DefenseDefense ConceptsConcepts

Who is the Prey?: The Challenges of the Predator Drone Program and High-Val-ue TargetingSarah Catanzaro

Too Much Information: Europe’s Successful Security Regime and its ElusiveEuropean Rapid Reaction ForceAlexander Justice Moore

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS - AFRICOM: An Independent Review forthe Obama AdministrationDaniel Lawner, Sarah Khederian

Taking the Offensive: The Utility & Limitations of RaidingAdam Elkus

Wasted Space:How and Why the U.S. Must Prepare

to Fight a Clean War in SpaceHoward Kleinberg

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w.abc.net.au/

Founder & ChairmanNewton Howard

Executive DirectorDavid E. A. Johnson

Board of DirectorsSharon BrownApril FoleyLester S. HymanSergey KanareykinSue KellyJerrold PostAmmar Qusaibaty

Senior FellowsShlomo ArgamonDrew BewickJohn CalleryRobert M. CassidyJames E. DavidsonGideon FriederNorman D. GeddesMathieu GuidèreRobert LawrenceMichael LitzelmanChris MasonAnthony Shaffer

FellowsMishkat Al-MouminSviatoslav BraynovDavid BrownMartin DudziakEdward GhafariDouglas M HosmerChris KammermanJames O'NeillSteve OrrinStefan E. SchmidtJ. Michael Waller

StaffSarah CatanzaroElise HoganDaniel LawnerFarley MeskoBenjamin E. PowerLindsay Vacek

Defense Concepts is published by the Center forAdvanced Defense Studies (CADS), a global se-curity think tank headquartered in Washington,DC. As a non-profit, non-governmental organiza-tion, CADS empowers experts from government,military, academia and the private sector who arecommitted to solving the security problems oftoday and examining the defense issues of tomor-row.

Defense ConceptsPublished by CADS Press

Editor in ChiefNewton Howard

Editorial BoardSarah Catanzaro, Elise Hogan, David E.A. Johnson, Lindsay Vacek

Compiled byFellows, Researchers and Staff

Designed by Sarah Catanzaro

Defense Concepts is made possible through donations from private foun-dations and individuals. Please support this publication and other cen-

ter-wide activities by making a contribution at www.c4ads.org. Becausethe Center for Advanced Defense Studies is a 501(c)(3) non-profit orga-nization, most donations qualify for a federal, and often state, income-

tax charitable deduction.

Defense Concepts (ISSN 1932-3816) is published quarterly by CADS Press at the Center forAdvanced Defense Studies, Directorate of Research, at 10 G Street, NE, Suite 610, Washing-ton, DC 20002 USA; info@c4ads.org; www.c4ads.org; + 1.202.289.3332. Volume V,Edition 2, Spring 2010. Printed in U.S.A. To subscribe to Defense Concepts, visitwww.c4ads.org, write to info@c4ads.org, call +1.202.289.3332 or write to Defense Con-cepts, Center for Advanced Defense Studies, 10 G Street, NE, Suite 610, Washington, DC20002 USA.

The Center for Advanced Defense Studies does not adopt specific policy positions; opinionsexpressed in Defense Concepts are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflectthe opinions of the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, its fellows, researchers or staff.

Copyright © 2010 by Center for Advanced Defense Studies. All rights reserved.

Table of Contents

SPRING 2010 VOLUME 5 EDITION 2

COVER STORY

Wasted Space:How and Why the U.S. Must Prepare to Fight a Clean War in Space

by Howard Kleinberg

Letter from the Executive DirectorQuick Takes

COMMENTARY

Innovating Citizen Engagement: The National Dialogue on the QuadrennialHomeland Security Review by Drew Bewick

Retroactive Attribution: The Ripple Effect of the House Foreign AffairsCommittee’s Resolution on Armenian Genocide by Elise Hogan

The Golden Gun: Economic Warfare in the 21st Century by Andrew Baer

FEATURES

Who is the Prey: The Challenges of the Predator Drone Program and High-Value Targeting by Sarah Catanzaro

Too Much Information: Europe’s Successful Security Regime and its ElusiveEuropean Rapid Reaction Force by Alexander Justice Moore

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS - AFRICOM: An Independent Reviewfor the Obama Administration by Daniel Lawner and Sarah Khederian

Taking the Offensive: The Utility and Limitations of Raiding by Adam Elkus

A Message from the Executive DirectorPeople Centric Security

In our last message, we described the path towards a ComprehensiveApproach to security. This multi-disciplinary path bypassed the the obstaclesof persistent conflict through a more effective and efficient use of govern-ment, international, enterprise and non-governmental organization assets toprovide more complete protection. The security and defense sector is reexam-ining traditional roles in light of the challenges posed by continuous spectrumof threats associated with persistent conflict. Our biggest challenges nowrelate to the episodes where the military cannot be the principal steward.Metrics for success for these phases are elusive, because the perception ofsecurity of the target population and the global audience ultimately deter-mines if a program or approach will be successful.

Experts, pundits, and practitioners of all sorts recognize the need toenable cooperation, coordination, collaboration, and communication to em-power both military and non-military partners. Too often, the search is for asilver bullet - a new organization, information sharing software, or cool gear- instead of a more complete understanding. At its root, cooperation, coordina-tion, collaboration, and communication involve the interaction of people in aphysical space to achieve a higher cognitive capacity. Decisions in thisenvironment are not about data, they are about harmonizing how differentgroups of people use the same data.

CADS has recently expanded its strategic and media footprint through anew positioning and visibility strategy. The Center expanded its roster ofpartners by welcoming Ambassador April Foley to our Board of Directors.The Global Security Monitor highlighted unprecedented challenges in India,Kyrgyzstan, and Lebanon before they became popular topics of discussion.Our Understanding Clandestine Organizations Program (UCOP) has gener-ated interest in adversary behavioral studies among government clients.CADS sponsored both a Common Defense West conference in San Diego,CA and an International Law Enforcement Conference on Post TraumaticStress Disorder in Palm Beach, FL. And this is only a short list that does notinclude many other flourishing initiatives.

To ensure these programs and advances in interagency coordination andinterdisciplinary research continue to lead us towards a “people centric”security, the Center relies upon public donations and grants. Please help us tomake Innovation for Peace a reality by donating at www.c4ads.org.

LTC David E.A. JohnsonExecutive Director

QUICK TAKES

Wasted Space: How and Why the U.S. Must Prepare for a Clean War inSpaceHoward KleinbergThe challenge of space debris generated by active defenses is oftentimesmisunderstood and overstated. More importantly, the concerns regardingspace debris are far less ominous than threats to the very survival of the U.S.as a nation. Because space is a pivotal arena for the U.S., we may to have todefend it by force. With judicious design and utilization of future space-basedassets and weapons, U.S. space-based assets can be protected against ASATswith a minimum of space debris generation.

Who is the Prey?: The Challenges of the Predator Drones Program andHigh-Value TargetingSarah CatanzaroIn a volatile and perilous global setting, human capital is a terroristorganization’s most valuable asset, differentiating terrorist groups that sur-vive from those that struggle. Terrorist groups rely on important decision-makers who establish policies and organizational structure, allocate resources,and communicate strategic vision. When executed properly, a high-valuetargeting approach can generate strategic effects; however, an assessment ofthe relative utility of this program requires a discriminating look at purposes,targets, and circumstances.

Too Much Information: Europe’s Successful Security Regime and itsElusive European Rapid Reaction ForceAlexander Justice MooreEuropean Union attempts to develop a European Rapid Reaction Force(ERRF) have resulted in little meaningful progress. The security regimesliterature recognizes two forms of state behavior: cooperation and competi-tion. The existing definitions for these terms create a behavioral dichotomy:cooperation entails mutual restraint from arms buildups and alliance-buildingwhile competition equals unilateral action along these lines. To build asuccessful joint force, EU member states must engage in cooperativeaction—an unprecedented measure in the security realm. Tracing theERRF’s history, this article concludes that without external shocks prompt-ing EU security anxiety, major advances in the force’s operational capabilityare unlikely.

QUICK TAKES

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS - AFRICOM: An Independent Re-view for the Obama AdministrationDaniel Lawner and Sarah KhederianOn October 28, 2009, CADS held a conference, AFRICOM: An IndependentReview for the New Administration, in cooperation with Representative JohnTierney, Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. Chairman Tierney of-fered the keynote address outlining ongoing issues for oversight of the U.S.Africa Command. His comments were followed by a half-day of expertremarks on the remaining challenges and opportunities for the Command inthe future. The day’s speakers delivered insightful and varied remarks to anaudience of African Embassy representatives, U.S. civilian governmentpersonnel, U.S. military personnel, congressional staff, and representativesfrom non-governmental organizations, think tanks and universities.

Taking the Offensive: The Limitations & Utility of RaidingAdam ElkusRaids executed by small units, special forces and counter-terrorist groups canbe astoundingly successful, defying the odds and all logic when a smallnumber of soldiers operating in difficult environments inflict striking defeatsthat sharply alter the military situation and possibly even determine theoutcome of the conflict. However, military pundits continue to debate wheth-er such unanticipated and potentially devastating military attacks should becategorized as tactics (i.e. the concepts and practice for winning battles) or asa significant element of grand strategy (i.e. the collection of policies thatcomprise the state's effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, andeconomic tools together to advance the national interest).

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COMMENTARY

The DHS offers civilians a chance to participate in policymak-ing, the U.S. recognizes the Armenian genocide, and formerTreasury Secretary Hank Paulson reveals an economic war-fare scheme - each story highlights the role of individuals andpopulations in shaping history.

Innovating Citizen Engagement: The National Dialogue onthe Quadrennial Homeland Security Review

Drew Bewick

Retroactive Attribution: The Ripple Effect of the House For-eign Affairs Committee’s Resolution on Armenian Genocide

Elise Hogan

The Golden Gun: Economic Warfare in the 21st CenturyAndrew Baer

The DHS leveraged social networks such as Facebook and Twitter, blogs, and Ning com-munities to advertise the National Dialogue.

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INNOVATING CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT: THE NATIONAL DIALOGUEON THE QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND SECURITY REVIEWDrew Bewick The Department of Homeland Security was recently nominated for a CitizenService Award - an award recognizing innovative citizen outreach efforts by gov-ernment offices accorded by the U.S. General Services Administration - for itswork on the The National Dialogue on the Quadrennial Homeland Security Re-view (QHSR). If you are interested in how social media and citizen engagementcan change national security policy, read on. The first-ever Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) report waspublished in February 2010. To address the recommendations of the National Com-mission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States articulated in the Implement-ing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, the U.S. Department ofHomeland Security (DHS) conducted a comprehensive review of the entire home-land security apparatus. The primary purpose of this examination was to develop astrategic framework that could guide the activities of participants in homeland se-curity toward the achievement of a common objective. The authors of the QHSRoffered specific recommendations on how to strengthen and mature the homelandsecurity enterprise. For example, they described mechanisms to enhance coordina-tion and unity of effort across multiple homeland security partners and stakehold-ers. The QHSR is not a resource prioritization document; rather, it offers anoptimistic homeland security concept for the U.S. based on a set of five key mis-sion areas integrated across the vast homeland security landscape.i For observers of U.S. national security, the completion of the inaugural QHSRwas a watershed event not just because it set forth a unified conception of home-land security and pinpointed five key homeland security missions, but because itidentified the stakeholders responsible for homeland security and a description ofhow the DHS designed the review. First, the QHSR provides the framework for anew Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE)ii and em-phasizes that the five key mission areas are enter-prise-wide, and not limited to the DHS alone.Hundreds of thousands of people from across thefederal government, state, local, tribal, and territori-al governments, the private sector, other NGOs,and other societies are responsible for executingthese missions.iii Previous attempts to unify thehomeland security community called for informa-tion sharing and collaboration across boundaries.However, these efforts did not go quite as far; theydid not adopt a wide enterprise-approach to home-land security in comparison to this QHSR.

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Second, the QHSR was executed in a transparent, open and collaborative man-ner using the latest Web 2.0 technologies to engage stakeholders and the public. Incolloquial language, this quadrennial review is not your father’s quadrennial re-view. The QHSR was not designed in a smoke-filled room by select Senior Steer-ing Groupsiv nor was it created using a top-down approach like the Pentagon’searly Quadrennial Defense Reviews. Through a series of three web-based, publicDialogues (the National Dialogue on the QHSR) driven by an iterative, online col-laborative discussion forum hosted by the National Academy of Public Administra-tion (NAPA), DHS collected the wisdom of U.S. citizens, as well asoperational-level expertise and specialized knowledge and incorporated it in thereview. Insights gained from this experience led DHS to continue the momentumby launching a new collaborative forum to help expand its capacity for public en-gagement. The Dialogue was conducted in three phases between July 16 and October 4,2009. More than 20,000 stakeholders from all 50 states and the District of Colum-bia, and more than 1,000 cities participated in the conversation. The National Dia-logue on the QHSR included three dialogues:

· Dialogue 1: An initial forum for the exchange of participant ideas on the goalsand objectives developed by DHS study groups across six topic areas.

· Dialogue 2: A deeper discussion on how best to prioritize and achieve the pro-posed goals and objectives.

· Dialogue 3: A review of the final products of each study group with partici-pant feedback and identification of next steps.

Over the course of these three Dialogues, stakeholders were asked to review,rate, and discuss the concepts, ideas, and draft recommendations developed by thesix QHSR study groups. The valuable comments and ideas solicited were madeavailable to the study groups tasked with writing the QHSR for DHS.v Overall, theextensive stakeholder feedback, along with insights from the DHS study groupmembers, interagency partners, and ordinary citizens informed the work of theQHSR study groups in an unusually open and collaborative manner in the oftensecretive homeland security and counter terrorism domain. The final report hasbeen delivered to Congress and can be viewed on the Department of HomelandSecurity’s QHSR page.vi

By conducting their study in a manner so that the drafts were accessible to allinterested parties, without regard to their position or formal credentials, the Dia-logue provided the opportunity for stakeholders and the public to review, rate, andopenly discuss the raw, unvetted materials initially developed by the QHSR Study

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Groups. This achievement cannot be easily overlooked. The National Dialogueon the QHSR was one of the largest, most complex stakeholder consultationefforts that the federalgovernment has everundertaken.vii Ratherthan set policy internal-ly in a top-down fash-ion, DHS completed theQHSR in an innovativeand ccoordinated man-ner that engaged tens ofthousands of stakehold-ers and harnessed theirideas and comments inthe process. Perhaps theQHSR can be regarded asa sign of the time, but itis also an example of how emerging technology can be used to invite and initi-ate mass collaboration and enable citizen engagement to shape U.S. nationalsecurity policy. The level of engagement, registered by the NAPA’s National DialogueTeam, is quite impressive.viii Overall, more than 2,977 individuals registered toparticipate in the Dialogues. These participants left 856 unique ideas, 3,174comments, and 8,425 ratings. In keeping with the experience of other socialnetworking web sites, Dialogue participants spent an average of nearly 7minutes on the site and contributed to the rapid improvement of its features. Aspart of their outreach strategy, the National Dialogue Team used Twitter,Facebook, and other social networking platforms to share information withparticipants. Its triumph is a nod to the efficiency and effectiveness ofcollaborative technologies, a trend which the business community has alreadyembraced. Moreover, its success begs the question whether we are likely to seesimilar approaches become more frequently used in the decision-makingprocess within the U.S. security domain. Where can readers get the answer? Asodd as it may sound to long-time national security observers, you might want tokeep an eye on Twitter and Facebook for future announcements.

Drew Bewick has participated in 30 venture capital investments in technologycompanies and has helped visionary social entrepreneurs launch profitable ven-tures. He also served as Chief of Technology Tradecraft in the Defense HumanIntelligence Management Office of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

“...its triumph is a nod to the efficiencyand effectiveness of collaborativetechnologies, a trend which thebusiness community has alreadyembraced. Moreover, its success begsthe question whether we are likely tosee similar approaches become morefrequently used in the decision-makingprocess within the U.S. security domain.”

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i Staff, 2010. Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report, Washington: Department ofHomeland Security http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ qhsr_report.pdf.ii Ibid, ix. The term “enterprise” refers to the collective efforts and shared responsibilities ofFederal, State, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector partners—aswell as individuals, families, and communities—to maintain critical homeland security ca-pabilities. The use of the term connotes a broad-based community with a common interestin the public safety and well-being of America and American society that is composed ofmultiple actors and stakeholders whose roles and responsibilities are distributed and sharediii Ibid, ixiv Staff, 1997. Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington: Office of the Secretary of De-fensev Staff, 2010. A National Dialogue for the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, Wash-ington: National Academy of Public Administrationhttp://www.homelandsecuritydialogue.org/vi Staff, 2010. Quadrennial homeland Security Review, Washington: Department of Home-land Security http://www.dhs.gov/qhsrvii Citizen Service Award, "Dialogues on the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review," Cit-izen. Service Award Blog, entry posted February 22, 2010,http://citizenserviceaward.wordpress.com/2010/02/ 22/dialogues-on-the-quadrennial-home-land-security-review/viii Ibid

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HIGHLIGHTSThe Global Security Monitor (GSM) is CADS’s web resource that provides timely, in-depth analysis of domestic and international developments. The GSM features a blogwhere staff members and interns at the Center can share ideas and opinions on importantcurrent events and policy issues. The GSM also includes briefs that focus on evolvingtrends such as asymmetric threats, hybrid warfare, economic warfare, and energy security.The Center supplements the GSM website with a bi-weekly newsletter delivered to a grow-ing readership. The following two articles were selected as exceptional examples of theeditorial work presented in the GSM. To find out more about the GSM, visitgsm.c4ads.org, and to subscribe to the bi-weekly newsletter, write to info@c4ads.org.

