distracting stimuli: do they elicit or inhibit counterargumentation and attitude shift

6

Distracting stimuli: Do they elicit or inhibit counterargumentation and attitude shift"

DEIRDRE MACCANN HASLETT"" Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin

A bstract

Studied the effects of distracting stimuli, presented simultaneously with a persuasive but counterattitudinal communication, on subvocal counterargumentation and attitude shift. All subjects were first-year undergraduate male students at Birm- ingham University, England. The 80 experimental Ss who formed ten different treatment groups, responded to distracting sequences of numbers by performing visual, auditory, vocal and manual tasks, and combinations thereof, while listening to the message. The base-line group of 28 Ss merely listened to the same communication, which advocated compulsory male sterilisation. After task completion, all Ss were given a six-item Likert-type attitude measurement questionnaire, a counterargumentation measurement similar to that devised by T. C. Brock (1 967) and a three-item comprehension test of the arguments used in the communication. The results suggest that distracting stimuli which are greater in intensity or which require a more 'active' response from the recipient (up to a certain level of activity) are more likely to inhibit counterargumentation and thus elicit shift to- ward agreement with the message (while leaving comprehension levels unaffected) than those which are lower in intensity, or which require either a 'passive' or a 'high-active' response.

In a re-interpretation of the Allyn and Festioger (1961) data, Festinger and

* This paper is based on a dissertation commenting on the manuscript. submitted to the University of Birmingham, England, in fulfilment of the requirements ** Requests for reprints should be sent to for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. the author, Economic and Social Research Thanks are extended to Dr. John Innes, Institute, 4 Burlington Road, Dublin 4, University of Edinburgh, and John Haslett, Ireland. Trinity College Dublin, for reading and

Eur. J . SOC. Psychol. 6 ( I ) , p p . 81-94

82 Deidre MacCann Haslett

Maccoby (1964) proposed that distracting stimuli, presented simultaneously with a persuasive, but counterattitudinal, message, heighten the recipient’s susceptibility to attitude change by blocking the ‘counterargumentation’ process. The term ‘counterargumentation’, used not infrequently by social psychologists (e.g., Janis and Tenvilliger, 1962; Zimbardo, Snyder, Thomas, Gold and Gurwitz, 1970), was employed by Festinger and Maccoby to describe the active, subvocal, answering process by which individuals can reject counterattitudinal arguments in a situation where they cannot vocally articulate their disagreement, thus defending their beliefs, attitudes and values.

It seems reasonable to assume (Sokolov, 1969) that an individual who is strongly committed to a certain opinion or belief will not listen to disagreeable arguments without any counteraction on his part, and so Festinger and Maccoby hypothesised that this belief-defensive process could be interfered with if the listener‘s attention was sufficiently distracted so as to make it difficult for him to counterargue, but not so difficult as to interfere with his comprehension of the speech.

Because of their failure, however, to measure counterargumentation and demon- strate its inverse relationship with attitude shift, the hypothesis was challenged by Haaland and Venkatesan (1968), Silverman and Regula (1968), Rosenblatt (1966) and others, on the ‘common-sense’ grounds that distracting stimuli presented repeatedly during a message should interfere with the recipient’s comprehension of the arguments, thus preventing the learning of a new attitude and so lessening shift (McGuire, 1968).

Their challege was acknowledged by Brock (1967) who devised a reliable measurement for retrospectively assessing counterargumentation levels and who attempted (Osterhouse and Brock, 1970; Keating and Brock, 1974) to specify those character- istics of the distraction which were most likely to heighten the persuasive attempt.

