discovery harbour - of georgian bay · 2017-03-06 · about software development by lcdr s.w....

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MaritimeEngineeringJournalCANADA'S NAVAL TECHNICAL FORUM

75tk

October 1997

Submarine Surgery:Radical refit procedure for the O-boats

Also:• Changes in Fleet Support

• Penetanguishene's "Discovery Harbour

Canada

Looking Back:

Discovery Harbour -A bit of naval history on the shoresof Georgian Bay

MARITIME ENGINEERING JOURNAL OCTOBER 1997 1

MaritimeEngineering 15th Anniversary Issue

Journal Established 1982

The Maritime Engineering Journal (ISSN 0713-0058) is an unofficial publication of the Maritime Engineersof the Canadian Forces, published three times a year by the Director General Maritime Equipment ProgramManagement. Views expressed are those of the writers and do not necessarily reflect official opinion or policy.Mail can be addressed to: The Editor, Maritime Engineering Journal, DMMS, NDHQ, MGen George R.Pearkes Building, Ottawa, Ontario Canada K1A 0K2. The editor reserves the right to reject or edit anyeditorial material. While every effort is made to return artwork and photos in good condition, the Journal canassume no responsibility for this. Unless otherwise stated, Journal articles may be reprinted with proper credit.

OCTOBER 1997

DEPARTMENTSEditor’s Notes

by Captain(N) Sherm Embree ..................................................................................2Commodore’s Corner

by Commodore F.W. Gibson ....................................................................................3Forum:

Speaking the Unspeakable: Reinstilling trust as a precursorto enhanced teamwork by Capt(N) I.D. Mack ..........................................................................................4The Equipment Change Dilemma

by L.T. Taylor ......................................................................................................5The Misuse of Technology

by Roger Cyr .......................................................................................................5

FEATURESSubmarine Surgery

by LCdr Ken Holt .....................................................................................................7FMF Cape Scott — Changes in Fleet Support

by LCdr David Peer ...............................................................................................14Integrated Machinery Control System Operator Training Tools for

the Canadian Navyby LCdr K.Q. Fong, A. Hodhod, D. Sakamoto and V. Colaço ..............................18

Firm Requirements: The Number One Misconceptionabout Software Developmentby LCdr S.W. Yankowich ........................................................................................25

The Admiral’s Question(Reprinted from Trident) ........................................................................................27

GREENSPACE: Attitudes toward the Environmentby LCdr Mark Tinney .............................................................................................28

LOOKING BACK: Discovery Harbour — Penetanguishene’sNaval Connectionby Mike Belcher .....................................................................................................29

BOOK REVIEW: “Operation Friction — The Canadian Forces in thePersian Gulf 1990-1991”Reviewed by LCdr Doug Burrell ...........................................................................30

NEWS BRIEFS ......................................................................................................... 31

Director GeneralMaritime Equipment ProgramManagementCommodore F.W. Gibson

EditorCaptain(N) Sherm EmbreeDirector of Maritime Management andSupport (DMMS)

Editorial AdviserCdr Don FlemmingDGMEPM Special Projects Officer

Production Editor / EnquiriesBrian McCullough

Tel.(819) 997-9355Fax (819) 994-9929

Technical EditorsLCdr Mark Tinney (Marine Systems)LCdr Marc Lapierre (Combat Systems)Simon Igici (Combat Systems)LCdr Ken Holt (Naval Architecture)

Journal RepresentativesCdr Jim Wilson (MARLANT)

(902) 427-8410CPO1 G.T. Wall (NCMs)

(819) 997-9342

Art Direction byCFSU(O) Creative Services

Translation Services byPublic Works and Government ServicesTranslation BureauMme. Josette Pelletier, Director

Our Cover:A rather unusual view of HMCS Ojibwa. Story begins on page 7. (CF Photo)

MARITIME ENGINEERING JOURNAL OCTOBER 19972

Editor’s Notes

By Captain(N) Sherm Embree, CD, P.Eng., CIMarEDirector of Maritime Management and SupportEditor

I f someone were to ask me what thekey element is behind the Journal’slongevity and success, I would an-

swer without hesitation that it is “people.”To many of you, the names of the peoplethat appear in our masthead or alongsidethe articles we publish are familiar in andaround the Maritime Engineering commu-nity. For the most part the names belongto shipmates and co-workers. Whatmakes them special is that they share thedistinction of contributing, in one way oranother, to the continuance of Canada’sbest forum for the presentation of navaltechnical issues.

While many of our editorial contactstend to be “one-time-only,” we have beenvery fortunate in having enjoyed the long-term support of several major players.Production editor Brian McCullough,who has been with the magazine in onecapacity or another since its launch in1982, edits and produces the Journalthrough his company, Brightstar Commun-ications. Brian’s wife Bridget Madill , ajournalism graduate of Carleton Univer-sity and a former federal government edi-tor, plays a much understated role inproviding crucial assistance to our com-puterized desktop publishing process.

Two other key players deserve ourgratitude. The first is the CFSU(O) Crea-tive Services section, until recentlyheaded by Nicole Brazeau. Thanks to hercareful management and the ongoingskillful attention of production managerDave Doran (now the section’s managerand art director) and graphic designersIvor Pontiroli and now Ron Lalonde,

the Journal’s transition to DGMEPM in-house desktop production has been a re-sounding success. Another essentialbehind-the-scenes player is the PWGSCTranslation Bureau. Under the directionof Josette Pelletier, the bureau calls uponthe services of a wide range of dedicatedadministrators and skilled translators toensure the Maritime Engineering Journalis available in both official languages.From both of these organizations theJournal has, over the years, receivednothing less than exemplary, award-win-ning professional service.

In celebration of our 15th anniversary,the Journal now has a new subtitle on thefront cover of the magazine. After onefalse start with a motto contest, we finallyreceived a wonderful selection of sugges-tions from a good military/civilian cross-section of ranks and occupations. True toform, the submissions ranged from thepessimistic (“Always reengineering”) tothe poetic (“Ma mer, ma vie”). We con-sidered them all very carefully (as anony-mous entries) during a spirited editorialsession last March, before deciding upon“Canada’s Naval Technical Forum.” Con-gratulations go out to Lt(N) P.J. Pope ofthe DMCM/Subs section in DGMEPMfor submitting the winning entry. As areward for his success he was presentedwith a nicely personalized copy of CmdreDuncan E. Miller’s book, “The PersianExcursion: The Canadian Navy in theGulf War.”

On this upbeat note, I wish to close bythanking all of you who have supportedthe Maritime Engineering Journal since

its inception in 1982. Your submissions,suggestions, technical assistance andmoral support over the last 15 years havegiven this magazine a powerful sense ofpurpose and mission. Thanks to your in-volvement, the Journal continues to keeppace with the concerns and interests ofCanada’s maritime engineering commun-ity, and is able to share your viewpointson these issues with a wide audience.

Fifteen years later, Canada’s navaltechnical forum still going strong

Are you receiving enough copies of the Journal?If you would like to change the number of magazines we ship to your unit or institution, please fax us your up-to-daterequirements so that we can continue to provide you and your staff with the best possible service. Faxes may be sent to:Editor, Maritime Engineering Journal, (819) 994-9929.

The Journal welcomes unclassifiedsubmissions, in English or French.To avoid duplication of effort and toensure suitability of subject matter,prospective contributors arestrongly advised to contact theEditor, Maritime EngineeringJournal, DMMS, NationalDefence Headquarters, Ottawa,Ontario, K1A 0K2, Tel.(819) 997-9355, before submitting material.Final selection of articles forpublication is made by the Journal’seditorial committee. Letters of anylength are always welcome, but onlysigned correspondence will beconsidered for publication.


Commodore’s Corner

By Commodore F.W. Gibson, OMM, CDDirector General Maritime Equipment Program Management

Maritime Engineering Journal Objectives• To promote professionalism among

maritime engineers and technicians.

• To provide an open forum wheretopics of interest to the maritime engi-neering community can be presentedand discussed, even if they might becontroversial.

• To present practical maritime engi-neering articles.

• To present historical perspectives oncurrent programs, situations and events.

• To provide announcements of pro-grams concerning maritime engineeringpersonnel.

• To provide personnel news notcovered by official publications.

I n his Forum article, “Nobodyasked me, but ...” in our last issue,Cdr Paul Brinkhurst raised a con-

cern regarding the tendency of varioussubgroups within the navy to isolatethemselves, producing a segmented navalcommunity. He also stated a need for a“unifying vision,” and asked if we are go-ing to improve relationships both withinand outside the MARE community. Inthis current issue, Capt(N) Ian Mack con-tinues the thread, pointing to the failure oftrust as a cause of segmentation, observ-ing that “teamwork is everything” and“tough issues require face-to-face discus-sion.”

I am pleased to see that the Journal isbeing used as a forum to air this discus-sion, and would like to explore further theperception and reality of segmentation inour naval community. Let me offer myperspective.

Is it surprising that these separationscan occur? No. The organization and oc-cupational stovepipes that we see are notnew. Dwindling budgets cause interserv-ice rivalry for the limited resources avail-able, while force reductions naturally leadto almost an instinctive move to closeranks against a perceived threat to thegroup. These pressures tend to exacerbatethe organization and trade boundaries.The exceptions to this have been seenduring times when we have been calledupon to protect our country. Does this ex-planation make it acceptable? No. Whatis required to deal with these separationsis a common vision to bind us together,short of actual conflict.

Do we in the navy have a unifying vi-sion? I believe the answer is yes. Oneneed only look to Maritime Command’sstated “naval vision:”

The Navy exists to protect Canadianinterests in the ocean areas adjacentto the Canadian coast and beyond.To do this, we need a combat cap-able fleet, which entails far morethan simply possessing modern war-ships. Achieving combat capabilityrequires, above all, dedicatedpeople, ashore and afloat, who havethe opportunity to practice anddevelop their skills. The navy of thefuture must sail, it must sail often,and it must be ready. Our job is tomake it so.

“Successful teamwork re-quires mutual trust, respectfor each other’s opinionsand concerns, and a genu-ine willingness to listen...”

Is teamwork required? Yes! A visionby itself is not the complete answer.Teamwork is how we must execute thevision, given that there are various ele-ments and organizations that must cometogether to do what the navy is beingasked to do. The inefficiency and disor-ganization caused by segmentation cannotbe diminished unless the energy of team-work is added to the system. The fleetsupport plan, developed by DGMEPM inconjunction with the Chief of MaritimeStaff and the formations, exemplifies how

teamwork can be used to bridge the dif-ferences that otherwise separate these or-ganizations.

What are the ingredients to teamwork?Successful teamwork requires mutualtrust, respect for each other’s opinionsand concerns, and a genuine willingnessto listen and discuss rather than ignore ordictate. Every effort must be made to un-derstand the other’s point of view. Like-wise, there must be a willingness to un-derstand the constraints that have beenplaced on each group. There must be nointent to prejudge one group versus an-other. Perhaps most importantly, theremust be a willingness to “think outsidethe box.” Teamwork is dependent notupon organizational structures, but uponsharing and reinforcing the unifying vi-sion. It must always be recognized that ateam requires more than one participant,and that all players must want to be partof the team.

There are difficult discussions that arestill required. We cannot hide behind ourrespective organizations or trades. Theremust be free, open and honest discussionwith no hidden agendas, other than whatis best for the navy. Our unifying visionas the support community must be to pro-vide the fleet with the best short- , inter-mediate- and long-term support possible.Our challenge is to bring the energy ofteamwork to bear to increase the cohe-siveness of our naval community in orderto ensure our collective realization of thenaval vision and our duty to serve thefleet.

Teamwork & Building Bridges


Forum

Speaking the Unspeakable:Reinstilling trust as a precursor to enhancedteamworkArticle by Captain(N) I.D. Mack

Well done to Cdr Brinkhurstfor his recent submission toForum! (See “Nobody asked

me, but...,” Maritime Engineering Jour-nal, June 1997.) He has suggested that theissue of adversity between and withincommunities is unacceptable, and he hascalled for the MARE Council to lead theway in returning to the improved relation-ships which typify a team. Has he spokenof the unspeakable?

Though routinely written about in thisjournal, the MARE Council remains apoorly understood body. It is the venue inwhich matters important to the technicalcomponent of the navy’s defence team aretabled for discussion, and from whichDGMEPM and his team of sub-MOC ad-visers receive advice. Of note, the Coun-cil has rarely addressed technical issuesnot related to the personnel and trainingdomains. Having been a member since1989, I have routinely observed importantpersonnel issues being widely consultedwith the MARE commanders’ chains inOttawa and on both coasts beforeDGMEPM opened a dialogue at theCouncil. As well, except for a brief per-iod while I was in the MARCOMHQ/N1organization, Council meetings haveregularly been attended by a seniorMARS officer at the captain(N) levelfrom the personnel and training branch.In many instances, members were taskedto obtain input from other bodies withinthe navy and the CF. I say this to informall that the MARE Council is not meantto be an insular body, it is one whose pri-mary approach is consultation.

And yet, many perceive that we are notunified in our support of some importantsubjects. Most never hear of the rationalefor MARE Council decisions. How is thisso? Would a broader Council comprisedof MARS, MARE and SEA LOG seniorofficers better ensure a common visionand avoid time wasted fighting parochialbattles which paralyze us? Would it leadto improved communications? An inter-esting hypothesis. I would offer another.

