disinvestment and privatisation

Disinvestment and Privatisation in IndiaAssessment and Options*

R Nagaraj

Ownership reform in public sector enterprises (PSEs) initiated since 1991 has as yet been quantitatively modest. It is perhaps too early to judge the effects of these initiatives on their financial performance. While the slow pace of the reform can be perceived as an opportunity, there is perhaps merit in carefully reviewing the policy in light of economic theory, and comparative experience. As the bulk of the public investments are in industries with economies of scale and scope (with externalities that in principle invite considerable regulation), this study suggests an alternative institutional arrangement for improving PSEs financial performance: mutual stock holding among complementary enterprises tied around a public sector bank to minimise problems of soft budget constraint, dysfunctional legislative and bureaucratic interference, and to encourage close interaction between banks and firms to promote long term economic development.

Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research Gen. Vaidya Marg, Goregaon East Mumbai 400 065 Email: [email protected] March 26, 2005*

This study is prepared for the ADB Policy Networking Project, coordinated by Chiranjib Sen, Indian Institute of Management Bangalore. I am grateful to T C A Anant, K L Krishna and many participants of the two workshops held in New Delhi and Bangalore, for their comments and suggestions on the earlier drafts of the paper. Usual disclaimers apply.

Disinvestment and Privatisation in IndiaAssessment and OptionsR Nagaraj Introduction: Employing about 19 million persons, public sector currently contributes about a quarter of Indias measured domestic output. Administrative departments (including defense) account for about 2/5th of it, the rest comes from a few departmental enterprises (like railways and postal services), and a large number of varied non-departmental enterprises producing a range of goods and services. These include, close to 250 public sector enterprises (PSEs) owned and managed by the central government, mostly in industry and services (excluding the commercial banks and financial institutions). At the state level, production and distribution of electricity, and provision of passenger road transport form the principal activities under public sector, run mostly by autonomous boards and statutory corporations. Though public investment in irrigation would perhaps rank next only to electricity in most states, it is generally viewed as public service, hence counted as part of public administration. Besides, there are about 1,100 state level public enterprises (SLPEs) that are relatively small in size. While the contribution of all these varied publicly owned and managed entities to national development is widely acknowledged, their poor financial return has been a matter of enduring concern especially since the mid-1980s when, for the first time, the central governments revenue account turned negative an imbalance that has persisted ever since. In 1991, a small fraction of the equity in selected central PSEs was sold to raise resources to bridge the fiscal deficit.1 Though quantitatively modest (as will be seen later), the disinvestment signaled a major departure in Indias economic policy2. While there have been instances of sale of publicly owned enterprises as running concerns on pragmatic considerations, it is only in the last decade that such sales (and sale of limited equity) acquired the status of public policy. Table 1 summarises what successive union finance ministers have said about the policy intent in their budgetary speeches, how they wished to pursue it, and what they planned to use the proceeds for. Such a shift in policy is in tune with the widespread move away from public ownership since it was initiated in the late 1970s in the UK, and in the early 1980s in Chile a change that has swept the world since then. Structural adjustment lending that was initiated around the same time by the Bretton Woods institutions included privatisation as an integral component of the policy based lending for the economies in financial1

Besides disinvestment, the reforms also decided refer chronically loss-making PSEs to BIFR (as with the private sector firms), national renewal fund was set up to finance voluntary retirement scheme for public sector employees, introduced memorandum of understanding (MOU) to be signed between PSEs and their operating ministry, as a means of imparting managerial freedom and performance appraisal. See Appendix 1 for relevant excerpt from Industrial Policy Statement, 1991

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distress. Such an initiative was buttressed by the World Banks influential official publication, Bureaucrats in Business (1995), which was a serious indictment of how the extension of the state in provision of private goods and services resulted in serious loss of efficiency, waste and lost growth opportunities for many less developed economies.3 In macroeconomics, especially after the Latin American debt and inflationary crisis in the 1980s, privatisation was widely advocated as a quick and sure means of restoring budgetary balance, to revive growth on a sustainable basis (Dornbusch, 1991). At the micro level, the change in ownership is often advocated to increase domestic competition, hence efficiency; and encourage public participation in domestic stock market all of which is believed to promote popular capitalism that rewards risk taking and private initiative, that is expected to yield superior economic outcomes.4 Thus, these changes are part a wider reversal in perception and policy in the recent times. Without attempting a detailed appraisal of the analytics and evidence of privatisation, this report briefly reviews the Indian experience in Part I, and examines the policy options in Part II.5 The study is largely restricted manufacturing and non-financial enterprises owned and managed by the central government. Part I Review of Disinvestment and Privatisation Disinvestment was initiated by selling undisclosed bundles of equity shares of selected central PSEs to public investment institutions (like the UTI), which were free to dispose off these shares in the booming secondary stock market. The process however came to an abrupt halt when the market collapsed in the aftermath of Harshad Mehta led scam, as the asking prices plummeted below the reserve prices.6 Since the stock market remained subdued for much of the 1990s, the disinvestment targets remained largely unmet. The change of government at the Centre in 1996 led to some rethinking about the policy, but not a reversal. A Disinvestment Commission was constituted to advise the government on whether to disinvest in a particular enterprise, its modalities and the utilization of the proceeds. The commission, among other things, recommended (Disinvestment Commission, 1997):3

For a symposium of five papers on this study from different perspectives, see World Development, January 1999. It is perhaps useful to draw a distinction between privatization and deregulation or liberalization. While the former strictly deals with change in ownership, the latter is concerned broadly with change in rules of entry and exit of firms and on their conduct. In this study we are concerned strictly with privatization, and not with deregulation or liberalization. There are many comprehensive reviews of literature on this issue, for instance, Megginson and Netter (2001), Rammohan (2001), Tandon (1997), Cook and Kirkpatrick (2000). Though disinvestment was not part of the scandal, the process got some what discredited as some officials associated with the policy reforms were found have had an association with Harshad Mehta.

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Restructuring and reorganization of PSEs before disinvestment, Strengthening of the well-functioning enterprises, and To utilize the disinvestment proceeds to create a fund for restructuring of PSEs.

In response to the public debate, and to the commissions recommendations, some large and well-functioning PSEs were declared jewels (Navaratnas) in the governments crown, and were granted greater managerial and financial autonomy. However, disinvestment did not pick up as the share prices remained subdued because of the scandals that rocked the financial markets.7 But, by the turn of the decade, there was some improvement mainly in response to the stock boom engineered by Ketan Parikh. Apparently some PSEs stocks were part of the scandal, which this time also involved the UTI.8 The new government that came to power in 1998 preferred to sell large chunks of equity in selected enterprises to strategic partners a euphemism for transfer of managerial control to private enterprises. A separate ministry was created to speed up the process, as it was widely believed that the operating ministries are often reluctant to part with PSEs for disinvestments as it means loss of power for the concerned ministers and civil servants. The sales were organised through auctions or by inviting bids, bypassing the stock market (which continued to be sluggish), justified on the grounds of better price realisation. Notwithstanding the serious discussion on the utilization of disinvestment proceeds, they continued to be used only to bridge the fiscal deficit. Strategic sale in many countries have been controversial as it is said to give rise to a lot of corruption, discrediting the policy process. Aware of such pitfalls, efforts were made to be transparent in all the stages of the process: selection of consultants to advice on the sale, invitation of bids, opening of tenders and so on. Between 1999 and 2003, much greater quantum of public assets were sold in this manner, compared to the earlier process, though the realised amounts were consistently less than the targets except in 2003 (Table 2 and 3). Nonetheless, there are series of allegations of corruption and malpractice in many of these deals that have been widely discussed in the press and the parliament. Instances of under pricing of assets, favouring preferred buyers, non-compliance of agreement with respect to employment and retrenchment, and many incomplete contracts with respect to sale of land, and assets have been widely reported.97

It is perhaps worth reminding ourselves that the 1990s witnessed a series of frauds in the financial sector that seriously dented the credibility of the stock market, which is yet to recover in terms of participation of domestic small investors. After the Harshad Mehta scam, there was, MS Shoe scam, collapse of NBFCs, vanishing companies scam, teakwood plantation scam, collapse of CRB group of financial companies, collapse of housing bubble in 1996, and finally the Ketan Parikh scam in 2000. A credible and careful account of the reasons of the collapse of UTI (and along with it, publics trust in the stock market) is yet to be written. One could hypothesize that the governments directive to buy PSEs stocks probably contributed to the beginning of the end of UTI. As official agencies and courts are investigating many of these issues, we do not consider it prudent on our part to go into them at this stage.