On the basis of these, and preliminary investigations (MacCann Haslett, 1974) to the study discussed here, predictions concerning not only the basic Festinger and Maccoby hypothesis, but also the effects of the intensity of the stimuli, the medium of reception of the stimuli by the recipient, and the activity level of the recipient’s response to the distractions, were formulated with respect to attitude shift, counterargumentation levels and learning (comprehension) of the communication’s arguments. The hypotheses tested were as follows: 1 . A persuasive, but counterattitudinal, message will elicit counterargumentation

- providing support for this hypothesis is obviously fundamental to the validity of the Festinger and Maccoby proposal, and evidence from Osterhouse and Brock (1970) and Keating and Brock (1974) indicated that a persuasive, dis- crepant message would elicit counterargumentation which could be quantita- tively assessed.

Distracting stimuli 83

2. Counterargumentation will be suppressed by repetitive distractions, more particularly by those which are greater in intensity or which involve an ‘active’ rather than a ‘passive’ response from the recipient. After a certain optimum level of activity is reached a reverse effect would be expected due to the subject’s inability to cope with too great a perceptual load (Schouten, Kalsbeek and Leopold, 1962) thus not properly hearing the communication. More precisely the predications are that: a. Ss who receive the distracting stimuli (groups of 1, 2 or 3 digit numbers)

at a high-intensity rate (22 groups per minute) will be more distracted than those who receive it at a low-intensity rate (10 per minute) and will thus counterargue less.’

b. Ss who respond to stimuli by performing a low-active task (i.e., calling out - vocal, or writing down - manual, the numbers) will also be more distracted and thus will counterargue less than those who merely receive the stimuli through passive media (i.e., watch the numbers on a monitor screen - visual, or receive them on tape - auditory) and do not perform any task. Within the low-active group no counterargumentation differences will be found between the vocal and manual tasks. Keating and Brock (1974) found that inhibition of counterargumentation was more enhanced by vocal than by manual response, but the difference was slight and statistically non-significant. It is hypothesised in this study that each task will demand a similar degree of ‘activity’ from the recipient and thus counterargument differences will not be expected. Similarly, with the passive groups (visual and auditory), each response is expected to demand a similar level of non-activity and differences between them are not predicted.

c. Those subjects, however, who perform a high-active response task (i.e., vocal and manual responses together) will be so distracted as to be prevented from properly receiving the communication and will thus counterargue more than low-active Ss. Thus, one would expect to find a curvilinear relationship between activity-passivity on the one hand, and counterargumentation levels on the other, with high-active and passive groups having higher levels than low-active conditions. In the case of the former, high counterargumentation will be due to frustration experienced by the recipient while coping with too demanding a task; with the passive groups, on the other hand, a high level will be due to the recipient’s defensive reaction in a situation where he is not otherwise prevented from counterarguing, as would be the case with low-active conditions.

1. These rates were chosen as the most the preliminary studies. optimum on the basis of data collected in


3. Agreement with the message will be inversely related to counterargumentation, i.e., those groups who counterargued most will be least likely to agree with the proposals in the message, and those who counterargued least, to agree most. Within the passive and low-active groups, neither attitude shift nor counterargumentation levels will be related to the recipient’s level of comprehension of the arguments used. As indicated by Osterhouse and Brock (1970) and Keating and Brock (1974), all groups would be expected to have similar levels of comprehension. It could, however, be expected that the highly distracted high- active groups would have lower comprehension levels than either passive or low-active groups (Haaland and Venkatesan, 1968) but not so low as to render the communication meaningless.

Method

Subjects

One hundred and eight Ss, who were first-year male undergraduate students attend- ing a wide range of courses at the University of Birmingham, England, participated in a post-test only control-group experiment (Campbell and Stanley, 1963).

Design

Ss were randomly assigned (Table 1 below) to the cells of a 2 x 2 x 2 design (high intensity, low intensity; low active, passive; visual, auditory) superimposed on a 2 x 3 cross-classification (high intensity, low intensity; high-active visual, low-active visual, passive visual) with a base-line control group (Winer, 1972); there were no high-active auditory Ss as trial runs had indicated that this condition was obviously too intense and the message could not be heard at all.

