. However, they remain part-time communicators of religious knowledge needed for everyday practice. This role is performed in an “informal sector of religion.” It is through the contribution of such madrassa graduates that Muslim communities remain connected with their tradition. Group Mobilization

One political activist pointed out that being Muslim was not just about faith but also living in this world. “Without being part of a Muslim vote bank for political purposes nothing in the world would move for us,” he said. The course writer for the Open University in Delhi said that group pressure alone enables an individual to secure services from the state needed for everyday living. The Muslim community, like all other communities, depends on its middlemen or mediators “to get things done.” “But no middleman would have clout with the government machinery if it did not have a backing of the community that acted as a vote bank,” he said. I invited the interviewees to think over a hypothetical scenario: “Would we have any need left for the Muslims to behave as a vote bank if the rule of law prevailed in the wider society?” Most agreed that being a Muslim in the latter sense would not be relevant. The Urdu journalist from Mumbai clarified that the two ways of being a Muslim—i.e., for reasons of faith and for the worldly reasons—gives us the difference between being a member of the ummah (community defined by faith) and a qaum (community defined by shared tradition).92

91 As social scientists, we have little clue as to how madrassa networks with the community of its constituency, and what kind of exchanges take place involving both symbols and material, between the madrassa and the society of its stake holders. 92 In social terms, there are two modes of a community’s relationship with its religion. One mode is based on the principles of interiorized faith. This is contrasted with the principle of community belonging. This may also be seen in terms of consummatory versus instrumental use of religion in matters of collective living. The use of religious resources for what they are intended is thus contrasted with political use of religious markers. To build further on the argument: the executive summary of a conference on “Religion and Security in South Asia” (August 19-22, 2002) makes a



Clarifying Religious Intolerance

According to one respondent, religion by itself is not intolerant, but people may be tolerant or intolerant. This gave me a clue to explore more on the Muslim community’s stance of intolerance expressed in religious or communal terms. My question to various respondents was: What accounts for intolerance and why must it be expressed in religious terms? Most importantly, what are the various factors which occasion intolerance among Muslims? Most of the people agreed that when we talk about intolerance, we need to be clear which place we are talking about as well as what one is being intolerant about. Some of the factors the group discussed are as follows: acts of discrimination against an individual or a group on account of being Muslim (in matters of education, housing, employment, etc.); non-implementation of legal provisions which necessitates group pressure to secure it; and hate-acts targeting Islam and Muslims.

Acts of Discrimination The interviewees spoke about various acts of discrimination that fuelled a continuous sense of victimization among members of the Muslim communities. Such experiences were recounted either through firsthand reporting or hearsay. Discrimination was felt in matters of housing, employment and admissions to the educational institutions especially the universities. I wanted to know from the respondents if they could distinguish between cases of discrimination and rejection on the grounds of merit. I got no response regarding this distinction. Further, I wanted to know if the case against discrimination was based on shared personal anecdotes or whether they were aware of some systematic information on the subject. Most respondents were not aware of any available facts and figures on acts of discrimination. The prevalent thinking which various political campaigns use to highlight the issue is the mismatch between the population of educated Muslims and the number of Muslims employed in the state bureaucracy. The Sachar report shows that only 13 percent of Muslim workers are engaged in regular jobs. In comparison, the figure for the upper caste Hindus is 25 percent. For the urban areas, the figure for Muslims is 27 percent but the number for upper caste Hindus is 49 percent. The group shared instances of discrimination, either firsthand or those heard from friends and acquaintances, within formal organizations. The most common acts of discrimination were found during: the job hiring process, admissions to colleges or universities, when applying for loans or other titles, when seeking promotion. Participants did not know of any systematic studies on discrimination.93

distinction between religious identity as a vehicle, rather than inspiration, for religious radicalism. The report is available at: http://www.apcss.org/core/Conference/CR_ES/020819-22ES.htm. 93 The Sachar report notes: “The widespread perception of discrimination among the Muslim community needs to be addressed. There are hardly any empirical studies that establish discrimination,” 239.



Discrimination and the State

Various groups shared their concern about a prevalent discriminatory practice of the state in not allowing religious minorities to freely use their constitutional right granted in article 30 for establishing educational institutions of ones choice.94 The focus group responses revealed how the provision of the constitution did two things to Muslims. First, it has generated a great deal of hope and initiative among Muslims to mobilize people and resources in establishing and administering educational institutions of their choice. Second, it has generated much disaffection in the community on account of the discriminatory practices of offices and departments of government in: a) refusing to permit the establishment of educational institutions as well as delay recognition of minority status for religious minorities; b) denying affiliation of minority educational institutions with universities; and c) refusing or delaying grant support to minority educational institutions. A graduate in sociology, now living in Deoband, cited examples of two institutions—one in Uttar Pradesh and another in Maharashtra—that had frustrating experiences campaigning with the national commission for minorities to get the permit and thereby obtain a minority status out of the state governments for their schools.95 The latter case needed land from the state for construction of a school building.

As part of the program to modernize madrassas, the Indian government attempts to bridge the madrassas with mainstream universities. The principle behind this practice is to bring a traditional sector of education in contact with a mainstream one, thus enabling madrassa students to receive a secular education. To make this happen, minority educational institutions are promised the right to affiliate with the universities. But this right is never easily realized. Subhania Anjuman Islamia School in Bilaspur had the unfortunate experience of receiving a grant-in-aid from the government of Madhya Pradesh, being repeatedly told that the amount of the grant would soon decrease. Extra mobilization was required of watch groups, as well as the national commission for minorities, to secure the grant without being “blackmailed” by this constant threat of having the grant taken away. A principal of a private school in Dasna (Uttar Pradesh), some 30 kilometers from Delhi, observed that the schools receiving grants from the government are also targets of unreasonable interference by state officials in the management of these educational institutions. A journalist from Delhi discussed a recent controversy surrounding a grant application from a Muslim educational institution, the Anjuman Madarsa Noorul Islam Dehra Kalan. The matter began with a writ petition filed by a madrassa of Ghazipur district, challenging out of turn grants-in-aid to other minority institutions. In its April 5, 2007 judgment, the Allahabad High Court held that Muslims could not be treated as a religious minority in Uttar Pradesh. The 94 Article 30 of the Constitution of India grants the right to all religious minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. Furthermore, clause 2 provides for the government to grant aid to such educational institutions, and clearly specifies that the state shall not discriminate against institutions on the ground that these were under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language. The complaints focusing on the discriminatory practice adds to the pool of Muslim grievance in India. 95 The example from Uttar Pradesh is that of Willayat Hussain Degree College, Deoria. The one from Maharashtra is the case of the Dr. Zakir Hussain Urdu High School and Junior College, Phulgaon.



court also asked the UP government to treat all Muslim institutions applying for grants-in-aid on a par with non-minority institutions without any discrimination. The judgment, provoking a strong response from Muslim groups, was stayed.96 A social worker from Lucknow, aged 46 years, pointed out that the court”s judgment was tuned to the Assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh that were starting in the coming week.97 The sociologist pointed out that the court judgment was politically inappropriate but noted that there was no criterion to assess the minority status of a religious group at the state level. It is true that Christians are a minority at the national level, but not at the state level in Nagaland.98 A 54 year old teacher from an Urdu school in Delhi, and a recipient of the best teacher award from the Delhi state government, described how she had usually found various schools that catered to Muslim majority students being refused or delays in filling teacher vacancies for Urdu language. She also described how there was always a shortage of Urdu textbooks which the state was responsible for providing to the students. In general the groups believed that unofficial acts of discrimination violating article 30 need to be resolved. The groups felt that the Muslim community should be encouraged to establish their educational institutions without fear, or having to bargain with state officials. Such steps are likely to help in overcoming the current educational marginalization of the Muslim community in the educational sector.

Responses to Discrimination: Coming Together

During the course of a discussion on Muslim responses to discrimination, some interviewees pointed out how one such response was to live in areas of concentrated Muslim populations. Living in predominantly Muslim majority areas is seen as helping foster social networks and support systems built upon mutual trust and dependence in certain aspects of everyday living. In a way, the practice of discrimination is inversed in such places. For example, it is normally

96 The Allahabad High Court judgment on the question of treating Muslims as a minority at the state but not the national level triggered a debate in the media. The justification of the judgment can be found in, “Hindus are in minority in UP: HC” Times News Network, May 7, 2007; Aloke Tikku, “Minorities to be defined, state-wise,” Hindustan Times, May 6, 2007, http://www.hindustantimes.com/storypage/storypage.aspx?id=d61334cf-b886-4345-8711-4275fdfa4c1c&&Headline=Minorities+to+get+crystal-clear+legal+face+”from+now. A critical appraisal of the above debate that Muslims are not a minority in UP may be seen in Yoginder Sikand and Nigar Ataulla, Minorities, “A Little More Unequal,” Tehelka- the people”s paper (21 April, 2007), http://www.tehelka.com/story_main29.asp?filename=op210407Minorities.asp. 97 Allahabad High court judge S.N. Srivastava gave the ruling after considering various criteria including the population of Muslims as enumerated in the census reports of 1951 and 2001. He pointed out that the present population of 18.5% makes Muslims in UP a more dominant group in comparison to any other religious community; thus Muslims cannot be treated as a religious minority community. The Court said the UP government should treat members of the Muslim community as equals to those belonging to the non-minority communities without discrimination in accordance with law. The judgment led to mobilization of communal politics close to the assembly elections. See the report on MSN News, April 05, 2007. 98 The central government is set to move a constitutional amendment in Parliament to establish a procedure for defining minorities at the state level. For background details to such a move, see “Banish the minority,” May 7, 2007, http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?id=8756c8b0-b07b-479c-9570-209757ea974e&&Headline=Banish+the+minority+report.



difficult for a non-Muslim to buy property in a predominantly Muslim majority area of Naya Mohalla in Jabalpur (Madhya Pradesh), Batla House in south Delhi, or Bani Sarai in Meerut (Uttar Pradesh). Muslim concentrated localities have developed an invisible fencing which obstructs non-Muslims in the role of traders, merchants, landlords, tenants or even as skilled or unskilled workers. A non-Muslim desirous of buying property in a Muslim concentrated area is invariably frustrated. The failure to enter the predominantly Muslim terrain is often construed as an outcome of an intolerant community. The meaning of “intolerance” comes from the structures of exclusion a given area establishes around itself. Thus, “intolerance” tends to assume a behavioral stance toward the “other” in forms ranging from routine expressions of indifference to outright hostility. The latter attitude, however, is mostly episodic and is scarcely demonstrable on a routine basis. For instance, in the old city of Aligarh, Muslim majority localities such as Upper Court (pronounced as “ooper kote”) and Sarai Rehman are periodically vulnerable to inter-ethnic tensions. The residents in the localities live by the principle of mutual familiarity organized into a fort-like grid (qila bandi) that forbids entry of any outsider. Communal riots are a violent outcome of inter-group tussles in breaking the “strongly classified” territory built around a community and a locality. What do people gain from living in Muslim majority residential areas? Many agreed that “To overcome the distance between various authorities and the problem ridden Muslim localities, we need to put up a group pressure all the time. We can”t stand together without being Muslim.” Some respondents felt that, “There are both good and bad aspects of living in an ethnic ghetto.” One claimed that, “It is always convenient to perform matters related to your religion. For example, a Muslim locality has a mosque, a halal meat shop, and some arrangements for burying the dead.” “The local market sells goods which are sensitive to the community”s needs.” “The women wearing veils and men sporting beards do not evoke reactions from others. This makes the place secure.” Everyday life in a Muslim locality brings the residents face-to-face with government functionaries against whom complaints are routinely raised. The pool of complaints evokes a mixture of anger and community mobilization.99 Other respondents noted negative aspects of living in Muslim majority areas. “The government always treats such areas with a prejudiced eye. Laws related to the regulation of urban space are seldom applicable.” “All government services such as water and electricity supply, retail shops, schools, and banks are poorly available.” “Parks, parking spaces and road conditions are bad.” “The government turns the other way when it comes to implementing certain rules and regulations in Muslim residential settlements.” Almost all the responses carried references to help needed in making official institutions more responsive to Muslim families” applications and petitions. Individuals needed to secure admissions for their children to schools and colleges, in matters of seeking jobs, getting hospital

99 There is an urgent need for large scale research on areas of Muslim population concentration for purposes of examining the nature of marginalization, everyday struggles for survival, the discriminatory attitude of the state toward Muslims” issues and problems and the nature of indigenous symbolic “weapons” contrived for neutralizing discrimination.



admission for ailing family members, permission from the municipal corporation for re-building houses, securing licenses for commercial ventures, or obtaining bank loans, solving telephone problems, or resolving electricity-related problems. The local police station proved to be the most important department needing continuous mediation through middlemen. The list of problems was long indeed. The university lecturer from Calicut disagreed with the view that the “coming together” was always a response to the experience of discrimination. In Kerala, according to him, Muslim elite groups have managed to forge solidarity among Muslims with an explicit objective of betterment of the entire community. It is not to confront the “enemy” outside but to uplift ones own people within that have produced bonding among Muslims in south India. The development of Muslim communities has branched off into the establishment of educational institutions, social welfare organizations and programmes in social reform.100 Recommendations for Muslim Concentrated Areas

Participants agreed that policies must focus on the limited access of Muslims to mainstream education, employment and other state services and welfare measures. The marginalized areas of Muslim concentration need special attention as these provide an important window to the conditions of Muslims in India. Other respondents expressed the need for madrassa modernizing initiatives to include “vocationalization.” Skill generating courses with immediate relevance to the local economy are seen as greatly beneficial. The formulaic inputs of modern subjects are perceived as ill-advised and, most of the time, irrelevant considering local circumstances. Just imagine the mismatch between computer literacy programs and the places which have no electricity for hours everyday. Respondents felt that vocational courses should focus on training to become tailors, mechanics, electricians, plumbers, doctors and general health workers to meet the needs of poor and rural communities.

Reform in Islamic Education

Most participants of the focus group were not aware that madrassa-going children were as small as 4% of the total population of school-age children. But they had differing views on the need to modernize madrassa education. Many asked, “Why can”t the modern education we wish to see in madrassas, be provided through the secular schools.” Some noted that, “Not all madrassas are similar. Nor do they have similar surroundings. The reform program should also differ from one madrassa to the other.” The following illustrations refer to the internally differentiated universe of madrassas. This illustration is to point out that modernization efforts also have to be sensitive to the local needs and not use a common “pill” to reform every madrassa.

100 For an insightful discussion on the role of Kerals Muslim elites in sponsoring a network educational and social institutions to produce a specific variety of Muslim modernity, see Osella F. and Osella C. (2007) “Muslim Entreprneurs between India &the Gulf”, ISIM Review, 19 / Spring.



A 56 year old Qur”an instructor organizes a “mobile madrassa” in a pastoral community, van gujars (forest dwellers), who travel annually from the pastures in the foothills of the Himalyas. For this teacher, religious instruction contributes to this group”s “iman” (faith) which is necessary for living in difficult conditions. Similarly, the Madrassa-e Islamia Muttasil Mangalore caters to the needs of the peasant communities in neighboring villages, some 80 kilometers from the well known Darul Ulum Deoband. The madrassa harbors no pretensions, according to the school”s principal, of training the students to become the “babu and sahib,” terms used to deride the modern salaried man. “If you replace fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) with physics, would the graduate get a job?” asked the principal. Can education on its own cure the ills of economy?” asks another respondent. Some responses proved critical of secular schools and skeptical of the modernization projects for the madrassas. One man noted that, “Degrees don”t get you the jobs automatically, otherwise one wouldn”t see the educated unemployed youths. What would you achieve if you simply change the curriculum?” he added. Another stated, “In most schools and colleges secular education lacks quality. It is also insensitive to the special needs of minorities and is not able to retain the Muslim students for longer schooling.” Many agreed that, “The lack of mainstream secular and affordable schooling also leaves no options for Muslim families but to send their children to the madrassas.” Some participants expressed the need for a differentiated blueprint of madrassa modernization. “The program for the modernization of madrassa education must look into what the students are expecting from religious education. Some students go to the madrassa to get a modicum of sacred knowledge and then go on to the secular schools. Another stream of students who wish to become full-time professionals in religious knowledge needs to know the modern world better.” One observer noted that, “The full time scholars in Islamic knowledge may like to familiarize themselves with international law and modern politics to gain knowledge about the modern society.” There were also some success stories regarding the modernization of madrassa programs.101 An initiative of the Chandigarh administration, for example, has developed a computer-literacy package for children in under-privileged and minority communities. The administration, bearing the cost of the training program, has collaborated with United Progressive Muslim Front, a volunteer group, to introduce computer program learning for students of Manimajra Madrasa in Chandigarh.102 The state of Andhra Pradesh, in collaboration with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), has reached out to some 1200 madrassas with the objective of integrating formal mainstream education into their curricula.103 Our respondent from Calicut pointed out that it has made a world of difference in matters of reform in Kerala in so far as it is initiated by the Muslim communities themselves. In Kerala,

101 A brief survey of madrassas that have managed to combine religious with secular curricula is presented in Yoginder Sikand, Bastions of the Believers: Madrasas and Islamic Education in India (Delhi: Penguin Books, 2005). 102 For more details of the program see, Rajan Walia, “Computer Lessons at Madarsa,” Times News Network, May 18, 2007. 103 For more details see “US Assists Andhra Pradesh in Madrassa Education,” December 27, 2006, http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/pr122706.html.



various religious communities have produced a significant competitive arena of marketised education as well as socially reformed institutions of religious studies. Reformed institutional setups among Muslims in south India have contributed to the promotion of female literacy, women”s participation in mosques, and a widespread bridging of religious and modern education. At higher levels of education, most Arabic colleges are affiliated to modern universities and receive grants from the government. The movement for spreading education has led to the establishment of scores schools and colleges, polytechnics, industrial training institutions, printing presses,computer outfits, health care and medical centres.104 Recommendations for Reforming Madrassa Education, Supporting Secular Schools

Most interviewees agreed that the education of Muslims should not mix madrassas and public schooling together. Moreover, it was agreed that the modernization of madrassas must never be used as a substitute for the state”s constitutional obligation to provide, under Article 21A, education to its citizens. It was believed that the modernization of Muslims rather than the madrassas would come about indirectly as a result of the state”s provision of secular and subsidized education through its formal institutional system. Respondents feel that the educational backwardness of Muslims is a serious issue. One quick answer is the community”s access to mainstream education. While the state has a constitutional responsibility of providing free and compulsory education up to the age of 14, respondents felt that there are more specific initiatives which should be addressed, including the following:

• High quality government schools should be established in Muslim concentrated areas. • In order to overcome the male-female divide in education content and quality, exclusive

schools for girls should be set up to allow for gender equality in education among Muslims.

• There is an urgent need to implement the constitutional provision to make primary education available in the mother tongue. This requires a mapping of the Urdu speaking population.

Muslim Integration into the Indian Economy

Different Muslim scholars and activists in the focus group were asked to comment on their views on the state of Muslim integration into the Indian economy. The following responses are significant. One man noted that, “The issue of unemployment as well as lack of access to regular salaried positions in government jobs always figures in the list of Muslim grievances in any political representation.” Another stated that, “The scheduled castes and tribes get job reservations in the government offices. Similarly marginalized Muslims don”t get the same treatment on the argument that there is no inequality among believers in Islam.” One woman

104 For further elaborations on the story of madrassa reform in Kerala, refer to an insider”s account in “Interview with a madrasa graduate from Kerala on madrasa reform”, http://www.indianmuslims.info/interviews/interview_with_a_madrasa_graduate_from_kerala_on_madrasa_reform.html Also refer, Yogendra Sikand, Ibid.:122-39.



agreed by saying, “The share of Muslim workers in the government and public sector does not exceed 5 percent of the total workforce.”105 One respondent dismayed that, “The Muslim community doesn”t figure well in regular salaried jobs. This is because of educational backwardness coupled with institutional discrimination.” One noted however that, “A large number of Muslims are part of the artisan sector, i.e., the weaving industry including manufacturing of textile and textile products, wood work trade, brassware manufacturing, fabricated metal-products, lock making, butchery and meat trade.” “Artisan skills have their origins in traditional rural society. Such trade either remains home-based or small-scale industrial unit. A skilled artisan who is usually self-employed doesn”t have to fear any discrimination of an employer.” “The only exception to the artisans facing discrimination relates to the settings of communal tension and violence. Places like Bhivandi, Moradabad and Aligarh are places where Muslim artisans developed into large scale commercial ventures.” Most respondents agreed that Muslims do not seem to suffer from open unemployment as the majority settles for whatever work comes their way. Muslims seem to hold a permanent position in the casual jobs so characteristic of what is called the “informal” sector of economy. This permanent “casualization” is seen as helpful in lowering the count of unemployment among Muslims.106 One respondent claimed that, “Muslims show a high reliance in self-employment activities, mostly in the urban areas, with women figuring highest in this category. Muslim women are mostly engaged in enterprises that are home based and dependent on subcontractors and middlemen. This is indicative of poor remunerative returns and low earnings.” Another noted that, “A large number of Muslim workers are engaged in home based enterprises. The Muslim self-employed workers show higher figures in street vending when compared with other minorities. Muslims do not compare well with other groups in agricultural work. But they participate substantially in the traditional crafts and artisan work.” One lamented that, “The disadvantage of figuring high in self-employment makes such Muslims “unbankable” (i.e., not worthy of high credit) from the point of view of the banks.” A large number of self employed Muslims in Kerala have opted for their status in preference to a regular job in the government bureaucracy. This is largely because Muslim business people have an established presence and offer to their own people employment opportunities on a competitive basis. Recommendations for Better Economic Integration

Many members expressed the concern that, “The artisan groups suffer from the threat of losing their skills. There is also the challenge to upgrade and refashion their skills so as to keep abreast of the current demands of the international market.” Participants claimed that, “As Muslim children show high dropout rates in schools, the government must address the specific vocational

105 The Muslim presence in the state bureaucracy of Jammu and Kashmir is profiled in Naseer A Ganai, “Muslims a minority in JK services,” Hindustan Times, May 7, 2007, http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.asp?Date=7_5_2007&ItemID=44&cat=1. 106 For computing statistics on unemployment, the Sachar report prefers “daily status unemployment rates over usual unemployment rates,” 89.



needs of this group. Existing technical training programs must develop special packages for such Muslim children.”107

On Muslims” Need for Micro-Credit

An embroiderer from Varanasi, aged 55 years, who works in his ancestral craft with his family, complained that no major national bank considers him dependable for receiving a loan. The conventional channel of securing money comes from the traditional money lender, i.e., usually the exporter, a merchant or a retailer in the market. Exporters are able to secure substantial loans from the bank on the basis of their established business in supplying and exporting silk saris. The embroiderer points out that even a government scheme intended to provide low interest credit tends to ignore embroiderers, saying embroiderers always found it difficult to fulfill the formalities of loan applications. Instead, several organizations stand up on their behalf and act as intermediaries in accepting soft loans. A 45 year old female social activist from a traditional carpet weaver”s family in Mirzapur (Uttar Pradesh) said how individuals, groups and organizations who have made contacts in the market were favored by the major banks. “Do you think micro-finance can make a real difference to your condition?” was a question I posed to a 40 year old locksmith from Aligarh, a wood-carver in Saharnapur, a brass-worker from Moradabad, a shoemaker from Agra and a female bangle-maker from Ferozabad. Each of them concurs with the view that micro-credit is a good idea, but too good to be true, especially when it comes to actually getting the money in hand. Often, the trickle-down of money from government schemes is slow and incomplete. The locksmith said that when the local bank cleared his loan of 5,000 rupees on a government scheme, he received only four thousand rupees, although he had signed for the whole amount. One respondent claimed, “In matters of bank credit there is a developed system of middlemen between the applicant and the bank. These middlemen eat into the sanctioned loan. This is a widespread problem.” The middleman may sometimes be the bank official. The bangle-maker and brass-worker confirmed that this was indeed a very common practice. Bank officials usually keep up to 20 percent of the loan amount on the pretext of “processing charges.” Most artisans were not versed in the language bankers used to process the credit. This basic ignorance made loan recipients vulnerable to exploitation and deceit. The sociologist from Delhi referred to the Sachar report in describing how major banks hesitate extending loans to the self-employed Muslim artisans or entrepreneurs in specific localities. Apparently certain banks have identified some Muslim majority settlements as “negative geographical zones” whose residents are part of an undisclosed blacklist, and can thus not easily obtain credit.108

107 The Sachar report recommends a reduction in minimum qualifications for Muslim students in the polytechnic courses (see 245). 108 The Sachar committee report examines the discriminatory practice of some banks in a few areas of Muslim concentration in Mumbai and Ahmadabad.