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Thus, during the last 13 years Rs. 29,520 crores were realised by sale of equity in selected central government PSEs, (in some cases) relinquishing managerial control as well (Table 4). This formed less than one per cent of central governments cumulative fiscal deficit in this period. Amid disinvestment and privatisation, some new PSEs are also created. For instance, many departmental activities were being corporatised (setting up of BSNL for instance) with a view to disinvestment. New PSEs are also formed to take up newer activities like road development corporations (promoted by state governments to execute highways and irrigation projects). Legal issues in the D-P process: Legality of the disinvestment process has been challenged on a variety of grounds that slowed the sale of public assets. However, there were two significant judicial rulings that broadly set the boundaries of the D-P process. These are: 1. Privatisation is a policy decision, prerogative of the executive branch of the state; courts would not interfere in it. 2. Privatisation of the PSE created by an act of parliament would have to get the parliamentary approval. While the first ruling gave impetus for strategic sale of many enterprises like Hindustan Zinc, Maruti, and VSNL etc. since 2000, the second ruling stalled the privatisation of the petroleum companies, as government was unsure of getting the laws amended in the parliament. Privatisation at the state level: A sizable proportion of the state level enterprises are welfare corporations largely intended to meet social welfare objectives, and to secure resources from public sector banks and development financial institutions. However, many SLPEs are also involved in manufacturing and mining activities to utilize local resources and to cater to the regional markets. SLPEs as a whole make sizable financial losses.10 Privatisation at the state level began somewhat earlier than at the Centre. Sale of the state governments equity holding in Allwyn Nissan Limited in Andhra Pradesh in 1989, UP State Cement Corporation to Dalmia Group, and Auto Tractors in 1991 were precursors to the national level policy changes (Bajaj, 1994)11. By 2003, 35 such SLPEs have been

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Apparently, these corporations serve an important political function. Legislators who are denied ministerial positions are usually appointed as their chairpersons of such enterprises. Allwyn Nissan was a state level joint venture set up in 1985 to produce light commercial vehicles in collaboration with Nissan of Japan.

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privatized. But, interestingly, over five times as many enterprises (180) were shut down during this period (Table 5). Employment in PSEs: As Figure 1 shows, employment in the central PSEs has declined from about 2.2 million in 1991-92 to about 1.7 million a decade later. A marginal rise in 2001-02 is on account of the shift of employment from department of telecommunication to incorporation of BSNL as a corporate entity. If one traces employment in a set of same enterprises over the 1990s, perhaps the decline would be greater. The fall in employment is clearly the result of voluntary retirement scheme (VRS) initiated using the National Renewal Fund, as part of the structural adjustment programme. What has happened to employment after privatisation? Perhaps it is too early to get firm evidence since substantial privatisation occurred only during the last four years. However, popular reports suggest some retrenchments and compulsory retirement of workers. Reportedly some private firms have violated their contract in this regard (Modern Foods, for instance). There are also reports of employment generation at BALCO on account of capacity expansion. Performance of PSEs after disinvestment and privatisation: In principle, disinvestment is unlikely to affect economic performance since the state continues to be the dominant shareholder, whose conduct is unlikely to be influenced by share prices movements (or return on equity). Privatisation can be expected to influence economic outcome provided the firm operates in a competitive environment; if not, it would be difficult to attribute changes performance sole or mainly to the change in ownership. Assessing the principles, premises and performance of the D-P process: Right from the beginning in the UK, privatisation has been a policy in search of an economic rationale to borrow the title of Kay and Thompsons (1986) well-known contribution. Mainstream economics is largely agnostic about the role of ownership, focusing mainly on how market structure affects performance of firms (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). If privatisation is seen as a means of raising resources for the budget, it can be analytically shown to be cheaper to sell public bonds than public assets (Yarrow, 1986). Instead of seeking the reasons for privatization, one could instead ask why a certain firm should remain in public sector. Some would contend that with rapid technological change, natural monopoly, as a powerful argument for public ownership has simply disappeared. Such an argument would surely hold for telecommunications, not but for the rest of public monopolies. Based on studies of privatisation of natural monopolies, Ravi Ramamurthi (1999) contended:

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Sectors such as railways, however, are harder to regulate after privatization (see Ramamurthi, 1997). The regulatory task can be especially difficult in sectors such as highways, or water or sewage, where competition is weak or totally absent, investments are lumpier, externalities are much more important, and pay back periods run 8-10 years or more, thereby increasing uncertainty and risk for contracting parties. Renegotiations are likely to be the rule, brought on by unanticipated developments or simply opportunism on the part of investors or governments. History is full of examples in which such arrangements have fallen apart a few years after they were signed (Ramamurthi, 1999: 149).

In fact, it is mainly the property right theorists who have underlined the role of ownership on economic performance (Fama, 1980). But in the twentieth century, with the separation of ownership from control in modern industry, there is a serious agency problem regardless of its ownership. The view that the secondary capital market and the market for managers provide adequate discipline on a firms performance is at variance with evidence, especially the US experience (more about it later). What is the evidence on the efficiency effects of privatisation? It is highly mixed, to put it mildly. Florio (2004), perhaps the most recent and definitive quantitative account covering the longest time period of the UK experience, does not show any measurable efficiency gains on account of the changes in ownership. World Banks official study (Ghalal et al, 1995), perhaps the most careful exercise at making pair-wise comparisons of comparable firms in many countries, was extremely cautious in suggesting welfare gains. In fact, one of the authors of the study, Pankaj Tandon, in an independent paper was more categorical in rejecting the hypothesis of efficiency gains from privatisation in less developed countries (Tandon 1997). If this selective review of evidence is anything to go by, then one should have a modest expectation from whatever privatisation that has happened in India.12 Britain, the cradle of modern capitalism, has witnesses the public policy pendulum swing from nationalisation to privatisation (or denationalization) many times over, in the 20th century. While the US has a model of private ownership, and control with public regulation, continental Europe and Japan have, by and large, stayed steady with greater public ownership in such industries. Although there have been some privatisation in these economies, such attempts have remained relatively modest with limited changes in ownership and control of national assets. Thus, there seems to be no unique model that is universally sound for promoting efficiency of resource use. Perhaps it has a lesson for us: we have to search for a solution suited for our conditions that are broadly consistent with economic reasoning. Before seeking evidence on the effects of the D-P in India, perhaps it would be useful to ask how valid were the premises of the disinvestment policy to begin with. It is widely believed, as large and growing share of the fiscal deficit was on account of PSEs financial losses getting rid of them would restore the fisc back to health. How valid was such a diagnosis? Nagaraj (1993) had shown, using a widely accepted a methodology that PSEs financial losses were not the principal cause of the growing fiscal deficit in the12

For a different reading of the evidence, with a greater focus on the financial aspects of the reform, see Megginson (2005).

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1980s, and in fact PSEs share in the fiscal deficit had steadily declined in the decade. In other words, the government per se was largely responsible for the growing fiscal deficit, not the enterprises owned by it. Updating these estimates for the 1990s using a more refined method, the estimated deficits of the general government confirmed our previous findings (Figure 2).13 Governments share (in terms of equity and debt) as a proportion of PSEs total fixed investment shows a steady decline since the mid-1970s, suggesting a gradual tightening of their budget constraint (Figure 3). The decline in governments contribution is being met increasingly by a rise in internal resources (Figure 4). These long-term trends indicate, contrary to the widely held views, the growing fiscal deficit since the 1980s is not on account of financial losses of the enterprises. The above evidence suggests that the popularly used indicator of net profit as a proportion of total equity does not adequately reflect PSEs financial performance. While such a measure may be useful for a private shareholder, it has many shortcomings to gauge the return on public investment. For many reasons, PSEs tend to be over capitalized. First, while these enterprise are expected to develop infrastructure on their own using budgetary resources (adding to their capital costs), state government agencies usually vie with each other to provide larger and better infrastructure for private firms, thus reducing their capital cost. Therefore, depreciation charges for PSEs tend to be much larger. Second, capital structure of PSEs is seldom designed to maximise returns for the shareholder, namely the government. Usually PSEs are granted large loans in the initial year; when they are unable to service the loans, these are often converted into equity to reduce their debt repayment burden. Thus, many PSEs have high equity, not by design but by default, adversely affecting the net profitability ratio. Moreover, from an economic viewpoint, capital structure of an enterprise is of secondary importance compared to return on capital employed. It is widely believed that PSEs respectable profitability ratio (gross profits to capital employed) is mainly on account of the surpluses of the petroleum sector enterprises whose pricing includes an element of taxation. Interestingly, as shown in Figure 5, the profitability ratio has improved since the 1980s even excluding the petroleum sector enterprises a clear evidence on improvements in PSEs financial performance. But could it be merely due a faster rise in administered prices of PSEs output (on account of their monopolist position in the domestic market)? This is not so, as evident from the fact that the ratio of deflators of public sector output and GDP has declined since the mid-1980s (Figure 6). If PSEs financial performance has improved as shown above, what then accounts for the growing deficits? The problem seems to lay in poor financial returns in electricity boards, road transport corporations and railways, which are probably not adequately reflected in the above measures. For instance, revenue-to-cost ratio in SEBs has remained less than one for much of the 1990s, a decade of much talked about reforms, despite a steady rise13

For methodological details of the results reported in this section, refer to Appendix 2.

