democratization and ethnic politics: rwanda's electoral legacy
TRANSCRIPT
Democratization and Ethnic Politics:Rwanda’s Electoral Legacy
DAVID EMMANUEL KIWUWA
Department of Politics, University of Nottingham, UK
ABSTRACT The democratization process in Rwanda has long been characterized by ethnic politics,punctuated by the 1993 genocide. The country’s perennial efforts to venture into democraticgovernance via electoral practice appear to be pre-empted by the exclusionist and zero-sumnature of ethnic politics, especially in deeply divided societies. This paper sets out to analyse thenature of the 2003 presidential and parliamentary elections. While doing so, the article attemptsto address two crucial concerns: 1) what was the impact of ethnic politics on the electoral processand results and 2) did these elections contribute to the democratization process in Rwanda? Thearticle will argue that these elections did little to overcome ethnic political dynamics and onlymodestly advanced the democratization ethos. While the process and outcome were deemed‘acceptable’ and a ‘first step in the right direction’, the exercise highlighted a number ofchallenges which the article attempts to analyse.
Within the current democratization discourse, it is hard to envisage democracy without
elections, although it is not hard to come across elections without democracy. However,
many pseudo-democratic elections are precisely becoming contemporary political cur-
rency in many deeply divided ethnic societies. Increasingly electoral observers have
argued that elections in such countries are hardly meaningful in terms of being able to
advance the democratic ethos. Yet the real dilemma is when the nature of political
competition and power distribution are not only defined but also threatened by ethnic
dynamics. When, then, can elections count as a legitimate vehicle of the democratization
process? Rwanda’s experience with elections presents another theoretical and empirical
window into the efficacy of elections in the transitional politics of deeply divided ethnic
societies.
Rwanda has had questionable electoral experiments dating back to 1953—question-
able in the manner and character of these elections and in the degree of electoral com-
petition. Newbury (1988, p. 180) has argued that Rwanda’s political discourse is
characterized by ethnic politics, with its general electoral framework, choice of candi-
dates, electoral issues and results all taking an ethnic character. Electoral competition in
Rwanda has also taken a Tutsi–Hutu dimension/minority–majority demographic
Ethnopolitics, Vol. 4, No. 4, 447–464, November 2005
Correspondence Address: David Emmanuel Kiwuwa, Department of Politics, University of Nottingham,
University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK. Email: [email protected]
1744-9057 Print=1744-9065 Online=05=040447–18 # 2005 The Editor of EthnopoliticsDOI: 10.1080=17449050500348568
configuration. For the Hutu, their overwhelming demographic advantage (over 85%)
meant a potential vote bank ensuring democratic perpetuation in power. To them
democracy literally meant majority rule and majority rule meant Hutu rule. Thus sub-
sequent electoral results clearly reflected a pattern of ethnic voting where the
outcome resembled a sort of ethnic census (Lemarchand, 1970, p. 196; Kuper, 1977,
p. 191). Electoral competition in the First Republic (1959–73) and Second Republic
(1973–93) demonstrated such ethnic bias that it helped institutionalize ethnic politics
and shape Rwanda’s political landscape. However, what made these elections funda-
mentally flawed was not their ethnic characteristics per se, but rather their exclusion
of the Tutsi, their lack of competitiveness and their outright non-democratic nature.
For these reasons we shall side-step their consideration. Considering the much more
recent local and regional elections in 1999 and 2000, their non-party basis and politi-
cally restricted nature fails to meet the bar of open competition, hence offering
minimal explanatory value. Our emphasis therefore shifts towards analysing the first
open and ‘competitive’ 2003 multiparty presidential and legislative elections.
Rwanda’s 2003 elections were a fundamental step towards democratic rule, coming
against a background of a political past manifested in institutional discrimination,
ethnic exclusion and authoritarianism. Whether Rwanda was able to transcend this was
yet to be answered by the elections. Following perpetual electoral failure, the 2003 elec-
tion had very telling lessons for divided polities in Africa and the democratizing world in
general. While the elections were held in an apprehensive political atmosphere, with the
Hutu as a demographic majority and Tutsi as a politically dominant minority, the
dynamics involved had far reaching implications beyond the boundaries of Rwanda. In
focusing on these elections I attempt to address the central question of this article: what
was the impact of ethnic politics on these elections and how meaningful were they to
Rwanda’s democratization efforts?
Rwanda operates a presidential system of government with a strong executive (nominat-
ing a prime minister as head of government) and an elective legislature and judiciary. The
2003 multiparty presidential and legislative elections were the first post-genocide elec-
tions that marked some kind of ‘discontinuity’ from Rwanda’s long legacy of ethnic exclu-
sion and institutionalized ethnic politics. These elections were seen as an important test
and barometer of the de-ethnicization of national politics by the transitional government
of national unity (Assimwe & Wakabi, 2003, p. 5). As a general trend these elections
would be referred to as ‘founding elections’, although on this occasion we shall refer to
them subtly as ‘transitional elections’ (Schedler, 2002a, p. 103; 2002b, p. 3; Carothers,
2002; Bratton, 1998, p. 51; Linz, 2000, p. 33). Our analysis of the impact of ethnic politics
on the electoral process will be undertaken within the framework of an entire electoral
process; that is, analysing at various stages the role and impact of ethnic politics. For a
systematic and comprehensive approach, we intend to address both the presidential and
legislative elections concurrently, as similar or overlapping issues make this inevitable.
The Presidential Elections: Candidates, Parties and Issues
The end of the transitional period was marked by the 25 August 2003 elections. In some
way the organization and holding of these elections by the Transitional Government of
National Unity (TGNU) was the final fulfilment of the principal requirements of the
Arusha Declaration. This declaration, reached in Arusha (Tanzania) in 1990 to settle
448 D. E. Kiwuwa
the political quagmire Rwanda found itself in, had stipulated that the transition govern-
ment was expected to negotiate a new constitution and organize a multiparty all-inclusive
general election.
For the presidential elections the main and strongest candidate in the race was incum-
bent and Rwanda Patriotic Front/Army (RPF/A) strongman retired General Paul
Kagame (Kalinaki, 2003a, p. 1). A Tutsi, Kagame was the leader of the victorious
RPF/A rebel group comprising mainly Tutsi refugees. A strict disciplinarian, he
honed his political and military skills during his long service in the Uganda National
Resistance Army (NRA). Not known for his political abilities but for his military astute-
ness, Kagame had long been the real power behind the transitional post-genocide gov-
ernment dominated by the RPF. He served in various capacities as minister of defence
and vice president and was later nominated and elected president in 2000 by the transi-
tional assembly.
