dillon mcgee lawsuit

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE EASTERN DIVISION DENNIS CHADWICK MCGEE, as Personal Representative/Administrator of the Estate of DILLON C. MCGEE, deceased, Plaintiff, v. MADISON COUNTY, TENNESSEE; JOHN MEHR, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Madison County, and THOMAS KNOLTON, individually and in his official capacity as a Deputy Sheriff of the Madison County Sheriff’s Office, Defendants. No. 1:15-cv-01069 JURY DEMANDED COMPLAINT Plaintiff Dennis Chadwick McGee, as Personal Representative/Administrator of the Estate of Dillon C. McGee, deceased, files this civil rights and wrongful death action against the above named Defendants arising out of the death of Dillon Chadwick McGee on September 26, 2014, and in support would show as follows: I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Plaintiff is bringing this action against Defendants for the wrongful death of Dillon McGee. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Madison County, Tennessee, through its practices, policies, customs, and patterns of conduct violated Dillon McGee’s civil rights guaranteed to him under the constitution of the United States of America by utilizing excessive force in trying to Case 1:15-cv-01069-egb Document 1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 1 of 24 PageID 1

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The father of 18-year-old Dillon McGee, who was fatally shot by a Madison County sheriff’s deputy last year, has filed a lawsuit alleging wrongful death and civil-rights violations in U.S. District Court in Jackson.

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  • IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

    EASTERN DIVISION

    DENNIS CHADWICK MCGEE, as Personal

    Representative/Administrator of the Estate of

    DILLON C. MCGEE, deceased,

    Plaintiff,

    v.

    MADISON COUNTY, TENNESSEE; JOHN

    MEHR, individually and in his official capacity as

    Sheriff of Madison County, and THOMAS

    KNOLTON, individually and in his official

    capacity as a Deputy Sheriff of the Madison County

    Sheriffs Office,

    Defendants.

    No. 1:15-cv-01069

    JURY DEMANDED

    COMPLAINT

    Plaintiff Dennis Chadwick McGee, as Personal Representative/Administrator of the Estate of

    Dillon C. McGee, deceased, files this civil rights and wrongful death action against the above

    named Defendants arising out of the death of Dillon Chadwick McGee on September 26, 2014,

    and in support would show as follows:

    I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

    Plaintiff is bringing this action against Defendants for the wrongful death of Dillon

    McGee. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Madison County, Tennessee, through its practices,

    policies, customs, and patterns of conduct violated Dillon McGees civil rights guaranteed to him

    under the constitution of the United States of America by utilizing excessive force in trying to

    Case 1:15-cv-01069-egb Document 1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 1 of 24 PageID 1

  • 2

    apprehend Dillon McGee and ultimately killing him on September 26, 2014. Deputy Thomas

    Knolton of the Madison County Sheriffs Office, acting under color of state law, used

    unwarranted and unnecessary force at the Maverick Convenience Store at 3 Way Lane in

    Madison County, Tennessee, when he shot Dillon McGee at close range in the back without

    justification and then sought to cover up his heinous act by saying that he had to shoot Dillon

    McGee because McGee was trying to run him over. However, Defendant Knolton fired the fatal

    shot at point blank range into the drivers side window as Dillon McGee was turning both his

    body and his vehicle away from Knolton and after any threat of being hit by McGees vehicle

    had passed. The fatal bullet entered Dillon McGees back and exited his chest as his vehicle

    pulled away from the deputy and Defendant Knolton was not in danger of being struck by the

    McGee vehicle when he chose to fire two shots into the drivers window at point blank range

    with the full intent of killing Dillon McGee.

    The Madison County Sheriffs Office failed to train its deputies, failed to have adequate

    policies and procedures in place for its deputies, and allowed its deputies to engage in a custom

    and pattern of conduct without appropriate oversight and supervision that was the moving force

    behind the unconstitutional killing of Dillon McGee. Moreover, Madison Countys past history

    of allowing its deputies to violate the civil rights of the citizens of this county created an

    environment where deputies believed they could use excessive force and get away with it.

    Defendant Mehrs personal actions in this case after the killing of Dillon McGee show that he

    condoned, approved, and ratified the conduct of Deputy Knolton and helped to foster this

    environment where deputies truly believe that they can violate the civil rights of others and

    escape any responsibility for their actions.

    Defendant Mehr accepted the story of Defendant Knolton without questioning this story

    Case 1:15-cv-01069-egb Document 1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 2 of 24 PageID 2

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    or challenging him on details that were inconsistent with both the scientific evidence and

    eyewitness statements. Instead of taking action against Defendant Knolton or making a

    statement to the citizens of this community that excessive force will not be tolerated under his

    leadership, Defendant Mehr put Defendant Knolton back to work and praised him for his bravery

    and he did this months before the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation completed its investigation.