We are experiencing the same chal-lenges all large institutions are faced withtoday — change. Change is an expensivebusiness to do right in large conservativeinstitutions such as our military. Whenimplemented on a shoestring budget byorganizations constrained to current allo-cations, those who are involved becomebusier and busier. I submit that all leaderseverywhere are at war with “busyness,”and that in recent years we have been los-ing this war.

“Leaders must tackle the bigissues in full view of...the com-munity. They must speak theunspeakable...expose issuesfor all the greyness that thesetough questions really are.”

The result is a lack of ongoing dia-logue with MAREs and other officersacross the navy. The word goes out toconsult, but the discussion often is super-ficial due to time constraints. The toughissues involved are only effectively ad-dressed through face-to-face discussion atall levels, and leaders are failing to getthis job done. Junior officers are not be-ing routinely engaged before decisionsare taken, and are subsequently not get-ting “the word” to pass along. Is this why,in a recent MARCOM focus group,young sailors, POs and CPOs indicatedthat respect for superiors is low and lead-ership by example is disappearing?

The result is what Cdr Brinkhurstspeaks of, in that we are not “carrying ona conversation with the situation,” nor arewe talking out important and controver-sial issues. Hence, we are not buildinglike-minded thinking, we are not givingall members the opportunity to be heard,and thus we frequently fail to engendertrust in the leadership to make the rightdecisions. This failure of trust is the rootcause of the adversity Cdr Brinkhurstspeaks of, and the team is suffering.

Captain(N) Mack is the Base Commanderof CFB Halifax.

In the military, teamwork is everythingand the very essence of “things military.”So we must reinstill trust as a precursor toenhanced teamwork. Leaders must tacklethe big issues in full view of all membersof the community. They must speak theunspeakable in terms of doubts, and ex-pose issues for all the greyness that thesetough questions really are.

In our battle against busyness, leadersmust place the right priority and focus onthis requirement, as with all others. But iftrust is at risk, as intimated by CdrBrinkhurst, then I and all other leaders,not just in the MARE community butthroughout the navy, must make time torestore with vigour the very essence ofour military profession, the value of theteam to the survival of the naval family.

In terms of practical application,MARE seminars need to be less on inter-esting presentations and more on work-shops to talk out important questionsfacing the navy today. Naval officers andCPOs need to spend more time talkingwith each other in open forum sessions ona routine basis. Of course, civility andloyalty must guide such dialogue, but oth-erwise the floor must be open for all tospeak their mind on any issue of interest.

In today’s reality (as in any war), onlyovert leadership can have any impactwhatsoever. And truly, it is the leadershipteam’s priority calling, the MARE Coun-cil’s most urgent task, to enhance the dia-logue and transparency of importantdecisions taken. Trust may have been lostin some quarters through omission, butnow it can only be regained by design.


There is apparently a great dealof dissatisfaction with the ECprocess. It is said to be unre-

sponsive, too complicated and bureau-cratic, too costly and too slow. But let’sput the process into perspective.

There are many EC proposals that aregood ideas. The difficulty is in separatingthose that meet a requirement from thosewhich create an upgrade but are outsidethe approved statement of requirementsfor the ship. The real failing in the ECprocess is that it does not require a pro-posal to be gauged against the originalship design requirement or a statement ofcapability deficiency for the class. Withstrict application of a comparison to therequirement, more ECs would be can-celled during the early stages. Good ideasshould not be suppressed, but at the sametime the EC process must focus on thefew proposals which overcome deficien-cies or bring the ship up to the require-ment. Enhancements beyond meeting thedesign requirement need very carefulscreening in today’s resource-limited en-vironment.

The time spent processing EC propos-als through even Part II consumes re-

The Equipment Change DilemmaArticle by L.T. Taylor

sources. If the Part I screening had can-celled the proposal as “No stated require-ment or known capability deficiency,” or“Enhancement beyond stated requirementfor class,” then resources would not beexpended on staffing “good idea ECs” tojust sit on the shelf as not affordable atthis time. These resources could then beapplied to the few “required” ECs, andthe time needed to complete the processand have them implemented could be re-duced.

Forum

“Enhancements beyondmeeting the design require-ment need very carefulscreening in today’sresource-limited environ-ment.”

I titled this the EC “dilemma.” Thedilemma is how to ensure that we do notstifle the submission of EC proposals,which could result in one of the “few” notbeing put forward in the first place. Also,what do we do with the “good idea” pro-

posals? A good idea may not be appropri-ate for follow-up at that moment, but itmight be suitable for consideration laterwhen other changes are being carried outor if a requirement changes. Another as-pect of the dilemma is getting people (es-pecially ships’ commanding officers) tounderstand that the ships are notconfigured to their preferences, but tomeet a requirement.

It would be nice to provide answers.Although I have opinions on some ap-proaches, I wrote this more to get peoplethinking about what the EC process isreally meant to accomplish.

The Misuse of TechnologyArticle by Roger Cyr

Over the last few decades soci-ety has become technology-oriented, always seeking bet-

ter, more advanced technology or devicesto help bring about better productivityand efficiency. The feeling prevails that,without these advanced technologies, pro-ductivity would be hindered or even im-paired. But is more advanced technologyalways needed, or is society just chasingthe illusion that technology is the answerto all deficiencies? When seeking to ap-ply a new technology, is due considera-tion given to “method,” or is the new

technology just applied to old and archaicways, processes, activities?

The availability of new technologyshould be a magnificent chance to goback to the drawing board and rethink theway things are done. In most cases, how-ever, new technology is merely applied toexisting imperfect methods. The opportu-nity for radical change, for the reengin-eering of methods, processes and activi-ties is ignored in the haste to correct defi-ciencies.

Will an improved faster computer in-crease the productivity or efficiency of

someone doing word processing? Is therea requirement to produce texts faster? Isthere a real need for someone to producethe texts at all? Can the activity be donedifferently? Simply acquiring a faster de-vice to do the same activity the same waywill likely result in little or no real gainsin productivity and efficiency. Similarly,enhancing components of a system with-out taking due regard for the system as awhole will probably not produce signifi-cant gains in overall system performance.

Naval combat systems have seen greatevolution in their technological make-up.

L.T. Taylor is the Mechanical andElectrical Engineering Officer at FMFCape Scott.


Cdr Roger Cyr (ret.) is the Chief ofQuality Assurance at the NATO Mainte-nance and Supply Agency in Luxem-bourg.

ForumYet, for the most part, the same methodsthat prevailed decades ago are still usedwith these systems. The opportunity torethink naval operational processes andactivities presented by the availability ofthe new technology was not seized.

Take, for example, the tracking of con-tacts in shipborne systems. This is indeedno longer done by a plotter using greasepencils on a Plexiglas table top. Instead,it is now done by a plotter on a computerscreen. The (archaic) process of plottingtracks has been partially automated, but amore efficient method of performing thisprocess or activity has not really beenestablished. As to whether the activityneeds to be done at all, or if it can bedone differently, or if it can be done moreefficiently by a machine than a person —these questions were not asked. Ratherthan look from a system perspective atimproving methods and ways of doingthings, new technology is used to partiallyautomate archaic methods that are heavilydependent on human intervention.

It should be noted that the closest pos-sible real integrated system is one humanbeing. The integration process degradesexponentially as more human beings areintroduced into the system because peo-ple are self-centred systems that do notcommunicate well. In groups they intro-duce mistakes, misunderstandings andmisconceptions. Hence, any real inte-grated system must have as few humanbeings as possible, with the optimumnumber being one. Naval combat systemsare vulnerable to these same human short-comings because they are still heavilydependent on human intervention.For ex-ample the identification of threats, which

could best be performed by a machine intoday’s complicated combat environment,has been subjected to greater automation,but the old ways and methods which aredependent on human input have been re-tained.

This heavy dependence on human in-tervention was retained because the oldways of operating naval systems, or navaldoctrine and operating concepts havebeen maintained. The need to reengineeror rethink the combat system processes

and activities before introducing improve-ments in automation was not realized, sothere are still too many human interven-tions in the overall process, with the ensu-ing unreliability.

Canadian naval combat systems havenot yet proven to be fatally unreliable be-cause of their dependence on humans.There are nonetheless striking examplesof human failures, such as the unplannedfiring of a second missile by HMCS Van-couver because the operator mistakenlypressed the fire button twice. There aremany other examples in the world wherethe consequences of human beings at-tempting to cope with complex systemswere fatal — recall the disastrous out-come of HMS Sheffield’s involvementwith an Argentinean Exocet missile in theFalklands, and USS Stark’s inadequateresponse to an Iraqi-launched Exocet.The Stark incident report went so far as to

“The opportunity to rethinknaval operational processesand activities presented bythe availability of the newtechnology was not seized.”

state that because missile attacks evolveso quickly, reaction time must be cut byremoving human intervention. Had theanti-missile defences been totally compu-ter controlled, the proper reactions to theattack could have been initiated automati-cally and the ship would likely not havebeen hit. The old ways or methods, whichare dependent on human intervention,were the weak link in the system.

Although new technologies and de-vices could dramatically improve systemperformance, there is continuing resist-ance to fundamentally change methodsand concepts. Technology is simply usedto automate old methods, without takingdue consideration to overall system re-quirements and performance. In the end,however, new technology combined withold ways will always result in automatedobsolescence.

As a general rule, article submis-sions should not exceed 12 double-spaced pages of text. The preferredformat is MS Word, orWordPerfect, on 3.5" diskette, ac-companied by one copy of the type-script. The author’s name, title,

Submission Formatsaddress and telephone number shouldappear on the first page. The last pageshould contain complete figure captionsfor all photographs and illustrations ac-companying the article.

Photos and other artwork should notbe incorporated with the typescript, but

should be protected and inserted loose inthe mailing envelope. If at all possible,electronic photographs and drawingsshould be in TIFF format. A photographof the author would be appreciated.


The neatly severed stern section of an O-boat sitsin the synchro-shed in Halifax.

During pre-refit surveys con-ducted for the 1993-94 refit ofHMCS Ojibwa, fractures were

discovered in the diesel engine bedplates.In addition, Ojibwa’s diesels were knownto be in serious need of high-quality over-haul which could only be performed ef-fectively in the shop. The prognosis wasthat serious engine damage could be ex-pected due to excessive vibrations. Side-effects included lengthening of fractures,causing damage to neighbouring structureand increased noise which could poten-tially have adverse affects on submarinestealth. The situation was clearly unsatis-factory for operators and maintainersalike. Repairs were in order.

The diesel engines needed to be re-moved and replaced. In so doing, suffi-cient access would be gained to allow thebedplates to be properly repaired. Therepair facility and engineering groups ofthe time — Ship Repair Unit Atlantic,Naval Engineering Unit Atlantic and theDirectorate of Ship Engineering (DSE 5)— recognized that several options wereavailable.

The standard approach developed bythe Oberon class designers and buildersin the United Kingdom was to remove thediesel engines through a so-called “softpatch” or “top hat” in the crown of thesubmarine pressure hull. This would be

Submarine SurgeryArticle by LCdr Ken HoltPhotos by CFB Halifax Base Photo

an extremely man-power-intensive andthus expensive under-taking, and would meanextending the refit pe-riod, thereby affectingoperational availability.As the Canadian navydiscovered during itsexperience with theSubmarine Operational Update Project(SOUP) in the 1980s, removing the siz-able soft patch presented considerablestructural problems. In the interest ofminimizing structural difficulties and im-proving production efficiency, an alterna-tive engine-removal method wasinvestigated for the refit of HMCSOjibwa (and applied subsequently for therefit of HMCS Onondaga as well).

Planners eventually settled on a radi-cally different approach. If the submarinewere severed in two, diesel engine re-moval/replacement and bedplate repairswould be much simplified. Furthermore,other refit work would benefit from theincreased accessibility. Technical investi-gations concluded that cutting the subma-rine hull into two sections would be bothfeasible and relatively efficient, realizingan estimated production saving of 12,000designated labour hours. Key considera-tions revolved primarily around maintain-

ing the structural integrity of the pressurehull, and the cost of reworking the electri-cal cables in the area of the cut. A planwas formulated and, once blessed by sen-ior management, surgery commenced onHMCS Ojibwa.

The impending work was a new andnovel approach for the Canadian navyand not without risk. This paper providesan overview of the technical considera-tions, as well as the reasons behind someof the decisions taken, in particular withrespect to the pressure hull work. It ishoped that this brief account adequatelyportrays the work and recognizes theachievements of the many who contrib-uted to these success stories. Since bothOjibwa’s and Onondaga’s pressure hullswere cut and reinstated in very similarfashion, no attempt has been made to dis-tinguish clearly between either refit ex-cept where there were notable differencesin the work.


BackgroundPre-refit planning and surveys for

Ojibwa revealed that the ASR1 engineand bedplate foundations required seriousattention, engineers at NEUA and NDHQimmediately began to address the prob-lem at hand. Preliminary investigationswere conducted to determine whether itwould be better to remove the engines forrepair in the shop, or repair them in-situ.It soon became clear that the benefits ofrepair by replacement (RxR) significantlyoutweighed those of an in-situ operation.The RxR option offered:

• improved engine quality;• easier engine alignment in the shop;• significant productivity increase in

the shop environment;• engine repair and overhaul (R&O)

would be removed from the refit plancritical path (thanks to the availability ofreplacement diesels from the ex-Britishsubmarine HMS Osiris); and

• potential gain for RxR of other com-ponents.