With the advent of multiparty politics Kagame emerged as the obvious party candi-
date for the RPF, later confirmed through a national party conference in July 2003
(AFP, 2003a, p. 14). His nomination and selection, though widely expected, was
based on conscious calculation. First, Kagame had long held the de facto leadership
of Rwanda deriving from the RPA’s outright military victory against the previous
regime. This earned him broad respect from both friends and foes and he was increas-
ingly seen within and outside Rwanda as the only political and military figure capable
of holding a divided and deeply traumatized state together. Given the importance of
the military in African politics, the absolute loyalty of RPA to Kagame only served
to reinforce his stature and political standing. Second, the conspicuous absence of
any possible challenger within the party rendered his candidacy and nomination a fore-
gone conclusion. Most importantly, he seemed the only security (and literally life)
guarantor to both friends and foes thanks to his initial preoccupation with security
and peace.
A former exiled and long-shot challenger was Faustin Twagiramungu, a Hutu. Stand-
ing as an independent, his political party the Mouvement Democratique Republique
(MDR) had earlier been dissolved and banned by the transitional assembly on the
basis of alleged divisionist ideology.1 The assembly argued that the banned, predomi-
nantly Hutu-supported MDR party represented not only a potential roll-back to the
era of ethnic politics but most gravely posed a “security threat” (Mugalura, 2003,
p. 7). Twagiramungu had been a moderate Hutu politician during the previous
regime, although he later joined the post-genocide regime. He had belonged to the
moderate wing of the MDR, which was party to the Arusha Accord and a partner in
the first post-genocide transitional government. In fact, his nomination to the premier-
ship of the early transitional government was partly a result of his moderate stance.
Reyntjens (2003, p. 178) notes that Twagiramungu’s non-ethnic appeal, then a rarity
in Rwandan politics, coupled with the explicit agreements over the provisions in the
Arusha Accord favoured his inclusion. Most significantly, it was a calculated political
attempt by the RPF to cast their Tutsi dominated government as inclusive.2 However,
increasing ethnic uneasiness and internal political disagreement led to his resignation
and flight into self-imposed exile in Belgium in August 1995. Returning in 2003 to
run for the presidency, Twagiramungu was viewed by internal and external observers
as the only realistic and credible opposition candidate to the incumbent. His political
resume notwithstanding, he was perceived and portrayed by the Kagame camp as a
Rwanda’s Electoral Legacy 449
political relic of the much-despised ethno-political era, an antithesis of the current
regime ideology. Despite this negative portrayal, he still represented a ‘silent force’ of
Hutu political agitation and a potential threat to the incumbent if the majority Hutu
opted to evoke their ethnic trump card. Another independent and former cabinet
member Jean Napomoscene Nayinzira, together with the only female aspirant,
Dr Alivera Mukabaramba of a new Partie du Progres et la Concorde (PPC), both with
negligible chances or political clout joined the race (Wakabi & Shyaka, 2003, p. 5).
Despite the ‘multiparty’ nature of this election, it was apparent that the presidential
contest was between the incumbent Kagame and Twagiramungu. Likewise, many com-
mentators saw this as a two-way race, with an edgy but largely predictable outcome.
Many saw it as a race between a Tutsi ‘dominant’ minority and a Hutu ‘subordinate’
majority, a race between the past and the future. While these could be the unconscious
undertones, the implication of such dichotomies represented a very disturbing analysis,
with many political commentators going as far as to invoke the ‘Burundi syndrome’
parallel (Bisika, 2003, p. 19).3
Interestingly, various political parties failed to field a presidential candidate opting
instead to throw their lot in with the incumbent president (Munyaneza, 2003a, p. 1;
Assimwe, 2003a, p. 1). The Democratic Centrist Party (DCP), the Tusti dominated
party, Parti Liberale (PL), the Social Democratic Party (PSD), Islamic Democratic
Socialist Party of Rwanda (PDI) and later the PPC all endorsed Kagame’s candidacy,
effectively diluting the competitive edge and wide choice of the elections. While it
may not necessarily have changed the course of the electoral results, this sweeping
endorsement is reflective of the total co-optation of these parties by the ruling RPF
regime, but also is indicative of their lack of significant political clout. As one local
journalist mused, “Kagame still needs some serious contestant . . . this will make it
look like a ‘selection’ not an election. It will reduce the legitimacy that he is dying
to get from this election.”4 While this coalition under normal circumstances does not
necessarily dilute the competitiveness of elections, the available opposition should be
able to provide a real alternative. Given the prevailing political anxiety, Twagiramungu
neither represented that alternative nor was given the opportunity to be that alternative.
Rwandan political observers noted that, with the only credible opposition party dis-
solved, and the RPF determined to keep ethnic anxiety alive vis a vis evoking the
memory of the genocide, the stage had been set for an inevitable RPF electoral clean
sweep.5
Contrary to the regime’s argument that ethnicity had no place in shape or form in this
election, it is evident that candidate selection, inter-party manoeuvres and campaign
platforms were all hyper-sensitive to ethnic politics and reacted to them. This inevitably
had far-reaching negative implications for the elections and the democratization process
in general.
Electoral System
Formulating a system that is sensitive to Rwanda’s sociopolitical character encouraged
political accommodation, consensus building and power sharing, not to mention offering
an institutional solution to Rwanda’s fragmented self. The electoral system devised was
meant to deliver such arrangements. This was through a mixture of simple plurality of
first past the post (FPTP) for the executive (presidential elections) while preferring
450 D. E. Kiwuwa
proportional representation (PR) for the two-chamber legislature (Reilly & Reynolds,
2000). A presidential candidate who obtained a simple majority of say 51% of the
vote was to be declared winner.
On the other hand, the legislative elections for the deputies in the lower chamber was
decided through the List PR system. This system required political parties to present a
list of candidates to the electors, although these voted for the party not the candidate
unless in circumstances of an independent. The seats were then allocated to the
parties, coalitions and independent candidates by dividing votes received by the elec-
toral quotient. This quotient was calculated by dividing the total number of valid
votes of each list having obtained at least 5% of the votes cast by the number of
seats to be contested. The remaining seats therefore are given to the candidates with
the highest number of votes. For the reserved seats for women, youth and disabled in
the lower chamber and the senators in the upper chamber, elections were through
electoral constituencies and the vote here was by simple plurality. Any candidate
who garnered a majority of the constituent votes was automatically voted through.