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in physical efficiency of thermal power plants (as measured by plant load factor) (Figure7). If the above reasoning and evidence is persuasive, then they suggest that the empirical premises for the ownership reforms were rather thin. While undoubtedly public sectors financial performance needed an improvement, they were not, in the main, on account of the central PSEs that were the targets of the D-P. They mainly lay in (i) the growing expenditure and subsidies of the government, and (ii) poor return on investment in electricity, irrigation and road transport. In all these cases, the real problem is not so much public ownership, but pricing of public utilities and government s inability to collect user charges, for a variety of political and social reasons. To sum up, as the sale of equity has been quantitatively a modest, in relation to the size of public sector in India, it is hard to judge the efficacy of the reform effort. Moreover, it is perhaps too early to be definitive about the outcomes. Analytical bases of the policy reform were fragile to begin with, and comparative experience does not give much optimism for measurable efficiency gains from these changes in ownership of industrial assets. Above all, if the evidence reported is anything to go by, the premises of the D-P policy were rather weak. II Policy Options With over a decade of sustained efforts to redraw the boundaries of the ownership of public industrial assets, there has hardly been any political or professional consensus on the need for, and the modalities of, privatisation. This can be interpreted to mean either of the two possibilities: that there is a great potential for the sale of public equity, or, that there are practical difficulties of doing it. Realistically speaking, if ownership reform is a policy imperative then the options before us seem limited to the following: 1. Rule out large-scale privatization, considering (a) the shallow domestic stock market,14 (b) relatively small size of the private corporate sector,15 and (c) the wide spread political opposition to transfer of managerial control to foreign owned firms, and (d) social costs of such transfers. 2. In principle, disinvestment without a change in management is unlikely to make much difference to efficiency. It may help raise limited resources from the capital market, mainly reflecting the government monopoly in the industry. But this is a14

Despite considerable modernisation of institutions and procedures of securities markets in the last decade, they are many shortcomings: one, the market is still very shallow with a few scripts accounting for the bulk of the trade; two, volatility in the Indian market is still one of highest in the world; three, despite NSEs phenomenal growth, it is small coterie of BSE brokers that call the shots in the entire market. Thus, the India market continues to be what Vijay Joshi and I M D Little appreciatingly called it the snake pit. It is perhaps worth reiterating that size of Indias private corporate sector is relatively small, estimated to be between 10 to 12 per cent of domestic output. Barring a few, most private sector firms are small compared to PSEs that are targets of privatisation.

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costly source of finance with high transaction costs. Given excess liquidity currently in the financial system it would be cheaper to sell bonds domestically to raise the required finances. 3. Financially unviable (loss making) PSEs need to be drastically restructured or closed down. However, these enterprises are invariably located on valuable real estate, as most of these industrial enterprises were the locus of urban and regional industrial development. Empowered committees consisting of all the stakeholders could be created to shut down such enterprises, dismantle the plant and machinery, and sell the real estate in a transparent manner; and/or develop the real estate jointly with institutions like the LIC or state housing boards. Workers are unlikely to object to such proposals if they are assured of a fair share of the sale proceeds either in cash or part of the housing to be built using the land. 4. In consumer goods industries like hotels etc, where PSEs may have quality assets in prime locations but lack sound management, long term leases or management contracts could be a viable option. However, efficacy of this option lies in the design of contracts. If they were highly loaded against government it would vitiate the purpose. 5. Need for the institutional mechanism of disinvestment commission with representatives from different stakeholders to deliberate on all the above matters in a transparent manner. Doing it administratively by a ministry would perhaps discredit the D-P policy. If we admit that there are genuine limitations of selling off of PSEs core of which belong to energy, infrastructure, and industries of strategic interest in national development then there is perhaps no credible alternative but to improve the functioning of these enterprises.16 We, then, are back to the old question: how to improve PSEs performance where a change in ownership is unlikely to make much difference.17 There is a large (administrative) literature (including many valuable official reports) addressing such a question; much of it dwells on the autonomy and accountability of enterprises posed mainly in terms of administrative controls of the government as the ultimate owner, and procedural accountability of the managers. One of the widely advocated suggestions is to create industry wise holding companies for instance, Arjun Sengupta Committees main suggestion (Government of India, 1984) as an institutional buffer between an enterprise and the government. But the evidence on this organizational form is perhaps not encouraging, as it often implies creation of another tier of bureaucracy, undermining the autonomy of the firm or factory level managers.1816

For instance, In 1991, 14 largest PSEs constituted 55 per cent of value added and capital employed. The enterprises included in decenig order in terms of gross block are: ONGC, NTPC, SAIL, Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd., NALCO, Indian Oil, Neyveli Lignite, MTNL, Indian Airlines, Shipping corporation, IPCL, Air India, and South Eastern Coal Fields. PSEs need not necessarily have to be large and monolithic organization. There is considerable scope for rationalization of these enterprises. It is worth remembering that PSEs like SAIL and Coal India were conceived and functioned initially like a holding company.

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Economic analyses of public sector performance, however, seem to have largely ignored the institutional black box, by focusing mainly on the macroeconomic effects of public investment and planning for growth. Many studies critical of Indias growth and its distribution have identified political economic reasons for poor performance of PSEs. More recently, in line with the current orthodoxy, some have advocated ownership reform, which we have argued to be of limited value. Problem of corporate governance: In the evolution of modern capitalism, with separation of ownership from control as firms grow in size and complexity, agency problem arises: how to ensure that the managers (promoter in Indian parlance) work to maximise return on shareholders capital. Given the information asymmetry, managers could pursue their private goal disregarding the shareholders interests. This is at the heart of the problem of modern literature on corporate governance. Various institutional and contractual mechanisms have evolved in the last century to grapple with this problem. In the context of efficiency of resource use in a socialist economy, Oskar Lange sought to solve the problem of how to ensure that managers of public firms maximized efficiency consistent with the goals set by the central planners. However, looking at the microeconomics of firms in a socialist economy, Jonas Kornai argued that they were unlikely to be efficient because of the soft budget constraint: that is, firms do not go bankrupt or managers do not loose their jobs for their poor performance. Firms can always renegotiate their contracts with the planners to hide their inefficiency. In India public sector firms are often face with multiple objectives, and multiple owners or monitors central government, state governments, legislators, public auditors and so on. Managers may not necessarily maximise profits as they could always highlight a particular achievement to suit their convenience. Managers may be risk averse as they face constitutionally mandated procedural audit by the CAG if an enterprise is majority government owned. Managers efficiency objectives may come in conflict with dysfunctional political interference in operational matters (at the expense of policy issues) to meet narrow political goals. However, at the same time, poor performance by managers does not involve any punishment as they can re-negotiate the output prices, budgetary support, or have access to soft and/or government guaranteed loans; in other wards they do not face a hard budget constraint. Thus, the agency problem is endemic to all economic systems. Moreover, problem of soft budget constraint is not restricted to socialist economies but evident in market economies as well when the firm is question is large and considered of strategic importance for the economy, though perhaps to much lesser extent. Rescue of Chrysler Corporation the third largest automotive firm in the US in the late 1970s and United Airlines after 9/11 in the US are clear instances of state support for failing companies. Such support is more common in financial sector, where failure of firms can have significant systemic risk.