    Defendant Mehr took over the responsibilities of the Madison County Sheriffs Office with full

    knowledge that its deputies had engaged in a pattern of violating the constitutional rights of the

    citizens of this county and even made this past conduct an issue during his campaign. However,

    Defendant Mehr chose not to take any action to protect the citizens of Madison County from

    abusive deputies when he was sworn in as sheriff and then chose to ratify, condone, and approve

    the deadly actions of Deputy Knolton well before a thorough investigation had been done.

    Law enforcement officers must be given the right to protect themselves and the innocent

    citizens of this community from the unlawful acts of criminals. However, the Sheriff of Madison

    County must hold his law enforcement officers to a high standard of honor and integrity and

    when an officer over reacts and unlawfully takes the life of another, he or she must be held

    accountable for their actions to protect all of the innocent citizens of this community from harm.

    II. PARTIES

    1. Dennis Chadwick McGee is bringing this action as personal

    representative/administrator of the Estate of Dillon C. McGee, deceased, for the benefit of Dillon

    McGees wrongful death beneficiary. Dennis Chadwick McGee is also the father of Dillon C.

    McGee, deceased. The family of Dillon McGee recently received the results of DNA testing that

    confirmed that the decedent is the father of E.L., the minor son of Shelby Lipford. Ms. Lipford,

    as the mother of E.L., is aware that this action is being filed and consents to Dennis Chadwick

    Case 1:15-cv-01069-egb Document 1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 3 of 24 PageID 3

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    McGee bringing this action on behalf of E.L., the wrongful death beneficiary of Dillon McGee.1

    2. Dillon McGee was an adult resident citizen of the State of Tennessee and was

    killed by Defendant Knolton as set forth in this Complaint during the afternoon of September 26,

    2014. Dennis Chadwick McGee is a resident citizen of Madison County, Tennessee, residing

    therein at 136 Mason Road, Humboldt, Tennessee. Dennis Chadwick McGee as personal

    representative/administrator of the estate of Dillon C. McGee, deceased, is a proper party to

    bring this action for the wrongful death of Dillon Chadwick McGee pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann.

    20-5-101 et seq., including but not limited to Tenn. Code Ann. 20-5-106.

    3. Defendant Madison County, Tennessee, (Defendant Madison County) is duly

    incorporated under the laws of the State of Tennessee. Defendant Madison County, Tennessee

    can be served by serving Steven W. Maroney, county attorney, 425 E. Baltimore Street, Jackson,

    TN 38301. Defendant Madison County is responsible for the actions and inactions of its

    employees, agents, and apparent agents and for the operation, training, and policies for the

    Madison County Sheriffs Office.

    4. Defendant John Mehr (Defendant Mehr or Sheriff Mehr) is an adult resident

    citizen of Madison County, Tennessee. At all times pertinent hereto, Defendant John Mehr was

    the Sheriff of the Madison County Sheriffs Office and was acting under color of state law at all

    applicable times. Defendant Mehr is responsible for the day to day operations of the Madison

    County Sheriffs Office and is the final policymaker with respect to law enforcement operations

    for Madison County, Tennessee. Defendant Mehr was under a duty at all times relevant to this

    case to run the policing activities of the Madison County Sheriffs Office so as to preserve not

    only the peace of Madison County but also to preserve to its citizens the rights, privileges, and

    1 Plaintiff is not including the full name of the infant child in this Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

    Procedure, Rule 5.2(a)(3) but will provide the Court with complete information concerning the child upon request.

    Case 1:15-cv-01069-egb Document 1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 4 of 24 PageID 4

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    immunities guaranteed and secured to them by the constitutions and the laws of the United States

    and/or the State of Tennessee. Defendant Mehr is being sued individually and in his official

    capacity as Sheriff of the Madison County Sheriffs Office, and may be served with this

    Complaint through serving Sheriff John Mehr at 546 East College St, Jackson, Tennessee

    38301.

    5. Defendant Thomas Knolton (Defendant Knolton or Deputy Knolton) is an

    adult resident citizen of Madison County, Tennessee. At all times pertinent hereto, Defendant

    Knolton was a Deputy Sheriff with the Madison County Sheriffs Office, acting under the color

    of state law and within the course and scope of his employment with the Madison County

    Sheriffs Office. Defendant Knolton is sued individually and in his official capacity as a Deputy

    Sheriff of the Madison County Sheriffs Office, and may be served with this Complaint through

    serving him at 546 East College St, Jackson, Tennessee 38301.

    III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

    6. This Court has jurisdiction over this action because of the important questions of

    federal law presented by this case pursuant to inter alia 28 U.S.C. '' 1331 and 1343. The Court

    has pendent jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims asserted herein

    pursuant to inter alia 28 U.S.C. ' 1367.

    7. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1391(b)(2) because the

    events giving rise to the causes of action alleged in this Complaint occurred within the Western

    District of Tennessee.

    8. Plaintiff brings this cause pursuant to federal statutes including, but not limited to,

    42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983 and 1988 in conjunction with all relevant statutes and laws including

    Tennessees Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes (Tenn. Code Ann. 20-5-101 et seq.).

