do ethnic parties promote minority ethnic conflict?

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Do Ethnic Parties Promote MinorityEthnic Conflict?John Ishiyama aa University of North Texas ,Published online: 24 Feb 2009.

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Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 15:56–83, 2009Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN: 1353-7113 print / 1557-2986 onlineDOI: 10.1080/13537110802672388

Do Ethnic Parties Promote MinorityEthnic Conflict?

JOHN ISHIYAMAUniversity of North Texas

Do ethnic parties exacerbate ethnic conflict? Many scholars haveargued that the mere appearance of ethnic parties inevitably leadsto a spiral of ethnic conflict and the collapse of incipient democ-racies. This article tests this proposition by examining how ethnicparties affect protest and communal conflict across 82 countriesand 213 ethnic/communal groups from 1985–2003. Using a vari-ety of quantitative techniques, I find that ethnic parties do mobilizeminority ethnic groups to engage in protest, but there is no naturalconnection between the appearance of ethnic parties and the extentto which the minority group engages in communal conflict.

Do ethnic parties exacerbate ethnic conflict? On the one hand, several schol-ars have argued that the mere appearance of ethnic parties leads to the“ethnification” of politics and a spiral towards instability and the collapseof incipient democracies.1 On the other hand, several scholars have arguedthat ethnic parties provide opportunities for interest articulation from groupsthat might normally be shut out of the political system.2 Indeed, a longstand-ing argument made by advocates of the consociational school is that ethnicparties actually help dampen conflict by channeling demands through legalchannels, thus increasing “voice” and preventing “exit” of ethnic groups viaconflict.3

The question as to the role played by ethnic parties in fomenting conflictis not simply an issue for academic debate. Indeed, many countries have ex-plicitly adopted bans on the existence of ethnic parties as a policy “remedy”for ethnic conflict, based largely on the presumption that such parties are bytheir very nature destructive political entities. This was certainly the justifica-tion in Bulgaria, where constitutional bans on the existence of ethnic parties

Address correspondence to John Ishiyama, Professor of Political Science, Department ofPolitical Science, University of North Texas, 1155 Union Circle #305340, Denton, TX 76203-5017. E-mail: [email protected]

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Ethnic Parties and Minority Ethnic Conflict 57

were adopted in 1991.4 Such bans have also been employed in Turkey,Afghanistan, and Iraq.5 Further, as Anika Becher and Mathias Basedau note,ethnic party bans have been used in at least 22 sub-Saharan African states andhas become one of the more popular ways in which states have attemptedto contain the destructive effects of the ethnification of politics.6

Nonetheless, despite the substantial debate in the literature, there is rel-atively little comparative, quantitative/empirical work that has been done asto whether ethnic parties actually contribute to ethnic conflict. Most stud-ies have either focused on single countries to explain why ethnic partiesare successful7 or have concentrated on specific regions, such as Western,Eastern, and Central Europe rather than adopting a broadly comparativeapproach.8

In this paper, I examine the question of how ethnic parties affect ethnicprotest and communal conflict by using the Minorities at Risk (MAR) databasecombined with data on ethnic parties across 82 new democracies or democ-ratizing states in the developing world and 213 ethnic/communal groups. Inparticular I focus on the question of whether the mere appearance of ethnicparties is associated with higher degrees of ethnic group political protest andethnic group communal conflict. I concentrate only on new democracies, inas much the extant literature that points to the dangers of ethnic partiesfocus on their damaging activities in newly democratizing states NOT fullyconsolidated democracies.9

ETHNIC PARTIES AND ETHNIC CONFLICT

There has been a longstanding interest in the role played by ethnic parties inpromoting ethnic conflict. Many scholars have argued that the appearance ofethnic parties is a “bad” thing for new democracies or systems in transition.From this perspective, not only does the appearance of ethnic parties deependivisions between groups but ethnic parties serve to exacerbate conflict.

Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle offered one of the earliest expla-nations as to how ethnic parties promote conflict in plural societies.10 In theRabushka and Shepsle model, a key role is played by ethnic elites and theorganizations that they lead. These organizations engage in the politics ofethnic outbidding, which ultimately undermines multiethnic cooperation andinevitably leads to nondemocratic, ethnically exclusive states. Other authorshave similarly argued that because ethnic parties make their political appealspecifically on ethnicity, their emergence often has a centrifugal effect onpolitics.11 This is especially harmful to new democracies, where democraticinstitutions are quite fragile. Indeed, under such conditions, ethnic compe-tition can easily turn into ethnic conflict. This is because the competitionfor votes for the ethnic party involves mobilizing the ethnic group—and

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58 J. Ishiyama

the best way to do that is to use inflammatory and confrontational rhetoric,distinguishing between “us” versus “them.”12 As Richard Gunther and LarryDiamond note, “the electoral logic of the ethnic party is to harden and mo-bilize its ethnic base with exclusive, often polarizing appeals to ethnic groupopportunity and threat . . . the ethnic party’s particularistic, exclusivist, andoften polarizing political appeals make its overall contribution to societydivisive and even disintegrative.”13

In addition, ethnic parties, indirectly contribute to worsening ethnic ten-sions by promoting party politics along cultural lines, which often leads tothe marginalization and exclusion of a cultural minority. As a consequencesuch minorities may feel encouraged to resort to undemocratic or even vio-lent means in order to counter this dominance. Further, merely by promotingidentity-based politics, ethnic parties can significantly raise the stakes of thepolitical game, reinforcing group identities and thus raising the likelihood ofconflict. For these reasons as well, ethnic parties increase the likelihood ofintercommunal conflict and threaten the survivability of new democracies.14

Thus, from the above perspective, the mere appearance of an ethnicparty should signal an increase in the rise of interethnic conflict. In short, asDonald Horowitz notes:

By appealing to electorates in ethnic terms, by making ethnic demandson government, and by bolstering the influence of ethnically chauvinisticelements within each group, parties that begin by merely mirroring ethnicdivisions help to deepen and extend them. Hence the oft heard remarkin such states that politicians have created ethnic conflict.15

On the other hand, several scholars contend that ethnic parties canplay a constructive role in promoting intergroup accommodation. Indeed,advocates of the consociational school have long argued that by promotingthe emergence of ethnic parties and then representing them broadly this willfacilitate the integration of as many subcultures as possible into the politicalgame, thus creating the conditions for interethnic cooperation.16 Further, bysecuring representation for minority groups, openness serves to facilitate theintegration of disaffected groups into the political system, which ultimatelyleads them to moderate their demands. Frank Cohen argues the broader therepresentation the more likely the ethnic group feels bound to the existingsystem—as he puts it “by making institutions more accessible and makingethnic cleavages more explicit, ethnic groups will engage in more frequentbut less intense conflict. They will use moderate means of resistance to effectchange in the status quo.”17

Others, such as Sherrill Stroschein contend that ethnic parties do notcause ethnic conflict but emerge as the result of it—that is, they reflect dif-ferences that already exist. Nonetheless, ethnic parties can channel demandsinto more legitimate forms of participation and thus allow conflicts to be

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resolved politically rather than through violence.18 Others have similarlyattributed the preservation of ethnic peace in various settings to the repre-sentation of ethnic parties in Parliament.19 Ishiyama demonstrated that in thepostcommunist world, ethnic parties have served to assist in bringing intothe political process those who would have been otherwise alienated by theemerging democratic systems in the region.20

Current research, such as Johanna Birnir, Kanchan Chandra, JamesFearon and David Laitin, and Daniel Posner, offers a more contingent viewof the link between ethnic cleavages and conflict and stresses the impor-tance of ethnicity and ethnic cleavages as cost-effective strategic resourcesfor group formation, interest definition, and collective action.21 Perhaps oneof the strongest and most articulate proponents of the notion that ethnicparties can have a positive effect on the stabilization of new democracies isKanchan Chandra. Chandra directly attacks the notion of ethnic outbidding,which is so central to the argument that the mere appearance of ethnic par-ties sets off a chain reaction leading to a spiral of extremism that destroysdemocratic politics altogether. Rather, she argues that ethnic parties can helpsustain democracy if these parties are institutionally encouraged to competeon multiple dimensions rather than on just the unidimensional axis of eth-nicity. Indeed, political institutions that restrict “ethnic politics to a singledimension destabilize democracy, whereas institutions that foster multipledimensions of ethnic identity can sustain it.”22

In a similar vein, Johanna Birnir, in examining patterns of ethnic politicsin a broadly comparative way, contends that the ethnification of politicsdoes not necessarily translate into violence.23 Like Chandra, she argues thatethnic identity serves as a stable but flexible information shortcut for politicalchoices and assists in stabilizing party formations and hence the developmentof democracy. If violence results it is largely the result of political institutionalfactors, particularly restrictions on access to the executive. This exclusion iswhat leads to violence, not the political mobilization of ethnicity.

