descartes on the power of ideas

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North merican Philosophical Publications

Descartes on the Power of "Ideas"Author(s): Stephen I. WagnerSource: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Jul., 1996), pp. 287-297Published by: University of Illinois Presson behalf of North American Philosophical PublicationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27744708.

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2/12

History

of

Philosophy

Quarterly

Volume

13,

Number

3,

July

1996

DESCARTES ON

THE

POWER OF IDEAS

Stephen

I.

Wagner

Descartes'discussion

of

ideas

in

Meditation

III

is often

seen as

the

most

problematic

element

in

his

metaphysical

project.

A

previous

paper

in

this journal offers a reading ofMeditation II which attributes toDescartes

a

conception

of the

mind

as

an

active

power.1

That

view

can

provide

a

range

of

clarifications

to

Descartes'Meditation

III

theory

of

ideas.

This

paper

will

spell

out the most

central

of

those clarifications.

Even

though

this discussion of

Descartes'theory

of

ideas

does

derive

from

an

earlier

analysis

ofMeditation

II,

it

need

not

be

seen

as

dependent

on

the

validity

ofthat

analysis.

Our initial claims

about

the nature

of

mind

can

be

considered

along

the

lines

of

Descartes'

own

approach

in Part

VI

of

the Discourse

on

Method,

with

regard

to the

suppositions

he

employs

in

theOptics and theMeteorology. He tells

us

inDiscourse VI that he thinks

he

can

deduce

these

suppositions

from his

primary

truths,

but

that

in

his

presentation

he would

simply

allow the

causes

to

be

proved

by

the

ef

fects ?that

is,

he

would

take the

explanatory

force of

these

suppositions

as

constituting

such

proof.

Our claims about the mind's

nature

can

be

derived

from

the Meditation

II text.

But

the

present

discussion

need

not

presuppose

the

validity

ofthat derivation?the results ofthat

analysis

may

also be taken

as

suppositions.

With these

as

starting points,

we

will

be

led

to

a

range

of

clarifications

to

Descartes'

discussion

of ideas

inMedita

tion III. These

effects

can

serve

to

furnish,

ifnot

proof,

at

least

support

for the

explanatory

causes.

I.

The Meditation II

Discoveries

Our first claim

is

that theMeditation

II

thinker discovers themind

to

be

an

active

power,

whose

cognitive

activity

consists

in

the

generating

of

representations.

All

of

the

mind's

cognitive

acts

are

discovered

to

involve

some

degree

of

generative activity?from

the

most

perfect

exercises ofthat

power

in

generating

clear

and distinct

perceptions,

to

the

less

perfect

exercises

in

our

imaginings

and

sensings.

Our

second claim

is

that

this

discovery

is

achieved

by recognizing

that,

in

each of

our

thoughts,

the

power

affecting

our

will is

a

reflection

of the

mind's

generative

power.

For

example,

the

clear

and

distinct

perception

of

the

piece

of

wax

has

two

components?the

representation

of

the

wax as

287

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3/12

288

HISTORY

OF

PHILOSOPHY

QUARTERLY

extended,

which

is

a

representation

generated

by

the

intellect,

and

the

power

compelling

our

assent,

which is a

representation

of the mind's

activity.

In

our

perceptions

which

are

not

clear

and

distinct,

this

power

is

experienced

as

a

less

forceful inclination of the will.

In

addition

to

the

recognition

of these individual

thoughts

as

generative

acts,

Meditation

II

provides

the

thinker

with

a

clear and distinct

perception

of the

mind

itself

as

a

thinking thing.

This

perception,

also

self-generated,

is achieved

by

consolidating

the

spectrum

of

representations

of the mind's

activity

into

a

single representation,

which

consists

wholly

of

a

power

affecting

the meditator's

will.

The

generation

of this idea of the mind

explains

Descartes' claim in the

Synopsis

that

Meditation

II

enables

themeditator

to

form

a

concept

of

the

soul

which

is

as

clear

as

possible

and is also

quite

distinct from

every

concept

of

body

(AT

VII,

13;

CSM

II,

9).2

The natures ofmind and

body

are

presented

in

our

clear and

distinct

perceptions

of

each.

