demitologizacija religijskih narativa na balkanu

Demitolo gizacija religijskih narativa na BalkanuUloga religija u (post)konfliktnom drutvu i procesima pomirenja na prostorima bive JugoslavijePriredili: Nikola Kneevi, Sran Sremac i Goran Golubovizbornik je objavljen u okviru edukacionog programa uloga religija u post-konfliktnom drutvu uz podrku organizacije kerk in actie, holandija

Novi Sad, 2012.

Demitolo gizacija religijskih narativa na Balkanuulo ga religija u (Post)konfliktnom Drut vu i Pro cesima Pomirenja Izdavai: centar za istraivanje religije, politike i drutva, novi sad Priredili: nikola kneevi, sran sremac, goran golubovi Dizajn korice: nikola kneevi Prelom teksta: zoran ivanevi tampa: spirit, novi sad Tira: 200 Mesto izdavanja: novi sad Godina izdanja: 2012 ISBN 978-86-89419-00-9

SADRAJ

Predgovor 5 Sergej Flere Was the Bosnian War (1992-5) a full fledged religious war? 7 Davor DALTO religion, politics and beyond: The Pussy riot case 25 Martina Topi Deconstruction of the religious narrative: Antemurale christianitatis and the construction of Difference 47 Darko ogo mit na nasuni (ili: o dometima mita i dometima demitologizacije) 77 Zlatiborka Popov-Mominovi Faith-based aktivizam: novi praktiki okvir za promiljanje projekta demitologizacije 95 Nikola Kneevi od kosovskog mita do mita o hrianskoj naciji: od deprivatizacije do politizacije religije i bellum iustum koncepta u srbiji i SAD 111 Sergej Beuk konflikt i postkonfliktna teologija: mogunosti demitologizacije 139 Goran Golubovi sufizam i verska tolerancija 149

Lejla Mui ekoloki nacionalizam kao projekat rodne i religijske de(kon)strukcije u kulturi sjeanja Balkana 163 Violeta Cvetkovska Ocokolji, eljko uri, Tatjana Cvetkovski Podseanje na krstake ratove iz ugla vizantijskih i arapskih pisaca 191 Branko Bjelajac o hrianskoj graanskoj javnosti 209 Alma Jefti Pogled na religijski narativ sa panoptike distance netrepeljivosti 229 Enoh eba Baptistike crkve u hrvatskoj i njihova reakcija na ratno nasilje promatrana iz perspektive kranske socijalne etike 233

Predgovor

suoavanje sa prolou predstavlja sloen proces u kojem pojam seanja ima jednu od kljunih uloga. kako moemo da se seamo na pravi nain? na koji nain da izbegnemo selektivno, iznova ekskluzivistiko pamenje koje nas liava empatije za patnje i rtve drugih i drugaijih, a opet nekada istih, a sada sukobljenih strana, koje nas tera da idealizujemo prolost ne osvrui se pritom na injenice. Postavlja se pitanje kako je uopte i mogue doi do ove faze dijalokog istorijskog narativa ako ostanemo taoci poricanja stvarnosti, duhova prolosti i mitomanskih istorijskih konstrukcija koje nam pokrivaju pogled ka budunosti, ostavljajui nas tako zatoene u vrtlogu iskrivljene realnosti, primoravajui nas da je iznova ponavljamo. nai sunarodnici izmiljali su i konstruisali tradicije, svesno naglaavajui razlike i prekidali karike u lancu kolektivnog seanja, stvarajui tako pozadinsku kakofoniju zla i prepremajui pozornicu za predstavu uasa. ipak, upitna i dalje ostaje njihova uloga. neki njihove linosti i dalje idealizuju i apoteiziraju dok drugi svesni injenica pokuavaju da se suoe sa prolou i njenim posledicama. Potrebno je zakoraiti prema prema istini, istini koja boli, ali istini koja oslobaa (jn, 8,32). istini koja ne iskrivljuje injenice, ne podlee mitologizaciji i preuvelianoj viktimizaciji prolosti ve eli uporediti narativne strukture koje iz seanja proizilaze i kroz prizmu dijaloga stvoriti novi narativ, koji rtve oslobaa a vinovnike osveuje o krivici. Bez sumnje, seanje predstavlja put iz lavirinta traume, bola i patnje u kome prepliu prolost i sadanjost, ije okolnosti nesumnjivo utiu na budunost. uzimajui ovo u obzir vano je istai ulogu demitologizacije religijskih narativa koji su esto interpretirali kulturne i etnike konflikata kao religijske. ovakva vrsta definicije konflikta, uvek podie uloge ali samim tim i potencijal da ih dodatno produbi. u kontekstu toga potrebno je demitologizovati narativne konstrukte i unutar njih, Bultmanovski reeno, otkriti kerigmu samu sutinu, osloboenu od ideolokih i politikih inilaca koji je iskrivljuju i ine otvorenim za razne interpretacije i manipulacije. Urednici

5

prof. dr Sergej Flere

filozofski fakultet univerziteta u mariboru

Was the Bosnian War (1992-5) a full fleDgeD religious War?

Abstractafter defining a religious war as one in which the warring parties efforts are expressly legitimated for the flocks participation by the respective religious authorities, the author analyzes whether the Bosnian War of 1992-95 fits these criteria. The major subject of study are official religious sources. in the cases of two of the three religious parties involved, the islamic community and the serbian orthodox church, it is easily discernible that, for them, this was considered a religious struggle; they legitimated the participation of their respective membership, whereas the roman catholic church never committed itself explicitly in words. nevertheless, deeds on the part of catholic officials (e.g. distribution of rosaries, blessings of armaments) indicate that the it also understood the War and the participation of its members as parts of a religious endeavor. Thus, the War can be considered to meet the criteria of a religious war.

Introduction

Religion and war it is often considered that religion, if not directly pacifist in its attitude, is at least predominantly contrary to war and that it is so particularly in modern times. Thus religion often recommends detachment from all worldly affairs, particularly from conflict and violence. for example, the Bible recommends, be at peace with one another (Mark 9:49) on numerous occasions, and even in The Quran one can read But if the enemy incline towards peace, do thou (also) incline towards peace (8:61). anti-war positions may be considered even more typical of todays christianity. new concepts have evolved in christian theology to promote this view (just peace-making theory, stassen /ed./). on the other hand, any review of religious history would reveal such a position as one sided at best. The history of christian involvement in war is long and rich in incident. even theology was drafted early in the development of christianity with a view to the justification of war, with the concept of a just war (ius ad bello and ius in bello) directly serving this purpose. classic statements include that by st. augustine who holds that Those who act according to a divine command, or even gods laws as enacted by the state and who put wicked men to death have by no means violated the commandment, Thou shalt not kill (De Civitate Dei). in islam, the Quranic notion of jihad has drawn notorious attention. The War in Bosnia and herzegovina, which took place during 19925, although a tragic event, provides an interesting recent case to study. it has attracted much scholarly attention, including its religious aspects (mojzes Yugoslav; vrcan; mojzes (ed.) religion; velikonja et al.; ramet; velikonja). although these authors note the religious component, they fall short of expressing whether it was a truly religious war. Arguments to the contrary among arguments to the effect that the Bosnian War was not or could not have been a religious war, one should mention the insight expressed by imi, a sociologist of religion from the region, who held that a religious conflict would need to have aligned various christians against

9Sergej Flere Was the Bosnian War (1992-5) a full fledged religious war?


non-christians, i.e. the orthodox and the catholics against the muslims which was not the case during most of the events during the Bosnian war (imi in mojzes (ed.) religion 132). This argument does not hold as a general dogmatic rule, as each religious identity is separate and particular, regardless of theological differences, which may be greater or smaller. neither does it meet the empirical test. orthodox-muslim clashes did predominate in the beginning, with catholic-muslim ones following, and only at the end was there a picture to be seen, albeit unclearly, of two christian sides fighting, predominantly jointly, against the muslims. in fact, the picture was one of confusion, if theological distances are taken as a criterion. historical experience in interpeting the meaning of religion becomes relevant here1. others maintained that the War was not a religious war, but an act of aggression on the part of the serbian armed forces from serbia proper (zgodic. 14 and other authors aligned with the muslim/Bosnyak/Bosnian legitimist interpretation), a position which introduces another level of analysis, that of international law. This issue is thus not of interest here. another way of denying that this was a religious conflict is by stating that the role of the confessions and religious communities was a minor, subjugated, accessory one in their relationship to political players (mardei in mojzes (ed.) religion 25; mojzes in mojzes (ed.) religion 27). such a contention is difficult to prove. With the same plausibility one may entertain the opposite notion, as does zgodi, who holds that in this case political parties ha[d] become the extended arm of religious communities (31). in a similar vein, vrcan, possibly the most authoritative sociologist of religion in the region, assessed the situation as one of nationalist political strategies having obtained explicit religious legitimacies sice the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis ( 119). Thus he does not deny the religious nature of the conflict, but does not attribute sufficient power and originality to this component. Whether religious communities and their leaderships were manipulated or instrumentalized by political or intellectual elites is pointless for the purpose of assessing whether it was a religious war.