The problem then became one of howto remove the engines from the submarineand from the synchrolift refit shed itself.At the time, removal through the softpatch was thought to be the only solution.Unfortunately, the two synchro-shedcranes had a combined lift capacity ofonly 10 tonnes — the ASR1 enginesweighed 33 tonnes each. A crane capableof lifting 200-300 tonnes could be con-tracted to lift the engines out, but thiswould mean cutting a five-metre-squareopening into the roof of the synchro-shed.

But then the question was raised, Whyremove engines through the pressure hullcrown at all? During the SOUP project,refit teams had difficulty maintainingpressure hull circularity in the area of thesoft patch because the frames were cut.Removing a much larger patch in the caseof the impending Ojibwa refit would onlymagnify this problem because moreframes would be affected over a largerarc. SRUA had equipment capable ofrolling plate in excess of pressure hullplate thickness, but as this would have tobe accomplished in several pieces,achieving top hat circularity would stillbe a major concern (and would involvefabricating replacement stiffeners to ex-acting specifications).

It was at this point that an alternativesolution was put forward. As extreme asit seemed, the proposal to cut the subma-rine pressure hull in two would facilitateeasy engine removal and effectively solvea good deal of the problems associatedwith the process envisaged to date. Radi-cal surgery, however, would be required.

Technical ConsiderationsObviously, a great deal of considera-

tion was given to the safety implicationsand production issues before cutting thesubmarine pressure hulls in such dramaticfashion. Reinstating the boats such thatperformance capability was left undimin-ished was the real challenge. As NEUAput it in one of its briefing slides: “Busi-ness as usual is easier, but innovation is alot more fun.”

The primary concerns surrounded thequestion of pressure hull structural integ-rity (and its impact on submarine opera-tions) and the significant cost of identi-fying, rolling back, severing and reinstat-ing the electrical cables. A great deal ofdiscussion ensued between the ship struc-tures and materials experts in DND, theircontractors and counterparts from othernavies as the project team investigated theadvantages and disadvantages of cuttingthe pressure hull. A corollary and mostimportant question to resolve was whereto make the cut — just forward of or justabaft the engines (Fig. 1).

It was eventually decided to cut abaftthe engines, but exactly where to cut stillhad to be determined. Choosing a loca-tion to make a straight, 360-degree cir-cumferential cut on the submarinepressure hull structure was a challenge.Not surprisingly, the team wanted a loca-tion in the vicinity of the diesels whichwould allow them access to the engineswith the least possible disruption to other

systems and equipment. This was a tallorder, considering the high density ofequipment and systems fitted in the en-gine-room, not to mention the externalsystems and casing structure.

Moreover, small imperfections in thesteel were of concern since delaminationsunder locked-in stresses could potentiallybecome large defects once released dur-ing the cutting process. To avoid thisproblem, extensive non-destructive ex-aminations were performed to determinea location to cut the submarine where aminimal number of imperfections wouldbe disturbed. In the case of Onondaga,the NDT survey uncovered a significantnumber of embedded laminations in anumber of the plates. The team had todecide whether or not to repair these priorto proceeding with the pressure hull cut.Their decision to repair the defects afterrewelding turned out to be the best courseof action since negligible rework waslater required.

Structure also needed to be consid-ered. The work had to be accomplishedwithout disturbing either the geometry orthe material condition of the pressure hullstiffeners and plating. Circularity of thehull had to be maintained to within verystringent tolerances — plus or minus 0.5percent of the pressure hull radius. In ad-dition, rewelding could not occur tooclose to the pressure hull frames to ensurethat a full-penetration weld could be per-formed and that stiffeners would not bedistorted by the process. A location close

CUT LOCATION ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES

S o f t P a t c h ( " To pH a t " C u t )

• p r o v e n m e t h o d• f e w e r r e m o v a l s• n o e n g i n e a l i g n m e n t

p r o b l e m s

• s i g n i f i c a n t s t r u c t u r a lr i s k — ( i . e . , c i r c u l a r i t yo f p r e s s u r e h u l l , a n d

h i g h e r s t r e s s e s o nl o n g i t u d i n a l w e l d s t h a no n c i r c u m f e r e n t i a l

w e l d s )• a v a i l a b i l i t y o f m a t e r i a l

• m o r e w e l d i n g

F o r w a r d o fE n g i n e s

• l e s s e l e c t r i c a lc a b l i n g• f e w e r r e m o v a l s

• l e s s w e l d i n g

• e n g i n e / g e n e r a t o r f i t• h i g h e r s h e a r / j a c k i n gl o a d s

• m o r e s t r u c t u r e t os u p p o r t a f t e n d a td o c k i n g

A b a f t E n g i n e s • e a s i e r e n g i n e

r e m o v a l• a f t e n d l i g h t e r a n dt h u s e a s i e r t o m o v e

• m o r e e l e c t r i c a l c a b l e s

• m o r e w e l d i n g• m o r e r e m o v a l s

Fig. 1. A quick perusal of the pros and cons of the major cut location optionsreveals some of the technical complexity involved in the decision-making.


to mid-bay between the pressure hull ringstiffeners at frame 91.5 was selected forboth submarines.

A special dock block and jacking ar-rangement had to be designed to enabletransfer and movement of the after end ofthe submarine as an intermediate step be-tween cutting and rewelding the pressurehull. Four 100-ton, two 200-ton and two50-ton hydraulic jacking units were

mounted on existing trolley units to en-able both vertical and transverse adjust-ment of the after end (Figs. 2 and 3).

Jacking operations were particularlytricky both during the cut and at fit-upwhen the submarine was being weldedback together. While intact, the subma-rine could be likened to a beam resting onnearly continuous supporting blocks. Theweight of the submarine varies along its

length and is particularly heavy in thearea of the engine-room, but the load isdistributed relatively evenly to the dockblocks because of the stiffness of the hull.However, when the submarine is cut, thehull’s ability to transfer load along itslength is eliminated in the vicinity of thecut. The jacks therefore played a veryimportant role in compensating for theseload imbalances.

Fig. 2. Details of the docking and jacking arrangement.

Fig. 3. Preparations for cutting the pressure hull included (1) removing the fibreglass casing; (2) cutting the outer hullsections with oxyacetylene torches; (3) cutting the keel plates; and (4) cutting away the removable exterior hull skin. Notealso the arrangement of jacks and docking blocks.


The greatest fear was that the hullwould be subjected to excessive shearfrom load imbalance while the submarinewas only partially cut. With this in mind,the jacks were fitted with pressure gaugesto provide instantaneous load feedback.Pressure readings were converted to loadfigures manually such that direct shearloads could be determined. Engineersmonitored jack loads every half hour,making minor adjustments to compensateas necessary. This proved to be of greatvalue both during the cutting and

rewelding operations. In addition to theload cells, dial indicators were used tomeasure deflection of the hull and straingauges were fitted to provide a secondsource of shear load indication (althoughthe strain gauges proved not to be of realvalue).

Selecting the Cutting ToolStandard practice for removing steel

from a hull is to use a cutting torch, butthis raised several concerns. First, highlevels of heat applied locally would affect

the metallurgical properties of the steel.The heat-affected zone in the remainingpressure hull steel would then require ex-tensive preparation prior to welding toensure against substandard metallurgicalcharacteristics. A secondary concern andby-product of the cutting-torch methodrevolved around the shortening of thesubmarine and the subsequent effect onbuoyancy. It was estimated that up to twoand a half centimetres of the length of thesubmarine would be lost to a combinationof the cutting process and, later, the edgepreparation necessary to reconnect thetwo sections of pressure hull. Since thisequated to something in the order of onetonne of lost buoyancy (the same as add-ing a tonne of equipment to the subma-rine) submarine manoeuvrability,particularly as it affected trim, diving andsurfacing would need to be revisited.Measures such as solid ballast modifica-tions would have to be taken to ensurethat capability was not adversely affected.

Once again the question was raised asto whether there was a better way, thistime in relation to hull-cutting methods.The NEUA naval architect duly set aboutinvestigating alternative cutting methodsin preparation for the work on HMCSOjibwa. The advantages and disadvan-tages of cutting by machine and by high-pressure water-jet were explored (Fig. 4).

PROCESS ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES

Flame Cut(Oxyacetyleneor plasma)

• readily availableequipment• common practice inyard

• high heat input — creation of aheat-affected zone• additional effort• loss in material (up to 2.5 cm) —buoyant volume reduced• measurement difficulties at end ofcut sequence

Milling MachineCut

• cut/edge preparation inone step• heat input lower thanflame cut

• very expensive

High-PressureWater-Jet Cut(i.e. water andgarnet particlemixture)

• clean cut• no heat input• affordable• no significant loss ofmaterial

• requires screening• requires disposal of waste• learning curve — first time forproduction

Fig. 4. Cutting Process Comparison

Fig. 5. Details of the Cutting Process


Fig. 6. Elevation, port-side view of the submarine after the stern section has been pulled back to allow access to the dieselengines.

Fig. 7. Details of the main-engine removal set-up. Once the submarine sections were separated, a specially designed flatbedtransporter was moved into place. One at a time, the engines were pulled back, then hoisted onto the transporter for deliveryto the engine shop for overhaul.

A high-pressure (25,000 psi) water-cutting tool was found to be technicallycompliant and did not suffer the samedrawbacks associated with the use of acutting torch. There is no heat input andtherefore no heat-affected zone to con-tend with. Also, the water-cutting methodwould not shorten the submarine by anyappreciable amount (about three millime-tres compared with roughly 25 mm if atorch were used) because it leaves a much

narrower “kerf” and requires virtually noedge preparation apart from bevellingprior to rewelding. Measures would haveto be taken to protect equipment insidethe submarine from water and grit dam-age, but considering the small volume ofwater (4½-7 litres per minute) this did notpose a significant problem. Still, a tempo-rary bulkhead was erected to contain allspray within one frame bay.

The CutWith all of the preparations complete,

it finally came time to do the actual cut-ting job. It was, for the most part, a ratherboring experience. Until the after sectionwas pulled away from the rest of the sub-marine, there was no obvious evidence ofanything much happening. Magnetictracks were attached to the pressure hullto guide the water-jet cutting head, which


proceeded along at ap-proximately 2½ cm perminute.

During the cuttingevolution, water-jet noz-zles needed to be changedout relatively frequently.For Onondaga the con-tractor elected to useruby-tipped nozzle headsrather than diamond-tipped heads as originallyintended. This proved tobe a problem since theseheads degraded veryquickly with the high-pressure flow of waterand garnet particles. Thisresulted in the water-jetchanging shape and thusincreasing the cut widthto maximum tolerancesmore rapidly than ex-pected. To avoid too seri-ous a step at the locationwhere cutting stoppedthen recommenced, fivenozzle heads were used tomake the complete 360-degree cut.

To avoid local over-loading of the pressurehull, the cutting sequencewas carefully establishedin advance to co-ordinatewith the dock block jack-ing arrangements (Fig. 5).In the case of Onondagathe contractor elected to complete thefirst cut sequence in two parts. Ratherthan a single pass, cutting counter-clockwise past the pressure hull crown toabout 280 degrees as was originallyplanned, the first cut was prematurely ter-minated in the area of the crown. The re-mainder of the first cut sequence was thencompleted in a clockwise direction fromabout 280 degrees to the crown. Around2 a.m., as the water-jet approached towithin about four centimetres of thecrown to complete the first sequence, aloud “bang” was heard. It was the remain-ing steel suddenly giving way. One canwell imagine the concern of GordMacDonald, the FMF Cape Scott weldingofficer who was on site at the time. Aseven-centimetre-long jagged fragment ofsteel left hanging from the after end of thesubmarine was cut away (it now resideson Gord’s desk), and the subsequent re-pair was straightforward.

As discussed previously, jack pres-sures were measured and recorded every

half hour throughout the cutting evolu-tion. These figures were converted toforces and assessed to ensure that localloads on the pressure hull remainedwithin acceptable limits throughout theevolution. Pressure gauges at the jackinglocations were used to determine the finalweight of the after section of the subma-rine once it was fully cut. These wouldeventually be used to assist in realigningthe two sections in preparation forrewelding. Ojibwa load data was laterused to initialize jacking pressures duringthe Onondaga evolution.

With the after end of the submarinepulled away (Fig. 6), a 3 x 6-metreflatbed trailer was manoeuvred into place.A transfer cradle (Fig. 7; see also frontcover photo) built specially in the yardwith twenty caterpillar type rollers ena-bled intermediate diesel movements toand from the trailer. The diesel engineswere then slung via rigging onto thetrailer for transport to the shop for somemuch needed R&O. (In the case of

Ojibwa, replacement diesel engines fromthe ex-British submarine HMS Osiriswere installed, eliminating the enginework from the refit critical path.)

Reinstating the Pressure HullAs discussed previously, controlling

distortion was extremely important in en-suring adequate structural integrity.Reassembly is a much more straightfor-ward process if distortions introducedduring cutting are minimized, but theforces involved are not trivial. Under nor-mal docking conditions, Oberon-classsubmarines present dock block loads asgreat as eighty tonnes at any one ofroughly seventy-five keel block locationsalong the length of the hull. Once the sub-marine has been cut and the diesel en-gines are removed, these loads are alteredsignificantly.

The after hatch in close vicinity of thecut location at frame 91.5 was externallystiffened to control distortions. This didnot prove to be entirely effective during

As extreme as it seemed, the proposal to cut the submarine pressure hull in two would facilitateeasy engine removal. (Canadian Forces Photo)


the Ojibwa refit, however, so a muchmore satisfactory internal cruciform-shaped stiffening arrangement was de-signed and fitted for Onondaga.