The

clear

and

distinct

perception

of

mind

represents

it

as

a

generative

power,

capable

of

operating

on

its

own?as

such,

it

qualifies

as

the idea

of

a

substance.

The

perception

of

body

includes

no

representation

of

power

and

no

compelling

ground

for

concluding

that it exists.

Finally, these discoveries lead the meditator to an understanding of the

meanings

of

thought

and existence.

Thinking

is

seen

to

signify

the

causal

activity

of

generating

ideas.

Existing

is taken

to

signify

an

exer

cise

of

causal

power.

Thus,

the meditator

is

justified

in

concluding

that

whenever

he

thinks,

he

exists.

Given

these

claims,

we can

turn to

Descartes' discussion

of ideas

in

Meditation III.

We

will look

first

at

the clarifications

provided

for

our

understanding

of

objective

reality,

formal

reality

and the causal laws.

We

will then

look

briefly

at

the

impact

of

our

perspective

on

material

falsity

and the idea ofGod.

II.

OBJECTIVE

REALITY

AND

THE

CAUSAL

LAWS

Descartes' discussion of

ideas

inMeditation

III is

primarily

in the

service

of

deciding

whether

he

can

conclude

to

the

existence

of

anything

other

than

himself.

After

rejecting

his

natural

inclinations

as

a

reliable

guide

for

deciding

that

any

of his

ideas

are

not

self-generated,

Descartes

develops

another

way

of

proceeding:

But it

now occurs

to

me

that there

is

another

way

of

investigating

whether

some of the things ofwhich I possess ideas exist outside me. In so far as the

ideas

are

simply

modes of

thought,

there is

no

recognizable

inequality

among

them:

they

all

appear

to

come

from

within

me

in

the

same

fashion.

(AT

VII, 39-40;

CSM

II,

27-28).

Taking

an

idea

as

a

mode

of

the

mind

is

taking

it

materially ?as

an

operation

of

the

intellect,

as

the

Meditations'

Preface

tells

us.

On

our



4/12


5/12

290

HISTORY

OF

PHILOSOPHY

QUARTERLY

tion

from within

experience.

And since the

power

representing

the mind

is the

power

to

generate

any

and all ofour

ideas,

itwill effectamore forceful

inclination

of the will than the

power

experienced

in the

idea of

the

wax.

Thus,

the

idea of the

mind

will,

as

Descartes

puts

it,

undoubtedly

be

seen

to

have

more

objective reality.

A

few clarifications

are

in

order here.

First,

this

reading

of

objective

reality

leads the meditator

to

identify

reality

with

power

and,

given

the

Meditation

II

result,

to

equate

both

of

these with

existence. This three

fold identification

is

supported

by

Descartes'

later

characterization of

objective

reality

as

the

mode

of

being

by

which

a

thing

exists

objectively

in the intellect byway of an idea (ATVII, 41; CSM II, 29). We can note

too

that the

suggestion

made

by

many

commentators

that

objective

reality

must

be

identified

with

possible

existence

is

in

fact

appropriate.

But

within the

order

of

reasons,

an

understanding

of

necessary

existence

has

not

yet

been

achieved,

so

the

meditator does

not

yet

have

the

resources

to

make that finer distinction.

The statement

just

quoted

leads

us

to

a

second

point.

Descartes

charac

terizes

objective

reality

as

the

way

inwhich

a

thing

exists

in

the

intellect,

and

this

might

seem

to

suggest

that

it is

a

mistake

to

explicate

it

as a

power

affecting the will. But Descartes' comments

to

Mersenne

in

January

1641

are

helpful

here:

I

claim that

we

have ideas

not

only

of all that

is

in

our

intellect,

but

also of

all

that

is in

the will. For

we

cannot will

anything

without

knowing

that

we

will

it,

nor

could

we

know this

except by

means

of

an

idea.

. .

.

(AT

III,

295;

CSMK

III,

1724).

We

are

reminded

here

that

our

entire discussion

of

ideas

is

conducted

from

a

self-reflective

posture.