RETROACTIVE ATTRIBUTION: THE RIPPLE EFFECT OF THE HOUSE FOR-EIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE’S RESOLUTION ON ARMENIAN GENOCIDEElise Hogan In a 22 to 23 vote in late March 2010, the House Foreign Affairs Committeepassed a resolution condemning the 1915 mass killings of Armenians in Turkey asgenocide. In 2007, the Bush administration aggressively contested a similar bill toprevent it from reaching the House. Officials voiced their anxiety about alienatingTurkey since Washington depended on its close Muslim ally for access to NorthernIraq and regional efforts to isolate Iran. In two similar votes (1975, 1984) Congressalso deferred from using the term genocide. However, April 24, 2010 marked the95th anniversary of the massacre and deportation of as many as 1.5 million ethnicArmenians. Moreover, the dispute over the genocide label had set off what DanEggen of The Washington Post called a “lobbying frenzy.” Finally, during his cam-paign, President Obama unequivocally promised that he would recognize the mas-sacre as a genocide. These pressures combined to provide Congress with theimpetus to acknowledge the Armenian genocide. Nevertheless, the course of events preceding the announcement of the resolu-tion was tarred by the usual political maneuvering. Secretary of State Hillary Clin-ton stepped in at the last minute to sway the Committee against voting, but to noavail. She warned Rep. Howard Berman, the Committee Chairman that both sheand Obama opposed any action by Congress. Clinton admonished the Committeeto forgo voting on the resolution since it could jeopardize relations between Tur-

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key and Armenia. However, this reasoning is somewhat dubious. In a CNN inter-view, Fadi Hakura, Turkey Analyst at Chatham House, a London-based think tank,suggested that the security interests of the U.S., and not the international communi-ty, are the real motivator for the State Department’s intervention. The response from Turkey has been quick and pointed. Turkey recalled NamikTan, its ambassador to the United States, for consultations following the resolutionand Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu cautioned that “each interference by athird party will make this normalization impossible,” thereby alerting the U.S. ofthe effects its actions could have on diplomacy between Turkey and Armenia. Da-vutoglu also mocked the seemingly arbitrary voting process and narrow margin ofvictory by which the resolution was passed. He questioned whether history shouldbe treated in such an “unserious manner.” His criticism undermines theCommittee’s respect for the legacy of its allies Those investigating this episode have faced hurdles in acquiring access to nec-essary primary sources from the Ottoman archives, but 2008 marked a diplomaticturning point between Turkey and Armenia when they created an impartial interna-tional historical commission to examine available archival evidence. Much of thedebate is centered on what is and is not considered genocide, since several of thedeaths during this epoch were caused by displacement, war, and disease.

Turkey acknowledges and commemorates the 1915 deaths of Armenian civil-ians, but does not regard the casualties as genocide, which it defines as a plannedand deliberate systematic elimination of people. Rather, Turkey ascribes the esti-mated 1.5 million deaths to the civil war and unrest that occurred in the wake of adisintegrating Ottoman Empire. After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, nationalism diffused rapidly as a con-sequence of the dynamic reign of Mustafa Atatürk and the advent of Kemalism,

A relic of the Armenian massacre at Erzingan. Such evidence of the casualties can be foundthroughout Armenia.

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whereby the nation seeks to establish a modern, democratic and secular nation-state, guided by educational and scientific progress. Under Atatürk, Turkey wasquickly modernized according to the western European example. Education, lan-guage, religion and penal codes were reformed during the first part of the twentiethcentury. As a result, modern Turkey is a fiercely proud nation, and is consequentlyframing the passing of this resolution as a deeply emotional affront on Turkishidentity and history. Davutoglu is correct; it is reductive and quite frankly, absurd,that one vote, by a nation that was not even a participant in the incident, can sealthe pages of history. Since the resolution was passed, Secretary Clinton expressed White House op-position to the resolution by offering condolences to Davutoglu, thereby thawingU.S.-Turkey tensions. The ambassador has since returned to Washington and Tur-key sent representatives to the April Nuclear Summit in Washington, DC. Never-theless, the timing and administrative fumbling surrounding the House resolutionmarred the United States’ ties with Turkey. Moreover, the resolution cut off Turk-ish-brokered peace talks between Syria and Israel and may have further strainedthe already tenuous relationship between Turkey and Armenia. While SecretaryClinton’s belated intervention and subsequent apology may have patched U.S.-Tur-key relations for the time being, the ripple effects of the Armenian genocide reso-lution are multi-dimensional and are yet to be fully realized.

THE GOLDEN GUN: ECONOMIC WARFARE IN THE 21ST CENTURYAndrew Baer

In his recently released memoirs On The Brink, former Treasury SecretaryHank Paulson alleges that top Russian officials made overtures to their Chinesecounterparts suggesting that the nations coordinate to initiate economic warfareagainst the United States in the Summer of 2008. Paulson claims that during the2008 Summer Beijing Olympics Russian officials pressed China to dump its Fan-nie Mae-Freddie Mac holdings, proposing “that together they might sell bigchunks of their GSE holdings to force the U.S. to use its emergency authorities toprop up these companies.”Central bank data confirmsthat Russia sold all 65.6 billiondollars worth of its Mae-Macholdings mid-2008. AlthoughChina rejected Russia’s propos-al, the incident highlights thepotential for state-level, non-military disruptions to destabi-lize the international system

“While for several years scholarshave maintained that the role ofthe state has diminished withregards to the threat environment,arguably, these kinds of non-militarydisruptions... may shift our focusback to state-to-state conflict.”

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and reveals a potential blind-spot in the U.S. approach to national security.While for several years scholars have maintained that the role of the state has

diminished with regards to the threat environment, arguably, these kinds of non-military disruptions ( i.e. the use of international events as a diversionary tactic,state cooperation in economic manipulation, etc.) may shift our focus back to state-to-state conflict. And with the Department of Defense and U.S. Government sofixated on countering guerilla insurgencies and christening irregular or asymmetricwarfare as the term du jour, Paulson’s experience should underscore the lingeringdanger of state-to-state economic warfare.

With $13 trillion worth of debt, much of it owned by foreign entities, the Unit-ed States is increasingly vulnerable to hostile coordinated economic maneuveringby competing powers, such as Russia and China. China is the largest foreign U.Sdebtor owning nearly 24% of the debt backed by foreign entities, totaling just un-der 800 billion dollars. OPEC follows in fourth with 185 billion dollars, or 6 %,and Russia, seventh, with nearly 118 billion dollars, or 4%. Political commonsense would ostensibly dictate that being indebted to your competition is folly.

Maybe Thomas Jefferson was on to something when he wrote the following:“The system of banking [is] a blot left in all our Constitutions, which, if not covered,will end in their destruction... I sincerely believe that banking institutions are moredangerous than standing armies; and that the principle of spending money to bepaid by posterity... is but swindling futurity on a large scale.”

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COVER STORY

Howard Kleinberg analyzes the challenge of space debrisgenerated by active defenses and suggests technologies thatcan protect U.S. assets while generating minimal amounts ofdebris.

Wasted Space:How and Why the U.S. Must Prepare

to Fight a Clean War in Space

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Introduction Much anxiety has been engendered within the various space operations commu-nities regarding combat operations in space. Several stakeholders fear that anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons will generate so much space debris that Earth’s OrbitalSpace (EOS)i will become too ‘clogged up’ with lethally bullet-fast pieces of debristo ever be usable again. With this in mind, critics argue that space warfare should beprohibited.ii Unfortunately, the recent test of an anti-satellite weapon by China inJanuary of 2007 transformed the issue of space warfare and its attendant spacedebris-generation challenge from the realm of the hypothetical to the real.iii With justone test, space has been irrevocably altered from a free and open observation andcommunications zone into a battlefield of the post-Cold War era. Thus, it behoovesthe U.S. to contemplate how to counter such weapons (including their physicaldestruction) through methods that render these armaments ineffective and keep U.S.space systems secure. Concurrently, policymakers must consider solutions thatgenerate minimal amounts of long-term space debris.

Satellites have been usedas warfighting assets by theU.S. military since Opera-tion Desert Storm in 1991.Indeed, their use in combathas only expanded in scopeand extent and continues tobe a vital part of the ongo-

ing War on Terror, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere.iv This newbattlefield, like all others before (and below) it, has strategic implications that are ofimmeasurably great importance. Consequently, the issue of the residual wreckagecaused by any physical combat conducted therein should also be given properconsideration. However, discussions of ‘pollution’ in space must place this issue inits appropriate context within the overall, broader range of issues involving thetransformation of space into a strategic environment. Now is an opportune time torevisit the debris inquiry and consider the options for minimizing debris resultingfrom space combat operations and for removing debris.

The key lesson of China’s 2007 ASAT test is that the physical destruction of asatellite of even moderate size can result in the generation of a massive amount ofspace debris in addition to the loss of the satellite itself. Therefore, ASATs must bestopped at all costs, not only to prevent the resulting space debris but also to securethe increasingly vital space-based capabilities and all satellites within that orbitalzone. ASATs are here to stay, simply because there is no way to legislate theirremoval, regardless of the effort put forth to try to prevent their proliferation. Theonly reliable means to prevent their devastation of space in the foreseeable future is

“The key lesson of China’s 2007 ASATtest is that the physical destruction of asatellite of even moderate size can resultin the generation of a massive amount ofspace debris...”

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to find and implement ways to thwart or destroy them, with as little collateraldamage to friendly assets and the space environment as possible.

This paper argues that not only is the challenge of space debris misunderstoodand oftentimes even overstated (if only by omission of certain key facts), but inactuality, it is a far less important issue than threats to national security that mayeven jeopardize the survival of the U.S. as a nation. Space is a vital arena for theU.S.; it is a venue not only from which, but also in which, the U.S. can win or losefuture wars against other space-capable adversaries, both current and nascent. Thus,space is a “terrain” that we may have to have to defend by force in both the physicaland electromagnetic contexts.

Fortunately, there are a number of methods and approaches, both passive andactive, that can be used to counter the ASAT threat. Moreover, relatively few ofthem involve the use of force in space itself. Indeed, the earlier in the ASAT’slaunch cycle it can be thwarted, the better positioned the defenders will be.

Next, the author of this paper argues that with the judicious design and utiliza-tion of future space-based assets and weapons, U.S. space-based assets can be wellprotected against ASATs. Notably, these weapons could also be used to provide theU.S. with the single most effective possible missile defenses with minimal to nohazardous space debris generated. Space-based kinetic-kill weapons can destroyrockets in their boost phase in or just above the Earth’s atmosphere, regardless oftheir payloads, whether they are nuclear warheads, satellites, or ASATs. No satel-lites will be lost and no hazardous space debris will be generated if a boost-phasemissile-defense system is operational and functional. Additionally, there are anumber of other means by which satellites can be disabled without generating debris.

ASATs themselves must be stopped at all costs, since the damage they couldwreak, both in the short-term and longer-term, indubitably warrants their defeat anddestruction. Kinetic kills of satellites can be achieved, but only when the nationalsecurity of the U.S. is at sufficient risk. Under these circumstances, the destructionof enemy space-based assets would abrogate concerns regarding the secondaryconsequences of the space debris generated. However, there are less ‘dirty’ ways torender a satellite nonoperational, such as directed energy and forcibly maneuveringthe satellite about, as well as blinding or shading it from the sun’s energy-providingrays. Space debris hazards can be mitigated or eliminated entirely, even in theeventuality of a kinetic kill, given the correct targeting and tactics. Kinetic kills are

“Not only is the challenge of space debris misunderstoodand oftentimes even overstated ... but in actuality, it is a farless important issue than threats to national security thatmay even jeopardize the survival of the U.S. as a nation.”

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not the only means by which anti-satellite operations can be conducted; otheroptions exist than can disable the satellite without obliterating it.

Finally, in the longer run, the rising numbers of nations and organizations usingspace mean that the problem of space pollution will inevitably worsen, possibly to

hazardous levels that prohibit access.EOS will eventually need to becleaned up, regardless of wartime orpeacetime usage. To solve this long-term challenge, there are a numberof entirely viable, affordable, but asyet untried technologies available toperform the space-cleanup task.

Background: The Importance of Space, and the Space Debris Problem Space is a medium of vital interest to humanity in general and to the UnitedStates specifically. The U.S. depends on space for its global military capabilities, aswell as for communications, commerce, science, navigation, weather forecasting,and for a multitude of other military operations, such as intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance (i.e. ISR).v Space access is not achieved without generatingnegative secondary effects: the process of launching satellites into orbit around theEarth inevitably leaves behind some ‘pollution’ in the form of space debris. Thisspace debris is comprised of the detritus of spent or exploded rocket boosters, andexpired or exploded satellite fuel tanks or batteries. Not all of this junk remains inspace; some of it falls back to Earth, where it usually burns up in the atmosphere.But while some pieces will remain in orbit around the Earth for merely a few hours,others may remain ‘up there’ for centuries to come. Like all objects in orbit, debris obeys the laws of celestial mechanics, followingrelatively fixed, predictable closed paths.vi These laws portend both good and badnews about the predicament of space debris. The good news is that space debrisorbits the Earth in a largely predictable manner, making it easier to avoid. The badnews is that because any object in orbit around the Earth travels at speeds of up toseveral miles a second, collisions between objects traveling at such speeds could bedevastating. While great military power can be projected with the use of space-basedcapabilities, no satellite has ever been destroyed in combat. However, this is afortuitous coincidence, a result of both the brevity of the Space Age itself, and aconsequence of the ‘stable deterrence’ doctrine established by the U.S. and theSoviet Union (the two dominant space-going protagonists of the Cold War era ofrelative bipolar stability). During that era, each side placed reconnaissance satellitesin orbit over the other state’s territories to monitor and verify each other’s strategic

“Today, however, the bipolarinternational system is gone,replaced by an increasinglymultipolar scenario of a growingnumber of actors with capabilities in space.”

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nuclear capabilities. They agreed not to attack these space-based verification assetsin order to avoid provoking a nuclear war.vii

Today, however, the bipolar international system is gone, replaced by an increas-ingly multipolar scenario of a growing number of actors with capabilities in space.This changing spacescape has resulted in a higher likelihood of physical combatoperations as evidenced by China’s recent testing of a direct-ascent anti-satellite(ASAT) weapon. This threat is one that cannot be swept away by the stroke of a penor the wording of a treaty. On the contrary, it requires the development of physicaldefenses. Daniel Davis summarizes this issue as follows:

Virtually every competent armed force possesses unmanned aerial systems,and a growing number possess the ability to attack space-based platforms.Therefore, we must create the ability within our force to both defend againstsuch attacks and to launch counterstrikes. Like it or not, space has beenadded as a dimension of war. Our potential adversaries possess the abilityto shoot down, blind, deceive or outright destroy the space platforms uponwhich we critically rely. If we don’t protect our satellites and improve ourability to employ precision weapons against hostile enemy forces, we incuran avoidable, unacceptable vulnerability.viii

Just How Severe Is the Space Debris Problem? At first glance, space debris appears to be an imminent and looming problem.The numbers alone are cause for alarm. There are an estimated 12,500 or so objectsin EOS that are 10cm or larger in diameter.ix Of these 12,500 objects, only about 700are actually active, operational spacecraft.x This means that an overwhelming 94.4%of man-made objects in space are junk. Another negative factor to consider is that,like all man-made machinery, all satellites will eventually deteriorate; their orbitalmaneuvering rocket-fuel will be depleted or their electronics or batteries will failfrom either the harsh environment of space or from sheer old age. Unlike a failedaircraft, however, a dead satellite will not fall out of space immediately, but canremain in orbit for years, centuries, or even millennia, depending upon its altitudeand other factors. In addition, an estimated 100,000 pieces of debris between 1cmand 10cm in size are in orbit.xi As for the number of objects that are under 1cm, theirestimates “probably exceed tens of millions.”xii What makes this latter figure alarm-ing is not only its sheer magnitude but also the fact that these fragments areundetectable using current technologies. Finally, with an estimated 75 ongoingspace launches per year, the space debris problem will only become more hazardouswith time.xiii

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Fortunately, not all space debris remains in orbit permanently. In fact, certainregions of Earth’s orbital space are actually self-cleansing, as is the case with debrisin Low Earth Orbit (LEO), the most frequently used zone of EOS. The Earth’s outeratmosphere (mesosphere, thermosphere and exosphere)xiv extends out as far as1,000km, exerting a small but measurable amount of aerodynamically inducedfriction on objects in space.xv If not corrected or compensated for, this aerodynamicdrag will eventually bring an object into the Earth’s main atmosphere where thecombination of high air density and object velocity will incinerate the object. Thus,space debris in LEO does not inherently pose a long-term risk to space-accessibility,because that much-used volume of EOS is essentially self-cleaning. However, thisprocess can take months or even years to occur.xvi

Space Defenses and Space Debris in ContextASATs, or Anti-Satellite weapons, were first developed in earnest by the Cold

War superpowers during the 1970s and 1980s. By the mutual consent of the U.S. andSoviet Union an agreement not to deploy ASATs was reached in that era.xvii ASATsgrant their user the ability to carry out ‘strategic paralysis’ strikes against anyadversary that makes extensive use of space assets, whether for economic, civil ormilitary purposes. Indeed, the more that a target state uses space-based capabilities,the more vulnerable it is to attacks on its space assets. This is a paradigm thatChinese military thinkers have long discussed and applied in their recommendationsfor targeting.xviii

ASATs are now more than ever a looming problem and threat that policymakersmust address. We are now in a different era in which space technology has prolifer-ated widely and will only continue to spread. China’s 2007 ASAT test has reintro-duced a threat to space and national security policy not seen since the darkest daysof the Cold War, when both the U.S. and Soviet Union tested ASAT weapons.xix

Disturbingly, China has stated its strategic interest in acquiring the capability toattack U.S. satellites in order to bolster its own ability to fend off U.S. forces (forexample, in a possible future military takedown of Taiwan).xxTwo conditions aggra-vate this seemingly forbidding challenge: first, the U.S. is highly dependent on spaceassets for its military and economic security; and secondly, these assets are effective-ly unprotected at the moment. There are currently no defenses available to directly

“We are now in a different era in which space technology has proliferated widely and will only continue to spread.”