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Comparative experience: Experience of the last century shows that different economic systems have sought to solve this problem in a variety of ways, with varying degrees of success. The Soviet system was perhaps quite capable of solving the problem in the initial phases of extensive growth with a clear objective of maximisation of national output. However the system began to falter, as the economy got more complex, in the phase of intensive growth when objective was to increase productivity of resources (Bhaduri, 1998). The command economy was unable to resolve the agency and incentive problems at the micro level because of the soft budget constraint. As noted earlier, in the Anglo Saxon economies, the secondary stock market acted as the disciplining device on corporate performance and as market for managers. In principle, stock prices that summarise all publicly available information on the firm performance should provide adequate signals for managers to act optimally. The system is also seems capable of providing risk capital to spur rapid technological progress, as witnessed in the role that venture capital funds played in promoting the Internet revolution. However, given the agency problem, there is enormous scope for abuse of the system, adversely affecting the shareholders interests and possibly hurting economic efficiency in the aggregate. Hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts have exposed the inefficiency of such a disciplining mechanism (Dore, 2000). The recent implosion of some of the worlds biggest companies, astronomical rise in managerial remuneration disproportionate to performance of firms, and widespread abuse of stock options by top managements in firms like Enron and Tyco by the turn of the last century have seriously dented the credibility of the stock market based principles of corporate governance (Stiglitz, 2003). Follower industrializing economies of continental Europe and Japan evolved a bank centric mechanism of financing of industrialization and corporate governance to overcome some of the well known shortcomings of the stock market heeding to Keyness advise, and Greschenkrons (1962) historical insights (Zysman, 1983). In this system, banks not only provide loans but equity as well, hence closely monitor the performance of firms. Japanese system of interlocking equity ownership centered around a main bank, called Keiretsu, with mutual stock holding leading to accountability and risk sharing, has been able to overcome some of the widely observed informational deficiencies in the stock market based system, hence improved efficiency and growth over a sustained period (Aoki, 1996). Admittedly, bank centric systems have had their share of problems. While such a system was perhaps capable of engineering a rapid capital accumulation and technological catch up with the US, it was probably not nimble enough to finance risk taking to extend the technological frontier as evident from the experience of the 1990s. Many blame the close and opaque nexus between firms, banks and the bureaucracy for the Japanese debacle in the 1990s that has persisted for more than a decade now. Similarly, state sponsored industrialistion is believed to be responsible for the East Asian crisis in 1997.

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Although there is some rethinking on the basis of the above mentioned instances in Japan and continental Europe about their institutional mechanism, it is hard to deny the superiority of the bank centric systems in promoting the post-war experience (19452000). Variants of the Japanese model of financing and governance have contributed in no less measure to the unprecedented success of late industrialising economies of East Asia as represented by the rise of the rest, to use Alice Amsdens phrase (Amsden, 2001). Thus, on balance, history and theory seem to favour a bank centric system at least in the early phase of industrialisation. Evolution of the Indian system: In light of above, how does one chrecterise India? Over the first three decade of the planned economic development, a bank centric system was broadly put in place with an elaborate network of public sector banks, development finance and investment institutions. Though banks, especially the DFIs had representation on company boards by virtue of their large debt and equity holding (both public and private), there was no attempt to nationalise private corporate firms, or to interfere with managerial control of existing promoters unless the firms were mismanaged. Thus, the system was broadly supportive of development of private enterprise consistent with the national objectives. Moreover, as Indian enterprises are predominantly family-managed, public financial institutions sought modernize corporate governance (like introduction of professional managers in the boards) and financial practices, without questioning the rights of management of the promoters. But, the role of the financial institutions was largely subordinated to the implementation of quotas and licenses. Financial system, thus, could not adequately develop expertise in screening investment projects, market and technologies, and assessing market risk. They had little role disciplining corporate managers with financial carrots and sticks. In other words, banks and financial institutional were not encouraged to develop their reputational capital, that is perhaps central to a sound financial system. A close reading of the early studies by R K Hazari (1986) on licensing, and later Narasimham Committee report on shifting from physical to financial controls (Ministry of Finance, 1985) seem to suggest that they proposed to nudge the institutions towards a bank centric system of financing and corporate governance. Although development banks increasingly financed PSEs investments, they had limited role in governance of these enterprises, was largely in the hands of the operating ministries and were subjected to parliamentary controls. Parliament constituted Committee on public undertakings (COPU) that looked into the functioning of selected PSEs. Similarly, CAG is constitutionally mandated to audit PSEs in which the central government held more than 50 per cent of equity shares. While such measures of public accountability are in principle desirable in a democracy, in practice, the parliamentary committees had little role in ensuring efficacy of resource use in these publicly owned firms. As measures of enforcing sound corporate governance, these methods were not effective.

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However, overlooking the hard task of institutional design to suit the specificities of large, heterogeneous, democratic industrializing economy of India, the reforms initiated in the 1990s have sought to improve PSEs financial performance by transferring ownership and control to private sector, and resort to stock market based discipline. As the above discussion clearly demonstrates, regardless of ownership agency problem exists is ubiquitous, and problems of soft budget persist in varying degree when the firms involved are large and strategic. Further, private ownership would not guarantee improvement in efficiency if the market structure remained the same; on the other hand a private monopoly, could be worse than a public one.19 A suggestion for reform: On the basis of the above, if we accept that the real problems facing PSEs are, (i) dysfunctional political interference, (ii) constitutionally mandated procedural audit and (iii) soft budget constraint, then following measures can be suggested: Reduce the government holding in PSEs to less than 50 per cent by transferring share to mutually complementary firms by creating Japanese style keiretsu, tied around a public sector bank or financial institution. For instance interlocking of equity holding among steel, coal and electricity firms; or petroleum exploration, refining and petrochemical complexes. Such a measure would eliminate the procedural audit as well as political interference on the day-to-day operational matters. However, to ensure public accountability managers may be asked to make presentations to the parliamentary sub-committees on efficiency of resource use. At the same time, managers should have clearly defined security of tenure for say 3 or 5 years to ensure continuity and to show measurable performance. Harden the budget constraint for PSEs by a clear sunset clause on budgetary support or government guarantee for loans, except for specific public purpose oriented investments. Given that banks provide substantial equity and loans, they would, in principle, have incentive to monitor PSEs performance to retain their reputatational capital. However, question would still remain who will monitor the banks? There are no easy answers to it. Given the increasing independence of the Reserve Bank, it is conceivable to device a system to where the central bank and other regulatory authorities are given the responsibility of appointing top managers of banks. Such a scheme of delegated monitoring is in principle is better for efficiency. Such a monitoring could focus on long-term corporate goals such as productivity growth market shares, and R&D outcomes. To ensure that PSEs do not abuse their oligopolistic position in the domestic market, reasonably open trade and investment regime could impart the discipline of the world market.

19

In a political democracy, a public monopoly would be more answerable to political representatives than a private monopoly.

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Pranab Bardhan (1991 and 1993) has argued in favour of such a system for India to overcome the problem of soft budget constraint and a way to acquire dynamic comparative advantage. Applying the recent advances in information economics and drawing from the recent experience, Stiglitz and his associates caution developing economies against moving from financial repression to financial liberalization (Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz, 1996). Such attempts have more often than not, led to many financial crises. Arguing against such polar extremes, these scholars have advocated Japanese style relationship banking system or Korean style hard budget constraint banking as desirable forms of financial system, which they define as financial restraint. Conclusions While public sector enterprises contribution to national development is widely acknowledged, their poor financial return has been a matter of deep and enduring concern, especially since the mid-1980s when, for the first time, the central governments current revenues were found inadequate to meet its current expenditure. Though firm and industry level studies of PSEs have often highlighted gross inefficiencies and poor profitability, many of them have also suggested their unquantifiable (or difficult to quantify) non-economic benefits. However, macroeconomic discourse in India has largely focused on the crowding-in effects of public investment, and the need for institutional structures to insulate the PSEs from political and bureaucratic interference to improve their financial returns. Deeper analyses have sought to offer political economic explanations for continuation of such a state of affairs. As a means to restore budgetary balance, after the crisis in 1991, government sold a small fraction of its equity shares in selected public sector enterprises to public investment institutions. Though quantitatively modest, it signaled a major departure in public policy; it was the thin end of the wedge that led to transfer of managerial control in a few PSEs about a decade later. The policy shift was also significant, as it deflected the contours of the discourse on public sector reform from institutional design and corporate governance to a change in ownership in favour of private sector as a means to overcome the inefficiencies. The shift in debate was consistent with the changes in the discussions on economic policies worldwide. Quantitatively, the disinvestment and privatisation have been modest so far, as proportions of the targets, revenues realised, or as a proportion of the fiscal deficit. Disinvestment did not secure much revenue, as the stock market was subdued during much of the 1990s on account of a series of scandals that repeatedly rocked the financial markets. Sale of substantial chunks of equity with transfer of managements that took place in the last 3-4 years has yielded sizable revenues. But most of these sales have been contentious with a series of legal cases pending in the courts, and enormous adverse commentary on them in press and the parliament. Should we persist with the policy of ownership reform? Realistically speaking, prospects for the D-P appear limited, as the bulk of the public investments (in terms of capital employed) are in infrastructure and industries of strategic importance, where market

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failures and national interests seem too significant to be left unattended by public policy. There is little that is credible in economic theory that argues ownership as the principal basis for economic outcomes. Moreover, accumulating evidence on privatisation across the world does not give any prospect of this policy making a genuine difference to firm level performance on a sustainable basis. If the above assessment is reasonably persuasive, then we are back to the earlier question: how to design an institutional mechanism that limits (if not overcomes) the agency problem that is at the heart of modern capitalism with the separation of ownership and control of large firms, that puts hard budget constraint on firms, and reduces dysfunctional political bureaucratic interference. Solution to this problem seems closely tied to financing of investment, and financial system that provides resources for development and performs the function of a disciplining device on firms. While disinvestment and privatisation necessarily lead towards stock market based discipline, we have argued that history and theory do not seem to support it to be the superior alternative. We are inclined to favour the Japanese and German style interlocking of ownership of complementary PSEs tied together with a bank that enforces greater managerial accountability, and encourages long term outlook of output growth and acquisition of technological capabilities. Admittedly, there are a numerous enterprises with modest investments that are in the public sector fold that operate in competitive markets or do not serve ant strategic purpose. Among these, loss making ones can be disposed off by selling the real estate of these enterprises by creating empowered committees of all stakeholders in these enterprises. Workers are unlikely to oppose such moves if there is a reasonable and transparent sharing of proceeds of such sales. The remaining PSEs operating broadly in competitive environment can be granted greater autonomy, or give out to private parties on management contracts or on lease. To undertake these tasks, there is a need for a body like the disinvestments commission with representation from all stakeholders to workout the modalities of undertaking these changes.