From

this

posture,

the inclinations

of

the

will,

as

they

are

experienced

in

our

thoughts,

can

be

apprehended

and

can

serve

as

ideas

of

the mind and

its

modes.

A final

clarification

is

provided by

E.J. Ashworth's criticism of

Descartes'

grading

of

the

objective

realities

of his ideas:

.

. .

how

are we

to

grade

the

reality

of ideas?

.

. .

Having

a

high grade

of

reality

must

involve

having

certain sorts of

property

to

a

high

degree, including

causal

efficacy

or

creative

power.

How

can

any

of these be

assigned

to

my

ideas?5

Ashworth's

questions help

focus

our

proposals

in

an

important

way.

Our

ideas

can

be

assigned

causal

efficacy

not

in

the

sense

that

they

them

selves

are

causally

efficacious;

rather

they

contain

objective reality

in

that

they

exhibit

an

exercise

of

causal

power.

The meditator's

understanding

that the

power

exhibited

is

a

reflection

of

the

mind's

creative

activity

of

generating

ideas

captures

the

sense

in

which

objective

reality

is

indeed

a

representative

reality.

Returning

to

the

text,

we can

now

see

how Descartes'introduction of

his

first

causal

principle

is

grounded:



6/12

DESCARTES

ON

THE

POWER

OF

IDEAS

291

Now it is

manifest

by

the natural

light

that

there

must

be

at

least

as

much

in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause. For

where,

I

ask,

could the effect

get

its

reality

from,

if

not

from

the cause?

And

how

could the

cause

give

it to

the effect unless

it

possessed

it?

(AT

VII,

40;

CSM

II,

28).

Our

perspective

makes

plausible

this claim of

proportionality

between

the

effect

and its cause.

As

a

result

of the

Meditation

II

discoveries,

the

meditator

in

fact takes

objective reality

to

be

an

effect,

since

the

power

moving

our

will

is

understood

to

be

a

reflection of the

mind's

generative

activity.

Insofar

as

it

is

such

a

reflection,

the

claim

seems

to

follow

easily

that

it

cannot

exceed

the

generative

power

itself.

Thus,

Descartes'

princi

ple seems to be an appropriate candidate for a deliverance of the natural

light.

Furthermore,

we can

explain

how Descartes

can now

go

on

to

say

that

two

more

general principles

follow from

this

result:

It

follows from this both

that

something

cannot

arise

from

nothing,

and

also

that what

is

more

perfect?that

is,

contains

in

itself

more

reality?cannot

arise

from what

is less

perfect.

(AT

VII,

40-41;

CSM

II,

28).

Many analyses

seem

to

reverse

Descartes'

movement

of

thought

here,

suggesting that he derives his first causal principle from these more

general

principles.

But

our

analysis

seems

to fit

the

text

better,

since it

suggests

that both

the

causal

principle

and these

more

general

principles

can

in

fact be

seen

as

generalizations developed

from

and

grounded

in

the

Meditation

II

experiential

discovery

of the

mind's

activity

and

its effects.

This

viewpoint

accords better

with

Descartes'

claim in

Second

Replies

that

It is in the nature of

our

mind

to construct

general

propositions

on

the

basis

of

our

knowledge

of

particular

ones

(AT

VII,

141;

CSM

II,

100).

Invoking

his

second causal

principle,

Descartes

introduces the

notion of

a

formal

reality :

And this

is

transparently

true

not

only

in

the

case

of

effects which

possess

actual

or

formal

reality,

but

also

in

the

case

of

ideas,

where

one

is

considering

only

objective

reality.

.

.[I]n

order for

a

given

idea

to

contain such

and

such

objective

reality,

it

must

surely

derive

it

from

some

cause

which

contains at least

as

much

formal

reality

as

there

is

objective

reality

in

the

idea.

(AT

VII,

41;

CSM

II,

28-29).

Although

Descartes

seems

to be

applying

his

causal

principle

across

categories ?reasoning

from

the

existence

of

a

certain

objective

reality

in

his

ideas

to

a

certain

degree

of

formal

reality

in

their

causes?our

perspective

provides

a

corrective.