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defend against physical weapons attacks on satellites. By contrast, rogue orrevisionist states with nascent space capabilities or even with ballistic missilesand nuclear weapons can carry out attacks on satellites, and there is no possibleguarantee that they would never do so. China’s recent ASAT test proved thatspace-based capabilities are spreading to actors besides the U.S. and Russia; ifChina can conduct this sort of operation, other states are bound to obtain similarcapabilities. Worse, China has sold or disseminated other highly advancedweapons technologies such as cruise missiles to third-party actors, including Iran.Some of these technologies were then transferred by Iran to the Lebanese-IranianHezbollah terrorist organization.xxi

This implies that in thefuture, policymakers will beforced to choose betweendefending U.S. space assets,which may generate spacedebris with all of its atten-dant risk to current and fu-ture space operations, orlosing a war against an ag-gressive state that resorts toASATs to disable U.S. satel-lites. Fortunately, it is un-likely that policymakerswill have to accept the latter choice, for a number of compelling reasons. Even ifspace objects were to slam into one another, space is immense. Thus, even inLEO, debris can be routinely avoided. The already low risk-levels of collisionsbetween space debris and spacecraft (one incident in over 45 years of spaceflight)would not be catastrophically increased by limited space weapons usage. In fact,merely doubling the probability of a collision between debris and a satellitewould require doubling the mass of debris in orbit; doubling the amount of spacedebris in a space-conflict would entail the destruction of a massive 2,000 tonsworth of spacecraft. Since even the largest spacecraft currently in orbit weighsonly on the order of 18 tons apiece,xxii the destruction of hundreds of spacecraftswould be necessary just to double the odds of a space debris collision, to a risklevel which would still be quite low. This scenario would also require thedestruction of more sheer mass than is accessible to most adversaries, if only atthe present time.

However, there are cautionary notes that readers must consider when review-ing this necessarily macrocosmic approach. Firstly, the doubling of orbital debris

“This implies that in the future,policymakers will be forced tochoose between defending U.S.space assets, which may generatespace debris with all of its attendantrisk to current and future spaceoperations, or losing a war against anaggressive state that resorts to ASATsto disable U.S. satellites.”

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mass assumes a uniform distribution over all of EOS. In fact, the debris from thesekills would scatter throughout a band around the original orbit of the destroyedsatellite. This phenomenon was exhibited after the Chinese ASAT test of 11 January2007 destroyed an obsolescent weather satellite, thereby exposing a greater numberof satellites in a similar orbital band to potential collisions.xxiii Secondly, ASAToperations would generate vastly increased absolute quantities of space debris. Thisdebris could exacerbate the already challenging task of controlling space traffic, ofmanaging and manipulating satellites’ orbits so that they are not struck by any of theincreased numbers of pieces of debris.

Third, it is not the mass per unit volume of space that counts, but rather, thenumber, size, and orbits of discrete pieces that is of concern. It only takes one strikefrom a debris object to destroy a satellite. Additionally, logic dictates that the smallerthe size of the fragments, the more numerous they may be. To make matters worse,the smaller and more numerous the objects, the less likely we are to know wherethey are.xxiv

The final caveat is that, given the bullet-like speeds of orbital debris, even verysmall objects can inflict lethal damage to a satellite. While space wouldn’t necessar-ily become unusable in the aftermath of even a high-intensity space war, subsequentspace traffic control and management operations would be vastly more difficult,dangerous, and could result in the loss of one or more spacecraft, particularly in LEO,where most of the targets and subsequent combat is likeliest to take place.

To Stop an ASAT, Follow its Kill Chain As with so many practical problems, the earlier in its life-cycle a problem isprevented, the less expensive or difficult the solution becomes. This notion alsoholds true when defending against ASATs. Indeed, the best way to win a fight inspace is to avoid fighting there as much as possible. As with combat aircraft designand operations, attacks on satellites can be avoided or their effects mitigated.Alternatively, the probabilities of successful interception of ASAT attacks can beincreased by a variety of methods, known as susceptibility reduction and vulnerabil-ity reduction. Susceptibility reduction involves reducing the ability of the ASAT todetect and track its target. For instance, raising the altitude of the satellite makes itharder for an ASAT to reach. Similarly, stealth in both the radar cross-section andinfrared signatures of a satellite could be reduced, making it more difficult for anASAT to detect and track down. Likewise, maneuvering a satellite out of its regularorbital track would disrupt an ASAT’s limited detection and targeting capabilities.

Vulnerability reduction involves making the target harder to disable or destroy.It includes design measures such as separation and redundancy of vital componentswithin the body of the satellite, armoring in the likeliest or most vulnerable areas ofdebris impacts, damage suppression, and similar protections. However, while virtu-

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ally all of these measures are utilized in both the design and operation of combataircraft, few are currently in use in contemporary spacecraft.xxv

Of particular interest in the quest for an ASAT-resistant satellite systemdesign is the distributed multiple-small-satellite-design architecture proposed byDARPA’s F6 program, in which a number of small co-orbiting satellites wouldfunction collectively as a single larger satellite. A loosely-grouped cluster ofsmall satellites has many advantages. Each satellite is smaller and has a lowerradar cross-section, making it much more difficult to detect and to hit. Withsufficient separation distances between the component satellites, debris generat-ed from the physical destruction of one is unlikely to reach or damage the others.Redundancy of functions among satellites in the group enables it to continue tofunction even after one or more direct strikes by a KE ASAT. Finally, smallsatellites can be replaced more quickly with other small satellites than a singlelarge satellite would.xxvi Redundancy either through the use of many platforms orreadily available replacements and launchers on the ground (the concept underly-ing the Air Force’s concept of Operationally Responsive Space, or ORS)xxvii

would make it more difficult to cripple the U.S. military for extended periods.The F6 concept is illustrated in Figure 1, below:

Figure 1 – Space-Based Small-Satellite Group Conceptxxviii

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Other passive efforts could also prove useful, for example, transposing a satel-lite to a higher altitude out of the ASAT’s range. ASATs can also be thwarted bychanging the satellite’s orbital path or by placing the target out of the ASAT’s reach.Moreover, an ASAT can be defeated by active means, like destroying it on its launchpad.

However, there are problems and limitations to all passive measures, both in thepresent and in the future. ORS is still in its infancy, and might not stop a challengerwho has plenty of ASATs to spare, or simply deliberately creates orbiting clouds ofdebris. In addition, F6 and like designs are still years away from deployment. Whilethe recommendation to armor satellites in critical locations is used in the Shuttle andISS, it is employed by few other platforms. Even if all the passive-defense optionswere implemented in all future satellite designs and operations, they would donothing to protect the large array of large, non-stealthy, unarmored, high-valuesatellites currently in orbit, which constitute the bulk of the U.S.’ space-basedcapabilities and will continue to do so in the future. This means that U.S. spacecapabilities are and will remain extremely vulnerable to attack, a precarious securitysituation that is unlikely to be remedied for the many years or decades to come. Ifthe adversary’s space situational awareness and ASATs are effective and numerous

enough, and if itstargets are rela-tively few, large,low-orbiting, andimportant, theywill be found anddestroyed. Thiswill hold true un-less other protec-tive measures aretaken.

Hypervelocity-Collision Pulverization: No Space Debris… Done Properly All currently-operational U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) weapons usehypervelocity, direct-impact “hit-to-kill” Kinetic-Energy (KE) weapon systems toachieve the destruction of their targets. Hypervelocity is defined as a speed of Mach5 (five times the speed of sound, or 3,800mph) or higher.xxix “The ‘hit-to-kill’concept involves colliding with the incoming warhead, completely pulverizing it…This collision ensures complete destruction of a warhead carrying weapons of massdestruction — nuclear, biological or chemical — and the means of delivery, such asmid-range and long-range ballistic missiles.”xxx The great advantage of this ap-

“Even if all the passive-defense optionswere implemented in all future satellitedesigns and operations, they would donothing to protect the large array of large,non-stealthy, unarmored, high-value satellites

...which constitute the bulk of the U.S.’space-based capabilities...”

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proach with respect to orbital debris generation is that these hypervelocityimpacts result in the “pulverization” of the interceptor and its ballistic missiletarget into minute fragments and particulates.xxxi Also KWE missile defenseweapons typically intercept their targets outside the atmosphere, i.e., in space.

Hypervelocity collisions between ballistic missiles and kinetic-energy inter-ceptors generate no long-term space debris. This fact was first verified in theStrategic Defense Initiative Organization’s (SDIO) Delta-180 experiment ofSeptember 11, 1986, in which a direct collision occurred between the payload ofthe Delta-180 space-launch vehicle and its second-stage booster rocket, at aclosing velocity of about 3km/sec. This was the first time such a hypervelocityin-space collision had ever been carried out. The net result was the generation ofmillions of tiny fragments, most of which burned up in the Earth’s atmospherein a matter of minutes, and all of which disappeared within a few days. Further-more, the debris cloud scattered widely after the collision, thereby lowering itsdensity and the risk it posed as a debris-cloud.xxxii As Dr. Lowell Wood andAmbassador Henry Cooper point out about both the Delta-180 and BrilliantPebblesxxxiii tests:

“…there have been no adverse consequences reported from any of thesemajor hypervelocity collision events, which generate literally millions ofsand-grain-sized pieces of space debris, by anyone at all…

“Typical Pebble intercept altitudes, at which the collision debris is gener-ated, are 50-150 miles, where the residual atmosphere drags downcollision debris on time-scales of seconds to minutes -- and far lowerthan those at which recent midcourse defense-testing collisions havebeen made to occur. The residual air densities at the much higheraltitudes mistakenly guessed by the critics as pertinent to Pebbles of anyvintage are exponentially smaller, and the inversely proportional orbitallifetimes of debris created at these altitudes thus are several orders-of-magnitude larger than those relevant to Pebbles.”xxxiv

Hypervelocity hit-to-kill weapons would be designed along the lines of theSDI-era proposed Brilliant Pebblesxxxv and now-operational Ground-Based Mid-course Defense (GMD)xxxvi KE weapons. Figure 2 and Figure 3 illustrate theouter appearance and system architecture of the Brilliant Pebbles weapon system,respectively, while Figure 4 shows the GMD intercepting and pulverizing itsmissile warhead target.

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Figure 2 – Brilliant Pebbles Space-Based BMD Interceptorxxxvii

Figure 3 – Anatomy of a Future U.S. Space-Based Kinetic-Kill Vehiclexxxviii

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Figure 4 – GMD Intercept Imageryxxxix

Further evidence for the clean-kill potential of technology made to achievehypervelocity interceptions is that the GMD is designed to intercept ICBMwarheads in their midcourse phase, during which time they can reach altitudes of1,000km or more.xl While this altitude is well up into long-duration-orbit EOS,ICBM warhead interceptions present absolutely no long-term space debris haz-ard due to the interceptor/target pulverization process.xli This is to be expectedgiven the combination of factors intrinsic to interceptions of this nature: thesuborbital speeds of both missile and interceptor; the closing velocities that comefrom generally opposite directions resulting in tremendous closing speeds; thesmall, densely-packaged masses of both interceptor and warhead; and important-ly, the similar masses of the two items, all of which results in their mutualannihilation.

Is Debris-Free Space Warfare Possible? It is thus possible to protect our satellites in space from ASATs withoutgenerating large amounts of long-term debris (none, in some cases), but onlywhen combat occurs in limited regions of space, and under limited conditions. Inaddition, there are two ways to use weapons offensively in space relativelycleanly. The first way is to use Directed Energy (DE), by focusing optical,infrared, or radio frequency energy to disrupt or disable a target, without destroy-ing it outright, thereby shattering it into multiple pieces of debris. The second

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way is to use Kinetic Energy (KE) weapons against a target in space, but thisapproach should only be used in limited circumstances.

Given the attributes and limitations of hypervelocity-impact kills of targetsin space, some recommendations and restrictions on the use of KE weapons needto be made. First, both the interceptor and its target must both be relatively smalland compact or larger fragments might escape the pulverization process. Second,the collision velocities must be as high as possible in order to deliver as muchenergy to the target as possible, to pulverize as much of it as possible. Third, theinterception must occur in or close to the outer reaches of the Earth’s atmosphereso that at least some aerodynamic drag (relative to their small masses) will bepresent to drag these small fragments farther down into the atmosphere wherethey will be incinerated. Lastly, the target should ideally be intercepted before itreaches orbital velocity; otherwise, some of the resulting fragments could remainin orbit for years to come. KE weapons will not result in clean satellite kills at allaltitudes of EOS, nor can KE ASATs guaranteeably be cleanly used outside thiszone, almost regardless of their collision velocities.xlii If the kill must be achieved,the interception/collision velocity must be as high as possible, in order topulverize as much of both target and interceptor into fine particulates as possible. Direct proof of both the efficacy and limitations of the clean-KE satellite-killapproach, of ‘how it should be done,’ was evidenced in the 20 February, 2008shoot-down of an out-of-control U.S. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)satellite by the U.S. Navy using a specially-modified Standard SM-3 missiledefense interceptor launched from the AEGIS missile-defense cruiser USS LakeErie while sailing in the Pacific Ocean. In this shoot-down, the satellite was dead,tumbling out of control in a decaying low Earth orbit, its electrical power systemsshut down, its solar power panels folded, and its hydrazine fuel frozen solid in itstanks; the optimal small, densely-packed target for a clean KE kill in LEO.Indeed, this was precisely the effect achieved, with no large long-term debrisresulting from the AEGIS KE intercept.xliiixliv

The “Shotgun” Approach; Even Worse Co-orbiting ASATs are innately ‘messy’ satellite-killers, arguably more sothan KE-ASATs. First devised and tested by the former Soviet Union from the1960s through the 1980s, this type of ASAT kills its target by first risinggradually after its launch to achieve a parallel orbital path within a short distanceof the target satellite (i.e. ‘co-orbiting’ with it) then utilizing a blast-fragmenta-tion-impelled “grenade”-type warhead to destroy the target.xlv Supposedly, thismethod of attack generates ‘only’ a few hundred large pieces of debris.xlvi

However, this debris lingers for a very long time, even in LEO, as evidenced by

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the fact that today, debris from these Soviet-era tests still poses an on-orbithazard. “Several Soviet ASAT tests did create thousands of detectable pieces ofjunk that are still in orbit after 25 years… In total, 371 detectable pieces oforbiting junk still survive today from various Soviet ASAT weapons tests.”xlvii

Worryingly, the Russians produced stockpiles of these IS-Axlviii and IS-MUxlix

co-orbiting ASATs during the Cold War. These stockpiles have not been dis-posed of and may become a space-security threat in the future, either throughtheir reactivation into service by Russia, or via sales to other countries.l

Figure 5 – Soviet Co-Orbiting ASAT Attacking a Satelliteli

Directed Energy: the Cleanest-Killing U.S. Space Weapon TechnologyDirected-energy (DE) weapons are another means of conducting ASAT

missions that do not produce any space debris if used judiciously. As its nameimplies, DE involves the generation and focusing of either optical-frequency(laser) or radio frequency (RF) energy onto a target. One of DE’s greatestadvantages is its direct, line-of-sight flight path. It can also arrive at an orbitingtarget virtually instantaneously, since it travels at the speed of light, the maxi-mum velocity possible in the universe.lii Indeed, noted space security specialistRobert Butterworth agrees that the greater range and virtually instantaneousreach of DE may make it the active space-defense weapon technology of choice,particularly against short-flight time, direct-ascent ASATs.liii This type of usewould take advantage of both the instantaneous reach and greater range of DEdepending on its type and source location.