Birnir argues that, ceteris paribus, ethnic parties (which she refers to asethnic “attractors”) are predisposed to seek peaceful means to gain access topolitical power. This is because, as with all parties, ethnic attractors seek toact on the behalf of a constituency and seek leverage for that constituency.In turn voters, who use ethnic identity as a shortcut to sort through candidatepreferences, prefer parties that act on behalf of the ethnic constituency (thiscould be a nonethnic party as well). This provides for a strong incentive forthe ethnic attractor to gain access to the political executive, and this is bestachieved through peaceful means.24

Why is it the case, then, that members of some ethnic groups appearto peacefully support their group in electoral politics, while others do notsupport their groups, exit electoral politics and even engage in protest andviolence? Her answer is that if political intransigence and violence result, it

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60 J. Ishiyama

is not because of the ethnification of politics but rather the denial of politicalaccess to an ethnic group. It is the shutting out from the core of power thatproduces the kinds of violence and instability that is commonly associatedwith ethnic politics in the existing literature.

Despite the debate on the central role played by ethnic parties in theliterature, there is little in the way of a direct test as to whether or notthe appearance of an ethnic party promotes conflict. Rather much of theliterature (particularly the “contingent” approach) emphasizes the importanceof incentives facing ethnic parties as a way to contain conflict as opposedto directly assessing whether such parties have an independent effect oncommunal conflict. Does the mere appearance of an ethnic party impactviolence and protest (independently from other exogenous factors)?

OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING ETHNIC CONFLICT

Beyond the debate as to whether ethnic parties independently promoteethnic conflict, there are a number of other control variables that need tobe considered. In particular, these include political institutions, cultural andeconomic differences between the ethnic group and other groups in society,and contextual factors such as the level of globalization, economic growth,and resources.

Much of the literature, including both those who contend that the pres-ence of ethnic parties exacerbates conflict and those who argue that ethnicparties play a positive role in consolidating new democracies, point to theimportance of political institutions. In particular scholars have long pointedto the importance of the electoral system, the structure of the executive,and federalism in affecting the course of ethnic politics. Indeed, once cul-tural identity is politicized, the sustained intensity of that political relevancedepends on state institutions. Those institutions define the rules of politicalmembership, representation, and resource allocation. When these institu-tions structure membership, representation, and resource allocation accord-ing to previously established cultural criteria, “identity politics” dominatethe political game. Alternatively, if cultural identity had not been previouslypoliticized, institutions could create that political relevance or prevent itsinitial emergence. Indeed, institutional rules and procedures can be struc-tured in ways that prevent cultural identity from becoming politically relevantat all.25

Advocates of the consociational school (but others as well) have longargued that Proportional Representation (PR) electoral systems combinedwith parliamentary government provide the representation that allows forthe incorporation of ethnic interests, thus diffusing extremist demands.26

The focus on the independent effect of political institutions is particularlytrue of the consociationalist approach to ethnic party behavior. Although, as

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Pippa Norris (2002) rightly points out, the electoral system, while important,really is only one component in consociational systems of democracy, thebedrock of consociational theory is the assertion that Proportional Repre-sentation (PR) electoral systems combined with parliamentary governmentare the fundamental institutions upon from which many other arrangementsflow. PR provides the representation that allows for the incorporation ofethnic interests, thus diffusing extremist demands. On the other hand asJohn McGarry and Brendan O’Leary note: “a majoritarian system of liberaldemocratic government, designed to create strong powers for the govern-ing party, is no guarantee of liberty for ethnic minorities. A ‘winner takesall’ system in the presence of ethnic parties ensures that ethnic competitionwill be regarded as a zero-sum conflict.”27 Stephen Saideman, David Lanoue,Michael Campenni, and Samuel Stanton also find that more proportional sys-tems are better at containing ethnic conflict than are majoritarian or pluralitysystems.28

Others, however, question the wisdom of adopting PR systems to “rem-edy” the ethnic politics. George Tsebelis and Paul Brass for instance arguethat longer term use of term proportional arrangements may serve to re-inforce and perpetuate rigid segregation along narrow ethnic-cultural, reli-gious, and linguistic cleavages.29 Joel Barkan warns of the dangers of PRproducing extreme multipartism and fragmentation, which may promote in-stability in new democracies.30 Benjamin Reilly cautions against the “one sizefits all” arguments in support of PR and argues that district-based systemscan control and channel ethnic political demands in potentially constructiveways.31

In addition to electoral rules, there is also the argument that presi-dentialism promotes conflict as well. From this perspective, presidentialismpromotes “zero-sum” politics in which the winner takes all and the loserreceives nothing.32 In a presidential system where the executive is powerful,this essentially leads to the exclusion of minorities from the centers of power.This is particularly problematic in countries that are ethnically divided. Thus,for Mainwaring presidential systems inherently militate against “meaningfulrepresentation” and participation “in governing coalitions.”33 Although this isalso possible in a parliamentary system where a majority can run roughshodover a political minority, this is unlikely; what is more likely is that parties inthe parliamentary system will share power in coalitions. A corollary to thisargument is posed by Johanna Birnir who contends that what really mattersis whether the ethnic group is represented in the political executive.34 Thusminorities do not totally lose out and hence are provided with a larger stakein maintaining the existing system.35

On the other hand, Donald Horowitz contends that parliamentarianismis just as much to blame for political instability as presidentialism, particularlyif one examines the record of postcolonial Asia and Africa. For instance, inNigeria, where, under a parliamentary system, a “cluster of ethnic groups”

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acquired a majority of legislative seats and totally excluded all other groupsfrom political power, parliamentarianism contributed to the Biafran civil war.On the other hand, in presidential systems, Horowitz argues that the divisionof powers by different parties automatically guarantees a decidedly non-winner-take-all result that prevents the monopoly of power by one groupover another. The real culprit for the “exclusionary” characteristics of a systemis not presidentialism, but the electoral system, that is, the method by whichpresidents and legislators are elected to office. He contends that, in essence,the argument critics of presidentialism employ “boils down to an argumentnot against the presidency but against plurality election, not in favor ofparliamentary systems but in favor of parliamentary coalitions.”36

Federalism is also an often cited structural “remedy” to ethnic conflict.37

Generally many scholars have argued that federalism provides access forrepresentation (particularly at regional levels) for ethnic political demands.38

By doing so, this helps channel ethnic demands in more constructive waysand helps dampen the intensity of ethnic conflict. Further, by lowering thelevel of ethnic competition to the local or regional level, federalism helps“insulate” the political center from ethnic conflict.

Others have suggested that cultural differences fuel ethnic conflict; al-though there has been some debate here as well. Whereas many politicalscience scholars (see for instance Robert Kaplan and Daniel Moynihan, and tosome extent Samuel Huntington)39 suggest that conflict is more likely whencultural groups are different, political psychologists like Arjun Appadurai,Julie Kristeva, and Vamik Volkan contend cultural clashes are more likelywhen groups share common characteristics.40 Arjun Appadurai, in particular,contends cultural clashes are more likely when groups share common char-acteristics. He explores the links between ethnic violence and globalization,arguing that bodily violence between social intimates is a means of tryingto fix or stabilize ethnic identity amid the uncertainties of the post-Cold Warworld. In particular, Appadurai concerns himself with violence involvingpersons and groups with some prior degree of familiarity such as neighborsand kinsmen. He focuses on the connection between the indeterminacy ofethnic boundaries and brutality. The killing, torture, and rape associated withethnic violence is not simply a means of eliminating “other” but “involvesthe use of the body to establish the parameters of this otherness, taking thebody apart, so to speak, to divine the enemy within.”41 For Appadurai, thissearch for certainty through self-mutilation occurs as a result of the uncer-tainties of the current era: “The maiming and mutilation of ethnicized bodiesis a desperate effort to restore the validity of somatic markers of othernessin the face of uncertainties posed by census labels, demographic shifts, andlinguistic changes, all of which make ethnic affiliations less somatic and bod-ily, more social and elective.”42 Thus for Appadurai, ethnic violence is mostlikely to occur not between groups that are culturally different, but ironicallybetween groups that are culturally similar.

