digest remrev 5

8/11/2019 Digest Remrev 5

1/23

emedial aw Review

Page 1of 23igests

5

Acosta | Aguaviva | AAlcantara | Arceo | Bondoc | CantoCalderini | Capanas | Chan | Dela Cruz | Diaz | Galman

Garcia | Go | Ingles | Lagarde | Manigbas | Morato |JAReyes | Singzon | So | Soller | ATan | Telan | Ting | Uy

XXX. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

A. Interpleader (Rule 62)

OCAMPO V. TIRONA

Facts: Leonardo Ocampo alleged that he was the owner of a

parcel of land in Pasay City and that he bought it from RosauroBreton. Possession and management of the land was alreadywith him despite the TCT not being issued yet. Leonora Tironawas the lessee of the land even before Ocampo bought it.

Upon acquisition of ownership by Ocampo, he sent aformal notice to Tirona. Tirona religiously paid her rents untilthe subject premises were declared under area for prioritydevelopment. As such, Tirona invoked her right to first refusaland refused to pay her rent until the NHA processed herpapers.

Ocampo filed a complaint for unlawful detaineragainst Tirona. Tironas defense was that Ocampo was not theowner thus she shouldnt pay him rent. It should be noted thatTirona kept changing the theory of her case stating thatLourdes Rodriguez Yaneza owned the land when the case was

at the MTC and stating that Breton was the owner when thecase was appealed to the RTC.

Issue: Should the complaint for unlawful detainer prosper?

Decision: Yes.First, the issue of ownership is not essential to an

action for unlawful detainer. The fact of the lease and theexpiration of its term are the only elements of the action. Thedefense of ownership does not change the summary nature ofthe action. The affected party should raise the issue ofownership in an appropriate action, because a certificate of titlecannot be the subject of a collateral attack.

In actions for forcible entry and [unlawful] detainer,the main issue is possession de facto, independently of any

claim of ownership or possession de jure that either party mayset forth in his pleadings, and an appeal does not operate tochange the nature of the original action.

Furthermore, Tirona was estopped from denying thatOcampo had possession of the lease agreement. She paid herrent to him until such declaration of the area for prioritydevelopment. The sale of a leased property places the vendeeinto the shoes of the original lessor to whom the lessee boundhimself to pay.

Lastly (and more importantly), Tirona should haveused reasonable diligence in hailing the contending claimantsto court. Tirona need not have awaited actual institution of asuit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader.

An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does notknow the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting

claims on the property.The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a

person who has property whether personal or real, in hispossession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially,without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which inwhole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants,comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the saidproperty or who consider themselves entitled to demandcompliance with the obligation, be required to litigate amongthemselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to oneor the other thing.

The remedy is afforded not to protect a personagainst a double liability but to protect him against a doublevexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders thatthe claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in realitya new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and insuch a case the pleading which initiates the action is called acomplaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.

MAGLENTE, ET AL VS. PADILLA in her c apacity as Mani laRTC Judge, and several pr ivate respondents

Facts: Philippine Realty Corp (PRC) owned a parcel of land inIntramuros, which it leased to petitioner Maglente. The leaseagreement included a right of first refusal in favor of Maglenteas well as an agreement whereby PRC prohibited Maglentefrom subleasing the property. Nonetheless, Maglentesubleased the property to the private respondents (madami silaso di ko na lalagay names). Later on, PRC decided to sell theproperty and offered the land to Maglente in accordance withher ROFR. Maglente, together with her co-petitioners in thiscase (di ko na din lalagay yung names nila kasi madam

masyado), as co-buyers, agreed to buy the property from PRCHowever, PRC received a letter from the private respondentswhich expressed their desire to purchase the same property.

PRC filed a complaint for interpleader with the ManilaRTC to determine who between the 2 parties had the right topurchase the property. The RTC ruled in favor of the Maglenteand her co-petitioners, ordering PRC to execute a deed ofsale. CA affirmed. The SC likewise upheld the CA decisionholding that there had already been a perfected contractbetween PRC and the petitioners. So PRC executed a deed ofsale in favor of the petitioners, who then filed a motion for awrit of possession, because the land was in the possession othe private respondents. The respondents argued that theRTCs decision did not declare the petitioners as ownersentitled to right of possession but merely determined that theyhad the right to purchase. RTC ruled in favor of therespondents and denied the writ of possession. So thepetitioners filed this special civil action for certiorari.

Issue: Whether a writ of possession should be granted to aparty with a ROFR in an interpleader case? NOOOOOO!

Held/Ratio: The decision in the interpleader case merelyresolved the question of who had the right to purchase theproperty. The directive was only for the PRC to execute thenecessary deed of sale, nothing more. It was clear at that pointhat petitioners were not yet the owners of the property. Theexecution of the deed of sale was only preliminary to theireventual acquisition of the property. Also, although in the SC

decision affirming the RTC the SC refrained from declaring thepetitioners as the owners since, pending the execution of thedeed of sale or delivery of the property, ownership had yet totransfer to them at that time.

Thus, petitioners argument that the trial courts writ oexecution in the interpleader case carried with it the corollaryright to a writ of possession is without merit. A writ ofpossession complements the writ of execution only when theright of possession or ownership has been validly determinedin a case directly relating to either. The interpleader caseobviously did not delve into that issue.


2/23

emedial aw Review

Page 2of 23igests

5



Furthermore, the rule is that the enforcement of ajudgment may not vary or alter the tenor of the judgment butmust strictly conform to it. The RTC cannot therefore be faultedfor refusing to issue a writ of possession to petitioners as itsissuance would not be in conformity with the judgment in theinterpleader case.

Some other matters discussed

A writ of possession shall issue only in the followinginstances: (1) land registration proceedings; (2) extrajudicialforeclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) judicial foreclosureof property provided that the mortgagor has possession and nothird party has intervened, and (4) execution sales.

12Here,

petitioners seek the writ as a consequence of the trial courtsdecision ordering the execution of a contract of sale/contract tosell in their favor. The writ does not lie in such a case.

Petitioners cannot recover possession of the propertyvia a mere motion. They must file the appropriate action incourt against respondents to recover possession. While thisremedy can delay their recovery, the SC ruled that it cannotpermit an abbreviated method without subverting the rules andprocesses established for the orderly administration of justice.

ARREZA v DIAZ

FACTS: Bliss Development Corporation is the owner of ahousing complex located in Balara Quezon City. It instituted aninterpleader case against Arreza and Diaz who were conflictingclaimants of the property. the RTC ruled in favor of Arreza. Inview of said decision, Bliss executed a contract to sell theproperty to Arreza and Diaz was compelled to transferpossession together with all improvements to Arreza.

Thereafter, Diaz instituted a claim against Arreza andBliss for the reimbursement of the cost of the improvementswhich amounted to approximately 1.7 M inclusive of 8%interest. Arreza filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res

judicata and lack of cause of action. RTC dismissed the Motionto Dismiss and the Motion for Reconsideration of Arreza. Thisprompted Arreza to file a petition for certiorari with the CA. CAdismissed the petition saying that res judicata does not applybecause the interpleader case only settled the issue on whohad a better right. It did not determine the parties respectiverights and obligations.

ISSUE: Whether or not the claim for reimbursement is barredby res judicataYES

HELD: An examination of the answer filed by Diaz showed thathe asserted his status as a buyer in good faith and for valueand he prayed that affirmative relief arising out of the rights ofa buyer in good faith and for value be granted. This only

means that Diaz expected that the court shall award himdamages in the form of reimbursement in case judgment isrendered in favor of Arreza.

Diaz contends that in the pre-trial of the interpleadercase, reimbursement and damages was never put in issue.Thus it could not have been the subject of the interpleader andconsequently, not barred by res judicata. Diaz says it wasincumbent on Arreza to include the damages as an issue. TheSupreme Court said that (1) it is not the duty of the petitioner todo the lawyering against the respondent and (2) in a complaintfor interpleader shall determine the rights and obligations of theparties and adjudicate their respective claims. Such rights,

obligations, and claims could only be adjudicated if put forwardby the aggrieved party in assertion of his rights. That party inthis case referred to respondent Diaz. The second paragraphof Section 5 of Rule 62 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedureprovides that the parties in an interpleader action may filecounterclaims, cross-claims, third party complaints andresponsive pleadings thereto, "as provided by these Rules.The second paragraph was added to Section 5 to expressly

authorize the additional pleadings and claims enumeratedtherein, in the interest of a complete adjudication of thecontroversy and its incidents

Having failed to set up his claim for reimbursementsaid claim of respondent Diaz being in the nature of acompulsory counterclaim is now barred.