A freelance researcher in Jaipur said that micro-credit should always be accompanied by an institutional arrangement which would significantly lower the margin of error in information through the credit market. Among other things, this change may include, for instance, a registration of potential beneficiaries as co-operatives so that the role of various intermediaries would be minimized. The co-operative is also likely to generate a support network, making it so that the group rather than the individual assumes the responsibility for investments as well as repayments of loans. In Muslim majority settlements a need exists to reduce credit constraints of the poor. Any effective policy intervention must address the key sources of credit constraints. Absence of well-defined property titles, lack of protection to income shocks, poor information about borrowers, limited opportunities to build human capital and the prohibitive cost of credit reduce the ability of the poor to access financial resources. Furthermore, institutional inefficiencies compound the costs of finance for the poor. In Kerala, various religious communities have fostered their own micro-finance system extended to their own members. While this arrangement has worked successfully among the Hindu and Christian communities, it is poorly developed among the Muslims. This is partly because the deserving section of the population somehow falls outside patronage that works within a Muslim business establishment. Muslims in fishing communities and small trade remain excluded by both the community patrons as well as the modern banks as both lack a credible institutional anchoring. Recommendations

Many respondents felt that, “A micro-credit institution needs to be developed to provide financial support to the artisans and the self-employed among the poor Muslims.” One man said that, “The programs of micro-credit should also publicize various credit schemes. This is likely to minimize the role of intermediaries. It is important that micro-credit reaches the producer without any leakage and pilferage of the sanctioned loans.” Micro-credit must also include women who are currently at the margins of the banking system. The economic empowerment of Muslim women in particular is likely to generate the demand for education as well as develop the general confidence and capacities in dealing with the market and other official institutions. The empowerment of women should contribute to the social and economic empowerment of the Muslim community in general.

Conclusion

Almost every participant in the group interviews was aware that a national report on the condition of Muslims has recently been released, and expressed appreciation for the difference such a report will make in at least initiating a dialogue about the issues facing Muslims in India today. The participants know that most of the grievances expressed by the Muslim community have no backing in official statistics. In the absence of such “official facts,” seeking protection of equal rights is “like wielding a baton in the dark” (andherey men lath marna). The focus group



interviewees admitted that organized campaigns for securing welfare benefits or overcoming institutional discrimination are doubly strengthened with a backup of relevant official data.109 Overall, the groups agreed that madrassas and institutions of Islamic education, generally offering community services and goods not provided by the state, receive undue blame for the events of 9/11 and the global war on terror. Madrassas throughout the country are being unscrupulously homogenized and receive undue blame for the actions of a few isolated and unrepresentative schools and radical ulema. The sheer imperative of existing as an institution, respondents claim, creates networks of amiable co-operation with the local economy and society. Respondents feel that madrassas seldom produce intolerant, violence-conducive atmospheres. Furthermore, it is believed that the state discriminates against Muslims as a minority religious community, obstructing their paths to obtaining loans, entrance into universities and obtaining general economic well-being. Religion-based discrimination results in the formation of isolated Muslim populations that push Muslims further away from the mainstream and reach of government services. Acts of discrimination, along with unwarranted meddling in madrassa affairs, thus fuel a continuous sense of victimization and alienation among Indian Muslims. The respondents believed that Muslim workers are poorly represented in “regular,” salaried jobs. From this vantage, Muslims feel even more disadvantaged than the scheduled castes and tribes. Indian Muslims, as represented by the survey participants, are in general desirous of educational reform focusing on the demands of local realities and broader integration into the socio-economic life of their Indian counterparts. Muslims are greatly concerned over the “backward” state of the current education system in areas of concentrated Muslim populations, and want to see a vigorous growth in quality public schools with classes taught in Urdu and consideration given to the need for educating both males and females to allow equal opportunities of success and integration to both sexes.

109 The Sachar report recognizes the paucity of data about religious minorities in general and Muslim communities in particular. It recommends the creation of a National Data Bank (NDB) where data about religious minorities will be maintained and made available to the public. To quote from the report: “There is an urgent need to assess afresh the data needs for evaluating the conditions of citizens by SRC (social and religious categories) status on a regular basis so as to understand and assess the flow of development benefits” (p 238).

Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Asia Pakistan—Ansari and Akif




Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Pakistan

Zafar Ishaq Ansari and Syed Akif

Zafar Ishaq Ansari is Director, Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, Islamabad. He holds a PhD degree in Islamic Studies from McGill University and has taught at the University of Karachi, Princeton University, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and International Islamic University, Islamabad. He is the editor of the quarterly journal Islamic Studies and is a member of the editorial board of the Journal of Islamic Studies, American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Journal of Qur”anic Studies, and Studies in Contemporary Islam.

Syed Abu Ahmad Akif is Director General of the Employees Old Age Benefits Institution (EOABI), Ministry of Labor and Manpower, Government of Pakistan. Mr. Akif has held several posts in Pakistan”s civil service, including work in criminal justice, law and order, federal and provincial secretariats, and rural development. He holds an MPA from the University of Hawaii, Honolulu, and MAs in Journalism and International Relations from the University of Karachi. Mr. Akif has written on a range of topics including Islamic education and economy, Muslim civilization and Muslims in North America.



Executive Summary

Summary

This paper assesses the status of religious pluralism, women”s rights and Islamic education in Pakistan from the point of view of moderate Islam. The paper depicts Pakistan as a nation caught in a vortex of tumultuous change and conflicting worldviews and religious values. It argues that in the post 9/11 world Pakistani Muslims feel unjustly punished by U.S. and Western policies targeting extremism and promoting the war on terror. The paper finds that generally Pakistani women still suffer from conservative, discriminatory views and unequal treatment. Many Pakistanis see correlations between the madrassa education environment and the perpetuation of intolerance resulting from sectarianism and narrow interpretations of Islam.

Key Findings

• Regarding women”s rights, opinions throughout the country vary depending on province, ethnic group and social class. Islam is generally seen as giving equal status to women, albeit through different roles and responsibilities than males. As such, the general population does not favor Western notions of women”s rights.

• In more conservative areas like the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), women still tend to be considered second-rate citizens, subordinate to men. In rural areas, fundamental rights granted both by Islamic and secular laws, are routinely denied to women.

• Leaders of women”s rights movements often come from elite classes and have limited interaction with the majority of Pakistan”s rural female population. “Ordinary” citizens often have trouble identifying with development workers and NGOs, promoting women”s empowerment.

• While most Pakistanis support religious tolerance, in some areas it is generally believed that tolerance in religious matters was much better in the past than at present. Respondents claim that after 1979, particularly in the NWFP, views on toleration had changed with a perceptible tilt in the opposite direction.

• Often, as with women”s rights, there is a wide disparity between scriptural texts and laws advocating religious tolerance and the actual situation on the ground characterized by conflictual relations with on the Shias and intolerance towards the Christian and Hindu communities.

• Many respondents believe that Islamic madrassas are generally run by espousing narrow interpretations of Islam and holding sectarian biases; thus these institutions—not through text and curriculum per se, but rather through context and general environment—are seen as promoting intolerance.

Policy Implications • Pakistanis are generally desirous of vigorous reform of the religious education system.

They call for a single supervisory authority to regulate the curriculum and direction of religious institutions, bringing them in line with “modern” schools and enabling their graduates to become contributing members of society. Many call for open dialogue and debate promoting pluralism throughout the country.



Introduction: The State of Moderate Islam in Pakistan, 2007

Pakistani society is passing through an intense phase of transformation. Caught in a vortex of tumultuous change vitally affecting worldviews, values, social strictures, and lifestyles, various sections of Pakistani society find themselves pitched in a confrontation with their fellow countrymen and co-religionists. Pakistanis increasingly find themselves fragmented along various axes: religious, ideological, linguistic, economic, and political. There are also geographical and ethnic fault lines in the country. The pro-Western government finds itself embroiled in several crises, most of which are related to varying attitudes towards pluralism, religious moderation, women”s rights, Islamic education, and Pakistan”s place in the region and the world. There is a heightened sensitivity of Muslims throughout the world towards what is seen to be the aspiration of the West—primarily the U.S.—for global domination. In the post 9/11 world, Muslims generally feel themselves to be the object of American and Western foreign policy defined by the readiness to use an assortment of sanctions along with military force, which vast sections of Muslims see as being the cause of most of their troubles from Iraq to Afghanistan and Darfur to Palestine. With a long list of perceived double standards—from Guantanamo and “extraordinary rendition” to profiling and simple prejudice—research studies like the present one tend to reflect the mindset of the victim.110 The weeks preceding the research witnessed widespread divisiveness in Pakistan”s national political and religious milieu. In the heart of the national capital Islamabad, the government seemed helpless against baton-wielding women from a female madrassa111 and their male counterparts who were on a rampage harassing the owners of video-stores and even kidnapping intelligence police personnel. In the tribal areas an undeclared yet fairly extensive armed conflict has been going on between religious militants and the Pakistan army, with the latter having lost nearly a thousand men. The opposition religious parties had apologized for having initially supported the military dictator General Musharraf, who in spite of his widely propagated “enlightened moderation” had not made much headway against the well entrenched alliance of religious parties, the Muttahida Majlis-i Amal (MMA), which forms the backbone of governments in two of the four provinces and whose head is the chief of opposition in the national parliament. Pakistan in 2007 is a mix of tensions between Islam and the West, traditional vs. progressive interpretations, and the simple politics of resource allocation. At the time that this report was being written, July 2007, the single most bloody and bitter encounters in the long running battle between of the forces of religious extremism and the government has just ended in full view of the international media. While figures are disputed, the government estimates that 100 militants, females, children, and members of the Pakistani military perished in an operation launched to clear a mosque and a madrassa in the Pakistani

110 During the Karachi leg of the study, a strong resentment was shown against the scheme of the research which presumed the division of Islam into a “moderate” and, by implication, a “non-moderate” Islam. Participants said, “There is no such thing as moderate Islam” and that, “There may be moderate Muslims and extremist Muslims, but the religion has no categories or brands.” 111 E.g., Jamia Hafsa. It would be pertinent to note that many believed then and quite a few believe even now that the confrontational posture of this group was orchestrated by Pakistan”s “agencies.”



capital of more than a thousand students and their militant supporters who had earlier formed a self-appointed moral police. Although this vigilante group had been active for several months, the breakpoint came when seven Chinese masseurs were kidnapped and accused of moral corruption. Following this kidnapping the government warned the militants to leave the mosque and madrassa or face the full onslaught of the state. The standoff continued for a week, ending in a woeful tragedy which according to many was avoidable. Unfortunately the tragedy has not ended. Presumably as a direct consequence of this bloodbath a series of suicide-bombers not only attacked soft civilian targets but also blew up convoys of the army killing nearly 40 soldiers. Within a week”s time, the figure of fatalities rose to over 200. More such attacks are feared in what might be a long lasting battle that could have international repercussions and even prove ominous for the country”s stability. Pakistan’s real struggle with what is popularly termed religious extremism can be traced to the late 1970”s. At this time a leftward leaning quasi-secular government was overthrown by General Muhammad Ziaul Haq, the then army chief, after a strong, countrywide mass movement ventilated its grievances against the incumbent government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Ziaul Haq identified himself with the religious right (which had maintained the campaign against the incumbent Bhutto regime), and initiated a process of Islamization. In 1979, two almost simultaneous events added an impetus to Pakistan”s Islamization. The Russian invasion of Afghanistan saw a strategy of arming and funding of the anti-communist guerillas by the United States (carried out through the active support of the Pakistani government) while the coming to power of a religious regime in Iran meant the export of a resurgent Shi”ism and funding to Shia religious resurgence.

The Questions

This report covers the results of focus group surveys conducted in three Pakistani cities in early 2007. To undertake the survey and make subsequent assessments in Pakistan, a national coordination team was formed under the leadership of Dr. Zafar Ishaq Ansari.112 The focus group discussions centered on issues of economic development, education, pluralism, and women”s rights, but avoided directly political themes such as the promotion of democracy. The focus groups were asked the following questions:

• How would you characterize the majority opinion in Pakistan on issues such as religious pluralism and women’s rights?

• Do you believe there is a correlation between Islamic education and religious intolerance in Pakistan?

• Would you recommend reform on religious education or public education regarding religious minorities?

• Given Islam”s long legal tradition of guaranteeing religious freedom, how would you recommend promotion of pluralism in Pakistan?

112 The team comprised the following individuals: Khurshid Ahmed Nadeem, Islamabad; Syed Abu Ahmad Akif, Karachi; and Muhammad Suheyl Umar, Lahore.



In Karachi, there were difficulties in starting and sustaining the focus group discussions after the topic for the research had been revealed and the NBR or American connection announced. Only with some persuasion did participants continue their discussions on issues they considered part of a highly political—even conspiratorial—Western/Christian agenda and not an unbiased intellectual research, notwithstanding the involvement of respected local personalities associated with various esteemed institutions. Almost all the participants of the survey were keenly aware of the widening breach between the various points of view and the growing debate on the issues selected for the survey. There was a general agreement on the evident polarization of Pakistani society and violence between the groups of “Westernized” rejectionists and religious/political extremists. Members felt that the “ultras” are no longer a minority in the worldwide attempt to revive Islam, and thus no one can to ignore them. The extremes have broadened and the middle ground has become increasingly narrow, giving way to wide-scale confusion. “Moderation” emerged as a key-concept around which most of the issues were debated. Apart from the fact that “moderation” was connected with the strategy enunciated by the present Pakistani government, the concept was also seen as a middle course—i.e., the remedy for the present crisis—religiously, intellectually, and culturally. There was no consensus, however, on the exact definition and implications of “moderation.” Among participants, there was support for moderation as well as opposition and criticism. Objections and reservations about the idea of moderation were voiced by those who harbour suspicions about its rationale. Suggestions were made for building bridges across divergent views and promoting confidence for the “other” that could help Pakistanis create a reliable and effective national strategy for solving the country’s problems. Conflict among the participants immediately arose as the advocates of moderation tried to translate the concepts of “moderation” into action. There are five major areas of conflict where the approach that looks for a middle path is immediately confronted with opposition and divergent of views:

• gender issues (i.e., rights of women, employment, education, etc.); • the religious “other” (i.e., minorities’ status, human rights, international relations with

non-Muslims, jihad/terrorism); • cultural issues (i.e., cultural values—Islamic/Western, entertainment, media, etc.); • state religion (including questions related to state intervention in private life, issues like

Hasba Act, etc.); • state legislation (including questions related to the Hudood Ordinance/Riba/ Blasphemy

Law, etc.).

Below are some important criticisms encountered during the survey which concerned the general framework in which the questions were being asked:

• The West should ask itself the following question. Where in the Muslim world were

fanatics in positions of decision making? On the other hand, a number of decision makers



in the West, especially in the United States, are fundamentalists who are increasingly bringing their faith into the public realm.

• Recent polls had revealed that 85% of the western population approved of civilian killings, under whatever pretext or logic, while only 45% of the Muslim population approved this course of action!

• Throughout Europe, the borderline right wing fascist parties were in the ascendant. This was in sharp contrast with the Muslim world.

• Amendments in prevailing laws were being used to curtail civil liberties and rights in the West (primarily in the US with its Patriot Act). The moderates were certainly not doing this.

The coordinators felt that a predetermined framework often forced the survey’s participants to reach conclusions that were not necessarily sound and balanced in the larger perspective.

The Groups113

In all 108 participants took part in focus-group discussions in Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore (12, 26 and 70 respectively). While all groups comprised samples of convenience, by and large all major national groups – except formal members of the military - were associated with the survey either directly or indirectly.

Islamabad

A small but very influential group of participants undertook the discussion under the moderation of a TV broadcaster, journalist and scholar, Khurshid Nadeem. Karachi

Four focus groups comprising a total of 26 persons—many of them government officers—assembled in Karachi to discuss the issues presented in the concept paper. A great outburst took place when it was (voluntarily) revealed that the research had been commissioned by a US-based organization. The concept appeared conspiratorial to the group: all the elements of the conspiracy had come together, i.e., America”s onslaught against Islam mediated through such themes as pluralism and women”s rights which were also being harped on by those perceived to be their agents like the President of Pakistan and the coordinators of this survey. It was obvious that the term “moderate Islam” had touched many a raw nerve. In the uproar that followed soon after the start, several participants became incensed and outraged that any one had brought up the topic of “moderate Islam.” This was in spite of the fact that all the participants without exception were college graduates, rather than people of the ulema class, middle to upper income,114 unaffiliated with any political party and without any formal affiliation to any religious organization. One of the groups was so totally focused on the research being commissioned by a US based group, they refused to budge from the “should be” normative position.

113 For a list of focus group participants, see Appendix. 114 The lowest income was Rs. 40,000 /appx. $4,000 per month in purchasing power parity.



Lahore

The survey conducted in Lahore, Pakistan”s second largest city, included 70 persons from different walks of life, representing various religious affiliations and diverse educational and professional backgrounds, ranging from “secular liberals” to religious groups of different persuasions (both Shiite and Sunni). A maximum effort was made to identify the finer shades of religious affiliations by indicating the groups to which individuals belonged. Political affiliations were also noted. The attached list gives brief information on each participant and their place in the “lay of the intellectual landscape.”

The Discussions

Women’s Rights

Islamabad

It was agreed that the majority opinion varied throughout the country depending on the province, ethno-linguistic group and social class. It was thought that it would not be appropriate to club the whole of the country into one single monolithic “majority opinion.” Indeed, every province had its own culture which was a blend of long held social traditions, historical experiences, and interpretation of religion in that particular region. For example, in NWFP bordering Afghanistan, the local tradition tended to portray women as property and a burden on men. Women tend to be considered second rate citizens and subordinate to men in every sphere of life. Almost without exception the same patriarchal perception prevailed in the rural areas of the other provinces. Barrister Zafarullah, a participant, a leading national lawyer and human rights activist recalled his past observations and experiences when serving as a civil servant in the rural areas. He said that the fundamental rights of women granted both by Islamic and secular laws like inheritance, divorce (khul”a) and post-divorce maintenance were routinely denied in the rural areas of Punjab and other parts of the country. Moreover, contrary to popular belief, the denial of these rights to either Muslims or non-Muslims came in equal measure, regardless of religious affiliation. Other participants agreed with this observation. Participants also pointed out the need for creating some degree of clarity and developing agreement towards a comprehensive definition of women”s rights in Islam. “If it meant a denial of the need to wear hijab (or having to be modestly dressed), granting of an absolute right of divorce to women, and marriage without consent of guardians (wali), then this society will not support such an agenda. These are not considered to be “the real problems of the society” but issues being “deliberately propagated by some people under Western influence.” It was also observed that most of the problems faced by women are of these women”s own creation. The relationship between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law or between sisters-in-law generally adversely affects the peaceful domestic environment which in many cases leads to tragic consequences. For example the desire for a male child, mostly provoked by the woman relatives of the husband, often led to divorce or a second marriage. This is an unfortunate aspect of our social fabric which needs to be reformed.



Professor Fateh Mohammad Malik, a leading academic and a visiting professor at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, was very critical of Western powers and local NGOs which, in his opinion, propagated a foreign agenda. He said that women were being exceedingly used as commodities by both the multi-national and local marketing companies for commercial gain in a way that violated their honor. No NGO active in women”s rights had raised this issue. He also observed that Western involvement in this context had generated a reaction that has harmed women”s rights. Professor Malik observed that more female students were wearing the hijab today as compared to the past—an act which he considered to be a reaction against foreign cultural pressures. He was of the opinion that Muslim women should come out and openly compete in various walks of life for which the society will respect them. He quoted examples of Begum Shaista Ikramullah, a member of first legislative assembly of Pakistan and an Ambassador to the UN in the 1960”s, Ms. Benazir Bhutto and Syeda Abida Hussain and most recently several combat pilots in the Pakistan Air Force who had entered the political and public arena on the basis of merit. These were symbols of women”s dignity. He said that many of the women presently sitting in national and other assemblies were not true representatives of Pakistani women as they were in these forums because of their accidental relationship with a host of influential male politicians and a change of the system by the military government guaranteeing them one third of the seats—not in their independent and individual capacities. It was pointed out that the most of the women in the forefront of women rights activism hailed from the elite classes and had little or no interaction with the majority of our women who were poor and mostly rural based. This was a major reason why ordinary citizens—and women—could not identify themselves with the “development/ NGO-set.” Some participants opined that this issue of women”s rights had its roots in the socio-economic environment rather than in religion as was widely believed. Women who had been educated and had become economically independent were able to undertake a transformation with greater ease than their less resourced compatriots. Among other social restraining forces, the participants blamed the feudal system for many of the sufferings of Pakistani women. It was noted that while urban intelligentsia had long campaigned against the political and economic stranglehold of the feudal class, no comprehensive campaign had been launched against this system. In spite of the presence of numerous NGOs in the country, few if any had worked or were working for the elimination of this root cause of evils prevalent in the society. By the same token governments had not been seriously interested in land reforms and none had dared to implement the levy of agricultural tax. This was because of the political influence of the feudal class. Some participants linked feudalism with a misinterpretation of Islam. For example, the denial of the right of inheritance to women went in favor of the feudal class who did not want a division of their estates and thus, in a totally anti-Islamic interpretation, they married their women to the Qur”an, in a manner akin to the nuns who dedicated themselves to the service of the Lord. Karachi

In Karachi, where a large majority of the participants comprised government officers, not unexpectedly strongly normative statements were forthcoming. The participants said that a



majority of Pakistanis believed in women”s equality primarily because Islam grants equal status to women though giving them slightly different roles and responsibilities. Where such equality was not the case, it was believed to be primarily a class and cultural issue. It was noted that even the urban middle class did not consider women as equal and did not like Islam”s provisions on treating them equally and sharing property with them on account of vested interests. However, some participants did take a relativist approach and said that while perceptions of women”s rights varied, by and large the people of Pakistan were generally not in favor of “women”s rights” as understood and practiced in the West and propagated by the Western media. All the same, the majority opinion in Pakistan on pluralism and women”s rights remained a moderate and positive one.

The participants said, that while perceptions of women”s rights varied, undoubtedly, by and large the people of Pakistan were generally not in favor of “women”s rights” as is understood and practiced in the West and propagated by Western media. Most Pakistanis” views were influenced by Islam—for instance, most of them agreed that women should be modestly dressed. It was agreed that while Pakistanis had gender biases, if asked their opinion, the majority of Pakistanis would say that the rights of women are adequately protected (with the obvious exception of some contentious provisions of the Hudood Ordinance).

On the other hand, many believe in the equality of women primarily because Islam grants equal status to women though giving them slightly different roles and responsibilities. The participants felt that this was primarily a class question. The rural middle class, for instance, does not consider women as equal to men and effectively did not like Islam”s provisions on treating women equally and sharing property with them on account of their vested interests. On the other hand, the lower income groups which were by and large uneducated did not have a say in the national discourse.

