diablo canyon independent safety committee august 8, 2012 ... · diablo canyon independent safety...

Diablo Canyon Independent Safety CommitteeAugust 7‐8, 2012 Fact‐finding Meeting

Per Peterson, Member and R. Ferman Wardell, Consultant

1. Observe Performance Improvement Review Board Meeting2. DCPP NRC Issues: 230kV Capability and Control Room

Habitability3. Outage 1R17 Misposition, Clearance, and Safety Monitor

Results4. Containment Fan Cooler Unit Status5. Emergency Auxiliary Saltwater Pump Training6. Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program7. Office Seismic Safety Status8. Safety Culture Monitoring Panel9. DCISC Member Meeting with Plant Management

Diablo Canyon Independent Safety CommitteeJuly 18/19, 2012 Fact‐finding Meeting

Peter Lam, Member, and David Linnen, Consultant

1. 2011 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report and 2011 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report

2. Unit 2 Containment Concrete Inspection Results and Comparison to Unit 1 Results

3. Performance During Refueling Outage 1R17 4. Actions to Address Safety System Functional Failures5. DCISC meting with NRC Resident Inspector6. Status of Operator Licensing Classes7. Observation of DCPP Monthly Performance Review Meeting8. DCISC Member Meeting with DCPP Director of Site Services

Diablo Canyon Independent Safety CommitteeSeptember 5/6, 2012 Fact‐finding Meeting

Robert Budnitz, Member, and David Linnen, Consultant

1. Station Human Performance 2. NRC Integrated Three‐month Inspection Report 3. Maintenance Training Program 4. Observation of Electrical Maintenance Training5. Radiological Protection Program Audit for March/April 20126. Status of Implementing DCPP’s Nuclear Generation Operating Plan7. Status of DCPP’s Examination of Options to Once Through Cooling8. DCISC Member Meeting with PG&E Chief Nuclear Officer9. Briefing on the Pending DCPP Emergency Preparedness Drill10. Observation of Emergency Preparedness Drill

1

Plant Events and Operational StatusPerformance Indicators

Jan NimickDirector, Operations ServicesPG&E

October 10, 2012

October 2012 DCISC Public Meeting 2

Table of ContentsSafety• Recordable Injuries• Reactivity Management Program

Station Performance• Generation History • PPIR Areas of Improving and Declining Performance • QV Top Quality Performance Issues List


Table of Contents (Continued)Operational Performance• Operational Focus Index• Plant Misposition Component Performance• HP Error Rate – Station

Equipment Performance• System Health (Age of Red & Yellow Systems)• Equipment Reliability Index• Critical Equipment Clock Resets• Maintenance Rule Performance


Table of Contents (Continued)Program Performance• Corrective Action Program Index – Station• Engineering Program Health


Recordable Injuries


Reactivity Management Program


Reactivity Management Program - Explanations


Generation History – Past 12 Months

0

20

40

60

80

100

0

20

40

60

80

100

DAILY LOAD PROFILE (% MDC Net)

U-1

U-2

JUL AUG SEPOCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN

Unit 1 COD05-07-1985

Unit 2 COD03-13-1986

Continuous Days On-lineUnit-1 = 105.9 Unit-2 = 155.3

Through 9-30-2012

Unit-12012 YTDCapacityFactor 79.75%

Unit-2 2012 YTDCapacityFactor 98.31%

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PPIR Areas of Improving and Declining Performance


QV Top Quality Performance Issues List

NPG Top Quality Performance Issues Updated Through: September 7, 2012 PI Owner: G. Lautt, x4150 Data Owner: B/ Jones, x 4044

Escalations / Stop Work (By Date Identified)

Code**

CAP / Doc Date Identified

Forecast Status Change

Lead Dept

Responsible Mgr / Dir

QV Position

0 Ineffective Efforts to Ensure Problems Remain in CAP QE 50489883 06/08/12 08/30 -> 09/30(Complete C/A's) S G. Close Monitoring

Findings, Deficiencies, Gap Areas, etc.(In Order of Significance)

1a Design Quality Issues QR 50495407 06/22/12 09/20/12 (CARB Review) EP M. Winsor Awaiting CARB

Review

1b PCS Cabinets Heat Calc Errors QF 50504545 08/02/12 12/03/12 (Identify C/A's) PSSA L. Miller Update SAPN

1c Degraded 230kV Capacity – Inadequate Contingency NA 50494228 06/21/12 09/04 -> 10/04(Identify C/A's) EDE P. Johnson Complete ACE