B. Declaratory Relief (Rule 63)

Almeda v Bathala Marketing

Facts: Bathala Marketing leased the property belonging toAlmeda. It was a 4-year lease contract which started on May 11997. The parties stipulated that the present rental price wasbased on the present rate of assessment, and that in the eventhat any new tax or burden was imposed by authorities, therental price will be increased to reflect such new tax or burden(there was also a provision which provided for the decrease ofthe rental price in the event that the taxes were lowered).

There was another provision which provided that inthe event of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of thepeso at the time of the establishment of the contract was to befollowed.

Come December 1997, Almeda advised Bathala thaVAT will now be applied to the rentals. Bathala contended thatsince VAT was already in effect when the contract was enteredinto, then no increase should be done. In January 1998

Almeda told Bathala that the rent was to be increased by 73%because of inflation. Bathala rejected the claim, saying tha

only the court can pronounce extraordinary inflation.Bathala instituted an action for declaratory reliefAfter, Almeda filed an ejectment case against Bathala. Almedaalso moved for the dismissal of the declaratory relief because iclaimed that Bathala was already in breach of its obligationThe RTC and CA ruled for Bathala.

Issue: Was the action for declaratory relief proper?

Held: Yes, it certainly was.Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any personinterested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrumentexecutive order or resolution, to determine any question ofconstruction or validity arising from the instrument, executiveorder or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his rights

and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised insuch a petition is the question of construction or validity ofprovisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary is the generarule that such an action must be justified, as no other adequaterelief or remedy is available under the circumstances.

[

The requisites are: 1) the subject matter of thecontroversy must be a deed, will, contract or other writteninstrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof aredoubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must havebeen no breach of the documents in question; 4) there must bean actual justiciable controversy or the ripening of one between
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/mar2007/gr_148182_2007.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/mar2007/gr_148182_2007.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/mar2007/gr_148182_2007.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/mar2007/gr_148182_2007.html#fnt12


3/23

emedial aw Review

Page 3of 23igests

5



persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripefor judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is notavailable through other means or other forms of action orproceeding.

After Almeda demanded payment of adjusted rentalsand in the months that followed, Bathala complied with theterms and conditions set forth in their contract of lease bypaying the rentals stipulated therein. Bathala religiously fulfilled

its obligations to petitioners even during the pendency of thepresent suit. Bathala did not breach the contract. Thus, Bathalais not barred from instituting the petition for declaratory relief.

Issue: Is declaratory relief proper given that there is already aseparate action for ejectment, and thus the issues should beventilated there?

In Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation,the SC

held that the petition for declaratory relief should be dismissedin view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawfuldetainer. However, in that case,the unlawful detainer case hadalready been resolved by the trial court before the dismissal ofthe declaratory relief case. Here, the trial court had not yetresolved the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of

the declaratory relief petition. In fact, the trial court, where therescission case was on appeal, itself initiated the suspensionof the proceedings pending the resolution of the action fordeclaratory relief.

There was a case where the declaratory relief actionwas dismissed because the issue therein could be threshedout in the unlawful detainer suit (Teodoro v Mirasol). But in thatcase, there was already a breach of contract at the time of thefiling of the declaratory relief petition.

Thus, it is proper to entertain the instant declaratoryrelief action, even with the pendency of theejectment/rescission case before the trial court. The resolutionof the present petition would write finis to the dispute, as itwould settle once and for all the question of the properinterpretation of the two contractual stipulations subject of this

controversy.

MALANA V TAPPA

FACTS: Petitioners Carmen Danao Malana, et al. (Danaoheirs) alleged to be the owners of a land in Tugegarao whichthey inherited from Anastacio Danao. During the lifetime ofDanao, he allowed Consuelo Pauig (family member of Tappa)to build on and occupy the southern portion of the subjectproperty. Danao and Consuelo agreed that the latter wouldvacate the said land at any time that Danao and his heirs mightneed it. Danao heirs claimed that respondents Benigno Tappa,et al. continued to occupy the subject property even after

Consuelos death, building their residences thereon usingpermanent materials. Danao heirs also learned that Tappa, etal. were claiming ownership over the subjectproperty. Averring that they already needed it, Danao heirsdemanded that respondents vacate the same. The call wasunheeded. Meanwhile, Danao heirs referred their land disputeto the Lupong Tagapamayapa. During the conciliationproceedings, respondents asserted that they owned thesubject property and presented documents ostensiblysupporting their claim of ownership. The heirs opposed this,saying that the documents were falsified and highly dubious.This notwithstanding, Tappa, et al. created a cloud upon the

heirs title to the property. Thus, the heirs filed a case forReivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages in the RTC.

Issue:Did the judge commit grave abuse of discretion in motu propriodismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction? No GADPetition is dismissed. RTC should remand the records to theMTC.

Held:An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a personinterested under a deed, a will, a contract or other writteninstrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, anexecutive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The reliesought under this remedy includes the interpretation anddetermination of the validity of the written instrument and the

judicial declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder.Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule

63. Section 1 states that an action for the reformation of aninstrument, to quiet title, and to consolidate ownership in a salewith a right to repurchase may be brought under the RTCThese remedies are considered similar to declaratory reliefbecause they result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the

litigants, often without the need of execution. Whereas theRules of Court uses may, the amended JudiciaReorganization Act uses the word shall in determining

jurisdiction. JRA explicitly requires the MTC toexercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actionswhich involve title to or possession of real property where theassessed value does not exceed P20,000 (OMM) or P50,000(MM). In this case, the assessed value of the subject propertyis only P410.00; therefore, the jurisdiction is with the MTC, nothe RTC.

Further, an action for declaratory relief presupposesthat there has been no actual breach of the instrumentsinvolved or of rights arising thereunder. The purpose of anaction for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritativestatement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a

statute, deed or contract for their guidance in the enforcementhereof, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breachthereof. Where the law or contract has already beencontravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory reliefthe courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over theaction. In the present case, the case for quieting of title wasfiled afterDanao heirs already demanded, and Tappa refusedto vacate the subject property. Since the heirs had alreadybeen deprived of the possession of their property, the properremedy for them is the filing of an accion publicianaoan accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratoryrelief. An accion publicianais a suit for the recovery opossession, filed one year after the occurrence of the cause ofaction or from the unlawful withholding of possession of therealty. Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on thevalue of the property involved. Given that the property is onlyat P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction overan action to recover the same.

DBM VS. MANILAS FINEST RETIREES ASSOC.

FACTS: With the issuance of PD 765 in 1975, the Integrated

National Police (INP) was constituted and to be composed ofthe Phil. Constabulary (PC), as the nucleus, and the integratedpolice forces as components thereof. PD 1184 was then issued


4/23

emedial aw Review

Page 4of 23igests

5



in 1977 to professionalize the INP and promote careerdevelopment. Then, in 1990, RA 6975 (PNP Law) wasenacted. Under Sec. 23 of this law, the PNP would initiallyconsist of the members of the INP, created under PD 765, aswell as the officers and enlisted personnel of the PC. About 8years later, RA 8551 (PNP Reform and Reorganization Act of1998) was enacted, amending the PNP Law and reengineeredthe retirement scheme in the police organization. Under this

new law, PNP personnel stood to collect more retirementbenefits that what the INP members of equivalent rank, whohad retired under the INP Law. Thus, all INP retirees, lead bythe Manilas Finest Retirees Assoc., filed a petition fordeclaratory relief with the RTC of Manila, impleading DBM,PNP, NAPOLCOM, CSC and GSIS as respondents. Saidpetition alleged that INP retirees, although equally situated withthe PNP retirees with regard to retirement benefits prior to theenactment of the PNP Law, were unconscionably andarbitrarily excluded from the higher and adjusted benefitsaccorded to the PNP retirees.

The RTC rules in favor of the INP retirees. It held thatthe PNP Law, as amended, did not abolish the INP but merelyprovided for the absorption of its police functions by the PNP.Thus, INP retirees are entitled to the same benefits as the PNP

retirees. In the same decision, the RTC ordered the properadjustments of the INP retirees benefitsand its immediateimplementation. Said decision was appealed by the DBM,etc. to the CA. However, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in ordering the immediateadjustments of the INP retirees benefits when the basicpetition filed before it was one for declaratory relief.