Lahore

Three levels of responses could be discerned from the opinions expressed on the question of women”s rights: On the first level, both the religious and the liberal (and to a large extent the secular as well) agreed that women”s rights are guaranteed in the basic Islamic texts. Most scholars even compared the distinct Islamic record with a lackluster performance in the West up until modern times (even the example of Cambridge University”s denying admission to female students until not long ago came up). Some participants pointed out “problems” in Islamic texts and law which considered females as having a “lesser status in intelligence and, by implication, in creation.” In this connection the “sanction of wife beating” in the Qur”an and, by implication, male superiority was mentioned. A majority of religious people (80%) simply observed these aspects silently, presumably owing to a thinly disguised chauvinistic attitude that considered this question not being worth a discussion.



On the second level almost all (90%) of the liberals/moderates and the seculars talked about the duplicity or dichotomy of thought/claims and practice on the question of women”s rights in vast sections of the Pakistani society, especially in rural and tribal areas. They cited examples of customs, conventions, and attitudes that hampered or violated women”s rights and emphasized a need for social and legal reforms. Most of the religious participants attempted to defuse the issues by issuing rhetorical platitudes about women”s rights (60%) or side stepped the issue (40%) by declaring it to be a Western agenda. On a third level the question was addressed conceptually: some 40% religious scholars and 20% “liberals” said that the whole question of women”s rights, as well as the larger issue of human rights, had been conceived and had evolved differently in the modern discourse of human rights/social sciences vis-à-vis the classical Islamic tradition of maqasid al-shari”a; hence the difficulty it faced in Islamic societies. The same idea was expressed with relation to the issue of male chauvinism and negative stereotypes of the feminine in Muslim societies as these hampered the process of reform and legislation (60% of the total participants). The seculars asserted that male chauvinism was inherent to Islam as well as to religion as such while some of the liberals (40%) attributed it to an erroneous interpretation of Islamic texts and the attitudes prevalent among religious people. A tiny minority of the religious (20%) grudgingly admitted that it was related to misplaced religious arguments (claiming at the same time that it was nothing specific to Islam, citing Hindu and Christian instances). Some of the participants (15%) rejected the idea out of hand and attributed it to American Western propaganda and the agenda of globalization/Westernization/modernism/political aims, etc.

Religious Pluralism

Islamabad The participants observed that traditional society in the Punjab region was, on the whole more tolerant in religious matters. Muslims generally, and those in South Asia particularly, had long lived with people of other religions in mutual harmony. This tolerance was also observed in relationship with other Muslim sects including the “deviationist” groups (e.g., Qadianis, etc.). There was some unrest in some parts of the Punjab on the Qadiani issue in the 1950s but it was a local phenomenon having roots in the power politics of that time. After 1979, particularly in the NWFP, the situation had changed immensely and now intolerance was the central feature of this society. In Swat the Ahl-e-Hadith were grossly maltreated and the same had happened in Balakot. In Bara Agency 500 causalities had been reported in Deobandi-Barelvi clashes. After the US-led attack on Afghanistan, this intolerance for the West and other religions mounted alarmingly. Social behavior in this region was a product of both psychological and historical factors. For instance, for a long period those who had been rendered as untouchables by the Hindu Society been relegated to the task of menial and “dirty” jobs which were not considered respectable (such as toilet cleaning). Even when these groups converted to Christianity their social status did not improve significantly. Their occupation made them second class citizens and this had now



become a part of Muslim psyche in this region: thus, even when their job orientation changed with passage of time, they are often referred to with uncharitable words. Indian Muslims” relationships with Hindus had a historical background. Having ruled large parts of Hindu India, the Muslims” loss of power eventually led to the creation of Pakistan on the basis of the “two nation theory” which itself was based on the notion that the Muslim minority would never be allowed by the bigoted Hindu majority to live in peace and with honor: hence the demand for separation from the areas of India which had a Hindu majority. Given this worldview, combined with repeated acts of Indian hostility against Pakistan, Pakistan”s relationship with India was a stressful one and led to the creation of a national-security state which had hampered its development into a state and society trulty welcoming religio-cultural diversity. On the Qadiani issue, participants felt that the Qadianis had undermined a fundamental premise of Islam. The concept of a new prophet was an attempt to divide and rule the Muslims through the creation of a new ummah. It was seen as a political conspiracy against the Muslim civilization by the British colonial regime. The participants agreed that this state of prejudice ought to be changed, yet they felt that change would not come in days. It needed a continued effort. Islam did not believe in religious discrimination.

Karachi

The majority of Pakistanis espoused, supported and practiced pluralism. Pakistanis had long exhibited tolerance towards their fellow community members and friends. The apparent exceptions were due to non-religious reasons embedded in economic or political rivalry and other social and cultural limitations. A fringe or minority which was not ready to accommodate religious pluralism, however, did exist. This included a section of the professional religious class, its close followers and those taught in traditional religious institutions. This fringe was organized, vocal and well funded, and therefore, effective (in propagating its creed). The majority, however, believed in a Sufic interpretation of Islam which formed the popular opinion on religious issues. The participants felt that in spite of the fact that a large majority of Pakistanis was illiterate—or perhaps because of it—most of them believed in religious tolerance. This could be especially seen in the interior of the country where religious minorities were largely living peacefully with the majority Muslims. Indeed, it was felt that the educated class was under a greater influence of the radicals on account of their ability to be accessed through modern means of communication. Many made references to the increasing use of the internet by Muslims with extremist inclinations. Participants said that religious pluralism was evident, much more than absent, in every day life. This could be seen in offices and workplaces where colleagues from various denominations worked together in quite friendly environments. Generally speaking, during the sensitive period of Muharram too, a strong Shia-Sunni harmony is in evidence. The present Acting Chief Justice



is a Hindu115 and there are large numbers of religious minorities which continue to operate their age old businesses. Lahore

Conceptually, the question of religious pluralism was not of supreme importance for the seculars as, explicitly or implicitly, they maintained the position that religion was a human phenomenon that developed in response to psychological, social and other human challenges and needs. Almost all the seculars regarded religion as irrelevant to the concerns of modern life and hence religious pluralism was not seen as a problem as all religions were equally redundant. However, unlike their western counterparts, none of the Pakistani seculars took the next logical step of denying the transcendent or the Divine.116

The religious side, both the lay and the authorities, considered diversity of religions as divinely ordained and based on a wisdom that corresponded to the geographical and ethnic diversity of humankind. As such they had no problem with religious pluralism. The problem, as envisaged today, lay elsewhere. Muslims had been encouraged to believe, and the majority did eagerly believe, that Islam had superseded all other religions and accordingly it was the only valid religion on earth. All the same, howsoever absolute the claims of Muslim theologians and jurisprudents may be, they are shown as being receptive to the tolerance which Islam makes obligatory not just towards Judaism and Christianity but towards all creeds; reference was particularly made to the Qur”anic praise of truly believing Jews and Christians. On the practical level the situation was similar to the opinions expressed in reply to the question of women”s rights: Here too both the religious and the liberals agreed that the rights of the minorities were guaranteed in the basic Islamic texts and that later Islamic law mentioned it with a sense of pride (75%). In their opinion, Islamic historical record in this regard outshone the Christian, the Jew and the Hindu, etc. When confronted with the issue of the attacks on the Shia and the, Christian and Hindu communities, paradoxically the responses were both divided and unanimous. Participants were unanimous in saying that such acts were not sanctioned by Islam and were the doing of individuals or groups who believed in political violence bred by religious extremism. The responses were, however, divided on the issue of responsibility. The most common of the responses to such arguments (60%) was a personal dissociation from the monstrosities of religious persecution by saying that they were not true to the spirit of Islam. The other (40%) argued that such a discussion amounted to side-stepping the question and turning a blind eye to the fact that the groups in question (from among the Muslim communities) were not only making religious arguments to validate their actions but also claimed that the conceptual framework and basic assumptions through which these groups operated were supported by basic religious texts. In this case one could not absolve oneself of personal responsibility by simply disowning the group or groups in question. One must place the sin at the doorsteps of a definite group, school

115 This was written on July 16, 2007. On July 20, 2007 the suspended Chief Justice, who is a Muslim, was restored by the Bench of the Supreme Court. On November 03, 2007, the government managed to get rid of both, the Hindu and the Muslim judges who were not sufficiently compliant. 116 Perhaps for lack of conviction or the fear of the public reaction!



of thought or mode of interpretation in one”s community and try to hold a mirror to their thinking. A small number of survey participants (20%) suggested that the lack of accommodation and tolerance for religious pluralism stemmed from the growing tendency of the religious authorities and lay people under their influence to equate non-Muslims with the faithless/unbelievers (kufr). Thus there was a shift from the earlier inclusiveness to an overwhelming exclusiveness.

Islamic Education and Religious Intolerance

Karachi

Many participants felt that Islamic education was mainly provided in religious madrassas managed by people espousing narrow interpretations of Islam and holding sectarian biases; these institutions reinforce religious intolerance. As such, one group believed that there was a strong correlation between Islamic education and intolerance. As the state had failed to provide any kind of proper education the vacuum had come to be filled by madrassas of various colors and schools. Some of the participants presented different reasons for this state of affairs. Some saw the madrassas in the subcontinent as having a sectarian basis. They espoused the Deobandi, Barelvi, Ahl-i-hadith and Shia schools of thought, rather than a wholesome Islamic ethos and orientation, per se. Participants felt that promotion of loyalty to one”s narrow identity usually went hand in hand with promoting the broad fundamentals of Islam, but sometimes even at their cost. Other participants claimed that students with low mental caliber or those belonging to economically depressed groups generally gravitated to these madrassas. The consequences of this segregation were considered obvious. In these schools, there was little if any emphasis on critical inquiry while much attention was paid to rote learning and total submission. This economic co-relationship continues after the graduates leave the schools when little else is available to these students except the job of leading prayers (imamat) in a mosque or teaching Qur”anic reading at madrassas. Since most mosques are identified with one sect or the other, their affiliation with a sect enables graduates to secure jobs. One group said that “Islamic education” was a very vague term. When used to refer to Islamic instruction received in the “normal” Western modeled education established in the colonial or post-colonial era then there is no correlation of such education with religious intolerance. With openness allowing difference of opinions, at least two Karachi groups said that there was no correlation at all between “Islamic education” and intolerance. Whatever differences that there existed, this group claimed, were because of “mullah-ism” (a term used almost always for religious obscurantism). Some participants conceded that there were some madrassas—especially some of those established during or after Afghanistan”s armed resistance of Soviet military occupation in the 1980s and onwards—which gave rise to militancy and fuelled intolerant attitudes towards other interpretations. Some madrassas had an international political agenda and thus they trained and educated individuals to fight for the various Muslim causes taking place especially in Kashmir and Afghanistan.



One opinion was that religious intolerance in Muslim societies has long been presented in exaggerated terms. This participant claimed that such differences have long been an integral part of Christianity, Judaism and other religions as well.

Lahore

Almost all (90%) of the seculars and some of the liberals (20%) agreed that there was a correlation between Islamic education and religious intolerance in Pakistan which they termed as the hot bed of intolerance. The rest of the liberals (80%) and the religious participants denied that there was any connection between Islamic education and religious intolerance. A small number of survey participants (20%) denied occurrences of religious intolerance. The rest admitted its existence but attributed it to the shift from inclusivity to exclusivity mentioned earlier. The religiously inclined participants authorities were more explicit on the question as they pointed out the fact that the texts used in the madrassa system for the last several centuries contained no such materials that promoted religious intolerance. Some even went to the extent of mentioning that no student of Islamic education ever had the chance to read a work like The Green Mantle that was a common school book in the West! According to them it was not the text but the context that drove people towards extremism. It was the mindset of the management that gave texts a certain interpretation and created a certain ethos.

Reform in Religious and Public Education

Islamabad and Karachi

The participants recommended the following reforms in contemporary religious education. They believed that, first, the curriculum should be revised. It should be based on the Qur”an and Sunnah, the basic Islamic sources, rather than on the interpretation of a particular. Respondents felt that this will generate open mindedness and acceptance for other interpretations. It was also recommended that civil society should take initiatives to establish madrassas with a revised curriculum. There should be a single curriculum for the entire country. The educational environment of the madrassas should also be changed to bring them on par with “modern” schools. It was generally agreed that madrassa administrations and educational boards like the Wafaq-ul-Madaris should be involved in taking the initiative for such reforms. Most respondents felt that courses about other religions should also be included in the curriculum. The groups believed that public education provided in government or private schools did not require any major reform. However, there was a need for all “religious education” to be regulated by one single authority. The curriculum needed to be redesigned so that students leaving these institutions could become useful members of society. The curricula should include modern sciences and knowledge in addition to traditional Islamic learning. The focus should be on values inculcated by the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) and his Companions. Lahore

Though some (10%) of the seculars had misgivings about the question, almost all the other participants saw no need for a reform in public education regarding religious minorities since the existing model used in Pakistani public education in this regard had worked well. Not only were there no polemical or hate promoting texts in public education but, more importantly, there was a



solid system in which there was no coercion. Both the Muslim and non-Muslim students studied common subjects together and parted company when Muslim students studied Islamic Studies and the non-Muslim students opted for “ethics,” etc. Reforms in religious education for religious minorities met with a mixed response from the participants. Some (40%) of the seculars regarded reforms as necessary with the argument (refuted by the religious) that it was religious education that was responsible for negative stereotyping of the “other,” a view that was shared by a tiny minority of the liberals. The other participants referred to the correlation between Islamic education and religious intolerance discussed earlier as far as the question of religious education regarding religious minorities was concerned. The more informed among them mentioned reform initiatives that had begun with the help of the Norwegian government. The Islamic religious authorities responsible for madrassa education (the Wafaq or Board of Islamic Education) had opened a dialogue with their Christian counterparts. They suggested that such interaction and exchange was required instead of madrassa bashing and superfluous, uninformed talk of religious education reform.

Looking Ahead: Promoting Pluralism in Pakistan

Karachi

While religious freedom and pluralism in Pakistan had existed in the past, participants believed that the state had failed to promote true Islamic teachings and education (in addition to failure in secular subjects), and the resulting vacuum in education alternatives has been filled by the madrassas, including those on the fringe. Some participants felt that the only solution was for the state to take up a proactive role and start providing religious education rather than leaving it to inadequately educated ulema in madrassas with rigid interpretations of Islam.

Participants called for extensive open debates, discussions and seminars on promoting pluralism to develop stakeholder consensus without which no change could be implemented. Extensive use of mass media and public activism were seen as promoting change. Poverty reduction and economic uplift were said to be the real routes to developing a pluralistic outlook; only by reducing income inequalities could there be a change in educational standards and subsequent movement towards creating a real awareness about the message of Islam in its real spirit. It was generally agreed that the United States must also realize that the way to an enlightened Muslim population begins with an end to their persecution. Participants felt that the US should consequently withdraw from Muslim areas and countries and end all aggression against Muslims. The US must also stop supporting illegitimate regimes in the Muslim world while the Western world should adopt a balanced policy towards Islam and Muslims. The “softer Sufic” image of Islam, advocating interfaith dialogue and toleration, was also seen as a possible means for promoting religious pluralism.



Lahore

There was no uniform response from the participants: Almost all (90%) of the secularists recommended a secular or at least neutral public sphere for the promotion of pluralism in Pakistan and some of the liberals (15%) agreed with them. With the religious participants, mention of Islam”s long legal tradition of guaranteeing religious freedom elicited the same normative response as it did with the question of women”s rights, i.e., that these freedoms were guaranteed in the basic Islamic texts. Once again, there was a comparison of the Islamic record with the lackluster performance in the West up until the modern times. One participant said that there was no flaw in the Islamic law or its provisions, but rather that it was the haphazard way of Islam”s implementation or the mishandling and corruption of the religious authorities that gave rise to problems. Some participants suggested increased dialogue, talk shows, cultural activities and publications on the issue of religious freedoms to raise awareness.

Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Asia Eurasia—Michael Bishku




Moderate Islam in Eurasia: Turkey, Iran, and Uzbekistan

Michael B. Bishku

Michael Bishku is Professor of history at Augusta State University where he teaches courses on the Middle East, Africa, and British Empire and Commonwealth. He received his PhD from New York University in History and Middle East Languages and Literatures in 1981. Dr. Bishku has received Fulbright grants to study in Morocco and Tunisia (2001), Uzbekistan (1997), Turkey (1988) and Pakistan (1984), and National Endowment for the Humanities grants to do research at Duke University (1991) and the University of Texas at Austin (1985). He is a past President of both the Association of Third World Studies (1995-96) and of the American Council for the Study of Islamic Societies (2005-6).



Executive Summary

Summary

This paper provides an overview of the state of “moderate” Islam in Turkey, Iran, and Uzbekistan. It finds that there has been an “opening up” in economic, cultural, political arenas, and gender relations in Turkey in recent years, led by moderate Muslims. The paper demonstrates that moderate Muslims in Iran are not anti-Western, but see U.S. foreign policy as employing double standards. In Uzbekistan, radical Islamic organizations exploit economic hardships and public discontent, while the iron-handed state views moderate Islamic associations with suspicion. Key Findings

• There has been an “opening up” in Turkey’s economy, culture, politics and gender relations. The Justice and Development (AK) Party, a group with Islamist roots, is largely responsible for these changes. As “enlightened” Islam gets wider representation, radical Islamist opposition declines.

• Moderate Muslims in Iran advocate human rights, showing them to be compatible with authentic Islamic texts. Moderate Iranian Muslims are not anti-Western, but see U.S. foreign policy employing double standards throughout the Islamic world. Iranians believe that while the international community can support the human rights movement in Iran, it is ultimately the Iranian peoples’ responsibility to advocate and adopt human rights reforms.

• Uzbekistan’s government strives to stifle all political opposition. The state’s heavy-handed tactics, along with economic hardship and wide public discontent, are exploited by radical Islamic organizations to gain influence. Despite the fact that moderate Islamic associations provide economic initiatives and a social safety-net to many, they are viewed as a threat to the state’s legitimacy.

Policy Implications

• In return for implementing political, economic and legal reforms designed to conform to the norms of the European Union (EU), the EU and the United States should adopt a more welcoming approach to Turkey’s membership. EU membership will secure Turkey’s political and economic connections with the West and insure expanded rights and freedoms within Turkey.

• The international community can play a more constructive role in promoting respect for human rights and democratic reform as well as addressing poverty and underdevelopment through economic assistance in the Middle Eastern region. Iranians view the plight of the Palestinians as a human rights issue; they see Israeli actions, condoned by Western countries, as violating human rights.

• While Islamic extremism exists in Central Asia, the interests of the government and the people of Uzbekistan would be better served by working with Islamic associations and moderate Islamic leaders to marginalize the radical Islamic organizations. The United States and the EU should encourage cooperation between international aid organizations and moderate Islamic associations.



Introduction and Historical Background

This paper provides an overview and critical assessment of the state of “moderate Islam” in three countries in Southwest or Central Asia – referred here by the term Eurasia – that have been influenced by Turkish and/or Persian culture: Turkey, Iran, and Uzbekistan. These countries, which are overwhelmingly Muslim in population, are very important in terms of geography, politics, and economics for both those inside and outside their respective regions. Their respective histories obviously reflect changes in international relations and domestic situations. This paper will focus on contemporary affairs and the implications for the United States. Definitions of Terms

While each of these countries covered in the paper have there own distinct characteristics culturally and politically, for the sake of uniformity, the term “moderate Islam” refers to a modernist interpretation of the religious texts, while the term “moderate Muslim” refers to those who identify with the religion of Islam and are committed to non-violence and peaceful coexistence among various religious traditions. In Iran, among moderate Muslims the term “Islam” can refer to either “First Islam” or the authentic sources of Islam, i.e., the Qur’an and Sunnah about which there is consensus on their authority and “Second Islam” or the different interpretations/human understanding of those texts. Iran is dominated by clerics, though laymen also participate in the political bureaucracy. Dress and proper behavior are regulated by the religious/political establishment according to Islamic law (shari’a). On the other hand, “Islamism,” a political ideology whose goal is to capture state power and establish a regime based on Islamic law or at the very least use Islam as a rhetorical reference point in order to legitimize political action, is unconstitutional in both Turkey and Uzbekistan. However, Turkey’s democratic system has allowed Islamist political parties to operate for limited periods of time until the military, who until the last decade was seen as the historical guardian of Kemalism, intervened. Turkey

Turkey occupies a distinct place in the Islamic world. “Official Islam” (i.e. clerics and religiously related institutions) is sanctioned or controlled by the Turkish government. Under the Republic established by Kemal Atatürk in 1923, it became the first predominantly Muslim country to secularize and establish this principle in its Constitution. Turkey, nonetheless, records all citizens outside of Jews, Greek Orthodox, and Armenian Apostolic as “Muslims,” even those who are non-Sunni such as the Alevis or non-practicing nominal Muslims as well as Baha’is and those from small Christian sects! Under Atatürk’s leadership, during the 1920s, Turkey abolished the Caliphate and later replaced Arabic script with a modified Latin alphabet. In addition, it fully adopted European law and the Western calendar. That same decade, men were prohibited from wearing the fez, which suited Muslims for prayer as a skullcap could be worn under it, while women were discouraged from wearing the veil. In the 1930s, women were given the right to vote and serve in political and legal positions, while it was forbidden to wear religious dress outside of places of worship. Atatürk died in 1938, while his philosophy of Kemalism, which emphasized nationalism and secularism continued.



Following the Second World War, Turkey continued to look toward Europe by joining NATO, the Council of Europe and other Western organizations, while the Republican People’s Party, established by the late Kemal Atatürk, no longer had a monopoly in the Turkish parliament. Turkey is still in quest of membership in the European Union (EU). Since the 1950s, Turkey has relaxed restrictions on religious activities, with related issues becoming part of multi-party politics and, by 1970, an Islamist political organization, the National Order Party (later renamed the National Salvation Party, NSP) was established. The party’s leader and the face of political Islam in Turkey for the next couple of decades was Necmettin Erbakan. During the 1970s in the factional politics of the period, the NSP participated in coalition governments and held cabinet seats. Along with other political parties, the NSP was outlawed in the 1980 military coup, but resurfaced with the restoration of parliamentary government under the name Refah (Welfare) Party. During the 1980s and 1990s, Islamism was on the rise globally and specific political, economic and social developments in Turkey encouraged its growth. Among these were: massive urbanization, growth of an informal sector, decline of a developmentalist welfare state, neo-liberal orientation and deepening global integration of the economy, proliferation of small industry with subcontracting links to global markets, assertions of cultural peculiarities and authenticities, and the rise of liberal discourse of human rights. The last development was in contradiction to the Kemalist emphasis on the political will of the national community. Indeed, this movement away from the core identity, ideology and constituting principles of the Kemalist nation-state may be referred to as “Second Republicanism” and Islamism was able to develop in this environment as a “politics of identity.” Refah cut through class divisions by uniting, around a common Islamic identity, elements from all classes who were marginalized relative to the status acquired by political and ideological proximity to the Kemalist state who were then able to use the party to build networks of solidarity. Refah expanded from Turkish Islamism’s traditional social base of small-scale provincial business people to include the impoverished working-class population in big cities, left unprotected by the defunct welfare state, and from upwardly mobile elements seeking opportunities and acceptance. The latter included export-oriented sectors of the capitalist class, vocal members of the young professional middle class, and students. By 1994, Refah won the mayoralties of Ankara, the capital, and Istanbul, the commercial and intellectual center and a city of 12 million with mixed cultural backgrounds, including non-Muslims and foreign expatriates as well as religiously conservative migrants from the countryside. Recep Tayip Erdoğan was the mayor of the latter city and man who would become Turkey’s Prime Minister in early 2003 following the AK party’s victory in parliamentary elections in late 2002 with a plurality of 35 percent of the national vote and, due to Turkey’s system of proportional representation, a majority of seats. In 1995, Refah won a plurality of about 20 percent of the national parliamentary elections and formed a coalition government with the center-right True Path Party between June 1996 and July 1997, when they were forced out of office by the military following a process initiated with the memorandum of 28 February. In early 1998, Turkey’s Constitutional Court closed down Refah and banned its leader, Necmettin Erbakan from politics for five years for violating the principle of secularism by suggesting a plan to allow confessional laws for the respective communities,



including shari’a for consenting Muslims, a situation that existed under the Ottoman Empire’s millet system. The party was immediately replaced by the Fazilet (Virtue) Party, which was also closed down by the Constitutional Court in 2001. As a result, the old guard coalesced around Erbakan and formed the Saadet (Felicity) Party, which has little impact on Turkish politics, while the younger generation of reform-minded “post-Islamists,” led by Recep Tayip Erdoğan, founded the Justice and Development (AK) Party, which refers to itself as a “conservative democratic” political grouping. Learning from the failure of the Fazilet Party, the AK Party has realized that human rights can only be protected universally, rather than selectively. The AK Party is expected to increase its hold on the Turkish parliament in elections scheduled for July 2007, despite having a vote in that same body in May for compromise presidential candidate, Abdullah Gül, the foreign minister, invalidated by the Constitutional Court as a result of a lack of quorum caused by the opposition Republican People’s Party. While there are secularists who feel that the AK party has a hidden Islamist agenda, most do not want another military coup as it would eliminate any chance of Turkey joining the EU.