DE weapons also have the potential to be truly ‘clean-killing’ ASAT weap-ons, even more so than KE weapons. DE weapons’ effects can be calibrated asdesired simply by varying the intensity, duration and location of the energydirected onto the target. As a result, DE weapons possess the capability to blind,

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disable, disrupt or destroy satellites. Different methods of DE deposition can beused to achieve each effect. For instance, high-energy lasers, whether ground, air,or space-based (see Figure 6) could be used to accomplish a range of controlledeffects, such as temporarily dazzling or permanently blinding sensitive optical orInfra-Red (IR) sensors, overwhelming solar-electric semiconductor power-gener-ation arrays, or melding down the exterior of a satellite. Similarly, the power andenergy deposition could be ratcheted up to burn through the insulation and outerwall of the satellite, penetrate to the internal structure of the satellite, and destroyor damage the innards (computers, gyros, etc.) of the satellite sufficiently tolobotomize it without generating multiple large pieces of debris. As a finalalternative, the target could be shattered by imparting enough additional energy.However, this latter effort would generate debris. In the optimal lethal-effectscenario, a permanently-deactivated enemy satellite (or ASAT weapon, for thatmatter) would continue along in its existing orbit, albeit as an inert hulk thatcould be easily monitored and avoided.liv Similarly, High-Powered Microwave (HPM) weapons could be used todestroy targets in space. HPM weapons can disrupt or destroy a target bygenerating sufficient amounts of electrical current to electrocute the electronicmicro-circuitry that satellites are dependent on to function.lv As with the less-destructive usage of laser energy, judiciously applied HPM would also engendera temporarily jammed satellite’s communication systems. At the other extremeof potential effects, HPM could also be used to achieve a clean kill, leaving onlya drifting hulk in its wake. As Eileen Walling explains, “One advantage ofmicrowave weapons is that they do not physically destroy satellites and therebyproduce the debris that would harm other satellites.”lvi HPM DE is the preferredmethod of killing a satellite without transforming it into a debris cloud.

DE is arguably the better space-weapon technology option, for a number ofreasons. First, it can be used to control, limit or increase the desired level andduration of effects on a target, depending on the political or military situation aswell as the target itself. Second, as described above, the debris-generationproblem can be completely avoided if the satellite can be disabled but kept intact.Third, the risks of escalation in a space-war, especially with a nuclear-armedadversary, can be avoided if the effects of the target neutralization are temporary.Fourth, the need to resort to ultimately counterproductive ground-strikes, orworse, to nuclear weapons in retaliation for the loss of a “significant” number ofsatelliteslvii is eliminated altogether. Possessing the capability to effectively,flexibly, and cleanly defend our own space assets against physical attack wouldallow us to avoid the lost-space-capability nightmare scenario altogether.

However, even DE is not a cure-all: satellites might be hardened against DE;stealth, deception or evasion tactics may be used to circumvent targeting by DE

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and KE weapons; the target may be in too high an orbit to be within range of DEweapons. Nor is the risk of debris generation reduced to zero with the use of DEweapons, since some pieces might be sliced or melted off the target, or the targetmight explode outright (propellant tanks, batteries) with sufficient energy deposi-tion.

Figure 6 – Proposed U.S. Design for a Chemically Fueled Space-BasedLaserlviii

‘Boosting’ High-Energy-Lasers with Space-Based Relay Mirrors Space-Based Laser Relay Mirrors (SBLRMs) can extend the range and reachof DE lasers, enabling instantaneous coverage of all of EOS with accurate,pinpoint protective fire against ballistic missiles, boosting ASATs, and evenASATs in higher-altitude orbits and trajectories, with only a relative handful ofDE lasers. SBLRMs are another technology developed and proven during theSDI era as a means of extending the range and reach of laser weapons beyondtheir physical direct-line-of-sight limitations. The goal was to place a constella-tion of mirrors in orbit to provide the requisite sequence of reflection relay-pointsfrom any laser platform to any required area of coverage at all times in the samemanner as that utilized in the GPS or IRIDIUM constellations. With a sufficientnumber of mirrors in orbit, one laser source could instantly be used to engage anumber of targets anywhere around the world. In fact, the high-energy laseremitter can be located anywhere in the world, from locations on the ground, inthe air, or up in space. In addition, any given mirror could relay the beams of anynumber of sources, giving redundancy to the intended area of coverage if one ormore laser sources were lost.lix Perhaps surprisingly, SBLRM technology is the most mature of all theDirected-Energy Laser DEL systems stemming from the SDI program. An

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SBLRM was flight-tested in the Relay Mirror Experiment (RME) of February1990. In this experiment, a satellite bearing a specially-made mirror was orbited,and successfully and accurately reflected an Earth-based laser’s light-beam backdown to the ground onto a nearby stationary ground target, all while the satellitewas orbiting overhead in LEO and traveling at some 4.5 miles a second.lx TheRME used adaptive optics to compensate for atmospheric distortions in the laserbeam and produced a reflected laser beam that arrived in essentially coherentform on the ground target.lxi Further validation of the laser-relay-mirror method-ology lies in its recent resurrection and successful testing in the form of theAerospace Relay Mirror System (ARMS) for tactical battlefield applications. Ina July 2006 test, two balloon-lofted mirrors were used to reflect a laser from aground-based emitter to a ground target, two miles away.lxii

Just as with space-based KE weapons, SBLRMs could be used to shoot downmissiles of any hostile purpose in their boost phase. SBLRMs could also extendtheir DEL sources’ range much more than any KE weapon. They could even

‘bounce’ their beams to expand their reach around the world. Furthermore,SBLRMs could even be used to increase the reach of their beam sources fartherup into EOS, again with the near-instantaneity that only DE weapons can provide.Thus, they present a promising option.

Figure 7 – Space-Based Laser Relay Mirror Experiment of 1990lxiii

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ASAT Operations via Blocking, Tumbling and Towing There are several other methods of conducting debris-free ASAT operations.Since virtually all satellites currently in orbit utilize solar-electric arrays togenerate electrical power, one method of non-destructively ‘killing’ a satelliteinvolves co-orbiting a sunshade that would be interposed between the targetsatellite and the sun. This tactic would prevent solar energy from reaching thetargeted satellite’s solar arrays, cutting off its electricity. The satellite would bedeactivated once its batteries ran out.lxiv

Another way to ‘kill’ a satellite without generating space debris would be byphysically dislocating it by either tumbling or towing. Tumbling involves attach-ing a parasite satellite to the target satellite, which then tumbles the target beyondits ability to stabilize itself. Similarly, towing involves moving or towing thetarget satellite from its orbit beyond its capability to recover from such a displace-ment. In order to permanently eliminate the target satellite altogether withoutturning it into hazardous orbital debris, it could be towed either to the point ofreentry into the Earth’s atmosphere or out of EOS altogether, though the formeris much easier to achieve.lxv

KE Anti-ASATs: Last Resort, and NecessityIf all else fails and an ASAT is unswervingly, undeniably inbound towards a

high-value satellite and no other form of clean-killing defense can stop it, thenthe only alternative left to protect that high-value satellite is to use an Anti-ASAT(AASAT). Not only is there the potentially critical loss of the satellite and itscapabilities to contend with, but the resultant debris field could then pose anenormous threat to all other operators in that band of EOS. This is all the morelikely, given that most satellites tend to be clustered in a relatively few zones ofhigh utility and usage, such as LEO and Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO).Assuming that the total number of pieces of debris is roughly proportional to thetotal mass of the ASAT-plus-satellite collision, it behooves the defender to findsome way to stop the ASAT, regardless of the debris.lxvi If debris generation isindeed inevitable, then the ASAT should be destroyed with as small an AASATas possible in order to minimize the total debris mass produced. To this end,

“If all else fails and an ASAT is unswervingly, undeniablyinbound towards a high-value satellite and no other form ofclean-killing defense can stop it, then the only alternative leftto protect that high-value satellite is to use an Anti-ASAT.”

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microsatellites could be employed to function as satellite bodyguards, as illustratedin Figure 8 below. And to this end, and possibly for all of these reasons, both theAFRL and DARPA are working on defensive counter-ASAT microsatellitedesigns.lxvii

Figure 8 – Satellite Bodyguards Defending a High-Value Satellitelxviii

Yet More Ways to Defeat ASATs – Or Are There? In addition to stealth, evading, maneuvering, hardening, distributed components,and shooting them down, there are still other ways to stop ASATs from accomplish-ing their mission. Alternative methods include striking their launchers, and electron-ic attack/infiltration. The former would require detecting, locating and thenlaunching cruise or even ballistic missiles at the launch platform or vehicle (e.g., amobile launcher, such as was used by China). The Navy’s proposed Prompt GlobalStrike System would use conventionally-armed Trident submarine-launched ballis-tic missiles to destroy high-priority, mobile targets at long ranges and in very littleflight-time.lxix The latter option involves using highly sophisticated electronics incombat aircraft, warships, or military facilities to electronically infiltrate or ‘hackinto’ the radars, command and control systems, or the guidance system of the ASATitself. Israeli Defence Force/Air Force combat aircraft used this method to thwartSyrian air defense systems (including inbound surface-to-air missiles) protecting a

‘mystery’ nuclear facility that the IDF/AF subsequently destroyed.lxx

However, both of these approaches are perilous. Striking a ground target, evena missile launcher, would constitute an act of war, especially if the strike occurreddeep inside another country’s territory. Adversely, a submarine-launched ballisticmissile could be interpreted (accidentally or deliberately) as a strategic nuclear strike,initiating a miscalculation of intent and triggering a nuclear counterstrike. Even if it

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didn’t provoke a nuclear response, the potential repercussions would be substantial.How could the U.S. possibly explain to the international community that theresulting pile of rubble far into the domain of, say, China, was in fact an ASAT aboutto be launched? Nor would the owners of the pile of wreckage in question leaveincriminating evidence in the open for the world to inspect and confirm its guilt andultimately exonerate a U.S. act of war. There is also the risk that U.S. intelligenceentities could incorrectly identify the targeted launcher as an ASAT or other threat.Indeed, such an effort would most likely backfire against the U.S. The ASAT-defense-via-launcher-strike strategy would not tangibly enhance American security,and cannot be counted on to provide the last line of defense against ASAT attacks. Similarly, electronic attack or infiltration such as was purportedly carried out bythe IDF/AF requires that the attacking systems be in close proximity to the launcher,ground-based space-tracking radars, or command and control facilities. This disposi-tion would be extremely risky to the attacking systems and to their mission. Alterna-tively, this type of mission might be possible by hacking into the ASAT system’sground-based network via the Internet. However, friendly hackers may not be ableto hack into the system at all. In any event, this method is fraught with risk, andcannot be relied on to provide the last line of defense against ASAT attacks either.

Recent Federal Mandate for Space Defenses The language that Congress added to the FY 2008 Defense Authorization Bill(H.R. 1585) directs the Department of Defense to begin planning for space defenses.Ironically enumerated as Section 911, the Space Protection Strategy requires theDOD to map out strategy, forces, and doctrine for the development and deploymentof the capabilities needed to protect U.S. space-based capabilities, with planningextending as far as 2025.lxxi The most salient portions of the Bill are as follows:

“It is the Sense of Congress that the United States should place greaterpriority on the protection of national security space systems… The Secre-tary of Defense, in conjunction with the Director of National Intelligence,shall develop a strategy, to be known as the Space Protection Strategy, forthe development and fielding by the United States of the capabilities that arenecessary to ensure freedom of action in space for the United States… Thestrategy required… shall include each of the following:

“An identification of the threats to, and the vulnerabilities of, the nationalsecurity space systems of the United States… A description of the capabili-ties currently contained in the program of record of the Department ofDefense and the intelligence community that ensure freedom of action inspace…

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“For each period covered by the strategy, a description of the capabilities that are needed for the period, including-- the hardware, software, and other materi- als or services to be developed or procured; the management and organization al changes to be achieved; and concepts of operations, tactics, techniques, and procedures to be employed.”lxxii

While this language doesn’t specifically call for weapons in space, it directs theDOD for the first time to ensure that the U.S. military and intelligence communitiesplan appropriately to ensure that they will have freedom of action in space. As thisanalysis shows, that guarantee will require active defenses to defend U.S. spaceassets while at the same time preventing or minimizing the creation of additionallong-term hazardous space debris.

Clearing Out the Space Debris Issue… Literally Finally, the best long-term solution to the space debris problem is not achievedby mitigating or waiting for the debris to disappear (no matter how ‘short’ a periodof time it may linger in orbit). Considering humanity’s ever-increasing operationsin space, it is inevitable that more space debris will be generated with time. Whetherthe space debris problem will be worsened by space-combat operations is a question-able but ultimately irrelevant point. The fact remains that the problem of spacedebris is only going to worsen with time, no matter what is done to mitigate it.

Put simply, the space debris challenge demands an active space-debris removalstrategy, regardless of whether even a single satellite is ever intentionally destroyedin combat. Several existing technologies are viable and affordable. They address thedebris problem on a permanent, ongoing and dynamically responsive basis. Thesesolutions can be broken up into two basic subsets: space tugs and space-applied lasers.

Space tugs could be used to remove the largest long-term space debris problemitems, the spent upper-stage booster rocket stages malingering in Medium EarthOrbit (MEO) bands, where they may remain for millennia. Since these are large,unitary objects (either integral or fragmented booster stages, or dead satellites) theirsize and mass would require and justify the development of a space-based towingvehicle, or tug, to either de-orbit or boost them into an orbit outside of EOS. Thesetugs can be propelled by either nuclear or solar-electric energy. Sandia Laboratoryhas proposed their IOSTAR design for sustained, cost-effective space debris remov-al operations.lxxiii Skycorp Inc.’s Orbital Recovery System, also designated asCX-OLEV, uses photo-voltaic-array-generated electricity to power Hallthrusters.lxxiv

There is also a near-operational technology with which to remove smaller, morenumerous pieces of debris from LEO. Originally the result of a NASA study onspace debris removal, Project ORION proposed using High Energy (HE) Lasers,

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whether ground- or space-based, to remove debris from LEO. HE lasers wouldablate the surfaces of small pieces of debris, creating a thrust which, if generatedon the fragment face pointing towards the direction of orbit at any given moment,would provide a ‘retro-rocket’ thrust effect. This effect would slow the fragmentand lower its orbital altitude more quickly than would atmospheric drag alone.Multiple illuminations of a fragment during successive overhead passes wouldresult in its re-entry and burn-up in the Earth’s atmosphere proper earlier than ifit was left to its own devices. A ground-based laser is recommended over aspace-based system, given the vastly greater costs involved with the latter.lxxvlxxvi

According to NASA estimates, not only are the DE laser’s power require-ments entirely achievable, but the system itself would be remarkably effective.Two systems, one nearer-term and the other a longer-term proposal, were as-sessed. As Ivan Bekey explains:

“The nearer term system would be able to remove from orbit essentiallyall of the 30,000 1-to-10-cm debris objects at or below about 800-kmaltitude within three years, for an estimated total cost of $60 million-$80million, including R&D and operations. The longer term system wouldbe able to remove essentially all of the 125,000 1-to-10-cm debris objectsat or below 1,500-km altitude within two years, for an estimated totalcost of $150 million-$180 million.”

The surprisingly low costs and tremendous levels of efficiency of suchsystems are also listed in Table 1, below:

Table 1: Summary of ORION Costs and Capabilitieslxxvii

Near-term System Far-term System

Debris size, cm 1-10 1-10

Debris altitude, km <800 <1500

Number of objects de-orbited 30000 125,000

Technology Near existing Some development

Operating time, years 3 2

Cost, $M (as of 1997) 60-80 150-200

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SBLRMs could also be used in combination with ORION-type GBLs to removesmaller pieces of debris from orbit. SBLRMs would augment GBLs by increasingthe lasers’ total ‘dwell time’ on space debris. Increasing the ablation-effect time onsmaller pieces of space debris will cause them to de-orbit even sooner. This effectwould increase the rate at which LEO could be cleansed of debris compared with thestandalone effect of GBLs only. SBLRMs could also be used to extend the GBLs’

‘reach’ into higher earth orbits, serving to empty EOS of the multitudes of smallerpieces of debris that would otherwise linger in EOS for millennia. Finally, thismultiplied illumination-time might actually enable the complete vaporization of thesmallest and most numerous pieces of debris from the higher orbital altitudes.

Figure 9 – Sandia/IOSTAR Nuclear-Powered Space-Tuglxxviii

Figure 10 – CX-OLEV Space Tug Docking with Satellitelxxix

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Neither Conventional nor Nuclear Deterrence will Prevent Space Combat Both USSTRATCOM’s Gen. Cartwright and MDA’s Gen. Obering stated

in early 2007 speeches that the U.S. should be ready to respond to ASAT threatsby attacking launch sites before the ASATs can loft against their targets.lxxxlxxxi

Cartwright, in particular, advocated a nuclear response to a sufficiently cripplingASAT attack.lxxxii His statements beg several questions: Is the U.S. truly willingto strike targets deep inside Chinese territory to retaliate against lost satellites, oreven in response to a significant number of ASAT launches? How will thatprotect our satellites or prevent space pollution if the damage has already beendone? If we do carry out such strikes, conventional or especially nuclear, howwill the Chinese react to this seemingly disproportionate response, and act ofwar? Nuclear retaliation? An invasion of Taiwan? Clearly, deterrence will notwork here. Worst of all, we might be too blinded and crippled to be able respondat all to a sufficiently extensive attack against U.S. space-based assets. Lt. Col.Michael Baum described just such a scenario in his paper on space warfare,entitled “Defiling the Altar – The Weaponization of Space.”lxxxiii

Such an offense-only counter-ASAT approach, particularly with a nuclearthreat, is fraught not only with errors, but with peril. How would we even “know”for certain that anyone was going to attack our satellites? Certainly not with ourintelligence-gathering agencies that have failed to foresee everything from thefall of the Iron Curtain to the coming of 9/11.lxxxiv How would we prove to analready cynically anti-American world that the indecipherable, smoldering heapsof wreckage on some launch-pad deep inside China were actually ASATs aboutto be fired at U.S. satellites? Further, the Chinese would invariably hide or alterany evidence of their own hostile space ambitions from the world, so as to feedjust such world cynicism, undermining the U.S.’ own efforts against it.

