do what i say, not what i do
TRANSCRIPT
Do what I say, not what I do
Scienti®c fraud is a serious matter and
those who commit it are culpable. When
the fraud in question involves a clinical
study or has a direct bearing on patient
management, the matter may be
regarded as especially reprehensible.
Such deceit may lead to patients
receiving inappropriate or dangerous
therapy on the basis of the published
results. At the very least, time and
resources may be wasted in trying to
replicate the fraudulent results. The
extent of the problem is uncertain
but the GMC has recently struck off
a surgeon for a fraud committed
10 years previously. One of the worrying
aspects of the case was the revelation that
the surgeon's research supervisor and
other senior members of his university
were aware of the fraud and did not take
any action during the 10 years. The
research supervisor himself has since
been found guilty of professional mis-
conduct for his failure to take action.1
Against this background, it is dis-
turbing to ®nd that a substantial
majority of medical students would not
report a colleague they knew to be guilty
of academic misconduct.2 The reasons
adduced for this attitude are varied and
re¯ect the ambivalent approach to aca-
demic misconduct demonstrated in the
responses3 to Smith's editorial4 on a
student who was found to have cheated
in the Finals examinations. Many of the
explanations given appear to be
rationalisations for the widely held
disapproval of `informers' within British
culture and may re¯ect a feeling that
academic misconduct is not a terribly
serious affair. However, there does not
seem to be any difference in kind
between cheating in an assessment and
falsifying the results of a research study
in order to get it published. Both are an
attempt to gain academic advantage by
dishonest means. It is dif®cult to dis-
agree with Glick when he says, `It is
reasonable to assume that cheaters in
medical school will be more likely than
others to continue to act dishonestly
with patients, colleagues, insurers, and
government.'5
To be `honest and trustworthy' is
one of the Duties of a Doctor, as
de®ned by the General Medical Coun-
cil, as is the duty to `act quickly to
protect patients from risk if you have
good reason to believe that you or a
colleague may not be ®t to practise'.6
The medical students in Rennie and
Crosby's study gave assent to the latter,
stating that they would blow the whistle
if they thought a patient was at risk. If
this narrowly utilitarian approach is
taken, there must be a reliable means of
identifying that a patient is being put at
risk. This may be straightforward in the
case of immediate risk, but may be
much more dif®cult in the case of risk
at a later date. A settled habit of
dishonesty and untrustworthiness may
well put future patients at risk and it is
at least plausible that the student who
passes assessments by cheating may not
have acquired the knowledge and skills
needed for safe practise. On either
argument the student will become a
practitioner who is `not ®t to practise'.
A profession is de®ned by, among
other things, self-regulation. The
concept of self-regulation implies a
shared ethos and agreed standards of
behaviour. It also requires effective
sanctions against those who depart
from the agreed standards. The med-
ical profession within the UK has, at
®rst sight, all of these components.
The shared ethos is de®ned in updated
versions of the Hippocratic Oath such
as the Declaration of Geneva and
codi®ed as agreed standards of beha-
viour in publications from the General
Medical Council such as Good Medical
Practice. Sanctions for those who fail
to meet the accepted standards in-
clude suspension or erasure from the
Medical Register with consequent
exclusion from the right to practise.
Recent high pro®le cases have,
however, strengthened a widespread
perception in the media and among the
general public that self-regulation has
failed. Following the Bristol paediatric
cardiac surgery investigation, there has
been a succession of cases where doctors
known to be incompetent have appar-
ently been allowed to continue in prac-
tice unchecked for a considerable period
of time. This is partly a systems failure in
that the methods for identifying poor
performance are not well developed but
it is also due to reluctance on the part of
colleagues to report their concerns about
individuals. Clinical audit has been
widely introduced, but it is often
dependent on inadequate data collection
and processing systems. A major failing
in the past has been the lack of mana-
gerial surveillance of the audit system.
This has been addressed in the new
emphasis on Clinical Governance within
the National Health Service7 but this will
only be fully effective in so far as the
maintenance of standards within the
profession is perceived as the responsi-
bility of every individual. When loyalty to
an individual colleague takes the place of
loyalty to the professional ethos faults go
unchecked and major harm is done to
patients and to the colleague one is
seeking to protect.
Rennie and Crosby report a percep-
tion among students that the medical
school should be responsible for
detecting cheating thus freeing the stu-
dents from the need to blow the whistle.
If this repudiation of responsibility con-
tinues after they graduate Clinical
Governance will not produce the hoped
for improvement in standards of patient
care. The challenge for medical educa-
tors is to inculcate professional stand-
ards so effectively that whistle blowing is
unnecessary but to ensure that it will
occur if needed. This may need a
fundamental shift in our approaches to
Commentaries
Correspondence: Sam Leinster, Dean,
School of Medicine, Health Policy and
Practice, University of East Anglia, Norwich,
NR4 7TJ, UK. Tel.: 01603 593939; Fax:
01603 593752; E-mail: [email protected]
Ó Blackwell Science Ltd MEDICAL EDUCATION 2002;36:113±114 113
the assessment of medical students8 and
in our own attitudes to professional
behaviour.9 Perhaps the real problem is
that the students in Rennie and Crosby's
study are re¯ecting what we do rather
than what we say.
Sam Leinster
Norwich, UK
References1 Ramsay S. UK consultant censured for
failure to act on junior's research fraud.
Lancet 2001;357:780.
2 Rennie SC, Crosby JR. Students'
perceptions of whistle blowing: implica-
tions for self-regulation. A question-
naire and focus group survey. Med Educ
2002;36:173±9.
3 Letters. Cheating at medical school.
BMJ 2001;322:296.
4 Smith R. Cheating at medical school.
BMJ 2000;321:398.
5 Glick S. Cheating at medical school.
BMJ 2001;322:250±1.
6 General Medical Council. Good Medical
Practice. London: General Medical
Council; 1998.
7 Clinical Governance. Quality in the new
NHS. http://www.doh.gov.uk/clinical-
goverance/hsc065.pdf.
8 Ginsburg S, Regehr G, Hatala R,
McNaughton N, Frohna A, Hodges B,
Lingard L, Stern D. Context, Con¯ict
and Resolution: a new conceptual fra-
mework for evaluating professionalism.
Acad Med 2000;75 (Suppl.):S6±S11.
9 Satterwhite RC, Satterwhite WM III,
Enarson C. An ethical paradox: the ef-
fective of unethical conduct on medical
students' values. J Med Ethics
2000;26:462±5.
Do what I say, not what I do · S Leinster114
Ó Blackwell Science Ltd MEDICAL EDUCATION 2002;36:113±114