1 in his ascension to the bishopric on july 7, 1991 in a see where there was no conflict among the three confessions (Banat), Bishop atanasije jevti mentioned that they (roman catholics) collaborated for centuries with the crescent against the serbian people (vladika atanasije 143).

The three actors The War took place between three main actors: Bosnian muslims (styling themselves the legitimate state of Bosnia and herzegovina), orthodox serbs (later calling themselves the republika srpska) and catholic croats (calling themselves the croatian community of herceg-Bosna) (their official titles were susceptible to change during the War). There were also other minor participants within Bosnia and herzegovina itself, including fikret abdis units in cazinska krajina, who later called themselves the Province of cazinska krajina: although these also were muslims, fiercely opposing and fighting the legitimists. Thus, all parties took on a would-be-legitimate form, trying not to appear as either aggressors or rebels. The history of religious pluralism in Bosnia and herzegovina goes a long way back. Before ottoman rule was imposed, during medieval times, a Bosnian church, of the Patharene (Bogumil) creed seems to have prevailed. This meant that the two major religious groups, the catholics and the eastern orthodox, did not have a stronghold comparable to the ones they had in the vicinity. some take this to be the explanation for a relatively strong intrusion of islam during ottoman times. ottoman times were characterized by a relative tolerance between the catholics, eastern orthodox, jews (a group which has almost disappeared) and muslims, in spite of a rule based on despotism. ethno-religious strife among the groups became more evident during austro-hungarian rule (1871-1918) (velikonja; Donia, fine and hamer). relative harmony was typical of titos times as well, during which the muslims (Bosnyaks) made further steps toward national establishment. The basic issue of whether there was an inherent hatred among the groups, as upheld by the nobel prize writer ivo andri, or an inherent tolerance, as held by Donia et al. remains open. a basic fact pertaining to the nature of the War, was, of course, that the three main religious groups coincided with ethnic grouping: thus the parties were muslim Bosnyaks (40% of the population by the 1981 census, the last taken under normal conditions prior to the war, Jugoslavija 1918-1988. Statististiki godinjak, 1991, 45); roman catholic croats (18%), and the serbian orthodox (32%)2. This coexistence of ethnicity and confessionality is2 There were numerous lesser ethnic groups, among which the main position was held by the Yugoslavs.



not a chance circumstance, but one indicating that the formation of modern nationalism followed confessional lines in this environment, particularly during the 19th and 20th centuries. The muslim Bosnyaks were the last to form, both because of the negative muslim attitude toward nationality and because the other two groups disfavoured their ethnic establishment. Thus the census of 1971 may be taken as the demarcation when muslims within the national meaning were allowed to declare themselves as such. (Jugoslavija 1918-1988. Statististiki godinjak, 1991 45). The fact that the parties were confessionally and ethnically defined does not mean that individual members of other groups did not join certain armed forces, usually as a result of some coercive means. The best known instances are the serb general jovan Divjak, technically one of the leading officers of the legitimist armed forces (pertaining to official Bosnia and herzegovina, but in fact to the Bosnyak muslim faction only), and the convicted war criminal (ICTY no. IT 96-22, http://www. un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm) Draen erdemovi, a croat, who served in the serbian armed forces (army of republika srpska). The three parties differed in terms of their power backing in the War, as the Bosnyak muslims could rely on the authority and power of the state of Bosnia and herzegovina, which had been officially declared, whereas the other two parties claimed de iure and de facto independence (republika srpska and the croatian community herceg-Bosna) from this newly declared state3. The other two parties, particularly the serbs, could rely on major military resources from the neighbouring national matrix states and power, in contrast to the legitimists (ramet 440-469). other details of the War pertaining to its historical, political, legal and other dimensions, factors and circumstances are outside the scope of this paper, although very interesting. The beginning of the War The War began, according to an often quoted account (Biljana Plavi, one of the foremost serbian political figures, mentions this so in her3 The referendum for the declaration of independence of Bosnia and herzegovina took palce of 1 march, 1992 and the declaration followed immediately, as did the first clashes (ramet 413-440).

recollections; she is a sentenced, but publicly repentant war criminal), with the shooting of a senior member of a serbian wedding party on 1 march, 1992 in front of the serbian orthodox church in sarajevo (120). in the late 20th century, such an explanation is bizarre and naive, since Bosnia was not a country of agrarian patriarchy, but was a rather modernized society during the socialist period4. The War took many forms, with war crimes being committed by all parties (a special united nations war crimes tribunal was set up, see http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm). We shall not deal with the many details. The foremost initial war theater was the countrys capital, which was besieged and bombed by serbian (orthodox) forces. This meant that an entire modern city of several hundred thousand inhabitants was continuously shelled, causing loss of life and dissolution of the functioning of the city, including such amenities as the water and electricity supply. By late 1995, fighting spread throughout the country and coalescing on the part of the warring parties took on various patterns. The War ended with the Dayton-Paris accords, signed by representatives of all three warring parties and by foreign powers in the capacity of guarantors, although it was mainly brokered by the US side. The accord was signed on December 14, 1995, in Paris (ramet 471).


Religious warThe term religious war does not have the historical standing to be compared with holy war and just war. nevertheless, the term religious war seems increasingly appropriate, designating religion as the major dimension of the war. in joness Encyclopedia of Religion (2005), religious war is mentioned routinely and on numerous occasions, usually without special explanation of the term. for example, it is mentioned within the context of judaism as war, which is required as a moral and spiritual obligation (m. juergensmeyer 6648); it is also mentioned in4 Without giving data on other forms of modernization, we will note that in 1953 a law was adopted providing for muslim women not covering of their heads and faces (radi), which was implemented at the time with ease and without obstruction or conflict. a more deep-rooted indicator of the emeddedness of modernization is to be found in liberal consumption of alcohol, as the historian imamovi states, forms a national characteristic (imamovi 175).


denoting the crusades, the XVI century european wars (3557, 3929, 6036, 7282), jihad is translated as religious war (4614). finally, it is indirectly conceptually when the Encyclopedia claims that [t]he development of explicitly religious wars changes the relationship between religion and violence: religion now is the very source of violence, at least in the reading of the actors themselves. (graf 9597). This definition cannot be fully accepted, as it is known that other deeper causes of war prevail, but it is important for our purposes, since it underscores the nature of religious war in the perception of the actors. The religious motive must be primary for the actors in a religious war. here, we are exclusively interested in whether this war can legitimately be called a religious one, regardless of the self-evident fact that every war has many causes, antecedents, characteristics, features etc. The antecedents are, of course, to be found in the form of an escalation, with major voices instingating, adding to the interaction of rise in intolerance, a constructed awareness of the impossibility of coexistence, but this author would rather underscore the escalation of mutual inter-group fears. it also surpasses the scope of this paper to analyze the social groups which were most active in this discourse. on the other hand, scholarship holds that modern wars are not predominantly caused by religious factors, but by economic motives. Thus in the same Joness Encyclopedia of Religion, one finds among the most contemporary students of war, ideological factors are generally viewed as subordinate or epiphenomenal to material ones, religious and other forms of legitimation being understood as the convenient or even necessary means that serve to mask or mystify the acquisitive competition that is the primary motivation for armed conflict (lincoln 9680; see also van evera). to analyze whether this War was a religious one, one needs to define precisely what may be legitimately designated as a a religious war. religious war is not often normatively defined, although the BBC Encyclopedia does come close (www.bbc.co.uk/religion/ethics/war/religious/ holywar/shtml) to define the term. it is defined by the objectives of the war being perceived in religious terms, and the authorisation of conducting warfare by a legitimate religious leader. religious goals typically have to do with the following issues: the spread of faith; retrieving countries, that once belonged to that religion, even though members of the religion may have left a long time ago; the rescue of one religions members from the servitude of infidels; recovery and purification of consecrated places that are presently being polluted and profaned;

avenging blasphemous acts, cruelty to and killing of the members of ones religion (even though these may have taken place a long time ago). much of this would be relevant in the context we are considering, but would be beyond the scope of this paper. in line with the above, for the purposes of this paper a religious war is defined as one in which the warring parties efforts are expressly authorised and legitimated by relevant religious authorities. Thus, taking part in such a war becomes a religiously meritorious act in the eyes of religious authorities. The other part of the definition of religious war (perception of objectives) is more difficult to study with precision, although there is little doubt that this condition was met in this case. We will test whether it can be documented that the Bosnian war meets these criteria for religious war. meeting the criteria would be a step towards a more exact definition and explanation of the War.