Here too parties could opt to forward or back a particular candidate.
The election of party deputies as stipulated by the electoral law was by direct
universal suffrage, while constituencies or electoral colleges were used for the
women, youth, disabled and senators. The 2003 constitution stipulated the election of
a two-chamber legislature comprising both the lower house/chamber of deputies and
the senate, a rarity in Africa. This was a debut attempt to establish a bicameral type
of legislative system to ensure specifically equal representation of women and the intro-
duction of a kind of consensual model of governance (NEC, 2003). While the work of
both houses does appear to overlap, in essence it is complementary. Article 76 of the
new constitution stipulates that the chamber of deputies will be composed of 80
members, of which 53 are directly elected through universal suffrage, while the 24
reserved domains for women, two for youth and one for the disabled are filled
through constituencies. This office was to be held for a renewable duration of five
years. Article 82 and 83 stipulate an upper house/senate composed of 26 members,
with 12 of these elected from the 12 provinces, eight presidential appointees, four
selected by the Forum of Political Organisations from within its ranks, two university
representatives, and any former heads of state upon application. This office was to be
held for a non-renewable duration of eight years. The senate was largely to be
elected by an electoral college composed of executive committees of sectors, district,
municipality, the town councils of each province and the city of Kigali. The senators
representing higher institutions of learning were to be elected by a central assembly
representing these institutions.
Campaign Issues
While there was arguably a sprinkling of core public policies, these were overshadowed by
the persistent debate surrounding ethnic politics and the related issues of security. With
over 60% of the population below the poverty line, a miserly $200 per capita income,
and a very modest GDP, not to mention a stumbling justice system under the weight of
post-genocide justice, these seemed only peripheral. What seemed a running undercurrent
to the entire electoral campaign was the regime’s fear of the opposition’s evocation of
ethnic politics and its preoccupation with its antidote of unity and security. Irrespective
Rwanda’s Electoral Legacy 451
of concerted efforts by the transitional government to put unity and non-ethnic politics as
the new guiding principle, ethnicity remained real within everyday sociopolitical reality. It
will be remembered that the country’s constitution and Electoral Commission had expli-
citly banned any reference to divisive issues like ethnic mobilization and ethnic appeals.
This was reinforced by the organic law governing political organization and politicians,
which outlawed divisive and ethnic politicking in articles 5 and 38 subsection 1, article
40 subsection 4, 8, 11, 13 (Government of Rwanda, 2001).
Overall Kagame, being the incumbent, ran on an easy ticket of general government
achievement. His primary campaign issues were unity, democracy, security and develop-
ment. However, he continued occasionally to mention the need for education for all,
justice and general public concerns. While presenting the RPF agenda, Kagame was
quoted as saying “we shall emphasize the message for peace and security based on the
participation of Rwandans. We shall deepen the roots of democracy that our country
has so far attained” (Kagame, 2003; Assimwe, 2003b, p. 2). It is logical to argue that
perhaps the institutionalization and entrenchment of ethnic politics within pre-genocide
Rwanda’s sociopolitical structures fundamentally weakened the very fabric of
Rwanda’s cohesion and unity. It is therefore rational that the issue of unity became an
overriding and ongoing concern for Kagame. Rustow (1970, p. 337) has argued that
democracy without unity is not feasible. Hence, the tragic history of Rwanda, along
with the known potential of democratic dynamics to introduce ruptures within society,
made the unity debate imperative. With its disuniting and destructive potential already
evident in Rwanda’s immediate past, its potential for the future uncertain, ethnicity
remained a defining feature in Rwanda’s politics. It is no wonder that a great deal of
administrative, legislative and judicial safeguards were put in place to prevent its pre-
eminence within the political contest, a fundamental departure from previous electoral
or political practice. By making the appeal for unity (obumwe) central to his campaign,
Kagame sought to pre-empt and confront any tendencies to ethnic sympathies that his
rival was suspected of evoking among the Hutu. While vaguely acknowledging
the presence of Tutsi, Hutu and Twa identities, Kagame hardly mentioned them in his
campaign trail, emphasizing instead ‘Rwandaness’ and their unity.
Security perhaps followed in importance on Kagame’s agenda. While there was a
perceived threat from the interahamwe in neighbouring Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC),6 Kagame emphasized the continued need for national and collective
security. Despite significant successes on this front, he argued that total security was
an ongoing matter given the nature of geopolitics and the continued menace of
genocide suspects in the Congo. To many this was one area in which he certainly
held sway.
Interestingly Kagame trumpeted the need for democracy, although his version
appeared suspect to many Rwanda observers. It was what Ian Lustick (1979, p. 325)
has referred to as ‘controlled democracy’. Perhaps he took to heart Lijphart’s and
Lustick’s argument that too much democracy can be detrimental to the very spirit of
democracy. This is especially so when implemented in a very unstable political environ-
ment, hence the argument of sensitively and gradually regulating democratic space.
While liberal democracy allows for freedom of speech, choice and other attendant
freedoms, Rwanda did not experience such far-reaching democracy. As a government
official later argued “the remnants of genocidal ideology and ethnic manoeuvring
constrain the realization of a far-reaching democratic system”.7 It is crucial to identify
452 D. E. Kiwuwa
two positions in respect to the nature of democracy in the Rwandan context. While the
ethnic majority has relied on their demographic advantage to undermine the democratic
system, the minority has constrained democratic practice to safeguard itself against any
potential abuse. This mutual ‘fear of the other’, elsewhere described as the ‘ethnic
security dilemma’ has in the past created an impasse where the yielding of political
ground has been futile. An attempt to de-ethnicize political space has yielded mixed
signals and the question remains whether this is at all possible in the case of Rwanda.
Comparatively, Twagiramungu advanced relatively similar campaign issues to those of
Kagame, although he proffered a varied approach. While he also championed develop-
ment, education and unity, he was to differ fundamentally from Kagame on the issue of
ethnicity. Unlike Kagame, who opted to banish ethnicity from the political debate,
Twagiramungu sought to treat the matter as a Rwandan reality to be directly addressed.