HELD/RATIO: NO. RTC and CA decisions are affirmed.Although herein petitioners DBM, etc. had a valid

point, it must be remembered that the execution of judgmentsin a petition for declaratory relief is not necessarilyindefensible. In PDIC v. CA, the SC categorically ruled:Now, there is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for

declaratory relief that proscribes the filing of a counterclaimbased on the same transaction, deed or contract subject of thecomplaint. A special civil action is after all not essentiallydifferent from an ordinary civil action, which is generallygoverned by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of Court, except thatthe former deals with a special subject matter which makesnecessary some special regulation. But the identity betweentheir fundamental nature is such that the same rules governingordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil actions ifnot inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement theprovisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions.

Also, in Matalin Coconut Co., Inc. v. MunicipalCouncil of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, the SC ruled:x x x Under Sec. 6 of Rule 64, the action for declaratory reliefmay be converted into an ordinary action and the partiesallowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or proper,if before the final termination of the case "a breach or violationof an ordinance, should take place." In the present case, nobreach or violation of the ordinance occurred. The petitionerdecided to pay "under protest" the fees imposed by theordinance. Such payment did not affect the case; thedeclaratory relief action was still proper because theapplicability of the ordinance to future transactions stillremained to be resolved, although the matter could also bethreshed out in an ordinary suit for the recovery of taxes paid. In its petition for declaratory relief, petitioner-appellee

alleged that by reason of the enforcement of the municipaordinance by respondents it was forced to pay under protesthe fees imposed pursuant to the said ordinance, andaccordingly, one of the reliefs prayed for by the petitioner wasthat the respondents be ordered to refund all the amounts ipaid to respondent Municipal Treasurer during the pendency othe case. The inclusion of said allegation and prayer in thepetition was not objected to by the respondents in their answer

During the trial, evidence of the payments made by thepetitioner was introduced. Respondents were thus fully awareof the petitioner's claim for refund and of what would happen ithe ordinance were to be declared invalid by the court.

The SC sees no reason for treating this casedifferently from PDIC and Matalin. This disposition becomes althe more appropriate considering that the retirees, aspetitioners in the RTC, pleaded for the immediate adjustmenof their retirement benefits to which the herein petitioners, asrespondents in the same court, did not object to. Being awareof said prayer, the petitioners then already knew the logicaconsequence if, as it turned out, a declaratory judgment isrendered in the retirees favor. At bottom then, the trial courts

judgment forestalled multiplicity of suits which, needless tostress, would only entail a long and arduous process

Considering their obvious advanced years, the respondentscan hardly afford another protracted proceedings.

MEJIA v. GABAYAN*This is a confusing case, a lot of petitions were filed at paulitulit yung nangyayari, but the Declaratory Relief part was veryshort, not the main issue*

FACTS: Mejia is the registered owner of a parcel of landlocated in Isabela. The lot was a portion of a large tract of landcovered by a homestead patent granted to his father.

On August 13, 1978, the Secretary of AgrarianReform, issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) overportions of the property to the following tenant-beneficiariesCarlos Ramos, Danceso Gavino, Francisca Rueme, PedroGavino (some of respondents in present case)

In the meantime, the Courts decision inAlita v. Courof Appealswas promulgated, wherein it was held thaproperties covered by homestead patents were not covered byPD No. 27.

Mejia filed a petition with the DAR, for theexclusion of the property from PD No. 27. Provincia

Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) issued an Orderecommending the denial of the petition.

Instead of pursuing his appeal in the DAR case, Mejiaopted to file a complaint in the RTC of Isabela against thetenant-respondents for declaratory relief and recovery ofthe possession of the property alleging that the parcel o

land was originally owned by his father to whom a homesteadpatent was granted and that the land was not covered by PDNo. 27 as held by this Court inAlita v. Court of Appeals;

In their answer to the complaint, the tenantrespondents averred that there was a pending petition withDAR filed by Mejia for the exclusion of the property from thecoverage of PD No. 27; the action was beyond the jurisdictionof the court because the dispute between the parties isagrarian, and as such, within the original exclusive jurisdictionof the Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board(DARAB).


5/23

emedial aw Review

Page 5of 23igests

5



On January 25, 1995, the RTC rendered a summaryjudgment in favor of Mejia and against the tenant-respondents.Tenant-respondents appealed the decision to the CA.

In the meantime, on May 23, 1995, the DAR RegionalDirector issued an Order granting the petition of Mejiaexempting his property from the PD 27, BUT ordering him toallow the respondents-tenants to remain in possession of theproperty and to execute Leasehold Contracts in their favour.

Plus, DAR Sec ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction over theaction of Mejia (declaratory relief and recovery of possessioncase). This order became final and executory.Despite the DAR ruling becoming final and executory, Mejiafiled a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the

judgment in the RTC CASE. The trial court issued a writ ofexecution. (The writ was implemented but Mejia failed to takeactual possession of the property)

(Basically there are 2 cases: 1) Agrarian case whereMejia sought the exclusion of her land from PD 27 and 2) RTCcase for declaratory relief and recovery of possession of theproperty. RTC rendered a judgement first ruling that theproperty was exempt from PD 27. Subsequently, DARSecretary ruled the same BUT allowed the tenant-respondentsto stay in possession and to have Leasehold Contracts

executed in their favour. Mejia wants to implement the RTCdecision)

The issue now is, which decision should prevail?Mejia avers that the RTC decision had long become final andexecutory and can no longer be modified or set aside; that thetrial court was duty-bound to implement its decision; that theOrder of the DAR Secretary is not a supervening event barringthe enforcement of the RTCsfinal and executory decision.The tenant-respondents, on the other hand, aver that RTC ismandated to respect the Order of the DAR Secretary; that theOrder of the DAR is a special and exceptional circumstancewarranting the suspension of the execution of the decision ofthe trial court in the higher interest of justice.

ISSUE: WON the execution of the RTC ruling should

suspended-- YESThe general rule is that it is the ministerial duty of the

court to order the execution of its final judgment. However,Rule 135, Section 5(g) of the Rules of Court provides that thetrial court may amend and control its process and orders so asto make them conformable to law and justice.

More importantly, it is the DAR who has jurisdictionover the case. Having first acquired jurisdiction over the partiesand subject matter, DAR retained the same until finaldisposition of the case.

Mejia ought to exhaust all administrative remediesbefore seeking judicial recourse. Based on case law, anaction for declaratory relief is proper only if adequaterelief is not available through other existing forms ofactions or proceedings. A petition for a declaratory reliefcannot be made a substitute for all existing remedies andshould be used with caution. Relief by declaratory

judgment is sui gener isand not strictly legal or equitableyet its historical affinity is equitable. The remedy is notdesigned to supplant existing remedies. The remedy ispurely statutory in nature and origin. A declaratory

judgment does not create or change substantial rights ormodify any relationship or alter the character ofcontroversies.

C. Review of Judgment of COA or

COMELEC (Rule 64)

D. Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus(Rule 65)

D.1 Certiorari

REPULIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by DEPED) vCARMEL DEVELOPMENT, INC.

FACTS: Carmel Development Inc. filed a complaint forecovery of possession of a parcel of land in Caloocan cityoccupied by Pangarap Elementary and High Schools, whichwere established by DepEd so Carmel filed a case againstthem and the Caloocan school board.

DEPED filed a motion for extension of time to file ananswer and later on filed a manifestation with motion todismiss. But Carmel filed a motion to declare the defendants indefault for failing to file an answer. This was granted by thecourt and allowed them to present evidence ex parte.

DEPED filed a MR and motion to lift order of default

saying that it filed its motions on time and that Carmel failed tonotify and furnish it with a copy of the motion to declare indefault. DEPED also asserts that the case should be dismissedon the ground of forum shopping, in violation of SC AdminOrder 04-94.

The trial court, in the interest of justice, lifted the ordeof default but it denied the dismissal of the case. DEPED alsoclaims Carmel is forum shopping because there are 2 othercivil cases pending involving the same parties and subjectmatter in the Caloocan RTCs. As proof, it attached duplicatecopies of the other trial courts orders. Since the TC denied

the MTD, DEPED filed a petition for certiorari (R65) seeking toannul the trial courts orders. The CA dismissed this and theMR was later denied.

DEPED presents the fact that the

Verification/Certification of Carmel was signed only byCarmels counsels. DEPED also contends that there are 2other civil cases pending in another branch of RTC Caloocanbut CA resolved that trial court rightfully denied the MDbecause DEPED failed to attach the proper pleadings in thoseother civil cases. (They filed only duplicate originals, notcertified true copies. CA held that under Section 1, Rule 65 othe 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is required that thepetition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of theassailed orders and not by mere duplicate originals. Hence thispetition.