Rewelding the submarine was pro-gressed by applying normal pre-heat andpost-heat to the pressure hull plating toensure that the heat-affected zone (fromthe welding) would have sufficient metal-lurgical toughness to withstand serviceconditions, including low-temperatureoperations. The weight of the submarinewas used to help align the forward andafter sections of the pressure hull. Thetwo sections were welded at the crown,then the jacks were lowered, graduallyredistributing the load until the two sec-tions came into alignment at the bottom(visual plate alignment techniques wereused). The entire bevelled edges of thetwo joined sections were then welded in-side and out and subjected to full non-destructive testing by radiography,magnetic particle investigations and ultra-sonics.

Quality Control/Quality AssuranceConcurrent with the HMCS Onondaga

refit, FMF Cape Scott was (and still is)undergoing significant change to its qual-ity processes. ISO9000 status was subse-quently bestowed upon the FMF at large.The quality process being developed wasapplied wherever possible to the specifi-cations developed by the engineering di-vision for implementation by production.Records of objective quality evidencewere kept and used for the acceptance ofphysical work. These included:

• circularity measurements taken be-fore and after using a “MANCAT” opticalalignment system;

• strain and deformation data (fromgauges fitted to the hull); and

• NDT records from before (materialcondition and cut location) and after(weld quality records, etc.).

Monitoring during the work providedfurther records (e.g., load cell measure-ment data from jack locations).

ConclusionsBoth HMCS Ojibwa and HMCS

Onondaga have now undergone majorsurgery involving cutting their pressurehulls into two sections. Worn diesel en-gines were readily replaced and bedplaterepairs conducted. Technical risk regard-ing structural integrity, and the cost torenew electrical cabling were successfullyaddressed. Given the circumstances of theday, both evolutions must be consideredas technical victories — the objectives ofthe refit were achieved by methods notenvisaged until the ingenuity of the DNDtechnical support community came intoplay.

Following the Ojibwa work, NEUAoffered these thoughts in the way of les-sons learned:

• Senior management is willing toadopt novel and potentially risky ap-proaches if there is a perceivable payoff(in this case, reduced refit time).

• Business as usual is easier, but inno-vation is a lot more fun.

• Novel approaches can boost morale(as this one did in the dockyard).

• Such a project can foster strongerworking relationships between the agen-cies involved.

Should the O-boats be cut to removediesel engines during future refits? Nowthat two submarines have successfullyundergone radical surgery of this nature,the technical feasibility has certainly beenproven. The decision therefore rests as abusiness case issue.

AcknowledgmentsA special thanks is extended to LCdr

Doug O’Reilly, Mr. Gord MacDonald,Mr. Roger Barakett and Mr. Jean PaulAyotte (Yogi) at FMF Cape Scott for pro-

LCdr Holt is the DMSS 2-3 Ship andSubmarine Hull Structures Officer atNDHQ.

viding the scribe with sufficient materialand anecdotes with which to write thispaper. LCdr Wayne Nesbitt, LCdr (Ret.)Xavier Guyot and staff at the former Na-val Engineering Unit Atlantic and ShipRepair Unit Atlantic are commended fortheir role in engineering the HMCSOjibwa refit and for having the courage topursue this novel approach. Technicalmaterial presented in this paper drewheavily upon documentation which theyproduced.


The maintenance and repair ofwarships has been a part of theHalifax waterfront since the

18th century. Many changes have oc-curred in the relationship between thefleet and the dockyard. From the RoyalNavy and wars of the British empire tothe Royal Canadian Navy and two worldwars the relationship constantly evolved.Placed in this context, the current changesto naval engineering and maintenance(NEM) during the 1990s represent just asmall evolution in the support to the fleet.

The most recent changes to the fleetNEM support organization on the EastCoast trace back to 1991 when our shipswere being prepared for duties in supportof Operation Friction. The achievementsand accomplishments of Ship Repair UnitAtlantic (SRUA), Naval Engineering UnitAtlantic (NEUA) and Fleet MaintenanceGroup Atlantic (FMGA) during the rushto prepare ships for deployment to thePersian Gulf resulted in two unit com-mendations. Though the NEM organiza-tion proved extremely effective, the GulfWar experience made everyone realizethat more efficient methods existed tosupport the fleet. The ship repair and na-val engineering units seized the opportu-nity and both units embarked on con-

FMF Cape Scott �� Changes in FleetSupportArticle by LCdr David Peer

tinuous improvement programs to changetheir business practices.

In 1994, external political, budgetaryand industrial pressures combined to ac-celerate the pace of change. MaritimeCommand (MARCOM) initiated a com-plete functional review of naval engineer-ing and maintenance that reevaluated howSRU, NEU and FMG provided support tothe fleet. The goal of the functional re-view was to reduce support costs by 20percent and allow MARCOM to shift re-sources to sustain operations.

The East Coast NEM units were ableto take an aggressive approach to thefunctional review because of the continu-ous improvement initiatives in SRUA andNEUA and a labour-management strate-gic alliance in SRUA. The ContinuousImprovement Program had changed la-bour and management working relation-ships and provided a framework andreference for those participating in thefunctional review. The strategic alliancewas — and remains — a cornerstone ofthe co-operative approach used to man-age change in the newly formed FleetMaintenance Facility Cape Scott. Over aperiod of three years in SRUA, labourmanagement evolved from a conven-

tional, confrontational approach to a col-laborative, win-win approach.

The navy’s NEM organization wasfacing major challenges. Its ability tomeet fleet operational requirements wasproven, but it was not cost-conscious andcould not demonstrate cost-effectiveness.Measuring unit performance and cost-effectiveness was impossible. Manage-ment and service delivery functions weremixed, cost visibility was absent, and thewhole support organization was driven byconsumption. With no effective feedbackon cost, the system of fleet support lackedaccountability and often experiencedproblems when operational priorities be-tween ships came into conflict. In a timeof reducing resources, change in fleetsupport was inevitable.

Restructuring NEM SupportIn 1994, the East Coast NEM units

employed more than 2,200 military andcivilian personnel with direct and indirectexpenses of over $150 million annually.FMF Cape Scott stood up April 1, 1996with about 1,500 personnel. Though thefunctional review authorized a maximumestablishment of 1,700 people (222 mili-tary and 1,478 civilians), it set actual per-sonnel levels to match the forecast work.

Figure 1. FMF Cape Scott Organization


Cape Scott entered fiscal year 97/98 withjust under 1,400 people (200 military and1,200 civilians). The manning level con-tinues to reduce to match the anticipatedworkload.

In forming Cape Scott, the functionalreview concentrated major changes inmanagement and support areas. Figure 1shows the new organization. The two linedepartments — Engineering and Produc-tion — were formed around the legacyorganizations of NEUA, FMGA andSRUA. The line departments now operatewith considerably less management andsupport overhead.

The Operations Support departmentconsolidated the NEM administration,safety and environment, information tech-nology, and industrial engineering func-tions. The department streamlined,consolidated and significantly reduced allsupport areas. The Business Manage-ment, Quality Management, and Financefunctions are new. They manage FMFbusiness operations, the quality manage-ment system, and the accounting and fi-nancial systems.

FMF Cape Scott stood up with engi-neering maintenance and repair capabili-ties similar to the former NEM units, butwith 36 percent less overhead. For exam-ple, when the functional review estab-lished the production department fromSRUA and FMGA, the SRUA productionorganization eliminated two levels of su-pervision and reduced material supportpersonnel by over half.

The functional review exceeded thetarget and achieved a 23-percent reduc-tion. The overall resource reduction inCape Scott included more than 500 civil-ian employees (representing $13 millionin salary costs); 17 percent of all militarypositions; and 10 percent of all Opera-tions and Maintenance costs. An inter-nally funded facility rationalizationproject (managed internally and run inparallel with the functional review) con-solidated Cape Scott real estate on bothsides of Halifax Harbour. The rationaliza-tion resulted in additional annual savingsof $1.4 million.

The facility rationalization project re-duced East Coast NEM requirements byabout 45,000 square metres. Shopsmoved from the Naval Armament Depotin Dartmouth to Halifax, eliminating fa-cilities and equipment duplication. Theshop moves also increased efficiency byreducing travel time and delays.

The First YearOver the past year everyone has

worked hard to stand up and run FMFCape Scott during a period of significantchange and resource reduction. Since theimplementation phase of NEMS:

• one hundred more civilian positionshave been eliminated;

• performance measurement has be-gun;

• the direct production ratio — or theportion of all hours available used to de-liver a service — has increased from 42percent to 53 percent;

• accidents have been reduced by 50percent;

• time lost due to accidents has beenreduced by 60 percent;

• R&O turnaround time has decreasedby 50 percent;

• overtime has decreased by over 80percent, saving $1.6 million;

• Cape Scott has gone on-line withself-funded information technology im-provements; and

• customer feedback and surveys haveindicated a noticeable improvement incustomer satisfaction.

Last year, the Maritime Forces Atlan-tic (MARLANT) operating budgetfunded Cape Scott to provide over onemillion productive person-hours to sup-port MARLANT units and the navy. Thebreakdown is shown graphically in Fig. 2.Services in support of NDHQ tasks(R&O and refits) have recently reducedfrom 70 percent to 60 percent of the totalproductive capacity. Current projectionsindicate NDHQ allocations could be re-duced to as low as 50 percent. This trendmay continue as the navy places in-creased reliance on in-service supportcontracts for entire ship classes, and shiftstoward more third-line support in indus-try.

The other significance of Fig. 2 toCape Scott is not readily apparent. Al-though Formation Halifax funds 100 per-cent of Cape Scott’s salary wageenvelope, it consumes less than half theresources. Funding and division of workoccasionally become a source of conflictwhen Cape Scott is caught between For-mation priorities and NDHQ tasks. Theconflict started in 1993 when NDHQ de-volved 100 percent of the NEM salarywage envelope to the Formation. At thattime Formation only consumed 30 per-cent of the NEM resources. Althoughfrom the Formation perspective NDHQtasks may seem to consume a dispropor-tionate share of the MARLANT operatingbudget, the percentage of NDHQ workhas reduced significantly.

For Cape Scott, NDHQ tasks are criti-cal to cost-effectiveness. A steady flow ofwork from non-Formation sources allowsCape Scott to load-level work around thecyclical availability of operational ships.Unfortunately, the MARCOM functionalreview focused almost entirely within theCommand for solutions. The reduction inservice to NDHQ — placed on CapeScott by the functional review, subsequentbudget cuts, reengineering and other For-mation initiatives — occurred withoutsignificant NDHQ input. This has createdsome misunderstandings and mistrust andleft some significant issues unresolved.

Though the functional review accom-plished a significant feat by reducingMARLANT engineering maintenance andrepair costs by over 20 percent, it wasnever more than an 80-percent solution.The functional review missed the broaderaspects of fleet support outside the con-text of MARCOM and did not signifi-cantly affect the legacy service deliveryprocesses of NEUA and SRUA.

Figure 2. Work Distribution FY 95/96


Today’s ChallengeCape Scott has a new challenge to re-

duce capacity and balance the productionand engineering work force with the cur-rent workload. Unit capacity must matchthe decreased demand so Cape Scott canprovide support to the fleet cost-effec-tively. Reserve time has doubled from lastyear and has now reached levels fourtimes traditional norms. An overall reduc-tion in demand has created excess capac-ity because our work force is primarilyindeterminate. Cape Scott’s ability toquickly adjust its work force eroded whenthe functional review reduced term andcasual employee numbers to insignificantlevels.

Excess permanent employee capacityreduces the unit’s overall cost-effective-ness. To remain more cost-effective CapeScott must quickly address over-capacityissues affecting cost performance, andreduce the work force in FY 97/98 tomatch our current, permanently reducedworkload. This human resource issue willstrain labour-management relations inCape Scott.

Since Cape Scott stood up in April1996, six major factors have developedthat define the new challenge:

• By fiscal year 98/99, based on knownbudget reductions, Cape Scott will seedemand reduced to 66 percent of the fore-cast workload established in 1995. Unfor-tunately, the external political, budgetaryand industrial pressures on naval engi-neering and maintenance continue to re-strict the flexibility of the unit to identifyadditional work to use current capacity.

• The government direction on in-creased partnership with industry and thecontracted engineering and maintenancefor new ship classes such as MCDV havepermanently decreased demand for engi-neering and maintenance work in CapeScott.

• Cape Scott is organized to supportrunning repairs for 1960- and 1970-vin-tage warships and submarines. As the na-vy’s older steam-powered destroyers paidoff, demand on Cape Scott changed. Ca-pability and capacity do not match thecurrent demands of a modern fleet. Forexample, the traditional backlog of manu-facturing for the supply system (nationalinventory) to support steamers has beencleared and will never reappear.

• Federal budget decisions made inprevious fiscal years will continue to re-duce DND’s budget each fiscal year inthe near future. In FY 98/99, MAR-LANT’s operating budget will decreaseby $11 million (Cape Scott’s share will be$6 million). The real impact will be a re-

duction in our direct labour work force asCape Scott’s operating budget movesfrom $57 million to $51 million in FY 98/99.

• Cape Scott must consider the possi-bility that a decision in late 1997 not toproceed with the last scheduled Oberonrefit could drastically change the demandon the unit. Submarine support, includingrefit activity, consumes about one third ofthe total capacity output of Cape Scott.This would further reduce the work forcerequirements in FY 98/99 to 55 percentof FMF Cape Scott’s original 1995 ca-pacity.