He audaciously argued that ethnicity should not be used to muzzle dissent and opposition
but to enhance “unity in diversity” (Twagiramungu, 2003). While this was uncharted
territory within post-genocide discourse, his message failed to resonate with a weary
electorate careful not to be associated with anti-establishment ideology lest they be
labelled enemies of unity and reconciliation and promoters of ‘divisionism’. Undoubtedly
his detractors argued that Twagiramungu was pursuing ethnic politics, which purportedly
defined his electoral strategy. He was accused of attempting to create a divisive ethnic
party during his premiership, and this accusation was to dog him throughout his campaign.
The National Electoral Commission (NEC) and the Unity and Reconciliation Commission
constantly accused and reprimanded him for ethnic politicking (Kansiime, 2003, p. 2; AFP,
2003b, p. 22). To the many Tutsi elite, government and Kagame supporters, a vote for
Twagiramungu was a vote for a genocidal ethnic ideology and a return to ethnic politics.
Crucially even his supporters were conscious of being perceived as sanctioning ethnic
ideology. This anxiety thus limited their support overtly or covertly. In an increasingly
familiar pattern the government-controlled media headlined one of their publications:
‘Now Twagiramungu calls for ethnic loyalty’. This was sure to draw resentment and
scorn from an anxious population. Twagiramungu was quoted as cautioning his supporters
that “national unity should not rob you of what you are. Stick to your history” (Rutaisire,
2003, p. 1). Amid such recrimination, the various alternative programmes the opposition
had floated were sure to be lost.
As earlier pointed out, our analysis of these elections will be concurrent because of the
overlapping nature of some themes. We shall therefore return shortly to the nature and
results of the presidential elections. In the meantime, let us consider the legislative elec-
tions. The transitional government held five legislative elections to the bicameral parlia-
ment, that is elections for deputies, senators, youth, women and the disabled.
Legislative Elections
The 29 September–2 October legislative elections were meant to replace the dissolved
appointed Transitional National Assembly. Like the presidential elections, these
were also multiparty. The election to the senate and lower chamber were relatively
low-key, as a result either of presidential electoral fatigue or general indifference.
Asked why morale and enthusiasm was low, election officers observed that the presi-
dential elections were perhaps more important to the general populace than the
parliamentary elections, hence the lack of enthusiasm.8 The Rwanda Patriotic Front
Rwanda’s Electoral Legacy 453
alliance (PDC, PDI, PSR, and UDPR) fielded 53 candidates, while PL put forward 49
candidates, PSD 43 candidates and PPC 43 candidates for the legislative elections.
There were 72 female candidates competing for the 24 reserved domains, while the
number for the youth seats was seven. Six candidates were competing for one disabled
seat. The overall number of independents was 16. However, it should be noted that
these figures in the course of the electoral campaigns were subject to fluctuation as a
result of candidate withdrawals. For the senatorial contest the criterion was ‘exclusively
merit’, regardless of one’s party affiliation. Also, candidates were expected to be of
relatively high standing in society or highly skilled in their field of expertise. This
requirement was peculiar in the sense that it attempted to create an upper house domi-
nated by particularly elite persons and ‘intellectuals’. Within Rwanda’s political context
we are yet to understand the express need for a high chamber, a need that could not be
met by a representative single chamber. Nevertheless, the senate contest, despite its
merit pretensions, was but a test of political craftsmanship and manoeuvring not to
mention RPF strategic manipulation. It was apparent that electoral constituencies,
unlike the universal suffrage, would be more open to political manipulation, particularly
by RPF interests. The ability to influence these directly or indirectly using political and
social shrewdness coupled with government political ‘godfathership’ ensured that the
right candidates obtained the desired results.
Conducting the Ballot
Schedler (2002b) and Hermet et al. (1978) have argued that, for elections to be meaningful
to the democratizing process, the fairness and openness of the elections and the general
democratic credentials of the electoral process ought not to be in doubt. Hence it is essen-
tial while analysing any elections to go beyond the election-day analysis to the period of
campaigning, candidate selection, election process management like voters registration,
impartiality of the Electoral Commission and the legal redress thereafter. While the
2003 Rwandan general elections were ‘commended’ by the international community,
like many African elections these too fell short of a democratic clean bill of health. The
European Electoral Observer and Monitoring Team summarized the process as a
“promise for the opening of a new democratic era in Rwanda” (Willum, 2003). Overall
these elections gave mixed signals where, on one hand, electoral inconsistencies
threatened to overshadow any accomplishments and, on another, they were viewed as a
successful step in the right direction.
The first hurdle for perhaps the most cautious elections in Rwanda’s history was
donor withholding of electoral financial assistance. This emanated from donors’ uneasi-
ness with Rwanda’s electoral laws and perceived high-handedness vis a vis opposition
candidates (AFP, 2003c, p. 6). The rules of the electoral competition stipulated by the
electoral commission ostensibly restricted freedom of speech, association and free, fair
and open competition, although these were largely in line with the provision of the 2003
constitution. Based on the law governing political organisations, articles 5, 18, 38 and
40 prohibit political parties from basing themselves on race, ethnicity, religion or sex,
and stipulates that they must “reflect” at all times the unity of Rwandans. Although it is
easily appreciated that divisive and exclusionary appeals are a danger to an ethnically
sensitive Rwanda, blanket restrictions and ambiguous interpretations appear to
impinge on the democratic rights of freedom of association and speech. How to
454 D. E. Kiwuwa
strike a balance between vigilance against such forces and yet observe the various free-
doms of association and speech was crucial to the democratic credentials of these
elections.
Most importantly, political party activities were restricted to provincial level, with grass-
root activities explicitly banned. The regime argued that this was necessary to safeguard the
easily gullible populace from succumbing to the allure of ethnic politics. Schedler (2002a,
p. 106) has noted elsewhere that such legislation may be an increasingly smart fashion of
electoral control, relied upon as ‘auxiliary precaution’ to reduce electoral uncertainty.
Further, the impartiality of a government-appointed electoral commission was widely
questioned in view of their selective enforcement of the electoral law (Munyaneza, 2003a,
p. 1; Ntiyamira et al., 2003, p. 1). It had been argued that, despite the Electoral Commission
act 3 of law no. 39 2000 establishing the independence and autonomy of the commission,
deriving its resources largely from the state, as in many other developing countries around
the world, compromises its impartiality. The procedure for the staffing of the commission
also largely allowed for a substantial degree of executive influence and manipulation
of electoral management. More significantly, the president of the Electoral Commission,
Prof. Crysologue Karangwa, like most of its executive board members was an RPF
member and sympathizer. However, whether the above inconsistencies resulted in
commission bias or had any influence on the final count cannot authoritatively be
substantiated.