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    IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

    9. On September 26, 2014, Defendant Knolton shot and killed Dillon McGee. At all

    times relevant to this action, Defendant Knolton was acting in the course and scope of his

    employment with the Madison County Sheriffs Department and under color of law.

    10. Upon information and belief, Defendant Knolton acted in accordance with the

    flawed policies of the Madison County Sheriffs Office and the inadequate training it provided

    its deputies at all times relevant to this action. Nonetheless, Defendant Knolton intentionally

    chose to shoot Dillon McGee in the back as Dillon was trying to get away from him at a time

    when Dillon McGee posed no threat of harm to Knolton, his partner or anybody for that matter.

    11. At the time of this unlawful killing, Defendant Knolton was attempting to do a

    hard take down on Dillon McGee to question and/or arrest him concerning an incident that had

    happened the night before. Defendant Knolton chose to exercise this technique in an unmarked

    car and in plain clothes and without activating his emergency lights. This technique was

    excessive and placed both the deputies and Dillon McGee and his passenger in danger.

    Moreover, upon information and belief, Defendant Knolton made the decision to use this

    aggressive and excessive technique without seeking permission or approval from anyone at the

    Madison County Sheriffs Office and Defendant Madison County allowed its deputies to use this

    aggressive and excessive technique to serve warrants without appropriate oversight and/or

    supervision.

    12. Upon information and belief, Defendant Knolton was there to investigate an

    incident that happened on September 25, 2014, during which Dillon McGee had been riding

    around with friends when they got into an altercation. Upon information and belief, there was a

    fight between the young men, with Cody Melton and Dillon McGee allegedly being the

    Case 1:15-cv-01069-egb Document 1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 6 of 24 PageID 6

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    aggressors in that altercation. However, after this alleged altercation, both of the alleged victims

    voluntarily got back into Dillon McGees car and asked him to drop them off where they had left

    their vehicle. Moreover, the allegations against Dillon McGee were never proven because he

    was killed the following day.

    13. Upon information and belief, the alleged victims went home and told a parent

    what happened and one of the parents called a deputy with the Madison County Sheriffs Office

    and relayed what had happened to that deputy.

    14. The Madison County Sheriffs Office, for some reason, chose not to question

    Cody Melton but instead chose to target Dillon McGee and to do a hard take down on him.

    Upon information and belief, a Madison County deputy questioned one of the young men who

    was involved in the previous nights altercation and asked him to tell Dillon McGee to meet him

    at the Maverick Convenience Store on Three Way on the afternoon of September 26, 2014, with

    the full intent to serve the arrest warrant on McGee via a hard take down method with guns

    drawn.

    15. On September 26, 2014, at approximately 1:30 p.m., Dillon McGee and a friend

    stopped in a parking lot near the Maverick Convenience Store at 3 Way Lane in Madison

    County, Tennessee and went in to purchase a soft drink and cigarettes. The two young men then

    walked back to the car and got inside.

    16. Defendant Knolton and his partner Deputy Terry Stewart drove down Three Way

    Lane behind the Nissan Versa that Dillon McGee was driving and then pulled in the lot to do a

    hard take down on Dillon McGee. Again, Defendant Knolton was driving an unmarked car and

    was not wearing a uniform. Knoltons partner likewise was not wearing a uniform and neither

    deputy activated the emergency lights on their vehicle to make sure that Dillon McGee and

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    others would know they were law enforcement officers.

    17. Witnesses at the scene did not hear the deputies tell the occupants of the car that

    they were law enforcement officers or that they had a warrant for the arrest of Dillon McGee.

    Upon information and belief, the deputies never properly identified themselves as law

    enforcement officers. Deputy Stewart was near the drivers door and Defendant Knolton was in

    front of the vehicle with his gun drawn and pointed at Dillon McGee. Defendant Knolton fired

    at least two shots through the windshield of the Nissan Versa in close proximity to Dillon McGee

    shortly after jumping out of his car and pointing a gun at McGee. Fortunately, neither bullet

    struck McGee. Dillon McGee was then able to pull his vehicle around the deputy in an effort to

    leave the parking lot to protect him and his passenger from harm.

    18. After hearing the first set of shots, witnesses on the scene looked in the direction

    of Knolton and the Nissan Versa and saw Knolton side stepping to keep up with the moving

    Nissan Versa when he fired multiple shots at very close range into the drivers side window as

    the Versa was making a right hand turn away from the officer. Defendant Knolton was out of

    harms way and the vehicle was pulling away from him when he side-stepped to keep up with

    the moving car and fired the shot that killed Dillon McGee.

    19. The first shot fired into the drivers side window shattered the glass and then

    grazed the shoulder of the decedent.

    20. Defendant Knoltons second shot into the drivers side window hit McGee in the

    back and caused a fatal wound that killed Dillon McGee.

    21. Dillon McGee was able to drive away from the Maverick Convenience Store and

    was attempting to get onto Highway 45 when he lost consciousness and drove off of the road.