Authorisation by religious authorities for achieving religious goalsThe Serbian Orthodox Church mojzes, a knowledgeable source, holds that the the SOC seems to have played a most harmful role (religion 84), pursuing definitely from the point that war is an unwished and tragic event, causing immense suffering. The SOC was rather explicit in its official stand on the War in Bosnia5. The head of the SOC, Patriarch Pavle, reflected on the issue when he told the international intermediary, lord carrington, that serbs cannot take part in any part of independent croatia, as they have to be under the same roof with serbia and all serbian krajinas (border regions, one of which was located in Bosnia s.f.)it is time to comprehend that victims of genocide cannot live together with their former and perhaps their future executioners. he continued, These co-nationals of ours, of the same faith and blood, are confronted by the following fateful choice:5 The SOC was criticised openly by numerous Protestant churches and agencies in the World council of churches for a sin similar to that of Deutsche christen who gave support to hitlers nationalistic policies (quoted from mojzes religion 85).


either they will, by the arms in their hands, win existence in the same state with the matrix of the serbian people, or they will be forced to emigrate from this new independent state of croatia, sooner or later. This is not a call to arms, but it is an explicit justification. The Patriarch legitimated the serbian armed struggle citing historical reasons. he also gave lip service to christianity: The serbian church wishes nothing else but to be on the side of truth and justice, of universal christian principles (Patrijarh Pavle 1991 1). The above words pertain directly to the war in croatia, which preceded the Bosnian one, but they are just as valid, since the policy of the SOC towards Bosnia was the same, motivated by the same rationale of the serbian orthodox flock constituting a single state. on the eve of the commencement of hostilities in Bosnia, the holy council of church hierarchs, on january 17, 1992 communicated that the serbian orthodox church (SOC) and the serbian people never accepted the artificial and illegitimate AVNOJ6 borders established without historical and ethnic foundation, established on the part of the communist guerrilas under conditions of occupation and civil war (sveti arhijerejski sabor 4-5). Patriarch Pavle explicitly blessed the serbian forces the defensive struggle during an imposed War in july, 1994 (quoted by radi in mojzes (ed.) 178), as did many other SOC dignitaries. The rationale for the active serbian role in the Bosnian War is expressed: there is legitimacy in serbian military action of any type, since serbs have historical experiences allowing for preventive action; every serbian action is essentially a defensive one, regardless of form. This statement basically follows mazzinis revolutionary formula, one nation one state. only one state for each nation. although it is not surprising that the SOC could maintain such a position, as serbs were a very scattered nationality within the former Yugoslavia, this formula was a successful mobilizational formula in the 19th century, one neither fully nor easily achieved in the 19th century, and completely out of line with events at the end of the 20th century. The initial SOC position was expressed even more explicitly by Bishop amfilohije in the early stages of the War when he anticipating6 AVNOJ 3 (Third session of the anti-fascist council of national liberation of Yugoslavia) was a provisional communist led parliament of Yugoslavia in 1945-6. The borders between the republics of the former Yugoslavia were never officially explicitely defined, though they were drawn up by a group of communist officials led by milovan Djilas.

victory cheerfully said god has given the serbs a new chance to achieve their dream of living in one state. similar optimism is expressed when he said in the same breath: god expects something great from this People, when he positions the People in the focus of world events. We need to endure, as the victory belongs to the innocently crucified (tanjug 8). Bishop amfilohije stated a year later, when the War at its fiercest The War in Bosnia today is a struggle by our brethren in Bosnia and herzegovina for golden (or: priceless) liberty and the honour of the entire eastern orthodoxy let god grant every assistance and the power to withstand the pressures of the world, as our lord jesus chirst has already been victorious over such pressures (Patriarch Pavle Pismo 5). one of the rare instances of more theological attempts to contemplate the War occurs in the second Theological-Philosophical symposium during the Days of sts. cyril and methodius, held in cetinje in 1996, directly after the Wars end (mladenovi and ulibrk (eds.) 1996). The proceedings of this symposium deserve attention, both owing to the typical nature of the positions expressed, and because of the composition of the participants. Besides prominent theologians and Bishops (amfilohije radovi, atanasije jevti), one finds numerous other authors, including the notorious radovan karadi, the war-time president of republika srpska and presently fugitive indicted war crminal. The nature of his activities could not have been unknown to the organizers at the time of the symposium. The position of the SOC on the War usually emerges without direct reference to it. The favourite topics touching on the War are imperfection of human nature, the special nature of morality during wartime, accentuation of the serbians christ-like nature and their history as a calvary. The struggle of serbs against foreign domination are accentuated with reference to the kosovo covenant to avenge defeat and treason during the kosovo Battle of 1389. at the symposium, one could hear such war-praising assertions, as we christians are against this-worldly peace, because it is enmity towards god, but we opt for war against the self-satisfied peaceThe five year fatherland War in republic srpska and krajina cleansed out national soul, illuminated our christian intellect, renewing our covenantal conscience The final panegyric stated that liberty is always achieved by the holy cross and by violence. (arsenijevi, in mladenovi and urlibrk 234).



in statements from the symposium one can find many to the effect that the modern world is morally debased, which is also manifested in wars, this being a consequence of godless communist ideology or of wars being without justice, as american ones are (radovi in mladenovi and ulibrk 269), but there are no direct statements about individual acts or misdeeds, particularly not those committed by members of their own flock. one of the few SOC prelates demonstrating some awareness of the responsibility of this church was the metropolitan of zagreb and ljubljana jovan, who stated in 1996 that individuals from the SOC were, aware and unaware, introduced into the dangerous war game by way of manipulation where extra-ecclesiastical intellectuals (writers, the circle around the serbian academy) truly defined policy (quoted from tomani 17). The active and almost vanguard SOC position in defining the goals of warfare is almost sufficient for the other two confessional parties, also with historical memories of injustice and tragedy, to comprehend the War in religious terms7. however, the other two actors were far from playing reactive roles. The Islamic Religious Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina to comprehend the role of the islamic community, it should to be mentioned, by way of introduction, that islam and any particular islamic religious community (such as the islamic religious community in the former Yugoslavia and later the islamic community in Bosnia and herzegovina), are not organized in a church type organization. its organizational structure is more complex, not bureaucratic in Webers meaning with a rationally ordered hierarachy. The complexity includes7 all nationalities and religious communities are likely to speak, through the mouths of their ideologues, of being particularly tragic in fate and self-sacrificial in behavior. for muslims, see, e.g. imamovi, maanovi in mojzes (ed.) 145-9. for croats, see e.g. tudjman (1994) who stressed the ante-murale nature of the position of catholic croats and their tragic fate in confrontation with larger nations (first the hungarians and later the serbs). for serbs, an entire ideological circle of ideas on the tragic nature of serbdom was present, including their martyrdom for the establishment of Yugoslavia, the bad deal they got in that state, particularly as to internal borders, the injust nature of economic redistribution, the anti-serbian position on the part of communists before and after they came to power, tito included, and ideas on the messianic nature of serbian history as a whole; for a critical overview, see n. Popov (ed.).