As

we

have

seen,

the

objective reality

of

an

idea?its

power

to

move

our

will?is

taken

by

the

meditator

to

be

a

manifestation,

within the

realm

of

ideas,

of the mind's

power

to

generate representations.

The

formal real

ity

to

which

the

power

affecting

our

will

corresponds

is

our

mind's

genera



7/12

292

HISTORY

OF

PHILOSOPHY

QUARTERLY

tive

power.

So

our

reading

shows that Descartes

is not

applying

his causal

principle

across

categories,

since both formal and

objective

realities denote

causal

powers.

He

is

simply

correlating

the manifestation

of

a

causal

power

within

consciousness

with the

power

itself

operating

outside

the

realm

of

his direct

awareness.

Our

analysis

shows

too

that

the

paradigm

forDescartes'

introduction

of

his

term

formal

reality

is

the

mind,

insofar

as

it

is

understood

to

be

a

generative

power.

Thus

we

see

that

the causal

relationship

between

formal

and

objective

realities

comes

first in the order of

discovery, grounded

as

it

is in the

Meditation

II

discovery

of

the

mind's

power

to

generate

ideas.

Our

understanding

of formal realities in

general

and of formal-to-formal

causal

relationships

must be

epistemologically

grounded

in

these

para

digms.

We

should,

then,

agree

with Annette

Baier,

who

has also

traced

the

fundamental

nature of

the

formal-to-objective

causal

paradigm

back

to

Meditation

II

and

says:

If

the

causal

principle

did

not

apply

to

objective reality,

then

it could

not

be

known

to

the meditator

to

hold

good.6

Within

the

order

of

reasons,

the causal

link

between

formal

and

objective

realities

is

not

problematic?it

is basic.

Our

perspective

also

helps

to

clarify

Descartes'

explanation

of

objective

reality

to

Caterus

in First

Replies

as

the

object's being

in

the

intellect

in

the

way

in

which

its

objects

are

normally

there

(AT

VII,

102;

CSM

II,

75).

We must

take the

object ?the

formal

reality?to

be

a

causal

power.

The

way

in

which such

an

object

is

in

the intellect

is

not

in

the form of

a

picture

image.

Rather

it

is

there

through

a

representation

of the

objects's

causal

power,

in

the form

of

the

power

affecting

our

will.

Finally,

our

perspective

can

offer

a

clarification

regarding

Descartes'

infamous

causal

resemblance

principle :

A

stone,

for

example,

which

previously

did

not

exist,

cannot

begin

to

exist

unless

it

is

produced

by

something

which

contains,

either

formally

or

emi

nently

everything

to

be found

in

the

stone;

similarly,

heat

cannot

be

produced

in

an

object

which

was

not

previously

hot,

except by

something

of

at

least

the

same

order

of

perfection

as

heat,

and

so on.

But

it

is also

true

that

the idea

of

heat,

or

of

a

stone,

cannot

exist

in

me

unless it

is

put

there

by

some cause

which

contains at least

as

much

reality

as

I

conceive

to

be

in

the

heat

or

in

the

stone.

(AT

VII,

41;

CSM

II,

28).

Descartes'

principle

has

occasioned

widespread

discussion

and

criticism.

But

our

discussion

shows

that the

meditator has

been

led

to

understand

formal and objective realities as powers. Since the meditator is, at this

point,

cognizant

of

only

one

kind

of

causal

power,

the

only

resemblance

between

cause

and effect

which

can

be

at

issue here

concerns

degrees

of

causal

power.

From the

perspective

which the meditator

has

been

led

to

adopt,

Descartes will be

seen as

saying

simply

that the

cause

must contain

at

least

the

same

degree

of

power

as

is

contained

in

the

effect.



8/12

DESCARTES

ON

THE POWER OF

IDEAS

293

III.

The Formal Reality

of

Ideas?

A

further

clarification

confronts

a

possible

objection

to

our

analysis,

Our

view that

formal

reality

denotes

generative

power

entails that

ideas

n

themselves

have

no

formal

reality.

This

claim, however,

runs

counter

to

the views

of

most

commentators.