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There has also been a growing interest in the linkage between globaliza-tion and ethnic conflict with many scholars viewing globalization as bringingabout a new era of intense cultural and ethnic conflicts.43 The general argu-ment made by advocates of this approach is that globalization has intensifiednationalistic and localistic sentiments as a result of greater international eco-nomic integration. Inequities generated by globalization, or so the argumentgoes, generate parochial forms of resistance rooted in an imagined past thatnever was. The homogenization of culture brought about by globalizationelicits reactions that exalt differences and local particularisms.44 Globalizationforces a materialistic and superficially universalistic set of Western values onthe rest of the world, and this elicits a violent reaction. The homogenizinginfluence of globalization creates strong opposition to wholesale adoptionof the values and standards of the international community. Further, thegrowth of communication and electronic media (including television, butincreasingly the Internet) erodes traditional values and moral restraints, byintroducing the “glitz of Hollywood.” In addition, economic integration, per-haps the most seductive form of globalization, has tremendous social andpolitical consequences, including potentially triggering ethnic and culturalconflict. The global spread of market capitalism, and its attending shrink-ing transport costs and growing communications facilities means that bothgoods and people can more easily move from one country to another.45 Themovement of peoples and goods leads to competition for jobs and othereconomic benefits, and an expanding set of material desires and aspirations,most of which are frustrated, creating greater resentments and the desireto single out scapegoats. Many theorists thus suggest a direct connectionbetween economic globalization and ethnic conflict. For instance, as Wrightand Macmanus argued, although earlier there was considerable hope thateconomic interdependence would bring about “world harmony,” in fact thenew intimacy brought about by increased trade and financial flows, andother forms of economic interdependence has provoked “political and cul-tural backlashes that were the seeds of serious conflict.”46

Other scholars have also pointed to the importance of economic dis-parities as a source of ethnic conflict (or economic grievances). It is arguedthat economic disparity, as captured by differential rates of poverty betweenany two ethnic, religious, or socioeconomic groups of people, would di-rectly result in conflicts over resources.47 Ethnic conflict has also been seenas the result of economic competition between ethnically differentiated seg-ments of the working class or between ethnically differentiated traders andcustomers.48 Thus, based upon this, we would expect that communal conflictwould be greater under conditions of economic disparity.

In addition, there are other economic factors that also stimulate conflict.These are less related to “grievances” and more to economic “greed.” AsPaul Collier and James Fearon and David Laitin have noted, the availability ofresources provides an incentive for “greed” that in turn provides incentives to

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engage in conflict.49 In particular, a most important risk factor is that countriesthat have a substantial share of their income (Gross Domestic Product [GDP])coming from the export of primary commodities are radically more at risk ofconflict.

WHAT IS AN ETHNIC PARTY?

There have been several recent attempts to define an ethnic party. For in-stance, Gunther and Diamond contend that a “purely ethnic party seeks onlyto mobilize the votes of its own ethnic group [italics in original].”50 Similarly,Kanchan Chandra and Daniel Metz define an ethnic party as a “party thatovertly represents itself to the voters as the champion of the interests ofone ethnic group or a set of groups to the exclusion of another or others,and makes such a representation central to its mobilizing strategy.”51 Both ofthese definitions emphasize how the parties portray themselves and presup-pose the existence of competitive elections (which makes considerable sensegiven that what gives life to parties is the prospect of power). In this senseboth of these definitions conceive of parties as primarily electoral organiza-tions that seek power, which is consistent with the general definition of politi-cal parties as offered by Leon Epstein, Giovanni Sartori, and Kenneth Janda.52

In a similar vein, Herbert Kitschelt argues that the defining feature ofethnic parties (which he refers to as “particularistic sociocultural parties”) isthat they limit their appeal to a particular ethnic or regional constituency and“explicitly seek to draw boundaries” between ethnic “friends” and “foes.”53

For Kitschelt the ethnic party does not pursue a universalistic program butrather seeks to secure material and political benefits for the ethnic group.Thus, unlike other types of political parties, electoral mobilization is notintended to attract additional voters outside of the group to support theparty.54 As a result, the potential electoral base of the party is defined andlimited by ethnicity. Thus, the ethnic party, according to Brass, in essence,strives to become “that one political organization dominant in representingthe demands of the ethnic group against its rivals.”55

For the purposes of this paper I employ Brass’s definition of the ethnicparty as an organization that seeks to explicitly represent the interests of theethnic group and use the operationalization of that definition as proposedby Chandra and Metz. An ethnic party is identified as the first party to either(a) proclaim itself as the primary representative of the ethnic group and onlythat group OR (b) is widely regarded as the first party to represent the inter-ests of that group and only that group. Thus, this definition would includeparties that identify themselves as the representative of a particular group(such as the Magyar Coalition in Slovakia or the Bodo Peoples’ LiberationFront in India) as well as parties that are widely regarded as ethnic despite

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proclaiming themselves officially as nonethnic (such as the Movement forRights and Freedoms in Bulgaria, which is largely a party of ethnic Turks).In this article I limit the inquiry to include only those countries that havehad at least one reasonably competitive election from 1985–2003, since theethnic outbidding argument is premised on the existence of some degree ofpolitical competition. Of the 213 ethnic groups in the sample, 89 were rep-resented by a party that explicitly claimed to represent (and only represent)the ethnic group and met the criteria as an ethnic party as identified above.

DATA

As indicated above, this article is interested in testing the relationship be-tween the presence of an ethnic party and protest and communal conflict.Thus, the focus is not on all ethnic groups, but only groups that are poten-tial candidates to engage in violent conflict. This includes all “groups thatdefine themselves using ethnic criteria (who) make claims on behalf of theircollective interests against the state, or against other political actors.”56 Forthe purposes of this paper, then, the units of analysis are the minorities atrisk. A minority at risk is defined by Gurr as a group that “collectively suffersor benefits, from systematic discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis other groupsin the country or countries in which it resides” or it “is the focus of politicalmobilization and action in defense or promotion of the group’s self-definedinterests.”57

The MAR data have been criticized extensively over the years, includingthe lack of conceptual clarity and the use of ambiguous terminology, thelack of demonstrable intercoder reliability, sample selection bias, and ques-tions regarding the validity of the coding procedures.58 However despitethese problems the MAR data are unquestionably the most comprehensivecollection of data that records ethnic group characteristics and behaviors,both violent and nonviolent. The most recent data includes a sample of337 individual ethnopolitical groups and are thus very well suited for broadcomparative analysis.59

One of the principal problems facing the MAR is that of sample-selectionbias. A solution employed by Johanna Birnir begins by first identifying anappropriate universe of cases exogenously to MAR.60 This sample is thenselected from the cases that are available in the MAR data set. In this paper, Ibegan with the cases defined exogenously by Birnir and then use the samplefrom the MAR she derived. However, I further limit the sample by using thefollowing criteria:

• I only include in the data set those minorities at risk in countries in whicha particular, identifiable ethnic or racial group is present (thus excludinggroups regional or religious groups such as those labeled as “northerners”

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66 J. Ishiyama

or “Sunni”) for the years 1985–2003 (roughly the beginning of the end ofthe Cold War with the ascension of Gorbachev in the Soviet Union andthe latest year in the data set).

• Further, since the focus of virtually all of the literature on the effectsof ethnic parties presupposes the existence of some type of competitiveelection, I limit the country cases to only those that have had at least onerelatively competitive election (even if only a limited or flawed election)from 1985–2003. Operationally, this meant a score of at least a −3 on thePolity IV, Polity2 democracy-autocracy score.

• I focus only on developing countries rather than the richest countriesin the world (for example, the high income Organization for EconomicCooperation and Development countries as defined by the World Bank),largely because developing countries are at greater risk for democraticreversal as the result of ethnic conflict than are the wealthier (and moredemocratically consolidated high-income countries).