schools in the educational meaning, schools of thought, brotherhoods, orders, endowments, as well as autonomous laymen and spiritual leaders, not to speak of historical and spatial variation in association with the state. a special place in the formation of its position that of its flock, but particularly in comprehending the muslim position in Bosnia and herzegovina, was played by alija izetbegovic. although he was a lay person, his impact carried great religious authority. Thus, an islamic individual had a particular impact upon events in Bosnia. it is his book The Islamic Declaration, who was sentenced by the then communist authorities for enemy propaganda and spent years in jail. he was to become the first elected President of the Presidency (collective head of state) of Bosnia and herzegovina within the then Yugoslavia in 1990 (still within the Yugoslav set of institutions), continuing his mandate after independence as head of state. The other two nationalities understandably comprehended his book as a programme for the future Bosnia and herzegovina, despite his current pronouncements. he was regarded not only as a martyr, but almost a prophet, next to mohammed and his having received the king fahd medal for the promotion of islam was regarded as a confirmation of such a conviction (velikonja 278). This is not sufficient direct support for the War in Bosnia as a religious one on the part of muslims, but it does lend some indirect and tangential support. it helps to understand how the other two ethno-confessional parties may have comprehended the conflict in religious terms from the initial stages, the book having appeared in 1990. in the Islamic Declaration, izetbegovic hypothetically pictures a state based on islamic principles, stressing its superiority and purity as a religiously homogenous society. The Declaration is not much of a detailed plan for a purely islamic state. Written in 1970, first published in 1990, it speaks of the need for the state to be fully based on islam in all walks of life, without details being spelled out too clearly. islam is regarded as superseding religion, a unity of faith and law, education and force, ideal and interest, spiritual community and state, voluntariness and coercion (Deklaracija 19). never does it say to which state it is to be applied, although that that may be evident, izetbegovi being a Bosnian. its particular features may be found in promoting the idea of islam allegedly being in line with the republican form of government (Deklaracija 29) and speaking of a future muslim world federation (Deklaracija 50-51).



it is not difficult to imagine that, under the circumstances of the existing uncertainty in Bosnia and herzegovina in 1990, with fear being disseminated, these words, coming from a then prominent politician and later president of Bosnia an herzegovina, could be understood as a battle-cry for the establishment of a purely and fundementally islamic state in Bosnia. These statements also somewhat contribute to setting the stage for the War in a religious framework. They were not directly stated by religious prelate, but izetbegovi was regarded almost as a religious martyr for having been in prison, and among muslims lay persons have spoken with greater authority as there was no hierarchical church organization. moreover, during the War itself, we note two events indicative of the islamic communitys position on the War. first, there are the words of the highest islamic community authority res-el-ulema mustafa ceri who stated: it will be difficult to convince muslim Bosnians that what is happening to them is not a continuation of the crusades waged against islam and muslims by europe (quoted by cvitkovi 29). in the next year ceri went further and said the defense of the country of Bosnia is now a holy issue for every (islamic) believer. (quoted by cvitkovi 33). a similar statement was given by the ryaset (the highest islamic collective body in Bosnia) (reported by cvitkovi 126). lower level imams in direct communication with believers asserted the islamic concepts of dying in war for allah being a special honour, and becoming a shehhid taking the militant directly to the precincts of the paradise (reported by cvitkovi 101). The second clear indication of the position of the islamic community towards the War is to be found in a deed, a doing where participation is a religious undertaking. in the legitimist army in 1993, a special combat unit was composed of imams only. (reported by cvitkovi 25-6). This was also a case of authorisation on the part of the clergy by setting an example.

The Roman Catholic Churchit is not easy to find explicit claims of the roman catholic complicity with war efforts with the croats. it is clear, however, that catholic leaders were most effective in producing an enormous amount of information material, with their interpretation of events (mojzes 89).

mojzes also notes, in another paper, that the RCC in croatia and Bosnia gave signals to the serbs that they [were] endangered (velikonja et al. 20) by supporting a particular political party and by taking stands on the linguistic issue (whether serbian and croatian are a single language). mojzes, finally, singles out the hypocrisy of the roman catholic church (RCC) (velikonja et al. 23). This still falls short of meeting the definition of religious war. most of the official catholic pronouncements stated the unfortunate nature of the war, its being imposed on catholics and the sufferings of catholics (Vrhbosna, 1991-5). catholic prelates even condemned the war crimes committed by members of their own flock, although in a general way (cardinals Pulji and kuhari in 1993, quoted in velikonja 271). The statement closest to supporting the War effort was to be found possibly in the ascension speech by the Bishop of mostar in 1994, when he mentioned, among other issues i extend my fraternal encouragement to the brave defenders of our people and country (nastupni govor, Vrhbosna 1-4/94, 137). Beside the fact that, if the other two religious parties are involved directly, it is almost impossible for the catholics not to view it similarly, there are some data on direct complicity and perception of the War in religious terms. Thus, a survey carried out by i. cvitkovi in 1993, the central part of the war effort, among croatian militants of the king tvrtko Brigade in Bosnia indicated that 18% of the militants confirmed of their current armaments had been blessed by catholic priests (cvitkovi 2004, 124). Despite evasive words on the part of the catholic clergy, particularly its higher echelons, the wearing of rosaries by croatian militants was promoted and organized by the catholic church. The parish priest from a herzegovina village distributed over 1000 such sets of beads. The wearing of rosaries was not a spontaneous event of popular religiosity. in the croatian military newspaper (published in croatia, but distributed in Bosnia as well, among croat militants), the theologian Dr. adalbert rebi wrote With rosaries around their necks, our defenders went to the defense of the homeland and saved their lives in a miraculous way by the protection of the virgin (quoted in cvitkovi 129). (serbian militants wore Byzantine style crosses). The benedictions and the rosaries are good examples of direct catholic involvement, complicity was never officially confirmed.


ConclusionThe paper maintains that the War can legitimately be viewed as a religious one, in spite of arguments to the contrary, which entertain ideas of other causes and other dimensions being dominant. even though the War was complex, it has been shown that the religious dimension was of a nature allowing it to be legitimately nominated as a religious war. officials of the three groups did endorse and promote belligerent activity on the part of the flock, and these promotions, endorsements and blessings could have no other effect but legitimise the war efforts, enflaming them further. religion thus introduced a dimension of ultimate (divinely sanctioned) morality of the War efforts. although the SOC may have been the first to undertake and definitely was the most explicit in this activity, all three sides undertook such activities, only traces of which are to be found today in documents, since many activities were not advertised. The globalisation of the world, with the creation of more functional interconnectedness and even functional unity in all spheres of life, is paralleled by varied cultural reactions, among which not the least is to be found in ethnic, confessional and other parochialism and clinging to ones cultural, particularly religious identity, which may dominate at times of crisis and challenge. it is questionable whether a cosmopolitan and general humanist orientation remains in force beyond ordinary times and good times. accordingly, this author doubts that we have truly entered a new civilization of generalized values, with human life valued as such. in critical situations, one returns to the basic, primary group and a clan-like sense commitment. The Bosnian case may not have been an exception and anomaly, as has already been pointed out by huntington (1994) and vrcan.


REFERENCEScvitkovi, ivan. konfesija u ratu. sarajevo-zagreb: svijetlo rijei-oi u oi, 2004. glasnik: slubeni list srpske Pravoslavne crkve. Beograd: srpska Pravoslavna crkva, 1994. Donia, robert j, fine, john v.a. and hamer, john c. Bosna and herzegovina: a tradition Betrayed. london: columbia university Press, 1994. graf, franz. violence. , encyclopedia of religion, l. jones (ed. in chief). Detroit: macmillan reference. Detroit: mcmillan reference. Pp.9595-9600, 2005. huntington, samuel. The clash of civilizations and the remaking of the World