References Amsden, Alice H (2001): The Rise of "The Rest": Challenges to the West from LateIndustrialising Economies. Oxford University Press, New York.

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Aoki, Masahiko (1996): Unintended Fit: Organisational Evolution and Government Design of Institutions in Japan, in Masahiko Aoki et al, edited, Role of Government in East Asian Economic Development: Comparative Institutional Analysis, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Bajaj, J L (1994): Divesting State Ownership: A Tale of Two Companies, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol., No. August 27. Bardhan, Pranab (1991): The State and Dynamic Comparative Advantage, Exim Bank Commencement Day Annual Lecture, Export-Import Bank of India, Mumbai. _______ (1993): Economics of Market Socialism and the Issue of Public Enterprise Reform in India, in Kaushik Basu et al (edited): Capital, Investment and Development, Blackwell, London. Bhaduri, Amit (1998): Some Lessons from the Two Economic Systems, in Deepak Nayyar edited, Economics as Ideology and Experience, Frank Cass, London. Cook, Paul and Kirkpatrick, Colin (2000) (ed): Privatisation in Developing Countries, Edward Elger, and UK. Disinvestment Commission (1997): Report of the Disinvestment Commission (Chairman: G V Ramakrishna), Author, New Delhi. Dore, Ronald (2000): Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism Japan and Germany versus the Anglo-Saxons, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Dornbusch, Rudiger (1991): Policies to Move from Stabilisation to Growth, Proceedings of the Annual Conference on Development Economics, 1990. World Bank, Washington D C. Fama, E (1980): Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 88. Florio, Massimo (2004): The Great Divestiture: Evaluating the Welfare Impact of the British Privatisations 1979-1997, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. Galal, Ahmed, et al (1994): Welfare Consequences of Selling Public Enterprises: An Empirical Analysis, Oxford University Press for the World Bank, Washtinton D C. Gerschenkron, Alexander (1962): Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. Government of India (1984): Report of the Committee to Review the Policy for Public Enterprises (Chairman: Ajun Sengupta), Government of India, New Delhi.

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Goyal, S K (2000):Privatisation in India, in Gopal Joshi edited, Privatisation in South Asia: Minimising the Negative Social Effects Through Restructuring, SAAT-ILO, New Delhi. Gupta, Anand P (1993): "Reforming Deficit Measurement: The Indian Case", Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 28, Nos. 8-9, February 20-27. Hazari, R.K (1986): Essays on industrial policy, Concept Publication House, Delhi. Hellman, Thomas, Murdock, Kevin and Stiglitz, Joseph (1996): Financial Restraint: Toward a New Paradigm, in Masahiko Aoki et al, edited, Role of Government in East Asian Economic Development: Comparative Institutional Analysis, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Kay, John and Thompson, D J (1986): Privatisation: A Policy in Search of a Rationale, Economic Journal, Vol. 96, No. 1. Megginson, William L (2005): The Financial Economics of Privatisation, Oxford University Press, New York. Megginson, William and Netter, Jeffery (2001): From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatisation, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 39, No. 2, June. Ministry of Finance (1985): Report of the Committee to Examine Principles of Possible shift from Physical to Finance Controls (Chairman: M Narasimham), Government of India, New Delhi. Mishra, R K (2004): Privatisation Challenges for Good Governance: A Case of India, Institute of Public Enterprise, WP No. 25. Naib, Sudhir (2004): Disinvestment in India: Policies, Procedures and Practices, Sage India, Delhi. Nagaraj, R (1999): How are Public Sector Enterprises doing in the 1990s? A Brief Assessment, paper is presented at a seminar in University of Mumbai, March 1999 (mimeo). _______ (1993): "Macroeconomic Impact of Public Sector Enterprises: Some Further Results", Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 28, No. 3-4, January 14. Ramamurthi, Ravi (1999): Why Havent Developing Countries Privatised Deeper and Faster/, World Development, Vol. 27, No. 1, January.

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__________ (1997): Testing the Limits of Privatisation: Argentine Railroads, World Development, Vol. 25, No. 12, December. Ram Mohan T T (2001): Privatisation: Theory and Evidence, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 36, No. 52, December 29. Sarma, E A S (2004): Disinvestment: What FMs Have Said since 1991, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 22, May 29-June 4. Stiglitz, Joseph (2003): The Roaring Nineties: Seeds of Destruction, Allen Lane, New York. Tandon, Pankaj (1997): Efficiency of Privatised Firms: Evidence and Implications, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 32, No. 50. Vickers, John and Yarrow, George (1991): Economic Perspectives on Privatisation, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 2. Spring. World Bank (1995): Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of Government Ownership, Oxford University Press, New York. Yarrow, George (1986): Privatisation in Theory and Practice, Economic Policy, No. 2, April. Zysman, John (1983): Governments, Markets and Growth: Financial Systems and Politics of Industrial Change, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

Table 1: What successive Finance Ministers have said about D-P in their budget speechesYear Finance Minister Why disinvstment?R Nagaraj

Key phrases used in the Budget speech

19


1991-92 1997-98 1999-2000

Yashwant Sinha Manmohan Singh P Chidambaram Yashwant Sinha

2003-04 Jaswant Singh Which PSUs to disinvest? 1991-92 Yashwant Sinha Manmohan Singh 1997-98 P Chidambaram 1999-2000 Yashwant Sinha 2000-01 Yashwant Sinha How to Disinvest and to whom? 1991-92 Yashwant Sinha 1991-92 1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 2000-01 2001-02 2003-04 Manmohan Singh Chidambaram Yashwant Sinha Yashwant Sinha Yashwant Sinha Yashwant Sinha Jaswant Singh

For broad-based equity Improve management Raising resources for the PSUs Long-term disinvestments policy for enhancing budgetary receipts For improving productivity and profitability of enterprises Developing capital markets To unlock production potential of undertakings Selected PSUs Silent Non-strategic PSUs Non-strategic PSUs Up to 20 per centequity to MFs/investment institutions in public sector Do Government to retain majority equity in strategic PSUs Do Though gradual disinvestments or strategic sale Bring down government equity to 26 per cent or less Not in small lots Asset management Co. to hold residual shares post disinvestments

How disinvestments proceed be used? 1992-93 Manmohan Singh NRF for assistance to workers (specially women)in unorganized sector; Also, for special employment schemes in backward areas After meting VRS needs, create a Restructuring fund for PSUs. 1999-2000 Yashwant Sinha To fund social and infrastructure sectors 2001-02 Yashwant Sinha PSU restructuring For creating workers safety net Public debt reduction Social and infrastructure sector 2003-04 Jaswant Singh Create Disinvestment Fund to direct proceeds for specific uses.