This left a total of 213 groups (from 82 countries) selected from the MARdata base. The list of countries, minority groups, ethnic parties, and foundingdates of these parties are provided in Table 1.

VARIABLES

Since I am interested in how ethnic parties affect the activities of ethnicgroups, for this study there are two primary dependent variables: (a) theextent to which ethnic group members engage in various forms of protest;(b) the extent to which the ethnic group has engaged in communal violencewith other groups. Both of these variables were taken directly from theMinorities at Risk (MAR) Phase IV data set.

Protest is measured using the annual protest scores for the period1985–2003 from the MAR. Protest scores were coded from “0” to “5” where:

0 = No protest reported1 = Verbal Opposition (Public letters, petitions, posters, publications,

agitation, etc.)2 = Symbolic Resistance: Scattered acts of symbolic resistance (for example,

sit-ins, blockage of traffic, sabotage, symbolic destruction of property)or political organizing activity on a substantial scale.

3 = Small Demonstrations: A few demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots,total participation of less than 10,000.

4 = Medium Demonstrations: Demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots,total participation of less than 100,000.

5 = Large Demonstrations: Mass demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots,total participation greater than 100,000.

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TABLE 1 List of Countries, Ethnic/Communal Groups, Ethnic/Communal Parties, and YearParty Founded

Yearparty

Country Group Ethnic party founded

AFGHANISTAN HAZARAS Hizb-e-Wahdat 1990AFGHANISTAN UZBEKS National Islamic Party 1991ALBANIA GREEKS Omonia 1992ALGERIA BERBERS Rally for Culture and

Democracy1989

ANGOLA BAKONGOANGOLA OVIMBUNDUANGOLA CABINDAARGENTINA JEWSAZERBAIJAN ARMENIANSAZERBAIJAN LEZGINS Sadval 1990AZERBAIJAN RUSSIANSBANGLADESH CHITTAGONG HILL

TRIBESChittagong Hill Tribal

People’s CoordinationAssociation

1972

BANGLADESH HINDUSBANGLADESH BIHARISBELARUS RUSSIANSBELARUS POLES Union of Belarusan Poles 1990BOSNIA SERBS Serb Democratic Party 1990BOSNIA CROATS Croatian Defense Council 1991BOSNIA MUSLIMS Party of Democratic Action 1989BOTSWANA SAN BUSHMEN First People of Kalahari 1991BRAZIL AFRO-BRAZILIANS Unified Black Movement 1978BRAZIL AMAZONIAN INDIANSBULGARIA TURKS Movements for Rights and

Freedoms1990

BULGARIA ROMA Democratic Roma Union 1990BURUNDI HUTUSBURUNDI TUTSISCAMBODIA CHAMSCAMBODIA VIETNAMESECAMEROON KIRDIS Movement for the Defense

for the Republic1992

CAMEROON BAMILEKECOLOMBIA BLACKSCOSTARICA ANTILLEAN BLACKSCROATIA SERBS Serb People’s Party 1991CROATIA ROMA Party of Roma of Croatia 1991CYPRUS TURKISH CYPRIOTS Republican Turkish Party 1970CZECHREP ROMA Romani Democratic

Initiative1989

CZECHREP SLOVAKSDEM. REP. CONGO BAKONGODEM. REP. CONGO LUBADEM. REP. CONGO LINGALADEM. REP. CONGO LUNDA, YEKEDEM. REP. CONGO KIVU REGIONDEM. REP. CONGO NGBANDIDEM. REP. CONGO HUTUSDEM. REP. CONGO TUTSISDJIBOUTI AFARS Front for the Restoration

and Unity of Democracy1991

(Continued on next page)

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68 J. Ishiyama

TABLE 1 List of Countries, Ethnic/Communal Groups, Ethnic/Communal Parties, and YearParty Founded (Continued)

Yearparty


ECUADOR BLACKSEGYPT COPTSESTONIA RUSSIANS Russian Party of Estonia 1991ETHIOPIA AFARS Afar Liberation Front 1992ETHIOPIA ERITREANSETHIOPIA NILO-SAHARANSETHIOPIA OROMO Oromo Liberation Front 1973ETHIOPIA SOMALIS Ogaden National Liberation

Front1984

ETHIOPIA TIGRAYANS Tigrayan People’s LiberationFront

1975

ETHIOPIA AMHARA All Amhara People’sOrganization

1992

FIJI EAST INDIANS Fiji Labor Party 1985GEORGIA ABKHAZIANS AYDGYLARA (Popular

Front of Abkhazia)1988

GEORGIA ADZHARSGEORGIA OSSETIANS (SOUTH) ADEMON NYKHAS

(Ossetian Popular Front)1989

GEORGIA RUSSIANSGHANA ASHANTIGHANA EWEGHANA MOSSI-DAGOMBAGUINEA FULANI Union for the New Republic 1992GUINEA MALINKA Guinean People’s rally 1992GUINEA SUSUGUYANA AFRICANS People’s National Congress 1957GUYANA EAST INDIANSHUNGARY ROMA Roma Social Coalition 1991INDIA KASHMIRIS National Conference Party 1956INDIA NAGASINDIA SANTALSINDIA SIKHS Shiromani Akali Dal 1920INDIA MIZOS Mizo National Front 1956INDIA TRIPURAS Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti 1969INDIA ASSAMESE Assam People’s Association 1985INDIA BODOS Bodo People’s Progressive

Front1967

INDONESIA CHINESEINDONESIA EAST TIMORESE Timorese Democratic

Movement1974

INDONESIA PAPUANS Free Papua Movement 1965INDONESIA ACEHNESE Free Aceh Movement 1976IRAN AZERBAIJANIS Azerbaijani United Islamic

Front2002

IRAN BAHA’ISIRAN BAKHTIARIIRAN BALUCHISIRAN KURDSIRAN TURKMENIRAN ARABS Arab Council Movement 1979IVORY COAST LEBANESE


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Yearparty


JORDAN PALESTINIANSKAZAKHSTAN RUSSIANSKAZAKHSTAN GERMANSKENYA KIKUYUKENYA LUOKENYA MAASAISKENYA SOMALISKENYA TURKANA/POKOTKENYA KALENJINSKENYA LUHYAKENYA KISIIKYRGYZSTAN RUSSIANSKYRGYZSTAN UZBEKS Party of National Unity and

Concord1993

LATVIA RUSSIANS Russian Citizens Party 1995LEBANON DRUZE Druze Progressive Socialist

Party1949

LEBANON MARONITECHRISTIANS

National Liberal Party 1958

LEBANON PALESTINIANSLIBERIA AMERICO-LIBERIANLITHUANIA POLES Polish Electoral Action 1994LITHUANIA RUSSIANS Union of Russians 1995MACEDONIA ALBANIANS Party for Democratic

Prosperity1990

MACEDONIA SERBS Democratic Party of Serbs 1992MACEDONIA ROMA Democratic Progressive Party

of Roma in Macedonia1992

MADAGASCAR MERINAMALAYSIA CHINESE Democratic Action Party 1966MALAYSIA DAYAKS Party Bansa Dayak Sarawak 1983MALAYSIA EAST INDIANS Malaysian Indian Congress 1957MALAYSIA KADAZANS United Pasok-Momogun

Kadazan Organization1963

MALI TUAREGMALI MANDEMEXICO MAYANSMEXICO ZAPOTECSMOLDOVA GAGAUZ Gagauz Peoples Party 1989MOLDOVA SLAVSNAMIBIA SAN BUSHMENNAMIBIA BASTERSNAMIBIA EAST CAPRIVIANSNIGER DJEREMA-SONGHAINIGER HAUSANIGER TUAREGNIGERIA HAUSA-FULANINIGERIA IBO Igbo People’s Congress 1994NIGERIA OGANI Movement for the Survival of

the Ogoni People1990

NIGERIA YORUBA Oodua People’s Congress 1995(Continued on next page)

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70 J. Ishiyama


Yearparty


NIGERIA IJAW Movement for the Survivalof the Ijaw

1992

PAKISTAN AHMADISPAKISTAN BALUCHIS Baluchi People’s Liberation

Front2000

PAKISTAN HINDUSPAKISTAN PASHTUNS

(PUSHTUNS)PAKISTAN SINDHISPAKISTAN MOHAJIRS Mohajir Qaumi Movement 1986PANAMA BLACKSPANAMA CHINESEPAPUA N.G. BOUGANVILLEANS Bouganvillean People’s