ISSUE: W/N the case should be dismissed for not being

accompanied by certified true copies of the assailed decisionand resolution but only the duplicate originals.

W/N the CA acted with GADLEJ in denying the MD though thepleadings show litis pendentia.W/N the CA erred in ruling that Carmel complied with SC

Admin Cirular 04-94.

HELD/RATIO:1. Yes, duplicate originals are allowed. Rule

46 should be harmonized with Rule 65.The issue here is whether duplicate originals are

allowed or only certified true copies are allowed pursuant toR65, Sec. 1 (because DEPED submitted duplicate originals).


6/23


7/23

emedial aw Review

Page 7of 23igests

5



The appeal mechanics under the LGC constitute Bayantelsplain and speedy remedy in this case.

ISSUE: W/N Bayantel is required to exhaust administrativeremedies before seeking judicial relief with the trial court. NO.

RATIO: Section 22of rule 65 governs petitions for prohibition.

Since BAYANTELs properties were already leviedbecause of nonpayment of real property taxes, an appealto the LBAA is not a speedy and adequate remedy. One ofthe recognized exceptions to the exhaustion- of-administrative remedies rule is when, as here, only legalissues are to be resolved.

It should be noted that before an appeal to the LBAAcan be considered in this case, prior payment under protest ofP43M should be given. Given this reality, an appeal to theLBAA may not be considered as a plain, speedy and adequateremedy. It is thus understandable why Bayantel opted towithdraw its earlier appeal with the LBAA and, instead, filed itspetition for prohibition.

Not so Important

OTHER ISSUE: W/N BAYANTELs properties are exempt fromreal property tax under its legislative franchise.YES.

Bayantels franchise being national in character, the"exemption" thus granted under Section 14 of RA 3259 appliesto all its real or personal properties found anywhere within thePhilippine archipelago. The LGC withdrew all exemptions butCongress amended Bayantels original franchise. This means,although the exemption under RA 3259 was impliedly repealedby the LGC, such exemption was expressly revived under RA7633. The LGC gives LGUs the power to tax real propertiesnot specifically exempted (like BAYANTELs properties).

D.3 Mandamus

LAMBINO V. COMELEC

FACTS: Lambino et al gathered signatures and filed a petitionwith the Comelec for the holding of a plebiscite that will ratifytheir initiative petition under the Initiative and Referendum Act(RA 6735). In substance, their initiative petition sought toamend the Constitution by adopting a unicameral-parliamentary form of government. They claimed that theirpetition was supported by at least 12% of all registered voters,with each legislative district being represented by at least 3%of its registered voters.

The Comelec denied the initiative petition for lack ofan enabling law governing initiative petitions. The Comelecinvoked the case of Santiago v. Comelec where the SC

2 SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. When the proceedings of any

tribunal, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or withgrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequateremedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby mayfile a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts withcertainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding therespondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matterspecified therein, or otherwise, granting such incidental reliefs as lawand justice may require.

declared RA 6735 inadequate to implement the 1987Constitutions initiative clause.

Lambino now go to the SC seeking the issuance ofthe writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside theComelecs resolution and to compel the Comelec to give duecourse to their initiative petition.

ISSUE: Was there GAD in denying the Initiative petition?NO

HELD: Petitioners failed to comply with the requirements of theConstitution for conducting an initiative. The people signing theproposal must sign the entire proposal and the proposal musbe embodied in the petition. These two elements are presenonly if the full text of the amendments is first shown to thepeople who express their assent by signing such proposal in apetition. A signature sheet is meaningless if the person signinghas not first seen what he is signing. The signature sheewhich the people signed merely asked the people if theywanted a change in the form of government into aparliamentary system.

Moreover, the initiative petition contained matterstotally unrelated to the change in the form of government. Thisforces people to sign a petition that effectively contains two

propositions, one of each they may find unacceptable.Further, an initiative petition applies only to

amendments and not revision. A revision implies a change thaalters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering theprinciple of checks and balances or separation of powers. Theinitiative here is an a revision and not merely an amendment.

Lastly, RA 6735 provides that the people must signthe petition. The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petitionOnly petitioners and their counsels did.

No GAD can be attributed to the Comelec indismissing the initiative petition where it merely followed theSCs ruling in the case of Santiago, and PIRMA v. Comelec.

Where was the Mandamu s discuss ion in this case?There was none, perhaps the Court did not need to discuss

whether mandamus was proper for two reasons. Firstpetitioners failed to show a clear legal right since their initiativepetition was fatally defective. Second, the Comelec did notunlawfully neglect the performance of its duty since petitionersdid not comply with the requirements of an initiative petition.

ESQUIVEL VS OMBUDSMAN

Facts: PO2 Herminigildo Eduardo and SPO1 ModestoCatacutan charged Mayor Antonio Esquivel and his brotheBaranggay Eboy Esquivel with illegal arrest, arbitrarydetention, maltreatment, attempted murder and grave threatsOthers who participated in the alleged crime were also

charged.The charge was initially filed with the PNP-CIDG(Criminal Investigation and Detection Group). Their initiainvestigation shows that while Eduardo was about to eat lunchthe 2 Esquivels together with others disarmed him of hisservice pistol. He was then forced to board a vehicle andbrought to the Municipal Hall.

While on board the vehicle, Mayor Esquivel mauledhim and threatened to kill him. Upon arriving at the municipahall, the mayor ordered Eduardo to be killed. At this pointCatacutan arrived to verify what happened to his teammateHe was also threatened. The mayor struck Eduardo in the


8/23

emedial aw Review

Page 8of 23igests

5



nape with a handgun while Eboy was holding him. Eduardolost consciousness. When he woke up, he was released butnot before being forced to sign a statement in the police blotterthat he was in good physical condition. Eduardo surmises thatthis happened because the mayor believed him to be amongthe law enforcers who raided a jueteng den wherein membersof a crime syndicate who are connected to the mayor wherearrested.

The records were forwarded by the PNP-CIDG to theombudsman. The deputy ombudsman recommended MayorEsquivel and Bgy. Captain Eboy Esquivel to be both indictedfor the crime of less serious physical injuries while MayorEsquivel alone for grave threats. Charges against the otherswere dismissed. Ombudsman approved this resolution soinformations were filed with the Sandiganbayan.

Esquivels brought the matter to the SC via certiorari,prohibition and mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretionon the part of the ombudsman when it failed to consider theexculpatory evidence. Said evidence is the admission ofEduardo that he was in good physical condition (the one hewas forced to sign). As such, Eduardo is stopped from claimingthat it was injured. Eduardo counters by saying this is issue isfactual in nature and thus, is not the proper subject of a

certiorari action. Also, it is alleged Sandiganbayan has nojurisdiction over the case.

Issue: Whether the petition for certiorari, prohibition andmandamus was proper?

Held: NO!(Note: This case is under mandamus only. There is

only 1paragraph in the case relating to mandamus. But Illdiscuss certiorari and prohibition as well)

Eduardo admitted signing the document but theadmission merely applied to the execution of such and not toits truthfulness. Esquivels argument is evidentiary in natureand its probative value can be best passed upon after a fullblown trial on the merits. As such, certiorari is not the proper

remedy. The SC is not a trier of facts.Prohibition is a writ directed to the court itself,

commanding it to cease from the exercise of a jurisdiction towhich it has no legal claim. Here, Sandiganbayans jurisdictionover the criminal cases is clearly found on law (since one ofthe accused, Mayor esquivel, is of salary grade 27,sandiganbayan had jurisdiction. It is only when none of theaccused are occupying positions corresponding to salarygrade27 or higher will the rtc or mtc have jurisdiction). Being anextraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be resorted to whenthe ordinary and usual remedies provided by law are adequateand available.

40Prohibition is granted only where no other

remedy is available or sufficient to afford redress. That thepetitioners have another and complete remedy at law, throughan appeal or otherwise, is generally held sufficient reason fordenying the issuance of the writ.41In this case, petitioners werenot devoid of a remedy in the ordinary course of law. Theycould have filed a motion to quash the informations at the firstinstance but they did not. Also, a writ of prohibition will not beissued against an inferior court unless the attention of the courtwhose proceedings are sought to be stayed has been called tothe alleged lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The foundation of this

rule is the respect and consideration due to the lower court andthe expediency of preventing unnecessary litigation. Here, theissue of jurisdiction was raised only in the SC and not beforethe sandiganbayan.