For

instance,

Nicholas

Jolley

says:

While

laying

the

foundations

for his

proof

of the

existence

of

God,

Descartes

distinguishes

between

the

'formal' and

'objective' reality

of

ideas:

ideas

have

formal

(or

intrinsic)

reality

by

virtue of

being

modes

of

thought,

or

mental

events;

and

they

have

objective reality

by

virtue

of their

object

or

repre

sentational

content.8

Vere

Chappell,

while

placing

his view in the context of his distinction

between

ideasm (ideas

taken

materially)

and

ideas0 (ideas

taken

objec

tively),

agrees:

Descartes

holds that

there

are

different

modes of

being

or

existence,

different

ways

in

which

things

are.

Objective

being

is

the mode

in

which

things

in

the

intellect

characteristically

exist. This

sort of

being

is contrasted with

actual

or

formal

being,

which

is

the mode

in

which

things

outside the intellect

exist.

The

acts

or

operations

of the

intellect?including

all

ideasm?also

have

actual

or

formal

being.9

But

while

this

view

is

widely accepted,

we

must

see

that

the relevant

texts

are

far from clear

in

this

regard.

We should

note, first,

that Gassendi

states

the view

we are

questioning

in his

objections:

You do

in

fact..

.distinguish

between

objective

and formal

reality,

where

'formal

reality,'

as

I

understand

it,

applies

to

the idea

itself

not

as

it

represents

something

but

as an

entity

in

its

own

right.

(AT

VII, 285;

CSM

II,

199).

Descartes,

however,

does

not comment

on

Gassendi's

claim,

passing

up

this

opportunity

to offer

us

explicit

guidance

on

this

point.

InMeditation III itself, one passage seems to deny that ideas are formal

realities:

. .

.although

the

reality

which

I

am

considering

in

my

ideas

is

merely

objective

reality,

I must

not

on

that

account

suppose

that the

same

reality

need

not

exist

formally

in

the

causes

of

my ideas,

but that

it is

enough

for

it

to

be

present

in

them

objectively.

For

just

as

the

objective

mode of

being

belongs

to

ideas

by

their

very

nature,

so

the formal

mode

of

being

belongs

to

the

causes

of

ideas?or

at least the

first and

most

important ones?by

their

very

nature.

(AT

VII,

41-42;

CSM

II,

29).

Descartes denies

here

that the

objective

mode

of

being belongs

to

the

causes

of ideas because their nature is to be formal realities. His claim that the

objective

mode of

being

belongs

to

ideas

by

their

nature

is

presented

in

a

parallel

form?as

captured

in his

just

as

(quemadmodum)?suggesting

that

we

should

deny

them

formal

reality.

It is

surely possible

to

argue,

as

Chappell

does,

that

since Descartes tells

us

that

an

idea

can

be

taken

in

two

senses,

the

formal

mode of

being belongs

to

ideas taken

materially.



9/12

294

HISTORY

OF

PHILOSOPHY

QUARTERLY

But this

move

simply

creates

a

problem,

which has

perplexed

many

com

mentators,

of

understanding why

Descartes introduces a different

term? materially ?rather

than

referring

to

this

sense

as

an

idea taken

formally.

On

our

view,

this

problem

never

arises.

Ideas

taken

materially

are

modes of

the

mind,

but,

since

they

do

not

possess

generative

power,

are

not

themselves

formal

realities.

In

one

other

passage

central

to

this

issue,

Descartes

describes the

rela

tion

between ideas

and their

causes:

For

although

this

cause

does

not

transfer

{transfundat)

any

of

its

actual

or

formal

reality

to

my idea,

it

should

not

on

that

account

be

supposed

that

it

must be less real. The nature of an idea is such that of itself it requires {exigat)

no

formal

reality

except

what

it

derives from

my

thought

{praeter

illam

quam

mutuatur

a

cogitatione

mea),

of which

it

is

a

mode.

(AT

VII,

41;

CSM

II,

28).

Descartes'

claim that the

cause

does

not

transfer

any

of

its

formal

reality

to the idea

suggests

that

the

mind,

in

its

causal

activity,

does

not

provide

an

ideam

with

any

formal

reality.