Table 1. Distribution of subjects in a 2 X 2 X 2 design superimposed on a 2 X 3 cross- classification, with a base-line control group

Response task to distraction _ _ - . _~__._______ _ _ _ _ ~ . - -

Low active Passive High active __.__ ~

(Visual only) Visual Auditory Visual Auditory Non- Vocal and manual Vocal Manual Vocal Manual distraction

High intensity 8 4 4 4 4 8 8

Low intensity 8 4 4 4 4 8 8 - 28


Within low-active distraction, the visual and auditory groups were further sub- divided for purposes of counter-balance so that half responded vocally and the others manually. The 28 Ss in the base-line group listened to the communication but were not distracted.

Apparatus

Ss arrived individually and were seated in a small cubicle. On a shelf, slightly above eye-level, was a loudspeaker to the S’s left and a monitor screen to his right, which were linked to the adjoining control room. Before testing commenced each S was given an introduction sheet, an instruction sheet, a sealed booklet, a ‘numbers’ sheet for recording numbers (manual Ss only) and a tape-recorder for the same purpose (vocal Ss only).

Introduction sheet Ss were informed, in a fictitious cover story, that they were playing a small part in an inter-varsity study on students which was ‘attempting to correlate various aspects of achievement, motivation, opinion and mobility with factors as diverse as housing problems, interference levels, library facilities, etc.’ When the experiment was finished, none of the 108 subjects questioned the relationship of the task they had performed to the cover story they had been given, although opportunity was given for them to do so. Subjects were thanked in advance for their help and co-operation.

Instruction sheet All Ss were informed that they would hear a 7-minute speech through the speaker. The instructions then varied according to the requirements of each group; e.g., vocal Ss were told to call out numbers onto the tape-recorder, and so on. All Ss were finally instructed to open the accompanying booklet at Section 1 when the speech had finished and answer all the questions.

See ‘Dependent measures’ below.

Message

Each S was exposed, at the beginning of the test session, to a persuasive communication which presented, in the form of a speech from a ‘Doctor’ (Kelley, 1967; Choo, 1964) to the fictitious ‘Association for the Protection of the Environment’, six main arguments strongly supporting the legalised compulsory vasectomisation


of all males who have produced three or more offspring. Pilot testing, using an independent group of male undergraduate students (MacCann Haslett, 1974), had indicated that the arguments used were both persuasive and highly counterattitudinal. On the basis of these findings it was thought that arguments advocating the compulsory introduction of male sterilisation were likely to produce high levels of counterargumentation.

Dependent measures

Attitude measurement In Section 1 of the booklet, Ss were presented with six statements relating to the arguments they had just heard concerning vasectomy. All Ss were asked to indicate the extent of their agreement with each statement on an %point Likert-type scale (Likert, 1932) varying from ‘very strongly agree’ to ‘very strongly disagree’ (see ‘Results’ below for scoring procedure).

Comprehension measurement Comprehension was measured (Section 2) by asking each subject three yesho questions dealing with the arguments used in the communication (Ausubel, 1969).

Counterargumentation In Section 3 , Ss were asked to retrospectively list their thoughts and ideas formed while listening to the communication; those which constituted statements directed specifically against one of the six main arguments proposed by the speaker were classified as counterarguments, using the procedure developed by Brock (1967) and further modified by Osterhouse and Brock (1970). Three types of statements were classified as counterarguments: (1) declarative statements which specifically men- tioned possible undesirable consequences of the arguments used in the communication; (2) statements which questioned the validity of the arguments presented and (3) statements which suggested alternative means of achieving the ends advocated. Not including as counterarguments were statements of agreement with the communication, statements of affect, interrogative statements and simple un- qualified statements of disagreement (for scoring procedure see ‘Results’ below).

Results

Before discussing the extent to which the hypotheses were supported, it is neces- sary to comment briefly on the scoring procedures used.