• Within DND, Maritime Commandand Maritime Forces Atlantic the pressureto shift budgetary resources from supportto operations increases as budgets reduce.MARLANT considers Cape Scott a sup-port unit and has directed a 15-percentimprovement in efficiency by FY 99/2000. This efficiency gain means eitherincreased service from the same sizework force, the same service with asmaller work force, or some combinationof increased service and a smaller workforce. With the pressure to keep the fleetat sea, the Formation commander coulddirect some combination of the two. Im-proving efficiency will further reduceCape Scott’s operating budget and ourdirect labour capacity. Where permanentemployees solely provide excess capacity,a reduction in the size of the permanentwork force will be necessary.

These major factors represent only theimmediate quantifiable impacts on CapeScott’s future. The full impact of addi-tional issues that could reduce overalldemand on Cape Scott is not known.These issues include:

• Maritime Command’s implementa-tion of the Department’s readiness andsustainment policy;

• The implementation of delegatedmaintenance budgets and user pay;

• The increased use of credit cards forlocal purchase rather than FMFCS manu-facture; and

• The analysis of all Cape Scott’s ac-tivities and capabilities for alternate serv-ice delivery by March 1998.

To respond to all the major factors andadditional issues, FMF Cape Scott criti-cally reexamined how it provided serv-ices to the fleet. In the fall of 1996, CapeScott established a Continuous Improve-ment Project to explore opportunities inthe service delivery process. Phase 1 ofthe project was an extensive activity-based cost (ABC) analysis of the servicedelivery process. The analysis quicklydetermined that reengineering was neces-

sary to reduce costs and achieve addi-tional efficiency gains. It was clear thatlegacy service delivery processes fromNEUA and SRUA were still effectively inplace. It was also clear that no effectiveperformance measures existed to managea business-like service to the fleet.

The Cape Scott response to the ABCanalysis was to immediately start plan-ning for the phase 2 reengineeringproject.

FMF2000 — Tomorrow’s OpportunityFMF2000 is Cape Scott’s response to

the service delivery challenge and thesecond phase of the continuous improve-ment project; it will match our capabili-ties and capacity to our customers’ needs.FMF2000 will improve the service deliv-ery process within the broad context ofthe navy’s fleet support plan (FSP), andmake the service delivery process morecost-effective. Combined with other con-tinuous improvement initiatives to im-prove work force flexibility, it will alsoreduce fleet support costs, make the unitmore efficient, and position Cape Scottfor the future. Phase 2 project definitionstarted last spring and the project com-menced in May of this year. The designphase will complete in the fall.

The goal of FMF2000 is to redesignCape Scott’s service delivery process byusing best practices and exploiting ournewly developed activity-based costing(ABC) model from phase 1. OnceFMF2000 defines a new service deliveryprocess, the implementation of projectdesign recommendations will begin thisfall and complete in fiscal year 98/99.

FMF Cape Scott formed in a consoli-dation process that reduced the cost ofproviding naval engineering and mainte-nance and repair services by 23 percentover FY 93/94 baselines by reducingmanagement and management overhead.While there may be some additional sav-ings possible in our management and sup-port costs, the bulk of the unit’s costs arenow tied up in the service delivery proc-ess. This process will provide the focusfor FMF2000. Any further efficiency witha constant or smaller work force will haveto come through reengineering servicedelivery. This critical issue with servicedelivery is realigning and modernizingcapabilities, activities, practices, proc-esses and capacities to improve cost-ef-fectiveness, efficiency and flexibility.

The process issue is critical to the unit.Support to the current and future fleetmust:

• cost less;


• increase customer choice and satis-faction; and

• provide services that are so competi-tive that the cost-effectiveness of the unitwill no longer be in question.

For FMF2000 to be successful, theunit recognized early that the reengin-eering effort must extend beyond CapeScott to include a broader perspective ofnaval engineering and maintenance.Though the unit mission is primarilywithin the MARLANT business and op-erational environment, NDHQ demandrepresents a significant portion of output.Unfortunately, the link between NDHQwork and Formation objectives is cur-rently weak. Cape Scott can be caughtbetween conflicting requirements whenNDHQ demands on the unit do not alignperfectly with Formation priorities.

FMF2000 will consider all aspects ofthe fleet support plan process and involvestakeholders from NDHQ, Command,Formation and Cape Scott. It will rede-sign Cape Scott’s service delivery proc-esses by examining best practices inoutside industry and using the ABCmodel and job and cost data availablefrom the unit’s management informationsystem. Some of the goals of the projectagainst which Cape Scott will measuresuccess include:

• improving end-to-end plan processmanagement of fleet support;

• validating FMF capabilities;• improving the service delivery proc-

ess to reflect best practices and positionCape Scott to be the best naval shipyardin North America;

• reducing fleet support costs andmeeting efficiency targets;

• examining, and as necessary redefin-ing, how capacity is provided based ongovernment policy and business caseanalysis; and

• developing process performancemeasures.

The FMF2000 project will operate atthree levels (Fig. 3) to provide a forum toaddress the issues outside Cape Scott’scontrol. Of particular concern is the goalto improve end-to-end process manage-ment of the fleet support plan. The execu-tive steering committee deals at thestrategic level and provides all FSPstakeholders and the process owner aplace to address pan-naval issues. Theprocess owner is Capt(N) Gerry Humby,Commanding Officer of FMF Cape Scott.The executive steering committee dealswith strategic issues such as what theservice delivery process will produce andwhat external constraints will apply to thereengineered service delivery process.

The steering team operates at the For-mation and unit level and deals with thetactical issues of how the design team willmeet the strategic direction. The steeringteam is the usual arbiter of issues floatedup from the design team. As the CapeScott process owner, the commandingofficer provides the link between thesteering team and the executive steeringcommittee.

The working level team actually con-ducting the project will be led by CapeScott’s engineering department head, CdrGilles Hainse. The design team will relyon continuous improvement project teamsto deal with specific issues like workforceflexibility and shop compression. Theproject will follow a very tight time line.The project began in May and will com-plete a final report by October.

This project is not the only change ac-tivity under way at Cape Scott. Some sig-nificant initiatives will be progressing inparallel with FMF2000:

• revising the ABC model to reflect thelast fiscal year;

• registering the quality managementsystem to ISO 9001;

• benchmarking all capabilities by costfor alternate service delivery;

• re-opening collective agreement ne-gotiations (Cape Scott has already suc-cessfully completed one collectiveagreement); and

• installing a new management infor-mation system.

These initiatives will place challengingconstraints on project resources and limitdesign flexibility, but then no projectwould be complete without constraints.

ConclusionCape Scott is committed to excellence

in naval engineering and maintenanceservices. To achieve excellence, CapeScott must work in partnership with allstakeholders in fleet support to maintainthe navy’s operational tempo in a climateof declining resources, a changing work-load and government outsourcing policy.

Cape Scott has had to take decisiveaction to ensure resource reductions donot jeopardize its mission to support thefleet. The unit understands where it was,where it is and where it needs to go.FMF2000 will fundamentally change howthe fleet receives support.

Figure 3. FMF 2000 Project Structure

LCdr David Peer was the IndustrialEngineer at Ship Repair Unit Atlanticand the Staff Officer at FMF Cape Scottduring the Formation and stand-up of thenew NEM organization. He is nowserving on exchange with the Royal Navy.


The installation of the IntegratedMachinery Control System(IMCS) in the Canadian navy’s

new patrol frigates and updated Tribal-class ships has prompted a rethinking ofthe way marine operators and techniciansare trained. CAE Electronics Ltd., in con-junction with the Canadian Department ofNational Defence, has developed newtraining platforms to allow the navy toproperly train its ship crews in an effec-tive and efficient manner. These plat-forms consist of classroom trainers andon-board training systems which sharesimulation models, instructor facility in-terfaces, utilities and IMCS software.

As systems become more integrated,training programs must be capable of in-corporating seamless simulations of sev-eral pieces of equipment to be effective.Similarly, the accidents at the Three MileIsland and Chernobyl nuclear power sta-tions have resulted in more stringent re-quirements being imposed on the fidelity

Integrated Machinery Control SystemOperator Training Tools for theCanadian NavyArticle by K.Q. Fong*, A. Hodhod†, D. Sakamoto† and V. Colaco†(*Department of National Defence, Ottawa, Ontario; †CAE Electronics Ltd., Saint-Laurent, Québec)

of the systems used to simulate full-rep-lica nuclear power plants. The softwaremodels must be able to accurately re-spond under all normal and abnormalconditions. The growing power of com-puters, coupled with a reduction in theircosts, has made it possible to bring thefidelity of full-scope simulators into theclassroom, as well as to individualworkstations, in order to help meet someof these stringent requirements.

Several years ago, CAE ElectronicsLtd. developed its Real-time Object-ori-ented Software Environment (CAEROSE™) as an internal, software produc-tivity tool in response to changing re-quirements in the training field and theevolving computing power available fromworkstations. It was felt that a graphical,icon-based, object-oriented software en-vironment would allow modellers to moreeasily and accurately translate theirknowledge of a particular process into asimulation than traditional methods al-

lowed at that time. It was also determinedthat modular, object-based simulationswould be much easier to maintain andwould provide greater reusability thantraditional software code. Additional ben-efits included automated code and docu-mentation generation, requirementstraceability and greater ease of use. CAEROSE™ allows a user to model a systemby assembling schematics using objectsfound in predefined functional libraries.The environment is unique in that it al-lows the user to connect schematicsacross different types of environments(i.e. hydraulic, electrical and control) soas to provide a high-fidelity, integratedrepresentation of an actual system.

The Canadian Navy’s SituationWith the arrival of Canadian patrol

frigates (CPF) and the update of theTribal-class ships (under the Tribal-classUpdate and Modernization Program —TRUMP) in the late 1980s, the IntegratedMachinery Control System was intro-duced into the Canadian navy. An impor-tant aspect of IMCS development for thenavy was how to effectively train the sail-ors to use these highly automated controland monitoring systems. Initially, shore-based trainers for each class of ship wereintroduced to provide the necessary train-ing, ranging from basic IMCS familiariza-tion courses to advanced certificatetraining. It quickly became evident thatthe “throughput” of these single-seat,team-type trainers was inadequate andthat additional training tools were re-quired.

In addition to the critical throughputtraining requirement, two other major is-sues also needed to be considered:

(a) The Canadian navy is mainly atwo-coast navy, separated by a vast dis-tance of over 5,000 km. With TRUMPshore-based trainers located on the WestCoast and CPF shore-based trainers lo-

(This paper was presented at the 11th Ship Control Systems Symposium in Southampton in April 1997, and appears here in abridgedform courtesy of Computational Mechanics Publications, Southampton SO40 7AA, United Kingdom.)

Fig. 1. TRUMP Shore Based Trainer — Block Diagram


cated on the East Coast, trainees had totravel from coast to coast for the neces-sary training. Training options whichwould result in the reduction in the costof travel and living expenses were beingsought.

(b) The throughput of certificate train-ing at sea was severely affected by thevery limited number of training bunksallocated to the Marine Engineering de-partment in CPF ships. This problem wasfurther compounded by an inability toprovide sufficient emergency drill train-ing at sea without affecting a ship’s op-erational schedule. For this reason, manycertificate trainees were unable to com-plete their on-the-job-training packagewithin the prescribed time frame.

As a result of the given constraints,CRT-based classroom trainers and subse-quently on-board training systems wereacquired to satisfy the training require-ment. The CRT-based trainer was initiallydeveloped internally by the navy, makinggeneral IMCS familiarization trainingpossible. The Canadian navy has sincecontracted CAE Electronics Ltd. to up-grade both the hardware and software ofthe CRT-based trainer and enhance its

existing training functionality. CAE isalso in the process of upgrading the CPFShore Based Trainer. To address the limi-tations of conventional on-board trainingas noted above, all Tribal-class ships arecurrently fitted with an on-board trainingsystem, while an option for fitting an on-board training system in CPF ships hasrecently been exercised by the navy.

IMCS TrainersIMCS trainers are mainly divided into

two categories — shore-based and on-board. In the Canadian navy, shore-basedtrainers consist of a full mission trainerknown as the Shore Based Trainer (SBT),and a part-task trainer known as the Ma-rine Systems Trainer (MAST). Thetrainer embedded in the control system iscalled an on-board training system(OBTS). These trainers are designed toallow maximum reusability andcommonality of software components onboth types of trainers. This methodologyreduces development cost and enhancesmaintainability. The plant/ship systemssimulation models, the instructor facilitysoftware and the IMCS software are themain software components common tothese trainers.

Shore Based TrainerThe SBT is a full-mission trainer de-

signed in a specific configuration to pro-vide all IMCS training, ranging frombasic IMCS familiarization to advancedcertificate training for fleet school stu-dents and shore support personnel. Thistraining encompasses both individual andteam training. Individual training aims todevelop skill in console functions, whileteam training aims to develop co-ordinated, procedural skills for certificatetrainees.

One of the many advantages of atrainer over other methods is that it canreproduce the sequence of events andtime scale of an actual ship performance.Operators register information from awide range of sources, making it impor-tant for the information to be consistent inall aspects in order to maintain the opera-tors’ concentration in the virtual reality. Itis for this reason that the Shore BasedTrainer incorporates a simulation modeldesigned on the basis of first-principlemodelling techniques. Electrical, thermal-hydraulic, mechanical and control aspectsof the ship systems are simulated in thismanner using CAE’s ROSE™ software

Fig. 2. Typical CAE ROSE TM Hydraulics Schematic


package. All simulation models are devel-oped from the ship’s system configurationand fine-tuned with performance datafrom actual sea trials.