What the

idea does

derive

from

my

thought

seems

to be

something

other

than

formal

reality.

Our

view

provides

an

answer?the

idea

does

not

derive

generative

power,

but

only

representative

power,

in the form of

a

power

affecting

the will.

We can conclude, then, that the text does not provide an obstacle to our

claim that

ideas

have

no

formal

reality.

IV.

MATERIAL

FALSITY

A

full

treatment

of

the

issues

involved

in

Descartes'

concept

of

material

falsity

is

beyond

the

scope

of

our

discussion.

It will suffice

to

show

that

our

perspective

is

helpful

in

a

central

respect.

We

can

focus

first

on

Descartes'

description

of this

concept:

For although. . .falsity in the strict sense, or formal falsity, can occur only in

judgements,

there

is

another kind

of

falsity,

material

falsity,

which

occurs

in

ideas,

when

they

represent non-things

as

things.

For

example,

the

ideas

which

I

have of

heat

and

cold contain

so

little

clarity

and

distinctness that

they

do

not

enable

me

to

tell

whether cold

is

merely

the absence

of

heat

or

vice

versa,

or

whether both of

them

are

real

qualities,

or

neither

is.

And

since

there

can

be

no

ideas

which

are

not

as

it

were

of

things,

if

it

is

true

that cold

is

nothing

but the

absence

of

heat,

the idea which

represents

it

to

me as

something

real

and

positive

deserves

to

be

called

false_(AT

VII,

43-44;

CSM

II,

30).

And

second,

we

need

to

see

Descartes'

explanation

of how these

materially

false

ideas

are

caused:

Such ideas

obviously

do not

require

me to

posit

a source distinct from

myself.

For

on

the

one

hand,

if

they

are

false,

that

is,

represent non-things,

I know

by

the

natural

light

that

they

arise

from

nothing

?

that

is,

they

are

in

me

only

because

of

a

deficiency

and

lack

of

perfection

in

my

nature. If

on

the other

hand

they

are

true,

then

since the

reality

which

they

represent

is

so

extremely

slight

that I

cannot

even

distinguish

it from

a

non-thing,

I

do

not

see

why

they

cannot

originate

from

myself.

(

AT

VII,

44;

CSM

II,

30).



10/12

DESCARTES

ON

THE

POWER OF

IDEAS 295

These

statements

indicate,

as

a

number of commentators

have

shown,

that

we

must

distinguish

the

representative

character of Cartesian

ideas

from

their

objective

reality. 10

This conclusion follows

from the

fact that

those

ideas which arise from

nothing

have

representative

character

(since

all

ideas

are

as it

were

of

things )

but have

no

objective

reality

(since

an

idea

can

have

no

more

objective reality

than

there

is

formal

reality

in its

cause).

While

this result

has often

proven

problematic

for

commentators,

it

can

be

easily

understood

from

our

perspective.

Our

discussion

has shown

that

most

of

our

ideas have two

components.

For

example,

the clear and

distinct

perception

of

the

wax

consists of

the

representation of the

wax

as

extension and the power affecting

our

will.

On

our

view,

the

latter

is the

idea's

objective

reality;

we can

identify

the

former,

for

the

point

at

issue,

as

its

representative

character. The

objective

reality

of

an

idea shows

it

to

be the effect

of

the

operation

of

some

causal

power,

indicating

that

it

truly

represents

a

thing.

But

the

reality

con

tained

in

some

of

our

ideas

is

so

slight?they

exhibit

so

little

power?that

we

cannot

tell

if

they

have

any

objective

reality.

Nevertheless,

all

ideas,

even

those which

seem

to

have

no

objective reality,

are

as

it

were

of

things

in

that

they

have

some

representative

character. For

example,

even

the

idea of cold

presents

an

actual

sensation,

as

Descartes

tells

Arnauld,

and

thereby provides subject matter for error :

.

.

.my

only

reason

for

calling

the idea

'materially

false'

is

that,

owing

to the

fact that it is obscure and

confused,

I

am

unable

to

judge

whether

or

not

what

it

represents

to

me

is

something positive

which

exists

outside of

my

sensation.