Congress1999

PERU BLACKS(AFRO-PERUVIANS)

PHILIPPINES IGOROTS Cordilleran People’sMovement

1984

PHILIPPINES MOROS Moro National LiberationFront

1971

REP. OF CONGO LARIROMANIA GERMANSROMANIA MAGYARS

(HUNGARIANS)Democratic Alliance of

Hungarians in Romania1989

ROMANIA ROMA Democratic Union of Roma 1990RUSSIA CHECHENSRUSSIA TATARS Ittifak 1990RUSSIA KARACHAYRUSSIA ROMARUSSIA AVARS Avar National Movement 1990RUSSIA INGUSHRUSSIA LEZGINS Sadval (Unity) 1990RUSSIA BURYAT Buryat-Mongolian People’s

Party1990

RUSSIA KUMYKS Tenglik-Equality 1989RUSSIA TUVINIANSRUSSIA YAKUTSENEGAL DIOLAS IN

CASAMANCEDiola Movement of

Democratic Forces inCasamancai

1982

SIERRA LEONE CREOLESSIERRA LEONE LIMBASIERRA LEONE MENDESIERRA LEONE TEMNESINGAPORE MALAYSSLOVAKIA HUNGARIANS Hungarian

Coaltion-Coexistence1990

SLOVAKIA ROMA Democratic Union of Roma 1990SOUTH AFRICA ASIANSSOUTH AFRICA COLOREDSSOUTH AFRICA XHOSASOUTH AFRICA ZULUS Inkatha Freedom Party 1975


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Yearparty


SRI LANKA INDIAN TAMILSSRI LANKA SRI LANKAN TAMILS Tamil United Liberation

Front1972

TAIWAN ABORIGINALTAIWANESE

TAIWAN MAINLAND CHINESETAIWAN TAIWANESETAJIKISTAN RUSSIANSTAJIKISTAN UZBEKSTANZANIA ZANZIBARISTHAILAND CHINESETHAILAND MALAY-MUSLIMS Barisan National Revolution 1960TOGO EWETOGO KABRETURKEY KURDS Kurdish Workers Party 1984TURKEY ROMAUGANDA ACHOLIUGANDA ANKOLEUGANDA BAGANDAUGANDA KAKWAUGANDA KARAMOJONGUGANDA KONJO/AMBAUGANDA LANGIUGANDA LUGBARA/MADIUGANDA LUGBARA/MADIUGANDA NYARWANDAUKRAINE RUSSIANS Russian Movement in

Ukraine2000

UKRAINE CRIMEAN TARTARSUKRAINE CRIMEAN RUSSIANS Russian Party of Crimea 1999VENEZUELA BLACKSYUGOSLAVIA KOSOVO ALBANIANS Democratic League of

Kosova1989

YUGOSLAVIA CROATS A Democratic Alliance ofCroats of Vojvodina

1991

YUGOSLAVIA SLOVENESYUGOSLAVIA HUNGARIANS Democratic Community of

Hungarians in Vojvodina1990

YUGOSLAVIA SANDZAK MUSLIMS Muslim Party of DemocraticAction

1990

YUGOSLAVIA ROMA Democratic Political Partyof Roma

1990

YUGOSLAVIA SERBSZAMBIA BEMEBEZAMBIA LOZIZAMBIA TONGAZIMBABWE NDEBELE

Sources: Arthur Banks, T. Muller, and W. E. Overstreet, Political Handbook of the World (Washington DC:CQ Press, various years); Janusz Bugajski, Political Parties of Eastern Europe: A Guide to Politics in thePost-Communist Era (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2002); Alan Day, Political Parties of the World, 6th Edition.(Farmington Hills, MI: Gale Group, 2005); Minorities at Risk Project, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/[accessed 13 June 2007].

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72 J. Ishiyama

The second measure the annual “communal conflict index” measuresthe extent to which the particular minority group is engaged in conflict withother groups. As with the protest measure, the communal conflict index ismeasured ordinally and is coded using the following values. Each measurewas coded per year from 1985–2003.

0 = No conflict manifest1 = Acts of harassment2 = Political agitation3 = Sporadic violent attacks4 = Antigroup demonstrations5 = Communal rioting6 = Communal warfare

The primary independent variable, presence of an ethnic party, is codedas a simple dummy variable where “1” connotes the presence of such a partyand “0” indicates the absence of such a party, per country, per year. In ad-dition, other alternative explanatory variables are included in the analysis.These are democratization, the level of constraints on the executive (whichis a rough surrogate for presidential systems), a measure of the electoralsystem, federalism, the extent to which an ethnic group is regionally con-centrated, cultural differences between the minority group and other groupsin a country, and economic differences between the minority group andother groups in the country. To measure democratization, I use the “RevisedCombined Polity Score” (Polity2) from the Polity IV Project for each countryfrom 1985–2003. The POLITY score ranges from +10 (strongly democratic)to −10 (strongly autocratic).

To roughly measure presidentialism I use a surrogate, the “constraintson the executive” variable from the Polity IV data base. Operationally, thisvariable refers to the extent to which there are institutionalized constraintson the decision-making powers of chief executives. Such limitations maybe imposed by any “accountability groups.” Given that presidential systemsare characterized by powerful, less constrained executives than mixed orparliamentary systems, this measure can be used as an indicator of thestrength of executive authority. A seven-category scale is used.

XCONST Executive Constraints Index0 = Unlimited Authority: There are no regular limitations on the executive’s

actions.1 = Intermediate Category2 = Slight to Moderate Limitation on Executive Authority: There are some

real but limited restraints on the executive.3 = Intermediate Category

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4 = Substantial Limitations on Executive Authority: The executive has moreeffective authority than any accountability group but is subject to subst-antial constraints by them.

5 = Intermediate Category6 = Executive Parity or Subordination: Accountability groups have

effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areasof activity.

To include this measure in the regression analyses below, I created a“dummy” variable by combining categories 1–4 and coding this as “0” andcombining 5, 6, and 7 and scoring this as a “1.”

As a measure of the electoral system I use the natural log of the averagedistrict magnitude for lower house legislative elections. This measure wasadvocated by Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart as the best measure ofthe electoral system in that the district magnitude (defined as the averagenumber of seats per legislative district) was the single most important elec-toral system’s dimension in affecting party behavior.61 I take the measurefrom the World Bank’s Data on Political Institutions data base (DPI2004).62

To measure whether or not a country was federal in a given year, I referto the list of federal states provided by the Forum of Federations organization(http://www.forumfed.org/). I code this variable simply as a dummy variable,where “1” connotes a federal system and “0” otherwise. Finally, as arguedby Birnir, access to the executive is a key variable that also explains theextent to which conflict and protest occur. To measure whether the partyhad access to the executive, I use a very simple dummy variable to measurewhether the identified ethnic party held a cabinet portfolio and was part ofthe governing coalition in any year between 1985–2003.

Another relevant variable that impacts the behavior of ethnic group isthe extent to which the group’s population is regionally or geographicallyconcentrated.63 The greater the extent of geographic concentration, it is ar-gued, the more likely the ethnic group will engage in political activities andthe greater the temptation for separatism. Thus we would expect that thegreater the level of geographic concentration the more likely the group willengage in acts of protest and communal conflict.

GROUPCON Groups spatial distributionValue Label0 = Widely dispersed1 = Primarily urban or minority in one region2 = Majority in one region, others dispersed3 = Concentrated in one region

This variable is also “dummied” where 0 and 1 are coded as “0” and 2 and3 are coded as “1.”

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74 J. Ishiyama

To measure cultural and economic differentials, I employ the ordinalmeasures developed by the MAR project. This cultural differentials indexwas based upon the assessment of differences regarding six dimensions:Different Ethnicity/Nationality, Different Language, Different Historical Tra-ditions, Different Religion, Different Social Customs, and Different Residence.To determine the degree of difference between the target minority group andother population groups, in terms of cultural differentials, the six dimensionswere combined into a composite index.

CULDIFXX Cultural Differentials IndexValue Label0 = No Differences1 = Slight Differentials2 = Substantial Differentials3 = Major Differentials4 = Extreme Differentials

As with the previous variables, I created another dummy variable by com-bining the values 0 and 1 (coded as “0”) and combining the values 2, 3, and4 (coded as “1”).