1d DCM T-24 Change Incorrect / Incomplete QF 50464387 50467177 03/05/12 11/01/12

(Complete C/A's) EP M. Winsor Monitoring

2 Human Performance – Stat ion Error Rate QD 50466953 50499131 06/26/12 10/17/12

(Complete C/A's) NP M. Frauenheim Needs LT Vett ing of CAs

3 Outage Preparation Challenges QF 50477803 4/30/12 12/10/12 (Monitor) R T. King Monitoring

4 Adv Trend in CCA H.1(b) Conservative Decisions NR 50494761 50505471

06/25/12 08/07/12

10/26/12 (Complete Eval) NR T. Baldwin Complete RCE

5a MS Rework Not Meeting Goals LW 50500910 50501139 07/24/12 01/21/13

(Identfy C/A's) MA L. Hopson Complete Eval

5b Maintenance Work Package Quality IR 50409024 06/15/11 9/28/12 (Cplt Task 27) MM M. Gibbons Monitoring

5c 2R16 Loss of Startup Events LR 50412203 06/29/11 09/14 -> 12/28(Cplt CA7 & Eff Eval) MS K. Pazdan Complete C/A's

6a Security Procedures Inadequate QF 50350924 60029396 10/12/10 10/15 /12

(Cplt Tasks 52-53) XS M. Priebe Monitoring

6b Standards not Consistent ly Reinforced QF 50446700 50434602 12/12/11 12/31/12

(Train on HU Tools) XS M. Priebe Monitoring

7 Adverse Trend – Procedure Compliance QF 50473118 04/16/12 02/22/13 (Eval Effectiveness) LO D. Burns Monitoring

8 Procurement Services QA Program QF 50465964 03/14/12 01/15/13 (Complete C/A's) SM D. Ritchie Monitoring

9 Vendor quality ACE LA 50497649 07/09/12 01/16/13 (Complete C/A's) PSSA S. Patterson Monitoring

10 Ineffective Design Specification Revision Control QF 50435416 50442476 10/24/11 10/08/12

(Monitor) EPD M. Winsor SAT

Performance Measure/ Thresholds Legend GREEN = Improvement plans adequately resolved the concerns, appropriate act ions have been

taken, performance is considered satisfactory. WHITE = Appropriate actions have been taken but insufficient t ime has elapsed to determine

sustainability. Quality is monitoring the effectiveness of actions. YELLOW = Corrective act ions do not appear to be sufficient to address the concern, or

performance levels are not meeting high standards. RED = C/A's not fully developed (RCE/ACE has not been approved by Sponsor/D-CARB),

or they are not on track . Additional mgt attention is warranted to resolve.

Changes from the previous report are in Bold ** Code Legend Prefix ** Code Legend Suffix

Q_ QV identified issue _F QV FindingI_ INPO identified issue _D QV Deficiency N_ NRC identified issue _G QV GAP (QPAR) L_ Line identified issue _E QV EscalationO_ NSOC identified issue _S QV Stop Work _R, A, W RCE, ACE, WGE


Operational Focus Index


Plant Misposition Component Performance


HP Error Rate – Station


System Health (Age of Red & Yellow Systems)


Equipment Reliability Index


Critical Equipment Clock Resets


Maintenance Rule Performance


Corrective Action Program Index – Station


Engineering Program HealthEngineering Program Health – August, 2012

PI Owner: Pat Nugent Data Coordinator: Kenneth Bych

Overall Health Owner Update Personnel Cornerstone

Infrastructure Cornerstone

Implementation Cornerstone

Equipment Cornerstone

1. Air Operated Valves Shrefler – SFS1 9/7/12 White Green Green White2. Appendix J Holtz - GWH3 9/7//12 White Green Green White3. Appendix R Hampshire - DJH1 9/7/12 Green Yellow Yellow White 4. BA Corrosion Control Hill - JEH2 9/7/12 Green Green Green White 5. Buried Pipe Goyette – LFG1 9/7/12 White Green Green Green 6. Cable Aging Mgmt Zakaria – IMZ1 9/7/12 Green White Green Green 7. Flow Acc. Corrosion Goyette - LFG1 9/7/12 Green Green Green Green 8. Heat Exchangers Kang – JHK4 9/7/12 Green Green Green White 9. In-Service Inspection Gonzalez - DAG1 9/7/12 Green Green White Green 10. In-Service Testing Sorensen - CCSn 9/7/12 Green White Green White11. Large Motors Waters SSW8 9/7/12 White White Green White 12. Maintenance Rule Tripp – BIT1 9/7/12 White Green Green Green13. Margin Management Goyette – LFG1 9/7/12 Green Green Red Green14. Motor Operated Valves Williamson - MVW1 9/7/12 Green White White Green15. Perf. Mon. Equip. Prentice -RNPZ 9/7/12 Yellow Green White White

16. Preventive Maint. (PM) Valine – ADV1 9/7/12 Green White Yellow Green17. RCS Mat’ls Mgmt Arhar - JHA1 9/7/12 Green Green Green Green 18. Snubbers Kewalramani – 9/7/12 Green Green Green Green19. Steam Generator Mgt Arhar – JHA1 9/7/12 Green Green Green GreenNOTE: Overall Health based on many parameters in each cornerstone. Following is a guideline, but scoring can result in red performance with action plans in progress.