The election exercise itself was conducted in a relatively commendable manner
although a number of electoral irregularities were observed. Although this was a secret
ballot, deliberate attempts to ‘guide’ or influence some illiterate voters on who to vote
for by electoral officials had been reported. Ballot box stuffing at some voting stations,
intimidation of opposition candidates or supporters, arrests or disqualification during
campaigns and unequal treatment of candidates all negatively affected the electoral
process (NEC, 2003; St Petersburg Times, 2003). While these observations were con-
tested, it should be argued that these were perhaps isolated incidents that could not
have significantly changed the outcome, most especially during the presidential elections.
With an overwhelming turnout for the presidential and legislative elections, the 2003
elections were considered very successful in relation to the general level of participation.
They were monitored and observed by the European Monitoring Observer mission, the
Commonwealth Secretariat, the African Union and civil society. While these give a rela-
tively positive account of the elections, some system and procedural concerns were noted
by the EU team (Mission d’Observation Electorale de L’Union Europeenne, 2003),
prompting a reservation on their ‘free and fair’ tag.
The Playing Field
Like many elections, what invariably influences the electoral outcome sometimes has
nothing to do with what happens on election day but rather with what happens long
before. Contemporary political discourse has seen electoral analysts expand their attention
further than the conventional electoral results on to the campaign process. From such
adjustment comes the observation that election campaigns reflect the nature of political
competition within the polity and the relationship between competing sociopolitical
actors. It is commonly accepted that in deeply divided states where politics is zero-sum,
elections have a polarizing and radicalizing effect. However, electoral campaigns based
Rwanda’s Electoral Legacy 455
on substantive rather than micro-level issues such as ethnic identity offer a greater promise
of post-election political stability and inclusiveness as they allow policy-based govern-
ments instead of those based on narrow political interests. This is particularly evident
within the post-1960s Western societies, whose predominantly policy-based political com-
petition offered a stable and inclusive post-electoral structure.
While it was apparent that these elections lacked a competitive edge, the electoral
dynamics seems to have constrained this competitiveness not as a conscious political
decision but out of fear of uncertainty. In looking for the most fundamental influence
of the 2003 Rwanda vote, one ought to look further than the electoral arena to the
socio-historical and contemporary context of these elections. The impact of a troubled,
conflict-ridden history juxtaposed with genocide on the political contest was inevitable.
This specifically helped skew the presidential elections in favour of the RPF candidate.
Various regime critics and international observers castigated the ruling government for
employing the psychology of the legacy of the genocide to throttle political support for
the opposition candidate. Ethno-political scaremongering became a weapon of negative
campaigns against the opposition. With the NEC continuously accusing the opposition
presidential candidate of playing ethnic divisive politics as his trump card, he was not
only demonized but also systematically harassed, intimidated, demeaned and politically
frustrated. With screaming headlines like ‘Twagiramungu calls for ethnic loyalty’,
‘Twagiramungu says he won’t share power’ and ‘Rwanda’s Jean Marie Le Pen’ the
media at times seemed as though it were an extension of the RPF campaign machinery.
It hence failed miserably in its cardinal role of impartiality and positive contribution to
the democratization process (Kansiime, 2003, p. 2; Rutaisire, 2003, p. 2; Museminari,
2003, p. 8).
Most disturbing was the disproportionate allocation of media coverage to the presiden-
tial contestants during the campaigns. While the exclusively state-controlled media were
peripherally covering Twagiramungu’s campaign in a way that at times bordered on the
ridiculous, Kagame received generous nation-wide coverage. With prime time news
slots headlining his campaign schedule while almost entirely ignoring the opposition can-
didate, Kagame enjoyed unfettered exposure. He was occasionally shown amid mammoth
joyous crowds, casting him as the reassuring father-like guardian of the state accompanied
with chants of mzee wachu (our father). When the media attempted to cover the opposition
candidate, it was only to show his empty or sparsely attended campaign rallies or to extend
its witch-hunt. Despite the ‘well-intentioned’ effort of the NEC to allocate media airtime
proportionally to all candidates, the incumbent appeared to either commandeer or attract
disproportionate print and visual media coverage. However, it would be imprudent not to
acknowledge an almost universal advantage that running incumbents have (IRIN, 2003).
In almost all conceivable democracies the ‘playing field’ is relatively unlevelled in respect
to a running incumbent vis a vis the opposition. As if to reaffirm the above observation, in a
meeting with a visiting Netherlands counterpart the foreign minister reiterated that “it is
impossible for the presidential candidate to have equal opportunities during
elections . . . in principle it is good practice but unfortunately impossible to achieve”
(Kanamugire, 2003, p. 4).
While the presidential elections were a highly charged affair, the legislative elections on
the other hand were more mundane, lacking novelty and excitement. Apart from coalition
parties conducting joint election rallies, the legislative elections were greatly constrained
by financial hardships, with only well connected and resourced RPF and alliance
456 D. E. Kiwuwa
candidates having modest campaigns. However, the low key multiparty elections were
attributed to lack of or limited alternative candidate choices and the high-handed
monitoring of campaign activities by the NEC, local administrative authority and state
functionaries. For instance, two parliamentary contestants and former Hutu cabinet
ministers were suspiciously disqualified on the eve of the elections on account of question-
able accusations of nomination forgeries, an increasingly “smart and legitimate” way of
subduing the opposition in Africa (Schedler, 2002a, p. 106).
The campaign field was also grossly skewed as a result of the disproportionate
availability of party campaign resources and administrative capabilities, most evident
during the presidential elections, although the pattern continued in the legislative
contest. Whereas the RPF candidate and incumbent had access by virtue of his
office to state resources and overwhelming organizational machinery, by contrast the
opposition candidates had little or no resources, hence curtailing their campaign
abilities. With the state’s refusal to finance or extend financial support to ‘any’
candidates because of the ‘unavailability’ of funds, and the discouraging of ‘mediocre’
candidates, the opposition had to make do with hand-outs from well-wishers and
personal savings. This turn of events, a contradiction of widely expected state
funding, was a sure way not only of throttling the opposition campaign abilities
but also of foreclosing on their ability to project their message countrywide and
consequently to compete fairly.