Additionally, would anyone outside the military really believe that a “PromptGlobal Strike” ICBM or SLBM hurtling in toward Chinese home territory wasnot, in fact, a nuclear weapon?lxxxv Would the Chinese really sit idly by whileICBM/SLBMs are hurtling inbound at them, even if they were somehow con-vinced that the missile wasn’t carrying nuclear warheads? Further, are U.S.policymakers really willing to threaten nuclear retaliation and risk killing mil-lions on both sides to avoid losing our satellites? How will nuclear retaliationsalvage our lost space assets or thwart defeat in a theater conflict, which will bemuch more likely after the destruction of these satellites?

Finally, the principle of mutually assured destruction does not hold if ourenemy lacks the dependency that we have on space, or does not possess anyspace-based assets. For example, China’s implicit dependency on their space-based capabilities is and will remain much less significant than our own, especial-ly if the Chinese are truly intent on getting control of Taiwan. Direct-ascent

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ASATs leave little time for any kind of measured response, such as knocking outground-control stations in order to stop them. Similarly, attacking ground sta-tions might not stop an ASAT already on its way towards its target. Put simply,there is no substitute for a space warfighting force that can provide an effective,active, timely, direct defense of U.S. space-based assets. Fortunately, there is increasing interest in some military circles in boost-phase missile defenses as a means of defending against ASATs. MDA’s then-Director, Gen. Obering said, “It’s not prudent to rely only on just one approachto meet the threat of anti-satellite weapons… You can’t always go on theassumption that you can do this offensively. You need some kind of defensivecapability as well.”lxxxvi The goal of a missile-defense-oriented approach toASAT defense would be to shoot down the missile launching the ASAT.lxxxvii

However, the absence of any mention of active space defenses in recent Congres-sional testimony by the senior leaders of the U.S. government’s national securityspace establishment is conspicuous.lxxxviii

When, not if, Push Comes to Shove… Even the best passive space-defense technologies and tactics cannot entirelyprevent the generation of long-term space debris under all foreseeable circum-stances. If the decision should be made to attack an adversary’s satellites usingKE interceptors, even the highest-closing-velocity-capable KE ASATs are goingto generate some debris when they obliterate much larger satellite targets.Moreover, potential future adversaries will also become more space-capable.China is the most exemplary such nation-state, but it is by no means alone. Withthese new space-capable nations will come the greater likelihood that theseadversaries will also develop their own space-based warfighting capability,including ISR, communications and even navigation satellite constellations,similar to our own systems.lxxxix We must also take heed that debris generationcould very well be China’s (or any other adversary’s) long-term strategy. As JoelWilliamsen points out, the threat of secondary collisions resulting from the debrisclouds of a possible future series of Chinese ASAT tests could deliberately posea serious long-term hazard to all users of LEO space, thereby degrading oreliminating its usefulness:

“This successful test… also raises the specter of a potential (and perhapsintentional) secondary threat with broad consequences – the generationof orbital debris as a threat to general satellite survivability. This second-ary threat of widespread orbital debris, while undirected, would be farmore likely to disadvantage a nation such as the U.S., with its far heavier

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dependence on a satellite-based infrastructure, than one such as China, andcould be an effective strategy for ‘leveling the playing field’ in futureconflicts.”xc

One day the U.S. will be forced to choose between losing a war to a space-capable enemy, or defending against that enemy’s assaults on our own space assetsby destroying its ASATs and ‘poking out’ its ‘eyes in space,’ by disabling oreliminating its space-based assets.xci Is the space debris ‘pollution’ problem really ahigher national security risk than the loss of thousands of American or allied troops,and possibly the loss of an entire war? Will we be prepared to deal with the threat ifan enemy launches ASATs at our satellites? Do we simply stand by, or prepare todestroy those ASATs before they can do even worse damage? If the only weaponsavailable are KE interceptors and the U.S. is facing defeat, what should U.S. spacesecurity policy be? This is the question that U.S. policymakers are going to have toconfront and answer in the years to come.

Conclusions Within the next few years, U.S. policymakers will have to make an importantchoice between losing a future major international conflict in space, with all theattendant costs and risks to both U.S. and global stability and security, or winningthat conflict albeit generating some extra space debris in the process. U.S. space-defense weapon constellations will secure the peace in Earth’s orbital space in thesame way that the U.S. Navy secures the world’s oceans, a presence that has notspawned a “destabilizing” arms race at sea. A number of potential adversaries eitherhave or will obtain weapons with which to conduct combat operations in space.China is but the most recent state to demonstrate such capabilities. Like Russia, theother known space weapons producer, China has sold arms and weapons technolo-gies to other states, including many that are antagonistic to the U.S. or its allies. Asa result, other space-threat actors will emerge in time.

The prospect of debris generated by space warfare is far less important than isU.S. national space security overall. Stakeholders must cautiously analyze the typesof weapons and operational doctrines that could be fielded by the U.S. to achieve thedual goals of space security and space debris mitigation. Indeed, it behooves the U.S.

“ Indeed, it behooves the U.S. to pursue these weapons andtactics, since this pursuit can guarantee not only the security ofits satellites, but also the long-term usability of EOS,particularly LEO, against the likelihood of hostile ASAToperations.”

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to pursue these weapons and tactics, since this pursuit can guarantee not only thesecurity of its satellites, but also the long-term usability of EOS, particularly LEO,against the likelihood of hostile ASAT operations. Furthermore, there are plentifulideas for viable and affordable technologies and methods for cleaning up the spaceenvironment. Maintenance of space will become necessary as its use grows in thecoming years, decades, and centuries. Even if many large pieces of long-term spacedebris were generated at higher altitudes by a space conflict, the choice ultimatelyremains a simple one: between ‘space-pollution’ and national defeat, betweensecurity and naiveté, between our all-important self-defense, and our de factosurrender to the first adversary that chooses to attack our space assets via this route.These are the stark yet undisputable policy choices being faced by U.S. policymak-ers today. The technologies currently envisioned for U.S. space weapons would providethe best means of achieving U.S. space security and continued national security inthe foreseeable future. These technologies would also minimize the risk of spacedebris generation. If used intelligently and judiciously, both hypervelocity-collisionand directed-energy weapons will provide an effective and debris-minimizingspace-defense force. It is vital that we arm ourselves to deter and defend againstASATs and other space-traversing threats as soon as possible. With luck, a strongU.S. space-defense force will prevent a conflict from ever occurring in space.Failing that, these forces will enforce the safety and security of space, hopefully witha minimum of long-term orbital debris along the way.

Howard Kleinberg has a BASc in Electrical Engineering from the University ofToronto and an MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University. He has tenyears of experience in the Canadian Space Industry and eleven years in the U.S.telecommunications and defense sectors.

iEarth Orbital Space (EOS), a term defined by the author to define the volume of spacewithin which artificial satellites are placed in regular orbits around the earth, out to a

‘practical limit’ at Geosynchronous Earth Orbit, or GEO.ii Leonard Weiss et al. 7 April 2005. Ensuring America’s Space Security, Federation ofAmerican Scientists, Appendix E: Orbital Debris.http://www.fas.org/main/content.jsp?formAction=297&contentId=311.iii Covault, Craig. 17 January, 2007. Chinese Test Anti-Satellite Weapon. Washington: Avia-tion Week & Space Technology.http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=space&id=news/CHI01177.xmliv Dolman, Everett and Hays, Peter and Mueller, Karl. 10 March, 2006. Toward a U.S.Grand Strategy in Space, Washington, DC: The George C. Marshall Institute.: 2-5,http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/408.pdf.

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v Rumsfeld, Donald H. (Chair). January 11, 2001. Report to the Commission to AssessUnited States National Security Space Management and Organization, Washington:Committee on Armed Services of the U.S. House of Representatives.: 8-9,http://space.au.af.mil/space_commission/executive_summary.pdf.vi Lee, James G. et al August 2003. Air University Space Primer, (USAF Air Universi-ty.: 8-1 – 8-22, http://space.au.af.mil/primer/.vii Staff. 26 May, 1972. Treaty Between The United States Of America And The UnionOf Soviet Socialist Republics On The Limitation Of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,(Washington: The Department of State of the United States of America.http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/abm/abm2.html.viii Davis, Daniel L. (Major, U.S. Army). January 2008. Heavy & Agile – Nine Steps toa More Agile Force, Armed Forces Journal.http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/01/3208280.ix There were approximately 11,000 pieces of orbital debris before the Chinese ASATtest of 11 January 2007, which added about 1,500 objects over 10cm in size to the mix.From Stansbery, Eugene. 29 April 2005. Orbital Debris Frequently Asked Questions.NASA Orbital Debris Program Offic., http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/faqs.html; and,Staff, Battlefield Space,. August, 2007. Cape Town: Popular Mechanics.http://www.popularmechanics.co.za/content/general/singlepage.asp?fid=991&pno=1.x David, Leonard, Space Traffic Control. May 5, 2004. Space.com.http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/technology/space_traffic_040505.html.xi Ailor, William. Winter 2000. New Hazards for a New Age Los Angeles: The Aero-space Corporation, Volume 1, Number 1.http://www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/winter2000/04.html.xii Stansbery, Eugene29 April 2005. Orbital Debris Frequently Asked Questions. Hous-ton: NASA Orbital Debris Program Office. http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/faqs.html.xiii Jorgensen, Kira and Johnson, Nicholas. 15 May 2007. Orbital Debris EducationPackage. Houston: NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, last accessed 15 May 2007:3.http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/EducationPackage.pdf.xiv Phillips, Shaun. 1 December 2005. Earth’s Atmosphere. NASA MSFC Exploration.http://liftoff.msfc.nasa.gov/academy/space/atmosphere.html.xv Lee, James G., et al. August 2003. Air University Space Primer. U.S.AF Air Universi-ty.: 8-22, http://space.au.af.mil/primer/.xvi Stansbery, Eugene. 29 April 2005. Orbital Debris Frequently Asked Questions.NASA Orbital Debris Program Offic. http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/faqs.htmlxvii Grego, Laura. May 30, 2006. Space Weapons Basics – A History of Anti-SatellitePrograms, Washington: Union of Concerned Scientists.http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_weapons/a-history-of-asat-programs.html.xviii Wortzel, Larry M.. 15 October, 2003. China and the Battlefield in Space. Washing-ton: The Heritage Foundation.http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm346.cfm.xix Covault, Craig. 17 January, 2007. Chinese Test Anti-Satellite Weapon, (Washington:

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Aviation Week & Space Technology.http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=space&id=news/CHI01177.xmlxx Wortzel, Larry M.. 15 October, 2003. China and the Battlefield in Space. Washington:The Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm346.cfm.xxi Kueter, Jeff and Kleinberg, Howard. 3 May, 2007. The Cruise Missile Challenge: De-signing a Defense Against Asymmetric Threats. Washington: The George C. Marshall Insti-tute: 17. http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/522.pdf; and,Fulghum, David and Barrie, Douglas. August 14, 2006. The Iranian Connection. Aviation

Week & SpaceTechnology: 20-22.xxii Pike, John. 27 October 2006. Advanced Keyhole / Improved Crystal / “KH-12”.GlobalSecurity.org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/kh-12.htmxxiii Staff. March 28, 2007. Space Debris Left by Chinese Test Poses Near-Term Worries.Inside Missile Defense, Vol. 13, No. 7; pg. 9-10xxiv Staff. 1997. Protecting the Space Shuttle from Meteoroids and Orbital Debris. Washing-ton, DC: National Research Council: 36xxv Williamsen, Joel. December 10-11, 2007. Direct Ascent KE ASAT Satellite Vulnerabili-ty: Applying Lessons Learned from NASA, Missile Defense, and Aircraft SurvivabilityPrograms,” (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, Briefing to Space and DefenseConference, Las Vegas, NV: 12, 20.xxvi Foust, Jeff. 20 August, 2007. From One, Many. The Space Review.http://www.thespacereview.com/article/937/1xxvii Rupp, Sheila. 22 May 2007. Operationally Responsive Space, News - Kirtland AirForce Base., http://www.kirtland.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123054292xxviii Brown, Owen C. 24 July, 2007. Industry Day Briefing – System F6 (Washington, DC:Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency: 9. http://www.darpa.mil/tto/solicit/BAA07-31/Dr._Owen_Brown's_Brief.pdfxxix Staff, hypersonic. answers.com, 2007. http://www.answers.com/topic/hypersonic; Itmust also be pointed out that the issue of Mach number disappears outside of the atmo-sphere in which to measure the speed of sound, as space is airless.xxx Staff. 2005-2006. GMD/EKV -- Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle/Ground-Based MidcourseDefense System. Raytheon Missile Systems.http://www.raytheon.com/products/stellent/groups/public/documents/content/cms01_055818.pdfxxxi Parts of the target spacecraft that are farther from the point of impact would be brokeninto larger fragments, however; the farther the part from the impact point, the lesser the im-pact energy, and the greater the fragment size.xxxii Chobotov, V.A. and Spencer, D.B. 16-19 April, 1990. A Review of Orbital DebrisModeling at the Aerospace Corporation,. Orbital Debris Conference: Technical Issues andFuture Directions, Baltimore, MD, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics,

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NASA, and DOD. http://pdf.aiaa.org/preview/1990/PV1990_1356.pdfxxxiii Brilliant Pebbles was high-tech kinetic kill machine composed of a constellation oftiny rocket-powered devices that would independently detect, track, and neutralize in-coming missiles. It was designed to operate in conjunction with the Brilliant Eyes sen-sor system and would have detected and destroyed missiles without any externalguidancexxxiv Wood, Lowell and Cooper, Henry F. 23 July, 2002. Hit-To-Kill Intercepts In Near-Earth Space. The High Frontier, 2002 Strategic Policy Issue Briefs.http://users.erols.com/hifront/2002_issue_briefs.htmlxxxvPfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr. and Van Cleave, William R.. 2006. Independent WorkingGroup on Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century –2007 Report, (The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.:41-58.http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWGreport.pdfxxxviStaff. May, 2006. Fact Sheet – Ground-Based Midcourse Defense. Missile DefenseAgency. http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/gmd06.pdfxxxvii Robert L., Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and William R. Van Cleave, Independent WorkingGroup on Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century –2007 Report, (The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 2006, pg. 46),http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWGreport.pdfxxxviii Cooper, Henry F. 1 October, 2002. Defending America from Offshore Missile At-tack. Washington: The George C. Marshall Institute;24.http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/119.pdfxxxixStaff. 8 January, 2007. GMD Intercept Imagery (50K). Missile Defense Agency,http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/images/ift9d.jpg,. Last accessed 8 January, 2007xlRussia’s latest ICBM, the Topol-M, has a maximum altitude, or apogee, of 1,000 km.;from Wade, Mark . Topol-M. 2007. Astronautix.com.http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/topolm.htmxli Staff. 2005-2006. GMD/EKV -- Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle/Ground-Based Mid-course Defense System. Raytheon Missile Systems.xlii Williamsen, Joel. Spring 2008. Satellite Vulnerability to Direct Ascent KE ASAT:Applying Lessons Learned from NASA, Missile Defense, and Aircraft Survivability Pro-grams. Wright-Patterson AFB: Aircraft Survivability Journal: 23-25.http://www.bahdayton.com/surviac/asnews/AS_Summer_2008.pdfxliii Matthews, Jim. 20 February, 2008. U.S. Navy Shoots Down Satellite. Aviation Week& Space Technology.http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/ERIE02208.xml&headline=U.S.%20Navy%20Shoots%20Down%20Satellitexliv Fulghum, David A. 24 March, 2008. Satellite Shootdown Surprised Planners, Aero-space Daily and Defense Report.http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/ASAT032408.xml&headline=Satellite%20Shootdown%20Suprised%20Planners

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xlv Grego, Laura. May 30, 2006. Space Weapons Basics – A History of Anti-Satellite Pro-grams. Union of Concerned Scientists.http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_weapons/a-history-of-asat-programs.html.xlvi Wade, Mark, IS-A. 30 March 2005. Astronautix.com.http://www.astronautix.com/craft/isa.htmxlvii Staff. August 10, 1995. Congressional Record – Amendment No. 2402, DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT 1996. U.S. Senate.http://www.fas.org/spp/military/congress/1995/cr950810.htmxlviii Wade, Mark. 2007. IS-A. Astronautix.com. http://www.astronautix.com/craft/isa.htmxlix Wade, Mark. 2007. IS-MU. Astronautix.com.http://www.astronautix.com/craft/ismu.html Ibidli Zak, Anatoly. 30 December, 2006. SPACECRAFT: Military: IS anti-satellite system.Russianspaceweb.com. http://www.russianspaceweb.com/is.htmllii Beason, Doug. 2005. The E-Bomb – How Directed Energy Will Change the Way FutureWars Will be Fought. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press: 9, 21-29liiiButterworth, Robert. January 2008. Assuring Space Support Despite ASATs. Washington,DC: The George C. Marshall Institute;2. http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/575.pdf.liv Singer, Jeremy. 2 March 2004. Air Force Document Envisions Variety of Anti-SatelliteWeapons. Space.com.http://www.space.com/spacenews/archive04/weaponsarch_030104.htmllv Walling, Eileen M. 2001. High Powered Microwaves and Modern Warfare from WilliamC. Martel (editor), The Technological Arsenal – Emerging Defense Capabilities. Washing-ton: Smithsonian University Press: 90-97, 102-103lvi Ibidlvii Gertz, Bill. 30 March, 2007. China Has Gained and Tested Array of Space Weapons.Washington: The Washington Times. http://www.washtimes.com/national/20070329-114710-9929r.htmlviiiStaff. 2 December, 2005. Space-Based Laser. Federation of American Scientists.http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/sbl.htmlixDouglas, Beason. 2005. The E-Bomb – How America’s New Directed Energy Weaponswill Change the Way Future Wars Will be Fought. Perseus Books Group: 165-169lxIbid, pg. 164lxi IbidlxiiStaff. 8 August, 2006. Boeing Demonstrates Aerospace Relay Mirror System.Spacewar.com.http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Boeing_Demonstrates_Aerospace_Relay_Mirror_System_999.htmllxiiiStaff. 11 December, 2006. Relay Mirror Experiment. Ball Aerospace & Technologies