To ensure a realistic training environ-ment, the TRUMP Shore Based Trainerconsists of components that are identicalto the actual ship installation in terms ofconsole functions. In fact, the trainer rep-resents a subset of the actual IMCS.These components include the machinerycontrol console, supervisory console,maintainer’s panel, local operating panel,digital propulsion controllers, the healthmonitoring subsystem, and even the datalogger and colour hard copier, all func-tioning exactly as the ones on board. Re-mote terminal units and the bridgeconsole are the only IMCS componentsnot included in the Shore Based Trainer.To complete the trainer, an instructor fa-cility, a host computer and a gatewaywere incorporated (Fig. 1), allowing fullcontrol and monitoring of all training ses-sions. Communication between the IMCScomponents and the simulation models isachieved via the gateway, which alsohosts the gas turbine management proc-esses. The gateway is also responsible forthe stimulation of the local operating pan-el’s hardwired lamps and gauges.

Compatibility with Actual IMCSA necessary requirement of the Shore

Based Trainer was that none of the IMCSsoftware be modified. This means that thesoftware (resident in the firmware) of theconsoles, the health monitoring subsys-tem and the digital propulsion controllerswould be unchanged as compared to thesoftware installed on the ships. The con-soles themselves are functionally thesame as shipboard equipment; however,commercial-grade structures have beenused for the training system.

In order to guarantee the authenticityof the system’s performance, the actualIMCS control software is used for thetrainer. This has the added benefit ofmaking the maintenance of the SBT soft-ware components independent from up-dates in the IMCS control software, asmodified IMCS software can be pluggedinto the SBT without any changes to it.The SBT platform has also proven to be avaluable IMCS support facility for repro-ducing and testing scenarios which havebeen observed on board ship, but forwhich it is not practical to try to repro-duce at sea. For this reason, the SBT canserve as a test bed for final qualificationtesting of IMCS software modificationsprior to shipboard installation.

IMCS EmulationsAs stated earlier, the remote terminal

units and bridge console were not in-cluded in the suite of SBT IMCS. Theactual remote terminal units (RTUs) serveas the connection points between the con-trol system and machinery sensors andactuators. They acquire plant input/outputinformation, process this information tocheck for an alarm or warning status, andtransmit the information onto the data busfor distribution to the other subsystems.In the case of the Shore Based Trainer,the host computer scans the simulatedplant and reports statuses and valuesthrough the serial link to the IMCS com-ponents. In this way it emulates the func-tionality of the actual remote terminalunits. The emulated RTUs also include allalarm processing capabilities.

The bridge console emulation is suchthat the instructor has the ability tochange and request speed changes, tripthe engines and perform all bridge sta-tion-in-control functions. The purpose ofthis emulation is not to train a bridge op-erator, but to present to the machineryoperator realistic demands from thebridge. From the students’ perspective atthe consoles, they will not be able to dis-

Fig. 3. Marine Systems Trainer — Block Diagram


tinguish any difference between theseemulations and the IMCS.

Plant/Ship Systems SimulationThe simulation of the plant/ship sys-

tems is divided into propulsion and hullsystems, ancillary systems, auxiliary sys-tems and electrical systems. Modellingsoftware development is performed usingCAE ROSE™ simulation, which usesuniquely identified icons, along with theirassociated codes, to represent the varioustypes of hydraulic, electrical and controldevices of a typical plant (Fig. 2). Once aschematic is drawn using CAE ROSE™,its associated software code is automati-cally generated based on its topology.Standard routines were developed formost components of plant equipment, en-suring a uniform simulation for all com-mon devices in the plant (e.g., tanks,pumps, heat-exchangers, valves, etc.).Modules of all the different systems are

plates. Instructor functional pages (con-trol points, scanpoints, malfunctions, lo-cal control, instructor command pages)are provided for each machinery compo-nent. A point template contains all thepoint-related information or attributes(point identification, alarm/warning sta-tus, current value/state, etc.).

The following is a more detailed de-scription of the features available to theinstructor at the I/F:

(a) Malfunctions (failures of devicesthat result in a deviation from normal shipperformance) are predefined for the in-structor, and may be selected as either aBoolean type (ON or OFF), such as anENGINE HOT START, or as an analoguetype, which may be scaled from a mini-mal to a maximum effect, such as a PIPEbreak.

(b) Local controls allow the controland simulation of devices which are re-

then linked to produce an integrated real-time, high-fidelity simulation of the ma-chinery plant required for the trainer. Thesame plant/ship models which are devel-oped on one trainer are also used on theother types of trainers of the same shipset.This means that only two sets of plant/ship systems simulation software wererequired to be developed — one for theTribal-class shipset and one for the CPFshipset.

Instructor FacilityThe instructor facility (I/F) is a graphi-

cal, highly user-friendly, point-and-clickman-machine interface for monitoringand controlling training sessions. It canalso be used by the instructor to preparelesson plans (predetermined sequences ofoperations) that are later executed uponcommand.

All system information and plant datais displayed via CRT pages, or point tem-

Fig. 4. Man-Machine Interface using TIGERS™


quired for training purposes, but are notaccessible from the IMCS. These includemanual valves, local pump controls andother input which cannot be controlledfrom the IMCS.

(c) Environmental controls. The in-structor can change the environmentalparameters of the training session. Seaand air temperature, wind and sea condi-tions can all be changed dynamically.

(d) Event logging/performancemonitoring . The event logger of the I/Fis a tool which the instructor can use tomonitor a student’s performance. Theevent log provides a quantitative measureof a student’s performance, and an on-linetool for monitoring the IMCS and theplant simulation.

(e) Signal override. From the I/F theinstructor can override any signal in theIMCS database. The value overwritten isseen by the student at the console or localoperating panel.

(f) Storepoints. The trainer is capa-ble of being returned to a specific presetship state by selecting a storepoint andrestoring it. A storepoint is created by

saving a snapshot of the entire plant sta-tus and IMCS settings. A base set ofstorepoints is delivered with the ShoreBased Trainer, which includes a “deadship,” “alongside/shore power,” “ready tostart,” and specific engine driving envi-ronments. The I/F also allows otherstorepoints to be easily created as re-quired by the instructor.

The instructor facility is able to accessCAE ROSE™ schematics during trainingsessions, enabling the monitoring andlogging of any parameter accessible fromthe schematics.

Marine Systems TrainerThe Marine Systems Trainer (MAST)

is a high-fidelity, CRT-based classroomtrainer with high-resolution graphical dis-plays of the man-machine interface(IMCS consoles and local operating pan-els). The MAST is used to train MarineSystems Engineering personnel to operateand manage the ship’s IMCS using stand-ard watchkeeping practices. It is also usedfor introductory IMCS maintainer train-ing.

The MAST consistsof one instructor facil-ity, 12 independent stu-dent workstations, andone commercial enclo-sure containing a com-puter processing unit(MDMC) and twomemory cards (MRAM)for each student station(Fig. 3). From the in-structor station, the in-structor selects a studentstation and then anMMI emulation (one ofthe emulated consolesor local operating pan-els). The instructor thendownloads the selectedMMI emulation to theIMCS enclosure RAMcard for the chosen sta-tion. The student stationwould contain the shipsimulation and the in-structor facility soft-ware. From theinstructor station, theinstructor is able to con-trol the instructor facil-ity software for eachstudent station.

The ship simulationsoftware originally de-veloped on the ShoreBased Trainer is usedfor the MAST, and sub-

sequently reused on the On Board Train-ing System. The MMI emulation givesthe student the same interface capabilitiesand options as on the real consoles andlocal operating panels (LOPs), includingthe operation and location of all instru-ments such as pushbuttons, indicatorlights, meters and keyswitches (Fig. 4).The high-fidelity, graphical emulation ofthe MMI is produced using The Interac-tive Graphics Environment for Real-timeSystems (TIGERS™), a CAE-integratedsoftware environment for developingreal-time, graphical, dynamic displays ofconsoles and panels. It is also used for thedevelopment of CAE ROSE™ objectsand simulation schematics, including hy-draulics, electrics and controls systems.As the simulation is executed, the instru-mentation on the TIGERS™ schematics(MMI emulation) can be manipulated us-ing a mouse and keyboard, and indicatorssuch as lights and meters will responddynamically in real time.

On Board TrainersThe On Board Training System

(OBTS) is a trainer embedded in the ac-

Fig. 5. TRUMP On Board Training System — Ship Installation


tual IMCS that can act as an extension ofthe Shore Based Trainer, allowing for acomparable level of training while at sea.The core to the concept of the OBTS isthe ability to convert the shipboard ma-chinery control console (MCC) into atraining console and run training sce-narios while actual control of the machin-ery plant is maintained by the rest of theIMCS. Once this is accomplished, atrainee can practice IMCS drills and pro-cedures at sea without interfering withship operations.

The TRUMP On Board Training Sys-tem has been functionally implemented asshown in Figures 5 and 6. A second com-puter processing unit (MDMC) wasadded to the machinery control console.This slave MDMC is responsible formaintaining a serial link to a host compu-ter. It is also host to the gas turbine man-agement processes for certain remoteterminal units of the training session, andthe digital propulsion controller. Duringthis time, the machinery control consoleis not connected to the IMCS data bus,and can only communicate through ashared memory interface to the MMIMDMC (master MDMC) of the machin-ery control console.

The development of the On BoardTraining System has gone through an ex-tensive evaluation process to ensure it issafe for use with the IMCS. To reflect theintended use of the OBTS in a shipboardenvironment, the following safeguard fea-tures have been incorporated:

(a) Only the machinery control con-sole is able to operate in training mode.

(b) The machinery control console isprevented from changing to training modeif it is the station-in-control, or if the su-pervisory console is unavailable.

(c) When the machinery control con-sole is in training mode, all operatingIMCS MMI stations are notified by a sys-tem-wide message appearing on the op-erator status page. In addition, pagesdisplayed at the machinery control con-sole are visually distinguished to reflectIMCS status as “Training.”

(d) Control actions performed at themachinery control console while in train-ing are sent only to the simulation compu-ter and will not impede the ship’s systemsor the rest of the IMCS.

(e) The machinery control consolewill automatically revert to normal opera-tion within 15 seconds if the supervisoryconsole becomes unavailable, if the seriallink between the machinery control con-sole and the simulation computer is lost,or upon request by the operator.

When the machinery control consoleconverts to a training console, it discon-nects itself from the rest of the IMCS toensure that no information generated dur-ing training is seen by the rest of theIMCS. The last information transmittedby the machinery control console is amessage indicating that it has entered atraining session. The border of the ma-chinery control console pages alsochanges from the standard green to anamber colour, and the time and date fieldreflect that the console is in trainingmode.

The On Board Training System alsoincludes an instructor facility with thesame capabilities as that of the ShoreBased Trainer. The OBTS can be oper-ated alone or with the assistance of aninstructor. The instructor facility has beeninstalled so as to occupy minimal space inthe machinery control room. The hostcomputer is in a separate room and theinstructor facility becomes simply amonitor and trackball. The monitor hangsfrom the deckhead above the machinerycontrol console and can be swivelled outof the students’ view or controlled by thestudents themselves. The trackball allowsfor table-free use of the instructor facility.The keyboard may be used, if preferred,

but is not necessary for the normal opera-tion of the instructor facility.

SummaryThe capabilities of the described train-

ers may vary, but all serve as excellentdevices and meet the specific need ofIMCS training. Perhaps the greatest dis-advantage to a full mission trainer is thedevice’s inability to handle the throughputrequirement. Technically, the ShoreBased Trainer is the most complete, but itis a “one-seat” trainer restricted to a spe-cific type of training for a specific indi-vidual at any given time. Also, its cost ismany times that of the Marine SystemsTrainer (MAST) due to the extensivehardware requirement. On the other hand,the MAST is a multiseat trainer. Thenumber of students that can be trained ata time is restricted solely by the numberof student stations connected to the net-work server. Due to its limitation, how-ever, of having only a single screen inwhich all system simulations and variouscontrol panel emulations can be dis-played, the MAST does not provide real-istic training in real time for emergencyoperation of the machinery plants, and thetype of training that can be provided islimited to basic familiarization of theIMCS. The greatest advantage of this

Fig. 6. TRUMP On Board Training System — Block Diagram


type of trainer is that it allows students torepeat each step at their own pace and asoften as desired to learn about the controlsystem and, subsequently, the ship’s op-eration.

Finally, the On Board Training Systemcan provide each ship with an environ-ment to conduct on-the-job training at norisk to the actual plant at a fraction of thecost of the Shore Based Trainer. It offersa relatively inexpensive, but highly effec-tive means of satisfying on-board trainingrequirements with no disruption to ship’soperations and without endangering theship’s equipment. It is very attractive interms of reduced travel and living costs,training benefit and trainer availability.

ConclusionThe procurement of the Shore Based

Trainer, Marine Systems Trainer and OnBoard Training System has enhanced thenavy’s capability in achieving its trainingobjectives by providing students withhands-on experience using IMCS man-machine interfaces. The student is notinhibited by a fear of causing machineryor personnel damages. The device, there-fore, provides an ideal learning environ-ment for operators to familiarizethemselves with the control system andthe associated ship systems. Feedbackfrom students at all levels has been posi-tive.