    22. The decedent did not pose any threat to either deputy or anyone else when he was

    Case 1:15-cv-01069-egb Document 1 Filed 03/30/15 Page 8 of 24 PageID 8

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    shot and killed by Defendant Knolton. Defendant Knolton claims that upon his approaching the

    vehicle driven by Dillon McGee, the decedent tried to run them over with his vehicle instead of

    complying with their requests and that they had no choice but to shoot him in self defense. The

    above story, however, is flatly inconsistent with the report of the medical examiner in this case,

    with ballistics proof in this case and with eyewitness accounts that show the fatal bullet coming

    from the drivers side door/window at close range as the decedents body was turning away from

    the deputy and as the Nissan Versa was making a right turn to exit the parking lot. By all eye

    witness accounts, Defendant Knolton was no longer in front of McGees vehicle and was out of

    harms way when he fired the fatal shot.

    23. Defendant Knolton walked right up to Dillon McGees car and shot him at point

    blank range in the back as he was trying to turn away from the approaching gun. Knolton was

    not wearing a uniform and arrived on the scene in an unmarked car without ever putting on his

    emergency lights. Upon information and belief, Dillon McGee did not know with any degree of

    certainty that Defendant Knolton was a law enforcement officer.

    24. At the time he was shot, McGee posed no threat of harm to Defendant Knolton or

    anyone else as he was simply trying to drive away.

    25. Defendant Knolton had no prior interactions with McGee which would suggest in

    any way that McGee posed an immediate or imminent threat to others as he drove away.

    26. Defendant Knolton had no reason to believe that McGee posed an immediate or

    imminent threat of serious physical harm to himself or others.

    27. Defendant Knolton violated the civil rights of Dillon McGee in a number of ways

    on September 26, 2014, from the way he misrepresented facts in an affidavit he signed to get an

    arrest warrant to the way he further decided to apprehend McGee via a hard take down and to

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    the way he walked right up to his car and shot him in the back at point blank range. Defendant

    Knolton utilized excessive force in attempting to execute McGee by using an unmarked car with

    two plain clothes officers with the plan being to approach him with guns down in the parking lot

    of a convenience store when they knew where he lived and where his parents lived.

    28. The actions of Defendant Knolton were objectively unreasonable.

    29. Defendant Knolton knew or should have known that McGees family lived a short

    distance away and yet chose to come at him with guns drawn in an aggressive tactical maneuver

    instead of trying to secure his arrest in a less aggressive and safer manner.

    30. Upon information and belief, Defendant Knolton and other Madison County

    deputies told others of the plan to apprehend McGee with the use of deadly force in an attempt to

    teach him a lesson and a number of McGees acquaintances were actually there to witness the

    events of September 26, 2014.

    31. Defendants Madison County and Mehr (individually and in his official capacity)

    failed to have appropriate and constitutional policies in place at the time of this incident, failed to

    properly train the deputies, failed to enforce the policies that they had in place and allowed their

    deputies to engage in a pattern of misconduct in violation of the Constitution of the Unites

    States. Defendants Madison County and Mehr (individually and in his official capacity) allowed

    Defendant Knolton and others to use hard take downs to serve warrants with appropriate

    oversight and approval and this pattern and custom allowed Defendant Knolton in this case to

    violate the civil rights of Dillon McGee. By way of alternative pleading, Defendant Madison

    County had constitutional policies but Defendant Knolton chose not to follow them and instead

    chose to utilize excessive deadly force in violation of such policies.

    32. Defendant Madison County and Mehr (individually and in his official capacity)

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    ratified, condoned and approved the conduct of Defendant Knolton in this case.

    33. Deputies with the Madison County Sheriffs Office have used excessive force in

    the past and yet Defendants Madison County and Mehr have done little to nothing to deter

    continued violations. Defendant Madison County and Mehr (individually and in his official

    capacity) did a woefully inadequate job investigating this incident and merely accepted the self-

    serving statements of the deputies involved without conducting the type of investigation that an

    incident like this requires, thereby sending the wrong message to both the deputies on this force

    and the citizens of this County. This is further evidence of Sheriff Mehr and Madison Countys

    ratification and approval of Defendant Knoltons conduct.

    34. Defendants have engaged in a pattern of unconstitutional conduct that created an

    environment that allowed this shooting to happen.

    35. Defendants violated McGees constitutional rights namely those rights protected

    by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as set forth herein.

    Those rights were clearly established at the time of the violation. A reasonable deputy or officer

    confronted with the same or similar situation would have known that using deadly force would

    violate those rights.

    36. It was clearly established law at the time Dillon McGee was shot that deputies and

    officers had no right to use deadly force when there was no threat to themselves or anyone else

    or after any perceived threat had passed.

    37. At the time Dillon McGee was shot, it was clearly established law that deadly

    force could not be used simply to prevent the escape of a felony suspect.

    38. Defendant Knolton had no probable cause that Dillon McGee posed an imminent

    or immediate threat of serious physical harm either to himself or to others.

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    39. Defendant Knolton had no reason to believe that Dillon McGee presented an

    imminent danger to himself, to his partner, or to any members of the public in the area after he

    pulled away from the deputies.