1. The eight response categories for the attitude questions were assigned raw scores ranging from 8 (maximum agreement) to 1 . Because of the low number of Ss and the narrow range of possible answers, these scores were transformed into 'more nearly normal' data using the cumulative frequencies for the answers in each question and the normal distribution function (Lindley and Miller, 1968), thus producing an objective method for attributing numerical scores to the qualitative attitude scale used, and doing so in such a way that the resulting data may be more efficiently analysed by the standard techniques of analysis of variance and t tests (Kendall and Stuart, 1967). It is not at all clear that other, and much more popular methods of attributing numerical (e.g. 'equal') scores are such that statistical inferences can confidently be made, although they are computationally easy to apply and intuitively easy to accept.

2. With regard to the counterargumentation data, all statements (N = 748) were judged by two graduate students, acting independently and without knowledge of treatment assignments. Statements classified as counterarguments were given a score of one and all other statements a zero score. A 'counterargument score' was assigned to a particular subject when both raters agreed, or when assigned scores varied over no more than one unit. In the latter case, the mean was taken as the final score. Out of a total of 1,496 comparisons (2 X 748 statements) 94 % were either in total agreement, or differed by only one unit.

Hypothesis I

This, the basic hypothesis tested here and in the preliminary studies, was well supported in the final experiment. 24 % of all statements produced in Section 3 were classified as counterarguments, rising to 30 % in the non-distraction group where efforts to suppress counterargumentation were not made. From the evidence pre- viously available (Brock, 1967; Osterhouse and Brock, 1970) these results would appear to be satisfactory.

Hypothesis 2

Table 2 shows the mean number of statements classified as counterarguments for each group. As expected, the distribution of all statements did not vary (Flo = 11.2, not sig.) while the number of counterarguments showed signiticant variation from group to group (Flo = 44.5, sig. at 0.1 %).


Table 2. Mean scores for (i) counterargument production, (ii) agreement with message and (iii) comprehension of arguments by distraction intensity (high, low) and response task

Counterargumentation Agreement Comprehensior

Higha Lowb High" Lowb Higha Lowb

High active 1.0 1.75 -.15 Low active

Low active

Passive (visual) 0.63 2.62 .38

Base-line control 2.11 -0.16 Mean 2.11 1.08 1.97 -0.16 0.12

(visual) 0.25 0.5 .34

(auditory) 2.25 2.5 .08

Passive (auditory) 1.25 2.5 -.07

.03 1.75 1.5

-.18 2.0 2.25

-.07 1.63 2.0 .13 2.13 1.75 .11 1.75 2.25

.004 2.25 1.85 1.95 2.25

__________..__

a. 22 flashes per minute b. 10 flashes per minute

Non-distracted subjects, as predicted, counterargued more ( X Z , = 6, sig. at 2.5 %) than the distracted (experimental) subjects as a whole. Within the experimental groups several predictions were upheld; high-intensity Ss counterargued less (PI = 15.3, sig. at 0.1 %) than low-intensity; low-active Ss counterargued less than passive but only under visual conditions alone (XZl = 10.4, sig. at 0.5 %); and low-active Ss counterargued less than high-active (Xz, = 8.6, sig. at 0.5 %). As predicted, counterargumentation differences between vocal and manual groups were not observed, but the visual group did counterargue less (XZl = 14.7, sig. at 0.1 %) than the auditory group. Apart from this unexpected finding (which will be discussed below) this hypothesis was reasonably well supported.

Hypothesis 3

Table 2 also shows the mean transformed agreement scores for each group across all attitude questions. 2 X 2 X 2 and 2 X 3 analyses of variance did not indicate any significant differences in agreement levels between the various distracted (experimental) groups. Between distracted as a whole and non-distracted, although significant counterargumentation differences were found, there was little evidence of difference in mean agreement scores for these group ( t = 0.6, not sig.).

Within the distracted groups, there was some support for the hypothesised inverse causal relationship between counterargumentation and agreement levels.