While the campaign period was relatively short, the RPF was the only party in place
that had nation-wide campaign machinery, thereby gaining campaign mileage. Undoubt-
edly, as long as incumbents control another crucial resource—time—they tend to have a
head start. With extensive grassroots campaign machinery, co-opted local administrative
structures and a ban on grassroots campaigning by political parties, the RPF appeared to
have an edge. The RPF financial muscle was unmatched by any of the opposition candi-
dates and its ability to put together US style campaign structures simply overwhelmed and
intimidated already demoralized contenders. Private and government corporation contri-
butions, individual donations and indirect solicitation from the private sector swelled
the RPF campaign financial kitty. Advertising billboards, TV, radios and print media
advert slots, campaign flyers, party or candidate paraphernalia like umbrellas, baseball
caps and clothes all overwhelmed opposition candidates whose visibility within the cam-
paign trail was almost obliterated.
For a party predominantly associated with the well-to-do social elite of Rwanda, it is no
surprise that substantial resources were put at its disposal, not only for winning elections
but also to ensure the retention of political power to safeguard their livelihood and
economic interests. For the opposition candidate, missing some campaign schedules
was not an anomaly usually helped along by uncooperative local administrative
authorities, who seemed hell-bent on frustrating these candidates directly or otherwise.
In a quip about Twagiramungu’s failure to turn up at an election rally, a local official
chided him for not leaving his postal address behind to have his letter of authorization
delivered to him.9 On campaign trails it was not uncommon for Twagiramungu to be
confronted by an empty or barely attended campaign rally. His supporters reportedly
complained of state intimidation and a deliberate campaign to discourage people from
attending his rallies. With reportedly a single computer and a single room at his residence
for a campaign headquarters, Twagiramungu appeared a candidate doomed from the start
in comparison with an RPF fully functional campaign headquarters and regional offices
Rwanda’s Electoral Legacy 457
with full-time staff. With a questionable campaign strategy the opposition was unlikely to
project its message widely and extensively into the rural areas in comparison with the
RPF’s well laid-out network.
Some Rwanda observers have argued that the RPF campaign machinery deployed state
resources to grease the electoral wheels in areas of traditional opposition. Not only were
‘developmental projects’ promised or earmarked by government for immediate consider-
ation in such areas, a great amount of such help was channelled to youth, women and rural
projects in a period much closer to the election campaign. In one such instance hundreds of
livestock were delivered to Ruhengeri province, a predominantly Hutu area, in an electoral
period, arguably to impress upon them that ‘there’s more where this came from’ only if
you make the ‘right’ choice. However, whether the 99.6% of the electoral vote from
this particular area has a direct bearing on pre-electoral activities can not be definitively
stated.
Interpreting the Election Results
The RPF and its allies won the 2003 election resoundingly. With 95.05% in the presiden-
tial and 73.78% in the legislative elections, the RPF and allies obtained a convincing
victory that, despite reported flaws, could not have been fundamentally different. To
what could the RPF and alliance success be attributed? With a turnout of 99.48% for
the legislative elections and 96.55% for the presidential elections, could it be said that
the RPF received an indisputable mandate from across the political, social and ethnic spec-
trum? What can these electoral results tell us about ethnic politics in Rwanda in general
and its democratization efforts in particular?
First, these results can partly be explained by the overwhelming desire of the electorate
to forge ahead with relative certainty, hence opting for a more familiar tried and tested
choice. While Kagame and the RPF might not have been the best choice, he definitely
was the only option. The recent political quagmire Rwanda found itself in called for a
lot of reflection on the part of the electorate. Having a disturbing history of ethnic
voting, the choice presented as an alternative to Kagame and the RPF could not have
made the situation any harder than it already was. With a population keen to show
lessons learned and a progression away from ethnic politics, Twagiramungu’s supporters
had little strategic option but to vote for Kagame in the collective need to demonstrate their
newly learned political ‘vision’ of non-ethnic voting.
Second, the RPF government message of political closure on the past and the beginning
of a new political dawn with politics of a ‘national’ character appeared convincing to the
general populace. The RPF also made every effort to remind the electorate that the peace,
unity, security and development they enjoyed were the achievement of Kagame’s govern-
ment. On this basis, conflict-weary rural voters perceived the Kagame government as
having performed better and did not want to shoulder the risk of uncertainty, hence the
inevitability of voting for him.10 To a population disenchanted by war and political
instability, Kagame offered the only immediate option for political stability, continued
‘prosperity’ and unity. The overwhelming necessity not ‘to rock the boat’ worked
against the opposition.
Third, Kagame and Twagiramungu both occupied different sides of the image spectrum.
While Kagame exuded resolve, strong leadership and political certainty, his counterpart—
despite a spell as an outspoken pre-genocide opposition leader and premier—did not
458 D. E. Kiwuwa
inspire such confidence. His flight to exile not only cast him as a quitter but also one
who could not stay the course once challenged by difficult choices. The press and
RPF government increasingly cast him as a feeble, ideologically suspect and unreliable
leader. Kagame chided him constantly for “wanting to come back and occupy a house
others had constructed and painted”. Most importantly, the prospect of Twagiramungu’s
leadership, perhaps composed of squabbling politicians in a very fragile political
environment and certainly devoid of military support, was not what most voters
were looking forward to (Kalinaki, 2003b, p. 2). Thus trust and confidence in
political direction proved a vital factor that significantly tilted the race in favour of
Kagame.
Fourth, the RPF alliance with other parties seemed to have consolidated Kagame’s and
the RPF’s gains. Although we can not establish precisely how much the coalition contrib-
uted to RPF fortunes, it is clear that the alliance decision to throw their lot in with RPF
created a two-way race. This was presented as a choice between ‘good’ and ‘evil’, cer-
tainty versus uncertainty and divisive versus non-divisive politics. With this dichotomy,
the ultimate winners were always going to be Kagame and his party.
Fifth, Kagame’s attempt to reach out and embrace every Rwandan friend and foe
earned him respectable credentials as a national builder, reconciler and unifier. His
attempt to integrate his military and government with former regime forces and
politicians reflected his inclusive and ‘reaching out’ agenda. The presidential decree
pardoning thousands of mostly juvenile and old Hutu genocide secondary suspects
helped cast him as a person interested in national unity, reconciliation and political
progression. With almost every Hutu family having a relation in prison, this gesture
was evidence of Kagame’s sincerity to reach out to the majority Hutu and was
perhaps rewarded with electoral support.