The Economic Differentials Index is coded as a seven-point scale. Itis based upon six economic dimensions, including: Income, Land/Property,Higher Education, Presence in Commerce, Presence in Professions, and Pres-ence in Official Positions. As with the political differentials index, the eco-nomic differentials index also ranges from −2 to +4, with the low score in-dicative of substantial economic advantages enjoyed by the minority group,and +4 indicating substantial economic disadvantages faced by the minoritygroup. Again with this variable I create another dummy variable combiningthe scores −2 to 0 (coded as “0”) and 1 to 4 (coded as “1”).

Three additional control variables I employ relate to the national eco-nomic context and the likelihood of protest and conflict. These include ameasure for globalization (Foreign Direct Investment [FDI] as a proportionof Gross Domestic Product) and the GDP per capital annual growth rates.Further as measure of the dependence on primary commodities, I use themeasure that Collier and Hoeffler use regarding primary commodity exportsas a percentage of GDP. All of these measures were derived from the WorldBank’s World Development Indicators.

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Did the presence of an ethnic party exert an independent effect on theannual level of protest engaged in by the ethnic group in a given country ina given year from 1985–2003? In Table 2, I report the results of two modelsthat regress the dependent variable, the annual protest index, against the

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TABLE 2 Coefficient Estimates and Collinearity Diagnostics for Ordered Logit Models, De-pendent = Annual Protest Index

Model 1(Ordinal Logit) Model 2

(standard error) [VIF] (Ordinal Logit)

Lag Protest 1.46∗∗∗ (.04) [1.18] 1.44∗∗∗ (.04) [1.17]Ethnic Party .37∗∗∗ (.09) [1.21] .38∗∗∗ (.09) [1.20]Federalism Dummy Variable .20∗∗∗ (.10) [1.13] .19∗∗ (.10) [1.18]Constraints on Executive Authority .06∗∗ (.02) [1.23]Access to Executive Dummy −.08∗∗ (.01) [1.13] −.03∗∗ (.01) [1.15]Polity2 .01∗∗ (.01) [1.31]Log Average District Magnitude .04 (.03) [1.15] .03 (.03) [1.17]Group Concentration Dummy −.03 (.09) [1.04] −.03 (.10) [1.09]Cultural Differentials Dummy .29∗ (.12) [1.12] .31∗∗ (.12) [1.12]Economic Differentials Dummy −.08 (.09) [1.07] −.09 (.08) (1.07)Foreign Direct Investment/Gross

Domestic Product (GDP)−.01 (.01) [1.15] −.02 (.01) [1.14]

GDP per Capita Annual Growth Ratein Percentages

−.01 (.01) [1.09] −.01 (.01) [1.10]

Primary Commodity Exports aspercent of GDP

.00 (.00) [1.18] .00 (.00) [1.19]

Pseudo R2 = .55 Pseudo R2 = .54

∗p ≤ .05, ∗∗p ≤ .01, ∗∗∗p ≤ .001.N = 3795.

eight independent variables (along with a lagged endogenous variable as acorrective for autocorrelation). In addition to the coefficient estimates andstandard errors, I also report the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores todetect problems with multicollinearity.64

Model 1 reports the results of a time series cross-sectional (TSCS)model with a lagged endogenous dependent variable. Since the depen-dent variable is ordinal, I ran ordinal logit models. As indicated by theDurbin Watson statistic, there is little in the way of autocorrelation afterincluding the corrective lagged endogenous dependent variable. Furtherafter conducting a White’s test there appeared to be no problems withheteroscedasticity—hence corrective measures (such as a White Correction)were not required. Since I found a high degree of collinearity betweenthe Polity2 variable and the XCONS (constraints on the executive) measure(VIF = 10.91), I ran two separate models, dropping the XCONS in one model,and the Polity2 variable in the other.

From Table 2, it is clear that ethnic groups that were represented by anethnic party were significantly more likely to engage in protest than wereethnic groups that were not represented by such parties. This is consistentwith the literature that suggests that ethnic parties mobilize their constituents(but for the consociationalists they channel political activities into less ex-treme and violent actions). In addition, the greater the degree of democracywas also associated with the greater the level of protest. This would suggest

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76 J. Ishiyama

that the greater the openness in the political system the more channels fornonviolent interest articulation. This is also supported by the relationship be-tween the constraints on the executive and ethnic protest. In addition, federalsystems were likely to experience more ethnic group protest than nonfed-eral systems (again consistent with the notion that political openings in thesystem promote ethnic group political mobilization). However, the electoralsystem had no bearing on the level of ethnic group protest, contrary to muchof the consociational literature. Further, economic globalization as measuredby FDI/GDP and economic growth measured by annual change in GDP percapita were unrelated to protest, as was primary commodity exports as apercentage of GDP. Importantly, however, access to the political executivehad a significant dampening effect on protest.

Further, groups that were culturally different from the majority weremore likely to engage in protest than those that were not. This did not appearto be related to the extent to which groups were geographically concentratednor the extent to which they were economically deprived relative to themajority population. Finally, there were no problems with multicollinearity,as indicated by the low-VIF scores, which were all less than 2.65

Second, does the presence of an ethnic party promote communal con-flict? As mentioned above, this is the primary issue that divides those whoargue that ethnic parties promote a cycle of destruction in new democra-cies, and those that argue (like Kanchan Chandra and the consociationalscholars) that ethnic parties can play a more positive role. Table 3 reportsthe results of two models, which regress the dependent variable, the annualcommunal conflict index, against eight independent variables and a laggedendogenous dependent variable. As indicated in Table 2, again it appearsthat the presence of an ethnic party exerts a significant and independenteffect on communal conflict—that is, ethnic groups that are represented byan ethnic party are significantly more likely to engage in conflict. Unlike thesituation with protest, democracy and limits on executive authority have littleimpact on communal conflict, and federalism appeared to be only marginallyrelated to communal conflict (surprisingly the coefficient sign was also pos-itive, indicating that federal systems were positively related to communalconflict). Thus, although these political variables appeared to affect the levelof protest, they did not relate to communal conflict. The single most impor-tant structural factor is access to the political executive—it had a significantdampening effect on communal conflict. Finally, the extent to which groupswere geographically concentrated was positively and significantly related tocommunal conflict, as was the variable economic differences, and consistentwith the work of Collier, and Fearon and Laitin, primary commodity exportsas a percentage of GDP, across all four models.66

It would be tempting to conclude that ethnic parties were the causeof both increased ethnic group protest and ethnic group communal conflict(which would support scholars like Rabushka and Shepsle, and Horowitz)

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TABLE 3 Coefficient Estimates and Collinearity Diagnostics for Ordered Logit Models, De-pendent = Annual Communal Conflict Index

Model 1(standard error)) [VIF] Model 2

Lag Conflict 1.33∗∗∗ (.05) [1.10] 1.33∗∗∗ (.05) [1.10]Ethnic Party .43∗∗∗ (.14) [1.17] .49∗∗∗ (.13) [1.12]Federalism Dummy Variable .35∗ (.15) [1.15] .33∗ (.15) [1.15]Constraints on Executive Authority .04 (.04) [1.11]Access to Executive Dummy −.03∗∗ (.01) [1.15] −.03∗∗ (.01) [1.13]Polity2 .02 (.01) [1.13]Log Average District Magnitude .16∗∗ (.04) [1.07] .16∗∗ (.05) [1.10]Group Concentration Dummy 1.05∗∗∗ (.25) [1.08] .91∗∗∗ (.23) [1.06]Cultural Differentials Dummy .45∗ (.22) [1.10] .32 (.21) [1.10]Economic Differentials Dummy .35∗ (.14) [1.06] .38∗ (.14) [1.05]Foreign Direct Investment/Gross

Domestic Product (GDP)−.03 (.02) [1.15] −.03 (.02) [1.15]

GDP per Capita Annual Growth Ratein Percentages

.02 (.01) [1.09] .01 (.01) [1.09]

Primary Commodity Exports aspercent of GDP

.02∗∗∗ (.00) [1.18] .02∗∗∗ (.00) [1.18]

Pseudo R2 = .62 Pseudo R2 = .62

∗p ≤ .05, ∗∗p ≤ .01, ∗∗∗p ≤ .001.N = 3795.

but this would be premature. Indeed, it may be the case that the presence ofan ethnic party neither causes protest nor conflict, but rather the existence ofan ethnic party is the result of preexisting higher levels of protest and conflict.In other words, ethnic parties do not cause anything but are preceded byprotest and conflict that give rise to them.