2. High active could only be compared (auditory) condition was not included. with low active (visual) as a high-active


Within highllow intensity, although F tests indicated no differences in agreement levels between these groups, the overall mean scores indicated that agreement- with-message was higher with the high-intensity group (t = 1.80, sig at 5 %), while the counterargumentation relationship was reversed, as predicted. Within five of the six attitudinal questions (Section l), the mean high-intensity score for each question was higher than that for the low-intensity group, and the binomial probability of high-intensity not agreeing more than low, overall attitudinal statements, was very low (1.5 %).

Low-active and passive groups did not differ in agreement levels, although there were counterargumentation differences (but only under the visual condition alone), with low-active groups counterarguing less, as predicted. These results, and the lack of an inverse relationship between counterargumentation and agreement, would suggest that low-active and passive tasks were highly similar in the demands they made. on the response mechanisms of the recipients. Agreement levels between the groups, particularly under high-intensity alone, were in fact very similar, and counterargumentation differences, over 'both visual and auditory conditions, were not significant. This data can be seen as a corrollary of the predicted reverse relationship - if counterargumentation differences between groups are not elicited, then agreement levels will not differ.

Low-active Ss counterargued significantly less than high-active, and therefore it would be expected that low-active Ss would agree more. On five of the attitudinal questions, low-active Ss had higher agreement levels than high-active, a difference which was significant under the high-intensity condition alone ( t = 1.96, sig. at 5 %). It was predicted that low-active Ss would agree more and counterargue less than both high-active and passive, thus inferring that high-active and passive groups would have similar agreement levels. Again, high-active could only be compared with passive-visual, and although in all six questions the passive score was greater than high-active, the differences were not significant.

As with the counterargumentation scores, vocal and manual groups did not differ from each other in attitude shift. Although the overall 2 X 2 X 2 analysis of variance indicated no difference between visual and auditory groups, when these two variables were examined under high intensity alone, with active-low/passive as the other factor (Table 3 below) then visual agreed more with the message than auditory (F = 4.8, sig. at 5 % ) while counterarguing less.


Table 3. 2 X 2 analysis of variance of response and medium variables under high intensity

Source df ss MS F

Medium 1 1.028 1.028 4.81* Response 1 .022 Cells 3 1.13 Inter. 1 .08 W. Cells 28 5.992 214

7.122 _ _ _

Totals 31

* Sig. at 5 %

This hypothesis finally predicted that attitude shift scores and counterargumentation levels would not relate to differences in comprehension of the arguments used in the communication. Table 2 indicates the mean correct comprehension score for each group, and analysis indicated that differences between the groups were not present (X2,0 = 11.2, not sig.). High-active had the lowest comprehension score, but was not significantly different from the others.

Discussion

On the whole the data give a certain limited support to the Festinger and Maccoby (1 964) prediction - that lower levels of distraction produce greater counterargumentation which in turn inhibits attitude shift, while comprehension remains unaffected. The essential basis of the first hypothesis - that a counterattitudinal message which is also persuasive and ego-involving, will elicit counterargumentation - was well supported and suggests that acceptance of the subvocal defence is feasible not only in terms of definition, but also in terms of measurement.

Festinger and Maccoby’s proposal that distraction per se will inhibit counterargumentation was supported, but inversely related agreement-with-the-message was not consequently observed. This would indicate that it is not sufficient merely to compare non-distraction with distraction as a whole, but rather one must con- sider those attributes of the stimuli used in a given experimental situation which are most successful in supporting an inverse relationship, particularly it would seem (from this and previous studies), increased intensity level of the stimuli. The relationship was undoubtedly strongest with higMow-intensity groups, supporting not only Keating and Brock (1974) but also Silverman and Regula (1968), whose highly distracted Ss were significantly more persuaded than low distracted, and Kiesler and Mathog (1968) whose high-intensity group had difficulty in subvocali-

Distracting stimuli 9 1

zation and produced greater attitude shift. In the Keating and Brock study, it was suggested on the basis of Osterhouse and Brock‘s findings and the experimental research of Sokolov (1969) that the vital quality of the distracting stimulus was its ability to block an essentially ‘subvocal activity’ and this was more likely to be effectively suppressed by a distraction which demanded a ‘vocal’ response rather than one which required a ‘manual’ or ‘visual’ response. The findings of this study modify this suggestion somewhat, and while it could be accepted that the subvocal explanation is quite probably correct, the evidence does not confirm that vocal-type responses are inherently more capable than others of blocking the defensive process and causing attitude change. Counterargumentation is more likely to be suppressed, and agreement with the message enhanced, by those distractions which can be classified as ‘high intensity’ and less likely to be affected by ‘low intensity’.