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Corp. Last accessed 11 December, 2006, pg. 2lxiv Lewis, Jeffrey. 17 February 2006. Space Weapons in U.S. Defense Planning. Interna-tional Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation.http://www.inesap.org/bulletin23/art03.htmlxv Ibidlxvi Preferably, the interception will be carried out in such as away as to deflect the debrisout of the direction of the defended satellitelxvii Beneski, Barron. 14 November, 2007. Orbital Awarded $29.5 Million Contract For AN-GELS Satellite Program By Air Force Research Laboratory. Dulles, VA: Orbital SciencesCorporation. http://www.orbital.com/NewsInfo/release.asp?prid=635; and,Singer, Jeremy. 19 November, 2007. ANGELS’ Size, Mission To Increase. Space News: 4;andSinger, Jeremy. 3 December, 2007.DARPA Eyes using Tiny Satellite Clusters to DefendSpacecraft. Space News: 14.lxviiiZielinski, Robert H. (Lt Col., U.S.AF), and Worley, Robert M. II (Lt Col., U.S.AF),and Black, Douglas S. (Maj., U.S.AF), and Henderson, Scott A. (Maj., U.S.AF), and John-son, David C. (Maj., U.S.AF). August 1996. Star Tek—Exploiting the Final Frontier:Counterspace Operations in 2025.Maxwell-Gunter AFB: Center for Strategy and Technolo-gy, Air Force 2025 Study. http://csat.au.af.mil/2025/volume3/vol3ch09.pdf.lxix Singer, Jeremy. 6 November, 2006. Pentagon Weighs Global Strike Options,(Washington, DC: Space News.http://www.space.com/spacenews/businessmonday_061106.htmllxx Fulghum, David A., and Barrie, Douglas(October 8, 2007. Off the Radar – Israel usedelectronic attack in air strike against Syrian mystery target. Aviation Week & Space Tech-nology.: 28-29.lxxi Staff. 6 December, 2007. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008(Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both House and Senate), Section 911 - Space Protec-tion Strategy. Washington, DC: The United States Congress. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:7:./temp/~c110FZKhfy:e891522lxxiiStaff. 6 December, 2007. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008(Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both House and Senate), Section 911 - Space Protec-tion Strategy. Washington, DC: The United States Congress. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:7:./temp/~c110FZKhfy:e891522lxxiiiMurphy, Bill. May 28, 2004. Sandia-Designed Space Reactor Could Drive In-Orbit Sal-vage, (Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories, Vol. 56, No. 11: 8.http://www.sandia.gov/LabNews/LN05-28-04/labnews05-28-04.pdflxxivHall thrusters generate thrust by turning a propellant gas such as xenon into plasma. It isextremely efficient in terms of the total amount of thrust obtained per unit mass of fuel.Dennis Wingo et al, Orbital Recovery System Overview, (London: Orbital Recovery Limit-ed, August 2005,) pg. 1-8,http://www.orbitalrecovery.com/images/orbital_sys_overview.pdflxxvPhipps, Claude, ORION: A Solution to the Orbital Debris Problem, (Tucson: University

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of Arizona) http://www.seds.org/spaceviews/9707/articles.htmllxxvi Bekey, Ivan. May 1997. Orion’s Laser: Hunting Space Debris. Reston, VA: AerospaceAmerica, Volume 35, No. 5; 38-44.http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/orions_laser_hunting_space_debris.shtmllxxvii IbidlxxviiiMurphy, Bill. May 28, 2004. Sandia-Designed Space Reactor Could Drive In-OrbitSalvage, (Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories, Vol. 56, No. 11: 8,http://www.sandia.gov/LabNews/LN05-28-04/labnews05-28-04.pdflxxixWingo, Dennis et al. August 2005. Orbital Recovery System Overview. London: OrbitalRecovery Limited. http://www.orbitalrecovery.com/images/coneXpress_01_lrg.jpglxxxGertz, Bill. 30 March, 2007. China Has Gained and Tested Array of Space Weapons,(Washington: The Washington Times. http://www.washtimes.com/national/20070329-114710-9929r.htmlxxxiBennett, John T. April 2007. Agency Chief Says U.S. Must Face Threat With ‘Balanced’and ‘Integrated’ Solution, (Springfield, DefenseNews.com.http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2671100&C=americalxxxiiGertz, Bill. 30 March, 2007. China Has Gained and Tested Array of Space Weapons,(Washington: The Washington Times. http://www.washtimes.com/national/20070329-114710-9929r.htmlxxxiiiBaum, Michael E. (Lt. Col, USAF). Spring 1994. Defiling the Altar – The Weaponiza-tion of Space. Maxwell AFB: Airpower Journal.http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj94/baum.htmllxxxivPodhoretz, Norman. February 2008. Stopping Iran: Why the Case for Military ActionStill Stands. Washington, DC: Commentary Magazine.http://www.commentarymagazine.com/printArticle.cfm/Stopping-Iran-br--Why-the-Case-for-Military--Action-Still-Stands-11085lxxxvShachtman, Noah. January 2007. Hypersonic Cruise Missile: America’s New GlobalStrike Weapon. Popular Mechanics.http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military_law/4203874.html?do=printlxxxviBennett, John T. April 2007. Agency Chief Says U.S. Must Face Threat With

‘Balanced’ and ‘Integrated’ Solution. Springfield, DefenseNews.com.http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2671100&C=americalxxxviiIbidlxxxviiiRandolph, Monique (SSgt. USAF). Senior Leaders Testify about Air Force Space Pro-gram. Washington: Department of Defense, April 9, 2007.lxxxixStaff May 2006. Annual Report to Congress – Military Power of the People’s Republicof China, (Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense.; 31-35,http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China%20Report%202006.pdfxcWilliamsen, Joel. Spring 2008. Satellite Vulnerability to Direct Ascent KE ASAT: Apply-ing Lessons Learned from NASA, Missile Defense, and Aircraft Survivability

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Programs.Wright-Patterson AFB: Aircraft Survivability Journal: 23.http://www.bahdayton.com/surviac/asnews/AS_Summer_2008.pdfxciFadok, David A. (Major, USAF). February 1995. John Boyd and John Warden – AirPower’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis. Maxwell AFB: School of Advanced Airpower Studies:49. http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/saas_Theses/Fadok/fadok.pdf

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FEATURES

Since 1996, military and defense experts have advocated anetwork-centric approach to interpreting warfare in the infor-mation age. However, the following authors explain that apeople-centric understanding of conflict is also instructive.

Who is the Prey?: The Challenge of the Predator Drone Programand High-Value Targeting

Sarah CatanzaroToo Much Information: Europe’s Successful Security Regime and its Elu-sive European Rapid Reaction ForceAlexander Justice Moore

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: AFRICOM: An Independent Review forthe Obama AdministrationDaniel Lawner and Sarah Khederian

Taking the Offensive: The Utility and Limitations of RaidingAdam Elkus

http://ww

w.rall.com

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Who is the Prey? The Challenge of the PredatorDrone Program and High-Value Targeting

Sarah Catanzaro

Eight years after the attacks of 9/11, determining an effective counterterroriststrategy remains an urgent priority for the U.S. Government. Recently, policymak-ers have advocated high-value targeting (HVT), an approach whereby the seniorleadership of terrorist organizations (i.e. operational commanders, important ideo-logues, senior logisticians, and key financiers) are captured or killed. HVT hasgained popularity as an effective counterterrorism measure for disrupting Al Qa’idaand its associates based on the logic that when key leaders are eliminated, theirorganizations lose momentum and inspiration and will no longer maintain highlevels of performance. Thus, integrating HVT strikes with broader crackdownsagainst terrorist groups may reduce the numbers of terrorist attacks and fatalities inincidents.

Nevertheless, HVT strikes have failed to significantly decrease levels of terroristviolence. In 2009, 87 suicide attacks killed approximately 1,115 civilians in Pakistan.That same year, more than 1,600 civilians were killed by Taliban or anti-governmentforces in Afghanistan. Moreover, evidence indicates that militant groups continue totrain and support Western recruits.iThese egregious levels of militant violence seemto discredit arguments regarding the efficacy of drone strikes.

However, a methodical, comprehensive inventory of the most germane factorsto consider when planning HVT operations does not currently exist. While HVToperations may be an effective tactic under certain circumstances or when usedagainst particular enemy groups, it is unlikely that such tactics are universallyeffective in reducing the activity of violent extremist organizations. This paper willexplain why the strategy of HVT strikes is likely to fail in certain circumstances,particularly when used against groups with:

1) A clear line of succession2) Well-established bureaucratic structures or3) Institutions that can perpetuate the organization’s policies and agenda.

This paper will also explore why a consideration of a particular enemy leader’spositional authority and power is paramount to predicting the effects of HVToperations.

Background:Some scholars have examined the effects of high-value targeting on terrorist

organizations as a function of age, size, and type. For instance, based on an analysisof a comprehensive dataset  of 290 cases of “leadership decapitation”  from 1945-

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2004, Jenna Jordan, a scholar at the University of Chicago, infers that as terroristorganizations become older and larger, they become less vulnerable to the removalof their leaders.ii Additionally, she contends that religious and separatist groups arealso less vulnerable to HVT operations than ideological organizations. The reason-ing behind Jordan’s contention is as follows: she argues that ideological organiza-tions are often dominated by an influential leader who articulates an appealingvision for his group. In contrast, religious and separatist groups often have a strongbase of community support from which they draw motivation. Moreover, religionand ethnicity are often integral to individual identity. Thus, members of religiousand ethnic organizations may have a more difficult time distinguishing between

“personal” and “social” missions. Jordan recommends that policymakers study trendsin organizational decline to better understand whether and how certain types oforganizations are more vulnerable to destabilization.

Based on a statistical study of the HVT strategy, the researcher Aaron Mannesfrom the University of Maryland suggests that different organizations have differentvulnerabilities/sensitivities to high-value targeting.iii Similar to Jordan, he avers thatreligious organizations can better survive the loss of a leader because they arefrequently more robust in terms of membership and financial resources. He warnsthat religious organizations often have the capability to strike back against theiradversaries in response to a HVT strike; in fact, they may become substantially moreviolent and radical in the aftermath of HVT strikes.

Other authors suggest that the specific personality traits of a leader must beconsidered when assessing whether or not an organization will be crippled by HVToperations. Patrick Johnston, a pre-doctoral fellow at Stanford University, arguesthat operations should be designed to target groups led by charismatic leaders.iv Hecontends that a charismatic leader establishes strong interpersonal bonds with hisfollowers based on mutual trust, positive support, informal interdependencies,common bonds, open communication, high degree of autonomy, satisfaction, andshared loyalty. By instilling a sense of belonging and a positive feeling of identifica-tion with the group, the charismatic leader enhances his followers’ commitment tothe organization and can generate maximum participation in rebellion. Consequent-ly, the removal of a charismatic leader will upset the cohesion and enthusiasm of agroup and lead to its disbanding, or at least to its increased vulnerability. To supporthis argument, he highlights the example of the Indonesian Islamic terrorist groupDarul Islam, active since 1942, which immediately collapsed after its leader Karto-swiryo was captured and executed by the Siliwangi Army in 1962. He also cites theexample of the Burmese peasant revolt of 1930-1931, which subsided after its leaderSaya San was hanged by British forces in November 1931.

One of the most sophisticated analyses of terrorist leadership targeting efficacyis provided by Michael Freeman and Gordon McCormick, researchers at the Naval

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Postgraduate School.v These authors suggest that the nature of leadership within anorganization must be evaluated to determine how and when the HVT option isappropriate. Freeman and McCormick argue that HVT operations will succeed whenthe survival of a terrorist group is dependent on a leader’s charismatic attributes orits survival is dependent upon the leader’s ideological influence on the group (inparticular, his ability to convince members of the legitimacy of its goals and tactics).However, HVT operations will not be effective if the leader has already mentoredand groomed a cadre of potential successors and institutionalized his ideas andbeliefs by establishing customs and codes to guide the organization and/or councilsthat oversee its functioning in his absence. Additionally, the authors maintain thatHVT strikes may work when the survival of the terrorist group is dependent on theleader’s management skills and when decision-making responsibility is vestedsolely in the single leader (i.e. there is a central leader who determines strategy andtactics, guides recruitment, and provides resources to the group).

The conclusions drawn by these scholars do not appear to have significantlyinfluenced military doctrine for targeting enemy leadership. It would seem criticalthat military policy needs to be devised in conjunction with the extensive data minedfrom sociological, psychological, and computational studies that examine humanbehavior under changing circumstances. Surprisingly, current analyses and under-standings of the organizational structure and succession strategies for violent extrem-ist groups appear incomplete. While it may seem intuitive that a group that reliesupon rigorous succession planning and management will be more immune toleadership high-value targeting, hitherto there has been no published analysis thathas considered the succession strategy or the decision-making and governance

structure of the groups listedon U.S. State Department’slist of Foreign Terrorist Orga-nizations. Without this data,it is difficult to accuratelyestimate the probability of aneffective succession. As a re-sult, successful outcomesfrom HVT strikes are diffi-cult to predict and calculate.

Current Trends:Decapitation operations are currently perceived by many as an effective means

to reduce terrorist violence. Advocates of HVT strikes suggest that by exterminatingviolent extremists who have attacked civilians, the U.S. can gain domestic supportin places like Pakistan, where the population is terrorized.vi Others maintain thatmissile strikes force militants to devote more time to operational security (i.e.

“...military policy needs to be devised inconjunction with the extensive datamined from sociological, psychologicaland computational studies that examinehuman behavior under changingcircumstances.”

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denying adversaries access to critical information). Al Qa’ida trainers dedicate hoursto instructing recruits on security measures for the convening of meetings, preparingoperatives to answer questions in case they are arrested, and finally, developingmeasures to be taken to ensure successful escape from a raid by the securityauthorities. Taliban leaders frequently execute suspected spies accused of acting asinformants for the U.S. If terrorist operatives encounter something unexpectedduring the execution of a mission, they often abandon their plan out of fear thatoperational security has been breached. Because of U.S. missile strikes, Al Qa’idahas been forced to give up its traditional training facilities; now instructors mustmove temporary training operations from one compound to the next.vii

In some circumstances Al Qa’ida officials may be forced to engage in more opencommunication on cell phones and computers to gather information about theongoing military offensive.viii When terrorist groups are more transparent in theiroperations, military and intelligence analysts can intercept their communication.Supporters of HVT strikes also emphasize that these attacks can limit the capacityof Al Qa’ida officers to liaise with each other and can estrange the top commandfrom lower ranks.ix

However, these outcomes will not occur if the leaders who are removed arequickly and easily replaced. Moreover, leadership high-value targeting may even bedetrimental to the U.S. mission if the leaders who are eliminated are succeeded bymore aggressive and competent principals.

Overview of Current Decapitation MeasuresTargeting

When plotting HVT operations, targets are selected and an appropriate responseis chosen on the basis of operational requirements, capability, and limitations.Targeting methodology progresses through four basic functions: decide; detect;deliver; and assess.x

· Military planners determine a target based on the assigned military objec-tives. The objective outlined by the National Security Council associatedwith HVT operations involves attacking terrorists and their ability to oper-ate (National Security Council 2006).

· Next, planners acquire information on the target. Military commanders relyupon a combination of informants’ tips, radio interceptions, and overheadsurveillance.

· Subsequently, commanders choose an appropriate application of force to bedelivered. To determine the most operationally sound package, the probabil-ity of damage and arrival for a weapon system is considered.

· Finally, with whatever means available, an assessment of the effects of theoperation is completed to estimate the level of success or failurexi

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When deciding who to target, military planners ostensibly select “strategicindividuals” whose elimination will disrupt the terrorist system. However, thedefinition of a “strategic individual” remains vague. In a monograph published bythe United States Army Command and General Staff College, Lt. Com. VictorHyder of the U.S. Navy, defines a strategic individual as:

A single person widely identified on the world stage as the nucleus of thesystem or the environment he influences and is subsequently given signifi-cant diplomatic, informational, military, and economic value relative to vitalnational interests and the desired end state.xii

Unfortunately, too much of a premium is placed on the individual, his reputationwithin the organization, and his reputation internationally based on the crimes he hasinflicted against civilian society. Too little emphasis is placed on his rank andposition within the context of the larger mother organization. While a terrorist leadermay be respected and revered figure by the group, if he can be easily substituted byone of his subordinates, his valence is more questionable.