order. new York: simon and schuster, 1994. imamovi, mustafa. historija Bonjaka. sarajevo: Preporod, 1998. izetbegovi, alija. islamska deklaracija. sarajevo: Bosna, 1990. juergensmeyer, mark. nonviolence encyclopedia of religion, l. jones (ed. in chief). Detroit: macmillan reference. Pp. 6646-6649. lincoln, Bruce. War and Warriors, encyclopedia of religion, l. jones (ed. in chief). Detroit: macmillan reference, vol. 14, 9679-9683, 2005. mladenovi, ratko and ulibrk, jovan. (eds.) jagnje Boije i zvijer iz bezdana. filozofija rata. cetinje: svetigora, 1996. jugoslavija 1918-1988. statististiki godinjak. Beograd: savezni zavod za statistiku, 1991. mojzes, Paul. Yugoslavian inferno : ethno-religious warfare in the Balkans. new York : continuum, 1994. mojzes, Paul (ed.) religion and the War in Bosnia. atlanta, GE: scholars Press, 1998. nastupni govor Biskupa ratka prigodom preuzimanja biskupske slube, vrhbosna, slubeno glasilo biskupija metropolije vrhbosanske: sarajevo. pp. 136-139, 1994. Patriarch Pavle. Pismo Patrijarha Pavla britanskom lordu karingtonu, predsedniku meunarodne mirovne konferencije. Pravosavlje, 576, 1, 1991. Patriarch Pavle. Pismo Patrijarha Pavla savezu jevrejskih optina jugoslavije. Pravoslavlje, 596 5, 1994. Patriarch Pavle. izjava njegove svetosti Patrijarha Pavla. Pravoslavlje, 46, 1995. Plavi, Biljana. svedoim. Banja luka: triopoint, 2005. Popov, neboja (ed.) srpska strana rata: trauma i katarza u istorijskom pamenju. Beograd: republika, 1996. radi, radmila. verom protiv vere: drava i verske zajednice u srbiji 1945-1953. Beograd : institut za noviju istoriju srbije, 1995. ramet, sabrina. Balkan Babel : The Disintergration of Yugoslavia from the Death of tito to the War for kosovo. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002. ramet, sabrina. The Three Yugoslavias. state Building and legitimation, 19182005. Washington: Woodrow Wilson center Press, 2006. sveti arhijererjski sabor srpske pravoslavne crkve. Poruka svetog arhijerejskog sabora srpske pravoslavne crkve. glasnik, slubeni list srpske pravoslavne crkve, 4-5, 1995. tanjug. hoe Bog neto veliko od ovog naroda, Politika, no. 28539, 24 march, 1993, 8. tomani, mirko. srpska crkva u ratu i ratovi u njoj. Beograd: krug, 2001. tudjman, franjo. Bespua povijesne zbiljnosti : rasprava o povijesti i filozofiji zlosilja. zagreb: hrvatska sveuilina naklada, 1994. van evera, stephen. The causes of War: Power and the roots of conflict. ithaca NY: cornell university Press, 1999. velikonja. mitja. religious separation and Political intolerance in



Bosnia-herzegovina. college station: texas a & m university Press, 2003. velikonja, mitja, mardei, eljko, mojzes, Paul, and zgodi, enes. The role of religions and religious communities in the Wars in ex-Yugoslavia, religion in eastern europe, 24, 2003, 1-42. vladika atanasije Beseda na hirotoniji i ustolienju episkopa banatskog atanasija, glasnik, slubeni list srpske pravoslavne crkve, 1991, 142-145. vrcan, sran. seven theses on religion and war in the former Yugoslavia. The Public 1, 1994, 115-124.

Internet sourceswww.bbc.co.uk/religion/ethics/war/religious/holywar/shtml, retrieved 28 july, 2007 www.neaadvent.org/cathen/1546c.htm retrieved 19 july, 2007 http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm retrieved 19 july, 2007

The institute for the study of culture and christianity [email protected]

doc. dr Davor Dalto

religion, Politics anD BeYonD: the PussY riot case

AbstractThe recent case of the russian punk group Pussy Riot, their action in moscow cathedral and the subsequent process against them, have highlighted many important issues that the russian society faces today. however, this case can also be the basis for a more general analysis of the religion politics relations, and the political dimension of orthodox christianity. examining relations between religion and politics one can point to two important elements that both religion and politics, in their institutional manifestations, share. They are: 1) the will to power, and 2) the communitarian dimension of human existence. in order to fully understand the paradoxical position of christianity in respect to politics and state, it is necessary to differentiate between eschatological and historical christianity. Key words: church, christianity, religion, state, politics, control, power, community

i want to begin my essay on religion and politics referring to a very recent event. it is a political provocation by a previously marginal and mostly unknown punk group Pussy Riot. The provocation took place earlier this year (2012), triggering the process against its members. it is my hope that the analysis of this important case will help us in drawing more general conclusions as to the relations between religion and politics. The reason for the trial against the Pussy Riot group was their performance in the moscow cathedral of christ the savior, staged on february 21, 2012. The performance was a punk prayer to the mother of god to chase Putin out. The space right in front of the iconostasis served as a ready-made stage for this performance. The response of the authorities was harsh. The three members of the band, Yekaterina Samutsevich, Maria Alyokhina, and Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, were arrested and accused of hooliganism motivated by religious hatred. i will focus now on their closing statements they had delivered on august 8, 2012, before the court sentenced them to two years in prison, on august 17, 2012. in these, intellectually very refined statements, they explain the main intentions of their performance, putting it in a broader context of russian society and orthodox christianity.

27Davor DALTO religion, politics and beyond: The Pussy riot case

The Pussy Riot Philosophy Closing Statementsat the very beginning of her statement, Yekaterina Samutsevich explains the reasons for choosing the cathedral of Christ the Savior for their performance. she perceives the cathedral as an important symbol of political power in russia since the current patriarch kyrill took the office. This claim is a platform upon she develops her brief but very insightful analysis of Orthodox aesthetics used for political purposes by the current kremlins administration. The question she starts with is Why did Putin feel the need to exploit the orthodox religion and its aesthetic? and continues:


after all, he could have employed his own, far more secular tools of powerfor example, the state-controlled corporations, or his menacing police system, or his obedient judicial system. it may be that the harsh, failed policies of Putins government, the incident with the submarine kursk, the bombings of civilians in broad daylight, and other unpleasant moments in his political career forced him to ponder the fact that it was high time to resign; that otherwise, the citizens of russia would help him do this. apparently, it was then that he felt the need for more persuasive, transcendent guarantees of his long tenure at the pinnacle of power. it was then that it became necessary to make use of the aesthetic of the orthodox religion, which is historically associated with the heyday of imperial russia, where power came not from earthly manifestations such as democratic elections and civil society, but from god himself.8 it is interesting that Yekaterina employs aesthetical vocabulary in the context of politics, power and religion. she does not point primarily to the institution of the church or the spectrum of popular beliefs as the way the current administration makes use of orthodox christianity, but rather to the aesthetics of the orthodox religion which has been absent from the public sphere during the communist times. This space which was left by the expulsion of the church and christianity since the Bolsheviks could and, in fact, has been used according to Yekaterina for Putins political aims: here, apparently, the authorities took advantage of a certain deficit of the orthodox aesthetic in soviet times, when the orthodox religion had an aura of lost history, of something that had been crushed and damaged by the soviet totalitarian regime, and was thus an opposition culture. The authorities decided to appropriate this historical effect of loss and present a new political project to restore russias lost8 i quote all three statements following the english translation by: chto Delat news (statement by Yekaterina Samutsevich); marijeta Bozovic, maksim hanukai, and sasha senderovich (statement by Maria Alyokhina); maria corrigan and elena glazov-corrigan (statement `12by Nadezhda Tolokonnikova). These translations were edited by liora halperin, katharine holt, vera koshkina, ainsley morse, rebecca Pyatkevich, sasha senderovich, and Bela shayevich. source: n Plus one magazine, http://nplusonemag.com/ pussy-riot-closing-statements.

spiritual values, a project that has little to do with a genuine concern for the preservation of russian orthodoxys history and culture. it was also fairly logical that the russian orthodox church, given its long mystical ties to power, emerged as the projects principal exponent in the media. it was decided that, unlike in the soviet era, when the church opposed, above all, the brutality of the authorities toward history itself, the russian orthodox church should now confront all pernicious manifestations of contemporary mass culture with its concept of diversity and tolerance. implementing this thoroughly interesting political project has required considerable quantities of professional lighting and video equipment, air time on national television for hours-long live broadcasts, and numerous background shoots for morally and ethically edifying news stories, where the Patriarchs well-constructed speeches would in fact be presented, thus helping the faithful make the correct political choice during a difficult time for Putin preceding the election. moreover, the filming must be continuous; the necessary images must be burned into the memory and constantly updated; they must create the impression of something natural, constant, and compulsory. from this passage we learn how the religious aesthetics serves political purposes. it is both the very aesthetical properties of certain religious expressions (Yekaterina points to their aura and mysticism, but one could also add other explicit aesthetical aspects, such as liturgical rituals, icons, incense and so forth) and the aesthetical exploitation of some aspects of religious practices through the mass-media what makes religious aesthetics useful for wider social and political goals. however, it seems that, according to Yekaterina, it was not only the political establishment which made use of the church, but the very institution of the church (personified here in the figure of the patriarch) willingly accepted its new role, within the changed social context. it seems that the church, as an institution, perceives itself as an ally of the current regime. supreme political authorities have been interpreted as symbols, maybe even the very embodiment of russia, russian history and russian people, which is a view deeply rooted in the imperial russian tradition. This, in return, gives the church a prominent social position, increasing its influence. Thus, the state church deal is mutually beneficial. The state