    40. Dillon McGee had a constitutional right to be free from the use of deadly force or

    excessive force because, at the time he was shot, all officers and all other persons were in a

    position of safety.

    41. Defendant Madison County has failed to adequately and constitutionally train its

    police officers in the use of deadly force when attempting to arrest an individual they believe to

    be a fleeing felon.

    42. Defendant Knolton=s acts, inactions and omissions were conducted with deliberate

    indifference to Dillon McGee=s constitutional rights.

    43. Dillon McGee suffered a deprivation of his 4th Amendment right to be free from

    unreasonable searches and seizures.

    44. Defendant Madison County failed to adequately train its deputies, including

    Knolton, on proper use of deadly force in circumstances such as those presented here.

    45. Dillon McGee suffered a deprivation of his 14th Amendment right to procedural

    and substantive due process, including but not limited to his right to personal privacy, bodily

    integrity and life.

    46. Rather than admit his wrongful conduct, Defendant Knolton knew that he could

    simply tell his supervisors and investigators that he was in fear for his safety and/or his partners

    safety and he would be exonerated from killing an eighteen (18) year old boy and that is exactly

    what happened in this case.

    47. Defendant Madison County failed to adequately train its officers in violation of

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    the Constitution of the United States of America.

    48. Plaintiff asserts that Dillon McGee suffered great pain and suffering and lost his

    life as a direct and proximate result of the actions and inactions of Defendants and his family has

    suffered greatly because of this loss.

    49. It was foreseeable that Dillon McGee would lose his life and Plaintiff would

    sustain such damages on behalf of his heirs as a result of Defendants actions and inactions.

    V. CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS THOMAS KNOLTON

    50. Plaintiff hereby incorporates, in its entirety, each and every Paragraph contained

    in this Complaint and by reference makes said Paragraphs a part hereof as if fully set forth

    verbatim.

    51. Plaintiff avers that firing multiple gunshots at an individual who is not an

    immediate threat amounts to the use of excessive and/or unreasonable deadly force against the

    decedent in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

    Constitution, especially when the shots are fired in the back while the individual is pulling away.

    52. Defendant Knolton committed the actions and/or omissions described herein

    under the color of state law and by virtue of his authority as a law enforcement officer of the

    Madison County Sheriffs Office and substantially deprived Dillon McGee of his clearly

    established rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed to him by the Fourth Amendment and

    Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and

    1988.

    53. The unreasonable and excessive use of force against Dillon McGee in the form of

    multiple gunshots fired at him as his car was rolling away from the deputy deprived him of his

    Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable, excessive and deadly

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    force and unreasonable seizure. Plaintiff avers that Defendant Knolton knew to a moral certainty

    that the shots fired at Dillon McGee as means intentionally applied to seize him were likely to

    cause severe injury or death.

    54. Defendant Knolton was not justified in his use of deadly force and did not and/or

    could not reasonably believe in good faith that deadly force was warranted in this case. His

    behavior as described in this Complaint was objectively unreasonable.

    55. Defendant Knoltons actions in deciding to do a hard take down of Dillon

    McGee under the facts and circumstances of this case deprived Mr. McGee of his rights

    protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

    56. Defendant Knoltons actions were done with deliberate indifference to Dillon

    McGees health, safety, welfare, liberty and life.

    57. Defendant Knoltons actions were egregious and shock the conscience.

    58. A reasonable officer confronted with the same or similar situation would have

    known that using deadly force would violate Dillon McGees rights protected by the Fourth and

    Fourteenth Amendments.

    59. In support of the Plaintiffs claim that the conduct of Defendant Knolton violated

    the Fourth and Fourteen Amendment rights of Dillon McGee, Plaintiff relies upon the factual

    allegations set forth in this Complaint.

    60. Plaintiff avers that he and his wife and the decedents minor son had a

    constitutional right of familial association with Dillon. Further, Plaintiff avers that he and his

    wife and decedents minor son had a constitutional right to the society and companionship of

    Dillon. As a direct result of Defendants acts and omissions, Plaintiff and his wife lost their son

    and suffered great losses of a personal and pecuniary nature, including but not limited to the loss

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    of companionship, society and support of the Decedent as well as grief, sorrow and mental

    suffering and so did decedents minor son. Plaintiff avers that the Defendants violated these

    rights and that their actions constituted an unconstitutional termination of his familial association

    and society and companionship of their son under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Unites

    States Constitution.