TacticsTargeted individuals have historically been eliminated through surgical strikes,

invasions (i.e. when military forces invade with orders to capture a leader), andinsurgencies (i.e. when military forces facilitate coups or insurgencies to removespecific leaders).xiii However, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVS) are currentlyused to annihilate terrorist leaders and operatives. UAVS, which have been opera-tional since 1999, are controlled from the ground via satellite systems and onboardcameras. UAVs have been flown in combat over Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia,Serbia, Iraq, and Yemen, although the drone program in Pakistan has received themost media attention and criticism. The MQ9-Reaper craft, designed by GeneralAtomics Aeronautical Systems, is the first hunter-killer UAV designed for long-endurance, high-altitude surveillance. It can carry four Hellfire missiles (whichprovide precision striking power against tanks, structures, bunkers and helicopters)and two 500lb GBU-12 laser-guided bombs (used mostly against fixed armor).xiv

Predator and Reaper drones cost $4.5 and $17 million respectively, comparedto $100 million for a F-35 fighter that performs tactical bombing. Business informa-

“Unfortunately, too much of a premium is placed on theindividual, his reputation within the organization, and hisreputation internationally, based on the crimes he has inflictedagainst society.”

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tion providers predict that theworldwide UAV market will ex-pand significantly in the next tenyears as militaries embrace UAVsystems and incorporate new poli-cies regarding their applications.xv

In the February 2010 QuadrennialDefense Review Report, the De-partment of Defense announcedplans to expand the unmanned air-craft system program.xvi By 2012,the Air Force intends to grow itsfleet of UAVs from 100 to 370and expand its roster of UAV pi-lots and operation staffers to atleast 1,100.xvii

ActorsThe CIA and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) both conduct HVT

operations. Tactically, they execute these operations through the drone programsdescribed above. The military version of the drone program operates in the recog-nized war zones in Afghanistan and Iraq and targets enemies of American and alliedtroops (most often, insurgents) stationed there. However, during a House ArmedServices Committee hearing in July 2007, James Clapper, Undersecretary of De-fense for Intelligence, also admitted to the use of U.S. Special Forces in targetedcounterterrorism operations in Pakistan.xviii

The Pentagon’s roster of approved terrorist targets seems to be expandingdespite their announcement regarding declines in the number of Al Qa’ida and theTaliban fighters. While it originally contained 367 names, 50 Afghan drug lordswere recently added in an attempt to limit the flow of drug money that is helpingfinance the Taliban insurgency, but there is no precedent for killing individuals whoare not traditional military targets, such as drug lords.xix The Pentagon has divulgedsome information about it taxonomy of targets: some people are approved for killingon sight while others necessitate additional authorization; a target’s location must beconsidered to limit collateral damage; and two “credible human sources” and

“substantial additional evidence” are required to prove the person is an enemy.xx

However, based on records of those killed, organizational features – such as succes-sion strategy, the existence of a strong deputy or heir, and the presence of institutions

U.S. military and intelligence operations use pilotlessdrones in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan both forsurveillance and to fire missiles at targets.

http://ww

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to perpetuate policy in the event of a strike – are not seriously considered whenselecting targets.

The CIA initialized a drone program to increase the number of U.S. personnel inAfghanistan and crack down on suspected terrorists in the region. In 2002, PresidentBush authorized the CIA to target and kill Osama bin Laden and specific individualsassociated with Al Qa’ida. In November 2002, top Bush Administration officialspublicly announced a successful MQ1-Predator (the predecessor to the MQ9-Reap-er) strike against Aqed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, a suspected Al Qa’ida operativecredited with plotting the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole. Unlike SOCOM’smission, the CIA’s program currently focuses on terror suspects throughout theworld, including in countries where U.S. troops are not based (i.e. Al-Harethi waseliminated in Yemen, although Yemen is not considered a battlefield or an enemystate). Moreover, the CIA has also joined SOCOM and Pakistani intelligenceservices in an aggressive campaign to eradicate local and foreign militants who havetaken refuge in some of the most inaccessible parts of the country.xxi

Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, investigators from the New AmericaFoundation, report that the Obama administration has sanctioned at least forty-oneCIA missile strikes in Pakistan alone and that CIA attacks have killed between 760and 1,050 people. Approximately 500 to 720 of the total killed were identified inreliable press reports as militants. Only twenty leaders of Al Qa’ida, the Taliban, andallied groups were eliminated, all of whom were killed since January 2008.xxii

Figure 1: Average Deaths from U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2010xxiii

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When President Bush provided written legal authority to the CIA to hunt downand kill the terrorists, he did not stipulate that the Agency should seek furtherapproval each time it plans to stage an operation. Consequently, the agency does notprovide information on how it selects targets. Nevertheless, reports of fatal airstrikes often emerge, exposing some information on the type of individuals targetedin HVT operations. Such reports reveal that those eliminated by the CIA range fromBin Laden’s family members to operational elements to paramilitary planners.Drones have targeted little-known Pakistani Taliban figures that remain obscureeven amongst U.S. counterterrorism scholar circles. Strikes have also killed severallow level Al Qa’ida militants whose importance to Bin Laden is questionable at best.In fact, only a handful of the drone strikes reported by Bergen and Tiedemann killedAl Qa'ida leaders.xxiv Since the pipeline of militant recruits has not been blocked, theopportunity cost of eliminating such minor figures, regardless of the group’s leader-ship structure or succession strategy, is unclear. Despite the order of the U.S.Government that force should only be applied when it is a military necessity, itseems as if the CIA continues to broaden the definition of high value targets due topressure from congressional intelligence committees, greater confidence in thetechnology, and reduced resistance from Pakistan.

Costs of Decapitation StrikesAlthough HVT strikes represent a promising tactic, there are important grounds

for developing stricter criteria for selecting targets.

1. Civilian Casualties: There is evidence that attacks kill innocent victims due to poor ground intelli-

gence. According to an analysis released by the New America Foundation, thenumber of civilians killed in Predator and Reaper attacks could be as high as 320innocents. In February 2002, a Predator reportedly followed and killed three suspi-cious Afghans, including a tall man in robes who was thought to be Bin Laden;however, authorities later discovered that the victims were innocent villagers. InSeptember 2009, a NATO air strike in Afghanistan killed between 70 and 125people, many of them civilians who were mistaken for Taliban insurgent, who weretaking fuel from two stranded oil trucks.xxv

2. Geographical Dispersion:Decapitation operations may also have deleterious effects if they disperse Al

Qa’ida and its associated cells, particularly to Pakistan’s densely populated urbanareas like Karachi.xxvi While cross-border strikes in Pakistan may induce limitedcollateral damage, drone strikes and commando raids in more heavily inhabited

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areas would result in additional civilian casualties and corresponding anger directedagainst the governments in Islamabad and Washington. Thus, militant groupsattempting to hide important insurgents will most likely move to heavily populatedareas, hoping that their enemies will be discouraged from attacking and might sufferheavily from bad public opinion if they do.

3. Inadvertent Fuel for Anti-American Propaganda:Several counter-insurgency warfare experts point out that the HVT strikes have

already incited propaganda disasters. Al Qa’ida and the Taliban routinely claim thatthose killed in UAV attacks are all civilians. It is impossible to obtain an accuratebreakdown of the death toll because militants live amongst civilians and are notuniformed, so extremist groups can effectively inflame anti-American sentiment andundermine the fragile Pakistani state by exaggerating civilian deaths. Bergen andTiedemann observe that the “inevitable civilian casualties are a superb recruitingtool for the Pakistani Taliban.”xxvii In a similar vein, David Kilcullen, the formerPetraeus advisor and counter-insurgency theorist, has argued that “every one ofthese dead non-combatants represents an alienated family, a new revenge fueled,and more recruits for a militant movement.”xxviii

In Pakistani cities, large protests have been held decrying the drone programsince several Pakistanis perceive the program as an infringement on their sovereign-ty and blame the U.S. for the violence in their country. Regardless of whether or notseveral Pakistani civilians go on to join terrorist organizations, it is important to notethat a militantly anti-American Pakistan (a country already equipped with dozens ofnuclear weapons and a booming population) could evolve into a calamitous strategicproblem for the United States.xxix

4. Revenge Attacks:Revenge also

plays an importantrole in the upsurge indeadly violence fol-lowing a HVT opera-tion. For example,brutal assaults onPakistani govern-ment strongholds sug-gest that formerlyunaligned militantgroups have joinedMembers of the National Trade Union Federation of Pakistan

demonstrate in Karachi against U.S. drones on January 23, 2010

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together against the Zardari administration.xxx Moreover, the insurgents in Pakistancan use drone strikes to justify the attacks in the Punjabi heartland in Pakistan. Forexample, Baitullah Mehsud, the former leader of the Pakistan Taliban, claimed thatthe March 2009 attack on a Lahore police academy that killed 18 people was “inretaliation for the continued drone strikes by the U.S. in collaboration withPakistan.”xxxi The December 30, 2009 suicide bombing attack at an American basein Khost that killed seven CIA officers and contractors involved in overseeing U.S.drone strikes in Pakistan was allegedly conducted to avenge the death of severalmilitant leaders. xxxii

5. Loss of Intelligence:When militant leaders and foot soldiers are eliminated, U.S. forces lose a source

of information. Important intelligence could be gleaned by interrogating jihadistoperatives rather than killing them. Moreover, drone strikes may also destroyimportant documents and communication devices containing valuableinformation.xxxiii

Successful Succession?It can be argued that an increase in the number of drone attacks would augment

the appeal of militant groups and anger many civilians. However, since neither themilitary nor the political establishment has articulated an effective alternative, dronestrikes are a viable temporary tactic to pressure the Al Qa’ida leadership and itsallies. Nonetheless, for the reasons articulated in the prior sections, the author is insupport of carefully specifying and limiting the use of drone attacks. Decapitationstrikes lose much strategic efficacy if used non-specifically and if applied in circum-stances where the next generation of mujahedeen is poised to take over. A surgeonwould not use the same operation to treat every disease; instead he would select anorgan- or disease-specific option. Likewise, the U.S. government should not applythe same technology in all circumstances.

Leadership Succession:Leadership succession is an important event for any organizationxxxiv since it

affects not only the members of the organization, but also the security and politicalclimate of the region. To external constituents, the leader of a militant grouprepresents the organization, thus succession may be viewed as a signal of theorganization’s future. In some cases, when there is no apparent successor nor arethere institutions charged with selecting one, succession can cause disruptive changeand difficult transitions as the organization seeks to regain stability. Factionalizationand in-fighting become increasingly probable in this scenario.xxxv After the death of

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Salamat Hashim in 2003 due to lingering illness, the Moro-Islamic Liberation Front(MILF) became so factionalized that it no longer resembled a functional andcoherent organization. Some factions remained strongly motivated by jihadist polit-ical aspirations, while others were willing to accept secular government and socialpluralism.xxxvi

Unlike some corporations that are disturbed by CEO succession, terrorist organi-zations are often highly idiosyncratic. Thus, most subordinates possess importantpersonal contacts and networks, the ability to garner the cooperation of theorganization’s membership, and knowledge of local conditions and the internaloperations as a result of their individual experiences.xxxvii Consequently, when anestablished and knowledgeable group member is groomed as a successor they canquickly gain credibility and be accepted by key stakeholders of the group.

Succession literature suggests that successors promoted from within an organi-zation make few changes, thereby maintaining organizational stability. Moreover,inside successors are related to better post-succession performance thanoutsiders.xxxviii With regard to clandestine organizations like terrorist groups, succes-sors are virtually always selected from insiders. Thus, terrorist groups with designat-ed deputies or heirs are more likely to survive HVT strikes without experiencingdramatic changes.

Furthermore,succession decisionsin clandestine orga-nizations rarely restin the hands of indi-viduals who are un-familiar with thegroup and its inter-nal processes. Ter-rorist groups withexecutive bodies are probably capable of controlling the disruptive responses oftencreated by leadership succession by rational means. For example, they can selectsomeone to take over interim control of the group until a new leader is selected.Councils or committees can also ensure that succession planning is integrated withan analysis of the group’s mission, its strengths and weaknesses, and its opportuni-ties and threats. They can develop and implement succession plans to ensure a matchbetween the leadership candidate’s characteristics and group strategy. Most impor-tantly, they can legitimate and train the successor. At times, these assemblies mayeven chose to utilize succession as a means to adapt to their changingenvironment.xxxix

“With regard to clandestine organizationslike terrorist groups, successors are virtuallyalways selected from insiders. Thus, terroristgroups with designated deputies or heirs aremore likely to survive decapitation strikeswithout experiencing dramatic changes.”

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Succession is most traumatic if the group hesitates to announce the appointmentof its new leader. Without laws governing the order of succession or a legacy ofagnatic succession various commanders will vie for the top spot and competitionamongst their respective supporters may occur, creating latent tension. Without aleader to clarify the group’s strategic future, thereby promoting unity and strength,ideological disputes will occur and rifts may form. These power struggles may causethe jihadist organization to fracture into smaller groups. The U.S. can seize on suchan event to manipulate the organization’s points of instability. From the aboveconsiderations, emerges a general principle: terrorist groups characterized by aclearly delineated order of succession and/or effective bureaucracies and institutionswill be more capable of managing leadership transitions. Such groups may beresistant to HVT strikes; however, groups without such features will be less capableof enduring HVT strikes.

Applications in Pakistan:In recent years, several new terrorist groups have emerged in Pakistan, the

country in which the most rigorous and controversial HVT program is administered.Moreover, several existing groups have reconstituted themselves in Federally Ad-ministered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, a remote and mountainous territorywhere the Pakistani government has ceded control over the Waziristan region totribal leaders aligned with Al Qa’ida and the Taliban.

Figure 2: Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004 -2010xl

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Leadership elements of Al Qa’ida, the Afghan Taliban, and other terroristgroups have migrated to Pakistan's tribal areas and now work closely with a widevariety of Pakistani militant groups also operating there. Currently, it is impossibleto determine how many groups are operating in the region. However, it is crucial torecognize that the groups active in Pakistan are diverse; there are sectarian groups,anti-Indian groups, secessionist groups, Afghan Taliban, Pakistan Taliban, PunjabiTaliban, Al Qa’ida and its affiliates.xli While some of these groups are domesticorganizations, others are embedded in transnational networks. Each of these groupshas a unique organizational structure and thus distinct vulnerabilities to HVT strikes.Because these groups have different motivations, goals, and purposes, they willutilize different tactics and different organizational structures. Diversity in functionleads to diversity in form. Dr. Jerrold Post, a professor at the Elliot School ofInternational Affairs observes that “classifying groups according to purpose seemsto be a useful way to make predictions about the relationship between groupbehavior and organizational structure. It is also possible to code organizationsaccording to the means by which they try to achieve their goals.”xlii Before expand-ing the drone program and targeting more militant leaders, it is first necessary toexamine the morphology of each of these groups.

Case Study:The Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) was able to

survive momentary HVT after the death of its second emir, Nabil Sahraoui becausethe group’s founding members had clearly set down a succession strategy in its firstofficial communiqué and charter. Moreover, the group was structured around anexecutive council, which legitimated the new leader. Despite optimistic assessmentsby the Algerian press that Sahraoui’s neutralization would establish peace andstability in the region, violence continued unabated. Because the leadership gap wasimmediately filled, the GSPC’s efforts were not affected by the death of their chief.In fact, this HVT operation may have even strengthened organizational commitmentto Abdelmalek Droukdel, Sahraoui’s successor.

The origins of the GSPC date back to the 1930s (i.e. when Algeria was underFrench colonial rule) with the foundation of the Algerian Ulama. The manifestpurpose of the Ulama was to provide a basic social structure for Muslims. However,through its efforts to create political and economic equality in the colony, the

“Before expanding the drone program and targeting moremilitant leaders, it is first necessary to examine the morphologyof each of these groups.”

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Figure 3: Hierarchy of the GSPCxliii

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Algerian Ulama quickly became embroiled in political involvement. By 1989, agroup of Islamist Algerians had formed the “Islamic Salvation Front” (FIS), apolitical party whose agenda included the establishment of an Islamic state. Howev-er, after the National Liberation Front (FLN), an opposing socialist political party,dissolved the FIS, some elements reconstituted themselves as the militant ArmedIslamic Group (GIA). In 1996, Hassan Hattab, former emir of the Kabylie region ofthe GIA, established the GSPC, which distanced and distinguished itself from theGIA by condemning the latter’s attacks on Algerian citizens.xliv

Because the GSPC was derived from the FIS (a political party), it was organizedin a governmental manner with departments and agencies. Established as a bureau-cracy with standardized procedures to guide the execution of its processes, theGSPC was divided into nine zones with an emir (“commander”) in charge of eachzone; the founding members of the GSPC appointed the first regional chiefs. Theemirs communicated frequently, although they maintained relative freedom in theirgeographic area. Moreover, the emirs formed a shura (i.e. a “council of notables”),which served as an executive board to formulate strategy and policy for the group.In the event of the deflection, capture, or death of an emir, the council would appointa new officer. The council was presided over by a chairman and the entire organiza-tion was overseen by a single leader, the “emir of the group.”xlv

In addition to the executive council, a judicial committee offered a religiousopinion on the council’s compliance with dogma, a military committee determinedgeneral strategies and tactics, and a media committee organized external communi-cations and disseminated propaganda. The leaders of these committees were appoint-ed by the regional commanders and served as advisors to the emir of the group.xlvi

Other elements of the GSPC were organized along functional lines, such asinternet services or support for insurgent operations in Iraq. The GSPC also builtconnections throughout western and central Africa and reinvigorated connections inEurope, where it formed self-contained cells in France, Italy, Spain, and Britain.These cells collaborate on logistical issues, weapons procurement, communications,and propaganda.xlvii

In addition to this formal division of powers and vertical command hierarchy,the founders of the GSPC also stipulated an unambiguous succession strategy. If theemir of the group was terminated, he would immediately be replaced by the chair-man of the council. If the chairman of the council was also eliminated, the command-er of the second zone, the Sahara and Sahel regions, would be selected.xlviii Thispolicy was activated when Sahraoui was killed.