Iran

Shi’ism was proclaimed the official state religion of Iran with the establishment of the Safavid dynasty in the early 16th century. Unlike the Ottoman Empire, modernization and secularization had a very limited affect on Iran during the 19th century, which was far weaker politically, economically and militarily than its western neighbor. As a result, Russia and Great Britain had a tremendous impact on Iranian domestic affairs. Indeed, Great Britain’s most important economic interest was the Anglo-Persian (later Anglo-Iranian) Oil Company, established in 1909. In 1921, with the withdrawal of Soviet and British forces from the country, Reza Khan, the commander of a Cossack brigade, was able to proceed to consolidate the various forces in Iran under his command. Two years later, he forced the Qajar monarch into exile and by 1925 became shah establishing the Pahlavi dynasty, replacing a “Turkish” line with a “Persian” one. The religious establishment was opposed to a republic. Unlike Atatürk, whose policies he admired, Reza Shah never established an official political party, but the Iranian parliament (or Majlis) became a rubber-stamp assembly. Reza Shah’s reforms were nowhere near as extensive or as greatly applied as was Atatürk’s as the ulema remained independent and continued to wear religious dress in public. While Islam remained the official religion of Iran, during the 1920s, European law was adopted in civil matters. The Islamic lunar calendar was replaced with the Zoroastrian solar calendar. State schools were open to females and there was an attempt to prohibit the women from wearing the veil, but they did not receive the right to vote until 1963. In 1941, Reza Shah was sent into exile eventually in South Africa, where he died four years later. The Soviets and British militarily occupied Iran for the duration of the Second World War and placed the Shah’s son Mohammad Reza on the throne. Besides the ulema, the young shah had to deal with leftists, landlords and the bazaaris (traders). Despite having extensive powers under the 1949 Constitution – the Shah could appoint the prime minister, dissolve the Majlis and was commander-in-chief of the military – and also a great deal of wealth from crown lands and businesses, he could not prevent Mohammed Mosaddeq and the National Front, composed largely of liberal nationalists who came mostly from urban and educated backgrounds, from weakening his position during the oil nationalization crisis of 1951-53. It took an American and



British coup to restore his power. In 1957, the Shah created SAVAK, a domestic security agency to suppress opposition to the monarchy. In June 1963, Ayatollah Khomeini was arrested for his protesting land reform and women’s suffrage as part of the so-called “White Revolution,” and was subsequently sent abroad into exile. Landlords who were supportive of the Shah were exempt from cooperating and redistributed plots were too small to be efficient. The continuing autocratic political rule of the Shah, corruption in government institutions, and economic troubles during the late 1970s left the Iranian ruler with few supporters. In addition, his close military ties with the United States and Israel were unpopular with the ulema and leftists. In February 1979, Khomeini returned to Iran, a fortnight after the Shah went into exile, as the military declared its neutrality. Khomeini, who became Iran’s supreme leader, died in 1989 and was succeeded by the Ayatollah Ali Khameni. In recent years, there have been four different tendencies among Muslim scholars in Iran: (1) Traditional, anti-human rights Muslims such as Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Messbah Yazdi, a member of Iran’s Assembly of Experts, and Ayatollah Ali Jannati, a member of both the Guardian Council and the Assembly of Experts; (2) Modern, anti-human rights Muslims such as the current President Mahmud Ahmadinejad – Khameni is the most well-known advocate for these two groups; (3) Traditional, pro-human rights Muslims such as Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri; and (4) Modern, pro-human rights Muslims such as Abdul Karim Soroush (1945- ), Mohammad Mojtahed Shabesstari (1936- ), Mostafa Malekiyan (1956- ), and Mohsen Kadivar (1959- ). Even though the philosophy of scholars in this group has had an important impact on Iranian thought, these individuals have not been active in the political arena. Former President Mohammad Khatami and 2003 Nobel Peace Laureate Shirin Ebadi are associated with this group. Uzbekistan

In the 17th and 18th centuries, there were three khanates in what is today Uzbekistan: Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokand. During the 1860s and 1870s, these territories fell under Russian control or influence, but over the next couple of decades there were periodic revolts of Muslim groups in the Fergana Valley against foreign rule. In Tashkent, there was a governor-general appointed by the Tsar who was responsible for Russification in the region. At the same time, the Jadidist movement, which attempted to modernize Islamic culture, faced opposition from the Russian government as well as the traditionalist ulema. At the time of the Russian Revolution, a number of Jadidists supported the Bolsheviks, but during the 1930s, many were purged from the Communist Party by Joseph Stalin. During the 1920s, Soviet authorities prohibited the use of the name “Turkestan,” and divided Central Asia into “national” states that scattered ethnic groups across borders. Islamic revolts led by mullahs and clan leaders, known by the name Basmachi (bandits), erupted throughout Uzbekistan (and the rest of Central Asia) in 1918 and lasted more than a decade. These were in resistance to Soviet actions, which in certain ways resembled the secularist policies of Kemalism in Turkey, but were brutal in their application. Arabic script was replaced first in the 1920s with Latin and in the 1930s with Cyrillic characters. (Since independence, Uzbekistan has readopted Latin script.) Sufi (mystic) brotherhoods were persecuted, waqfs (pious endowments) were seized and Islamic courts and schools were closed down. The veiling of women was officially discouraged and the hajj was precluded. During the



1930s, large numbers of mosques were closed (and in certain cases converted into workshops), Muslim ceremonies were banned, and ulema were arrested and/or executed. During the Second World War and afterwards, there was some relaxation of discriminatory policies. A Muslim Spiritual Board, which regulated official Islam in Central Asia, was established in Tashkent. The hajj was permitted on a selective basis, Qur’ans were allowed to be printed in Arabic, and madrasas (Islamic schools) were opened in Tashkent and Bukhara to train state-approved mullahs. At the same time, unofficial Islamic clerics and institutions operated underground. By the late 1980s, there were public displays of Islamic revival and the Qur’an was translated into Uzbek for the first time in 1992. Since independence in 1991, censorship has been very prevalent in Uzbekistan; there is no independent press and publications of books relating to Islam are connected with the history of Uzbekistan, rather than contemporary Islamic thought or Islamic jurisprudence. Islam Karimov, a former Communist official and independent Uzbekistan’s only president, rules with an iron fist. Thousands of political opponents have been killed, jailed or fled into exile and official Islam is still regulated by the state. Just like the late president of Turkey, Turgut Özal (1989-1993), Karimov made a hajj to show his country’s cultural rather than political connection with Islam. While radical Islam is insignificant in Turkey, it is problematic in Uzbekistan. Yet Karimov’s government has been excessive in its behavior using global terrorism as an excuse to operate against moderate secular and religious opponents of the regime. Muhammad Solih, exiled chairman of the banned Erk (Freedom) Party, who ran for president of Uzbekistan in 1991, was sentenced to jail in absentia for twenty years in a show trial in 2000 for a bombing in Tashkent the previous year. The Uzbekistani press published a doctored photograph in which Solih was meeting leaders of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Afghanistan. While Wahhabism was introduced to the Fergana Valley in 1912 by a native of Medina, Sayed Shari Muhammad, it never became popular due to the area’s Sufi tradition. By the 1980s, with Saudi assistance in the Afghan War, it was reintroduced to the region, but the Uzbekistani government has since the 1990s exaggerated its presence by labeling ordinary Muslim believers who attend unofficial mosques, were unofficial prayer leaders, taught children how to read the Qur’an or wore religious beards as “Wahhabis.”

Research Framework and Participants

To assess the status of moderate Islam in Eurasia, representative focus groups were convened in each of the selected countries. Questions asked of participants in Turkey and Uzbekistan emphasized issues of political participation, religious tolerance, education and gender from the Islamic perspective. The focus groups were organized to represent cross sections of society. In the case of Iran, written philosophical works of four moderate Muslims – Abdul Karim Soroush, Mohammad Mojtahed Shabesstari, Mostafa Malekiyan, and Mohsen Kadivar – attempting to reconcile the modern concept of human rights with the authentic textual sources of Islam were utilized.

Turkey

There were two meetings in late January and mid-February 2007 which lasted about four hours each that were designed to study the diversity of Muslim identity and its transformation in the



context of social and political change. An important organization in this transformation is the Justice and Development (or AK) Party. Panelists included those identified as opinion leaders sharing Islamic identity and/or sensibility, while representing a cross section of Turkish society. The six individuals were chosen keeping in mind the three major dividing lines that define Turkey’s social structure: class, gender, and state vs. civil society.117 Uzbekistan

There were 38 interviewees, representing a “diverse range of professional, general, ethnic, and religious backgrounds,” coming from different geographical regions, and holding different ideologies. They included: four scholars (two affiliated with Uzbekistan government institutions and two conducting independent research); three human rights activists (two males from the Fergana Valley and a female from Tashkent); three imams (one representing the State Council for Muslims and two representing state-sanctioned mosques in the Fergana Valley); five journalists (two working for government newspapers and TV and three who are freelance); three business owners (one in agriculture from Karshi, located southwest of Samarkand, and the other two in furniture and candy, respectively, from the Fergana Valley); five students from state universities and colleges, the majority located in the Fergana Valley; three governmental officials (one representing the State Tax Committee, the other two from regional administrations in the Fergana Valley); and twelve “ordinary believers in Islam” who work in the agricultural sector, at least two being members of Hisb ut-Tahrir. The interviewees were asked seven separate questions on such subjects as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hisb ut-Tahrir, Akromiya (a group connected with a demonstration in the Fergana Valley in May 2005 that resulted in hundreds of people being killed by Uzbekistani troops and soured relations with the United States), religious (in)tolerance, and human rights.

Account of Discussions and Findings

Turkey

All participants were in agreement that there has been a liberalization in economic, cultural, and political arenas as well as gender relations in Turkey in recent years, and that the AK Party, and its transformation from its earlier Islamists roots, had been a factor in this regard. The HAK ĐŞ representative was reluctant to admit the Islamic origins of his organization, despite the fact that the word “hak” connotes both “God” and “justice.” He instead emphasized that his organization had developed the term, “conservative democracy,” which was later adopted by the AK Party. Like the AK Party, his organization now supported EU membership because it would expand liberal rights and freedoms in Turkey and promote the “parallel interests” of all elements in society, which could be addressed by the processes globalization. The MÜSĐAD representative agreed with this assessment and noted that members of his organization changed course

117 (1) There was the vice president of MÜSĐAD (the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen) founded in 1990, (2) an advisor to the president of HAK-ĐŞ, a labor union confederation originally established in 1976, (3) the first female vice mufti of Istanbul representing official Islam, (4) a female attorney who formerly headed the Women’s Commission of the Refah Party, (5) a professor of theology who is a member of the Higher Educational Council, which was created by the military regime in early 1980s to centrally control the Turkish university system, and (6) the Istanbul coordinator and national executive board member of MAZLUMDER, a human rights association founded in 1991. Both women wear headscarves. The professor and the attorney did not attend the second meeting.



following the military memorandum of 1997, which led to the overthrow of Erbakan’s Refah Party government. Despite the aforementioned organizations appealing to opposite sides of the class division there was agreement of its representatives on the value of give and take in democracy as opposed to promoting sectarian Muslim ideas and interests. The MAZLUMDER representative also concurred on the new openness among groups in Turkey, but used Islamic language and references the most of all panelists. He explained that there were difficulties in having to speak the cultural language of Muslims at the same time as promoting universal human rights. For example, it was tough for him to condemn Hamas for terrorist acts such as bombing buses when, in his words, Israel’s acts of aggression were no different. In addition, within his organization there were debates on whether they should defend the rights of transvestites, given the behavior’s offensiveness to many Muslims. The Vice Mufti of Istanbul is the first female in that position and a representative of the state-controlled Directorate of Religious Affairs. She was appointed a year ago to that position by the AK Party after having served as a preacher since 1993 and felt that the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Director of Religious Affairs, and the Mufti of Istanbul were all very enlightened officials chosen by the AK Party. Indeed, the Mufti prayed together with the Pope at a mosque on the latter’s visit to Turkey in November 2006. As for the promotion of women, there were female vice muftis in six other provinces. The Vice Mufti defended the Directorate as an important institution in assisting “average citizens” to rid themselves of “backward” cultural practices, particularly those regarding women, which they mistook as being religiously sanctioned. The female attorney and the MAZLUMDER representative, both from more radical Islamist backgrounds, challenged the contention that there could be a single “correct” version of Islam. However, when the Vice Mufti spoke up against specific discriminatory practices against women, such as treating boys and girls unequally and “honor killings,” she was supported by the female attorney and the MAZLUMDER representative. The Vice Mufti, who wore a headscarf, mentioned that at some university campuses she would be barred for this act! (It should be mentioned that both the Turkish Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights support the ban on headscarves on university campuses.) The professor of theology had formerly been a teacher of the Vice Mufti and a was a member of Higher Educational Council, the board responsible for the headscarf ban and, in the past, has been responsible for firing professors presumed to have links with political Islam. While he avoided discussion of sensitive political issues, his presence as an AK Party appointee on the Council was important as a demonstration of the government’s effort to mainstream Muslim opinion right into the secular establishment of the country. The liberalization in the economic, cultural, and political arenas in Turkey in recent years is a development which enhances the United States’ campaign to get the European Union to eventually accept Turkey as a member of that organization. Such a relationship would bring Turkey in line with the EU’s standards and provide a more stable political environment in the country. Perhaps the Turkish government and the Kurds would arrive at a mutually suitable arrangement guaranteeing the latter some form of autonomy while ensuring the territorial integrity of the country. A solution to the Kurdish issue also would improve Turkey’s relations



with its Middle Eastern neighbors in the long run, especially Iraq, a source of worry to European opponents of Turkey’s membership in the EU. Iran

The moderate Muslims’ project on human rights, to a large extent, is a reaction to the Islamic traditionalists approach to that issue. The former advocates human rights as specified in the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights and contrary to what traditionalists might believe that it is compatible with authentic Islamic texts. According to traditionalists, a Muslim’s main concern is (and must be) to know what he/she is obligated to do in order to avoid God’s wrath and punishment, and enjoy worldly happiness and eternal salvation. The human being is primarily considered to be the “duty-bearer” rather than the “right-holder.” In modern discourse, however, it is the reverse! The modernists approach is based on two fundamental assumptions: (1) the human being has an essential, inalienable domain of choice; and (2) therefore, the human being is autonomous, and free from any supreme source of authority. According to traditional Islam, rights of religion, life, property and mind are not guaranteed to all human beings equally. All citizens are divided into three classes – Muslims, “People of the Book” (i.e. Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians), and “Heathens.” A Muslim is not free to change his/her religion; to do so, one would become an apostate (murtad) and be severely punished. “People of the Book” must pay a special head tax (jizya) and are not allowed to forbid their children from participating in Islamic gatherings, attending Islamic schools, or being exposed to Islamic propaganda; additionally, they are not permitted to spread their religious ideas or criticize Islamic practices. As for “Heathens,” they are forced to convert of be killed, while their wives and children are to be enslaved and their property confiscated. Baha’is have been denied rights along these lines. However, nowadays as it might humiliate Muslims if these measures were carried out, they may be temporarily suspended. Moderate Muslims do not approve of these discriminatory laws as they are unjust. While they are loyal to “First Islam,” i.e., the authentic sources of Islam such as the Qur’an and Sunnah, they defer to the rationalist approach of “Second Islam.” In other words, independent reason takes priority and that this is essentially part of historical Islamic tradition. However, there are still limits. Since traditional understanding of Islamic law (shari’a) is the main source of resistance to accepting human rights, moderate Muslims criticize the traditional understanding of fiqh (knowledge). As for social and commercial interactions, when shari’a does not attain benefits (maslahah) it can be taken as a sign that God has a different intent in certain circumstances. The theoretical framework to revise edicts of jurisprudence that appear to be in conflict with human rights is to challenge the traditionalists utilizing three strategies: “linguistic,” “historical,” and “critical.” In “linguistic strategy,” it is assumed that words or phrases might have more than one legitimate meaning and that one may revive a “marginalized” meaning. However, this method has very limited application. As for “historical strategy,” one can challenge practices such as polygamy given the changed circumstances of the time. For example, in tribal societies at the time of the Prophet as men more often lost their lives in war and were seen as bread-winners responsible for the protection of women (and children), polygamy was seen as a response to social need. Today, it is obsolete and unjustified. “Critical strategy” entails separating and giving preference to God’s trans-historical and trans-cultural message in the Qur’an from socio-historical features of Arab culture at the time of the Revelation.



Muslim human rights activists in Iran are deeply concerned with what appear to be double-standards of Western countries regarding human rights and utilizing it as a means of political propaganda against an oppressive regime rather than as a moral obligation in its own right. In their view, Israeli actions, which they see as violations of human rights, tend to be accepted by Western countries, while Palestinian issues may be given inadequate attention. In addition, American and British actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, in their view, have on many occasions breached human rights. The best way for the West to support the human rights movement in Iran is to use persuasion rather than coercion. Economic assistance in the Middle Eastern region can address poverty, which is a breeding ground for the growth of fundamentalism, while facilitating the process of arriving at a just solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict strips the fundamentalists of one of their best weapons in mobilizing public opinion in the Islamic world against the West. Moderate Islamic scholars are very receptive to intellectual and cultural achievements in Western civilization. Rather than threatening military action, the West can be more constructive in assisting their goals of democratic reform and promoting human rights through economic measures that benefit the region. Uzbekistan

The first question asked of respondents concerned whether they believed, like the Uzbekistan and U.S. governments, that both Hisb ut-Tahrir (HT) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) posed a security threat. There were three distinct schools of thought: supporters of a “hardline” approach, advocates of the rule of law, and supporters of constructive engagement and dialogue with Islamic groups. The first group included not only a worker from a state-affiliated construction company in the Fergana Valley and a scientist from Tashkent, but also a member from a banned political opposition group. They all felt that Islamic activity both radical and moderate sought the destruction or weakening of secular order and that the only way to deal with the more radical groups was through repressive measures. The rule of law group included a political scientist, a freelance journalist, a female human rights activist and an official from the State Committee for Religion. While they all agreed with members of the first group on the perils of Islamic radicalism, they believed that the state should respect personal religious freedoms but maintain legal control over religion. The third group included an imam and a business owner from the Fergana Valley as well as a freelance journalist and a graduate student from Tashkent. They acknowledged that HT’s call for “justice and equality of people” had appeal among Muslim believers in Uzbekistan, while the IMU’s more militant approach had caused aversion. All agreed that the best way to deal with the “misguided” Islamists was through dialogue rather than coercion while the journalist expressed the view that Uzbekistani authorities lacked credibility in their statements and actions. This latter point was also raised by others, especially those from the Fergana Valley when it came to discussion of Akromiya. There were divisions among the respondents regarding the tolerance or intolerance of Islamic groups. A female human rights activist from Tashkent believed that HT and IMU advocated discrimination against women, while a state-affiliated imam from the Fergana Valley felt that they were intolerant of non-Muslims. An HT member disputed these contentions with regard to his group and strongly condemned IMU’s use of violence. The interviewees offered a number of reasons for intolerance: religious illiteracy, economic and social problems, political repression, and reactions to secularism and Westernization. Several state-appointed Islamic clergy members and some academics interviewed argued that those connected with radical Islamic groups were



either poorly educated or had no formal religious training. Several human rights activists felt that greater political participation by opposition parties and independent media outlets could offer legitimate and democratic channels to express popular frustration regarding the economy and other issues. An NGO worker from Tashkent complained that local and international organization should be allowed to address the needs of local communities. There were divisions of opinion on whether Islam and democracy were compatible that broke down largely along the religious or secular backgrounds of the respondents. Several journalists and human rights activists argued that international institutions should link discussions related to the Uzbekistan government’s debt to the latter’s compliance with human rights. Unfortunately, Uzbekistan (and other Central Asian) governments use the issue of terrorism to harass ordinary believers. As a result of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent Western intervention in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan gained strategic importance for the West, while issues of human rights violations in that country were generally ignored. Most of the leaders in Central Asia are former Communists and as in the case of Russia hopes of political liberalization following the collapse of the Soviet Union have dimmed. Uzbekistan does not have the energy wealth of Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and its sizable population face economic hardships. Economic leverage and cooperation between international aid organizations and moderate Islamic associations might gain political results.

Conclusion Of the three countries reviewed in this paper, Turkey has the most open political system and the best developed economy. It also has a moderate Muslim organization, the Justice and Development (or AK) Party, which has its roots in political Islam and is now the dominant party in the Turkish parliament after shedding its earlier objectives of an overt religious nature. Despite opposition to the Iraq War, Turkey has maintained good relations with the United States and is supported by the latter in its quest for membership in the European Union (EU). While the Kurdish issue has been an important problem in recent years it can be solved in a mutually beneficial way as Turkey further democratizes its political and economic systems and meets EU standards. Indeed, Turkey can serve as a model for countries with predominant or sizable Muslim populations. Having such an identity is compatible with respect for religious minorities as well as affording opportunities for women. Only time will tell, whether the EU will finally accept into its ranks a country where moderate Islam has become well developed. Certainly, Turkey’s membership in the EU would ensure a healthy balance between those in the country who identify closely with secularism and those who embrace an Islamic identity. Throughout the modern history of Iran, outside powers have intervened in that country’s political and economic affairs. Under the Pahlavis, Iranians were not introduced to as great a degree of secularization as was the case in Turkey under Atatürk and his successors. While Turkey was able to stand up to Western imperialism following the First World War and over a time embraced closer ties with Europe and the West, Iranians, for the most part, have been weary of Western political and economic intentions. These respective attitudes are reflected in the opinions of people in both countries who share an Islamic identity. Moderate Muslims, who are currently not in the most important positions of power in Iran, do seek better understanding with the West and would like to see a democratization in their own country. The U.S. can engage in political



dialogue and economic cooperation rather than military confrontation as a means to strengthen the hand of moderate Muslims. Uzbekistan is ruled by a former Communist official and is totally suspicious of any manifestations of Islamic identity that is not controlled by the state. Just like Turkey, Uzbekistan regards itself as a secular country; however, given the autocratic nature of the government, radical Islam has grown since independence and can pose a threat to the state. It has benefited from poor economic conditions and the absence of institutions that allow for adequate political expression. Unfortunately, Uzbekistan (and its neighbors in Central Asia) have used the events of 9/11 and other subsequent terrorist attacks as justification for violations of human rights, while the Western countries have been reluctant to exert pressure for political reform or to engage in dialogue with moderate Islamic groups.

Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Asia Iran—Arash Naraghi




Moderate Muslims in Iran and the Challenge of Human Rights

Arash Naraghi

Arash Naraghi has a doctorate degree in Pharmacology from Tehran University and is currently a PhD candidate in philosophy at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Dr. Naraghi is the author of A Treatise Concerning the Understanding of Religion: An Introduction to the Analysis of Abrahamidae Faith, and has published more than 30 papers on philosophical and theological issues in Iranian journals, mainly Kiyan magazine. Dr. Naraghi translated three books from English to Farsi including Reason and Religious Belief, Philosophical Theology, and An Introduction to Epistemology. His research interests include the philosophy of religion, theology, mysticism, and epistemology.



Executive Summary

Summary

This paper explores the attempts of moderate Muslims in Iran to reconcile modern interpretations of human rights with the traditional textual sources and teachings of Islam. The paper finds that while moderate Muslim groups and individuals do not harbor anti-Western sentiments as such, they are nevertheless highly critical of US foreign policy toward Iran and the region. The paper finds that many groups oppose the perceived politicization of the human rights question, which they see as the attempt to justify foreign government intervention in Iranian affairs. Activists are also frustrated by the apparent ‘double standards’ of the West in its treatment of human rights issues in the region.

Key Findings

• In spite of the strong opposition of traditional Islamic scholars and fundamentalists, moderate Muslims advocate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights for all individuals and groups regardless of their religious affiliation or ethnic background.

• Moderate Muslim scholars argue that traditional readings of Islamic texts are not necessarily relevant with regards to contemporary issues. These scholars argue that there is room for new interpretations of Islamic texts which prove more amenable to the protection of human rights.

• Moderate Muslims have employed three general strategies for ‘re-reading’ classical texts—the linguistic, historical and critical. Iranian politicians, such as the former president, Mohammad Khatami, and prominent human rights activists such as the Nobel laureate, Shirin Ebadi, have in turn adopted these innovative methods to champion broader readings of the human rights question.

• While moderate Muslims have no anti-Western tendencies as such, they are highly critical of US foreign policy in the Middle East. Moderate groups oppose the perceived politicization of human rights issues, claiming that foreign governments and organizations are using this argument as a justification to intervene in Iranian affairs. These groups are also frustrated over the apparent ‘double standards’ of the West in its impartial treatment of human rights issues in the region.

• Moderate activists believe that it is the responsibility of Iranians to advocate and promote human rights in Iran. However, they welcome the international community in its support of locally driven human rights movements.

Policy Implications

• Great opportunities exist for the international community to promote human rights in Iran more effectively. At the local level, instead of threatening the Iranian government militarily, the international community could benefit by adopting strategies of economic assistance in exchange for the state’s submission to democratic reform and respect for human rights.



Introduction

The main purpose of this paper is to present a brief review of how the ‘moderate Muslims’ in Iran understand human rights, and how they attempt to reconcile the modern conception of human rights with the authentic textual sources of Islam. Before I examine moderate Muslims’ approach to the issue of human rights, some preliminary remarks are required. First, in contemporary Iran, we may distinguish four different tendencies among Muslim scholars: 1. Traditional, anti-human rights Muslims, such as Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Messbah

Yazdi, currently a member of Iran’s Assembly of Experts, and Ayatollah Ali Jannati, a high member of the Guardian Council and also a member of the Assembly of Experts;

2. Modern, anti-human rights Muslims (Islamic fundamentalists are in this category. The currently president of Iran, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, represents this group in the Executive Branch of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, the highest political authority in Iran, is the most important representative of the first and the second groups.);

3. Traditional, pro-human rights Muslims, such as the Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri; 4. Modern, pro-human rights Muslims. The most important representatives of this group are

Abdul Karim Soroush (1945- ), Mohammad Mojtahed Shabesstari (1936- ), Mosstafa Malekiyan (1956- ) and Mohssen Kadivar (1959- ).118 And among them, Abdul Karim Soroush has been playing the leading role for last two decades in this area. Even though Islamic scholars of the fourth group have had a great social and political impact on Iranian community, (for example, Iranian reform movement that led to the presidency of Mohammad Khatami in May 1997 was greatly under influence of Abdul Karim Soroush’s ideas), they have rarely appeared as social or political activists. Among Iran’s high rank political leaders, the former president of Iran, Mohamad Khatami is the closest representative of this tendency in the framework of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Shirin Ebadi, the 2003 Nobel Peace Laureate, is also among the human rights activists who have great sympathy with the fourth group of Iranian Muslim scholars.

In this paper, by ‘moderate Muslims,’ I will be referring to the fourth group, i.e., a group of Muslim scholars who satisfy the following two conditions: a. Their understanding of Islam is compatible with modern rationality. In this sense, ‘moderate

Islam’ generally means ‘one of the modernist interpretations of Islam.’ b. This group also gives priority (or at least a great weight) to human rights as understood in the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).

118 Kadivar, from many aspects can be classified in the third category as well. Also, many scholars consider Ali Shariati, an Iranian intellectual who had a great influence on the young revolutionaries before and after the Islamic revolution, as an advocate of the ideological interpretation of Islam and, accordingly, they classify him in the second category. But in the last decade, many of Shariati’s followers have presented an interpretation of his writings which is much friendlier to the idea of democracy and human rights. So it is safe to classify him in the fourth category.



Secondly, the general consensus among moderate Muslims in Iran is that the use of the term ‘Islam’ is dangerously ambiguous and misleading. The term ‘Islam’ has been used in several distinct senses, and overlooking these different meanings has caused some serious misunderstanding among Muslims. When the term ‘Islam’ is used, at least one of the two following meanings might be intended: a. the First Islam or the authentic sources of Islam, i.e., Qur’an, and authentic (sahih) Sunnah

on which there is consensus on their authority; and b. the Second Islam or different interpretations of those texts.119 It is from the Second Islam that ‘moderate,’ ‘conservative,’ etc., schools of thought arise.

Defining Human Rights

The moderate Muslims’ project on human rights, to a large extent, is a reaction to the Islamic traditionalist approach to the issue of human rights. It is the traditional conception of human rights that is implicitly or explicitly presupposed in the Iranian legal system, and to a large extent shapes the social policy of the government towards Iranian citizens. To have a better understanding of the moderate Muslims’ view on human rights, it is helpful to contrast their ideas with those of traditionalist Muslims on this subject matter. The moderate Muslims consider their interpretation of human rights to be radically different from the traditionalists’ from two important aspects: a) They have a radically different conception of the notion of ‘human rights,’ and b) They have a radically different conception of the instances of ‘human rights.’ Let us examine their views on these two subject matters briefly.

‘Right’ as Defined by Tradition

Moderate Muslims were the first to emphasize the radical difference between the traditional and modern conceptions of the notion of ‘right.’ According to their observation, in the Islamic tradition, the ‘language of duty/obligation’ rather than the ‘language of rights’ has been dominated. According to the tradition, a Muslim’s main concern is (and must be) to know what he or she is obligated to do in order to avoid God’s wrath and punishment, and enjoy worldly happiness and eternal salvation. A Muslim ought to recognize three types of duties: duties towards God, duties towards other fellow human beings, and duties toward oneself. When a person fulfills his or her duty, he or she may enjoy certain rights related to that duty. The human being is primarily considered to be a duty-bearer rather than a right-holder agent. But in the modern discourse, the human being as such has some basic inalienable rights, and duties emerge

119 For this distinction, see for example, Abdul Karim Sroush, Ghabz va Bast-e theoric-e shariet (The Evolution and Devolution of Religious Knowledge) (Tehran: Serat Publication, 7thrd edition, 2000), 341. And, Mohammad Mojtahed Shabesstari, ‘Ghara’at-e Vahed ya Ghara’at-hai Kassir az Motoon-e Dini’ (‘One or Multiple Interpretations of the Religious Texts?’), in Mohammad Mojtahed Shavesstari, ed., Naghdi bar Ghara’at-e Rassmi az Din (A Critique of the Official Reading of Religion) (Tehran: Tahr-e No, 1st edition, 2000), 366-380. Also, Mosstafa Malekiyan, ‘Porssesh-haii piramoon-e Manaviat’ (‘Questions on Spirituality’), in Sunat va Secularism (Tradition and Secularism) (Tehran: Serat Publication, 3rd edition, 2005), 345-353.



from those rights (especially in the realm of ‘claim-rights’). Therefore, in the modern discourse, the human being is considered primarily as a right-holder rather than a duty-bearer.120 The language of right in modern discourse is mainly based on the following two fundamental assumptions: 1) the human being as such has an essential, inalienable domain of choice. In other words, in certain domains, s/he can do whatever s/he chooses, and no supreme source of authority can deprive her or him of this freedom; 2) therefore, the human being as such is autonomous, and free from any supreme source of authority. But this notion of ‘rights’ goes directly against the Islamic tradition. According to the vast majority of Muslim jurisprudents, and also according to the dominant theological point of view among Muslims, the normative force of all duties comes from God’s commands. Therefore, to know what ought to be done, one must rely on God’s words, i.e., the Qur’an and the Sunnah (the reported sayings and actions of the Prophet). According to traditional Islamic jurisprudence, every single action of human beings is subject to one of the following five categories: 1) it must be done, i.e., it is commanded by God, and refraining from doing that is considered a sin and requires some punishment (wajib); 2) it is forbidden by God, and performing it is a sin requiring some punishment (haram); 3) it is better to be done, i.e., it is recommended by God, but there is no punishment if one refrains from doing that (mustahab); 4) it is better not to be done, i.e., it is reprehensible according to God’s word, but there is no punishment if one performs it (makruh); or 5) it is permissible, i.e., the choice is left to the agent (mubah or mantaqh al- faraq). One might think that the last category is exceptional, because in this realm human beings can follow their own choices rather than God’s commands. But of course, this is not the case. All we are allowed to perform by our own choices are already determined by God’s command. In other words, the source of this ‘allowance’ (jawaz) is not something essential and inalienable to human beings as such. It is granted to us by His permission and its persistence entirely depends on that permission. Therefore, if He decides to restrict the domain of humans’ choices in the realm of mobah-at, He has every right to do so. Therefore, the traditional concept of ‘right’ means ‘allowance.’ ‘Right,’ in that sense, is dependent on and restricted by God’s permission. It is nothing but a very limited choice of action that is granted to human beings only through God’s permission. But, on the other hand, the modern conception of ‘right’ emphasizes an individual’s (independent and inalienable) choice and autonomy. And the notion of human choice and autonomy as understood in modern discourse, seems to contradict the individual’s submission to God’s authority as understood in Islamic tradition.

Human Rights According to Traditional Islamic Law

As far as traditional Islam is concerned, many instances of human rights (such as rights to religion, life, property, and mind) are not guaranteed to all human beings equally. In all these cases, the traditional Islamic law is discriminative. The legal or moral right of an individual, to a

120 Soroush emphasized this point first and, following him, some other moderate Muslims made the same observation. See, for example, Abdul Karim Soroush, ‘The Idea of Democratic Religious Government,’ in Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri, eds., Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: Essential Writings of Abdul Karim Soroush (Oxford University Press, 2000).



large extent, is a function of her or his religious beliefs (i.e., being Muslim or non-Muslim), social status (i.e., being free or a slave; being clergy or non-clergy), gender (i.e., man or woman), sexual orientation (i.e., being heterosexual or homosexual). Of course, Islamic law to a very large extent is free from ethnic and racial discriminations. To demonstrate this point, let us compare the human rights of Muslims and non-Muslims in the context of traditional Islam. As far as religion is concerned, traditional Islam divides all citizens into three classes: a) Muslims, b) the ‘People of the Book’ (ahl al-kitab), i.e., the Jews, the Christians, and the Zoroastrian, and c) the ‘heathen.’ Muslims

Muslims are free to openly practice their religion, express their religious beliefs, practice their rituals, teach their religion to their children, advertise and promote religious teachings in society. They also have the right to criticize all other religions and reveal their shortcomings while showing the supremacy of Islam. No one has the right to force a Muslim to abandon his religion by duress or to prevent him from participating in religious ceremonies. But, at the same time, Muslims are not free to do the following: 1. A Muslim is not free to change her or his religion. A Muslim who for any reason leaves his

or her religion, i.e., becomes an apostate (murtad), will be severely punished.121 2. A Muslim is not free to deny an affair which is taken to be indispensable to Islam.122 3. A youth whose parents—either both or one of them—have been Muslim is not free to choose

another religion other than Islam. If s/he for any reason refrains from becoming a Muslim, s/he will be considered as a ‘national apostate,’ and will be severely punished.123

4. A Muslim is not free to abandon the religious requirements or to do things that are prohibited by Islam. If s/he knowingly and intentionally commits any of such actions, then s/he will be punished.124

‘People of the Book’

But how about the ‘People of the Book’? First of all, Muslims are obliged to fight them until they choose one of the two following options: either a) they submit to Islam, or b) they pay a special capitation or poll tax, known as jizyah. Secondly, even if they choose to pay jizyah, they still are not free to do the followings: 1. They are not free to raise their children in such a way that the children will adopt their

parents’ religion. More precisely, the parents are not allowed to forbid their children from going to an Islamic school, or from participating in Islamic gatherings, and being exposed to Islamic discourse.125

121 For example, see, Ayatollah Abolghasem Khoi, Mabani Takalomat ol’Menhaj, Chap. 1, 324, 327, and issue #271, 330. Of course, the Sunni scholars do not have a consensus on the killing of an apostate in the case of repenting. 122 Ayatollan Rouhoall Khomeini, Tahrir al-Vassileh, Kitab al-Hudud, Al-qul fi al-Ertedad, issue #4, Chap. 2, 495. 123 Ibid. 124 The type of punishment has been left to the judge, but the most common punishment is whipping. For example, see, Mabani al-Takalomat al-Menhaj, issue #282, Chap. 1, 337. 125 See, Ayatollah Khoie, Menhaj al-Salehin, Kitab al- Jahad, issue #81, 397.



2. They are not free to advertise and promote their religion, or try to weaken the faith of Muslims. In other words, they are not allowed to spread their ideas or criticize Islamic doctrines.126

3. They are not allowed to openly practice that which is permissible in their religion but forbidden by Islam.127

4. They are not allowed to convert to any other religion but Islam; otherwise, they will be killed.128

5. If they do not fulfill their duties, they are not allowed to stay in the Muslim community. If they disobey the rules, either they can leave the community and find a safe place to live, or the leader of the Muslim community has the right to kill them, enslave them, or get ransom from them.129

The ‘Heathen’

Traditional Islam is very strict when it comes to the ‘heathen.’ Muslims are obliged to present Islam to them. If they refrain from submitting to Islam, then holy war against them would be unavoidable.130 Their wives and children would be enslaved, and all of their property and land would be confiscated as plunder.131 Of course many Shiite scholars believe that in the time of Occultation (i.e., when the twelfth Imam of the Shiites—Mahdi—remains invisible), offensive holy war (Jihad al-ebtedai) is not permissible,132 but there are some Shiite scholars who question this claim, and believe in the permissibility of offensive holy war even at the time of Occultation.133 These are dominant views among the vast majority of traditional Islamic scholars. And almost all official textbooks in Shiite seminaries contain these materials. There is also a strong tendency among many traditionalist Muslims to act upon these interpretations of human rights. For example, the rights of followers of the Bahaii faith, to a large extent have been limited due to this traditional interpretation. At the same time, many scholars admit that today it is not in the best interests of Muslims to openly advocate or implement these laws, especially if doing so brings humiliation to Islam and Muslims. In such situations, scholars take hold the above precepts as valid, but they suspend them temporarily until the right time arrives. To justify this temporary suspension, scholars appeal to a principle which is called ‘the principle of conflict’ (tazaahum). According to this principle, if we have two conflicting duties, and we cannot fulfill both, then we ought to perform

126 See, Tahrir al-vassileh, Kitab al-Hudud, Furu ahkam ahle zemmeh, Chap. 2, 507. 127 See, Tahrir al-vassileh, Kitab al-Hudud, Al sani men furu al-ahkam ahl zemmeh, Chap. 2, 506. Also, Menhaj al-Salehin, Kitab al- jihad, issue #80, Chap. 1, 397. 128 See, Tahrir al-vassileh, Kitab al-Hudud, Furu ahkam ahle zemmeh, Chap. 2, 507. 129 See, Minhaj al-Salehin, Kitab al- Jihad, issue #8, Chap. 2, 503. 130 Ibid., Chap. 1, 360. 131 Ibid., Kitab al- jihad, Al-qanimah, Chap. 1, 379-381. 132 For example, Tahrir al-vassihel, Kitab al-amr be maruf wa nahye az munkir, Khotam, issue #2, Chap. 1, 482. 133 See, Ayatollah Sheikh Mohammad Momen Qumi, Kalamat Sadideh fi Masail Jadidah, Kalamate fi al- Jihad al-ebtedai, 315-358. Also, Minhaj al Salehin, Kitab al- jihad, Chap. 1, 364-366.



the one which is more urgent or beneficial, or causes less harm. And of course, it implies that whenever it is possible to fulfill both duties, we are obliged to do both.134

The Approach of Moderate Scholars

Moderate Islamic scholars in Iran do not approve of these discriminative laws.135 From their perspective, the content of human rights as specified in UDHR must be guaranteed for all citizens equally. They do not oppose the discriminative laws because currently Muslims are in no position to impose them. Rather, they oppose them because they believe that these laws, in the context of modern life, are unjust, and therefore are in need of revision. But how do they justify this position religiously? In general, moderate scholars adopt a rationalist approach towards Islam. To some extent, they consider their approach as the continuation or revival of rationalist discourse in the Islamic tradition.136 For them, religiously speaking, the authority of the First Islam undoubtedly takes priority. However, after we have understood the First Islam, the authority of reason takes priority. Therefore, moderate scholars are committed to the unquestionable authority of the First Islam as the subject of true faith. But, as far as the Second Islam is concerned, they advocate a rationalist approach, according to which the authority of independent reason takes priority, i.e., all interpretations of the texts are subject to rational evaluation. Therefore, according to this rationalist approach, one cannot understand the Qur’an and Sunnah in ways that violate the laws of rationalism. Rationality is the sine qua non for both believing and understanding Islam. If a certain interpretation of an authentic religious text contradicts the requirements of rationality, then we have authority to believe the interpretation to be false, holding that the commentator has misunderstood the text. In other words, in such situations, the authority and veracity of the text remains intact, but the commentary will be ruled out.

134 See, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, ‘An-dar Bab-e Tazaahum’ (‘On the Issue of Conflict’), Kiyan, Vol. 45, 2000. In this short article, Ayatollah Montazeri appeals to ‘the principle of conflict’ to explain why today apostates are not to be killed. See also Montazeri’s article, ‘Bab-e Maftooh-e Ejtihad’ (‘Ejtihad is Alive’), in Andar Babe Ejtidad: Dar bareh Karamadi Feqh-e Islami dar Donyae Emrooz (On Ejtihad: On the Efficiency of Islamic Fiqh in the Modern World) (Tehran: Tarh-e no, 1st edition, 2005), 35-47. 135 See, Mohammad Mojtahed Shabesstari, Naghdi bar Ghara’at-e Rassmi az Din (A Critique of the Official Reading of Religion), 199-318; Mohssen Kadivar, ‘Hoghoogh-e Bashar va Laïcité va Din’ (‘Human Rights and Laïcité and Religion’), Aaiin, Vol. 4, 2007; ‘The Freedom of Thought and Religion in Islam,’ presented at The International Congress of Human Rights and the Dialogue of Civilizations in Tehran, May 6, 2006; and ‘Hoghoogh-e Ghir-e Mossalmanan dar Islam’ (‘The Rights of Non-Muslims in Islam’), Aiin, March, 2007; Mosstafa Malekiyan, ‘Mabani-e Nazari-e Modara’ (‘The Theoretical Foundations of Tolerance’), in Mosstafa Malekiyan, Rahi be Rahaii (A Way to freedom) (Tehran: Nashr-e Negah-e Moaasser, 2003); and Abdul Karim Soroush, ‘Azadi Bayan, Hagh-e Ezhar-e Nazar va Ebrazer Aghideh’ (‘Freedom of Speech, Right to Express Opinion’), Aftab, No. 25, May 2003; and ‘Ressaleh dar Modara,’ (‘Treatise on Tolerance’), Madreseh, Vol. 2, No.4, 2006, 9-12; ‘Fiqh var Tarazoo’ (‘Evaluating Fiqh’ [a critique of traditional fiqh especially on the issue of apostates]), in Andar Babe, Ejtidad: Dar bareh Karamadi Feqh-e Islami dar Donyae Emrooz (On Ejtihad: On the Efficiency of Islamic Fiqh in the Modern World) (Tehran: Tarh-e no, 1st edition, 2005), 15-34. 136 See for example, Abdul Karim Soroush, ‘Rationalist Traditions in Islam,’ presented at the International Conference on Islam (Religion and Democracy), at Deutsch-Amerikanisches Institut (DAI) Germany, November 13, 2004, on Soroush’s official site (www.drsoroush.com), and ‘Tajdid Tajrobeh Etezal,’ (‘Reviving the Experience of the Mutazilite’), lecture at Amir Kabir University, Tehran, 1381; and ‘Mafhoom-e Aghl-e Etezali’ (‘Mu’tazilah’s Conception of Reason’) (both can be found in www.drsoroush.com.); also see, ‘Text in Context.’



Of course, in the framework of this rationalist approach, we need to distinguish between those topics that go beyond the reaches of reason, and those that violate reason. The moderate Muslim can consistently accept the possibility of realms beyond the reach of reason. What they do not admit are claims that contradict reason. Since traditional readings of Islamic law (Shari’ah) provide the main source of opposition to universal human rights in Muslim societies, moderate Muslims have spent a great deal of effort criticizing the traditional understanding of fiqh. They, following tradition, distinguish between two types of jurisprudential edicts: a) edicts relating to worship (ibadat), and b) edicts relating to social and commercial interactions (mu’amalat). Ibadat is a set of rules regulating the relationship between God and human beings. But mu’amalat is a set of rules regulating relationships between human beings. Clearly the second set is socially and politically more sensitive. The moderate Muslim’s approach to fiqh is based on the following assumptions: 1. All jurisprudential edicts or Shari’ah laws are prescribed as a means to some kind of benefit

(masalih).137 Some of these masalih are verifiable in this life (masalih al-jalliah), and some of them are not (masalih al-khaffiah).

2. As far as the edicts relating to social and commercial interactions are concerned, these benefits must be verifiable in this world. The main purpose of these laws is to regulate our social lives in an effective and peaceful manner. As Al-Ghazali once said, the main purpose of fiqh (or more precisely, the edicts relating to social and commercial interactions) is to resolve hostility and conflicts in society.

3. If a Shari’ah law (relating to social interactions) attains the worldly, verifiable benefits it was supposed to attain, then we may take it as a good indication of God’s satisfaction as well. On the contrary, if a Shari’ah law does not attain the expected benefits, we may take it as a sign of God’s disapproval. (‘Benefit’ in this context is not identical to the notion of ‘utility,’ for it also connotes ‘justice.’)138

This understanding of fiqh provides moderate Muslims with a theoretical foundation to revise those jurisprudential edicts that are in conflict with human rights. Moderate Strategies

More generally, to resolve the conflict between the First Islam (as understood by traditional scholars) and the content of human rights, moderate Muslims suggest three different strategies—linguistic, historical and critical—as follows.

137 Among traditional Shia authorities, Ayatollah Khomeni was the first to introduce the notion of masalih to Shia Fiqh. See, Sahifeh Noor, Vol. 20, 170. 138 See for example, Abdul Karim Soroush, ‘Din-e aghali va akssari’ (‘Minority and Majority Religion’) in The Development of Prophetic Experience (Tehran: Serat Publisher, 2nd edition), 2000, 83-112. Mohammad Mojtahed Shabesstari, ‘Fiqh-e Siasi Bestar-e Aghlani Khod ra az Dast Dadeh Ast’ (‘Political Fiqh Has Lost Its Rational Context’), in Naghdi Bar Ghara’at-e Rasmi az Din, 184-195. Mosstafa Malekiyan, ‘Falasafeh Fiqh’ (‘The Philosophy of Fiqh’), Moshtaghi va Mahjoori, 363-393. And Mohsen Kadivar, ‘Az Islam-e Siasi ta Islam-e Manavi’ (‘From Political Islam to Spiritual Islam’), in Sunnat va Secularism (Tradition and Secularism), 405-431.