MANDAMUS: it is employed to compel theperformance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being itschief use and not a discretionary duty.

The duty is ministeria

only when the discharge of the same requires neither theexercise of official discretion nor judgment.

Hence, this Cour

cannot issue a writ of mandamus to control or review theexercise of discretion by the Ombudsman, for it is hisdiscretion and judgment that is to be exercised and not that o

the Court. When a decision has been reached in a matterinvolving discretion, a writ of mandamus may not be availed ofto review or correct it, however erroneous it may be.

Moreover

as earlier discussed, petitioners had another remedy availablein the ordinary course of law. Where such remedy is availablein the ordinary course of law, mandamus will not lie.

E. Quo Warranto (Rule 66)

LIBAN V GORDONFACTS:Liban et al, officers of QC Red Cross Chapter filed aPetition to declare Gordon as having forfeited his seat to theSenate because he was serving as the PNRC (Red Cross)Chairman of the Board of Governors.

Gordon was elected Chairman during hisincumbency, Liban alleges that it violated Sec 13 of Art 6 of theConsti which prohibits Senators from holding any other officeor employment in the govt or the goccs. Accdg toCamporedondo v. NLRC, PNRC is a government-owned ocontrolled corporation.

Gordon in his response says that Liban et al have nostanding to file the petition which appears to be an action foquo warranto, since it alleges that respondent committed anact which constitutes a ground for forfeiture of his public officeThey dont claim to be entitled to the Senate office. UndeSection 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, only aperson claiming to be entitled to a public office usurped orunlawfully held by another may bring an action for quowarranto in his own name. Also its already barred by

prescription since it should be commenced within one yearafter the and in this case, hes been working for PNRC for thepast 40 years. PNRC is also not a GOCC so the prohibitiondoesnt apply.

In their Reply, Liban claims that its neither an action forquo warranto nor an action for declaratory relief. They maintainthat the petition is a taxpayers suit questioning the unlawfudisbursement of funds, considering that respondent has beendrawing his salaries and other compensation as a Senatoeven if he is no longer entitled to his office.

ISSUES:1. W/N PNRC is a GOCC? NO, itsa Private OrganizationPerforming Public Functions.2. W/N Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution applies? No

not an office/ employment under the control of Executive deptso not considered as prohibited.3. W/N Gordon should be automatically removed? No.4. W/N Liban et al may legally institute quo warrantopetition against Gordon?

HELD:Liban et al Have No Standing to Fi le this Pet i t ion

Section 1, Rule 66of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. An action for the usurpation of a public office, position o


9/23

emedial aw Review

Page 9of 23igests

5



franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought inthe name of the Republic of the Philippines against:

(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which byprovision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of hisoffice; or

Liban et al are alleging that by accepting the position ofChairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, Gordon has

automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short, theyfiled an action for usurpation of public office against Gordon, apublic officer who allegedly committed an act which constitutesa ground for the forfeiture of his public office. Clearly, such anaction is for quo warranto, specifically under Section 1(b), Rule66 of the Rules of Court.

Quo warranto is generally commenced by theGovernment as the proper party plaintiff. However, underSection 5, Rule 66of the Rules of Court, an individual maycommence such an action if he claims to be entitled to thepublic office allegedly usurped by another, in which casehe can bring the action in his own name . The personinstituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalfmust claim and be able to show that he is entitled to theoffice otherwise the action may be dismissed at any

stage. In the present case, petitioners do not claim to beentitled to the Senate office and so have no standing to file thepresent petition.

DIVINAGRACIA VS CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTINGSYSTEM (CBS) AND PEOPLES BROADCASTINGSERVICE (PBS)

FACTS: CBS and PBS (C/PBS), two of the three networks thatoperate Bombo Radyo Philippines, operate radiobroadcasting services by virtue of their legislative franchises(RA 7477 and 7582). Under the RAs, there is commonprovision, aimed towards the constitutional mandate todemocratize ownership of public utilities, that C/PBS shouldoffer 30% of its common stocks to the public. Following theselaws, NTC thus granted Provisional Authorities

3to C/PBS.

DIVINAGRACIA then filed 2 complaints againstC/PBS, alleging that he was the owner of 12% of the shares ofstock of C/PBS separately, and that both stations failed tomake the 30% public offering of their stocks as mandated bythe RAs. For this failure, he prayed to cancel the ProvisionalAuthorities granted to C/PBS as well as in its legislativefranchises. NTC dismissed, saying it was not competent torender a ruling on that issue, that the complaint was acollateral attack on the legislative franchises of C/PBS, andthat the same is more properly the subject of an action for quowarranto to be commenced by the Solicitor General in thename of the Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to Rule 66 of

the Rules of Court.

CA: Affirmed.

DIVINAGRACIA counters that NTC has the power to cancelProvisional Authorities and CPCs, or in effect, the power tocancel the licenses that allow broadcast stations to operate.

3This allowed them to install, operate and maintain various AM and

FM broadcast stations in various locations throughout the nation.

ISSUE: W/N NTC has the authority to cancel ProvisionaAuthorities and Certificates of Public Convenience it issued tolegislative franchise-holders. (Related Issue: W/N a quowarranto is a more appropriate remedy?YES!)

HELD: There is in fact a more appropriate, more narrowly-tailored and least restrictive remedy that is afforded by the lawfor DIVINAGRACIA, which is quo warranto under Rule 66

4

The special civil action of quo warranto is a prerogative writ bywhich the Government can call upon any person to show bywhat warrant he holds a public office or exercises a publicfranchise. A forfeiture of a franchise will have to be declared ina direct proceeding for the purpose brought by the Statebecause a franchise is granted by law and its unlawful exerciseis primarily a concern of Government.

Quo warranto is specifically available as a remedy if iis thought that a government corporation has offended againsits corporate charter or misused its franchise. Thedetermination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, orwhether the right to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited bynon-user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative wriof quo warranto, the right to assert which, as a rule, belongs tothe State upon complaint or otherwise, the reason being that

the abuse of a franchise is a public wrong and not a privateinjury.

DIVINAGRACIA argues that since their prayeinvolves the cancellation of the provisional authority and CPCsand not the legislative franchise, then quo warrantofails as aremedy. This is without merit, as the authority of the franchiseeto engage in broadcast operations is derived in the legislativemandate. To cancel the provisional authority or the CPC is, ineffect, to cancel the franchise or otherwise prevent itsexercise. What could happen is that if the courts conclude thatprivate respondents have violated the terms of their franchiseand thus issue the writs of quo warranto against them, then theNTC is obliged to cancel any existing licenses and CPCs sincethese permits draw strength from the possession of a validfranchise.

OTHER NOTES:

Licenses issued by the NTC such as CPCs andprovisional authorities are junior to the legislative franchiseenacted by Congress. The licensing authority of the NTC is noon equal footing with the franchising authority of the Statethrough Congress. The issuance of licenses by the NTCimplements the legislative franchises established by CongressNTC cannot, without clear and proper delegation by Congressprevent the exercise of a legislative franchise by withholding ocanceling the licenses of the franchisee.

And the role of the courts, through quowarranto proceedings, neatly complements the traditionaseparation of powers that come to bear in our analysisDIVINAGRACIAs theory thatNTC has the presumed authorityto cancel licenses and CPCs issued to due holders oflegislative franchise to engage in broadcast operations wouldviolate the separation of powers.

F. Expropriation (Rule 67)

4Section 1: an action for the usurpation of a public office, position or

franchise may be brought in the name of the Republic othe Philippines against a person who usurps, intrudes into, ounlawfully holds or exercises public office, position or franchise.


10/23

emedial aw Review

Page 10of 23igests

5



BARDILLON v. BGY. MASILI OF CALAMBA

Facts: Respondent Bgy. Masili filed 2 complaints for eminentdomain owned by petitioner Bardillon. The 1

stcomplaint was

filed with the MTC following a failure to reach an agreement onthe purchase offer of P200k. The MRC dismissed the case forlack of interest for failure of Bgy. and its counsel to appear at

pre-trial. The 2nd

complaint was filed before the RTC over thesame lot and for the same purpose (erection of a multi-purposebarangay hall). Bardillon filed a motion to dismiss on theground of res judicata. Judge denied motion holding that theMTC which ordered the dismissal of the first case had no

jurisdiction over the expropriation proceeding. RTC decided infavor of Brgy. and issued a Writ of Possession.