Green Satisfactory performance with only minor open items. White Satisfactory performance due to multiple minor open items with corrective actions identified and in progress. Yellow Unsatisfactory performance due to notable (more than minor) deficiencies with corrective actions being determined and/or in progress. Red Unsatisfactory performance due to significant (or multiple notable) deficiencies with corrective actions being determined and/or in progress.

Notable changes this month: Margin Management implementation cornerstone turned red from mid-cycle assessment in August. Action plan being developed in response. Overall program

health color is not driven unhealthy by the change numerically, however it is being reviewed by owner and Manager. ECD = 9/30/12. Extent of condition SAPN 50510599 was written to evaluate other potentially misclassified programs and obtain Engineering Manager concurrence.

1. Large Motors is scheduled to present to PHC in September- Goryance. 2. Appendix R and PME programs were presented to PHC in August. Refer to Explanations Pages for specific recovery actions for all unhealthy programs.

21

Thank You

Jan Nimick

1

NRC Performance Indicators, Reportable Events, and ViolationsJuly 2012 – September 2012

Thomas BaldwinManager, Regulatory ServicesPG&E

October 10, 2012


NRC Performance SummaryJuly 2012 – September 2012Summary:• All NRC performance indicators meet NRC green performance

expectations.• Nine violations were reported since the last DCISC meeting.

All were determined to be very low safety significance.• A performance theme was identified by the NRC in their

midcycle assessment of the DCPP performance. The NRC identified that DCPP was aware of the performance trend and was taking actions to correct the performance.


NRC Performance Indicators

SP-05 IE01 0 >3 0 0 0.54 OpsSP-07 IE03 0 >6 0.9 0.8 0.77 OpsSP-06 IE04 0 >1 0 0 0.4 Ops

Mitigating System Performance Index (12 Qtrs) EDG MS06 >1E-6 -4.1E-07 -3.0E-07 <3.0E-07 MaintHPSI MS07 >1E-6 -3.1E-09 3.0E-08 <3.0E-07 MaintAFW MS08 >1E-6 -8.0E-08 1.7E-07 <3.0E-07 MaintRHR MS09 >1E-6 -4.2E-08 -3.1E-08 <3.0E-07 MaintCWS MS10 >1E-6 5.4E-08 -3.9E-08 <3.0E-07 Maint

SP-12 Safety System Functional Failures (4 Qtrs) SSFF MS05 0 >5 3 2 0 Maint

SP-13 BI01 0 >50% 0.01% 0.03% 0.05% U10.20% U2

C&EO U2C17

SP-14 BI02 <0.6% >50% 0.58% 0.37% 0.94% Maint

SP-15 EP01 >98.0% 90% 95.7% 96.4% EP

SP-16 EP02 100% 80% 93.3% 95.0% EP

SP-17 EP03 >99.9% 94% 100.0% 99.7% EP

SP-18 OR01 0 >2 1 0 RP

SP-19 PR01 0 >1 0 0 C&EO

Sec SP-20 PP01 <0.010 >0.08 0.007 0.018 Sec

Notes

Unplanned Scrams with Complications (12 Qtrs)

Cod

e

N/A

PPIR Goal OrgNRC WhiteIndicator Top Quart

Data Owner: Michael Richardson and Steven Zawalick

NRC Performance Indicators Diablo Canyon

PI Owner: Tom Baldwin x6060

Updated Through: August 2012

See next 2 slides for yellow PI explanations and action plans.

Unit 2

Initi

atin

g Ev

ents

Unplanned Scrams per 7000 critical hours (automatic and manual scrams)

Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 critical hours

Unit 1

Legend

Uni

t-Spe

cific

Per

form

ance

Indi

cato

rs

Emer

genc

y Pr

epar

edne

ssC

orne

rsto

neM

itiga

ting

Syst

ems

Barrie

r In

tegr

ity Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity - % of TS

RCS Leak Rate - % of TS

Sub-Report

Uni

t Com

mon

Per

form

ance

Indi

cato

rs

Rad

iatio

n Sa

fety

Occupational exposure control effectiveness (the number of non-compliances with 10CFR20 requirements for (1) high (greater than 1000mRem/Hr), and (2) very high radiation areas, and uncontrolled personnel exposure exceeding 10% of the stochastic or 2% of the non-stochastic limits, 4 Qtrs)

Offsite release performance (Number of effluent events that are reportable per 10CFR20, 10CFR50 Appendix I, ODCM, or TS, 4 Qtrs)

Alert & Notification (expressed as a percentage of the total number of ANS sirens tested during the previous quarter) (4 Qtrs)