Although this may be the case, the real question is whether the level ofprotest and conflict increases for the individual group AFTER the appearanceof the ethnic party. To examine this in Table 4 I report a simple differenceof means test that compares the protest and conflict scores before and afterthe first appearance of an ethnic party. As indicated in Table 4, interestingly,protest levels increase significantly after the first appearance of the ethnicparty. However, there is little change in the annual communal conflict index.The appearance of an ethnic party does little in the way of increasing levels

TABLE 4 Difference of Means, Annual Protest Index, and Annual Communal Conflict Index,Before and After Appearance of Ethnic Party, 1985–2003+

Mean score before Mean score after theappearance of party appearance of party t test

Annual Protest Index .79 1.53 −6.54∗∗∗

Annual Communal Conflict Index .67 .59 .56

+Only includes parties that appeared after 1985.∗p ≤ .05, ∗∗ p ≤ .01, ∗∗∗p ≤ .001.

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78 J. Ishiyama

TABLE 5 Chi-Square Statistics Annual Protest Index by Presence of Ethnic Party and AnnualCommunal Conflict Index by Presence of Ethnic Party

Annual protest index by Annual communal conflict indexpresence of ethnic party by presence of ethnic party

Single Member District Systems 136.05∗∗∗ 167.01∗∗∗

Multiple Member District Systems 162.88∗∗∗ 69.93∗∗∗

∗p ≤ .05, ∗∗ p ≤ .01, ∗∗∗p ≤ .001.

of communal conflict, at least for the period 1985–2003. These results sug-gest that the appearance of ethnic parties do lead to political mobilizationas indicated by the significantly increased protest scores—however their ap-pearance does not lead to an increased propensity to engage in communalconflict.

However, is this effect independent of other political/institutional fea-tures such as the electoral system? Indeed as noted above, according to theconsociational school, ethnic parties moderate their demands especially inthe face of proportional representation electoral systems. This would suggestthat systems that are broadly representative (such as higher seat magnitudesystems) would be more likely to lead to the moderation of ethnic partiesthan in countries that use small magnitude electoral systems (such as theuse of single-member districts). In Table 5, I report the results of a series ofchi-square statistics, cross-tabulating the appearance of an ethnic party andprotest and conflict while controlling for single versus multimember districtmagnitudes. As indicated there is no difference in the relationship betweenthe appearance of an ethnic party and protest and conflict when compar-ing single versus multimember district systems. The appearance of an ethnicparty is significantly related to both protest and conflict under both electoralsystems. Ethnic parties thus exert an independent effect on protest (but asindicated in Table 4, not on communal conflict).

CONCLUSIONS

The above paper examined the question of whether ethnic parties exert anindependent effect on levels of protest and communal conflict. Althoughthe results above indicated that ethnic parties do mobilize ethnic groups toengage in protest (and this effect is independent of political institutional andother contextual variables), there is no evidence that ethnic parties inde-pendently promote communal conflict. Although the appearance of ethnicparties is associated with communal conflict, the level of communal con-flict was as high before the appearance of an ethnic party as it was after.These findings would also call into question whether “remedial” actionssuch as ethnic party bans are effective at all, given that ethnic parties do not

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independently promote conflict. In fact, they may achieve exactly the oppo-site than what was intended. Greater exclusion may lead to the increasedattractiveness of extra legal actions on the part of the banned groups, partic-ularly groups that are politically mobilized.

The above results also suggest that better institutional “correctives” mayexist rather than ethnic party bans. In particular, of the variety of purportedinstitutional remedies to assuage conflict (electoral systems, federalism, ac-cess to the executive, and constraints on executive authority) only accessto the executive by the minority at-risk group has a significant dampeningeffect on the group’s propensity to engage in both protest and communalconflict (a finding supportive of Johanna Birnir’s work). Access to the locusof political power thus provides a powerful incentive to dampen both ethnicpolitical mobilization and conflict by providing groups a stake in the system.

Other institutional remedies are less promising. Federalism both pro-motes protest AND communal conflict (contrary to the dampening effectsclaimed by proponents of federalism as an institutional remedy for ethnicpolitics). This may due to the existence of local regional governments thatcan (a) be targets for mobilization for groups that may be a minority na-tionally, but a majority regionally and (b) provide springboards for nationalpower, thus emboldening the demands of cultural minorities.67 Presidential-ism (as measured by constraints on the executive) increases protest (perhapsbecause as Juan Linz argues presidentialism militates against meaningful rep-resentation of minority groups) but has no independent effect on conflict.Finally, the electoral system has no discernable effect on the propensity of agroup to engage in either protest OR communal conflict (contrary to much ofthe literature that suggests the electoral system is a key institutional variableaffecting both).

The above results may also suggest a “step function” in the connectionbetween ethnic group protest and communal conflict. Although ethnic par-ties mobilize their primary constituencies, there is no inevitable connectionbetween the ethnification of politics and ethnic conflict. Whether groupsengage in conflict is dependent on other factors (both cultural and demo-graphic as well as access to the executive). Although it has been popular toargue that the ethnification of politics inexorably leads to conflict and the dis-solution of new democracies, the above results suggest otherwise—conflictdoes not follow the appearance of ethnic parties as night follows day. Assuggested by Johanna Birnir, it is likely that communal conflict is caused byfactors external to ethnic mobilization rather than mobilization itself. How-ever, once conflict begins, only access to the executive appears to haveany dampening effect on a group’s propensity to engage in communal con-flict. This might suggest that only “grand coalitions” can provide enoughinducement for groups to stop fighting once the fight begins (which maybe the only solution to the current strife in places like Kenya in 2008, forexample).

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Indeed, whether or not ethnic mobilization evolves into communal con-flict is likely to depend heavily on state responses to ethnic mobilization. Al-though on the surface there appears to be a fundamental difference betweenthe “perils of ethnification” and “contingent” approaches to the role playedby ethnic parties, it should be remembered that Rabushka and Shepsle alsopointed to the important role played by state responses. Perhaps it is thetiming of the state response that is as important as the type of response?Perhaps access is important early in the process and other measures arerequired later? Although these questions are well beyond the current scopeof this project (which sought only to examine the proposition that the mereappearance of ethnic parties was connected to ethnic conflict) they representpromising avenues for future inquiry.

NOTES

1. Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985);Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability(Columbus, OH: Merrill, 1972).

2. Johanna K. Birnir, Ethnicity and Electoral Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press,2007); Kanchan Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Headcounts in India (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

3. Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 1977).

4. John Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning, Ethnopolitics in the New Europe (Boulder: Lynne Rienner,1997).

5. Matthias Basedau, Matthijs Bogaards, Christof Hartmann, and Peter Niesen, “Ethnic Party Bansin Africa: A Research Agenda,” German Law Journal, Vol. 8, No. 6 (2007), pp. 618–34, 618.

6. Anika Becher and Matthias Basedau, “Promoting Peace and Democracy Through Party Regu-lation? Ethnic Party Bans in Africa,” GIGA working papers 66 (Hamburg: German Institute of Global andArea Studies/Leibniz-Institut fur Globale und Regionale Studien, 2008).

7. For instance, India as in Kanchan Chandra’s 2004 study.8. Sherrill Stroschein, “Measuring Ethnic Party Success in Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine,” Prob-

lems of Post-Communism, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2001), pp. 59–69; John Ishiyama, “Institutions and EthnopoliticalConflict In Post-Communist Politics,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2000), pp. 51–67;Ishiyama and Breuning; A notable exception is the recent work of Johanna K. Birnir, 2007.

9. Robert Hislope, “Intra-Ethnic Conflict in Croatia and Serbia: Flanking and the Consequencesfor Democracy,” East European Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 4 (1997), pp. 471–94; Thomas Koelble, “Towardsa Theory of Nationalism: Culture, Structure and Choice Analyses Revisited,” Nationalism and EthnicPolitics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1995), pp. 73–89.