CA dismissed petition, no grave abuse of discretionbecause the 2

nd complaint was not barred by res judicata,

since the MTC had no jurisdiction over the action. Bardillonclaims that since the value of the land is only P11k, the MTChad jurisdiction over the case.

Issues:

Whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the caseNO Whether the dismissal before the MTC constituted res

judicataNO

Whether the CA erred when it ignored the issue ofentry upon the premises (writ of possession) - NO

Ratio:Jurisdiction

An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum ofmoney. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government ofits authority and right to take property for public use. As such,it is incapable of pecuniary estimation and should be filed withthe RTCs.

The SC explained in Brgy. San Roque v. Heirs ofPastorthat the primary consideration in an expropriation suit iswhether the government has complied with the requisites forthe taking of private property. The courts determine theauthority of the government entity, the necessity of theexpropriation, and the observance of due process. The subjectof expropriation suits is the governments exercise of eminentdomain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Although the value of the property is estimated in monetaryterms, this is merely incidental to the suit. The amount isdetermined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety ofthe expropriation.

Res JudicataOne of the requisites of the doctrine of res judicata is that thecourt that rendered the final judgment had jurisdiction over the

subject matter and the parties. Since the MTC had nojurisdiction over expropriation proceedings, res judicata doesnot apply even if the Order of dismissal may have been anadjudication on the merits.

Legality of Entry into PremisesBardillon argued that the CA erred when it ignored the RTCsWrit of Possession over her property issued despite thepending MR. SC not persuaded. The requirement for theissuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation case aregoverned by Sec. 2, Rule 67. On the part of the LGUs, it is

also governed by Sec. 195 of the LGC. The requisites fo

authorizing immediate entry are: 1) the filing of a complaint forexpropriation sufficient in form and substance and 2) thedeposit of the amount equivalent to 15% of the FMV of theproperty to be expropriated based on its current taxdeclaration. In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ after ihad filed the Complaint and deposited the amount requiredwas proper.

The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is amatter properly addressed to the RTC in the course of theproceedings. If petitioner objects to the necessity of thetakeover of her property, she should say so in her AnswerThe RTC has the power to inquire into the legality of theexercise of the right of eminent domain and to determinewhether there is a genuine necessity for it.

REPUBLIC V MANGOTARA

Facts: (Long and confusing case)7 consolidated cases stemmed from the 1914 case o

Cacho v. Government of the United States (1914 Cacho case).

1914 Cacho CaseIn the early 1900s, the late Dona Demetria applied fo

the registration of 2 parcels of land in the Municipality of IliganMoro Province (now called Iligan City, Lanao Del Norte). Onlythe Government opposed Doa Demetria's applications foregistration on the ground that the two parcels of land were theproperty of the United States and formed part of a militaryreservation, generally known as Camp Overton.

The land registration court ruled that the applicanDoa Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion of land occupiedand planted by the deceased Datto Anandog only; and herapplication as to all the rest of the land solicited in said case isdenied. Moreover, the applicant should present thecorresponding deed from Datto Darondon on or before theabove-mentioned 30th day of March, 1913. Final decision inthese cases is reserved until the presentation of the said deedand the new plan. Dissatisfied, Doa Demetria appealed to theSupreme Court. SC affirmed the LRC Decision.

83 years later, the Court was again called upon tosettle a matter concerning the registration of the Lots in thecase of Cacho v. CA.

1997 Cacho caseTeofilo Cacho (Teofilo), claiming to be the late Doa

Demetria's son and sole heir, filed before the RTC a petition fo

5 SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may

through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinanceexercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, owelfare for the benefits of the poor and the landless, upon payment o

just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution andpertinent laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent domainmay not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has beenpreviously made to the owner, and such offer was not acceptedProvided, further, That the local government unit may immediately takepossession of the property upon the filing of the expropriationproceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of aleast fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the propertybased on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriatedProvided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriatedproperty shall be determined by the proper court, based on the faimarket value at the time of the taking of the property."


11/23

emedial aw Review

Page 11of 23igests

5



reconstitution of two original certificates of title (OCTs). RTCgranted Teofilo's petition and ordered the reconstitution and re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The originalissuance of these decrees presupposed a prior judgment thathad become final.

CA reversed the RTC Decision. Teofilo appealed tothe SC. The SC reversed the judgment of the CA andreinstated the decision of the RTC approving the re-issuance

of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The Court found that suchdecrees had in fact been issued and had attained finality, ascertified by the Acting Commissioner, Deputy Clerk of Court III,Geodetic Engineer, and Chief of Registration of the then LandRegistration Commission. MR denied. Hence, the decrees ofregistration were re-issued bearing new numbers and OCTswere issued for 2 parcels of land in Dona Demetrias name.

THE ANTECENT FACTS OF THE PETITIONS AT BARThe dispute did not end with the termination of the 1997 Cachocase. Another 4 cases involving the same parcels of land wereinstituted before the trial courts during and after the pendencyof the 1997 Cacho case. These cases are: (1) ExpropriationCase (2) Quieting of Title Case (3) Ejectment or UnlawfulDetainer Case and (4) Cancellation of Titles and Reversion

Case. These cases proceeded independently of each other inthe courts a quo until they reached the SC, that consolidatedthe seven Petitions.Note: Ill just discuss the expropriation issue, the case is very

long with lots of different issues

The Complaint for Expropriation was originally filed by the Ironand Steel Authority (ISA), now the NSC, against Maria CristinaFertilizer Corporation (MCFC), and the latter's mortgagee, thePhilippine National Bank (PNB). During the existence of ISA,Pres. Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No. 2239,reserving in favor of ISA a parcel of land in Iligan City. MCFCoccupied certain portions of this parcel of land. Whennegotiations with MCFC failed, ISA was compelled to file aComplaint for Expropriation.

When the statutory existence of ISA expired duringthe pendency of Civil Case No. 106, the RTC-Branch 1 allowedthe substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff in Civil CaseNo. 106.

Alleging that the lots involved in the 1997 Cacho caseencroached and overlapped the parcel of land subject of thecase, Republic filed with the RTC a Motion for Leave to FileSupplemental Complaint and to Admit the AttachedSupplemental Complaint, seeking to implead Teofilo Cachoand Demetria Vidal and their respective successors-in-interest,LANDTRADE and AZIMUTH. However, the RTC denied theMotion of the Republic for leave to file and to admit itsSupplemental Complaint. RTC agreed with MCFC that theRepublic did not file any motion for execution of the judgmentof this Court in the ISA case. Since no such motion forexecution had been filed within the prescriptive period of 5years, RTC ruled that its Order dated November 16, 2001,which effected the substitution of the Republic for ISA asplaintiff in the case, was an honest mistake. MR of theRepublic denied because MCFC (the only defendant left in thecase) is NOT a proper party defendant in the complaint forexpropriation. Hence, the case was dismissed. The Republicfiled with the SC the consolidated Petition for Review onCertiorariand Petition for Certiorariunder Rules 45 and 65.

Issues:

1. Who are the proper parties in an expropriationproceeding?

2. W/N forum shopping was committed by the Republicwith the filing of the expropriation and reversioncomplaint

First Issue:The court ruled that defendants in an expropriation

case are NOT limited to the owners of the property to beexpropriated, and just compensation is not due to the propertyowner alone. They include all other persons owning, occupyingor claiming to own the property. In the American jurisdictionthe term 'owner' when employed in statutes relating to eminendomain to designate the persons who are to be made partiesto the proceeding, refer, as is the rule in respect of thoseentitled to compensation, to all those who have lawful interesin the property to be condemned, including a mortgagee, alessee and a vendee in possession under an executorycontract. Every person having an estate or interest at law or inequity in the land taken is entitled to share in the award. If aperson claiming an interest in the land sought to becondemned is not made a party, he is given the right tointervene and lay claim to the compensation.

At the time of the filing of the Complaint foExpropriation, possessory/occupancy rights of MCFC over theparcels of land sought to be expropriated were undisputedLetter of Instructions No. 1277 expressly recognized thaportions of the lands reserved by Presidential Proclamation No2239 for the use and immediate occupation by the NSC, werethen occupied by an idle fertilizer plant/factory and relatedfacilities of MCFC. It was ordered in the same Letter ofInstruction that NSC shall negotiate with the owners of MCFCfor and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation ofMCFC's present occupancy rights on the subject lands. Beingthe occupant of the parcel of land sought to beexpropriated, MCFC could very well be named a defendanin the case. The RTC evidently erred in dismissing theComplaint for Expropriation against MCFC for not being a

proper party. Also erroneous was the dismissal by theRTC of the original Complaint for Expropriation for havingbeen filed only against MCFC, the occupant of the subjectland, but not the owner/s of the said property. Dismissal isnot the remedy for misjoinder or non-joinder of parties.