Emergency Response Organization (ERO) drill/exercise performance (expressed as a % of opportunities to perform classifications, communications, & PARs that were successful) (8 Qtrs)

ERO Drill Participation (expresses as a percentage of "key" ERO members that have participated in a drill, exercise, or actual event in the previous 8 Qtrs)

Protected Area Security Equipment performance index (IDS&CCTV)

Favorable Trend Green Better than Station Goal

Un-favorable Trend Yellow Worse than Station Goal

Neutral Trend (little or no change) Red Worse than NRC "green"


Licensee Event Reports (LERs)July 2012 – September 2012• LER 1-2012-003 was issued August 6, 2012 to report loss of the

Unit 1 low temperature overpressure protection system for 9 minutes on June 7, 2012.

• LER 1-2012-004 was issued August 13, 2012 to report the transition into Mode 3 with an inoperable turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump.

• LER 1-2012-005 was issued August 31, 2012 to report the July 5, 2012 discovery of a non-conservative historical change to the atmospheric dispersion factor coefficient used in determining the control room ventilation system performance.


NRC Enforcement SummaryJuly 2012 – September 2012• Inspection Reports Issued:

– Integrated Inspection Report (IR 2011-003, 8/13/12) – Midcycle Assessment Letter (IR 2012-006, 9/4/12)

• Four NCVs in the last four quarters have a cross-cutting aspect of H.1(b), Conservative Assumptions in Decision Making. The NRC noted that this represents an new cross-cutting theme, but acknowledged that PG&E had identified the theme and was evaluating and correcting the cause. The NRC is therefore monitoring PG&E’s efforts in addressing this theme until the theme criteria are no longer met.


Noncited Violations (NCVs)NRC IdentifiedJuly 2012 – September 2012• NCV (Green) – Inadequate Preferred Offsite Power System

Design Control (C-C Aspect H.1(b) Conservative Assumptions)• SLIV (Green) - Failure to Perform a 50.59 evaluation (C-C

Aspect H.1(b) Conservative Assumptions)• NCV (Green) – Failure to Follow Procedure for Control of Tools

for Use on Stainless Steel (C-C Aspect H.4(c) Oversight)• FIN (Green) – Feedwater System Weld Flaw (C-C Aspect

H.4(a) Human Error Prevention)• NCV (Green) – Entering a High Radiation Area with Dose Rates

Greater than 1.0 Rem/Hour Without Knowing the Dose Rates in the Area (C-C Aspect H.2(d) Facilities/Equipment)

• NCV (Green) – Failure to Follow Procedure Resulted in the Loss of Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System Safety Function (C-C Aspect H.4(a) Human Error Prevention)


Noncited Violations (NCVs)PG&E Identified

July 2012 – September 2012 (Continued)• PG&E Identified – Inspections of reactor vessel supports were

not performed in accordance with ASME Code inspection requirements until November 2011.

• PG&E Identified – The Unit 2 bypass valves to the main steam isolation valves were not opened as required following unit shutdown on April 25, 2012, resulting in water accumulation in the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump steam supply line.

• PG&E Identified – A Unit 2 locked high radiation door inside containment was found unsecured.


NRC Cross-Cutting Issue Matrix

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

For HU/PIR For SCWENo CC Issues No CC Issues1-2 CC Issues N/A

0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 CC Issues N/A>3 CC Issues >0 CC Issues

0 0 0 0 n-3 n-2 n-1 n

6NRC/SR

176324Q11

1Q122Q12

3Q 2011 through 2Q 2012 (Rolling 4 Quarters)

Summary of Findings

0Findings per Quarter

A

-

Cross-Cutting Aspect

SCCI open with NRC

N

3Q11 Alternative Process P.1(e)

Total Findings, rolling yr Sum

49

16

2

Conservative Assumptions

H.1(b)

Facilities / Equipment

H.2(d)

Documentation H.2(c)

Training / Qualification

H.2(b)

0 0

Communication H.1(c)

4

1

0 0

3

2

Coordination H.3(b)

Procedural Compliance

H.4(b)

0 0

Human Error Prevention

H.4(a)

Planning H.3(a)

Systematic Process

H.1(a)

0

Communication P.3(c)

Potential Chilling Effects S.2(c)

Low Threshold P.1(a)

0

0

Trending P.1(b)

Legend

Training S.2(a)

Behaviors S.1(a)

0

Investigation S.2(b)

0

Performance Trending

P.3(b)

Alternative Process

S.1(b)

0

Safety ConsciousWork Environment

0

Perseptions of Retaliation

Environment to Raise Concerns

0

White

1

0

Institutionalized P.2(b)

0

Evaluation / Extent P.1(c)

Corrective Action P.1(d)

