deployment of ipsec vpn vpn, ipsec, pki, smart cards

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CATE-IDET Brno 11.5.2001 Deployment of IPSec VPN Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards Ivan Svoboda Ivan Svoboda Manager Manager Information security projects Information security projects

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Ivan Svoboda Manager Information security projects. Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards. Agenda. Business drivers VPN levels VPN & Firewall VPN & PKI VPN & Security Certification. Current issues. E-commerce, E-government Internet services Flexibility - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

CATE-IDET

Brno 11.5.2001

Deployment of IPSec VPNDeployment of IPSec VPN

VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart CardsVPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

Ivan SvobodaIvan SvobodaManagerManager

Information security projectsInformation security projects

Page 2: Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

2CATE-IDET

Brno 11.5.2001

AgendaAgenda

Business driversBusiness drivers VPN levelsVPN levels VPN VPN & Firewall& Firewall VPN &VPN & PKI PKI VPN & Security CertificationVPN & Security Certification

Page 3: Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

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Current issuesCurrent issues E-commerce, E-governmentE-commerce, E-government Internet servicesInternet services FlexibilityFlexibility Network infrastructure & cost reductionNetwork infrastructure & cost reduction Network Security ThreatsNetwork Security Threats

Sniffing IP spoofing Session hijacking Man-in-the-middle

The enabler: Secure VPNThe enabler: Secure VPN

Page 4: Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

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Secure networksSecure networks ? ?Praha BrnoData Data

X.25, ATM

Frame Relay Internet

PSTN

Page 5: Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

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Secure networksSecure networks ? ? YESYES ! !Praha BrnoDokument Dokument

X.25, ATM

Frame Relay Internet

JTS

Dokument Dokument

VPNVPN

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Secure networksSecure networks ? ? YESYES ! !Praha BrnoDokument Dokument

X.25, ATM

Frame Relay Internet

JTS

Dokument Dokument

VPNVPN

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LAN, WAN, Internet

Encryption layersEncryption layers

SSH, S-MIME

Appl.

Present.

Session

Link

Transport

Network

Physical

SSL/TLS

IPSec

L2TP, PPTP

Appl.

Present.

Session

Link

Transport

Network

Physical

Page 8: Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

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Encryption layersEncryption layers ApAppplilication (SSH, S/MIME etc.)cation (SSH, S/MIME etc.)

(-) application dependant (-) network access control missing (+) most specific services

Transport (SSL/TLS)Transport (SSL/TLS) (-) TCP-only (HTTP etc.)

Network (IPSec)Network (IPSec) (-) IP-only (+) every IP-packet is secured (+) IP-address tunelling

LinkLink (L2TP, PPTP) (L2TP, PPTP) (+) RAS, mixed networks (IP, IPX, NetBEUI etc.)

Page 9: Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

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Brno 11.5.2001

Appl.

Present.

Session

Link

Transport

Network

Physical

IPSec

Network layer encryption: IPSecNetwork layer encryption: IPSec

Dokument Dokument

Appl.

Present.

Session

Link

Transport

Network

Physical

IPSec

Page 10: Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

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Brno 11.5.2001

IPSec VPNIPSec VPN compatibility compatibility

e-mail

X.25

IPSec - VPN

platforms

applications

Microsoft Oracle

Novell

Unix

database

ERM client/server

GIS

Internet

Frame Relay

LAN

WAN PPP

www

networks

Appl.

Present.

Session

Link

Transport

Network

Physical

Page 11: Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

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IPSec VPN IPSec VPN functionsfunctions:: Data confidentiality & integrityData confidentiality & integrity

Encryption (ESP) Authentication (AH)

Users/nodes authenticationUsers/nodes authentication digital certificates X.509

Access controlAccess control Access to networks, Access to sources (servers)

Dokument Dokument

Dig. signed CA

Public key X.Y.

Page 12: Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

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LAN, LAN, WAN, ...WAN, ...

