PROF. T. IZUTSU

ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY (397-703 A)

Term-Paper

By

Muhammad Amin A. Samad

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Montreal, December 16, 1974

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INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC STUDIES

McGILL UNIVERSITY

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C O N T E N T S

Page

I. DEFINITION AND AREAS OF ISLAMIC

PHILOSOPY …………………………………. 2

II. EXISTING THINGS ………………………….. 2-8

a. Substance and Accident ……………………. 2

b. , , and ……. 7

c. Sensible and Known by Reason ……………. 8

d. General and Particular ……………………… 9

e. and ………………………………… 9

III. WORD, CONCEPT, AND DENOTATUM ….. 10-13

a. (Word or Term) …………………………. 10

b. (Concept) …………………………… 10

c. (Denotatum) …………………………. 10

d. (Univocal) and (Analogos) ……. 11

e. (Scepticism) ……………………………. 12

f. and ………………………………. 13

ENDTNOTES …………………………………………… 16

BIBLIOGRAPHY ………………………………………. 18

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I. THE DEFINITION AND THE AREAS OF ISLAMIC

PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy is acting to bringing the human soul to

perfection through the knowledge of realities of the existing

things as they are according to the degree of human ability.

Philosophy, then, is the study of the realities of existing things

as they are (not as they should be) as much as human possibility. Its goal is to bring the human soul to perfection.

Islamic Philosophy is divided into three areas:

a. Logical matters, logica ( or which is a

means (a tool) to obtain the other areas of philosophy.

b. Physical matters, phisica or

c. Divine science or divine matters or . It is

the knowledge of what is beyond nature. It is divided into

two categories:

1. , divine matters in more general meaning

which is also called (general matters), i.e.,

metaphysics, ontology, and science of existence.

2. , divine matters in the more particular

meaning, theology. In Islam it is called , “the

knowledge of argumentation”. It is the study of the existence of God and what we call His “attributes”. It does not discuss

the Essence of God , but it discusses the Essence of

God as qualified with , (e.g., , ), and

(e.g., , , and ( . So, is also called

“the science of and ”.1

II. EXISTING THINGS

Existing things can be divided into many categories,

among which are as follows:

A. Substance and Accident

i. Substance

3

Al-Sāwī gives the definition of substance as follows:

He puts (“in the concrete world”) to exclude God as

substance. Qut.b al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī gives the following

definition: (“Substance is something which is

standing by its own self).

There are peculiarities of substance, i.e.:

a. It has no opposite , e.g., Socrates is not an

opposite of Plato.

b. It has no difference in degree and gradation

, e.g., a man is not more or less human than another

man.

c. It can be pointed with physical pointing , e.g.,

this is a chair.

d. It has substantial movement according to

Mulla S.adra, e.g., the apple was a seed, then it became a

green apple, then a red apple. According to other

philosophers there is no substantial movement and there is no gradual process. At the stage of seed it is a seed and

nothing but a seed.

Substance can be divided into (material or physical) and

(non material).

a. Material substance is divided into: , ,

and .

b. Non-material substance is divided into:

1. . It needs (matter) in its function. It can

manifest its activity only through the body.

2. . it does not need in its activity.

Both and belong to the highest genera .

Qut.b al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī divided substance into:

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a. (the very essence)

b. which is divided into: , , and .

c.

d.

Descartes divided substance into:

a. Divine Essence distinguished in His absolute perfection

.

b. . Its distinguishing mark is the extension .

c. , either or .

The sequence of substance according to al-Ghazālī is:

, then , then , and then .2

ii. Accident

According to Aristotle there are nine categories of

accident. They are:

1. or (quantity). It is an accident which accepts

equality and non-equality by nature. In other words it is dividable. There are two types of this category:

a. (continuous quantity). If we divide it into two

parts we shall find (the common limit), e.g.,

g 1 A 2 . A is (the common limit), the end

and the beginning of the segment g1 and g2 respectively.

It has two types:

1. (fixed), e.g., ____.____.____.____.____

2. (unfixed), e.g., the division of time into past

and future. We only know and can actualize the

past, while the other part (future) is unknown. past . future

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b. (separable quantity), where there is no

common limit between them, e.g., o o o o . o o o o o

2. or (quantity). It is immovable state of substance

which does not accept equality or non-equality essentially.

For example, the redness of a piece of paper does not

admit being divided by dividing the paper. There are four types of this category:

a. (sensible quality), which is grasped by any

of the five senses. It is either (deep-rooted,

solidly established), e.g., the sweetness of sugar, the

hotness of fire, or , (easily disappeared),

like the redness of face in anger.

b. (mental quality), either (disappears

easily) like a sudden burst of anger, or a which is

deeply rooted, like knowledge, and envy to whom who

was born envious.

c. or (natural proneness), i.e., inborn

quality of something by which one strongly resists to be

affected, e.g., illness or easily affected .

d. . It deals with quantity, e.g., the

straightness and the bend of something.