Finally, the strong performance of the coalition within the legislative elections pointed
not only to the presence of the RPF in the coalition but also to substantial resource capa-
bilities. While the PL and PSD were mostly associated with the Tutsi survivor elite, they
had a decent financial muscle that enabled them to project their message more broadly
and intensively than other parties. They possessed several campaign offices countrywide
and set up an appreciable campaign network countrywide. While the MDR party, though
banned, would be looked upon with suspicion and distrust, the PL and PSD parties were
seen as victims of the previous political quagmire and a partner in Kagame’s government
efforts. It is no wonder that these two parties gained the top two places behind RPF in the
lower chamber elections and sent more candidates to the Senate (see Table A2 in the
Appendix). From a systematic analysis of these elections, it is evident that the RPF
success, though a foregone conclusion, was greatly helped by post-genocide jitters
manifested in the fear of ethnic politics. Consequently, we can argue that ethnic politics
had a negative and positive impact on the dynamics of these elections: positive by
contributing to the RPF success and negative by constraining opposition chances and
political space.
Overall the opposition candidates fared a lot worse than expected in the presidential
ballot, where Twagiramungu and Nayinzira polled a derisory 3.62% and 1.33% of the
total votes cast, respectively.11 This was further demonstrated by Twagiramungu’s defini-
tive loss in his own home area, where he gained a mere 0.70% compared with Kagame’s
99.05% (Bishumba, 2003, p. 9). Why then did the opposition fare miserably despite ethnic
demographic advantage and muted regime displeasure?
Rwanda’s Electoral Legacy 459
Perhaps to answer the above we ought to put these elections and results in context.
One would have to reflect on the overall electoral framework while also attempting to
understand the nature of post-genocide politics in Rwanda. It is important to under-
stand that Rwanda’s democratization process and power dynamics fall within the pol-
itical parameters imposed and defined by the genocide legacy. Hence the anxiety
related to ethnic politics defined and fundamentally influenced the electoral process
and results.
It had been a widely held conviction that the RPF presidential candidate would
perform exceedingly well given the nature of the opposition, while the party was
expected to put up a strong legislative show. While the RPF presidential campaign
was a foregone conclusion, the legislative elections were expected to be a more
closely contested affair. This was because the alliance within the presidential election
appeared to unravel slightly during the legislative elections. The PSD, PL and PPC
parties all fielded separate candidates. It is telling that the result was not exactly a
tight run as predicted, since the RPF alliance garnered a legislative majority, though
not an absolute sweep of the seats. While it is probable that voters seem to have
voted for the same party during the presidential and legislative elections, a small
number preferred other parties. With the electoral threshold at 5% of the total vote, a
slightly revised RPF alliance (PDC, PDI, PSR and UDPR) obtained 73.78% of the
vote, translating into 40 seats of the total of 53. The PL got 10.56%, translating into
six seats, while the PSD got 12.31% equating to seven seats. Since PPC only
managed 2.22%, with independents garnering a mere 1.09%, no seats were allocated
to either.
In analysing regional voting patterns we draw some interesting observations.12
Although Kagame performed strongly in all rural communes that were predominantly
Hutu, his performance in the capital Kigali was not total. While we have already dis-
cussed the reasons for his success elsewhere, his failure to pull off a similar feat in
Kigali is telling. In fact it is interesting to note that his opponent, Twagiramungu,
drew his biggest campaign rally and electoral gain in Kigali, where he polled 9.74%
(32 033 votes). Perhaps as elsewhere the reasons lie in the difference between voting
patterns in rural and urban areas of developing countries. Whereas the rural areas are
easily coerced and manipulated thanks to their high illiteracy levels, ignorance and
absolute poverty, not helped by thin electoral observer missions, urban areas with
higher numbers of electoral observers, a higher average income and concentration of
the elite, government coercion is minimal. Voting here therefore will tend to reflect a
fair degree of cross-sectional responses to government performance, where displeasure
and otherwise are demonstrated and expressed in equal measure. Nevertheless,
Kagame’s still strong performance in Kigali can generally be explained by the same
factors noted elsewhere.
Tellingly, Twagiramungu performed miserably in predominantly Hutu areas where in
the past this would be his electoral backyard. In areas like Ruhengeri, original hotbed
for anti-Tutsi and RPF discontent, Twagiramungu managed a mere 0.25% of the vote,
gaining another 0.59% in Gisenyi, 2.15% in Kibuye and 0.70% in Cyangugu. Perhaps
this illustrates a clear movement away from ethnopolitics in Rwanda or, on the other
hand, a reflection of an effective opposition demonization campaign and a ‘fear of retribu-
tion’-driven vote. It is worth noting that in Cyangugu area in particular, barely 90 days
earlier, only 24% of the population had voted for the constitution, yet the presidential
460 D. E. Kiwuwa
election returned over 99.05% for the RPF candidate. Why there was a sudden drastic
change of fortunes for Kagame cannot amply be elucidated. With the RPF performing
strongly in most areas, including predominantly Hutu areas of the north, northwest and
east, the claim of perpetual ethnic mobilization and voting appears not to hold. Likewise,
within the parliamentary elections, a breakdown of the results by constituency shows the
RPF alliance candidates polling strongly overall. To electoral commentators this could as
well be attributed to the absence of any parties that were strongly opposed to the RPF in
principle and practice than to genuine gains from a relatively competitive open political
system.
Conclusion
Terry Karl raised the spectre of a “fallacy of electoralism” when he discussed the
significance of elections within the democratization discourse (Karl, 1986, p. 9).
While this common misconception that elections are an equivalent to a democracy
has gradually but steadily receded, the debate on the centrality of elections still rages
on. It is clear to date that elections form part of the menu for the democratization
process. However, when the elections are complicated by systemic alignments like
societal cleavages and their very relevance questioned then a need to re-evaluate
their role in the democratic process is inevitable. The inconsistencies of Rwanda’s
electoral legacy, particularly the 2003 elections, beg very interesting questions. These
include whether elections are valid if certain adult people are disenfranchised by
virtue of their ethnic identity, when certain persons can not run for office, or whether
there is limited freedom of speech, assembly, movement or association in the need to
curtail ethno-political forces. Did the 2003 elections reflect declining ethnic politics
and cleavage voting and a rise in issue or policy voting? Consequently, did such
elections count as meaningful for the democratization efforts?