The owner of the property is not necessarily anindispensable party in an action for expropriation. According toRule 67, Section 1, expropriation proceedings may beinstituted even when "title to the property sought to becondemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippinesalthough occupied by private individuals." The same ruleprovides that a complaint for expropriation shall name asdefendants "all persons owning or claiming to own, oroccupying, any part thereof or interest" in the property soughto be condemned. Clearly, when the property alreadyappears to belong to the Republic, there is no sense in theRepublic instituting expropriation proceedings againsitself. It can still, however, file a complaint forexpropriation against the private persons occupying theproperty. In such an expropriation case, the owner of theproperty is not an indispensable party.

To recall, Presidential Proclamation No. 2239explicitly states that the parcels of land reserved to NSCare part of the public domain, hence, owned by theRepublic. Letter of Instructions No. 1277 recognized onlythe occupancy rights of MCFC and directed NSC to


12/23

emedial aw Review

Page 12of 23igests

5



institute expropriation proceedings to determine the justcompensation for said occupancy rights. Therefore, theowner of the property is not an indispensable party in theoriginal Complaint for Expropriation.

Moreover, the right of the Republic to be substitutedfor ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106 had long been affirmedby no less than this Court in the ISA case. The failure of theRepublic to actually file a motion for execution does not render

the substitution void. A writ of execution requires the sheriff orother proper officer to whom it is directed to enforce the termsof the writ. The Order of the RTC should be deemed asvoluntary compliance with a final and executory judgment ofthis Court, already rendering a motion for and issuance of awrit of execution superfluous.

Second Issue: The Republic did not commit Forumshopping

Forum-shopping takes place when a litigant filesmultiple suits involving the same parties, either simultaneouslyor successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Thus, itexistswhere theelementsof litispendentiaarepresent, namely: (a)identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent thesame interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted

and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the samefacts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two precedingparticulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that mayberendered in the pending case,regardless of which party issuccessful, wouldamounttoresjudicatain the other case.

Here, the elements of litis pendencia are wanting.There is no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for inCivil Case No. 106 (expropriation) and Civil Case No. 6686(cancellation of OCTs of Dona Demetria because thecertificates exceeded the areas granted by the LRC reversion).

Expropriation vis--vis reversionThe Republic is not engaging in contradictions when it

instituted both expropriation and reversion proceedings for the

same parcels of land. The expropriation and reversionproceedings are distinct remedies that are not necessarilyexclusionary of each other. The filing of a complaint forreversion does not preclude the institution of an action forexpropriation. Even if the land is reverted back to the State, thesame may still be subject to expropriation as against theoccupants thereof.

Also, Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allowsthe filing of a complaint for expropriation even when "the title toany property sought to be condemned appears to be in theRepublic of the Philippines, although occupied by privateindividuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful sothat the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify whoare the real owners."

Hence, the filing by the Republic of the SupplementalComplaint for Expropriation impleading Teofilo, Vidal,LANDTRADE, and AZIMUTH, is not necessarily an admissionthat the parcels of land sought to be expropriated are privatelyowned. At most, the Republic merely acknowledged in itsSupplemental Complaint that there are private persons alsoclaiming ownership of the parcels of land. The Republic canstill consistently assert, in both actions for expropriation andreversion, that the subject parcels of land are part of the publicdomain.

In sum, the RTC erred in dismissing the originalComplaint and disallowing the Supplemental Complaint. The

Court reinstates the Complaint for Reversion of the Republic.

REPUBLIC V. CA, REYES

FACTS:- The Republic, through the DPWH, wrote a letter to

Rosario Reyes requesting permission to enter into a

portion (663 sqm out of 1043 sqm) of a parcel of landowned by the latter in Cagayan de Oro City, for theconstruction of an extension of a street.

- The Republic took possession of Reyes property withoutinitiating expropriation proceedings.

- Reyes filed a complaint claiming just compensation anddamages against the Republic with RTC.

- RTC appointed 3 commissioners to determine the FMV othe property as well as the consequential benefits anddamages of its expropriation.

- The commissioners said the highest price for the subjecproperty was P4K per sqm. The Republic offered P 3.2Kper sqm. This was accepted by Reyes and filed an UrgenMotion to Deposit the Amount of P 2,121,600 in May 1994However, the Republic deposited the check only in

October 1994.- RTC ordered the commissioners to submit their report bu

were unable to do so. So upon Reyes motion, the RTCordered the appointment of new commissioners. The newcommissioners made a report valuing the property highetaking into consideration its location and the prevailingmarket values of lots near it.

- The new commissioners stated in their report that theRepublic took not 663 sqm but 746 sqm. Hence, only 297sqm was left. But that after deducting the setback areathe usable/buildable area left to Reyes would only be alittle over 50 sqm. It is neither ideal for purposes of anybuilding because it is small and is triangular in shape.

- RTC: Just compensation = P 5,526,000 (later amended toP 4,696,000). Also awarded damages. The Republicappealed.

- CA: REMANDED the case. The commissionersrecommendations on just compensation were nosupported by valid documents. Also, it was unclear in theRTC decision whether the trial court merely adopted thecommissioners recommendations or the court made itsown independent valuation of the subject property. ThusCA held that a reconvening of the commissioners or anappointment of new commissioners to determine juscompensation was necessary. Moreover, consequentiadamages should be awarded in lieu of actual damages forprivate respondents alleged loss of income from theremaining 297-sqm lot.

- The Republic filed a MR but was denied. Hence, this

appeal.

ISSUE: (1) W/N the case should be remanded; (2) W/Nconsequential damages should be awarded.

HELD: (1) YES. The procedure for determining juscompensation is set forth in Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of CiviProcedure. Section 5 of Rule 67 partly states that upon therendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoinnot more than three (3) competent and disinterested personsas commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the justcompensation for the property sought to be taken.


13/23

emedial aw Review

Page 13of 23igests

5



However, Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing ofcomplaint for eminent domain with the appropriate court by theexpropriator. If no such complaint is filed, the expropriator isconsidered to have violated procedural requirements, andhence, waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67,including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain justcompensation. When there is no action for expropriation andthe case involves only a complaint for damages or just

compensation, the provisions of the Rules of Court onascertainment of just compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule 67)are no longer applicable, and a trial before commissioners isdispensable.

In this case, petitioner took possession of the subjectproperty without initiating expropriation proceedings.Consequently, private respondent filed the instant case for justcompensation and damages. To determine just compensation,the trial court appointed three commissioners pursuant toSection 5 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.None of the parties objected to such appointment.

The trial courts appointment of commissioners in this particularcase is not improper. The appointment was done mainly to aidthe trial court in determining just compensation, and it was not

opposed by the parties. Besides, the trial court is not boundby the commissioners recommended valuation of the subjectproperty. The court has the discretion on whether to adopt thecommissioners valuation or to substitute its own estimate ofthe value as gathered from the records.

However, the trial courts decision is not clear as to itsbasis for ascertaining just compensation. The trial courtmentioned in its decision the valuations in the reports of theCity Appraisal Committee and of the commissioners appointedpursuant to Rule 67. But whether the trial court consideredthese valuations in arriving at the just compensation, or thecourt made its own independent valuation based on therecords, was obscure in the decision. The trial court simplygave the total amount of just compensation due to the propertyowner without laying down its basis. Thus, there is no way to

determine whether the adjudged just compensation is basedon competent evidence. For this reason alone, a remand ofthe case to the trial court for proper determination of justcompensation is in order.

(2) YES. Consequential damages are awarded if as a result ofthe expropriation, the remaining property of the owner suffersfrom an impairment or decrease in value. Thus, there is a validbasis for the grant of consequential damages to the propertyowner, and no unjust enrichment can result therefrom.

NPC V. SANTA LORO VDA. DE CAPIN AND SPS. JULITOQUIMCO AND GLORIA CAPIN

Facts: NPC is a GOCC duly organized under RA No. 6395.Pursuant to its 230 KV Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project(Project), NPC expropriated several parcels of land in Cebu tobe traversed and affected by its transmission towers and lines.

Among the lots affected were those of Capin and Sps. Quimco(respondents).