and its authorities obtain more than they could possibly obtain from other allies; they obtain blessings, aura of the tradition and glorious past (though it has never actually been that glorious for the common people) and even metaphysical foundations. toward the end of her expos, Yekaterina also addresses the reasons why the Pussy Riots action, which did not involve any sort of violence, provoked such a brutal response. This, in her view, has to do with aesthetics again: our sudden musical appearance in the cathedral of christ the savior with the song mother of god, Drive Putin out violated the integrity of the media image that the authorities had spent such a long time generating and maintaining, and revealed its falsity. in our performance we dared, without the Patriarchs blessing, to unite the visual imagery of orthodox culture with that of protest culture, thus suggesting that orthodox culture belongs not only to the russian orthodox church, the Patriarch, and Putin, but that it could also ally itself with civic rebellion and the spirit of protest in russia. Perhaps the unpleasant, far-reaching effect of our media intrusion into the cathedral was a surprise to the authorities themselves. at first, they tried to present our performance as a prank pulled by heartless, militant atheists. This was a serious blunder on their part, because by then we were already known as an anti-Putin feminist punk band that carried out its media assaults on the countrys major political symbols. in the end, considering all the irreversible political and symbolic losses caused by our innocent creativity, the authorities decided to protect the public from us and our nonconformist thinking. This ended our complicated punk adventure in the cathedral of christ the savior. The key point here is the fact that Pussy Riot dared () to unite the visual imagery of orthodox culture with that of protest culture, thus suggesting that orthodox culture belongs not only to the russian orthodox church, the Patriarch, and Putin, but that it could also ally itself with civic rebellion and the spirit of protest. This is, in many respects, a subversive perspective compared to the dominant, traditionalistic view of the role and place of church within the russian society. The traditional interpretation of the church society state relations makes

the church a political and national institution, closely tied to the ethnicity, national history, tradition and, not least, the ruler (emperor). This interpretation is grounded in a long history of the church state relations which goes back to the fourth century and the attempts of roman emperors to embrace the church and the faith making it an important political factor.9 history of Byzantine and, later, russian empires managed to construct a narrative in which the church and the state (later also the entire ethnical/national community) grow together, reflecting, in the ideal case, the state of symphony between the heavenly (church) and the earthly (state) spheres. rather than any justifiable orthodox theological position, this concept primarily reflects the power quest on both sides. in other words, we do not deal here with two distinct spheres, but rather with two types of power that operate within one and the same sphere: social, financial and political power that the state apparatus (with its ruling classes) as well as the church in its institutional form look for. in such a narrative, there is no clear distinction between mystical domains and political actions, between national interests and (pseudo) christian faith. it is thus natural that in such atmosphere any call for different views, or critiques of the monopoly that official church and state structures claim in religious and political domains, provoke violent responses. This leads to a paradoxical situation in which christianity, as the faith of freedom, love, personal consciousness and responsibility, is used to justify political oppression and the control of the religious domain, where only a certain class has the monopoly over the christian religious truths and their practical manifestations. to be fair, one has to admit that there is nothing uniquely christian or orthodox in these developments. it is the nature of political institutions (and religious institutions are often among them) to exercise power and spread their influence as much as possible. many different ideological narratives (religious, political, even scientific ones) can be employed to achieve these goals. The same story, in very different cultural and social contexts of course, we have seen in Western christianity, as well as in the muslim world, not to mention theocracies of earlier9 more on the relations between orthodox church and state, especially in respect to the Byzantine times, see a very careful study The legacy of the 13th apostle: origins of the east christian conceptions of church and state relation by john mcguckin (see: mcguckin 2003).



times. The reason why these tendencies are less visible and less dangerous in more democratic societies is the long history of struggle to build democratic institutions and procedures that will protect individual and group freedoms and rights, putting the state authorities under the public control. however, even then we witness to a very difficult process of separating politically useful religious narratives from the sphere of public policy.10 The topic of orthodoxy in its relation to the civic initiatives, rebellion, protests and personal responsibility, with which Yekaterina closes her statement, becomes the central focus of maria alyokhina in her speech. she comments on the distribution of power in contemporary russia, as the goal of Pussy Riot intervention: and it is interesting that our situation was depersonalized from the start. This is because when we talk about Putin, we have in mind first and foremost not vladimir vladimirovich Putin but Putin the system that he himself createdthe power vertical, where all control is carried out effectively by one person. and that power vertical is uninterested, completely uninterested, in the opinion of the masses. and what worries me most of all is that the opinion of the younger generations is not taken into consideration. We believe that the ineffectiveness of this administration is evident in practically everything. The roots of these complex social and political problems maria seeks in the system of education. it is the very system which ignores and, to a significant extent, abandons individual approach and individual responsibilities: our schooling, which is where the personality begins to form in a social context, effectively ignores any particularities of the individual. There is no individual approach, no study of culture, of philosophy, of basic knowledge about civic society. officially, these subjects do exist, but they are still taught according to the soviet model. and as a result, we see the marginalization of contemporary art in the public consciousness, a lack of motivation for philosophical thought,10 The case of united states of america is particularly telling in this respect. for more on how religious fundamentalism has been articulated and adopted in public policy see: chomsky 2007.

and gender stereotyping. The concept of the human being as a citizen gets swept away into a distant corner.11 for maria, this is directly connected to the problem of freedom. already children are instructed to give up their free initiatives and individual responsibilities: beginning in childhood, we forget our freedom. marias analysis is certainly right in pointing to the correlation between the level of individual freedoms and the magnitude of civic initiatives (at least in the societies with strong state apparatus). undermining freedom is directly related to the obedience as a desired mode of behavior, which results in the fear and lack of civic initiatives. moreover, the very existence of a citizen (in opposition to the amorphous people or nation) requires affirmation of freedom and individual consciousness: Why should they care if the wife of our Prime minister Dmitry medvedev wants to build an official residence there and destroy the only juniper preserve in russia? () This is yet another confirmation that people in our country have lost the sense that this country belongs to us, its citizens. They no longer have a sense of themselves as citizens. They have a sense of themselves simply as the automated masses. They dont feel that the forest belongs to them, even the forest located right next to their houses. i doubt they even feel a sense of ownership over their own houses. Because if someone were to drive up to their porch with a bulldozer and tell them that they need to evacuate, that, excuse us, were going raze your house to make room for a bureaucrats residence, these people would obediently collect their belongings, collect their bags, and go out on the street. and then stay there precisely until the regime tells them what they should do next. They are completely shapeless, it is very sad. having spent almost half a year in jail, i have come to understand11 This is where slavoj iek is, in my view, mistaken when he interprets their masks as a sign of de-individualization: This is why they wear balaclavas: masks of de-individualization, of liberating anonymity. The message of their balaclavas is that it doesnt matter which of them got arrested theyre not individuals, theyre an idea. and this is why they are such a threat: it is easy to imprison individuals, but try to imprison an idea! (available at: http://dangerousminds.net/comments/the_true_blasphemy_slavoj_zhizhek_on_ pussy_riot). i think that it is precisely this personal consciousness that maria affirms; the masks are there to expose the other sides mask, that of the state authorities and the entire society which wears hypocritical masks, hiding from their personal responsibilities.