Linguistic strategy. There are cases in which a single word or phrase has more than one accepted meaning. For some reason, however, one meaning has taken precedence over the rest. In such a case, the commentator may revive one of the marginalized meanings, and provide us with a new understanding of the ‘troubling’ passage which seems more amenable in the context of human rights. This method has a very limited application. Historical strategy. There are cases in which the commentator may contextualize the reading and provide nuanced approaches to the ‘troubling passage(s)’ which results in better protection of equal rights. As a general rule, ‘meaning’ is ‘context-sensitive.’ In other words, the same word or phrase may have different meanings in different historical contexts. One important way to preserve the inerrancy of the Qur’an is to understand the Qur’anic verses in their relevant historical contexts. For example, consider the case of polygamy. On the surface, it seems that Qur’an has approved this practice. But, if one takes the historical background of the relevant verses into consideration, one may reach a different understanding of them. In tribal societies such as Arabia at the time of the Prophet, men were the bread-winners, and were seen as responsible for the safety of women and children. Without men’s protection, women and children would find themselves in a precarious position. Furthermore, in such societies men tended to lose their lives in war far more often than women. Under such circumstances, polygamy was a response to a social need. In our days, when such needs no longer exist and when civic institutions can provide the protection of women and children, polygamy is an obsolete and unjustified phenomenon. If we expand this point of view, we arrive at an important principle according to which ‘jurisprudential edicts relating to social life were applicable only at the time of the Prophet unless the opposite can be proven.’ This principle stands in sharp contrast to the one accepted by traditional Islamic scholars who believe that ‘all jurisprudential edicts belong to all times and all places, unless the opposite can be proven.’ According to this strategy, we may categorize many of the discriminatory laws of the Shar’ah as laws emanating from another time and set of needs and exigencies which are no longer valid; therefore, the laws arising from these needs are now obsolete, and it is no longer necessary to abide by them.139 Critical strategy. The third strategy is closely connected to the second one. It attempts to understand the text in the light of the historicity of the text itself. According to this approach, the Qur’an consists of two worlds. The ‘first world’ consists of God’s essential message to human beings. This message, which forms the heart of the book, is trans-historical and trans-cultural. But to convey this message to human beings, God had to employ a language known to the immediate recipients of the revelation at the time, i.e., Arabic. More importantly this message presupposes Arab culture at the time of Revelation as the receiver of the communication. These two requirements created the ‘second world’ of the Qur’an.

139 Morteza Motahari used this method for Qur’anic verses regarding ‘slavery,’ Khatamiat (The Seal of the Prophecy) (Sadra Publisher), 63-65. Abdul Karim Soroush, ‘Bast-e Tajrobeh Nabavi,’ 22-4. Kadivar questions the authenticity and validity of all hadith’s and Rewayah that contradict the content of human rights. So far as the Qur’an is concerned, he often employs the Second Strategy; for example, see ‘Massaleh Bardeh-dari Dar Islam’ (‘The Problem of Slavery in Islam’), Aftab, no. 25. Also Malekiyan advocates a version of this approach: ‘Hermeneutic-e Qur’an va Taaroz-hai Agl-e Jadid ba Vahy,’ 301-322.



The ‘second world’ reflects the contingent socio-historical features of Arab culture at the time the Book was revealed to the Prophet. Being a Muslim means accepting the heart (i.e., the ‘first world’) of the Qur’an, and not the historical aspect of it (i.e., the ‘second world’). The moderate Islamic scholars in Iran distinguish between the culture of the Qur’an and the Arab culture at the time of the Prophet. They believe that the precondition of being Muslim is dedicating oneself to the culture of the Qur’an (i.e., the ‘first world’), rather than the Arab culture at the time of revelation. According to this interpretation, the jurisprudential edicts relating to social and commercial interactions are simply a reflection of Arab life during the time of revelation and are all contingent aspects of faith. Moderate scholars believe that the Prophet simply used the Arab culture of his time as an example to demonstrate to future generations how they can give a society a more divine direction without tearing it asunder. The way the Arabs lived fourteen hundred years ago has no superiority over other forms of life. If we accept this analysis, we must then conclude that all discriminatory laws in the Shari’ah that oppose equal human rights are contingent aspects of the first Islam. Negating or rejecting these laws in no way implies a rejection of the heart of the first Islam, or opposition to the Prophet.140

De-politicizing Human Rights

To promote human rights is a universal responsibility that all human beings owe to each other. So it is natural to expect the international community to take responsibility in promoting human rights in Islamic societies including Iran. But on the other hand, to many Muslims, the issue of human rights has become overly politicized, and has been misused to benefit the political and economic interests of Western countries, especially the US. Therefore, many Muslims, including Iranian moderate Muslims, view with caution and suspicion international attempts to promote human rights. Thus, for many moderate Muslims advocating human rights in Iran the urgent request is to de-politicize the issue of human rights. To them, the international community needs to consider the issue of human rights as an urgent moral obligation to human kind, rather than the means for opposing an oppressive regime. It is a costly mistake to approach human rights from purely political perspectives, using human rights abuses as justifications for foreign intervention (not to mention appealing to human rights as an excuse to achieve questionable political or economic goals). 141 Muslim human rights activists in Iran are also deeply concerned over the perceived double standards of Western countries regarding human rights. Muslim activists claim that the

140 Abdul Karim Soroush was the first to suggest this strategy. For his view, see, ‘Zati va Arazi dar Din’ (‘The Essential and the Accidental in Religion’) in Bast-e Tajrobeh Nabavi, 29-82. Also, Shabesstari, ‘Mossalmanan Bayad Hoghoogh-e Bashar ra Bepazirand’ (‘Muslims Ought to Accept Human Rights’) in Naghdi Bar Ghara’at-e Rassmi az Din, 265-311, esp. 267-280. 141 For example, Emad Baghi, the head of the Tehran-based Organization for the Defense of Prisoners' Rights, constantly warns against politicizing the issue of human rights in Iran, and at the international level as well. See, for example, Emad Baghi, ‘Ashoobidan-e Faal-e Siasi va Faal-e Hoghoogh-e Bashar’ (‘Confusing the Political Activist with Human Rights Activists’) Shargh Newspaper, July 23, 2006. Also, Baghi, ‘Marz-haii-e Siassat va Hoghoogh-e Bashar’ (‘The Boundaries between Politics and Human Righs’), Kargozaran Newspaper, September 10, 2006.



international community does not treat human rights violation cases impartially. For example, they state that the international community seems to be more inclined to overlook Israel’s violations of human rights. Secondly, many Iranian activists think that Western support for human rights in Iran will become more effective when these countries themselves become more sensitive and serious about the issue of human rights. For example, the United States and England, in their fight against terrorism and military attacks on Iraq and Afghanistan, have violated human rights on many occasions. These types of actions can easily be used by governments that violate human rights as a justification for their own violations and oppressive behavior.142

Promoting Human Rights

Taking all of these points into consideration, the international community can promote human rights in Iran more effectively at three levels—local, regional and international. Local Level Iranian society has been shaped around three major social dichotomies: modern/traditional, secular/religious143 and democratic/despotic. From time to time, one member of these dichotomies plays a more decisive role in the public sphere. Advocates of human rights in Iran can therefore be classified into one of the four following categories: a) modern, secular, democratic; b) modern, religious, democratic; c) traditional, religious, democratic; d) traditional, secular, democratic (if it is not an empty set). Many Iranian secular intellectuals fall in the first group.144 The moderate Muslims compose the second group.145 Grand Ayatollah Montazeri and his students, as well as the late Ayatoolah Mehdi Haeri Yazdi, a distinguished philosopher and Islamic jurisprudent, can be placed in the third group. As we can see, ‘democracy,’ as opposed to ‘despotism,’ is the common point of intersection between all of these groups. This fact indicates that presently the main challenge for human rights in Iran is formed around the debate on democracy versus despotism. Therefore, at present, to promote human rights in Iran means to support democracy in Iran. Of course, Iranian fundamentalists are strongly inclined to promote the rhetoric of war and national security in order to suppress and marginalize the currently dominant democratic discourse in Iran. Therefore, the best strategy to support the human rights movement in Iran is the strategy of persuasion rather than coercion. The international community can, instead of threatening the Iranian government militarily, adopt the strategy of offering economic assistance in exchange for the state’s submission to democratic reform and respect for human rights. Persuasion and

142 See for example, the Iranian journalist and human rights activist Akbar Ganji, ‘Sokhanrani dar Parleman-e Europa’ (‘Talk for European Parliament’), Strasbourg, October 2006, www.mihan.net. 143 I am using the term ‘secular’ rather loosely, implying those intellectuals who feel no commitment to religion (particularly, Islam). 144 I.e., figures like Javad Tabatabaii, philosopher and historian in Tehran; Babak Ahmadi, philosopher and political activist in Tehran; Daryoush Shayegan, philosopher and specialist in Eastern Religions in France; Daryoush Ashori, philosopher and translator of Nietzsche’s works into Farsi, and many others. 145 In addition to the scholars I have already mentioned, we may include some religio-national political groups in this category such as the followers of Mehdi Bazargan, the first prime minister of Iran after the Islamic Revolution.



persuasive use of funding seems to be the most effective way to support human rights movements in Iran.146 Regional Level Probably, the most serious threat to the human rights movement in the Middle East is the daily growth of fundamentalism in the region.147 Fundamentalism is one of the important factors behind under-development and backwardness in Muslim communities. An inhumane view of women, hatred of freedom and democracy, and the denigration of human rights are among the important characteristics of fundamentalist ideology. Fundamentalists are not usually well informed regarding Western science and culture, and even view them with animosity. For them, Western art, morality, philosophy, science and culture are thoroughly reprehensible and blasphemous. The increasing growth of fundamentalism in the region is a result of various factors such as the continuation of insecurity, poverty, underdevelopment, extensive economic and social inequalities, waves of war and defeat, along with a rising sense of inferiority from these issues. In addition to these structural elements, the question of Palestine needs to be mentioned. Muslims in the region feel that Western powers have been one-sidedly supportive of Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian struggle, while not recognizing the basic human rights of the Palestinian people. These perceived double standards in the realm of human rights allow fundamentalists to harness public opinion throughout the Muslim world against the West. To support human rights movements in the region, it is absolutely necessary to find a fair solution for this conflict. The moderate Islamic scholars in Iran all advocate a solution based on the recognition of the existence of two independent Israeli and Palestinian states within internationally recognizable borders that have been in the past supported by resolutions of the UN.148

International Level

At the international level, the international community should cultivate a thin, decentralized, and yet forceful, global public sphere. This system should include: an international criminal court of the sort currently being initiated, to deal with grave human rights violations; a set of international environmental regulations with enforcement mechanisms, plus a tax on the industrial nations of the North to support the development of pollution controls in the South; a set of global trade regulations that would try to harness the juggernaut of globalization to a set of moral goals for human development; a set of global labor standards for both the formal and informal sector, together with sanctions for companies that do not obey them; some limited forms of global taxation that would effect transfers of wealth from richer to poorer countries; and, finally, a wide range of international accords and treaties that, once ratified, can be incorporated into domestic systems of law through judicial and legislative action. In particular, it is important to reconsider the ‘resource privilege’ and the ‘borrowing privilege’ of the governments that do not represent their citizens and violate their basic human rights.149

146 See, Akbar Ganji, ‘Sokhanrani dar Parleman-e Europa’ (‘Speech to European Parliament’). 147 See, Akbar Ganji, ‘Jebheh Sevvom’ (‘The Third Frontier’), August 2006, www.mihan.net. 148Akbar Ganiji, ‘Jebheh Sevvom’ and ‘Sokhanrani dar Parleman-e Europa.’ 149 The ‘resource privilege’ includes the power to affect legally valid transfers of ownership rights in natural resources of the country in question. And the ‘borrowing privilege’ that the international community confers upon a



According to the current international order, any group controlling a preponderance of the means of coercion within a country is internationally recognized as the legitimate government of that country’s territory and people—regardless of how the government may have come to power, how it exercises power or the extent to which it is supported or opposed by the population it rules. It means that the international community, among other things, accepts this group’s right to act on the behalf of the people it rules, and confers upon it the privileges freely to dispose of the country’s natural resources and freely to borrow in the country’s name. From the perspective of some moderate Muslims, these are some of the important ways that the international community can help the Iranians to promote human rights in Iran.150

A Democratic Peace: Dialogue among Civilizations

The moderate Muslims’ pro-democracy and pro-human rights understanding of Islam, as well as their knowledge of the modern world, have had some political implications at the national and international levels. First of all, moderate Islamic scholars in Iran clearly and openly advocate democracy. Of course, they do not consider democracy as a political theory prescribed by Islam. More importantly, they believe that Islam as a religion prescribes no political theory per se. Moderate scholars advocate democracy because they believe it is the most effective way to govern a society in accordance with the requirements of justice. Along these lines, they criticize Ayatollah Khomeini’s theory of ‘the Governance of the Jurist’ (walayat ul-faqih).151 For them, Islamic jurisprudents (faqiha) as such have no political privilege over other citizens. Secondly, moderate scholars believe that democracy and respect for human rights are two principal pillars for peace and stability, both domestically and globally. That is why they advocate the doctrine of ‘democratic peace.’152 According to this doctrine, the interests of all members of democratic societies will be addressed, and the value of human rights will be

group in power includes the power to impose internationally valid legal obligations upon the country at large. See, for example, Arash Naraghi, ‘Mabani Akhlaghi Hagh-e Dekhalat-e Bashar-doosstaneh’ (‘The Moral Foundations for Humanitarian Interventions’), Madreseh, December 2005, Vol. 2. Also, to prevent the violation of human rights in Iran, Akbar Gani encourages the international institutions to take the strategy of offering economic assistance in exchange for the state’s submission to democratic reform and respect for human rights. See, ‘Shokhanrani dar Shorai-e Ravabet-e Khareji Amrika’ (‘Speech to the US Council on Foreign Relations’), March 1, 2007, http://news.gooys.eu/plitics/archives/2007/03/057767.php. 150 For some political concerns, the moderate Islamic scholars mostly avoid to address the political aspects of their project directly. Therefore, I based this section mainly on the writings of some Iranian journalists and human right activists who are very much sympathetic to the moderate Islamic movement in Iran. 151 Abdul Karim Soroush, ‘The Idea of Democratic Religious Government,’ in Abdul Karim Soroush, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam, Translated and Edited by Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri, (Oxford University Press, 2000), 122-130. Also Kadivar’s excellent books Nazari-ehai-e Dolat dar Fiqh-e Shi’I (The Theories of Government in Shi’i Fiqh),Tehran, Nashr-e Ney, 1st edition, 1997; and Hokumat-e Velai’I (Vali Government) (Nashr-e Ney, 1st edition, 2000); and also, Daghdagh-hai Hokumat-e Dini (Some Concerns about Religious Governments) (Tehran: Nashr-e no, 1st edition, 2001). Mohammad Mojtahed Shabesstari, ‘Democracy and Religiosity’ and ‘Democracy of Muslims not Islamic Democracy,’ both in Naghdi Bar Ghara’at-e Rassmi az Din, 107-151. Mostafa Malekiyan, ‘Gofto goo dar-bareh Hakemiat-e Dini’ (A Conversation on Religious Government’) in his book, Moshtaghi va Saboori, 341-362. 152 Akbar Ganji, ‘Jomhoori-e Jomhoori-ha’ (‘The Republic of Republics’), June 2006, www.nilgoon.org.



appreciated. Democratic institutions also to some extent guarantee equality of opportunity, a decent distribution of income, long-term security at work, the provision of basic health care and the public financing of elections among other things. When states can promote human rights up to some reasonable threshold level, people feel secure and respected, and this sense of security and respect decreases the level of hostility and violence within the country, and among countries. The ‘doctrine of democratic peace’ suggests a two-part policy. Domestically, the policy based on democracy and respecting human rights is the best strategy to secure the national interests of Iranians. As a foreign policy, the doctrine of mutual respect, promoting a robust agenda of cooperation, is the best strategy for becoming a strong member of the international community, and to insure the global peace. The idea of ‘Dialogue among Civilizations,’ proposed by the former president of Iran, Mohammad Khatami to the General Assembly of the UN, is a reflection of the ‘doctrine of democratic peace’ as understood by the moderate Islamic scholars in Iran.153 Thirdly, to preserve a stable global peace, ‘Dialogue among Civilizations’ advocates are open to positive relations with all regional countries based on mutual understanding and respect. As far as the countries in the region are concerned, relations with Israel are the most problematic. Of course, contrary to the Arabs, the Iranians have never been directly involved in the Arab-Israel conflict. The concerns that Iranians have for the fate of the Palestinians is more from a humanitarian perspective. If the peace process in the Israeli- Palestinian conflict leads to a fair result for both sides, then there will be no major obstacle to a positive relationship between Iran and Israel. In the framework of a foreign policy based on Iranians’ national interests, the positive relation with Israel seems quite reasonable.154 As far as other countries are concerned, the Iranian people are quite open and receptive to the positive relations with all countries, including the US. The moderate Islamic scholars are very much receptive to the intellectual and cultural achievements of Western civilization,155 but they are also very much critical of the so-called ‘imperialistic’ aspect of the West. In particular, they are critical of US foreign policy toward Iran.156 Of course, contrary to many Islamic countries, this anti-Western tendency is not dominant among the Iranians. Therefore, in the framework of a non-ideological foreign policy, the national interests of the Iranians require them to improve positive relations with the West, including the US.

153 See, http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000_2003/pdfs/dialo.pdf. 154 See, Ahmad Zeidabadi, ‘Diplomacy-e Iran dar Khavar-e Mianeh: az Shoar-hai-e Armani ta Sardar Gomi Siasi’ (‘Iran’s Diplomacy in the Middle East: From Idealistic Mottos to Political Confusion’), Tehran, Iran Farda, No. 31, 1998; also, Ganji, ‘Sokhanrani dar Parleman-e Europa.’ 155 See, Abdul-Karim Soroush, ‘Marefat, Moalefeh Momtaz-e Modernism’ (‘Knowledge is a Distinguished Feature of Modernism’), Kiyan, No.20; also, for Soroush’s articles on the West, see Tafarruj-e Sun (Inspection of the Design) (Tehran: Serat Publisher, 1st edition, 1987); and ‘Seh Farhang’ (‘The Three Cultures’), in Abdul-Karim Soroush, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam, 156-170; Mohssen Kadivar, ‘Usul-e Sazegari Islam va Moderniteh’ (‘The Principles of Compatibility of Islam and Modernity’). 156 For a typical critique of US foreign policy toward Iran, see, Ganji’s ‘Speech to the US Council on Foreign Relations.’ Also, for the roots of the Intellectuals’ ambivalent attitude toward the West, see, Abdul-Hadi Haeri, Nakhostin Roya-rooi-haie Andish-garan-e Irani ba Do Rooyeh Tamadooneh Borjovaii-e Gharb (The First Experiences of Iranian Intellectuals with the Janus-faced Bourgeois Civilization of the West

) (Amir-Kabir Publication, 3rd edition, 2000).

Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Asia Uzbekistan—Alisher Khamidov




Thriving Under Repression: Moderate Islamic Activism in Uzbekistan

Alisher Khamidov

Alisher Khamidov is a journalist originally from Kyrgyzstan. From June 1998 to July 2001, he served as Director of the Osh Media Resource Center (OMRC), a nonprofit independent media association in southern Kyrgyzstan. He has also acted as the regional coordinator of the Central Asian Media Support Project. Khamidov has written a series of articles on religion and ethnic conflict in the Ferghana Valley and political developments in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia, and is a frequent contributor to Eurasianet and IRIN. Khamidov is pursuing a Ph.D. in Russian and Eurasian Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. He has previously worked at Notre Dame University’s Sanctions and Security Project, the NEH Summer Institute on Eurasian Civilizations at Harvard University and at the Foreign Policy Studies Program of the Brookings Institution.



Executive Summary

Summary

This paper explores multiple views concerning the role of Islam in Uzbekistan’s public sphere, religious education, the question of tolerance and political participation. It finds that the Uzbek government exaggerates the dangers posed by Islamic extremists while remaining suspicious of potentially helpful moderate Islamic groups it perceives as threatening state authority. The paper argues that the increasingly popular Islamic associations—fed in part by dissatisfaction with current political and economic trends—are supporting areas inadequately served by the state, while the state’s repressive measures against opposition forces and the Muslim clergy are undermining its diminishing public support base.

Key Findings

• Islamic extremist groups have grown in size and influence by casting themselves as an outlet for Uzbek Muslims disaffected by unsatisfactory political and economic developments over the last decade.

• Uzbek authorities are exaggerating the dangers posed by Islamic extremists and radical organizations such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb ut-Tahrir.

• In recent years, Uzbek residents appear to prefer moderate Islamic organizations that focus on economic development initiatives.

• Islamic associations act as social safety nets in parts of Uzbekistan that are inadequately served by the government. They focus on community life, shun violence and extremism, and constitute centers of moderation for the Muslims of the region.

• Despite the promising potential for moderate Islamic associations to bring stability to a tense and volatile region, the Uzbek authorities view these groups as a threat to their political legitimacy. The government prefers to silence any voices perceived as threatening it authority. However, the state’s heavy-handed tactics play into the hands of the small group of Islamic extremists who would welcome the government’s downfall.

Policy Implications

• Islamic extremism does exist in the region, but the Uzbek government can do more to marginalize these extremists by working with, rather than opposing, Islamic associations and moderate Islamic leaders.

• Given that the state’s repressive measures against clergy undermine public support for government programs, the Uzbek authorities should rethink current policy toward Islamic associations.

• Until now, the US government has ignored encouraging collaboration between international aid organizations and moderate Islamic associations. However, it appears worthwhile for the United States to explore this option.



Introduction In the context of Global War on Terror (GWOT), radical and extremist groups in Uzbekistan have received much attention. The media has portrayed two groups in particular, Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, as major security threats in the region. Uzbek officials have increasingly relied on repressive measures to counter the influence of these groups. Citing threats posed by ‘Islamic extremists’ and ‘radicals,’ the Uzbek authorities have arrested many independent Muslim leaders and replaced them with Islamic clergy who are loyal to the government. In a more dangerous trend, the security services have also engaged in killing some Islamic leaders. Such punitive actions have tended to undercut public support for government programs because many ordinary believers have not shared the views of the Uzbek government officials. Rather than counter the source of radicalism and extremism, the government’s repressive policies have fueled anti-government sentiments among Muslim residents. Groups espousing radical and extremist goals do exist in Uzbekistan. But Uzbekistan is also home to many moderate Islamic associations and groups that are committed to non-violence and peaceful coexistence among various religious traditions.157 The lack of systematic and informed research about differences between radical and moderate groups has been a serious omission in the debate on Islam in Uzbekistan.158 As of now, we know little about the extent of support such groups enjoy in various parts of Uzbekistan. We also have few insights about factors that cause their popularity or lack thereof. Both scholars and politicians have a stake in bridging this serious gap in our knowledge. This paper will help fill in this research gap. It examines the activities of several Islamic groups while addressing the panoply of reasons for their popularity and rapid growth in the region. The paper goes on to present the views of the Uzbek residents about the similarities and difference between violent and non-violent Islamic groups. In the context of governmental reaction to Islamic groups, the paper considers the efficacy of the response of the Uzbek government to Islam so far and offers policy options.