Secure VPNSecure VPN – IPSec technology – IPSec technology

Data authentication and encryption

applications

TCP / UDP

IP

Ethernet / PPP

IPSEC

IP

applications

TCP / UDP

IP

Ethernet / PPP

IPSEC

IP

IKE (ISAKMP/Oakley)

ESP/AH

Page 13: Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

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IPSec ImplementaIPSec Implementationtion

SW

IPSec - VPN

Firewall

Router

HW

VPN-gateway

Dig. signed CA

Public key X.Y.

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IPSec InteroperabilitIPSec Interoperabilityy

LAN, WAN, Internet, JTS

Microsoft

Different types of products in different Different types of products in different locationslocations

IPSec compatibility: ICSA certificationIPSec compatibility: ICSA certification

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IPSec VPNIPSec VPN deployment deployment

WAN

LAN

Internet

PTSN

LAN

LAN

IntranetIntranet ExtranetExtranet E-businessE-business// /E-government /E-government

PDA, ...Where are the threats?Where are the threats?Internal vs. External

Page 16: Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

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VPN deployment issuesVPN deployment issues

VPN VPN & firewall& firewall Complementary technologies Coordination of policies necessary

VPN & PKI & smart cardsVPN & PKI & smart cards Complementary technologies Attribute certificates Two-factor authentication

Page 17: Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

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FFirewallirewall supplements supplements

High-availability

Contentsecurity

Loadbalancing

Antiviruscontrol

Vulnerabilitiesassesment

Intrusiondetection

Log analysis

Network management

Strongauthentication

VPN

PKIDirectory

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Brno 11.5.2001

Deploying a VPN ServiceDeploying a VPN Servicewith or without a Firewallwith or without a Firewall

Each component in the network Each component in the network solves its own distinct problemsolves its own distinct problem

Issues: Issues: Performance, reliability, Performance, reliability, policy policy integration, TCO, …integration, TCO, …

Security: question of protected area Security: question of protected area perimeterperimeter

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No Firewall ScenarioNo Firewall Scenario VPN Gateway authenticates users with X.509 certificates VPN Gateway authenticates users with X.509 certificates If all traffic is encrypted VPN Gateway acts as “perfect” firewallIf all traffic is encrypted VPN Gateway acts as “perfect” firewall No other filtering No other filtering

Access router

Internet

Secure VPN Gateway

Head office LAN

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Outside of Firewall ScenarioOutside of Firewall Scenario

VPN traffic decrypted by VPN GatewayVPN traffic decrypted by VPN Gateway Firewall can perform additional packet filtering, Firewall can perform additional packet filtering,

authentication, and application proxiesauthentication, and application proxies No changes to firewall security policyNo changes to firewall security policy Security perimeter ?Security perimeter ?

Access router

Internet

Head office LAN

Firewall Secure VPN Gateway

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In Parallel to Firewall ScenarioIn Parallel to Firewall Scenario

Network access validated and secured by VPN systemNetwork access validated and secured by VPN system Security policy more flexible and simple to implementSecurity policy more flexible and simple to implement No network traffic bottlenecksNo network traffic bottlenecks

Access router

Internet

Head office LAN

Firewall

Secure VPN Gateway

Page 22: Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

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LAN

Inside of Firewall ScenarioInside of Firewall Scenario (1)(1)

WAN VPNrouter

FWVPN

DMZ

Protected area

Page 23: Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

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Brno 11.5.2001

LAN

Inside of Firewall ScenarioInside of Firewall Scenario (2)(2)

WAN VPNrouter

FW

VPN DMZ

FW: FW: non-authorised users (access to Web server)

VPN: VPN: authorised users (access to accounting server)

Protected area

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ProblProblemem issuesissues

Correct IPSec transport throughCorrect IPSec transport through firewall (proxy server)firewall (proxy server)

Transport of LDAP (TCP/port309) and PKIX (TCP/port709)

Transport ISAKMP / IKE (UDP/port500) Transport ESP (IP/port50) AH (IP/port51) Network address translation (NAT)