And hence I

may

be led

to

judge

that

it

is

something positive

though

in

fact

it

may

merely

be

an

absence.

(AT

VII,

234;

CSM

II,

164).

The

representative

character

of the

idea,

along

with

our

inability

to

discern

whether

the

idea

has

any

objective

reality,

may

lead

us

to

mistakenly

judge

that there

is

some

causal

power?some

formal

reality?which generated

the

idea.

But,

in

fact,

it

may

arise

from

nothing ?that

is,

from

a

lack

in

our

nature.

We

see,

too,

that

this last

suggestion

does not

violate Descartes'

causal

principles,

since

only

the

objective reality

of

the

idea,

not its

repre

sentative

character,

has

been shown

to

require

a

positive

cause.

Our

perspective

shows that

material

falsity

is

indeed

an

intrinsic

feature

of

ideas,

as

Descartes

repeatedly

insisted.

Some

ideas

appear

to

not

exhibit

any

power.

Since

we

are

unable

to

discern whether

they

do,

they

provide

material for

making

false

judgments

in

the

way

we

have

described.

V.

THE

IDEA

OF

GOD

We

can

conclude

by

briefly

offering

some

suggestive

results

of

our

analy

sis

regarding

the

idea

of

God.

A

question

asked,

but

left

unanswered,

by

John

Yolton,

can

serve

as

our

focus.

Referring

to

the

idea

of

God,

he

says:

There

may

be

a

problem

with this

particular

idea.

.

.

.Can

an

idea be

a

mode

of

my

thought

but

not caused

by

me?11



11/12

296 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

QUARTERLY

From

the

outset,

the

Meditation

III thinker has

taken

an

idea,

as a

mode

of the

mind,

to

signify

a

generative

act. But after

concluding

that the idea

of

God

cannot be

caused

by

the

mind,

Yolton's

question

must be

confronted.

The

discovery

of this idea

creates

a

tension

in

the

meditator's

conception

of

the mind's

operations.

We

need

to

see more

clearly

how this tension

is

brought

about,

by

recognizing

the

unique

nature

of this

idea

within the

view we've set out.

Descartes'indications that this idea

has infinite

objective

reality

has the

implication,

from

our

perspective,

that it exhibits infinite

power.

The

import

of

this is

described

by

Descartes

in

First

Replies:

But if.

.

.we

attend

to

the

immense

and

incomprehensible

power

that

is

contained within the idea of

God,

then

we

will

have

recognized

that

this

power

is

so

exceedingly

great

that

it is

plainly

the

cause

of his

continuing

existence.

.

.

.[W]hen

we

perceive

this,

we are

quite

entitled

to

think

that

in

a

sense

he

stands

in

the

same

relation

to

himself

as

an

efficient

cause

does

to

its

effect,

and

hence that he derives

his existence from himself

in

the

positive

sense.

(AT

VII,

110-111;

CSM

II,

79-80).

From

our

perspective,

Descartes'

claim has

two

epistemological

conse

quences.

First,

the

immensity

of the

objective

reality

of the idea

of

God?the

immensity

of the

power

affecting

ourwill?seems to eliminate the need to

posit

an

efficient

cause

outside

of

itself.

It

can

only

do

so

if

the

power

shows

itself

to be self-creative.

This

suggests

that

its

infinitude is

not

to

be

understood

as

a

difference

in

degree

from the

objective

realities

of

our

other

ideas,

but

rather

as

a

difference

in kind. It

is

the

apprehension

of

this

self-creative

power

which

provides

the

meditator

with the

meaning

of

necessary

existence.

Second,

the

collapse

of

the

distinction

between the

power

within

the

idea

and

the

efficient

cause

of that

power

means

that it will

be

impossible

to

distinguish the objective reality of the idea from the formal reality which

is its

cause.

In

other

words,

the

meditator

will not

be able

to

distinguish

the idea from the

thing.