that prison is just russia in miniature. () There is absolutely no horizontal delegation of duties, which would make everyones lives noticeably easier. and there is a lack of individual initiative. in her view, this is what makes the entire society one giant jail, which affirms authoritarian modes of behavior: in jail and all over the country, people dont know where to turn with this or that question. Thats why they turn to the boss of the jail. and outside the prison, correspondingly, they go to Putin, the top boss. a reference to jail has a special significance in this context. jail is not only the place where the sword of justice forces all those who violated the (legitimate) law to go. it is also not only a metaphor for the lack of freedom in individual and public life. in totalitarian societies, and societies without functioning democracy (thought they might have many democratic institutions and procedures), jail is also a place for those who have problematic opinions and attitudes. at the same time, jail has been the means for making both true and false heroes and dissidents. marie thus aptly quotes vladimir Bykovsky and his statement: how unfortunate is the country where simple honesty is understood, in the best case, as heroism. and in the worst case as a mental disorder. mental disorder, just as committing fabricated crimes, has been an effective means of control and indoctrination, and the history of this kind of political pressure against dissidents and independent intellectuals begins with the persecution of the old testament prophets, continues with persecution of socrates and jesus, coming to modern intellectuals and dissidents such as mahatma gandhi, julian assange and many other people, very often uknown to the broader audience. This analysis of the social and political situation in russia leads maria to the analysis of the christian motives that lie behind their action. in this analysis, contrary to what the media, and the official church and state representatives wanted to portray, maria depicts the Pussy Riot action as being rooted in christianity and, in particular, orthodoxy. she seeks for the religious foundations of human freedom: i would like to note that this method of personal development clearly impedes the awakening of both inner and religious freedoms, unfortunately, on a mass scale. The consequence of the process i have just described is ontological humility, existential humility, socialization. to me, this transition, or rupture, is noteworthy in that, if approached from

the point of view of christian culture, we see that meanings and symbols are being replaced by those that are diametrically opposed to them. Thus one of the most important christian concepts, humility, is now commonly understood not as a path towards the perception, fortification, and ultimate liberation of man, but on the contrary as an instrument for his enslavement. to quote [russian philosopher] nikolai Berdyaev, one could say that the ontology of humility is the ontology of the slaves of god, and not the sons of god. When i was involved with organizing the ecological movement, i became fundamentally convinced of the priority of inner freedom as the foundation for taking action. as well as the importance, the direct importance, of taking action as such. she even connects their motives with the gospel: our motivation is () best expressed in the gospels: for everyone who asks receives; the one who seeks finds; and to the one who knocks, the door will be opened. [matthew 7: 8] iall of ussincerely believe that for us the door will be opened. in conclusion, maria tries to stress the character of their action and the positions they take in connection to christianity, stronger than in any of their previous claims: i believe that we are being accused by people without memory. many of them have said, he is possessed by a demon and insane. Why do you listen to him? These words belong to the jews who accused jesus christ of blasphemy. They said, We are stoning you for blasphemy. [john 10: 33] interestingly enough, it is precisely this verse that the russian orthodox church uses to express its opinion about blasphemy. This view is certified on paper, its attached to our criminal file. expressing this opinion, the russian orthodox church refers to the gospels as static religious truth. The gospels are no longer understood as revelation, which they have been from the very beginning, but rather as a monolithic chunk that can be disassembled into quotations to be shoved in wherever necessaryin any of its documents, for any of their purposes. The russian orthodox church did not even bother to look up the context in which blasphemy is mentioned herethat in this case, the word applies to jesus christ himself. i think that religious truth should not be



static, that it is essential to understand the instances and paths of spiritual development, the trials of a human being, his duplicity, his splintering. however, it is nadezhda tolokonnikovas closing statement that puts the strongest stress on christianity and orthodoxy. she is even ready to characterize their punk action as a form of yurodstvo which has deep roots in the christian tradition, especially in russia: Pussy riots performances can either be called dissident art or political action that engages art forms. either way, our performances are a kind of civic activity amidst the repressions of a corporate political system that directs its power against basic human rights and civil and political liberties. The young people who have been flayed by the systematic eradication of freedoms perpetrated through the aughts have now risen against the state. We were searching for real sincerity and simplicity, and we found these qualities in the yurodstvo [the holy foolishness] of punk. () Passion, total honesty, and navet are superior to the hypocrisy, mendacity, and false modesty that are used to disguise crime. The so-called leading figures of our state stand in the cathedral with righteous faces on, but, in their cunning, their sin is greater than our own. she also refers to the information they received bout the support they have among many of the faithful orthodox christians, who pray for them: This fact alone demonstrates that there is no single, unified group of orthodox believers, as the prosecutor would like to prove. This unified group does not exist. today, more and more believers have come to the defense of Pussy riot. They dont think that what we did warrants a five-month term in a pretrial detention center, let alone three years in prison, as the prosecutor has called for. every day, more people understand that if the system is attacking three young women who performed in the cathedral of christ the savior for thirty seconds with such vehemence, it only means that this system fears the truth, sincerity, and straightforwardness we represent. We have never used cunning during these proceedings. meanwhile, our opponents are too often cunning, and people sense this. indeed, the truth has an ontological,

existential superiority over deception, and this is described in the Bible, particularly the old testament. nadezhda (which translates as Hope) continues in an almost prophetic manner, claiming that the paths of truth always triumph over the paths of cunning, guile, and deception. truth in her eyes is something both ontological and something that has to do with knowledge and (rational) understanding: i dont want to label anyone. it seems to me that there are no winners, losers, victims, or defendants here. We all simply need to reach each other, connect, and establish a dialogue in order to seek out the truth together. together, we can seek wisdom and be philosophers, instead of stigmatizing people and labeling them. That is the last thing a person should do. christ condemned it. With this trial, the system is abusing us. Who would have thought that man and the state he rules could, again and again, perpetrate absolutely unmotivated evil? () i believe that every person should strive for this, and not only those who have studied in some philosophy department. a formal education means nothing, although prosecution attorney Pavlova constantly attempts to reproach us for our lack of education. We believe the most important thing is to strive, to strive towards knowledge and understanding. This is what a person can achieve independently, outside the walls of an educational institution. regalia and scholarly degrees mean nothing. a person can possess a great deal of knowledge, but not be a human being. Pythagoras said extensive knowledge does not breed wisdom. nadezhda puts their position vis--vis the regime in relation to the political dissidents and innocent martyrs from the christian past, who were also persecuted by the religious and state authorities: Do you remember why young Dostoyevsky was sentenced to death? his entire guilt lay in the fact that he was fascinated by socialist theories, and during meetings of freethinkers and friendswhich met on fridays in the apartment of [mikhail] Petrashevskyhe discussed the writings of fourier and george sand. on one of the last fridays, he read Belinskys letter to gogol aloud, a letter that was filled, according to the court that tried Dostoevsky (listen!) with impudent statements against the orthodox church and the



state government. after all the preparations for execution and ten agonizing, infinitely terrifying minutes awaiting death (Dostoyevsky), it was announced that the sentence was changed to four years of hard labor in siberia followed by military service. socrates was accused of corrupting the youth with his philosophical discussions and refusing to accept the athenian gods. () have you forgotten under what circumstances stephen, the disciple of the apostles, concluded his earthly life? Then they secretly induced men to say, We have heard him speak blasphemous words against moses and against god. and they stirred up the people, the elders and the scribes, and they came up to him and dragged him away and brought him before the council. They put forward false witnesses who said, This man incessantly speaks against this holy place and the law. [acts 6:11-13] he was found guilty and stoned to death. i also hope that you all remember well how the jews answered christ: it is not for good works that we are going to stone you but for blasphemy. [john 10:33] and finally we would do well to keep in mind the following characterization of christ: he is demon-possessed and raving mad. [john 10:20]

The Response of Intellectualsmany of the regime intellectuals have, predictably, attacked the Pussy Riot members and their action, as stupidity, hooliganism, blasphemy and even conspiracy against russia and russian orthodox church. Thus sergei markov explains: Pussy riots act inside the cathedral of christ the savior is not the stupidity of young girls, but part of the global conspiracy against russia and the russian orthodox church. according to this version [of events], Putin isnt obliged to just punish three idiots in a fatherly way, but also protect russia from this

conspiracy with all possible severity.12 This is typical for all (semi)totalitarian societies; victims are accused of violence and sins against the state and national interest. accusations of conspiracies of various sorts are a typical way to denounce the enemy and, if possible, destroy their credibility. The fact that the Pussy Riot members explicitly stated, just a day after the performance, that they respect religion in general and the orthodox faith in particular, and that they are especially infuriated when christian philosophy, which is full of light, is used in such a dirty fashion, which makes them sick to see such beautiful ideas forced to their knees, seems to have no relevance. obedience to the master (or masters) obviously has the priority over the moral integrity and intellectual credibility.