3. (where). A physical body needs a certain quality

which is called . This body occupying a certain place is

called . It is either:

a. where there is no room for the other body ,

e.g., water in the cup (full of water), or

b. where the body occupies only a small room,

e.g., I live in Canada.

4 (when). It is something occupying a certain point of

time. It is called . It is either:

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a. , i.e., a portion of timed whose both ends exactly

coincide with the appearance and disappearance of something,

e.g., one’s span of life: time . span of life . , or

b. , i.e., larger portion of time which comprises

a small portion of time which is in question, e.g., He lived in the

10th century: time . 10

th century ._______

He lived

5. (position), i.e., the internal relation between the

component parts, also in term of positional relationship of

the components with the outside of the body, e.g., laying down, standing, leaning, upside down, facing something

else, etc.

6. or (possession). This is still ambiguous for Ibn Sīnā,

but he gives his definition: “Possession is being of a

substance (A) which covers it (B), and moves (A) with its (B’s) moving, like somebody being clothed.” It may be

partial, e.g., ….. or impartial, e.g., …………..

7. (action), i.e., an action of influence of something upon

something else, e.g., fire exercises influence upon water

until it boils.

8. (passion), i.e., action of influence upon something

from something else, e.g., water receives influence from fire

until it boils (the opposite of ( .

9. (relation), i.e., if we have something in our mind we

have to produce something else which is essential and

related to it. It has two types:

a. (bilateral relation), e.g., if A resembles B, B

also resembles A. Therefore, it applies to mutual

resemblance , opposition , and facing one

another

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b. (unilateral relation). It is the relation between

(cause) and (effect), e.g., relationship between father

and son.3

In order to apply these accidents in one substance, if we

take as our substance, his being grown up is , his

being darker or the change of his figure is , having a

father and he might have a son is , being in his house

is , his working today or he worked yesterday is

being standing or sitting is , being armed to the teeth

and wearing his clothes is , being reading or writing is

, and his being slapped or beaten is .4

Sahrfawardi reduced this nine categories into four: 1. 2.

3. (including , , , and ( , and

(including and (.

B. , and

1. is whose existence is necessary and

whose non-existence is absurd Plato called it

. According to al-Kindi the existence of is a

decided matter outside reason and imagination.5

There are two kinds of :

a. ,i.e., an existence exists by itself

(essence), ens per se.

b. , ens per aliut, an existence exists by

other than itself. Since its existence depends upon other

than itself it is also called , e.g., the world.6

2. . It is divided into 2 categories:

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a. which is also called , since

here means .7

b. which is also called .8

Al-Ghazālī gives four meanings of as

follows:

a. i.e., what is not , which includes

.

b. , i.e., what is equal in both non-impossibility

and unnecessary of its existence or non-existence.

c. i.e., its existence is not necessary

, e.g., writing with regard to man.

d. It is applied to the present non-existence, whose

presence is not impossible in the future. Its existence is

e.g., the existence of the world before it exists.9

3. . It is divided into two categories:

a. , e.g., the impossibility of the union of

blackness and whiteness in something.

b. , e.g., the supposition of the occurrence of

the day of resurrection today which is impossible not be its essence, but because God knew that He would not

make it happen today. If God wanted to happen (which

is ( it would happen, and it would become .

So, every will become with the

presence of .10

C. (sensible) and (known by reason)

are things known through our five senses.

are things known through reason, e.g., the existence of

ability, knowledge, willingness, fear, shame, love and anger.

Most of existing things belong to this category.11

The best

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kind of existence according to al-Kindī is the existence of

God, and he believes that it is the object of absolute

knowledge and reason alone is the only way to

know God.12

D. (general) and (particular)

The existing things in their relation to each other can be

divided into four categories:

a. (more general), e.g., is than ا ………

b. (more particular), e.g., ا is than …..

c. (equal), e.g., is with .13

……….

d. (more general on one side, and

more particular on the other side), e.g., the whiteness of

animals. On one side whiteness is more general, as it

includes white paper, chalk, and many other things which are not animals. On the other side it is more particular, as

it excludes many non-white animals, e.g., black people,

black horses, crows, zebra, etc.14

E. and

Existing things can be divided into:

:which is divided into (eternally pre-existent) القديم .1

a. , i.e., there is no beginning of the time of

its existence.

b. , i.e., there is no beginning and cause ()

for its essence.

2. (incidental) which is also divided into:

a. , i.e., there is a beginning for the time of its

existence.

b. , i.e., there is a beginning for its essence by

which it is existent.