NRC Cross-Cutting Aspect Summary for DCPP

Aspects

Components

Areas

Timeliness P.2(a)

Frequent / Comprehensive

P.3(a)

Problem Identification and Resolution

Corrective Action Program

SummaryCross-Cutting Aspect Health

1871

GreenWhiteYellowRed 1 25

26

Long-Term Plant Safety

H.2(a)

39

ALL w/ CCA

1

Human Performance

Decision Making Resources Work Control Work PracticesSelf and

Independent Assessment

Operating Experience

6

YellowRed

2

Oversight H.4(c)

01

Green

1

9

Thank You

Thomas Baldwin

1

QPAR Summary and Top Concerns

Mikeal CulalaDirector, Quality VerificationPG&E

October 10/11, 2012


• Design Quality

• Human Performance Errors

• Radiological Work Practices

Top 3 Concerns


Design Quality• Outage Preparation and Execution

– The plant was challenged to complete major design modifications due to issues with design planning and implementation• Root Cause Evaluation completed (SAPN 50495407)• Significant Changes made to prepare for 2R17 outage• QV will perform an assessment of Design Quality to evaluation

effectiveness

• Contributing Factors and Insights– Failure to recognize the risk and complexity of the First

Time Projects• Did not designate as a strategic Project (Engineering Major

Project)• Ineffective management of the project


– Insight• Project management and recognition of the Strategic nature

major projects will enable the station to complete the project with a quality product

• Station management involvement through effective RRBs will improve the Quality of the design package


Human Performance• Outage performance short of plant goals

– Fundamental HU behaviors not internalized by all plant staff– Supervisors are not effectively coaching to standards– Work Instruction Quality

• Operations Status Control– Status control events continue to challenge performance

• Maintenance– Station rework did not meet goals– Corrective action includes improved observations and

coaching by management and focus on work instructions

• Insights– Supervisors and individual contributors have not

internalized basic error reduction tools into their daily routine

– Management focus on observation and training will improve day to day work activities


Radiological Work Practices• Self-Assessment results

– Supervisors are not enforcing standards and expectations with Individual Contributors

– RP personnel are not challenging RCA workers to adhere to RP Standards

• Corrective Actions– Training for all plant personnel on proper RCA work

practices by 12/31/12– Emphasis on supervisor coaching and observations in the

RCA

• Insights– Persistent problems with radiological work practices

indicate that workers do not fully understand the effects of their actions

– Subtle declines in standards and performance occurred as management were not sufficiently engaged in activities

7

Thank You

Mikeal Culala

San Luis Obispo County Office of Emergency Services

Overview of Diablo Canyon Related Emergency Planning and Preparedness

Objectives

Introduction to OESHow OES and others prepare Planning and training overview Exercises and drills informationGeneral related information

Who/What is County OES?

NPP Allocated Positions

5.5 total permanent staff positions in County OES

4.25 of the 5.5 are committed to nuclear power plant emergency readiness

In addition to the 5.5, OES currently has two temporary help Emergency Services Coordinators

General Emergency Op Area Coordinator

County OES coordinates general emergency planning, within the Operational Area between local agencies (what is an Operational Area?)

For nuclear power plant emergency planning, County OES coordinates with and between local, state, and federal agencies, as well as other organizations, and closely with PG&E.

Federal Oversight

• FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program

• Program created to address communities with commercial nuclear power plants.

• FEMA reviews and approves planning and preparedness activities, evaluates exercises and issues findings if issues are identified.

FEMA Requirements

FEMA term: “Offsite Response Organization” is a term used to refer to state, tribal, and/or local government organizations acting to protect the public health and safety offsite.

Thus, the County, cities, special districts, the State and related agencies are the OROs related to Diablo Canyon.

Offsite Response Organization

Our ORO make up is unique in that we have one common emergency plan for all the ORO jurisdictions related to Diablo Canyon - the San Luis Obispo County-Cities Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response Plan.

OES coordinates NPP emergency planning with and between the OROs, the state, and FEMA.

Joint Emergency Preparedness

The uniqueness of this joint plan resulted in an “Emergency Preparedness Leadership Award” in 2006 from the U.S. EPA Pacific Southwest Region.

The areas recognized included the unified efforts of local agencies to plan for nuclear power plant emergencies.

Partnerships

County Departments Seven Cities Special Districts Hospitals and EMS Local Agencies Schools Non Governmental

Organizations CA counties State Agencies Federal Agencies

OES serves as a coordinating agency between partner agencies to prepare and respond to emergencies.

A sampling of the agencies we work with related to emergency readiness

Emergency Planning

The NPP plan is made up of three parts, which includes an overall administrative plan, attachments that include over 50 “Standard Operating Procedures” – or SOPs - and a third section with reference information.

The SOPs are essentially NPP individual response plans or guides for the various ORO agencies who work jointly on emergency preparedness.