Critical Terms

Islamic activism and Muslim identity in Uzbekistan and Central Asia are a complex phenomenon. Given such complexities, this paper relies on a set of terms, which require elaboration. 157 The term ‘moderation’ is difficult to define. As Schwedler (1998) correctly notes, ‘a group may hold moderate and radical views simultaneously, for example with regard to

domestic versus foreign policy, or economic versus social issues.’ See Jillian Schwedler, ‘A Paradox of Democracy? Islamic Participation in Elections,’ Middle East Report 209

(Winter 1998): 25-29, 27.

In this paper, I will rely on Kramer’s (1995) definition: ‘‘Moderation’ will denote those Islamic groups and activists who formally declare their respect for, and commitment to,

pluralism and renounce the use of violence in achieving their objectives.’ See Gudrun Kramer, ‘Cross-Links and Double Talk? Islamist Movements in the Political Process,’ in

Laura Guazzone, ed., The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World (Ithaca, NY: Ithaca Press, 1995), 42. 158 Adeeb Khalid, ‘A Secular Islam: Nation, State, and Religion in Uzbekistan,’ International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 35 (2003).



Islamic roots refer to the Islamic heritage and practices that existed before Uzbekistan was incorporated into the Tsarist empire and later the Soviet Union. The term Islamist denotes Islamic activists, leaders and ordinary believers who would like to see Islam play a much greater role in their societies. The term radical Islamists refers to Islamic activists who would like to overthrow the existing secular government in Uzbekistan relying on peaceful and nonviolent means.159 The term extremists denotes Islamic activists who advocate militant and violent means in replacing the secular government of Uzbekistan with an Islamic one.160 Islamic state refers to a state in which the governing ideology and governance are based on Islam. The term moderate Muslim is applied to believers who renounce the use of violence and who demonstrate commitment to ideas of political pluralism and peaceful coexistence with other religious traditions. It is important to note that focus group participants had different understandings of these terms. Some participants did not distinguish between moderate, radical or extremist brands within the broader Islamic movement in Uzbekistan. They tended to use such terms as ‘terrorist,’ ‘Islamists,’ ‘extremists’ and ‘radical’ to denote Islamic activism that was banned by the state. Other participants, which included religious activists, scholars and journalists, tended to have a more nuanced understanding of differentiation among Islamic actors. For some participants with religious backgrounds, the Islamic state was associated with the rule of Shariat, or Islamic law. For others from secular backgrounds, it meant a utopian vision of reality. Difficulties

Difficulties in research were not only limited to problems in defining critical terms. Gathering data about Islamic activism and the human rights situation in Uzbekistan is fraught with obstacles. Uzbek government officials are generally reluctant to share information. They are particularly suspicious of scholars and journalists who attempt to sample opinions of ordinary people. Unlike government officials, many ordinary residents are often willing to share their views on political and economic developments. The Participants

In compiling data for NBR’s initiative looking at ‘Approaches to Moderate Islam in Asia,’ I have relied on interviews with individuals who represent a diverse range of professional, generational, ethnic, and religious backgrounds.161 159 Hizb ut-Tahrir activists fall under this definition. 160 In the Uzbek context, an example of an extremist group is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan which engaged in hostage-taking and military operations against the Uzbek and Kyrgyz security structures in 1999 and 2000. 161 Uzbek cultural events such as weddings, mourning ceremonies, ziofats (weekly or monthly gatherings of men) and mahalla (community) gatherings provided perfect settings for informal focus group interviews. The focus groups at such events formed naturally. Kinship, localism and regional ties among people fostered the atmosphere of trustworthiness and truthfulness. People who would otherwise be afraid to share their opinion, felt secure to voice



The participants included the following persons:

• four scholars (two affiliated with Uzbek government institutions and two others who are more independent in conducting their research);

• three human rights activists (two male activists from the Feghana Valley and a female activist from the capital Tashkent. All the activists are affiliated with non-governmental organizations that are now under pressure for their vocal criticism of Uzbek government);

• three imams, or Islamic clergy (one imam representing the muftiyat, or the state council for Muslims, and two others representing state-sanctioned mosques in the Ferghana Valley);

• five journalists (two working for government newspapers and TV and three independent freelance journalists who collaborated with Western media representatives;

• three business owners (one agricultural business owner from Karshi and two others involved in furniture and candy businesses in the Ferghana Valley);

• five Students (studying at state universities and colleges, mostly in the Ferghana Valley); • three government officials (one representing the state tax committee and two others

representing regional administrations in the cities of Andijan and Ferghana); and • twelve ordinary believers whose main occupation is in the agricultural sector. At least

two of them were members of Hizb ut-Tahrir. Perhaps not surprising, given the diverse nature of its participants, the views expressed by participants are often at odds with each other. While vocally agreeing on some basic issues, participants are divided in their opinions over the questions of democratic development, government responsibilities and the role of Islamic actors in the political process. This division can be explained by a set of geographical, ideological, professional and generational differences: Geographical factors. Another essential factor in fostering differences among the participants is the regional divisions within Uzbekistan. While some parts of Uzbekistan, including the capital Tashkent, are considered to have more secular residents, an increasing number of religious activists are based in the cities of the Ferghana Valley.

Ideological differences. Human rights activists and scholars tended to strongly support the rule of law, secularism and democratic governance. Meanwhile, government officials emphasized the importance of public order over human rights and democratic development. Islamic clergy and businessmen from the Ferghana Valley suggested that to promote the well-being of citizens, religion must be allowed to play a greater role in social life.

Generational differences. Among participants were a number of young, pro-Western liberals. But many of them were representatives of the older generation, which preserves some of the values and ideals of the Soviet past.

their thoughts in the circle of close companions and relatives. The participants came from several Uzbek cities: Tashkent, Karshi, Namangan, Ferghana and Andijan. I have visited these cities regularly over the past ten years and have built personal ties with the people who were interviewed.



Common Questions and Answers

Below is the summary of the main questions asked along with the focus group participants’ answers. 1. The government of Uzbekistan and the U.S. government consider Hizb ut-Tahrir and the

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan a threat to national security. Do you?

The interviewing process revealed that there are three distinct groups of thought on this question: 1) the supporters of a ‘hardline’ approach, 2) the advocates of the rule of law, and 3) the supporters of constructive engagement and dialogue with Islamic groups. The supporters of the ‘hardliner approach’ argued that Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) represent a threat to Uzbek national security. Participants within this group, which included a worker of the state-affiliated construction company from the town of Ferghana, a Tashkent-based Uzbek scientist who specializes in Uzbek politics, and a member of a banned Uzbek opposition group, claimed that Islamic activity, both radical and moderate, seeks the destruction or weakening of the secular order. Thus, according to them, only state coercion or fear of coercion prevents Islamists from rejecting the ‘secular rules of the game.’ Describing HT and IMU members as indoctrinated fanatics, the ‘hardliner approach’ supporters argued that the authorities must apply repressive measures against both groups. The member from the banned Uzbek oppositionist group asserted that ‘if the Uzbek opposition is to come to power in Uzbekistan, it will follow President Karimov’s hard-line approach of suppressing Islamists.’ The interviewee did not specify what he meant by hard-line approach or suppression. The participants representing the rule of law camp162 agreed with the premise of the first group about the perils of Islamic radicalism in Uzbekistan. But unlike the first group, they emphasized that the state must promote the rule of law and respect of religious freedoms while maintaining the control over religion. The political scientist asserted, ‘The state must keep Islamic activists in check. HT is a threat. It has been involved with terrorist organizations in the Middle East. [The leader of HT Taquiuddin] Nabhani wrote that HT would have to resort to violent means to overcome some obstacles. The idea of the caliphate means forcible indoctrination of the minds of people. In one of HT’s journals called ‘Al Wai,’ there was an article entitled ‘How to become a shahid?’’ This interviewee argued that freedom requires responsibility and that HT activists must respect rules of the states in which they operate if they want to avoid being targeted by secular officials. The official from the State Committee for Religion asserted, ‘The Council of Ulama [Islamic scholars of Uzbekistan] found that HT’s main ideas contradict the Quran because in Islam there should not be division into political parties. All Muslims are equal before Allah. Members of the party [HT] suffer not for their views, but for violating the laws, for their calls to overthrow the existing regime – this contradicts the country’s [Uzbekistan] constitution.’ The Uzbek official

162 These included a political scientist, a freelance journalist from Tashkent, a female human rights activist and an official representing the State Committee for Religion.



added that the Uzbek officials should utilize legal ways and ideological struggle to counter the ideas of HT and the IMU. Individuals within the third group—the supporters of constructive dialogue—took a different view from the first and second group. Participants within this group, which included an imam from the Ferghana Valley, a business owner from Andijan, a freelance journalist and a graduate student living in Tashkent, agreed that while the IMU’s militant approach caused aversion of many ordinary Muslims, HT’s call for justice and equality of people resonated powerfully with the believers in Uzbekistan. The participants argued that coercion was not an effective measure to combat religious radicalism. They suggested that constructive dialogue between religious activists and government officials can be beneficial for promoting stability in Uzbekistan. The imam from the Ferghana Valley asserted that ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir's aims and plans are not good, but instead of restricting the group and pushing it into a corner, [the Uzbek] government needs to hold open religious discussions.’ The graduate student agreed with the imam, saying that ‘HT activists are people who have been misled by a wrong ideology. Nevertheless, they are our relatives, friends, and colleagues. Their activities do not represent a threat.’ The student shared the story of his neighbor who was arrested recently on charges of religious extremism. The neighbor was known in the community as an honest and devout individual. ‘His only fault was that he prayed five times a day. He always told the truth,’ asserted the Tashkent student.’ The student noted that ‘the whole community [where the arrested lived] expressed dismay and anger at the arrest.’ But few people openly challenged the authorities for fear of repression and retributions. The journalist argued that each country has citizens who hold some extremist ideas. ‘For example,’ he noted, ‘in some Western countries there are parties that espouse Nazi principles. But these countries do not make a tragedy of all this because the authorities know that Nazi parties won’t be able to change the whole society – the majority of people do not follow such parties.’ The journalist argued that he was confident that there were people in Uzbekistan who hold extremist views. ‘They are present among the clergy as well. But they have never been influential enough. The myth about Wahhabists, Hizb ut-Tahrir and other religious groups was created by the authorities. I am deeply convinced that the terrorist bombings [which have been linked to HT and the IMU] have been masterminded by the [Uzbek] security structures. The evidence presented by authorities is so clumsy and inconvincible that people have a hard time believing them,’ told the journalist. 2. How would you characterize the activities of other Islamic organizations,

such as the Tablighi Jamaat and Akromiya?

Many participants were unaware of Tablighi Jamaat’s activities in Uzbekistan. Meanwhile, Akromiya has caused much discussion. Two themes have emerged as a result: the first theme stressed negative aspects from the activities of this group, and the second theme emphasized its positive sides.



A Tashkent-based journalist asserted that Akromiya was essentially an extremist group that attempted to take control over the government in Uzbekistan’s Andijan province. He claimed that an armed group of militants maintaining ties with Akromiya attacked government buildings and forced many ordinary residents of Andijan to gather in Babur square, the central venue in Andijan, on May 13, 2005. According to this journalist, the militants gathered crowds of residents in an effort to shield themselves from a possible attack by the government troops. To support his argument, the journalist referred to a video documenting the Andijan events that was released by the Uzbek government in 2006. The journalist further asserted that the Uzbek troops had to use force to prevent the spread of instability to other regions of Uzbekistan. A Tashkent-based researcher who is affiliated with the Institute of Strategic Studies of Uzbekistan agreed with this view. According to him, Akromiya’s activities sought to undermine the secular government in many parts of Uzbekistan. He went on to suggest that Akromiya members co-opted local officials in Andijan province by paying them bribes and buying them houses. He asserted that Tashkent was right to move decisively to restore the central government’s control over Andijan by attacking the existing links between local Akromiya members and ‘corrupt’ local officials in Andijan. ‘Andijan authorities allowed Islamists to dictate the rules. This was a grave mistake because it emboldened the radicals,’ asserted the scholar.

The other group, who mainly came from the towns of the Ferghana Valley, presented a positive view of Akromiya and its activities. An Andijan-based human rights activist argued that Akromiya never existed as an organization. He claimed that Akromiya was a myth created by the Uzbek security services to justify crackdown on ordinary believers. The human rights activists further argued that many people who were accused of membership in Akromiya were local devout believers who wanted a greater role for religious values in their society. An Uzbek refugee from Andijan who fled to Kyrgyzstan after the tragic events of May 13 in Andijan, asserted that people who were accused of membership in Akromiya were actually members of a local Muslim business association that acted as a social safety net in the area that was inadequately served by the government. According to him, these people focused on community life, shunned violence and extremism, and constituted forces for moderation among the Muslims of the Andijan area. The refugee claimed that their moderate stance, prosperous businesses, and relative independence from the state organs have earned them large followings throughout the Andijan province. An analyst who lives in Tashkent noted that Akromiya was named after Akram Yuldashev, a devout Muslim from Andijan province who allegedly founded the group in 1996. Yuldashev was jailed in the late 1990s for alleged anti-government activities. The analyst argued that Yuldashev had a wide following in Andijan, especially among numerous entrepreneurs who were growing increasingly unhappy with the government’s restrictive policies that depressed economic initiatives. The analyst noted that despite their anger at the central authorities, many entrepreneurs established links with Kabuljan Obidov, the then governor of Andijan province. Such close personal ties to Obidov allowed entrepreneurs to prosper. Obidov was a long-time protégé of President Islam Karimov for his loyalty and bold economic initiatives that made Andijan a more prosperous province compared to the other regions of Uzbekistan. But Obidov’s



links with devout local entrepreneurs soon raised Karimov’s suspicions. Karimov eventually fired Obidov on May 25, 2005 and appointed Saidullo Begaliev, formerly minister of agriculture, as the new governor of the Andijan province. The move was designed to bolster Tashkent’s control over a region that was becoming politically and economically independent. The analyst argued that Begaliev began a purging campaign that sought to crack down on the businesses that previously were associated with Obidov. In May 2005, the Uzbek authorities arrested 23 businessmen who maintained close ties to Obidov. They accused them of membership in Akromiya. Their arrest, according to the analyst, precipitated the Andijan events. A small business owner in the town of Karshi claimed that Akromiya and other religious groups emerged in Uzbekistan to fill the vacuum that resulted from the failure of Marxism-Leninism. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent process of nationalization, according to the business owner, have served as catalysts for the spread of different religious ideologies. The business owner further claimed that the sudden euphoria of independence engulfed the region in the early 1990s, opening up Central Asia to the outside world and ushering in various brands of Islam—each with its own agenda. Millions of Central Asians, in search of a new, post-Soviet identity, turned to their ‘Islamic roots.’ 3. How would you characterize the attitudes of such organizations toward the

religious ‘Other’?

As a result of lively discussion, two distinct groups of thought have emerged on this issue: the first characterized the attitudes as highly intolerant while the second group viewed them as tolerant. Participants representing the first group, which included a state-affiliated imam, a female human rights activist, a student and a journalist argued that the attitudes of HT, the IMU and Akromiya toward the religious other can be characterized as highly conflicting and intolerable. There was a general agreement between these people that the Islamic groups want to impose their rules with little regard to opinions and wishes of other segments of the population that were not Islamic. The state-affiliated imam in a small town near the city of Ferghana asserted that HT and IMU divide people into kufirs [pagans] and true believers. The imam argued that HT and IMU do not respect the right of other religious denominations and that if they were to come to power, they would launch attacks on other religious traditions and denominations. His view was supported by the female human rights activist who is based in Tashkent. She noted that the IMU, HT and Akromiya advocate discrimination against women, other religious groups and sexual minorities. She further noted that she was appalled by the idea of an Islamic state in which polygamy and violence against women would become ‘a daily reality.’ Based on this assumption, she argued, ‘Given that the activities of Islamists are extremely pugnacious and bloody, I believe that suppressing them is the best way.’ The second group, which included several Muslims working in the farming sector, called for differentiation among these groups. They argued that Hizb ut-Tahrir, the IMU and other Islamic groups had divergent goals and strategies of achieving them. An HT member who lives near the Uzbek border with Kyrgyzstan asserted that Hizb ut-Tahrir strongly condemned IMU’s use of violent methods. The HT member further asserted that ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir never sought to



discriminate against women and other social groups.’ He argued that HT members include many women and people who represent various social groups. He further claimed that HT respects ‘the Abrahamic religious traditions but rejects other religious denominations because they worship idols.’ The HT member added that ‘under an Islamic caliphate, Islamic leaders would protect other religions and give them the right to practice their faith.’ 4. What do you consider to be the sources of intolerance?

Participants gave multiple factors that served as sources of religious intolerance. At least four themes have arisen as a result: religious illiteracy, economic and social problems, political exclusion of particular groups and segments of the population, and a reaction to secularism and westernization. Representing the thinking of the first group, a Tashkent-based government affiliated imam asserted that ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir does not care about the Quran injunction that ‘there is no compulsion in religion.’ I believe all Muslims should be more tolerant of those who convert from Islam to other faiths and should not regard ‘apostasy’ as a sin and violation of religious requirements.’ This imam argued that self-centeredness, self-righteousness and the profound belief of infallibility in groups such as HT and the IMU were the major sources of their intolerance. The imam also cited religious illiteracy as the cause of intolerance. According to him, if the Uzbek clergy members were well-educated, then they would be in a better position to counter the extremist ideas and undermine the influence of such groups as the HT and the IMU.

The owner of the small business in the Karshi region of Uzbekistan cited economic and social problems. He argued that the growth of Hizb ut-Tahrir can be attributed, in large part, to underlying economic and social issues that have made the country fertile for the introduction of radical ideas. According to him, the turmoil caused by poverty, disease and crime has led to the broad radicalization of political and religious groups seeking change. He also noted that popular sensitivities over persistent social problems are playing into the hands of radical Islamic activists. He pointed to the spread of HIV, increased drug addiction, and prostitution that have emerged as major problems in Uzbekistan. Another group of participants, several human rights activists and a member of the Uzbek opposition asserted that, in addition to social and economic deprivation, political exclusion of various groups fostered religious intolerance. According to this group, the Uzbek government’s suppression of democratic institutions and mass media outlets has channeled public dissent into other forms of activity, such as the work of Hizb ut-Tahrir. They pointed out that HT and IMU gained influence mainly in areas of Uzbekistan where there are few robust and representative political parties, civil society organizations or independent mass media. There were also some participants—one Uzbek academic and journalist—who linked religious intolerance to the Muslim reaction against growing secularization and Westernization of Uzbekistan. According to these individuals, since the break-up of the Soviet Union, religious leaders in the region have voiced concern over deteriorating values in their communities, linking the moral decline with the post-Soviet penetration of Western pop culture. The participants claimed that many believers in Uzbekistan consider the spread of corruption, prostitution and



sexually transmitted diseases as one of the most tangible signs of growing modernization and secularization that hasten the population’s spiritual degeneration. 5. Can you recommend initiatives to promote religious tolerance?

Participants offered a wide range of recommendations to promote religious tolerance. Several Islamic clergy members and some academics emphasized the role of Islamic education. According to them, the lack of proper religious education163 has made many state-appointed Islamic clergy incapable of effectively countering radical ideas espoused by the IMU, HT and other radical groups. This group of participants suggested that there are a lot of imams and Islamic clergy members who are poorly-educated or who have no religious training at all. They reasoned that the government must provide funds and facilities to help retrain these religious clergy members. Several human rights activists, in the Ferghana Valley and in Tashkent, argued that the best way to promote religious tolerance was to expand the political participation of various groups. In particular, the rights activists argued that Uzbekistan should stop the harassment of opposition parties and media outlets and allow them to function freely in Uzbekistan. According to this group, the secular opposition parties and media outlets can serve as legitimate and democratic channels for expressing popular frustration with present economic and political decisions in Uzbekistan. Thus, as their thinking goes, the secular opposition groups may undermine the support base for Islamist groups by attracting potential Islamic activists to the ranks of secular opposition. Participants within this group have also emphasized the importance of state respect for human rights, and the freedoms of belief and speech. Several imams in Andijan and Ferghana argued that dialogue between government officials and religious groups can promote tolerance. According to them, the authorities should invite respectable and knowledgeable Islamic leaders to address Muslims through radio and television programs while promoting religious tolerance. The Karshi-based businessman claimed that the authorities should resolve economic and social problems which are at the roots of religious intolerance and extremist organizations.

An NGO worker from Tashkent called upon the Uzbek government to promote initiatives to build civil society. She complained that in recent years, the authorities have curtailed the activities of many local and international organizations which were playing an important role in addressing the needs of local communities.

163 Proper religious education meant different things to those interviewed. Those participants from secular and educated segments of society (e.g., human rights activists, journalists, students and government officials) tended to think that proper religious education would be sanctioned by the state and its curriculum would include secular social and natural science subjects such as mathematics, physics, biology, chemistry, sociology and law. Participants who came from religious backgrounds believed that proper religious education would rely on authentic sources such as the Quran and writings by recognized Islamic scholars and thinkers.



6. Given the traditional emphasis of Islamic law on the common good and the

rights of individuals, do you believe Uzbekistan's Muslim communities can

contribute to promoting human rights?

Two main groups with different views on this question have been identified. The first group mainly comprised Islamic clergy members. They argued that Islam is compatible with democratic ideals. An imam from Ferghana asserted that the Prophet Mohamed instituted democratic principles at the outset of the rise of Islamic civilization. The imam argued that Islam provided for an institution called Shura, a consultative organ that has advised state rulers. Another imam from Ferghana argued that injunctions in the Quran guaranteed basic rights of all people, including women. He noted that many centuries ago, the advent of Islam brought freedom and protection to women who were systematically beaten, tortured or even killed by their husbands. The imam emphasized that Islam continues to protect and promote rights of women. As an example, the imam referred to various arrangements within Islamic tradition that provide women with legal recourses within the Sha’ria, or Islamic law. In particular, he referred to a payment that a potential groom or his family must give to the family of a bride before marriage. Based on these observations, the imams noted that Islam can play a crucial role in promoting the rights of individuals in Uzbekistan. They noted that in their Friday sermons they continuously emphasize the importance of human dignity and respect for human rights. The second group of participants—a student from Kokand, another Ferghana Valley city, a female human rights activist and a Tashkent-based journalist—took an opposite view. People within this group argued that Islam was not compatible with democratic ideals. They pointed to the example of such countries as Saudi Arabia, Lybia, Iran and Somalia where Islamist ruling parties and movements have imposed harsh rules on their citizens, suppressing political opposition and curtailing independent media outlets. The Kokand student asserted that ‘Islamic groups can exacerbate human rights violations if they become influential.’ The student pointed to the mobilization of Islamic groups in the early 1990s that took place in Kokand and Namangan. According to him, the Islamists took advantage of the weak central government rule and formed vigilante militia squads that sought to enforce the rule of Sha’ria, which included the beating of alleged criminals with sticks. The female human rights activist asserted that there were many incompatibilities between democracy and Islamic values. She cited the practice of polygamy and of forcing women to wear veils in many Muslim countries. According to her, the Quran and Islamic scriptures allow men to have multiple wives. She noted that many Islamic figures and clergy members endorse and practice polygamy in many parts of Uzbekistan in violation of the Uzbek laws. The human rights activist added that there were other ways in which Islam violated rights of people. She asserted that in many Muslim states the authorities apply inhumane methods of punishment (e.g., beating with sticks, cutting off hands) toward criminals in accordance with the Quran.



7. The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom recommends

establishing ‘American Corner’ reading rooms around the country to

disseminate information on democracy, human rights, etc. Do you believe

this would have any impact?

Most participants thought that this was a good idea. But participants noted that, considering Uzbekistan and the US are not on good terms, opening such centers would be practically difficult.

8. By what means would you recommend the international community support and

expand the efforts of Uzbek human rights workers (e.g., educational exchange programs,

legal assistance programs, micro-finance programs)?