    61. Defendant violated Dillon McGees constitutional rights in many ways, including

    but not limited to:

    a. Misrepresenting the facts that were communicated to him in the affidavit that he executed to obtain a felony arrest warrant against Dillon McGee;

    b. Intentionally deciding to use a hard take down to serve the arrest warrant that was just executed against Dillon McGee where such an aggressive

    approach was not warranted;

    c. Aggressively attempting to apprehend Dillon McGee with his gun drawn in an unmarked car without activating any emergency lights or sirens and without

    making sure that he had back up on the scene in marked cars with uniformed

    deputies;

    d. Unnecessarily escalating a situation that could have been handled without the need for such an aggressive use of force;

    e. Failure to use or even attempt to use less aggressive or less intrusive measures in executing an arrest warrant;

    f. Not properly identifying himself as a Madison County Sheriffs Deputy so that Dillon McGee would know who was pointing a gun at him and

    attempting to stop his movement;

    g. Using deadly force when there was no danger to himself or anyone else in the area;

    h. Using deadly force to apprehend a fleeing suspect after any potential threat of harm had passed placing the suspect and his passenger at risk of serious

    bodily injury or death; and

    i. Using excessive force and otherwise violating the civil rights of Dillon McGee.

    62. As a direct and proximate result of the actions and omissions of this Defendant,

    Dillon McGee was killed and his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

    U.S. Constitution were violated.

    63. It was foreseeable that Dillon McGee would lose his life and Plaintiff would

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    sustain such damages as a result of Defendant Knoltons actions and inactions.

    VI. CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS JOHN MEHR,

    IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

    64. Plaintiff hereby incorporates, in its entirety, each and every Paragraph contained

    in this Complaint and by reference make said Paragraphs a part hereof as if fully set forth

    verbatim.

    65. At all times pertinent hereto, Defendant John Mehr was acting under the color of

    state law by virtue of his authority as the Sheriff of Madison County, Tennessee, and committed

    the actions and/or omissions described herein in violation of Dillon McGees rights, privileges

    and immunities guaranteed to him by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

    States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988.

    66. Defendant Mehr took over the responsibilities of the Madison County Sheriffs

    Office with full knowledge that its deputies had engaged in a pattern and practice of violating the

    constitutional rights of the citizens of this county, and even made this past conduct an issue

    during his campaign for election.

    67. Defendant Mehr chose not to take any action to protect the citizens of Madison

    County when he was sworn in as Sheriff from abusive deputies; and then chose to ratify,

    condone, and approve the deadly actions of deputy Knolton well before a thorough investigation

    had been done.

    68. Defendant Mehr failed to review deadly force and other relevant policies,

    practices and procedures which were in place when he became Sheriff. Thus, he failed to put

    into place constitutional policies for the Madison County Sheriffs Department regarding fleeing

    suspects or the use of deadly force.

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    69. Despite being on notice that there was a need for specific training regarding the

    use of deadly force when his deputies were faced with a situation similar to that presented here,

    Defendant Mehr did not institute appropriate training for such incidents. Specifically, sheriffs

    deputies, including but not limited to Defendant Knolton, were not provided adequate training

    regarding the apprehension or arrest of an individual suspected of committing a crime and did

    not institute appropriate training measures as to when the use of deadly force was appropriate.

    70. Defendant Mehr authorized the use of hard take downs in situations where such

    tactics were absolutely unnecessary, such as the situation described herein.

    71. Defendant Mehr did not require, train, or advise his deputies to use less

    aggressive and/or less intrusive measures to effectuate the service of an arrest warrant.

    72. Defendant Mehr permitted, condoned, and ratified all of the actions and inactions

    of Defendant Knolton as described herein.

    73. Defendant Mehr violated Dillon McGees clearly established rights protected by

    the United States Constitution.

    74. Plaintiff asserts that Dillon McGee suffered great pain and suffering and lost his

    life as a direct and proximate result of the actions and inactions of this Defendant.

    75. The aforementioned actions of Defendant Mehr were a proximate cause of the

    harms and damages alleged herein, including but not limited to the death of Dillon McGee.

    76. It was foreseeable that Dillon McGee would lose his life and Plaintiff would

    sustain such damages as a result of Defendants actions and inactions.

    VII. CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS BY MADISON COUNTY AND JOHN

    MEHR, IN HIS OFFICAL CAPACITY

    77. Plaintiff hereby incorporates, in its entirety, each and every paragraph contained

    in this Complaint, and by reference makes said paragraphs a part hereof as if fully set forth

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    verbatim.

    78. Defendant Knolton acted in accordance with unconstitutional policies that

    allowed deputies to use deadly force to apprehend an individual wanted for aggravated assault

    even when that individual did not pose an immediate or imminent threat to the deputy or public.

    79. Defendants Madison County and Sheriff John Mehr did not properly investigate

    deputy seizures and use of excessive force on citizens or properly discipline deputies for those

    acts and condoned an environment in the Madison County Sheriffs Office where deputies

    thought that it was okay to violate the civil rights of the citizens of Madison County.

    80. Defendant Madison County and its relevant policymakers have failed to act to

    remedy patterns of excessive force in the Madison County Sheriffs Office despite actual

    knowledge of the same, thereby tacitly approving and ratifying the type of misconduct alleged

    here.

    81. Defendant Madison County policymakers failed to have in place sufficient

    policies and training to prevent excessive force and it was this lack of policies and training which

    was the moving force behind the unconstitutional killing of Dillon McGee. Upon information

    and belief, the policy concerning the use of deadly force that was in place in September of 2014

    was on its face violative of the law and was unconstitutional.