Emergency Planning

Examples are SOPs for the CHP, school districts, County Office of Education, each of the five incorporated cities in the EPZ, Caltrans, State Parks, Public Works, Public Health, Sheriff, Cal Poly, American Red Cross, Port San Luis, Cuesta College, Paso Robles Event Center, Department of Social Services, among others.

Emergency Planning

There are also SOPs for various specific functions; for example, an SOP for the County Emergency Services Director, public information, offsite dose assessment/tracking, preparedness, protective action guidelines, among others.

Emergency Planning

1 NPP Admin Plan (Overview)Over 50 agency and function based SOPs

SOPs include: Checklists for each emergency position Preplanned actions based on

emergency classification level Evacuation Time Estimates Special Needs considerations Public School Relocation Carless Collection Public Notification Methods Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Control Guidelines Reentry, Return, and Recovery Ingestion Pathway issues

Emergency Planning

As just a couple of examples, the CHP SOP has predetermined traffic control points, the County Office of Education coordinates with the EOC and then in turn various school districts, the Air Pollution Control District SOP has procedures related to coordinated plume tracking.

Evacuation Times Estimate: information on projections of how long it will take to evacuate certain areas and much more info.

Training Overview

Annual Emergency Worker Training Program:

•Overview of Emergency Plans•Procedure training•Field sampling•Monitoring, and Decontamination•Exposure control•Public Information•Public Notification Methods•Dose Assessment

5,576 hours in 2011

Exercises and Drills

NPP exercises are required and evaluated by FEMA; however, we also go beyond what is required … we also request FEMA provide evaluators at times for exercises that are not required to be evaluated but we want their input.

Required exercises include plume, ingestion pathway zone, and a newly required hostile action based exercise scenario.

Full scale exercise participation may range from 200-1000 players.

Exercises and Drills

A FEMA evaluated exercise took place on December 7, 2011 for the Southern Congregate Care site (Evacuee Monitoring and Decontamination Center at the Santa Maria Fairpark).

A full scale non-evaluated, but FEMA observed, exercise took place October 3, 2012, involving many agencies and hundreds of participants.

Smaller drills take place on an ongoing basis throughout the year.

Emergency Communications

• Emergency Alert System (EAS)

• Early Warning System sirens (EWS)

• Red Phone System• Tone Alert System• WebEOC• Radio caches• Multiline Unit• Reverse 9-1-1• Direct Intercom Phones

Satellite Phone systems

Emergency Operations Center

A dedicated facility serves as the County’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

Used for many different types of emergencies and disasters

Staffed partially or fully depending on need and severity of emergency

Co-located with PG&E Emergency Operations Facility

RESPONSE FACILITY OVERVIEW

OperationalSupport Center

Control Room

Unified Dose Assessment

Center

Joint Information

Center

PG&E Technical

Support Center

CountyEmergencyOperationsCenter

PG&E EmergencyOperationsFacility

Joint Information Center & Phone Assistance Center

A dedicated facility serves as a Joint Information Center (JIC) for ORO agencies and PG&E

The JIC includes:

• Press briefing room

• Workspace for OROs & PG&E

• Phone Assistance Center

Unified Dose Assessment Center

Serves as a unified center, in the EOC/EOF, for county, state, & local agencies to provide:

•Dose projection & assessment •Plume modeling •Monitoring results•Ingestion information

School Relocation Sites

• Plans and agreements in place for school relocation centers.

• Schools may relocate children to these centers before protective actions are recommended.

• Parents can reunite with their children at these centers.

Public Notification & Information

www.slocountyoes.comDuring times of emergency: 543-2444

Agricultural Information

Special Needs List

List of self-registered independent living special needs individuals who may need assistance evacuating.

San Luis Obispo County OES

www.slocounty.ca.gov/oes

www.facebook.com/slocountyoes

@slocountyoes (Twitter)

(805) 781-5011

Fire Protection Diablo Canyon Power Plant

Lessons Learned from Fukushima

Robert Lewin, Fire ChiefOctober 11, 2012

Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee

Fire Protection• Diablo Canyon Fire Department is an onsite

private industrial fire department.• 5 personnel on duty daily.• Fully trained and professional.• No reserve force.• Diablo Canyon Fire is well equipped with two

type 1 fire engines, a type 4 fire engine, Haz Mat trailer, Multi-Casualty trailer, Breathing Support Trailer and other resources.

• CAL FIRE/San Luis Obispo County Fire is the fire department of jurisdiction responding from offsite.

Fire Protection• Regular joint training between the departments• An annual MOU is signed clarifying each

agency’s responsibilities.• CAL FIRE is an all risk consolidated fire

department with 21 fire stations in San Luis Obispo County. We can access resources from throughout California.