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According to philosophers the world is and

, while God the creator of the world is

.15

III. WORD, CONCEPT, AND DENOTATUM

A. (word or term)

Word or term is divided into two categories:

1. , i.e., it denotes to a single thing, e.g., Zayd, this tree,

that horse.

2. , i.e., it may denote to many things of its kind, e.g.,

man, the tree.16

B. (Concept)

It is the meaning we understand from the word. There is no word without meaning. It is also divided into:

1. , i.e., it applies to a single thing, it refuses

participation of more than one thing (denotatum, ),

e.g., Socrates, Plato.

2. , i.e., it does not refuse participation of more than

one thing, e.g., ا , it is applicable to Ali, Ahmad and

Zayd (more denoteta).

C. (denotatum)

, denotatum (pl. , denoteta) is the thing denoted

by the meaning of the word, though it does not actually exist in the external world, e.g., if we say “dragon” the denotatum

presented in our mind is a creature like a crocodile or snake,

with wings and claws, able to breathe out of fire, often guarding a treasure, as we used to read in the Eastern myth.

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D. (univocal) and (analogos)

Considering the quality and the difference of degrees of

the denoteta of a , it is divided into two categories:

1. , i.e., it is applied to denoteta equally, without

making any discrimination, e.g., the word ا is applied

to infinite number of denoteta equally; it is applied to

Hasan, John, Ali, and none of them is more man or less man than the others. The other example is the table; there

is no table more table than other tables.

2. , i.e., it is applied to denoteta not equally, but in

various degrees, e.g., light may be attributed to the light of

the sun which is strong, and the light of the lamp which is

weak (dim).

The word means that which makes us doubtful.

It refers to the fact that which we do not know to

which degree it is being applied. The concept puts us in

doubt to the degree applied to it. This phenomenon is

called , and the phenomenon of analogical gradation

is called . Muslim philosophers give us seven

principles for the of the as follows:

a. (priority), e.g., the hotness of fire has a kind of

priority before the hotness of boiling water, because

the hotness of fire is (cause) of the hotness of

boiling water.

b. (appropriation), e.g., the existence of the Creator

is more appropriate than that of the creatures,

because the former is , while the latter is

.

c. (temporal priority), e.g., by comparing the

existence of father and son; father is , while son

is .17

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d. (principal of being stronger). The classical

example is the concept of being white as applied to

snow and ivory. The whiteness of snow is

(stronger) than the whiteness of ivory.

e. (quantity), e.g., if A is 5 meters long, and B is 3

meters long, A is than B, and B is than A.

f. (numbers), e.g., ten is more than six.

g. (independence and lack of independence),

e.g., the existence of is than the existence of

. God is which means that He is independent

upon others, while the creatures are , as they are

dependent. The existence of depends upon the

existence of .

E. (scepticism)

It has three elements:

1. , i.e., a concept which is applied to all denoteta,

e.g., man, stone; the words share in common in the

existence.

2. , i.e., the existence of element of difference

among denoteta, e.g., father and son is different in .

3. , e.g., the of the father compared to his son.

There are three kinds of :

1. which is understandable to the common people..

2. which is understandable only to the highly

educated people (élite).

3. which is understandable only to the élite of the

elite, e.g., the mastery of the absolute reality, the essence

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of existence, which is according to Ibn ‘Arabī is nothing

but .

F. and

Ibn Sahlan al-Sawi gives the definition of and as

follows:

Another definition is:

.

is the essential constituent element of the concept. It is

something essentially required by something else, while is

not the essential constituent element. It is not essentially required by something else.

has four basic features. The lack of any of them

will not become . They are:

1. i.e., inseparability, e.g., in ا , ا is

always ; so, is . In ا , ا is

separable from ; so, is not .

2. or , i.e., there is no particular cause, as

cannot be causally explained, e.g., there is no cause why

. ا is in ا

3. , i.e., self-evidence, where proof is not needed, as it is

self-evident that ا is . The other example is that

the triangle has three lines is self-evident.

4. (rational precedence), i.e., precedes

rationally, e.g., if we say ا the rational concept

of ا precedes rationally the concept of .

There are two technical terms for , i.e.,:

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1. , i.e., as explained in the Eisagogé,

2. ( , Introduction to Theory of Logic), and we call it

“ in the first system.”

3. , i.e., as explained in the

which contains analytica priore (theory of syllogism

without reference to its contents), and analytica posteriora

which deals with contents of reasoning.

According to this system (which we call the second

system) some in the first system is . It is, in fact,

or , i.e., inseparable proportion of .

If we way “four is an even number”, being even is

according to the first system (as we can think of number

four without thinking of its evenness), but it is

according to the second system, as it belongs to

or (the evenness if four is inseparable from four).

The same case is with regard to the .

As there are two kinds of (i.e., the first and the

second system), there are also two kinds of :

a. which is according to the first system,

and according to the second system.

b. which is according to both the first

and the second system.