Politics as Religion, Religion as PoliticsThe Pussy Riot action was a successful provocation which highlighted many current issues within the russian society. however, their action can also be the basis for a more general analysis of the religion politics relations, and the political dimension of orthodox christianity. The case makes us think how deeply religious institutions and state authorities can be intertwined. to think of religion and politics is to face a paradox.12 source: guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/17/pussy-riot-verdict-defiance. another example is aleksandar Dugins (quasi) theological/political analysis of the Pussy riots action. he perceives it as an attack on the Byzantine model of government, which also became the traditional model of government in russia. This model affirms an alliance between spiritual and secular powers. since this is the traditional orthodox and organic model of government, any attack on this model is an attack on russia, russian tradition and orthodoxy. see: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ixhxryeX8tY&feature=share. however, one must admit that the role of intellectuals in supporting the dominant ideology and political order crosses the boundaries of post-communist countries. Thus, the western media and official intellectuals and many public figures in the West could not wait to express their outrage with this obviously politically motivated persecution in russia, forgetting at the same time to raise their voice against the constant attacks on the freedom of speech in their own countries, not only by the central political authorities but primarily by the corporate sector. even in the case of apparent political persecution of julian assange for his actions in the domains of freedom of information and democracy, many of the official intellectuals do not feel obliged to say anything in his defense. This only shows how the intellectual class can be obedient in spite of the very different contexts in which they find themselves, being either in a soft-dictatorship or some sort of democracy.


on the one hand, it might seem that religion and politics do not have much, if anything, in common. many would argue that politics and religion are fundamentally different and, in many aspects, even opposite; they belong to different mindsets that should not be confused under any circumstances. following this argument, religion is related to metaphysical and sacred things, questions about afterlife, religious rituals and so on, while to the political sphere refers primarily to power, legal (or illegal) violence, economy, administration and so forth; in any case to very earthly and usually not particularly pleasant things. on the other hand, everyone who has even a very superficial and general knowledge of history knows to what extent religion and politics have been intertwined, both in the christian and non-christian world. even today we witness to the rise of political ideologies that seek a religious justification throughout the planet. We can also notice the rise of religious fundamentalism, which is nothing else but a battle for political goals with the help of formally religious ideals, teachings and practices. and these processes, to make the whole image even more puzzling, take place both in the developing and in the developed industrial countries, in the age when we have already started to think that the time of religion and its strong social and political influence has gone. how to articulate this relation from a christian and, specifically, orthodox christian point of view? to properly clarify the relation between politics and christianity, it seems necessary to make a clear distinction between what nikolai Berdyaev calls eschatological christianity vs. historical christianity.13 The first one is charismatic, prophetic, radical in its personalism and in search for human freedom and creativity. The latter one belongs to this world and its history, to the state of necessity in which it is compelled to make compromises with the world. The first one draws its strength from eschatological expectations, the second one from the feeling of security that this world can offer. This distinction also helps us understand that we can draw two very different, even opposite, christian approaches to politics. it is clear from this description that will to power is not something that can be applied to christianity in its eschatological form. on the contrary, it is not a13 my interpretation of christianity is eschatological and i place it in antithesis to historical christianity. Berdyaev 1948: 243.

surprise that the historical christianity has suffered from the same deviations we find in the world, within the given historical, social and political context. historical, institutional christianity has thus many similarities with political institutions. They share the same will to power. i use this concept to describe human readiness to dominate over other human beings in a more structured and institutionalized way. authorities demonstrate this will to power whenever they try to exercise unjustifiable domination and, if necessary, repression against other people in a particular society and by the instruments their institutions provide them. Defined this way, the will to power is attached to the political sphere, understood in a very broad sense. Will to power makes thus religious institutions and state apparatus natural allies, when their interests in pursuing power are complementary, or natural opponents, when their intentions to spread power and influence get into a mutual conflict. Thus, it is not a surprise that many religious institutions, including christian churches, function in exactly the same manner as other power-structures, since they share the same aims. There is, however, another, more complex similarity between religion and politics. it is the communitarian dimension of the human existence that both of them affirm and exploit. We all know that human beings are the beings or community. The communal dimension of their existence is manifested at various levels: family and professional communities, nations, religions and so forth. however, from a christian perspective, all these particular collectives and identities, that are apparent in the social and political sphere of human existence, are just symbols of a much deeper, one might say metaphysical, aspect of human existence. That is what we can call christian personalism. That means that human being does not exist primarily as an individual (apart from the social/political sphere, of course), which then becomes a member of a certain collective, but the communal dimension of human existence is the very constitutive aspect of what a person is. This means that there is no particular human existence outside the communion of love, which gives to each human being his or her own particular and unique identity. i will not develop here this complex and interesting topic (which relies on some of the very basic christian dogmatic presuppositions) any further. What i want to point out is simply that this communitarian dimension is very often misused for political and ideological purposes. such pseudo-metaphysical interpretation of the communitarian dimension of human existence is the reason why these ideologies are very



successful people find in them a surrogate for the real metaphysical content of communion. This is where the fascination with particular ideologies, social collectives, and political narratives comes from, posing a huge threat to human freedom. instead of being what they are supposed to be practical and functional categories social and political collectives very often appear as metaphysical categories. This happens whenever one tries to give metaphysical or mystical foundations to the constructs such as states or nations. and this is precisely what is at stake in the Pussy Riot case, as well as in many other examples. it seemed that the decline of the close state church, and politics religion relations after the french revolution (in the so called western civilization at least) was irreversible. We thought of secularization and secular states as vital aspects of modernity and the entire western progress. however, the separation between the state and the church, and politics and religion, has not brought an end to the close politics-religion relation, though the meaning of this relation has changed. here i do not mean only of special relations that each country, in europe for instance, has with its churches and religious communities (ranging from a complete separation to state churches); what i have in mind is that particular political constructs such as states and nations have, in many cases, occupied the space of religion in its public (political) manifestation. This means that political agents were given metaphysical and quasi-sacred foundations. This can be seen in, for example, elevation of states, nations, political ideologies or political leaders to the level of secular deities and quasi-religious truths, supplementing them with the quasi-religious aura. even when we have a democratic system and the rule of law, we are very often faced with almost mystical concepts of national interests, our way of life, defense and so forth, that allow and justify even the most monstrous actions. modern states very often behave as some cruel gods that require human sacrifices (whether domestic or foreign) to be satisfied and to bring their citizens peace and prosperity. This is certainly the way politics exploits religious symbols, manipulating with religion, which should, by its very nature, transcend the sphere of the political. to try to give a sacred aura to the society and the political sphere (whether these intentions come from the political authorities or religious institutions) is always quite a certain way to secularize the religious sphere. on the contrary, to preserve the sacred character of religion, it seems necessary to secularize the society and its institutions (e.g. states), making them functional and useful for its members.

An Eschatological Christian Perspectivechristians see in the eschaton and the kingdom of god the only real reality, the only perfect order, which is not based upon external authorities but upon love. from a christian perspective, there will be no ideal form of the social or political systems in the course of history, just more or less acceptable, or totally unacceptable forms of government. all historic models are for christians in principle and by definition imperfect. in the mean time, till the eschaton comes, it is important to strengthen civil society, various local bottom-up initiatives, as well as the real democratic capacities, procedures, the rule of law and all other inventions that do not have metaphysical significance per se, but certainly make human life more human. to solve important social and political problems that even the most advanced societies are facing today, we do not necessarily need religion. We need solidarity and responsibility. however, to rise above this level, and do good things not because it is required by any ethical or social norms and standards, but because it is our mode of existence and the only way we can deal with other human beings and our environment, means for christians to give a testimony to the coming kingdom of god. however, although this cannot be expected from all members of a society, respecting the law, which provides the maximum of freedoms and opportunities to all members of a society (to the point when they interfere with other peoples freedom and opportunities), and human dignity is something that can be asked for and expected from all members of a society.


Saetaknedavna akcija ruske punk grupe Pussy Riot u moskovskoj katedrali, kao i sudski proces koji je pokrenut protiv njenih lanica neposredno posle performansa, stavili su u iu neke vane probleme sa kojima se rusko drutvo danas suoava. ovaj sluaj moe biti i osnova za jednu iru analizu odnosa religije i politike, kao i politike dimenzije pravoslavlja. istraivanjem odnosa izmeu religije i politike mogue je ukazati na dva elementa koja, kako politika tako i religija, dele u svojim institucionalnim manifestacijama, dele. to je volja za mo i zadnica kao nain

ovekovog postojanja. Da bi bilo mogue razumeti paradoksalnu poziciju hrianstva u odnosu na politiku i dravu, neophodno je napraviti razliku izmeu eshatolokog i istorijskog hrianstva. Kljune rei: crkva, hrianstvo, religija, drava, politika, kontrola, mo, zajednica


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