Source: Sarma (2004): 2195

Table 1: What successive Finance Ministers have said about D-P in their budget speechesYear Finance Minister Why disinvstment? Key phrases used in the Budget speech

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1991-92 1997-98 1999-2000

Yashwant Sinha Manmohan Singh P Chidambaram Yashwant Sinha

2003-04 Jaswant Singh Which PSUs to disinvest? 1991-92 Yashwant Sinha Manmohan Singh 1997-98 P Chidambaram 1999-2000 Yashwant Sinha 2000-01 Yashwant Sinha How to Disinvest and to whom? 1991-92 Yashwant Sinha 1991-92 1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 2000-01 2001-02 2003-04 Manmohan Singh Chidambaram Yashwant Sinha Yashwant Sinha Yashwant Sinha Yashwant Sinha Jaswant Singh

For broad-based equity Improve management Raising resources for the PSUs Long-term disinvestments policy for enhancing budgetary receipts For improving productivity and profitability of enterprises Developing capital markets To unlock production potential of undertakings Selected PSUs Silent Non-strategic PSUs Non-strategic PSUs Up to 20 per centequity to MFs/investment institutions in public sector Do Government to retain majority equity in strategic PSUs Do Though gradual disinvestments or strategic sale Bring down government equity to 26 per cent or less Not in small lots Asset management Co. to hold residual shares post disinvestments

How disinvestments proceed be used? 1992-93 Manmohan Singh NRF for assistance to workers (specially women)in unorganized sector; Also, for special employment schemes in backward areas After meting VRS needs, create a Restructuring fund for PSUs. 1999-2000 Yashwant Sinha To fund social and infrastructure sectors 2001-02 Yashwant Sinha PSU restructuring For creating workers safety net Public debt reduction Social and infrastructure sector 2003-04 Jaswant Singh Create Disinvestment Fund to direct proceeds for specific uses.

Source: Sarma (2004): 2195 Table 1: List of Privatised PSEs1 2 Lagan Jute Machinery Company Limited (LJMC) Modern Food Industries Limited (MFIL)

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3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Bharat Aluminium Company Limited (BALCO) CMC Ltd. (CMC) HTL Ltd. (HTL) IBP Co. Ltd. (IBP) Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited (VSNL)

Indian Tourism Development Corporation (ITDC) Hotel Corporation of India Limited (HCI) Paradeep Phosphates Limited (PPL)Jessop and Company Limited Hindustan Zinc Limited(HZL) Maruti Udyog Limited (MUL) Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd.(IPCL)

Table 2: Actual Disinvestment from April 1991 onwards and Methodologies Adopted No. of Target receipt Actual Companies in for the year (Rs. receipts (Rs. Methodology which equity in Crore) in Crore) sold Minority shares sold by auction 47 (31 in one method in bundles of very tranche and 16 2500 3038 good, good, and average in other) companies. Bundling of shares abandoned. 35 ( in 3 2500 1913 Shares sold separately for each tranches) company by auction method. Equity of 7 companies sold by 3500 0 open auction but proceeds received in 94-95. Sale through auction method, in which NRIs and other persons 13 4000 4843 legally permitted to buy, hold or sell equity, allowed to participate. Equities of 4 companies auctioned and Government piggy 5 7000 361 backed in the IDBI fixed price offering for the fifth company. GDR (VSNL) in international 1 5000 380 market. 1 4800 902 GDR (MTNL) in international

Year

1991-92

1992-93

1993-94

1994-95

1995-96

1996-97 1997-98

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1998-99 5

5000

5371

1999-00# 4

10000

1860

2000-01 4

10000

1871

2001-02 9 #

12,000

5632

2002-03 6

12,000

3348

2003-04 9

13,200

15547

market. GDR (VSNL) / Domestic offerings with the participation of FIIs (CONCOR, GAIL). Cross purchase by 3 Oil sector companies i.e. GAIL, ONGC & Indian Oil Corporation GDRGAIL, VSNL-domestic issue, BALCO restructuring, MFILs strategic sale and others Strategic sale of BALCO, LJMC; Takeover - KRL (CRL), CPCL (MRL), BRPL Strategic sale of CMC 51%, HTL 74%, VSNL 25%, IBP 33.58%, PPL-- 74%, and sale by other modes: ITDC & HCI; surplus reserves: STC and MMTC Strategic sale : HZL 26%, MFIL-26%, IPCL 25% HCI, ITDC, Maruti: control premium from renunciation of rights issue, ESOP:HZL,CMC. Maruti- IPO(27.5%), Jessop & Co. Ltd. (Strategic sale-72%), HZL (Call Option of SP 18.92%), Public Offers - IPCL (28.95%), CMC (26%), IBP (26%), DRDG (20%), GAIL (10%), ONGC (10%), ICI (9.2%)

Total #

48*

91500

45066

* Total number of companies in which disinvestment has taken place so far. # Figures (inclusive of control premium, dividend/dividend tax, restructuring and transfer of surplus cash reserves prior to disinvestment etc.) Table 3: Disinvestment in Public Sector Enterprises(Rs. Crore)

Year 1991-91 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95R Nagaraj

Target 2,500 2,500 3,000 4,00023

Proceeds 3038 1913 4843Disinvestment and Privatisation

1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04

7,000 5.000 4,800 5,000 10,000 10,000 12,000 12,000 14,500

362 380 902 5371 1860 1871 5632# 3348 15,547

# Figures inclusive of amount realized by way of control premium, dividend/dividend tax and transfer of surplus cash reserves prior to disinvestment etc.Source: Economic Survey 2003-04

Table 4: Status of Privatisation of SLPEs (as on March 31, 2003) State No. of No. enterprises privatized 128 82 5 42 54 30 39 No. Proposed to be privatized Closed Working enterprises Profit Loss making making 22 15 25 11 34 47 2 5 3 36 30 8

Andhra Pradesh Tamil Nadu Arunachal Pradesh Assam Bihar

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Delhi Goa Gujarat Haryana Himachal Pradesh Jammu-Kashmir Karnataka Kerala Lakshwadeep Madhya Pradesh Maharashtra Manipur Meghalaya Mizoram Nagaland Orissa Pondicherry Punjab Rajasthan Sikkam Tripura UP West Bengal TotalSource: Mishra (2004)

15 16 49 28 21 23 79 109 1 34 66 16 13 6 6 67 11 53 29 11 9 104 81 1158

5 3 1 5 15 3 2 1 1 1 1 4 1 24 1 2 23 5 180 6 2 2 12 23 6 18 3 1 14 5 10 11 30 20 288 22 12 8 3 32 34

3 24 16 13 16 38 59 44 10 4 3 10 5 25 11 68 62 519

35

24 10 103

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Figure 1: Employment in Central PSEs25 20 In lakh 15 10 5 0 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 2001 2002 2003 Year ending Employment

Figure 2: P ublic sector's share in fiscal deficit of the non-fin. con. gen. govt. 80 70 Per cent of fiscal deficit 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 Fiscal year ending

Figure 3:NDNFEs' budget constraint, 1961-96 Govt equity+loans in NDNFEs' investment Per cent of NDNFEs' investment 100 80 60 40 20 0 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 Fiscal year ending Govt's contribution

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F ig u re 4 : F ina nc ing o f N D N F E s , 1 9 8 1 -9 5 a s % o f g ro s s inve s tm e nt90 80 70 Per cent of gross cap. formation 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 -1 0 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 F is c a l y e a r e n d in g In te rn a l re s o u rc e s D o m e s t ic re s o u rc e s F o re ig n re s o u rc e s

F igure 5: P rofita b ility of C P E s G ross p rofit to ca pital e m p loye d20 Profitability in per cent 15 10 5 0 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 F is c al y ear ending Total CP E s A ll CP E s -petroleum

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Figure 6: Public sector price deflator relative to GDP deflator, 1982-96.Relative price 11 4 11 2 11 0 10 8 10 6 10 4 82 83 8 4 8 5 8 6 8 7 8 8 8 9 9 0 9 1 92 93 94 9 5 9 6 Fiscal year ending Relative price

84 82 80 Per cent 78 76 74 72 70

Figure 7: Cost and efficiency of power sect or Revenue-cost rat io and P lant load fact or

70 65 60 55 50 45 40

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

Fiscal year Revenue to cost rat ending load f actor Plant

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Appendix 1 Industrial Policy statement in 1991 Public Sector Portfolio of public sector investment will be reviewed with a view to focus the public sector on strategic, high-tech and essential infrastructure. Whereas some reservation for the public sector is being retained there would be no bar for areas of exclusivity to be opened up to the private sector selectively. Similarly the public sector will also be allowed entry in areas not reserved for it. Public enterprises which are chronically sick and which are unlikely to be turned around will, for the formulation of revival/rehabilitation schemes, be referred to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR), or other similar high level institutions created for the purpose. A social security mechanism will be created to protect the interests of workers likely to be affected by such rehabilitation packages. In order to raise resources and encourage wider public participation, a part of the government's shareholding in the public sector would be offered to mutual funds, financial institutions, general public and workers. Boards of public sector companies would be made more professional and given greater powers. There will be a greater thrust on performance improvement through the Memoranda of understanding (MOU) systems through which managements would be granted greater autonomy and will be held accountable. Technical expertise on the part of the Government would be upgraded to make the MOU negotiations and implementation more effective. To facilitate a fuller discussion on performance, the MOU signed between Government and the public enterprise would be placed in Parliament. While focusing on major management issues, this would also help place matters on day-to-day operations of public enterprises in their correct perspective. Excerpts relating to public sector taken from Press release on July 24, 1991.