• CAL FIRE responds 3 fire engines, a SLO City ladder truck and 2 Chief Officers to any fire.

• CAL FIRE is part of the offsite Emergency Operation Center Command & Control.

Regulations• Outside the power block the plant is regulated

by the County adopted California Fire Code and National Standards.

• Inside the power block the plant is regulated by the NRC which has implemented National Fire Protection (NFPA) 805 as an alternative standard. Requires specific firefighter training.

• Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited (NEIL) also inspects for fire safety.

Past Incidents• Over the last 30 years there have

been fires and other incidents at the plant:– 4 large wildland fires and many smaller

ones– 2 transformer explosions and fires– Insulation fire in the generating facility– Oil fires– Pump fires– Haz Mat spills

1982 Wildland Fire in Diablo Canyon

2007 Fire

Heavy Vegetation Growth

Prescribe Burning and other Fuel

Treatment Projects

• Necessary to maintain volatile vegetation from destroying outside power supply

Do Power Plants in the US Need Off-Site firefighters?

• 104 reactors at 65 power plants.

• Only 10 have full time fire departments. Including Diablo Canyon.

• 526 firefighters were dispatched to Fukushima from off-site

IN DANGEROUS RADIATION LEVELS, THE MEN MOSTLY OVER 40, HAD JUST 60 MINUTES TO LAY 800M (1/2 mile) OF FIRE HOSE TO HELP PUMP SEA-WATER FROM THE COAST TO THE REACTOR BUILDINGS.

Helicopter used to

drop water

Hydrogen Explosion

Firefighters vs. Engineers• Both are equally concerned with safety.• Engineers are tasked with preventing and

mitigating emergencies through good engineering.• Firefighters are tasked with preventing and

responding to incidents by reducing hazards and then mitigating an emergency after it happens.

• Engineers believe through redundancy of systems you can prevent an incident. Defense in Depth

• Firefighters believe systems and people may fail and then firefighters will be called.

Let’s make sure firefighters are trained and equipped.

• Both onsite firefighters and offsite firefighters need to be trained to industry standards and then have additional specialized training on protecting a nuclear power plant.

• Offsite responders must be required to participate in rigorous training with the onsite fire department in all areas of the plant, including within the radiological control area.

• Onsite notification systems and communications systems need to be modern and interoperable with offsite responders. Radio and cellular communication systems at Diablo need to be improved.

• The local emergency plans need to focus offsite fire departments’ emergency response onsite and limit their expectations for offsite duties.

Specific Lessons Learned

• The Diablo Canyon security needs to improve their speed in getting emergency response personnel to an emergency.

• Firefighters must understand and practice laying and pumping large-diameter hose with fire engines to the reactors and spent fuel pools from the ocean and reservoirs.

• Firefighters need to train on; time, distance and shielding on the ground, not in a classroom.

• Firefighters must be brought into the discussion with the NRC and the nuclear industry to collaborate on the surest methods to protect nuclear power plants and the communities that surround them.

• Specialized equipment needs to be stored off site where it will not be contaminated and should include personal protective equipment, water and food.

• An ordering process needs to be developed nationally to quickly order firefighters and radiological workers from other nuclear power plants to assist the affected plant.

• Plans need to be developed to evacuate nonessential employees and bring emergency responders to the plant if both access roads are blocked.

• Pacheco Road (North Road) needs improvement and to be more accessible.

• Diablo Canyon needs a new fire station built to essential services standards

• Emergency Operations Center needs to be expanded or rebuilt.

• CAL FIRE needs staff to focus on Emergency Planning

Conclusion• Diablo Canyon fire protection in many ways is a

model for other Nuclear Power Plants• Still, we need to make improvements• Fire Protection and Security at a Nuclear Power

Plant are both equally as important.• The defense against a radiological emergency is

similar to a fire:– Prevent it from happening– Contain it at its source– Control it quickly

• The Fire Department must be part of the Fukushima lessons learned discussion and implementation.

Questions

1

Fukushima Status UpdateOctober 11, 2012

2

Rec 2.1 Seismic Re-evaluations

NRC Actions• Draft Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) out for review• Final ISG to be issued by November

Current Actions• DCPP categorized as a 3-year plant• Senior Seismic Hazards Advisory Committee process is

proceeding • DCPP response letter to ISG due January 2013• DCPP hazard reevaluation due March 2015

3

Rec 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns

NRC Actions• NRC submittal due November 27, 2012 on walkdown results

Current Actions• The status of this item will be discussed later in today’s

presentations

4

Rec 2.1 Flooding Re-evaluations

NRC Actions• Draft Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) out for review• Final ISG to be issued by November

Current Actions• DCPP response letter to ISG due January 2013• DCPP hazard reevaluation due March 2015