Although there was evidence to support the curvilinear relationship hypothesised between high-active, low-active and passive, attitude-shift differences were not as strong as hoped for. Whereas low-active Ss counterargued less than passive and high-active groups, as predicted, they agreed more with the communication than high-active, but had agreement levels similar to passive recipients. Although only tentative, the relationship does reflect the frequently observed phenomenon (McGuire, 1966) where manipulation of an independent variable will increase (or decrease) in effectiveness until a ‘peak’ is reached at which point the variable is no longer valid, resulting in a reversal of an established monotonic relationship. Keating and Brock (1974) overlooked this possibility, when, on the basis of their simple linear relationships between the effects of low-active and passive groups on counterargumentation and agreement levels, they concluded that ‘humans are not as rational as the counterarguing explanation. . . presumes’, but rather any ‘lessening of vigilance over current attitudes . . . reduces the stability of that attitude making it vulnerable to change in the advocated direction’. When, however, the effects of a high-active response are considered alongside those of low-active and passive, the counterargument explanation of preserving attitudes would appear to have greater validity.

While not predicted, differences in subvocalization and attitude shift, between visual and auditory groups, were observed. In spite of Peterson’s (1969) evidence to the contrary, it was thought that, considering the simple repetitive nature of the visual and auditory distractions, counterargumentation would not differ; in fact the latter group counterargued much more. There is no evidence to suggest that the auditory Ss were concentrating more on the message by blocking out the distracting sounds and listening more closely to the arguments presented. The spoken and written records of vocal and manual subgroups, and the comprehension

92 Deidre M d m n Haslett

levels of the visual and auditory groups indicate that on all these measurements the groups did not differ from each other. Nor do the results support the ‘common-sense’ explanation which would suggest that the auditory task, if anything, would be more novel and non-familiar than the visual and would thus lead to less counterargumentation and greater attitude shift. The evidence obtained suggests that the visual stimuli, in so far as they involved more active participation on the part of the S (e.g., more effort would be required to constantly switch gaze from the monitor screen to the ‘numbers’ sheet and back, than to listen to the sounds) were therefore more distracting and resulted in decreased counterargumentation and greater attitude shift.

Although Festinger and Maccoby’s hypothesis was challenged by several workers on the grounds that attitude change must be related to learning of the communication, it must be remembered that none of the major learning theorists (e.g., Hov- land, Janis and Kelley, 1953; Weiss, 1962) with the possible exception of McGuire (McGuire and Papageorgis, 1961) have suggested that attitude change is automat- ically the result of the reception of novel information. Ausubel (1969) and others emphasise the importance of holistic learning or higher-order meaningfulness, rather than memory of details, as the vital factor in ‘learning’ new attitudes, and if this is a valid argument then it can be concluded that any obtained attitude differences in this study cannot be attributed to differential comprehension as all groups grasped the essential arguments equally well, apart from the high-active group as predicted. Rather than comprehension of the arguments, it would appear that opportunity €or acceptance of, or yielding to, the communication, as related to level of counterargumentation is the factor which separated those who were persuaded from those who resisted (Hovland et al., 1953). Those who yielded most, i.e., high-intensity Ss, passive and low-active groups, and visual recipients also counterargued least, and conversely, these who agreed least, i.e., low-intensity, high-active and auditory groups, had the greatest subvocal defence scores.