A wide range of suggestions and recommendations were articulated during the discussions and interviews: promote human rights and rule of law; economic restructuring and foreign investment; law enforcement training and professionalization; support NGOs; professional training in law and business.

Many focus group participants agreed that the international community must continue to promote the rule of law and respect for human rights in Uzbekistan. Most participants agreed that the use of torture, which is routinely employed by the secret services to secure self-incriminating statements against suspects, as well as other repressive measures by the Uzbek government, must be eliminated. Human rights activists went on to argue that the European and the US policy-makers must harshly criticize such measures on a systematic basis. Participants asserted that the Uzbek governments’ reliance on repressive measures was counterproductive because it helped the Islamic radicals to recruit new members. Several journalists and human rights activists asserted that the international institutions should link any restructuring or adjustments of Uzbekistan’s debt to the Uzbek governments’ compliance with its international obligations in the area of human rights protection. They also noted that the international community should work closely with the Uzbek leaders in promoting legal reforms that will ensure an impartial judiciary, independent legislation, and transparent mechanisms for the political participation of various groups. A few participants noted that it was important for the international community to help reform Uzbekistan’s law enforcement structures. A human rights activist from Andijan pointed out that OSCE’s experience of helping retrain police officers in the neighboring republic of Kyrgyzstan was in some ways productive in increasing respect for human rights. A local NGO worker from Tashkent complained that the international community has abandoned the NGO sector in Uzbekistan as a result of increasing pressures by the Uzbek government. She noted that many international organizations had closed their offices and left Uzbekistan in the past two years. According to the NGO worker, international organizations used to play a key role in directing the activities of the Uzbek civil society groups to better address the needs and interests of marginalized segments of the community. In particular, she cited the contributions of



several international grant-making institutions such as FINCA, Mercy Corps, Counterpart International, ACDI-VOCA, in fostering and promoting grassroots initiatives. Several human rights activists argued that assistance from international NGOs in the form of legal training, seminars, and roundtable discussions was particularly fruitful for the Uzbek human rights organizations. One activist said that, in collaboration with the ABA-CEELI (the American Bar Association), some local human rights organizations had sought to form juridical clinics and consultation centers to serve the needs of ordinary people. Unfortunately, according to this activist, nearly all human rights organizations have been driven out of Uzbekistan because the Uzbek government viewed their activities as a threat to its stability. Some participants expressed their skepticism about the ability of international organizations and the U.S.–based NGOs to have an impact on the Uzbek leadership. They argued that following the rupture in Uzbek-US relations in 2005, it would be enormously difficult for Western NGOs to return to Uzbekistan. Participants within this group, which included some businessman and students, argued that the Western government should emphasize the economic aspect of cooperation with Uzbekistan. According to these individuals, the United States and other international donors must rethink existing policies that often lead to the marginalization and exclusion of ordinary people. Instead, they must emphasize more inclusive measures whereby the benefits of foreign investment and globalization can be more fairly and proportionately distributed throughout all levels of society. The businesspeople called for increased Western investment in the Uzbek economy as a way to increase Western leverage over the current political situation in Uzbekistan. They argued that Uzbekistan is presently facing grave economic problems and is in desperate need of foreign investment. Due to its specific developmental needs, particularly in energy and the environment, Uzbekistan needs to diversify its partners instead of relying on such countries as China and Russia. In this regard, one businessman noted that business training remains the most acute need in Uzbekistan. He remembered that some United States Agency for International Development (USAID) contractors such as Pragma International and Booz-Allen have done some work in fostering business links between local medium-size enterprises and foreign companies. He called for further advice and assistance in attracting foreign companies and investment. An Uzbek journalist pointed out problems related to cross-border projects throughout Central Asian republics. He noted that international organizations such as the International Migration Organization and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) could engage in important areas of cooperation with the local authorities, which could include training officials, aiding them in introducing new standards of personnel management, training border control officials, and preparing specialists in peace-building efforts and community mediation. In regards to ways of dealing with some radical Islamic groups such as HT, several human rights activists noted that the Uzbek authorities are continuously lobbying western governments to recognize the HT as a terrorist organization and to help cut off its international funding and connections. The rights activists argued that international organizations and Western



governments should avoid designating HT as a terrorist organization because this could legitimize the repressive measures of Central Asian governments, further embolden the ongoing official harassment of ordinary believers and lead to widespread public outcry. Such a measure would also be seen by local believers as the international effort to support oppressive Uzbek governments. A Tashkent-based journalist argued that international organizations should open up lines of communication with moderate Islamic organizations in Uzbekistan. He noted that there are a lot of moderate Muslims who believe in democratic ideals such as free speech and free thought. The journalist went on to suggest that leaders and activists of such organizations can benefit from Western-funded exchange programs to share views with other European and American members of the Muslim community.

Conclusion

This paper presents a critical overview of Islamic activism in Uzbekistan. It has explored multiple public viewpoints regarding Islam in public life, the role of religious education, religious tolerance and political participation. The views of focus group participants varied, and the only goal shared by all was a desire to have a prosperous and dynamic country. Two themes emerged among the participants in the discussion on how to bring about change in Uzbekistan: 1) international pressure on human rights and 2) economic liberalization to create an internal momentum for greater openness. Some focus group participants argued that the Uzbek government must make efforts to change its current repressive policies and adhere to international principles of human rights protection. Other participants suggested that instead of focusing on political issues Uzbekistan should focus on direct foreign investment, the elimination of corruption and reforming key parts of the economy. They argued that such efforts could lead to improving the country’s economic prospects and, subsequently, to the decline of Islamic radicalism. On the issue of Islamic radicalism, there was a general, although not unanimous, agreement among participants that specific groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) constitute threats to Uzbek national security. Many were concerned that such groups are intolerant and even hostile to non-Muslims. Yet, the focus group interviews demonstrated that Islamic groups in Uzbekistan were not a monolithic force as they are often portrayed. Radical and extremist Islamic groups have their followers in Uzbekistan. However, in recent years, Uzbek residents appeared to prefer moderate organizations such as Islamic associations that focus on economic initiatives. Akromiya represented one of such groups. The interviews showed that Islamic associations act as social safety nets in parts of Uzbekistan that are inadequately served by the government. They focus on community life, shunning violence and extremism while fostering moderation among the Muslims of the region. Despite



the promising potential for moderate Islamic associations to bring stability to a tense and volatile region, the Uzbek authorities view these associations as a threat to their political legitimacy. The focus group participants amply demonstrated that pluralism of ideas does exist in Uzbekistan despite the government’s attempts to limit public discussion and political participation. Participants’ opinions provided a useful set of recommendations. Those interviewed wish to promote human rights and rule of law. They want to see economic restructuring along with strong foreign investment. They welcome law enforcement training and professionalization, while calling for the support of fledgling NGOs and professional training in law and business. One of the implications that emerges from these interviews is that the Uzbek authorities should rethink existing policies toward Islamic associations, considering the governments’ repressive measures against the clergy only undermines public support for government programs. Another implication is that the U.S. government should explore the possibility of encouraging collaboration between international aid organizations and moderate Islamic associations. In the opinion of one of the participants, the U.S. government came out strongly against the Uzbek government following the May 2005 Andijan massacre, thus gaining the respect of many Andijan residents and many Muslims who had lost family members during this tragic event.

APPENDIX: ICAS5 NBR PANEL HANDOUT

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION OF ASIA SCHOLARS

AUGUST 2-5, 2007

KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA

INSTITUTIONAL PANEL: APPROACHES TO ‘MODERATE’ ISLAM IN ASIA—THE DYNAMICS AMONG

ISLAM, MUSLIM IDENTITY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY

ORGANIZED BY:

THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH (NBR)

FRIDAY, AUGUST 3, 2007, 1:00PM-7:30PM [ROOM 403]

Panel 1: Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam Asia I: Southeast Asia [1:00pm-3:00pm]

Chair: Fred von der Mehden Moderator: Mahin Karim Participants:

1. Islam and Muslim Identity in Malaysia—Trends and Transformations—Osman Bakar 2. Southern Thailand Crisis—The Ethno-Religious and Political Dimensions—Imtiyaz Yusuf 3. (Philippines Paper)—Amina Rasul-Bernardo 4. Regional Assessment and Implications for the United States—Fred von der Mehden

Panel 2: Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Asia II: South Asia [3:15pm-5:15pm]

Chair: Mohammad R. Zaman Moderator: Mahin Karim Participants:

1. ‘Moderate’ Islam in Bangladesh—Trends and Trajectories—Iftekhar Iqbal 2. Dynamics among Muslims, Islam, Education, Economy, and Society in India—Mohammad Talib 3. Approaches to Moderate Islam in Pakistan—Syed Akif 4. Regional Assessment and Implications for the United States—Mohammad R. Zaman

Panel 3: Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Asia III: Eurasia [5:30pm-7:30pm]

Chair: Michael Bishku Moderator: Mahin Karim Participants:

1. Moderate Muslims in Iran and the Challenge of Human Rights—Arash Naraghi 2. Thriving Under Repression—Moderate Muslim Activism in Uzbekistan—Alisher Khamidov 3. Politics of Islamic Identity in Turkey—Haldun Gulalp & Fulya Atacan 4. Regional Assessment and Implications for the United States—Michael Bishku

The National Bureau of Asian Research Institutional Panel: Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Asia

Page 2 ICAS5, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, August 2-5, 2007



PARTICIPANT BIOGRAPHIES

Organizer:

A. Mahin Karim is Director of Eurasia and South Asia Studies at The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution based in Seattle, Washington, USA, dedicated to informing and strengthening policy in the Asia-Pacific. She has an MA in Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies from the Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, and a BA in International Relations, Modern Languages, and Asian Studies from Beloit College, Wisconsin. Ms. Karim has worked in the international development and human rights fields in Bangladesh, South Africa, and the United States. She has traveled extensively across Europe, Asia, and Africa having lived in Bangladesh, Germany, Thailand, England, India, China, Iran, South Africa, and the United States. Her research interests include political Islam and regional security in Asia. Project Senior Advisor:

Tamara Sonn is the Kenan Professor of Humanities in the Department of Religious Studies at the College of William and Mary. She has a PhD from the University of Chicago in Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations. Dr. Sonn is an internationally known Islamic scholar who specializes in Islamic intellectual history and Islam in the contemporary world. She is the author of numerous books on Islam, is the past president of the American Council for the Study of Islamic Societies, a member of the academic advisory council for the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University, a board member at the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, and a member of the editorial boards of Muslim World, American Journal for Islamic Social Science, and several other journals. Dr. Sonn is also the editor-in-chief of Religion Compass, an online-only journal that publishes original, peer-evaluated, state-of-the-art surveys of current research from across the entire religious studies discipline. Participants—Panel 1: Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam Asia I: Southeast Asia

Osman B. Bakar is professor emeritus at the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur. Prior to this, he was Visiting Professor and Malaysia Chair of Islam in Southeast Asia with the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding. Since 1995, Osman bin Bakar has served as the Deputy Vice Chancellor/Vice President of Academics and was the first (1992) and present holder of the Chair of the Professor of Philosophy of Science at the University of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur). Dr. Bakar’s research interests include Southeast Asian Islam, particularly Malaysian-Indonesian Islam, contemporary Islamic thought, and Religion and Science in the Islamic Context both Classical and modern. He teaches courses on Contemporary Islam in Southeast Asia, Religion and Science in Islam, and Dialogue of Civilizations. Amina Rasul-Bernardo is the Lead Convenor of the Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy and Trustee of the Magbassa Kita Foundation, Inc. A columnist, she started The Moro Times, a monthly supplement of The Manila Times that provides regular and comprehensive coverage of Muslim issues. Ms. Rasul-Bernardo was the editor of The Road to Peace and Reconciliation: Muslim Perspectives on the Mindanao Conflict (2002). She is presently editing a book on the Final Peace Agreement between the government and the Moro National Liberation Front as well as a monograph evaluating ten years of implementation of the peace agreement. Ms. Rasul-Bernardo was a member of the Philippine Cabinet under former President Fidel V. Ramos. She was the 2007 recipient of the “Muslim Democrat of the Year Award” from the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy in Washington DC.

Fred R. von der Mehden is professor emeritus in the department of political science at Rice University. He served as professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin from 1957-1968 where he was



director of East Asian Studies. From 1968-1998 he was Albert Thomas Professor of Political Science at Rice University, and is now Emeritus and a scholar with the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice. Dr. Von der Mehden has written extensively on Islam in Southeast Asia and has completed field studies in the region assessing attitudes in the area toward the Middle East. He holds a PhD from the University of California-Berkeley.

Imtiyaz Yusuf is head of department and lecturer in religion at the Graduate School of Philosophy and Religion, Assumption University, Bangkok. His research interests include Islamic Studies, the study of religion, and Islam in Southeast Asia.

Participants—Panel 2: Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam Asia II: South Asia

Syed Abu Ahmad Akif is Director General of the Employees Old Age Benefits Institution (EOABI), Ministry of Labor and Manpower, Government of Pakistan. Mr. Akif has held several posts in Pakistan’s civil service, including work in criminal justice, law and order, federal and provincial secretariats and rural development. He holds an MPA from the University of Hawaii, Honolulu, and MAs in Journalism and International Relations from the University of Karachi. Mr. Akif has written numerous articles and books, television scripts, and has translated and edited several works on a range of topics including Islamic education and economy, Muslim civilization and Muslims in North America.

Iftekhar Iqbal is professor of history at Dhaka University. Prior to joining Dhaka University, he was assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences at East West University, Dhaka, Bangladesh. He has a PhD and MPhil in Historical Studies from the University of Cambridge. Mohammad R. Zaman is associate professor of political science at Rowan University, New Jersey. He has a PhD in political science from the University of Durham, England, where he was a Commonwealth Scholar, and did post-doctoral work in international studies as a Ford Foundation funded visiting senior fellow at Columbia University, New York. Dr. Rashid’s areas of specialization include comparative politics, international relations, US foreign policy, contemporary world problems, and Asian politics. He has authored five books, and frequently contributes to refereed journals and newspapers. He has received several research grants and also consulted for a number of international development projects funded by the United Nations and the World Bank. Mohammad Talib is professor of sociology at Jamia Millia Islamia in New Delhi. His primary research interests are the sociology of education, Islam in India, marginalized groups, religious minority communities, tablighi, and Muslim education in India. Dr. Talib’s publications include Institutional Sources of Islam in Modern India: Cases of a Madarsa, Khanqah, Tabligh (forthcoming) and ‘The Tablighis in the Making of Muslim Identity’ (1997). Participants—Panel 3: Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam Asia III: Eurasia

Fulya Atacan is a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Yildiz Technical University. She has published extensively on Islamic movements and Sufi orders in Turkey, including Social Change and the Sufi Orders, The Case of Cerrahis (1990, in Turkish); Sacred Immigration, An Anatomy of a Radical Islamic Group (1993, in Turkish); “A Kurdish Islamist Group in Modern Turkey: Shifting Identities”, Middle Eastern Studies 37, 3 (2001); “Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP-SP”, Turkish Studies 6, 2 (2005).

Michael Bishku is associate professor of History at Augusta State University and teaches Middle Eastern, African, and British Empire and Commonwealth courses. He received his PhD from New York University in History and Middle East Languages and Literatures in 1981. Dr. Bishku has received Fulbright grants to study in Morocco and Tunisia (2001); Uzbekistan (1997); Turkey (1988); and Pakistan (1984) and National Endowment for the Humanities grants to do research at Duke University (1991) and



the University of Texas at Austin (1985). He is a past President of the Association of Third World Studies (1995-96) and is currently Vice-President-Elect of the American Council for the Study of Islamic Societies. Haldun N. Gulalp is a professor in the department of political science and international relations, and dean of the faculty of economic and administrative sciences, at Yildiz Technical University, Istanbul. Prior to this, he was professor of sociology at Bogazici University, Istanbul, and has served as a visiting fellow at St. Anthony’s College, University of Oxford (2005), and the Woodrow Wilson Center (2002-03). He has published extensively on Islam and Islamism in Turkey, including Politics of Identity: Foundations of Political Islam in Turkey (2003); ‘Enlightenment by Fiat: Secularization and Democracy in Turkey’ in Middle Eastern Studies 41, 3 (2005); ‘Using Islam as a Political Ideology: Turkey in Historical Perspective’ in Cultural Dynamics, 14, 1 (2002). Alisher Khamidov is a journalist originally from Kyrgyzstan. From June 1998 to July 2001, he served as Director of the Osh Media Resource Center (OMRC), a nonprofit independent media association in southern Kyrgyzstan. He has also acted as the regional coordinator of the Central Asian Media Support Project. Khamidov has written a series of articles on religion and ethnic conflict in the Ferghana Valley and political developments in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia, and is a frequent contributor to Eurasianet and IRIN. Khamidov is pursuing a PhD in Russian and Eurasian Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. He has previously worked at Notre Dame University’s Sanctions and Security Project, the NEH Summer Institute on Eurasian Civilizations at Harvard University and at the Foreign Policy Studies Program of the Brookings Institution.

Arash Naraghi has a doctorate degree in Pharmacology from Tehran University and is currently a PhD candidate in philosophy at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Dr. Naraghi is the author of A Treatise Concerning the Understanding of Religion: An Introduction to the Analysis of Abrahamidae

Faith, and has published more than 30 papers on philosophical and theological issues in Iranian journals, mainly Kiyan magazine. Dr. Naraghi translated three books from English to Farsi on ‘Reason and Religious Belief,’ ‘Philosophical Theology,’ and ‘An Introduction to Epistemology.’ He was a member of what is known as the Kiyan Circle at this time. His research interests include the philosophy of religion, theology, mysticism, and epistemology. Rapporteurs:

Torrey Goad is a Next Generation Fellow at NBR. He received his MA from the University of Wisconsin, Madison, in the department of Languages and Cultures of Asia. His fields of specialization include religious nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism in India and Pakistan. Prior to graduation, he completed an internship as a Political Officer with the U.S. Embassy in Georgia. Aishah M.V. Pang is Assistant Director of Programs and Administration at NBR. Ms. Pang holds a Master’s degree in Public Administration, with concentrations in nonprofit management and international affairs, from the Evans School of Public Affairs, University of Washington. She graduated with a BA in International Affairs, concentrating in East and Southeast Asia, from the Elliott School at The George Washington University. Her research interests include maritime security and the international relations of Southeast Asia.





PAPER ABSTRACTS

Panel 1: Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam Asia I: Southeast Asia

Islam and Muslim Identity in Malaysia—Trends and Transformations, Osman Bakar, University of Malaya: This report provides a comprehensive overview of moderate Islam in Malaysia. The report highlights Malaysia as a ‘moderate’ Muslim country that is a model of stability in the Muslim world, with a strong record for both economic development and inter-ethnic harmony, attributed to constitutional guarantees of religious freedom, policies that stress power sharing at the governmental level, and religious tolerance at communal levels. At the same time, the report stressed a growing need for inter-religious dialogue to resolve conflicts arising over mixed marriages, conversions, and inter-religious interaction resulting from increased social mobility. Southern Thailand Crisis—The Ethno-Religious and Political Dimensions, Imtiyaz Yusuf, Assumption University: This report provides an overview of the Muslim community in Thailand, based on field research and interviews. The report focuses on the views of self-identified Muslim ‘moderates’ in Thailand. Interviewees expressed gratitude for the religious freedom the Buddhist majority state guarantees them, and indicated clear concern for Muslim-Buddhist relations resulting from conflicts in southern Thailand. They indicated general sympathy with Muslim complaints of discrimination in the south, but strong opposition to the militancy emanating from Thailand’s southern regions. Informants also expressed concern about growing sectarian divides within Thailand’s Muslim community. Panel 2: Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam Asia II: South Asia

‘Moderate’ Islam in Bangladesh—Trends and Trajectories, Iftekhar Iqbal, Dhaka University: Based on five focus group discussions, this paper sums up the observations and suggestions of ‘moderate’ Muslims in Bangladesh on politics, education, and poverty. It appears that in all three vital sectors of national importance, moderate Muslims have a voice distinct from that of the predominantly secular civil society in the country, and recommend qualified Islamic interventions in areas where secular and individualistic approaches have failed. Most moderate Muslims attribute the continuum of political unrest and violence in the country mainly to abuses of institutions of governance and the democratic process. In the field of education, discussants observed that enormous diversity in terms of ideology, government engagement, pedagogic approaches and institutional capacities have contributed to the present inadequacies in the education infrastructure. Dynamics among Muslims, Islam, Education, Economy, and Society in India, Mohammad Talib, Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies: This paper is based on interviews with Muslims in India on a variety of issues, including the relationship between Islamic education and religious intolerance in India; characteristics of Islamic education and reform in India; relationship between economic marginalization and communal hostilities in India; perspectives on Muslim integration into the Indian economy; and thoughts on India’s Muslim poor. Specific emphasis was on the impact of 9/11 and its influence on radical and moderate Islam in India. Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Pakistan, Zafar Ishaq Ansari, International Islamic University, Islamabad: This paper covers the question of women’s rights in Pakistan and approaches to religious pluralism. It discusses women’s empowerment and socio-political role in a changing milieu, gauging public sentiment with regard to inherent rights given to women by authoritative Muslim texts and scriptures, as well as modern readings of those texts. This paper traces the possible connections between madrassas, intolerance, religion-inspired violence and sectarianism. It examines religious minority rights and presents diverse views on religious freedoms prevalent throughout the country.



Panel 3: Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam Asia III: Eurasia

Moderate Muslims in Iran and the Challenge of Human Rights, Arash Naraghi, University of California—Santa Barbara: This paper is based on interviews and writings of diverse representatives of moderate Islamic thought in Iran. The author characterizes as ‘moderate’ those who hold pro-human rights positions and oppose violence as a means to achieve social and political goals, whether domestic or international. They are contrasted with those who hold traditional approaches to Islam (involving literalism, divine-prerogative ethics, and legalism), including those traditionalists who support human rights. The report indicates that while traditional scholars hold that Islam accords Muslims the basic rights of religion, life, family, property, and reason, moderate scholars argue that these rights are due to all human beings, without distinction according to religious or other identity. Representatives of moderate interpretations of Islam employ similar reasoning to argue against other practices perceived as discriminatory in the modern world. Thriving Under Repression—Approaches to ‘Moderate’ Islam in Uzbekistan, Alisher Khamidov, Johns Hopkins University: This paper is based on interviews with individuals in Uzbekistan representing a diverse range of professional, generational, ethnic, and religious backgrounds. Views expressed by the interviewees were often conflictual, as expected given the diversity of backgrounds. On the issue of Islamic radicalism, there was general (although not unanimous) agreement that specific groups such as Hizb-ut Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan constitute threats to Uzbek national security. A number of interviews questioned the extent of religious extremist activities and expressed suspicion that the government had fabricated the threats to justify crackdown on civil society. Of particular interest were views of numerous religious scholars interviewed who argued that Islam is not only compatible with democratic ideals, but is inherently democratic. Politics of Islamic Identity in Turkey—Diversity and Transformation, Haldun Gulalp and Fulya Atacan, Yildish Technical University: This report provides a comprehensive overview of the rise of Islamism within the context of Turkey’s economic and political development. The report analyzes the views of ‘moderate’ Muslims from diverse groups of individuals, expressed during focus group discussions. An important theme of the discussions was the gradual transformation of Islamism in Turkey, from narrowly sectarian to focusing on the value of dialogue and communication, universal rights and freedoms, and democracy as both a process and a goal. For further information about NBR, please contact: A. Mahin Karim Director, Eurasia and South Asia Studies The National Bureau of Asian Research 1215 4th Avenue, Suite 1600 Seattle, WA 98161 U.S.A. P: +1 (206) 632-7370 F: +1 (206) 632-7487 E: [email protected]

bangladesh. moderate islam

Documents