The effectiveness of this learning envi-ronment depends on the degree of realismpresented by the training equipment. Onecommon feature of these trainers is theability to accurately simulate all modes ofoperation in real time for various condi-

tions by inputting the necessary pre-defined parameters. For this reason, theship’s staff and the technical authorityhave used these trainers for troubleshoot-ing purposes which has helped them tobetter understand system responses undervarious conditions. With the introductionof the On Board Training System, on-board training is no longer restricted bythe ship’s operation schedule. On-boardcertificate trainees now have a better op-portunity to conduct engineering emer-gency procedures and are able to finishtheir training within the prescribed timeframe.

Students do hands-on operation of theIMCS in various modes ashore as well asat sea. In doing so, they become morefamiliar with the operation and perform-ance of the equipment and therefore arebetter trained to fulfill their duties aboardship in normal and emergency situations.

Over the years, the training philosophyin the Canadian navy has evolved withthe acquisition of highly automated, com-puter-based systems. A combination ofclassroom lectures and hands-on traininghas proven to be an effective means oftraining personnel. Installation of IMCSaboard Canadian naval ships has shiftedthe emphasis to appropriate hands-ontraining. Without the appropriate trainingaids or training billets, the navy’s currenttraining requirements could not be effec-tively fulfilled.

Although the training philosophy inthe navy has evolved to include the use ofcost-effective, “high-tech” trainers in ad-dition to the traditional hands-on training,

MARI-TECH ’98Ottawa, OntarioJune 17-19, 1998

CIMarEAnnual General Meeting and Technical Conference

Contact:Mr. Gerry Lanigan

MSEI Services201-1150 Morrison DriveOttawa, Ontario K2H 8S9

Tel: (613) 828-1319 / Fax: (613) 828-7907e-mail: [email protected]

“Partnership in Support of the Fleet”

these new tools are not meant to replacethe actual hands-on training itself. Hands-on training remains an essential require-ment for IMCS certificate training in theCanadian navy.

AcknowledgmentsThe authors gratefully acknowledge

the collaborative efforts and valuablefeedback of both Coasts, in particular toPetty Officer King and Mr. R. Field. Theauthors would also like to express theirspecial thanks to Mr. P. York for histhoughtful advice and contribution to thepaper.

ReferencesBagdasarian A. and M. Allard, “Inte-

grated Platform Management System,”CAE Electronics, Saint-Laurent,Québec, Canada, 1993.

MacGillivary, P.J., “Integrated MachineryControl — The Canadian Experience,”Canadian navy, Ottawa, Ontario,Canada, 1993.

White, L. and A. Abramovitch, “TheROSE: A Real-time Object-orientedSoftware Environment for High Fidel-ity Training Simulators,” CAE Elec-tronics, Saint-Laurent, Québec,Canada, 1991.

Paper AbstractsRequested byFeb. 12, 1998


LCdr Tinney’s article, “Survivingthe Tar Pit: A Few Things toConsider when Acquiring De-

velopment Software,” (Maritime Engi-neering Journal, June 1997) accuratelyidentifies several fundamental aspects ofthe developmental software acquisitionprocess. The author’s inference, however,that software system requirements shouldbe “locked in” prior to proceeding withdevelopment, is a matter of some contro-versy and as such, is worthy of furtherdiscussion. The purpose of this article isto clarify some persistent misconceptionsassociated with the software requirementsspecification process and to propose al-ternative proven approaches to softwarerequirements specification.

The Elusive Firm RequirementsSpecification

Traditional thinking dictates that usersmust thoroughly and accurately definetheir requirements prior to the com-mencement of development and imple-mentation work. This approach is basedon the “waterfall” paradigm (Fig. 1),wherein requirements specification is adiscrete step which is a necessary and

Firm Requirements:The Number One Misconception aboutSoftware DevelopmentArticle by LCdr S.W. Yankowich

sufficient precursor to the subsequent de-sign and integration steps. It is demon-strably effective in both small andlarge-scale projects where a similar jobhas been done before and the require-ments are already well understood vis-à-vis their technological implementation. Incases where the software system is first ofits kind, and no previous project can beused as a basis for comparison, a thor-ough and accurate user-supplied require-ments specification is extremely difficultto obtain. This is because requirementsspecification is tightly linked to the hu-man perception of how the required tasksshould be implemented. “First of kind”software requirements, by their very na-ture, cannot be firm because it is impossi-ble to anticipate all the ways the taskswill change once they are automated.[1]

Strict adherence to the “waterfall” proc-ess inevitably leads to the users beingforced to firmly state their requirementsbefore they can fully grasp the nature ofthe implementation. Since requirementschanges must be frozen in order for acontract to be negotiated, errors in theinitial specification usually result in deliv-ery of a less than optimal product requir-

ing extensive andexpensive retrofits.

Software re-quirements defini-tion and validationis a learning proc-ess, and as such,should proceed insmall incrementalsteps as part of theproject definitionor initial softwaredevelopment activ-ity. There are nodefinitive guide-lines for how tobest achieve thisobjective. How-ever, depending onfactors such as sys-tem size, complex-ity, purpose andcontractual obliga-

tions, an oft-used rule of thumb is that 20percent of the total development effortshould be applied to system requirementsanalysis.[2]

Spiral DevelopmentOne effective approach to the require-

ments specification conundrum is toabandon the “waterfall” paradigm infavor of the “spiral” paradigm (Fig. 2). Inthe “spiral” paradigm, the software devel-opment process begins with a minimal setof requirements that are well understoodby both the developer and the user. Fromthese requirements an application is de-signed, implemented, tested and used intrial form. Experience and lessons learnedfrom this process are then applied as ad-ditional requirements are defined and im-plemented in the same manner. Thus, thefinal solution is gradually evolved in away that is much more likely to meet theuser’s needs. Though effective, the spiraldevelopment paradigm does have itsdrawbacks. It is resource- and schedule-intensive, and does not readily facilitateaccurate estimation of the total cost of theproject prior to contract award (as is re-quired for Treasury Board approval).Moreover, design decisions made early inthe spiral development process may pre-clude the implementation of newly speci-fied requirements in future iterations.

OOA, OOD and PrototypingThe need for an up-front, firm-fixed-

price contract with well-defineddeliverables, costs and schedule con-straints renders the “spiral” paradigm im-practical for most software developmentprojects. However, its iterative model ofdefine, design, code, integrate and testcan be effectively applied to an expandedproject definition or requirements specifi-cation phase. The established mechanismfor accomplishing this task is prototyping(Fig. 3). The use of prototyping as a soft-ware requirements discovery technique iswell established in industry. Paper docu-ments representing requirements are staticand passive, but a software prototype is afunctional and dynamic visual model ofthe user’s requirements. Applied as an

Figure 1. “Waterfall” Development Paradigm


integral component of the requirementsdefinition process, the prototype providesa basis for dialogue between developersand users that is far more effective thantext alone. By applying a mini “spiral”development process as the model from

which to implement successive proto-types during the project definition or re-quirements specification phase, a refined,accurate and comprehensive requirementsspecification, satisfactory to both userand developer, can be generated.

The traditional knocks againstprototyping are its cost and the generalbelief that the prototypes themselves are“throwaway” (i.e., not suitable for inte-gration into the final product) due to soft-ware rapid prototyping methodologies.While prototypes can be expensive, thegain in terms of a solid, workable require-ments specification, is often well worththe up-front expense. Moreover, modernobject oriented analysis (OOA) and de-velopment (OOD) techniques facilitateeasy integration of legacy prototypes intoa functional product (either as part of, orseparate from, the end deliverable). Thediscussion of the merits and applicationsof OOA and OOD methodologies is be-yond the scope of this paper. However,object-oriented-based prototypes haveproven extremely cost-effective in therequirements specification, design, andimplementation of the Operations RoomTeam Trainer (ORTT).

ConclusionWith software acquisition projects, the

challenge is to balance detail and qualityof the requirements specification with thebusiness need for a firm contractual rela-tionship. Since accurate and thoroughrequirements cannot be determined by theuser alone (irrespective of the technologi-cal implementation), it is essential that astructured, dynamic dialogue between theuser and developer be initiated as soon inthe project development process as possi-ble. Whether this requires the use of theevolutionary “spiral” development para-digm, or the application of OOA, OODand prototyping, the resultant understand-ing will provide a solid foundation for theentire project.

References[1] W.S. Humphrey, “Managing the Soft-

ware Process,” Addison-Wesley Pub-lishing Company Inc., Don Mills, ON,1990.

[2] R.S. Pressman, “Software Engineer-ing - a Practitioner’s Approach,”McGraw-Hill Inc., Toronto, ON, 1992.

[3] J. Connell and L. Shafer, “Object-Oriented Rapid Prototyping,”Yourdon Press, Englewood Cliffs, NJ,1995

Figure 3. “Spiral” Development Process Applied to Prototyping

LCdr Yankowich is the Combat SystemsTrainers Project Manager at PMO CPF.

Figure 2. “Spiral” Development Paradigm


The Admiral’s QuestionAuthor unknown

(This article appeared in the Dec. 22, 1981 edition of the Maritime Command Trident, and is abridged andreprinted here with their kind permission.)

The admiral of a fleet of galleysmanned by slaves reached for asheet of papyrus one day and

dashed off a note to one of his captains:“How fast can your ship go?”

Captains take seriously the questionsof admirals, and this captain, a graduateof the Tyre Naval College and of the Byz-antine Business School at Constantinople,prepared to give the admiral’s questiontop priority. Being action oriented, hecalled in his systems engineers and hiredoutside consultants and gave themmission-oriented orders. Meanwhile, heconferred on a less scientific basis withsome of his colleagues, for a number oftension-producing questions sprung tomind:

• Why is the admiral asking such ques-tions?

• Does he doubt my ability to obtainoptimum results from my ship?

• Is he considering the trade-off ben-efits of switching from galley to sail?

• If this happens, what is the future ofgalley captains, such as me?

• How can I influence any decisionthat may be made?

• Who are the real decision makers?• Who do I know at CinCMed?• Who was that guy in the Command-

er’s office I bought Greek wine for lastyear?

While the captain wrestled with thesequestions, his engineers went to work.The first step was, of course, the defini-tion of the problem. The galley, they say,was a homo-mechanical system compris-ing, basically, a number of homogenoussubsystems which were also homo-me-chanical. The man-machine mix had to beexamined and quantified. Statistics on theaverage weight and age of the slaves werecompiled and the importance of these fac-tors was mathematically computed. Mat-erials control specialists provided data onthe length and weight (wet and dry) of theoars. The psychological effect of atmos-pheric conditions on the slaves was avariable to be taken into consideration.Sea conditions provided another variable.Acceleration measurement problemsposed doubts about the prevailing state ofthe art.

Socio-economic and political consid-erations were not very relevant, but it wasthought that this input (provided by con-sultants from Phoenicia University) mightbe useful in answering follow-up ques-tions and, in any case, would demonstratethe thoroughness of the analysts.

The admiral, not receiving a quick an-swer to his question, repeated it, adding,“What the Hell is going on down there?”

This mild expression of irritationcaused whiffs of panic to swirl throughthe galley. Tensions increased, tempersgrew shorter, and there was much burningof midnight oil and flogging of slaves.The Greek slaves, toiling over their whirl-ing abacuses, had a particularly hard time.However, within 62 hours, an interim re-port was ready for the captain’s signature.It was long and included several appendi-ces, but it gave a clear picture of theprogress made on Phase 1, defined thearea of inquiry, explained the difficultiesbeing encountered, outlined the nature offuture research, praised the self-dedica-tion of those working on the task, andassured the admiral that all concernedwere confident of the ultimate success ofthe project. One of the appendices de-tailed the costs incurred so far and gaverefined estimates of future costs.

The admiral was taken aback whenthis report — 832 pages of legal-sizedpapyrus — arrived on his desk. The sonof a fisherman, he had come up from theranks and had not had the advantage ofattending either Tyre or Constantinople.He had been out chasing pirates when ithad been his turn to go to staff college, sohe missed that too. The admiral looked atthe captain’s report and decided to turn itover to one of his brighter staff officersfor evaluation. What he told the staff of-ficer was, “Boil this crap down to twopages.”

Within a week, the admiral was givena neat, two-page report, though there wasa one-page appendix which the staff of-ficer could not resist including, whichcontained a fascinating graph of his ownconstruction that vividly illustrated thebig picture of the entire project. The re-port told the admiral that the captain was

certainly tackling the project energeti-cally, that he had the correct approach,that all concerned organizational elementshad been plugged in, and that all technicalaspects had been considered. The staffofficer added his personal conviction thatthe captain and his people would succeed.He also noted that there were a few errorsin some of the original equations, butadded that these had been corrected andthat the appropriate people on the cap-tain’s staff had been notified.

In submitting his report, the staff of-ficer told the admiral that he had put athousand scribes to work producing thereport and that copies had already beensent to the department heads and techni-cal people. He asked the admiral whatfurther distribution he would like tomake.

The admiral, feeling the forces ofhigher education closing in on him, didnot reply, but stared out the window at thesea. It had never seemed so far away. Thestaff officer, thinking that his chiefwanted to consider his options, quietlyleft. The admiral continued to stare outthe window, then he arrived at a decision(on his own and by a process involvingsome emotional factors and irrationalthinking). He went fishing.