In spite of the criticisms of the distraction-acceptance hypothesis, its major fault was not the validity of its predictions but rather the comparative lack of sound supportive and derivative data. The efforts made in the study described here were successful in so far as they generated data which more accurately specified the workings of the hypothesis and produced support for it. Counter- argument differences were strong where predicted; attitude shift scores, although rather weak, were nevertheless as generally postulated; comprehension of the arguments used was not an important mediating variable, and the results on the whole were as Festinger and Maccoby would have predicted.


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R h m C

L’auteur ktudie les effets de stimuli de distraction, prksentks en m&me temps qu’un message persuasif impliquant une attitude contraire, sur la contre-argumentation sub- vocale et le changement d’attitude. Les 80 sujets de I’expkrience Ctaient des Ctudiants masculins de premiere annCe provenant de 1’Universitd de Birmingham, Angleterre, constitu6s en 10 groupes soumis B des traitements diffkrents. 11s rkpondaient B des skquences de chiffres tout en accomplissant des tgches auditives, visuelles, vocales et manuelles ainsi que certaines combinaisons d‘entre elles pendant qu’ils kcoutaient le message. Le groupe tdmoin constituk de 28 Ctudiants se bornait B kcouter le meme message qui exhortait B la stkrilisation masculine obligatoire.

Apres avoir accompli les tgches en question, on donnait B tous les dtudiants un questionnaire de mesure des attitudes du type Likert en six points, une mesure de contre-argumentation analogue B celle mise au point par T. C. Brock (1967) et un test de comprkhension en trois points portant sur les arguments utilisks dans le message. Les risultats semblent indiquer que les stimuli de distraction les plus grands ou demandant une rkaction plus ‘active’ du sujet (jusqu’; un certain degrk d’activitk) sont plus susceptibles de freiner la contre- argumentation et entrainent ainsi le sujet B changer d’opinion en optant pour le message (tout en laissant les degrks de comprkhension inchangks) que les stimuli de plus faible intensitt ou qui demandent soit une rkaction ‘passive’ soit ‘hautement active’.

Zusammen fassung

Untersucht wurden die Effekte ablenkender Reize, die gleichzeitig mit uberredenden, aber einstellungskontriiren Informationen dargeboten wurden, beziiglich h e r Wir- kung auf subvokale Gegenargurnentation und Einstellungsiinderung. Alle Vpn waren einjiihrige, nicht graduierte, mlinnliche Studenten der Universitslt Bhdingham, England. Die 80 Vpn, die zehn verschiede- nen Versuchsgruppen zugewiesen wurden, reagierten auf ablenkende Zahlensequenzen durch Ausfiihrung visueller, akustischer, sprachlicher und manueller Aufgaben und Kombinationen derselben, wiihrend sie die Informationen horten. Die Kontrollgruppe, bestehend aus 28 Vpn, horte nur die Infor- mationen, die Zwangssterilisierung bei Miinnern befurwortete. Nach Ausfiihrung der Aufgabe wurde allen Vpn ein Likert-Einstellungsfragebogen mit sechs Items gegeben, ein MeBinstrument zur Erfassung der Gegenargumentation, iihn- lich dem von T. C. Brock (1967) verwen- deten und ein Test zum Verstkindnis der in den Informationen enthaltenen Argumente, bestehend aus drei Items. Die Ergebnisse legen nahe, daB ablenkende Reize groBerer Intensitat oder solche, die eine ‘aktivere’ Reaktion vom Empfahger erfordern (bis zu einem gewissen Aktivitats- niveau) Gegenargumentation mit groBerer Wahrscheinlichkeit hemmen und so eine Tendenz zur Ubereinstimmung mit der In- formation hervorrufen (wobei der Verstiind- nisgrad davon unberiihrt bleibt), als Reize geringerer Intensitat oder solche, die ent- weder eine ‘passive’ oder eine ‘sehr aktive’ Reaktion erfordern.

distracting stimuli: do they elicit or inhibit counterargumentation and attitude shift

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