5

Rec 2.3 Flooding Walkdowns

NRC Actions• NRC submittal due November 27, 2012 on walkdown results

Current Actions• The status of this item will be discussed later in today’s

presentations

6Rec 4.2 FLEXProject team includes:

– Current project manager: Murrell Evans– 3 former Shift Managers one of which was an Operations

director – PG&E engineering and contractors– Westinghouse

Current Actions– Coping strategies being developed– Portable pump/generator staging locations– Equipment storage locations– Deployment routes – Hose/cable primary and secondary connection points and

routings

7

Rec 4.2 FLEX cont.Purchased equipment to date

– Trailer mounted diesel driven pump– Trailer mounted diesel driven 10kW generators (6

purchased)– Portable diesel driven diesel fuel oil transfer pump– Football satellite phone (3 footballs)– Radios (80 dual-band and 75 single-band)– Communication trailers (3 trailers)– Diesel driven air compressor for diesel generator air

receivers

9Rec 9.3 EP Communications and Staffing• Communications Assessment in progress in accordance

with NEI 12-01• Major improvements include 3 satellite footballs, 80 dual-

band and 75 single-band hand-held radios, and 3 communications trailers

• DCPP submittal of communications assessment and implementation schedule: October 31, 2012

• Phase 1 EP Staffing Study due April 2013

1

Status and Plans for Beyond-Design-Basis Emergency Power Supplies

October 11, 2012

2Beyond-Design-BasisElectrical Requirements

The Order requires the following assumptions:• Beyond-design-basis external event occurs impacting all units at site

• All onsite and offsite AC power is unavailable for an extended period of time

• Coping strategies must be capable of maintaining or restoring core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling

3Onsite Emergency Diesel Generators• Current emergency response procedures provide direction to restore AC power in accordance with station blackout guidance

• FLEX guidelines are being developed to specify actions for an extended loss of AC power

4

DC Coping Strategy

• Maintain ability to monitor key plant parameters• Existing battery life is 5.5 hours for one and 8.5 hours for

the remaining two• Strategy includes:

– Load stripping to extend battery life– Restoring charger power supply– Portable meters for local monitoring

5120V/240V AC Portable Generators• Restore ventilation to vital areas• Area lighting• Support communication equipment• Other miscellaneous needs

6Long-Term Restoration• Additional equipment to be provided by the Regional

Center– Industry assembling equipment list for Regional Center– 24 hour response time

• Transmission Operation– Actions being evaluated

1

Fukushima Flooding and Seismic Walkdowns

October 11, 2012

2

2.3 Flooding Walkdowns• Procedures developed in accordance with NEI 12-07• Teams consisted of experienced DCPP and corporate civil

engineering staff• Inspected 24 watertight barriers, 6 watertight hatches, over

40 penetration seals, 4 water tight doors and breakwaters• NRC Resident participated in selected inspections.• Items entered into Corrective Actions Program include:

• Corrosion (e.g., Auxiliary Salt Water (ASW) Snorkel piping)

• Concrete degradation (cracks, spalling, etc.)

• Debris in drains

• Potential preventive maintenance enhancements

• Walkdown results to be submitted to NRC November 27, 2012

3

ASW Snorkel Entry into Vault – Corrosion Source

4

ASW Snorkels – Corrosion on Top

5

Concrete Crack on ASW Vault Wall

6

Plugged Roof Drain – Aux. Building

7

2.3 Seismic Walkdowns• Procedures developed in accordance with industry

guidance• NRC Resident participated in selected inspections.• Scope for both units:

– Approximately 260 components (Including Spend Fuel Pool related items)

– Approximately 140 Associated Area Walkbys

8

2.3 Seismic Walkdowns cont.• Items entered into Corrective Actions Program include:

– Degraded Conditions includes approximately 32 corrosion related items and approximately 6 observation of non-seismic related issues (e.g., Leaky valve, loose insulation) and 2 others.• Most Notable: One Auxiliary Building Supply Fan declared

inoperable due to Anchorage degradation.– Configuration: Non-conforming conditions approximately

13; includes items such as grating clips, anchorage size discrepancies, loose conduits, weld size anomalies.

– Spatial Interaction; approximately 10 items, includes items such as; light fixture attachments; Seismically Induced System Interaction and flooding and housekeeping items.

• Walkdown results to be submitted to NRC November 27, 2012

9

2.3 Seismic Walkdowns

10

2.3 Seismic Walkdowns


Examples (Continued)


Conclusion• DCPP has completed a significant amount of work to

bring the site up to compliance. We have completed bracing upgrades to over 70% of the offices on the plant site.– These areas include all offices outside the Protected Area,

two of five floors in our Administration Building and the Control Room. Our goal is to have all areas in compliance by the end of the first quarter of 2013.

9

Thank You

Ken Pazdan

diablo canyon independent safety committee august 8, 2012 ... · diablo canyon independent safety...

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