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Appendix 2 Public Sector Enterprises and Fiscal Deficit Alternative estimates for India To test if PSEs growing deficits is the principal reason for the increasing fiscal imbalance, we need consistent time series information that includes all PSEs, at all levels of government (in a federal set up), after reconciling transactions among them. Since India's National Accounts Statistics (NAS) seem to provide such data set, it perhaps offers an opportunity to test the hypothesis in a limited way. Moreover, as quality of Indian data is accepted to be better than many developing countries, such an exercise appears a useful starting point. Nature and the limitations of the data set In NAS, public sector consists of (i) administrative departments, (ii) departmental enterprises (DEs) like railways, telecom, postal and irrigation services, and (iii) nondepartmental enterprises (NDEs) that include corporate entitities like Steel Authority of India, statutory organizations like state electricity boards and road transport corporations. NDEs are further disaggragated into (a) non-departmental financial enterprises and (b) non-departmental non-financial enterprises (NDNFEs). If PSEs are publicly owned organizations that produce goods and services whose selling price is related to costs, then DEs plus NDNFEs would include all PSEs in India. However, the NAS data has some limitations: (i) given the format of the published information, it is not always possible to aggregate DEs and NDNFEs, (ii) since the data are not presented in balance sheet format, widely appreciated financial ratios cannot be computed, and (iii) considerable delay in publication of these tables. Although these categories are comprehensive (compared to the easily available information on central government PSEs), we cannot present all our results for total PSEs; some times they are restricted for NDNFEs only. However, as the information is available for three decades, results based on it could have considerable value. Results reported in Nagaraj (1993) follows the above method. However, this method has some limitations. For instance, it excludes DEs, underestimating the deficits of PSEs. While the overall deficit is estimated using the NAS, the fiscal deficit is based on the public finance statistics that does not fully capture the transactions between the government and its enterprises. To overcome these limitations, we use Anand Gupta's (1993) method that consistently uses NAS. To arrive at the true size of India's fiscal deficit, Gupta outlined a method to estimate gross fiscal deficit of the general government including its enterprise sector, by reconciling various accounts of the public sector. In other words, his method estimates capital finance accounts for various parts of the public sector, and aggregates them to compute the fiscal deficit (excluding non-departmental financial enterprises).

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Introduction

Indian economy had experienced major policy changes in early 1990s. The new economic reform, popularly known as, Liberalization, Privatization and Globalization (LPG model) aimed at making the Indian economy as fastest growing economy and globally competitive. The series of reforms undertaken with respect to industrial sector, trade as well as financial sector aimed at making the economy more efficient.

With the onset of reforms to liberalize the Indian economy in July of 1991, a new chapter has dawned for India and her billion plus population. This period of economic transition has had a tremendous impact on the overall economic development of almost all major sectors of the economy, and its effects over the last decade can hardly be overlooked. Besides, it also marks the advent of the real integration of the Indian economy into the global economy.

This era of reforms has also ushered in a remarkable change in the Indian mindset, as it deviates from the traditional values held since Independence in 1947, such as self reliance and socialistic policies of economic development, which mainly due to the inward looking restrictive form of governance, resulted in the isolation, overall backwardness and inefficiency of the economy, amongst a host of other problems. This, despite the fact that India has always had the potential to be on the fast track to prosperity.

Now that India is in the process of restructuring her economy, with aspirations of elevating herself from her present desolate position in the world, the need to speed up her economic development is even more imperative. And having witnessed the positive role that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has played in the rapid economic growth of most of the Southeast Asian countries and most notably China, India has embarked on an ambitious plan to emulate the successes of her neighbors to the east and is trying to sell herself as a safe and profitable destination for FDI.

Globalization has many meanings depending on the context and on the person who is talking about. Though the precise definition of globalization is still unavailable a few definitions are worth viewing, Guy Brainbant: says that the process of globalization not only includes opening up of world trade, development of advanced means of communication, internationalization of financial markets, growing importance of MNCs, population migrations and more generally increased mobility of persons, goods, capital, data and ideas but also infections, diseases and pollution. The term globalization refers to the integration of economies of the world through uninhibited trade and financial flows, as also through mutual exchange of technology and knowledge. Ideally, it also contains free inter-country movement of labor. In context to India, this implies opening up the economy to foreign direct investment by providing facilities to foreign companies to invest in different fields of economic activity in India, removing constraints and obstacles to the entry of MNCs in India, allowing Indian companies to enter into foreign collaborations and also

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encouraging them to set up joint ventures abroad; carrying out massive import liberalization programs by switching over from quantitative restrictions to tariffs and import duties, therefore globalization has been identified with the policy reforms of 1991 in India.

The Important Globalization)

Reform

Measures

(Step

Towards

liberalization

privatization

and

Indian economy was in deep crisis in July 1991, when foreign currency reserves had plummeted to almost $1 billion; Inflation had roared to an annual rate of 17 percent; fiscal deficit was very high and had become unsustainable; foreign investors and NRIs had lost confidence in Indian Economy. Capital was flying out of the country and we were close to defaulting on loans. Along with these bottlenecks at home, many unforeseeable changes swept the economies of nations in Western and Eastern Europe, South East Asia, Latin America and elsewhere, around the same time. These were the economic compulsions at home and abroad that called for a complete overhauling of our economic policies and programs. Major measures initiated as a part of the liberalization and globalization strategy in the early nineties included the following:

Devaluation: The first step towards globalization was taken with the announcement of the devaluation of Indian currency by 18-19 percent against major currencies in the international foreign exchange market. In fact, this measure was taken in order to resolve the BOP crisis

Disinvestment-In order to make the process of globalization smooth, privatization and liberalization policies are moving along as well. Under the privatization scheme, most of the public sector undertakings have been/ are being sold to private sector

Dismantling of The Industrial Licensing Regime At present, only six industries are under compulsory licensing mainly on accounting of environmental safety and strategic considerations. A significantly amended locational policy in tune with the liberalized licensing policy is in place. No industrial approval is required from the government for locations not falling within 25 kms of the periphery of cities having a population of more than one million.

Allowing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) across a wide spectrum of industries and encouraging non-debt flows. The Department has put in place a liberal and transparent foreign investment regime where most activities are opened to foreign investment on automatic route without any limit on the extent of foreign ownership. Some of the recent initiatives taken to further liberalize the FDI regime, inter alias, include opening up of sectors such as Insurance (upto 26%); development of integrated townships (upto 100%); defense industry (upto 26%); tea plantation (upto 100% subject to divestment of 26% within five years to FDI); enhancement of FDI

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limits in private sector banking, allowing FDI up to 100% under the automatic route for most manufacturing activities in SEZs; opening up B2B e-commerce; Internet Service Providers (ISPs) without Gateways; electronic mail and voice mail to 100% foreign investment subject to 26% divestment condition; etc. The Department has also strengthened investment facilitation measures through Foreign Investment Implementation Authority (FIIA).

Non Resident Indian Scheme the general policy and facilities for foreign direct investment as available to foreign investors/ Companies are fully applicable to NRIs as well. In addition, Government has extended some concessions especially for NRIs and overseas corporate bodies having more than 60% stake by NRIs

Throwing Open Industries Reserved For The Public Sector to Private Participation. Now there are only three industries reserved for the public sector

Abolition of the (MRTP) Act, which necessitated prior approval for capacity expansion

The removal of quantitative restrictions on imports.

The reduction of the peak customs tariff from over 300 per cent prior to the 30 per cent rate that applies now.

Wide-ranging financial sector reforms in the banking, capital markets, and insurance sectors, including the deregulation of interest rates, strong regulation and supervisory systems, and the introduction of foreign/private sector competition.

Impact of Globalization of Indian Economy The novel Tale of Two Cities of Charles Dickens begins with a piquant description of the contradictions of the times: It was the best of times, it was the worst of times; it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness; it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity; we had everything before us, we had nothing before us

At the present, we can also say about the tale of two Indias: We have the best of times; we have the worst of times. There is sparkling prosperity, there is stinking poverty. We have dazzling five

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star hotels side by side with darkened ill-starred hovels. We have everything by globalization, we have nothing by globalization.