    82. Defendant Madison County policymakers were aware of, condoned and facilitated

    by their inaction, a code of silence in the Madison County Sheriffs Office, by which deputies

    fail to report misconduct committed by other deputies, such as the misconduct in this case.

    83. The injuries and death of Dillon McGee could have been avoided had Defendants

    Madison County and Sheriff John Mehr provided constitutional policies and appropriate training

    as to the proper use of deadly force. This lack of adequate policies and training amounts to an

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    unconstitutional policy.

    84. Defendant Madison County was on notice of each and every constitutional

    violation alleged herein taking place by Madison County Sheriffs Office deputies, its Sheriff

    and Defendant Knolton. These Defendants violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

    rights of Dillon McGee in that they were deliberately indifferent to the rights of Mr. McGee and

    others through their hiring, firing, and retention of officers, as well as their in adequate training

    with regard to the use of deadly force.

    85. These Defendants were on notice that Defendant Knolton and other Sheriffs

    deputies would be called upon to make decisions regarding individuals they perceive as fleeing

    or escaping from the service of an arrest warrant. Despite this notice, these Defendants failed to

    adequately train said officers, including Defendant Knolton, with regard to when to use or refrain

    from using deadly force. Defendants also failed to have in place adequate written policies and

    adequate procedures for the use of deadly force.

    86. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Madison County and Defendant John Mehr are

    liable for the actions of Defendant Deputy Knolton and all other law enforcement officials

    involved in the decision and execution of the hard take down and deadly force applied upon

    Dillon McGee as set forth above. Defendants Madison County and John Mehr permitted,

    encouraged, tolerated, and ratified an official pattern, custom, and practice by its law

    enforcement deputies violating the federal constitutional rights of the public at large during the

    course of their law enforcement applications. The actions of Defendant Deputy Knolton as

    alleged above were done pursuant to one or more policies, practices and/or customs of Defendant

    Madison County.

    87. After the incident, Defendants Madison County and John Mehr determined that

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    Defendant Knolton had acted appropriately and in compliance with the policies, practices and

    customs of the Madison County Sheriffs Office but did so well before any meaningful

    investigation was done. Notwithstanding the sheriffs vote of confidence, the actions of

    Defendant Knolton during this incident were in direct violation of the laws of the United States

    and the State of Tennessee regarding the use of deadly and/or excessive force. Despite violating

    the federal and state law, Defendant Knolton was not reprimanded or terminated but instead

    praised. Accordingly, the Defendants Madison County and John Mehr ratified, condoned,

    acquiesced in, and/or approved of Defendant Knoltons conduct in this action in all respects. As

    the Defendants Madison County and John Mehr determined that the Defendant Knoltons

    conduct as set forth herein was in compliance with the policies, practices and customs of

    Madison County and the Madison County Sheriffs Office, the Defendants Madison County and

    John Mehr are directly liable for the actions and constitutional violations of the Defendant

    Deputy Knolton. Moreover, this conduct is consistent with past actions of these Defendants,

    which created an atmosphere of no accountability on the part of the officers.

    88. As a matter of both policy and practice, the Madison County Sheriffs Office

    directly encourages, and is thereby the moving force behind the very type of misconduct at issue

    in this case.

    89. As a matter of both policy and procedure, the Madison County Sheriffs Office

    facilitates the very type of misconduct at issue here by failing to adequately investigate, punish

    and discipline prior instances of similar misconduct, thereby leading Madison County Sheriffs

    Deputies to believe their actions will never be scrutinized and, in that way, directly encouraging

    future abuses such as those affecting Plaintiff.

    90. Generally, as a matter of widespread practice so prevalent as to comprise county

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    policy, deputies of the Madison County Sheriffs Office conduct unlawful seizures and use

    excessive force on citizens, yet the Madison County Sheriffs Office makes findings of

    wrongdoing in a disproportionately small number of cases.

    91. Defendant Madison County does not properly investigate police/deputy seizures

    of civilians and uses of excessive force or properly discipline deputies for those acts.

    92. Defendant Madison County and Sheriff Mehr had an unconstitutional policy in

    effect at the time Dillon McGee was shot, permitting the use of deadly force even when no one

    was in harms way or in imminent danger.

    93. Plaintiff respectfully submits that Madison County and Sheriff Mehr are liable for

    damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and all other applicable statutes and laws because their

    custom, policy or practice was the moving force behind the constitutional violations addressed

    herein.

    94. Plaintiff respectfully submits that Defendant Madison County and Defendant

    Mehr are liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and all other applicable statutes and laws because

    their failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to such rights. Defendants failure to train

    was the moving force behind Dillon McGees constitutional deprivations.

    95. Defendant Madison County and Defendant Mehr had a policy, custom and

    practice of inadequate training and supervision.

    96. Defendant Madison County and Defendant Mehr had one or more

    unconstitutional written policies which were the moving force behind the constitutional

    violations suffered by Dillon McGee.