This

result

may

well

capture

the

true

sense

in

which

this

idea

most

fully

escapes

a

suspicion

of material

falsity?it

eliminates the

possibility

of

error

in

our

judgments

since

there

is

nothing

to

which

our

causal

principles

need

lead

us.

And

it

may

also

reflect

the full

sense

in

which

we

come

to

know that

God

must

be the

cause

of

this

idea.

These

epistemological

results

demand

that further

work

be

done

to

fully

answer

Yolton's

question. Up

to

now,

the

meditator

has taken the

power

exhibited inhis ideas to represent his own mind's generative power. Rec

ognizing

that

the

power

exhibited

in

this

idea is

not

his

own

forces

a

consideration

of the

relationship

between his

own

power

and God's

power?the

second

stage

of the

Meditation

III

proof

passes

to

that

very

issue.

The

full resolution

of this

issue

will

have

a

range

of

implications

concerning

the

proper

understanding

of the

mind's

operations,

whether the



12/12

DESCARTES

ON

THE POWER OF IDEAS

297

mind is

in

fact

a

substance,

and

more.

Those

concerns

are

beyond

the

scope

of our

present

discussion. It is

enough

fornow ifour

analysis

has

provided

some

helpful

results

regarding

Descartes'

theory

of ideas

and has

moti

vated further

investigation

in the directions

we

have

pointed

out.

St. John's

University

Received

September

29,

1995

NOTES

1.

Stephen

I.

Wagner,

Descartes'Wax:

Discovering

the Nature of

Mind,

History

of

Philosophy

Quarterly,

vol.

12

(1995), pp.

165-83.

2.

Our

view,

in

line

with Descartes'

statement

in

the

Synopsis,

denies

that

Descartes held

a

non-representational

view

of the

mind,

as

some

commentators

have

suggested,

e.g.

Michel

Henry,

The

Soul

According

to Descartes

in

Stephen

Voss,

ed.,

Essays

on

the

Philosophy

and Science

of

Rene

Descartes

(New

York:

Oxford

University

Press, 1993),

pp.

40-51.

3.

For

example,

Calvin

Normore,

Meaning

and

Objective Being:

Descartes

and

His

Sources,

in

Am?lie

Rorty,

ed.,

Essays

on

Descartes' Meditations

(Berkeley:

University

of California

Press,

1986), p.

238.

4. See also Third

Replies,

AT

VII,

181;

CSM

II,

127.

5. E. J. Ashworth, Descartes' Theory of Objective Reality, The New Scholasti

cism,

vol.

49

(1975), p.

338.

6.

Annette

Baier,

The

Idea of

the True

God

in

Descartes,

in

Am?lie

Rorty,

ed.,

op.

cit.,

p.

364.

7.

The closest Descartes

comes

to

attributing

such

power

to

ideas

is

his

statement

that one idea

may

perhaps

originate

from

another

(AT

VII,

42;

CSM

II,

29).

But

he

immediately

goes

on

to

argue

that

we

cannot

explain

this

origination

without

appealing

to

some

formal

reality

as

the

primary

cause.

This conclusion

only

follows

if

he is

assuming

that

ideas do

not

themselves

have

generative

power.

8.

Nicholas

Jolley,

The

Light

of

the

Soul

(New

York: Oxford

University

Press,

1990),

pp.

13-14.

9.

Vere

Chappell,

The

Theory

of

Ideas,

in

Am?lie

Rorty, ed., op. cit., p.

187.

10.

Calvin

Normore,

op.

cit.,

p.

230.

Normore here

credits

Margaret

Wilson

with

establishing

this

point.

11.

John

Yolton,

Perceptual

Acquaintance

From Descartes

to

Reid

(Minneapolis:

University

of Minnesota

Press, 1984),

note

14,

p.

41.

12.

Versions of this

paper

were

presented

at

the fall

1995

meetings

of the

Midwest

Seminar

in

the

History

of

Early

Modern

Philosophy

and

the Minnesota

Philosophi

cal

Society. My

thanks

go

to

the

organizers

and

discussants

of

those

meetings

(especially

Phil

Cummins,

Michelle

Eliot

and

Doug

Lewis)

for

their

help

with

my

work.

descartes on the power of ideas

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