Though some economic reforms were introduced by the Rajiv Gandhi government (1985-89), it was the Narasimha Rao Government that gave a definite shape and start to the new economic reforms of globalization in India. Presenting the 1991-92 Budget, Finance Minister Manmohan Singh said: After four decades of planning for industrialization, we have now reached a stage where we should welcome, rather fear, foreign investment. Direct foreign investment would provide access to capital, technology and market. In the Memorandum of Economic Policies dated August 27, 1991 to the IMF, the Finance Minister submitted in the concluding paragraph: The Government of India believes that the policies set forth in the Memorandum are adequate to achieve the objectives of the program, but will take any additional measures appropriate for this purpose. In addition, the Government will consult with the Fund on the adoption of any measures that may be appropriate in accordance with the policies of the Fund on such consultations.

The Government of India affirmed to implement the economic reforms in consultation with the international bank and in accordance of its policies. Successive coalition governments from 1996 to 2004, led by the Janata Dal and BJP, adopted faithfully the economic policy of liberalization. With Manmohan Singh returned to power as the Prime Minister in 2004, the economic policy initiated by him has become the lodestar of the fiscal outlook of the government.

The Bright Side of Globalization

The rate of growth of the Gross Domestic Product of India has been on the increase from 5.6 per cent during 1980-90 to seven per cent in the 1993-2001 period. In the last four years, the annual growth rate of the GDP was impressive at 7.5 per cent (2003-04), 8.5 per cent (200405), nine per cent (2005-06) and 9.2 per cent (2006-07). Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is confident of having a 10 per cent growth in the GDP in the Eleventh Five Year Plan period.

The foreign exchange reserves (as at the end of the financial year) were $ 39 billion (200001), $ 107 billion (2003-04), $ 145 billion (2005-06) and $ 180 billion (in February 2007). It is expected that India will cross the $ 200 billion mark soon.

The cumulative FDI inflows from 1991 to September 2006 were Rs.1, 81,566 crores (US $ 43.29 billion). The sectors attracting highest FDI inflows are electrical equipments including computer software and electronics (18 per cent), service sector (13 per cent), telecommunications (10 per cent), transportation industry (nine per cent), etc. In the inflow of FDI, India has surpassed South Korea to become the fourth largest recipient.

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India controls at the present 45 per cent of the global outsourcing market with an estimated income of $ 50 billion.

In respect of market capitalization (which takes into account the market value of a quoted company by multiplying its current share price by the number of shares in issue), India is in the fourth position with $ 894 billion after the US ($ 17,000 billion), Japan ($ 4800 billion) and China ($ 1000). India is expected to soon cross the trillion dollar mark.

As per the Forbes list for 2007, the number of billionaires of India has risen to 40 (from 36 last year)more than those of Japan (24), China (17), France (14) and Italy (14) this year. A press report was jubilant: This is the richest year for India. The combined wealth of the Indian billionaires marked an increase of 60 per cent from $ 106 billion in 2006 to $ 170 billion in 2007. The 40 Indian billionaires have assets worth about Rs. 7.50 lakh crores whereas the cumulative investment in the 91 Public Sector Undertakings by the Central Government of India is Rs. 3.93 lakh crores only.

The Dark Side of Globalization

On the other side of the medal, there is a long list of the worst of the times, the foremost casualty being the agriculture sector. Agriculture has been and still remains the backbone of the Indian economy. It plays a vital role not only in providing food and nutrition to the people, but also in the supply of raw material to industries and to export trade. In 1951, agriculture provided employment to 72 per cent of the population and contributed 59 per cent of the gross domestic product. However, by 2001 the population depending upon agriculture came to 58 per cent whereas the share of agriculture in the GDP went down drastically to 24 per cent and further to 22 per cent in 2006-07. This has resulted in a lowering the per capita income of the farmers and increasing the rural indebtedness.

The agricultural growth of 3.2 per cent observed from 1980 to 1997 decelerated to two per cent subsequently. The Approach to the Eleventh Five Year Plan released in December 2006 stated that the growth rate of agricultural GDP including forestry and fishing is likely to be below two per cent in the Tenth Plan period.

The reasons for the deceleration of the growth of agriculture are given in the Economic Survey 2006-07: Low investment, imbalance in fertilizer use, low seeds replacement rate, a distorted incentive system and lo post-harvest value addition continued to be a drag on the sectors performance. With more than half the population directly depending on this sector, low agricultural growth has serious implications for the inclusiveness of growth. Introduction:

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Globalisation is the new buzzword that has come to dominate the world since the nineties of the last century with the end of the cold war and the break-up of the former Soviet Union and the global trend towards the rolling ball. The frontiers of the state with increased reliance on the market economy and renewed faith in the private capital and resources, a process of structural adjustment spurred by the studies and influences of the World Bank and other International organisations have started in many of the developing countries. Also Globalisation has brought in new opportunities to developing countries. Greater access to developed country markets and technology transfer hold out promise improved productivity and higher living standard. But globalisation has also thrown up new challenges like growing inequality across and within nations, volatility in financial market and environmental deteriorations. Another negative aspect of globalisation is that a great majority of developing countries remain removed from the process. Till the nineties the process of globalisation of the Indian economy was constrained by the barriers to trade and investment liberalisation of trade, investment and financial flows initiated in the nineties has progressively lowered the barriers to competition and hastened the pace of globalisation Sponsored Links

Cheap Airfare IndiaAmazing Value. Secure & Safe Online Booking Engine. Book Now, Save Now!www.TigerAirways.com Makers-INGlobal WEB Exhibition for Makers-IN Recruitment Companies Join Nowwww.oersted-international.com Moving To Bangkok?Give Your Kids Affordable Indian Education. CBSE/IB, Indian Values!www.GlobalIndian.org.sg/BKKDefinition: Globalised World - What does it mean? Does it mean the fast movement of people which results in greater interaction? Does it mean that because of IT revolution people can be in touch with each other in any part of the world? Does it mean trade and economy of each country is open in Non-Intrusive way so that all varieties are available to consumer of his choice? Does it mean that mankind has achieved emancipation to a level of where we can say it means a social, economic and political globalisation? Though the precise definition of globalisation is still unavailable a few definitions worth viewing, Stephen Gill: defines globalisation as the reduction of transaction cost of transborder movements of capital and goods thus of factors of production and goods. Guy Brainbant: says that the process of globalisation not only includes opening up of world trade, development of advanced means of communication, internationalisation of financial markets, growing importance of MNC's, population

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migrations and more generally increased mobility of persons, goods, capital, data and ideas but also infections, diseases and pollution

Impact on India: India opened up the economy in the early nineties following a major crisis that led by a foreign exchange crunch that dragged the economy close to defaulting on loans. The response was a slew of Domestic and external sector policy measures partly prompted by the immediate needs and partly by the demand of the multilateral organisations. The new policy regime radically pushed forward in favour of amore open and market oriented economy. Major measures initiated as a part of the liberalisation and globalisation strategy in the early nineties included scrapping of the industrial licensing regime, reduction in the number of areas reserved for the public sector, amendment of the monopolies and the restrictive trade practices act, start of the privatisation programme, reduction in tariff rates and change over to market determined exchange rates. Over the years there has been a steady liberalisation of the current account transactions, more and more sectors opened up for foreign direct investments and portfolio investments facilitating entry of foreign investors in telecom, roads, ports, airports, insurance and other major sectors. The Indian tariff rates reduced sharply over the decade from a weighted average of 72.5% in 1991-92 to 24.6 in 1996-97.Though tariff rates went up slowly in the late nineties it touched 35.1% in 2001-02. India is committed to reduced tariff rates. Peak tariff rates are to be reduced to be reduced to the minimum with a peak rate of 20%, in another 2 years most non-tariff barriers have been dismantled by march 2002, including almost all quantitative restrictions. India is Global: The liberalisation of the domestic economy and the increasing integration of India with the global economy have helped step up GDP growth rates, which picked up from 5.6% in 1990-91 to a peak level of 77.8% in 1996-97. Growth rates have slowed down since the country has still bee able to achieve 5-6% growth rate in three of the last six years. Though growth rates has slumped to the lowest level 4.3% in 2002-03 mainly because of the worst droughts in two decades the growth rates are expected to go up close to 70% in 2003-04. A Global comparison shows that India is now the fastest growing just after China. This is major improvement given that India is growth rate in the 1970's was very low at 3% and GDP growth in countries like Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, and Mexico was more than twice that of India. Though India's average annual growth rate almost doubled in the eighties to 5.9% it was still lower than the growth rate in China, Korea and Indonesia. The pick up in GDP growth has helped improve India's global position. Consequently India's position in the global economy has improved from the 8th position in 1991 to 4th place in 2001. When GDP is calculated on a purchasing power parity basis.R Nagaraj 37 Disinvestment and Privatisation

Globalisation and Poverty: Globalisation in the form of increased integration though trade and investment is an important reason why much progress has been made in reducing poverty and global inequality over recent decades. But it is not the only reason for this often unrecognised progress, good national polices , sound