Page 25: Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

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Secure VPNs and Secure VPNs and AuthenticationAuthentication Two ends wishing to set up a secured Two ends wishing to set up a secured

session need to know who they are session need to know who they are communicating with, otherwise…communicating with, otherwise…

spoofing attack man-in-the-middle attacks

The secure tunnel needs to be The secure tunnel needs to be authenticated at both endsauthenticated at both ends

Authentication options (IKE):Authentication options (IKE): Certificates Shared secret

Page 26: Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

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Alternate Authentication MethodAlternate Authentication Method“Shared Secret”“Shared Secret”

Eliminate certificates for small deploymentsEliminate certificates for small deployments User enters a password for authenticationUser enters a password for authentication

supported by IKE, in lieu of certificates longer passwords are more secure password never traverses the network

But…not as scalable as certificatesBut…not as scalable as certificates password administration becomes difficult

Identity IP Password

[email protected] mylittlechickadee12

[email protected] 122.2.3.18 mIi8182

77.2.3.* 19insabinsa

Page 27: Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

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Brno 11.5.2001

VPN & PKIVPN & PKI

PKI is the most scalable PKI is the most scalable authentication method for VPNauthentication method for VPN

VPN is a “killer” aplication for PKIVPN is a “killer” aplication for PKI Dynamic modifications:Dynamic modifications:

Attribute certificates – VPN groups membership

Page 28: Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

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Secure VPN GroupsSecure VPN Groups

Internet

VPN gateway

User A

Engineering subnet

Finance subnet

Inventory subnet

User B

User C

Engineering VPN group• User A• Engineering subnet

Finance VPN group• User B• Finance subnet

Inventory VPN group• User B• User C• Inventory subnet

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WAN

LAN A

VPNVPN groups groupsAccess priviligesAccess priviliges

LAN B

VPN (1)

VPN (2)

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VPN policy managerVPN policy manager

Group members

VPN groups

New users

Page 31: Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

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Two-factor authenticationTwo-factor authentication

Page 32: Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

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Brno 11.5.2001

Smart cards advantageSmart cards advantage

Not only private key Not only private key storagestorage Private key Private key operations operations (electronic (electronic

signature on-card)signature on-card) SecuritySecurity ! !

Page 33: Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

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PKI & smart cardsPKI & smart cards

Dokument

DokumentE-mail

SSL

IPSecLDAPX.500

CA

Page 34: Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

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Brno 11.5.2001

Smart cards advantageSmart cards advantage

Different private keys/certificates:Different private keys/certificates: Clients: e-mail, SSL, IPSec, … Use: authentication, encryption, non-

repudiation (electronic signature) Single smart cardSingle smart card Multi-function cardsMulti-function cards

Physical access control (contact-less) Secure login Electronic signature

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Brno 11.5.2001

Multi-function smart cardsMulti-function smart cards

Page 36: Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

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Brno 11.5.2001

Is it really secure?Is it really secure?(IPSec VPN)(IPSec VPN)

FIPS 140-1Security CertificationFIPS 140-1Security Certification 22-5-5

ICSA CertificationICSA Certification cca 10-15cca 10-15

„IPSec compatible“„IPSec compatible“NNon-on-certificertifieded

Page 37: Deployment of IPSec VPN VPN, IPSec, PKI, Smart Cards

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FIPS 140-1FIPS 140-1

Cryptographic modules certificationCryptographic modules certification NIST - http://csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/cryptval CR: Electronic Signature Act Regulation

• Requirements for the private key protection, as a part of secure signature creation device)

Levels 1-4Levels 1-4 Level 2:

• Physical security for high risk environment (temper-evident coatings)

• User authentication• Controlled access protection (C2 equivalent)

VPN, PKI, smart card, …VPN, PKI, smart card, …

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ConclusionConclusion

www.tsoft.czwww.tsoft.cz [email protected]@tsoft.cz +420-2- 6134 8738+420-2- 6134 8738

VPN deployment issues/decisionsVPN deployment issues/decisions VPN level Security perimeter (Risk analysis) VPN & FW Authentication options (VPN & PKI & smart

cards) Security certifications