    97. The aforementioned actions and omissions of the individual defendants were

    proximately caused by the policies, practices, customs, and inadequate training of Defendants

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    Madison County and John Mehr and were the underlying cause of the death of Dillon McGee.

    98. It was foreseeable that Dillon McGee would be deprived of his constitutional

    rights and ultimately lose his life as a result of Defendants actions and inactions as described

    herein.

    VIII. WILLFUL AND INTENTIONAL TORTS OF DEFENDANT THOMAS KNOLTON

    99. Plaintiff hereby incorporates, in its entirety, each and every Paragraph contained

    in this Complaint and by reference make said Paragraphs a part hereof as if fully set forth herein

    verbatim.

    100. In addition to the above and/or in the alternative, the acts of Defendant Knolton

    alleged herein constitute the common law intentional torts of assault, battery, intentional

    infliction of emotional distress, and outrageous conduct under the laws of the State of Tennessee.

    101. Defendant Knolton committed an unpermitted and offensive touching of Dillon

    McGee through an object he set in motion, by firing a gun at point blank range into the back of

    Dillon McGee.

    102. Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that the acts and omissions of Defendant Knolton

    alleged herein were intentional, malicious, reckless, willful and wanton and in bad faith, entitling

    the Plaintiff to judgment against Defendant Knolton for all damages associated with the

    wrongful death of Dillon McGee, including but not limited to punitive damages.

    103. The aforementioned actions of Defendant Knolton proximately caused all of the

    harms and damages alleged herein, including but not limited to severe emotional harm of Dillon

    McGee and the death of Dillon McGee. Plaintiff alleges that such injuries and ultimately Dillon

    McGees death was a foreseeable consequence of the acts and omissions of Defendant Knolton

    as alleged herein.

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    IX. LOSS OF CONSORTIUM

    104. Plaintiff hereby incorporates, in its entirety, each and every Paragraph contained

    in this Complaint and by reference make said Paragraphs a part hereof as if fully set forth

    verbatim.

    105. Plaintiff alleges that as a direct, proximate, and foreseeable result of the conduct

    of Defendants as described herein, Dillon McGee suffered loss of life.

    106. Plaintiff and his wife (Christina McGee) and E.L., decedents minor son, also

    suffered in their individual capacities as a result of the conduct of Defendants. They suffered

    and continue to suffer the loss of services and companionship of Dillon and their damages are

    part of the overall pecuniary value of the life of the decedent to be disbursed to the wrongful

    death beneficiary.

    X. DAMAGES

    107. As a direct, proximate and foreseeable result of the acts and/or omissions of the

    Defendants, Dillon McGee was killed on September 26, 2014. The injuries for which Plaintiff

    seeks compensation, include, but are not limited to:

    a. Physical injuries, including the death of Dillon McGee, and this familys resulting loss of familial association with him;

    b. Conscious physical and emotional pain and suffering of Dillon McGee from the time of injury until his death, and his loss of the pleasures of life;

    c. Funeral expenses incurred for Dillon McGee; d. The pecuniary value of the life of Dillon McGee, including but not limited to

    the loss of his companionship and consortium;

    e. Loss of future earnings and future earning capacity; f. Prejudgment interest and/or post judgment interest and statutory and

    discretionary costs to the extent permitted by law;

    g. Attorney fees and expenses pursuant to applicable law, including but not limited to 42 U.S.C. 1988;

    h. Injunctive and/or declaratory relief that the acts and conduct set forth above were unconstitutional, and precluding them from engaging in such activities

    in the future; and

    i. All such further relief, both general and specific, to which he may be entitled

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    under the premises.

    XI. PUNITIVE DAMAGES

    108. Plaintiff hereby incorporates, in its entirety, each and every Paragraph contained

    in this Complaint and by reference make said Paragraphs a part hereof as if fully set forth

    verbatim.

    109. The actions of the Defendants sued in their individual capacity were performed

    intentionally, recklessly, fraudulently and/or maliciously, thus entitling Plaintiff to a substantial

    award of punitive damages under applicable law to be determined by the jury in this cause.

    XII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

    WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff sues Defendants jointly and

    severally for the injuries described and pray for judgment and an award of injunctive and/or

    declaratory relief and compensatory damages and punitive damages (where appropriate).

    Plaintiff seeks Three Million Dollars ($3,000,000.00) as compensatory damages, plus an amount

    of punitive damages as may appear fair and reasonable to a jury. Plaintiff seeks such other relief,

    both general and specific, to which he may be entitled in this case.

    A JURY IS RESPECTFULLY DEMANDED.

    Respectfully submitted,

    s/Jeffrey S. Rosenblum

    Jeffrey S. Rosenblum, (#13626)

    Matthew T. May, (#25547)

    Attorneys for Plaintiff

    6070 Poplar Avenue, Suite 550

    Memphis, TN 38119

    (901) 527-9600

    [email protected]

    [email protected]

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    mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]

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