Rwanda’s elections were found wanting on many counts. Perhaps one may argue that
the quality of these elections was compromised by the political context within which
they were taking place. Selectively picking from what I refer to as the “menu of elec-
toral manipulation”, Rwanda’s elections, while in principle a welcome development,
fell short of meaningfully advancing the democratization agenda, notwithstanding the
“difficult political circumstances”. Heeding Dahl’s argument that elections are import-
ant but in certain situations preferable in the later part of the democratization process
than is often the case, Rwanda’s elections were perhaps too early to foster any mean-
ingful open and free exercise. The substantial influence of ethnic politics on choice of
candidate(s), the rules of the game, the campaign agenda, the electoral playing field and
final results is evidently clear. To determine authoritatively whether these results
pointed to a decline in ethnic voting in light of the above would clearly be a false
call to make.
Ultimately it is prudent to acknowledge the limitation of elections within Rwanda’s
existing sociopolitical framework and the general difficulties of the institutionalization
of multiparty democracy in deeply divided societies. Democratization through elections
and its subsequent faltering in complex situations like Rwanda demonstrates a degree of
theoretical and empirical incongruousness. While not wanting to sound extremely
pessimistic about the Rwandan elections or overly optimistic like Kagame sympathizers,
Rwanda’s Electoral Legacy 461
this ‘electoral experiment’ should be seen as a democratic test run where subsequent
elections may improve and indeed deepen democratic behaviour and practice.
The 2003 Rwanda elections should be seen as a successful legitimating political strat-
egy for the RPF government. While tight legislative and political control of the entire exer-
cise may have gravely undermined the depth of its democratic credentials, many would be
forgiven for only mildly admonishing Rwanda given its unique circumstances. Perhaps
like many international donors and observers we are willing to acquiesce in the difficulty
of overnight success of democratization vis a vis elections against the purported danger of
ethno-politics. On this occasion many critics are willing to overlook electoral anomalies in
the hope that the next round will be a better round. To them perceiving these elections as
part of a protracted transitional battle in which layers of authoritarianism and ethnic poli-
tics are lost step by step is a realistic expectation. To the question of whether the elections
contributed to the democratization process in Rwanda, many would answer a definitive
yes; but, to quote Whitehead (1999, p. 84), “when the curtains of the first electoral
contest fall, the ‘drama of democratisation’ is far from over; in fact they mark a mere
point of departure”.
Notes
1. ‘Divisionist’ is interpreted according to law no. 47 of 2001 as “any oral or written statement, or any act of
division that may generate conflict in the population”.
2. ‘Election a warning sign of Rwanda’s slide back to divisive politics’, 28 August 2003, at http://
www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/08/27/1061663848906.html?from¼storyrhs, accessed 10 November
2003.
3. The Burundi syndrome is an analogy drawn from Burundi, a country with relatively similar social structures
to Rwanda that had a multiparty election where a Tutsi incumbent was running against a Hutu candidate.
Despite drawing huge electoral rallies, unlike his Hutu challenger, the real result of the elections ousted
the incumbent resoundingly, indicating an ethnic-voting pattern.
4. Author’s interview with anonymous local journalist, Kigali, 20 July 2003.
5. Author’s interview with a western Kigali diplomat.
6. Following the end of genocide, its perpetrators, codenamed interahamwe, meaning ‘those who hunt
together’, were reported to have fled to the DRC, where they are perceived by Kagame’s regime as
posing a constant security threat.
7. Author’s interview with anonymous RPF political cadre, 5 July 2003.
8. Author’s interview with electoral officers, Kigali, 29 September.
9. Author’s interview with local administrator, 13 August 2003.
10. The Burundi 1990 multiparty election and subsequent military coup acted as a constant reminder of what can
go wrong, despite a concerted attempt to distance Rwanda’s political experience from its neighbour’s.
11. For complete results see Table A1 of the appendix.
12. See Table A1 of the appendix.
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Appendix I
The tables below are a tabulation of the 2003 electoral results.
Rwanda’s Electoral Legacy 463
Table A1. Presidential outcome
Province/area Registered voters Actual vote Participation rate Total vote Invalid vote Kagame % Nayinzira % Faustin T %
Butare 344 445 332 035 96.40 317 869 14 166 286 158 90.02 8 744 2.75 22 967 7.23Byumba 324 883 311 047 95.74 294 801 16 246 277 050 93.98 5 019 1.70 12 732 4.32Cyangugu 281 050 279 582 99.48 275 632 3950 273 011 99.05 695 0.25 1 926 0.70Gikongoro 223 592 213 652 95.55 203 722 9930 198 460 97.42 1 856 0.91 3 406 1.67Gisenyi 397 641 402 007 101.10 401 079 938 397 725 99.16 975 0.24 2 379 0.59Gitarama 417 340 399 006 95.61 390 822 8124 348 595 89.18 11 350 2.90 30 937 7.91Kibungo 338 185 325 142 96.14 321 023 4119 308 916 96.23 4 883 1.52 7 224 2.25Kibuye 213 045 209 814 98.48 202 150 7664 195 836 96.88 1 968 0.97 4 346 2.15Kigali rural 387 376 381 416 98.46 372 369 9047 354 804 95.28 4 512 1.21 13 053 3.51Ruhengeri 416 373 411 767 98.89 410 326 1441 408 291 99.50 1 003 0.24 1 032 0.25Kigali town 382 351 335 501 87.75 328 795 6706 288 886 87.86 7 876 2.40 32 033 9.74Umutara 210 408 200 224 95.16 199 359 865 195 891 98.26 743 0.37 2 725 1.37Diaspora 12 060 11 374 94.31 11 269 105 11 154 98.98 10 0.09 105 0.93Total 3 948 749 3 812 567 96.55 3 729 276 83 291 354 4777 95.05 49 634 1.33 134 865 3.62
Source: Government of Rwanda (2003).
Table A2. Parliamentary outcome
Party
RPF and
alliance PSD PL PPC Independent Total
Votes received 463 067 396 978 83 563 42 433 3,818,603Percentage 73.78 12.31 10.56 2.22 1.09 96.48Seats won 40 7 6 0 0 53
Source: Government of Rwanda (2003).
46
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