According to the Theory of Predicables there are five

in the sense of , i.e., (the five

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predicables). Three of them belong to , i.e., , , and

; the other two belong to , i.e., and .

1. (genus). It is also called (natural universal). Its

denoteta are not individual things, but (species). It

does not represent , but , i.e., the

whole body has common elements in the denoteta,

e.g.,

( ) ( ) ()

2. (species). It represents of individual things, e.g.,

3. . It represents . It must fulfil two

conditions:

a. It must be a distinguishing factor.

b. It must be , e.g., with regard to ا .

4. (general or common accident). It is which

is not peculiar to a single denotatum, but it is common to some

others, e.g., with regard to ا , as there are many other

white thing are not ا . Another example is in regard to

ا

5. or . It is which is peculiar to only

one which is usually or , e.g., in regard to

.18

Al-ūsī divided into two categories:

a. , e.g., which is common to all mankind.

b. , e.g., actually ( ) with regard to

) . ا belongs to ).

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ENDNOTES

1Ibn Sīnā gives more details in the categories of philosophy:

1

2

See Taysīr Shaykh al-Ard., al-Madkhal ilā Falsafat Ibn Sīnā, 1st ed

(Beirut: Dār al-Anwar, 1967), pp. 184-185. 2 Ibid., pp. 179-182

3 Al-Ghazālī, Maqās.id al-Falāsifah (Cairo, 1936), 2

nd ed., pp. 23-

5; idem, Mi‘yār al-‘Ilm, ed. Dr. Sulaymān Dunyā (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif,

1961), pp. 312-313. 4 Taysīr Shaykh al-Ard., Madkhal, pp.178-9.

5 , see Muammad

al-Bahī, al-Jānib al-‘Ilāhī min Tafkīr al-Islāmī, (Cairo: ‘Isā al-Bābī al-

H.alabī, 1951), 2nd

ed., p. 71. 6 Taysīr Shaykh al-Ard., Madkhal, pp.210-212; al-Ghazālī,

Maqās.id al-Falāsifah, pp. 53ff; al-Ghazālī gives us the argument why

is equal to as follows:

See al-Ghazālī, Mi‘yār al-‘Ilm. pp.

345-346. 7Ibn Sīnā gives us two examples for this. He says:

. See Taysīr Shaykh al-Ard., al-Madkhal,

pp. 210-1. 8 Dr. Jamīl alībā, Ta’rīkh al-Falsafah al-‘Arfabīya (Beirut: Dār al-

Kuttāb al-Lubnānī, 1970), 1st ed., p. 221.

9Al-Ghazālī, Mi‘yār al-‘Ilm. pp. 343-4.

10 Ibid., p. 34.

17

11

Ibid., pp. 89-90. 12

Muhammad al-Bahī, al-Jānib al-‘Ilāhī, pp. 79-80. 13

By giving this example plants are considered having no sense at

all, though it is said that certain plants have no sense of feeling. 14

Al-Ghazālī, Mi‘yār al-‘Ilm., p. 92. 15

Ibid., pp. 334-335. 16

Ibid., p. 73. 17

Many philosophers believe in the which is one of the

three views which, according to al-Ghazālī lead to their believer to

infidelity, see al-Ghazālī, al-Munqidh min al-D.alāl, ed. Dr. Jamīl S.alība

and Dr.Kāmil ‘Iyā, 5th

ed. ([Syria]: Mat.ba‘at al-Jāmi‘ah al-Sūriyyah,

1956), p. 79; Dr. Jamīl alībā, Ta’rīkh al-Falsafah, p. 365 ff. 18

For al-Ghazālī’s definition of each of , see al-Ghazālī,

Mi‘yār al-‘Ilm, pp. 106-107.

18

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bahī, Muh.ammad al-. Al-Jānib al-‘Ilāhī min Tafkīr al-Islāmī.

2nd

ed. Cairo: ‘Isā al-Bābī al-alabī, 1951.

Ghazālī, Abū āmid al-, Maqās.id al-Falāsifah. 2nd

ed. Cairo,

1936.

_______, Mi‘yār al-‘Ilm, ed. Dr. Sulaymān Dunyā. Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 1961.

________, al-Munqidh min al-alāl, ed. Dr. Jamīl alība and

Dr.Kāmil ‘Iyād., 5th ed. [Syria]: Mat.ba‘at al-Jāmi‘ah

al-Sūrīyah, 1956.

alībā, Dr. Jamīl, Ta’rīkh al-Falsafah al-‘Arabīyah. 1st ed.

Beirut: Dār al-Kuttāb al-Lubnānī, 1970. Shaykh al-Ard., Taysīr. Al-Madkhal ilā Falsafat Ibn Sīnā, 1

st

ed. Beirut: Dār al-Anwar, 1967.