10. Rabushka and Shepsle, pp. 20–30.11. Benjamin Reilly, “Political Engineering of Parties and Party Systems.” Paper presented at the

Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, 2003.12. Koeble, pp. 73–89.13. Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, “Types and Functions of Parties,” in Larry Diamond

and Richard Gunther (Eds.), Political Parties and Democracy (Baltimore and London: Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 2003), pp. 23–4.

14. Becher and Basedau, p. 9.15. Horowitz, p. 291.16. Lijphart, pp. 1–20. Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy

in the Netherlands, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Hans Daalder, “The Conso-ciational Democracy Theme,” World Politics, Vol. 26, No. 4 (1974), pp. 604–21; Kenneth D. McCrae,Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies (Toronto: McClelland and

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Stewart, 1974); Eric A. Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (Cambridge, MA: Center forInternational Affairs Harvard University, 1972); Val Lorwin, “Segmented Pluralism,” Comparative Politics,Vol. 3, No. 2 (1971), pp. 141–75.

17. Frank S. Cohen, “Proportional versus Majoritarian Ethnic Conflict Management in Democracies,”Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 30, No. 5 (1997), pp. 607–30, p. 613.

18. Stroschein, p. 61.19. Lilia Petkova, “The Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria: Social Integration and Impact on

Bulgarian—Turkish Relations, 1947–2000,” Global Review of Ethnopolitics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2002), pp. 36–55,52.

20. Ishiyama, pp. 51–67.21. Birnir; Chandra; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,”

American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1 (2003), pp. 75–90; James D. Fearon and David D.Laitin, “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 4 (1996),pp. 715–735; Daniel N. Posner, “Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa,” American Journal ofPolitical Science, Vol. 48, No. 4 (2004), pp. 849–63.

22. Kanchan Chandra, “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 3,No. 3 (2005), pp. 235–52, 236.

23. Birnir, pp. 59–69.24. Kanchan Chandra and Sherill Stroschein make very similar arguments. See Chandra; Stroschein.25. Ishiyama, pp. 51–67.26. Pippa Norris, “Ballots not Bullets: Electoral systems, Ethnic minorities and Democratization,” in

Andrew Reynolds and Scot Mainwaring (Eds.), The Architecture of Democracy (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 2002); Cohen, pp. 607–630; Lijphart; Daalder; McRae; Nordlinger; Lorwin.

27. John McGarry and Brendan O’ Leary, The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation Case Studies ofProtracted Ethnic Conflicts (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 25.

28. Stephen M. Saideman, David J. Lanoue, Michael Campenni, and Samuel Stanton, “Democra-tization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled, Cross-Sectional Time Series Analysis from1985–1998,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2002), pp. 103–29.

29. George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley, CA: Uni-versity of California Press, 1990); Paul Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism (New Delhi: Sage Press, 1991).

30. Joel Barkan, “Rethinking the Applicability of Proportional Representation for Africa,” in T. D.Sisk and Andrew Reynolds (Eds.), Elections and Conflict Management in Africa (Washington, DC: USInstitute of Peace Press, 1998), pp. 25–45.

31. Benjamin Reilly, “Electoral Systems for Divided Societies,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No.2 (2002), pp. 156–70; Benjamin Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for ConflictManagement (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

32. Juan J. Linz, “The Perils of Presidentialism,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1990),pp. 51–69, 56; J. A. Cheibub, Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2006), p. 18; Timothy Power and Mark J. Gasiorowski, “Institutional Design and Demo-cratic Consolidation in the Third World,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1997), pp. 123–155;Matthew Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dy-namic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

33. Scott Mainwaring, “Presidentialism, Multipartism and Democracy: The Difficult Combination,”Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3 (1993), pp. 198–228, 223.

34. Birnir.35. Alfred Stepan and Cynthia Skach, “Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation,”

World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1993), pp. 1–22; Linz, pp. 51–69.36. Donald Horowitz, “Comparing Democratic Systems,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 1, No. 4

(1990), pp. 783–94, 784 (italics in original).37. Horowitz; Lijphart.38. Will Kymlicka, “Emerging Western Models of Multination Federalism: Are they Relevant for

Africa?,” in David Turton (Ed.), Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective(Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2006), pp. 1–25; K. Adeney, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Regu-lation in India and Pakistan (New York: Palgrave, 2006); R. Suberu, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict inNigeria (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001).

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39. Robert Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2003); Daniel Patrick Moyni-han, Pandemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); SamuelHuntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72 (1993), pp. 22–49.

40. Arjun Appadurai, “Dead Certainty: Ethnic Violence in the Era of Globalization,” Public Culture,Vol. 10, No. 3 (1998), pp. 225–40; Julie Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York:Columbia University Press, 1982); Vamik Volkan, Cyprus—War and Adaptation: A Psychoanalytic Historyof Two Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1979).

41. Appadurai, p. 247.42. Ibid., p. 246.43. Arjun Appadurai, “Dead Certainty: Ethnic Violence in the Era of Globalization,” Public Culture,

Vol. 10, No. 3 (1998), pp. 225–24; Robert Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History. (New York:Vintage Books, 1993); Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign Affairs Vol. 72, No. 3(1993) pp. 22–49; Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Pandemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1993).

44. Yahya Sadowski, The Myth of Global Chaos (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,1998), p. 95.

45. Robin Wright and Doyle Macmanus, Flashpoints: Promise and Peril in a New World(New York: Alfred Knopf, 1991).

46. Ibid., pp. 20–21.47. S. K. Bhaumik, Gang, and M. Yun, “Ethnic Conflict and Economic Disparity: Serbian and

Albanians in Kosovo,” Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 34, No. 4 (2006), pp. 754–73.48. M. D. Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and Territory (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 2003); E. Bonacich, “A Theory of Middleman Minorities,” American Socio-logical Review, Vol. 38, No. 4 (1973), pp. 583–94; E. Bonacich, “A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: TheSplit Labor Market,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 37, No. 4 (1972), pp. 547–59; William Easterlyand R. Levine, “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol. 112, No. 4 (1997), pp. 1203–50.

49. Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy,” in C. A.Crocker, F. O. Hampson, and P. Aall (Eds.), Leashing the Dogs of War (Washington, DC: United StatesInstitute of Peace Press, 2007); Fearon and Laitin, pp. 715–734.

50. Gunther and Diamond, p. 183.51. Kanchan Chandra and Daniel Metz, “A New Cross-national Database on Ethnic Parties,” Paper

Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwestern Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, 2002,p. 5.

52. Leon Epstein defines the political party as “any group of individuals, however loosely orga-nized, whose avowed purpose is winning elections.” Leon Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democ-racies (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 1; Sartori defined a party as “any political group identified by anofficial label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or nonfree),candidates for public office.” Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 63; Still more broadly, a party can be defined as anorganization that pursues a goal of placing its avowed representatives in government positions. KennethJanda, Political Parties (New York: Free Press, 1990), p. 5.

53. Herbert Kitschelt, “Divergent Paths of Postcommunist Democracies,” in Larry Diamond andRichard Gunther (Eds.), Political Parties and Democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 2001).

54. See Horowitz, pp. 294–7.55. Paul Brass, p. 106.56. Ted Robert Gurr, “People Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World

System,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 3 (1994), pp. 347–77, 349.57. Ibid., p. 349.58. For a recent criticism see Vladimir Tishkov, “Status in the World System and Economic Mobi-

lization,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 36, No. 4 (1999), pp. 571–91; also William J. Foltz, “Minoritiesat Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2(1994), pp. 513–14.

59. For a defense of the use of the MAR data, see Birnir, pp. 168–9.60. Birnir, pp. 168–169.

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61. Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of ElectoralSystems (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

62. Phillip Keefer, DPI2004: Database of Political Institutions (Washington, DC: World Bank,2005).

63. Shaheen Mozzafar, James Scaritt, and Greg Galaich, “Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleav-ages, and Party Systems in Africa’s Emerging Democracies,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 97,No. 3 (2003), pp. 379–90; Toft.

64. John Fox, Regression Diagnostics (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1991).65. Ibid.66. Toft.67. See Brass, 1991, for this point.

John Ishiyama is Professor of Political Science at the University of NorthTexas. He is author or editor of numerous books and articles on Democrati-zation, Postcommunist Politics, and Ethnic Politics in Russia, Eastern Europe,Central Eurasia, and Africa.

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do ethnic parties promote minority ethnic conflict?

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