By the time the second interim report,elegantly bound, was submitted, the ad-miral had been replaced by a younger na-val officer who had immediately made aclean sweep of the old admiral’s pro-grams and the entire project wasscrapped.


Greenspace: Maritime Environmental Protection

I recently had the good fortune tobe assigned as project manager forthe Maritime Environmental Pro-

tection Project (MEPP). One of the tasksthat goes along with the job is to provideupdates on the MEPP for the Greenspacesection of the Journal. So, for my inaugu-ral article in this space I would like tomove the discussion away from all thetangible goodies such as equipment, pub-lications, and drawings, and discuss oneof the intangible aspects of the project.Attitudes! Specifically, I want to discussthe attitude of the people who will be ex-pected to operate and maintain the equip-ment so that our ships can meet nationaland international environmental regula-tions — the ships’ crews.

Individual attitudes toward the envi-ronment can’t be dictated, but they cer-tainly can be influenced. On board shipthis influence starts with the commandingofficer and the senior heads of depart-ment. If they set the tone for the ship with

Attitudes toward the EnvironmentArticle by LCdr Mark Tinney

a positive attitude, and implement a wastemanagement regime which is easy to fol-low, the ship’s company will adopt thenew way of doing business with a positiveoutlook. The MEPP is not just a matter ofinstalling new equipment so that we canpulp and compact our waste. It is alsoabout finding ways to reduce, reuse andrecycle the waste that we generate.

A perfect example of this in action canbe found in SLt Charles Brown’s article,“Waste Not,” in the January 1991 issue ofthe Maritime Engineering Journal. Thearticle describes how Capt(N) JamesSteele of HMCS Protecteur had a re-markable influence in shaping his crew’sattitude toward the environment. Capt(N)Steele set the tone for the entire ship bypersonally getting involved and challeng-ing his crew to find new ways to reduceand recycle. Actually, what seems to beclear from reading the article is that manymembers of the crew already harbouredconcerns about dumping trash in the

Sean Gill of GEO-Centers of Pittsburgh, PA briefs Protecteur’s maintainers (E Techs andMar Eng Techs) on maintenance aspects of the ship’s new plastic waste processingequipment. (Photo courtesy of Sean Gill)

ocean. They just needed some-one to chart the way for themto do something about it. Sincethen, the ship has adopted acommendable waste manage-ment organization (as wit-nessed during a recent visit tothe ship by MEPP staff).

The same sort of attitudewas found on board HMCSMontreal when MEPP staffvisited to tell them we wouldbe installing their solid wastehandling suite during theirdocking work period. It mustbe appreciated that what we aredoing via the MEPP is install-ing additional equipment onour ships, and this equipment isgoing to translate into moreO&M for ships’ companiesthat are already overburdened.Telling crews that you are giv-ing them more work isn’t ex-actly a morale booster, so it isespecially encouraging to seethat they are very receptive tothe task of doing something

positive to prevent waste from beingdumped into the sea.

Overall I feel very confident that theMaritime Environmental ProtectionProject is going to be a tremendous suc-cess story both for the navy and the envi-ronment. Not just because we are givingpeople the tools to do the job, but be-cause their positive attitude is making thetask at hand as effective as it can possiblybe.


When you think of historicnaval bases in Canada,Penetanguishene, Ontario

doesn’t usually come to mind. However, afamily holiday this summer in the Mid-land area 150 km north of Toronto met upwith a surprising bit of naval history whenwe visited Discovery Harbour on theshores of Georgian Bay.

His Majesty’s Naval Establishment atPenetanguishene was established in 1817as a naval dockyard and base for Britishnavy warships charged with protecting theupper Great Lakes. With the War of 1812still in recent memory, the location of-fered a deep, sheltered harbour with ac-cess to Georgian Bay and a rough road toYork (now Toronto). Two warships, HMSTecumseth and HMS Newash, weremoored there “in ordinary” (masts, sails,rigging and armament removed andstored) in case theyshould ever be re-quired. Numerousother small craftwere based there forsupply duties. Thebase also served asthe winter home ofLt. Bayfield, a navalhydrographer whosurveyed andmapped much of theupper lakes.

As it turned out,the warships werenever required. Theyeventually broke upand sank at theirmoorings as theneed for the dock-yard diminished. By1857 the base wasno longer active andthe land was usedfor a military prisonand later, a psychiat-ric hospital. Today,the hospital and amaximum securityprison occupy thesite.

Discovery Harbour:Penetanguishene’s Naval ConnectionArticle and photos by Mike Belcher

Looking Back

Discovery Harbour is a recreation ofthe site as it was in the early 1800s. Inaddition to the visitor’s centre and KingsWharf Theatre, a number of heritagebuildings have been reconstructed. Toursof the site with guides in period costumeprovide a flavour of the harsh conditionson the base at the time. The life of a sailorposted to Penetanguishene was no seastory. Men spent the winter cutting woodin the bush and the rest of the year con-structing the buildings at the site andmaintaining the ships in storage.

The highlight of our visit to DiscoveryHarbour was the opportunity to take a sailin one of the two schooners based there,both modern reconstructions. HMS Bee isa small cargo schooner, while HMSTecumseth, built in 1995, represents oneof the base’s original warships. The re-constructed Tecumseth is a “reverse iron-

clad” (steel construction with woodsheathing to represent the original hull),and boasts a few features not seen on pe-riod ships, including diesel auxiliary pro-pulsion and a bow-thruster! Moderntrimmings notwithstanding, tourists signon as temporary crew and get to handlethe ropes as the ship heads out for a shortsail on Georgian Bay. Under the directionof a small crew of experienced officersand seamen (some of them navy retirees),our pressed crew of landlubbers got achance to experience life under sail, ifonly for a short time.

Historic Discovery Harbour at Penetanguishene, Ont. offers tourists a reconstructed 1800s view ofthis former British naval base on the shores of Georgian Bay. Visitors can go aboard the replica HMSTecumseth , the larger of these two schooners, for a short sail on the bay.

Mike Belcher is a survivability analystin DMSS.


Book Review

“Operation Friction — The CanadianForces in the Persian Gulf – 1990-1991”Maj Jean H. Morin andLCdr Richard H. GimblettA co-production of the Dept. of NationalDefence and University of Toronto Press280 pages, 30 illustrations$36.99 (cloth) 1-55002-256-3$19.99 (paper) 1-55002-257-1

I t was a summer of discon-tent. In late June, theMeech Lake Accord

floundered and left the nationdivided, its fate uncertain. TheOka crisis exploded on the na-tional scene in mid-July. Andthen a war broke out. This booktells the story of how Canadaparticipated in that war.

Written by two historians,Maj Jean Morin and LCdr Rich-ard Gimblett, “OPERATIONFRICTION, 1990 - 1991” is theofficial history of Canada’s rolein the Gulf War. It chronicles theevents leading up to the outbreakof the Gulf War and the deci-sions taken at the highest politi-cal and military levels thatdetermined Canada’s involve-ment in that war. Starting withthe early political decision tosupport the United NationsResolution 660, the authors tracethe preparation of the ships andhelicopters of Task Group 302.3 in Hali-fax and its deployment to the ArabianGulf. The book also details the consider-able effort to develop the logistics sup-port and command infrastructure that wasessential to maintaining the task group inthe Gulf.

The activities of the task group and thedevelopment of its role in the multina-tional intercept force up to November1990 are discussed in considerable detail.The authors then repeat essentially thesame pattern in discussing the prepara-tion, deployment and activities of the Ca-

Operation Friction — The CanadianForces in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991Reviewed by LCdr Doug Burrell

nadian Air Task Group. Finally, there issome discussion of the creation of theCanadian Forces Middle East Headquar-ters (CANFORME) in Manamah. Asevents rushed toward armed conflict, thenaval and air task forces roles began to beredefined. The authors describe in detailhow the transition came about and the

response of Canada to the men andwomen in the Gulf. Finally, the war itselfand Canada’s performance in it are de-scribed and analyzed. Of considerableinterest was the final section of the book,detailing the Canadian medical effort andother ancillary operations.

The book is more than a simple chro-nology of Canada’s role in the Gulf War.It also describes the interaction betweenthe allied forces and its impact on the em-ployment of both task groups and thefield hospital. This is the strength of thebook — its ability to convey to the reader

LCdr Burrell saw Gulf serviceas the Combat SystemsEngineering Officer in HMCS

Athabaskan. He is currently on posting toColorado Springs, Colorado.

an understanding of all the backgroundinteractions and their effects on the deci-sions made with regard to our involve-ment in the war.

The book is not is a definitive work ofCanada and the Gulf War. Frequently, theauthors start what could be an interesting

bit of anecdotal material oranalysis only to stop short offully developing it. From timeto time, this caused momentsof frustration and imparted acertain dryness to the narrative.There were also several in-stances when their conclusionsand/or comments were debat-able.

Would I recommend thisbook? Most emphatically! It isa concise and highly readableaccount of events and actionsat the national and commandlevels. My only regret is thatthe book is too concise. Attwice the length it would havebeen a superb work of militaryhistory.

Orders for “Operation Friction — TheCanadian Forces in the Persian Gulf,1990-1991” can be placed by contact-ing: University of Toronto Press, 5201Dufferin St., North York, Ontario,M3H 5T8, Tel. (416) 667-7791,Fax (416) 667-7832.


News Briefs

CPFA major milestone in the Canadian

Patrol Frigate (CPF) Project was com-pleted when HMCS Ottawa, the twelfthand last CPF, was transferred to opera-tional status on the West Coast onJuly 11. The project management office(PMO) is now nearing the completion ofits mandate, and establishment is beingreduced accordingly. CPF detachments atHalifax, NS and Esquimalt, BC werestood down in August.

One area of continuing work is in sup-port of CPF training. The MaintenanceProcedures Trainer (MPT) is a multime-

dia system, developed by PMO CPF andproduced under contract by Lockheed-Martin Canada using COTS hardware andsoftware. It provides CPF combat systemfunctionality at each student workstation,thus reducing the requirement to work onthe real equipment. The MPT is now be-ing used in the Canadian navy, and itssuccess has been noticed south of the bor-der. The USN has recently contractedLockheed-Martin Canada to provide asimulation for USG-2 maintenance andoperations training based on the CanadianMPT (USG-2 is an add-on to AEGIS, andis part of the system that provides an en-hanced network for co-operative engage-ment capability).

DGMEPM News RoundupThe following are updates concerning a number of noteworthy news itemsfrom the desk of Commdore Wayne Gibson, Director General MaritimeEquipment Program Management (DGMEPM):

MCDVThe Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel

(MCDV) Project is progressing well, withsix of 12 vessels now delivered to thenavy. Four more are in various stages ofconstruction or trials. HMCS Whitehorse(MCDV 06) departed Halifax on Aug. 25en route to her home port of Esquimalt.HMCS Goose Bay (MCDV 08) wasnamed and launched by her sponsor, Mrs.Doris Saunders, on Sept. 4. On the fol-lowing day, Captain(N) D.S. Mackay(MARLANT N3) laid the keel of thetenth MCDV, the future HMCSSaskatoon.

HMCS Winnipeg: CPF Project nearing completion (CF Photo)


News Briefs

QuestSince June 1997, Marystown Shipyard

of the Burin Peninsula in Newfoundlandhas been progressing the implementationphase of the mid-life refit of the CanadianForces oceanographic research vesselCFAV Quest. The ship was built atBurrard Dry Dock in Vancouver, andentered service in 1969. Quest has hadmost compartments stripped, and themajority of hazardous material has beenremoved. The main engines andgenerators have been landed, as has thelarge quarterdeck crane and tractionwinch system. Quest is now docked onthe Marystown synchrolift. The refitproject remains scheduled to complete inAugust 1998.

MARI-TECH ’98MARI-TECH ’98 and

the Annual General Meet-ing and Technical Confer-ence of the CanadianInstitute of Marine Engi-neering (CIMarE) will beheld in Ottawa, June 17-19, 1998. The theme ofthe conference is “Part-nership in Support of theFleet,” and will be ad-dressed in the context ofthe Canadian politicalscene, government policyand the marine industry.

The venue for the 1998conference will be theCitadel Inn, in the heart ofthe nation’s capital. Regis-tration will take place theevening of Wed., June 17.The AGM will be held onJune 18, with technicalpapers being presentedJune 18 and 19.

Conference informa-tion is available from Gerry Lanigan atMSEI Services, 201-1150 MorrisonDrive, Ottawa, Ontario K2H, 8S9;Tel. (613) 828-1319, fax (613) 828-7907,e-mail [email protected]

CFAV Quest (CF Photo)

CFMETRThe Province of British Columbia has

informed the Minister of National De-fence that it intends to cancel the licenceof occupation for use of the seabed at theCanadian Forces Maritime Experimentaland Test Range (CFMETR) at Nanoose.The province has provided the Govern-ment of Canada the required 90-day no-tice under the terms of the licence, and onAug. 21 informed Ottawa that it is tres-passing on provincial land but does notintend to “evict the Federal Governmentat the present time.” In response to thisaction, the Department of Justice has fileda claim in BC Supreme Court disputingthe validity of the cancellation. The basisof the federal government position is thatthe reasons forwarded by the province forcancellation are outside the terms of thelicence. The federal government hasstated that it will take whatever measuresare necessary to sustain normal opera-tions at the range. As such, operations atCFMETR are continuing as scheduled.

discovery harbour - of georgian bay · 2017-03-06 · about software development by lcdr s.w....

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