To be able to enter the said properties, NPC obtainedfrom each them "Permission to Enter for Construction ofTransmission Line Project". These permits were signed byrespondents upon representation by NPC that it would paythem just compensation for the intrusion into their properties.

Thereafter, NPC began to construct on the properties its powelines and transmission towers, which were completed in 1996NPC paid the respondents the amounts of P8,015.90 andP5,350.49, respectively. Only later did they discover that incomparison to the measly sums they were paid by NPC, theother landowners within their area who resisted theexpropriation in court or who entered into compromiseagreements with NPC were paid P448.30 to P450.00/sq. m. as

just compensation for the portions of their properties similarlyaffected by NPCsProject.Accordingly, they filed a Complaint for Rescission o

Agreement, Recovery of Possession of Parcels of LandRemoval of Tower and Transmission Lines, Damages andOther Reliefs, against NPC before the RTC. NPC counteredthat their claim for compensation for the full value of theirproperties was repugnant to Section 3-A of its Charteraccording to which, NPC is obligated only to pay the easemenfee equivalent to 10% of the market value of the land as juscompensation, plus the cost of damaged improvements. (Inshort NPC was saying that there was no expropriation but onlyeasement.)

At the Pre-trial, the parties agreed that the only issuefor resolution by the RTC was the determination of the amount

of just compensation due. Hence, the RTC, upon motion orespondents, issued an Order allowed them to file a Motion oSummary Judgment. The RTC gave NPC a 15-day period fromreceipt of such to file its Opposition to or Comment on theMotion for Summary Judgment. RTC further granted NPCsMotion for Extension of Time to file their comment. But despitethe 15 days extension given, NPC still failed to file itsComment. Consequently, RTC deemed Capin and SpsQuimcos Motion for Summary Judgment submitted foresolution.

RTC rendered a Resolution favoring respondents &ordered NPC to pay damages of P448.33/sq. m. for the 3,199sq.m. of respondents lots taken by NPC. NPC filed MR fo

just compensation to be reduced to P25.00/ sq.m. and aSupplemental MR for reduction of the interest rate (from 14%

to 6% per annum). RTC affimed its Resolution but reducedimposable rate to 6%/annum from filing of the complaint, and12% / annum from the time judgment become final andexecutory until fully satisfied. NPC appealed to the CA. CAaffirmed the RTC. MR denied. Hence, the present Petition foReview before the SC.

Issues: 1. W/N NPC only acquired an easement of right of wayon the properties (consequently making it liable to pay only aneasement fee not exceeding 10% of the fair market value othe portion of their property actually affected by theInterconnection Project, pursuant to Section 3-A(b) of itsCharter)?

Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real propertywith a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The rightof-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation onproperty rights over the land traversed by transmission linesalso falls within the ambit of the term "expropriation." AfterNPCs transmission lines were fully constructed on portions oCapin and Sps. Quimcos lots, NPC imposed restrictionsthereon such as the prohibition against planting or buildinganything higher than three meters below the area traversed bysaid lines. In addition, Spouses Quimco, holders of a SmalScale Quarry Permit, were also prohibited from continuing theiquarry business near NPCs transmission towers because o


14/23


15/23

emedial aw Review

Page 15of 23igests

5



and DAR, which respectively filed their answers. The RTCconducted a pre-trial, and appointed commissioners todetermine the proper valuation of the properties.

The RTC rendered a decision valuing the land atP103.33 per square meter (substantially the same price AFCand HPI wanted). It ordered the DAR and Land Bank to pay

AFC and HPI P1,383,179,000.00 for the land and its standingcrops. Interest equivalent to the market interest rates aligned

with 91-day Treasury Bills, from the date of taking up to fullpayment was imposed. It also ordered DAR and Land bank topay the Commissioners fees, and the attorneys fees, to becomputed at 2 % and 10% of the just compensation of theland and standing crops plus interest equivalent to the interestof the 91-Day Treasury Bills from date of taking until fullpayment, respectively. They were also ordered to pay thecosts.

Land Bank filed an MR. The decision was modifiedand an interest at the rate of 12% per annum was fixed fromthe time the complaint was filed up to the time of the finality ofthe decision. The same interest rate was imposed on the totalobligation from the time it became final and executor up to itsfull payment. The interest on the attorneys fees andCommissioners fees were removed. As to all other aspects,

the decision remained the same.Land Bank filed a notice of appeal. The RTC denied it

saying the proper remedy was a petition for review since it wasacting as a SAC. To question the RTCs denial, Land Bankfiled a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA granted thepetition and eventually nullified the RTCs orders.

AFC and HPI then filed a petition for review oncertiorari praying that the CA be reversed and that the RTCdecision be declared final an executory. The SC 3

rdDivision

said that the granting of the appeal was correct but that theRTCs decision regarding the payment and amount should beaffirmed.

Land Bank filed an MR which the 3rd

Division partiallygranted. The new decision deleted the award of attorneysfees. It also remanded the case to the RTC for a hearing on

the amount of Commissioners fees. Most importantly, itdeleted the 12% interest rateper annumin the total amount of

just compensation.Both AFC and HPI and Land Bank filed MRs which

were denied. Entry of judgment was made on May 16, 2008.Despite this, AFC and HPI still filed on May 28, 2008 severalmotions, namely: (1) motion for leave to file and admit secondmotion for reconsideration; (2) second motion forreconsideration (with respect to the denial of the award of legalinterest and attorney's fees); and (3) motion to refer the secondmotion for reconsideration to the Honorable Court en banc.The case was referred to the SC en banc.

Issue: WON interest and attorneys fees should be awarded toAFC and HPI.

Held: No! The second motion for reconsideration (with respectto the denial of the award of legal interest and attorney's fees)is denied, because, firstly, to grant it is to jettison theimmutability of a final decision a matter of public policy andpublic interest, as well as a time-honored principle ofprocedural law; and secondly, to award interest and attorneysfees despite the fact that Land Bank paid the justcompensation without undue delay is legally and factuallyunwarranted.

Ratio: (On the interest and attorneys fees) The taking oproperty under CARL is an exercise by the State of the powerof eminent domain. A basic limitation on the States power oeminent domain is the constitutional directive that privateproperty shall not be taken for public use without juscompensation. Just compensation refers to the sum equivalento the market value of the property, broadly described to be theprice fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and

ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the faivalue of the property as between one who receives and onewho desires to sell. It is fixed at the time of the actual taking bythe State. Thus, if property is taken for public use beforecompensation is deposited with the court having jurisdictionover the case, the final compensation must include interests onits just value, to be computed from the time the property istaken up to the time when compensation is actually paid odeposited with the court.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,the Courcame to explicitly rule that interest is to be imposed on the justcompensation only in case of delay in its payment, which factmust be sufficiently established. Significantly, Wycocowasmoored on Article 2209, Civil Code, which provides:

Article 2209. If the obligation consists in the paymen

of money and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity fodamages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall bethe payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence ostipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum(1108)

`The history of this case proves that Land Bank didnot incur delay in the payment of the just compensation. Asearlier mentioned, after AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to seltheir lands on October 12, 1995, DAR referred their VOSapplications to Land Bank for initial valuation. Land Bankinitially fixed the just compensation at P165,484.47/hectarethat is, P86,900,925.88, for AFC, and P164,478,178.14, forHPI. However, they rejected Land Banks initial valuationprompting Land Bank to open deposit accounts in thepetitioners names, and to credit in said accounts the amounts

equivalent to their valuations. Although AFC withdrew theamount of P26,409,549.86, while HPI withdrewP45,481,706.76, they still filed with DARAB separatecomplaints for determination of just compensation. WhenDARAB did not act upon their complaints for more than threeyears, AFC and HPI commenced their respective actions fordetermination of just compensation in the Tagum City RTCwhich rendered its decision on September 25, 2001.

It is true that Land Bank sought to appeal the RTCsdecision to the CA, by filing a notice of appeal; and that LandBank filed in March 2003 its petition for certiorari in the CA onlybecause the RTC did not give due course to its appeal. Anyintervening delay thereby entailed could not be attributed toLand Bank, however, considering that assailing an erroneousorder before a higher court is a remedy afforded by law toevery losing party, who cannot thus be considered to act in badfaith or in an unreasonable manner as to make such partyguilty of unjustified delay. As stated in Land Bank of thePhilippines v. Kumassie Plantation:

The mere fact that LBP appealed the decisions of theRTC and the Court of Appeals does not mean that ideliberately delayed the payment of just compensation toKPCI. x x x It may disagree with DAR and the landowner as toth

digest remrev 5

Documents