On June 20, 2004, Sahraoui, who had been the emir of the GSPC since August2003, and six other operatives were killed in a confrontation with the Algerian army.Several members of the GSPC feared that chairman of the council, Abdelmalek

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Droukdel, was also dead. These fears were fueled when the Algerian presidentcongratulated the Algerian authorities on their progress in the battle against terror-ism. To quell the anxiety of the GSPC’s membership, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, thechief of the second zone, momentarily assumed the leadership position. However,their concern faded when Abou Omar Abd Al-Birr, the head of the media committee,released a communiqué announcing that Droukdel was alive.xlix

On August 6,2004, Abou Al-Barra Ahmed, thehead of the judi-cial committee,published a sec-ond communiquéin which he an-nounced the ap-

pointment of Droukdel as the new emir of the group.l Although Droukdel hadpreviously occupied the post of chairman of the council under his predecessor andthus had already been designated as the successor to Sahraoui prior to his death, AlBarra officially endorsed him in this communiqué to ensure his legitimacy amongstthe GSPC’s ranks.

The leadership transition occurred seamlessly and the impact of the death ofSahraoui and HVT of the GSPC proved fleeting. In fact, it was not even necessaryfor the executive council to meet to discuss the nomination of the new leader.Droukdel automatically assumed the position of the new emir of the group. Hisnomination was not contested; after Droukdel’s survival was confirmed,Belmokhtar stepped down voluntarily and confirmed Droukdel’s position, quashingany rumors of internal fighting within the group.li

Upon taking office, Droukdel immediately initiated conversations with otherAlgerian groups to unite the Islamic movement in the country under one flag, that ofthe GSPC. Faced with pressure from the Algerian army and allured by Droukdel’sentreaties, which included offers to organize training and coordinate operations,many groups joined the GSPC and its membership swelled.

Moreover, within one year of taking office, Droukdel led the first operation ofthe GSPC outside Algerian borders. The raid on the remote Lemgheiti barracks inMauritania killed 150 soldiers. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi congratulated Droukdel forhis role in organizing this operation.lii

Additionally, some experts credit Droukdel with introducing new strategies ofviolent action, including suicide bombings, to Algeria. On April 10, 2007, the neworganization claimed credit for two suicide car bomb attacks in Algiers that killed

“The leadership transition occurred seamlesslyand the impact of the death of Sahraoui anddecapitation of the GSPC proved fleeting. Infact, it was not even necessary for the executivecouncil to meet to discuss the nomination of thenew leader.”

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23 people. This strike was the most aggressive and deadliest attack executed inAlgeria in years. Droukdel imported other Al Qa’ida tactics as well, including theuse of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and satellite imagery for thegeolocalization and planning of attacks. Droukdel also promoted the use of multime-dia technology as a new component in the ideological battle for the movement. Forexample, he began filming operations and including them in sensational videosdistributed on the Internet.liii The video “Jahim Al-Murtadin” (The Apostates' Hell)featured footage of the groups' brutal killings set to a soundtrack of jihad songsperformed by a male choir. The attack sequences were interspersed with statementsby Al Qa’ida commanders and footage from the GSPC training camps. liv

Some scholars have argued that although the alarming internationalization of theAlgerian insurgency was initiated in 2003, the strategic shift – from local to global –really began under the leadership of Droukdel. According to U.S. and Europeanofficials, Droukdel decided to intensify efforts to reach out to Al Qa’ida and otherextremist networks. The earliest contacts regarding a union occurred betweenDroukdel and Al-Zarqawi, and were dated from 2004, almost immediately afterDroukdel became head of the group. From that time on, contacts with Al-Zarqawiwere ongoing. To bolster ties with Al Qa’ida, Droukdel dispatched several emissar-

Harald Ickler, who was kidnapped by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, presents a photoof his captors, including one of the group’s top operatives, Amari Saifi, right.

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ies to Iraq. In September 2006, Al Qa’ida announced that it had formalized itsalliance with Droukdel’s network.lv

Hence, the HVT of Sahraoui failed to degrade or destroy the capacity of theGSPC to continue its attacks. Sahraoui was replaced by Droukdel, a commander ofarguably superior expertise and talent. In the year immediately after Sahraoui waseliminated, the GSPC conducted 56 attacks. This case study demonstrates that HVTstrikes should not be regarded as an assured way to cripple a terrorist organization. In contrast to the HVT strategy used against the GSPC, Algeria offered asix-month amnesty to Islamic militants on the condition of surrender. The offer wasquietly extended indefinitely. This strategy effectively exploited fissures within thegroup. Many GSPC leaders took advantage of the offer, each bringing their ownknowledge of GSPC activities while promising to encourage other militants tofollow their example. Consequently, infighting regarding the GSPC’s involvementin the Iraq War was compounded by distress over difficulties fillings its ranks withnew recruits.lvi

Recommendations:To determine the succession plan of various jihadist groups, analysts must first

develop a better understanding of their organizational structure. Some groups aremore bureaucratic in nature. They are characterized by a formal division of power,a hierarchy among office, and formal and informal networks that connect organiza-tional actors through flows of information and patterns of cooperation. On thecontrary, other groups utilize a network structure whereby they outsource certainfunctions, harness volunteer labor, and adopt a minimalist model. Analysts shouldalso examine the governance and decision-making structure of terrorist groups.While some groups are more consultative, others seem to be more oligarchic.Although some groups make decisions through parliamentary processes, othersrequire consensus or unanimity. By comprehensively examining the mechanics ofmilitant groups, researchers can better determine what sort of protocol the organiza-tion in question has in place for replacing its leaders and if future leaders will bepromoted, appointed, or elected.

The most effective way to determine the anatomy of a terrorist organization is toanalyze the terrorists’ own discourse. In recent years, jihadist groups have developedsophisticated communication systems with the ability to react to political develop-ments. Jihadist sites on the Internet that are used by terrorist organizations and theirsupporters to spread their extremist message and to recruit funds and activists canreveal important information about the group’s infrastructure. Similarly, printedmedia from Arab countries as well as Arabic-language London dailies and maga-zines and Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and Turkey should also be scrutinizedfor indications of the group’s configuration. Audio media, such as cassettes and

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radio broadcasts and visual media from TV channels in the Arab world and jihadistvideos posted online should also be translated and analyzed. From these sources,scholars can also glean information about emerging alliances or oppositions andconflicts within the jihad camp. Writings and speeches by both prominent Islamicterrorists like Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as well as other lessnotorious jihadis can also provide powerful insights into the authority structure andrelationships that characterize their organization.

Social Network Analysis (SNA) can also be applied to analyze the structure ofAl Qa’ida and related terrorist organizations. SNA models individuals, places, andobjects as nodes of a graph and represents relations between each node as links.Important subgroups can be identified as cliques on the graph and individuals inparticular positions of control or influence can be identified by their centrality on thegraph. Substructures of particular interest, such as communications chains can alsobe discovered using SNA. Researchers can also use Dynamic Network Analysis(DNA), which varies from traditional SNA in that it can handle large dynamicmulti-mode, multi-link networks with varying levels of uncertainty.

Figure 4: The Social Network of the Terrorist Group Responsible for the 1988U.S. Embassy Bombing in Kenyalvii

Knowledge of a terrorist group’s design and succession strategy can be used notonly to determine if the group is an appropriate candidate for a HVT strike, but alsoto develop measures that leverage and heighten the group’s dysfunctional structure,behavior, and both internal and external competition. Equipped with an understand-ing of the source of authority and legitimacy of leadership, other sub-lethal muni-tions and tactics can be designed to undermine the influence of enemy leadership.

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First of all, terrorist group members who appear less committed to theorganization’s goals should not be removed, especially if they can be reliablymonitored. Some terrorist operatives may be galvanized by thrill, financial gain, orattention-seeking. Others may furtively disagree with the group’s priorities. Becauseterrorist leaders must delegate tasks to their subordinates, allowing less dedicatedmembers who are unlikely to perform well to remain in the organization can lead toagency problems and organizational dysfunction.lviii

Effective information oper-ations can be used to in-crease internal dissensionin a terrorist group. Dr.Jerrold Post suggests that

psychological operations can be used to “magnify tension, sow distrust, recast theimage of the leader or pretenders to the throne, or weaken the already stressedclimate and paralyze the group.”lix Propaganda can cause fissures in the enemycamp by openly bringing up and playing upon contentious questions and issueswhich the enemy wishes to ignore, such as the tolerability of suicide attacks.

Agency problems experienced by terrorist networks can be aggravated byemphasizing the difference between affiliated groups. Publicly recognizing thedifferences between associated groups or the disparity between peripheral groupsand the center may generate competition for authority between these cliques. Forexample, jihadists in the North Caucasus republics (Chechnya and its neighbors)recently denounced ultra-radical "Kharijites" in their midst for holding heterodoxpositions.lx The disagreements between Salafi jihadists and Kharijites could beexacerbated by U.S. information operations specialists. Nevertheless, the manipula-tion of specific tribal rivalries and competitions requires a more sophisticatedunderstanding of the subtle points and positions that differentiate these groups.

Psychological operations can also be used to invalidate the legitimacy andtarnish the reputation of key leaders within an organization. For example, thePentagon released a video allegedly discovered by U.S. forces in a hideout in theAl-Yusufiyah neighborhood of southern Baghdad that portrays al-Zarqawi fumblingwith a U.S. M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW), the standard weapon of the U.S.Army. The video portrays him as a foolish and incompetent field commander.lxi

Psychological operations can also be designed to play up rivalry among leaders,create fissures between working partners, or cast doubt over the loyalties of oldcomrades. Dissension among the leadership of terrorist groups decreases cohesive-ness and control within the organization. “Divide and conquer” is an old, highlyeffective strategy.

Efforts should also be made to facilitate exit for operatives from the terroristgroup. As the Algerian example demonstrates, governments can implement national

“Dissension among the leadership ofterrorist groups decreases cohesivenessand control within the organization..”

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reconciliation programs to demobilize hundreds of militants. Amnesty can beoffered in return for cooperation and information. The information obtained fromthe defectors can be fed back into the group to create tension amongst the remaininggroup members and foment internal dissension.lxii

Finally, the U.S. government should try to undermine public support for terroristgroups. Policymakers must demonstrate to local populations that the militants’means and goals are anathema to their own. Jihadist policy planners have empha-sized the importance of maintaining connections between leadership and the civilianpopulation since Abdallah Azzam recognized these links in the 1980s. Abu Musabal-Suri’s influential work argued that the loss of a connection between leadershipand the people was a key factor in the failure of historical jihadist movements.

The discourse of moderate Muslim clerics and former terrorists who haverenounced violence can be circulated to promote a counter-ideology to Al Qa’ida.Several former radical Islamists have explained that Al Qa’ida’s ideology is un-Islamic and have noted that warfare, as depicted in the Koran, is generally compati-ble with the spirit of international law. For example, in his publication

“Rationalizing Jihad in Egypt and the World,” Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (a.k.a. Dr.Fadl) suggests that most forms of terrorism are illegal under Islamic law and hecastigates Muslims who resort to theft or kidnapping. Dr. Fadl also insists that theKoran forbids adherents to kill civilians, including Jews and Christians.lxiii Byendorsing scholars like Dr. Fadl, the U.S. can expose the sophistry of Al Qa’ida andcan outline the path back to moderation.

Information operations should also be used to create legitimacy for U.S. militaryassistance to Muslim nations by stressing that nearly 7 million Muslims live inAmerica, where the government protects freedom of religion. As Col. David M.Witty, a Military Transition team leader in the Iraqi National Counterterrorism TaskForce, asserts: “In the United States, Muslims are integrated into American society,are respected, and enjoy a high standard of living.”lxiv Abroad, the United State hasoffered aid and military assistance to Muslim societies and has opposed ethniccleansing attacks on Muslims in the former Yugoslavia.

To behead a terrorist organization, it is not necessary to guillotine its leader.When the terrorist leader is faced with the destruction of his ability to launch orcontrol his agents, then the organization will be decapitated.

Sarah Catanzaro is a Program Manager at the Center for Advanced Studies, whereshe directs the “Understanding Clandestine Organizations Program.” As an HonorsScholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford Univer-sity and Recipient of the William Perry Award for Excellence in InterdisciplinaryStudies, she examined the relationship between Al Qa’ida and local jihadist groups.

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i Bergen, Peter and Katherine Tiedemann. 4 February, 2010. The Year of the Drone. Wash-ington, DC: New America Foundation.ii Jenna Jordan. When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation.Security Studies 18, no. 4: 719. doi:10.1080/09636410903369068.iii Mannes, Aaron. Spring 2008. Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Captur-ing its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group's Activity? The Journal of International PolicySolutions 9: 40-50.iv Johnson, Patrick. 2009. The Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation in Counterinsur-gency. Stanford University .v Freeman, Michael, and Gordon McCormick. 28 February, 2007. Rethinking Decapitationas a Strategy against Terrorism. Paper presented at the International Studies Association48th Annual Convention. Chicago, Illinois.vi Solomon, Jay, Siobhan Gorman, and Matthew Rosenberg. 26 March, 2009. U.S. PlansNew Drone Attacks in Pakistan. wsj.com, sec. Politics and Policy.http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123803414843244161.html.vii Associated Press. 9 November 2009. Al Qaeda Training Camps Go Local, Mobile . CBSNews. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/11/09/world/main5584584.shtml.viii Anon. 2009. Offensive by Pak and U.S. drones has Shaken Qaeda. Indian Express. June2. http://www.indianexpress.com/news/offensive-by-pak-and-us-drones-has-shaken-qa/469521/.ix Evans, Michael. 3 January 2009. Death from Above: How Predator is Taking its Toll onal-Qaeda . The Times Online. January 3.http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article5435471.ece.x Hyder, Victor. 26 May 2004. Decapitation Operations: Criteria for Targeting EnemyLeadership. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army School for Advanced Military Studies.xi Ibidxii Ibidxiii Ibidxiv Loo, Bernard. 2009. Military Transformation and Strategy. New York: Taylor & Francis.xv Teal Group. 1 February 2010. Teal Group Predicts Worldwide UAV Market Will TotalOver $80 Billion In Its Just Released 2010 UAV Market Profile and Forecast. Teal GroupCorporation.http://www.tealgroup.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=62:uav-study-release&catid=3&Itemid=16.xvi Department of Defense. 2010. Quadrennial Defense Report. Washington, DC: TheWhite House.xvii EAA. 18 February 2009. U.S. Military Expands UAV Fleet. Young Eagles.http://www.youngeagles.org/news/archive/2009%20-%2002_20%20-%20UAV%20Fleet%20Expands.asp.

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xviii Scahill, Jeremy. 23 November 2009. The Secret U.S. War in Pakistan. The Nation.http://www.thenation.com/doc/20091207/scahill.xix Risen, James. 10 August 2009. U.S. to Hunt Down Afghan Drug Lords Tied to Taliban.The New York Times, sec. International / Asia Pacific.http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/10/world/asia/10afghan.html.xx Anon. 2006. Special Operations Forces and Counter-terrorism -- What Roles? StrategicComments 12, no. 7: 1. doi:10.1080/1356788061272.xxi Solis, Gary. 2007. Targeted Killing and the Law of Armed Conflict. Naval War CollegeReview 60, no. 2.xxii Bergen, Peter, and Katherine Tiedemann. 3 June 2009. The Drone War.http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2009/drone_war_13672.xxiii Bergen, Peter, and Katherine Tiedmann. 24 February 2010. The Year of the Drone .New America Foundation. Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative.xxiv Ibidxxv Mayer, Jane. 26 October 2009. The Predator War. The New Yorker.http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer.xxvi Daily Times Monitor. 9 April 2009. Extremists Relocating to Big Cities to AvoidDrone Attacks. Daily Times - Pakistan.http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C04%5C09%5Cstory_9-4-2009_pg1_2.xxvii Bergen, Peter, and Katherine Tiedemann. 3 June 2009. The Drone War.http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2009/drone_war_13672.xxviii Kilcullen, David, and Andrew Mcdonald Exum. 17 May 2009. Death From Above,Outrage Down Below. The New York Times, sec. Opinion.http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/opinion/17exum.html.xxix Bergen, Peter, and Katherine Tiedemann. 3 June 2009. The Drone War.http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2009/drone_war_13672.xxx Mayer, Jane. 2009. The Predator War. The New Yorker, October 26.http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer.xxxi Bergen, Peter, and Katherine Tiedemann. 3 June 2009. The Drone War .xxxii Bergen, Peter, and Katherine Tiedemann. 24 February 2010. The Year of the Drone.Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper. Washington, DC: New America Founda-tion.xxxiii Ibidxxxiv Kesner, Idalene F., and Terrence C. Sebora. 1 April 1994. Executive Succession: Past,Present & Future. Journal of Management 20, no. 2: 327-372.doi:10.1177/014920639402000204.xxxv Datta, Deepak K., and James P. Guthrie. September 1994. Executive Succession: Orga-nizational Antecedents of CEO Characteristics. Strategic Management Journal 15, no. 7(September): 569-577.

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xxxvi Islam, Syed Serajul. May 1998. The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani ofThailand and Mindanao of the Philippines. Asian Survey 38, no. 5: 441-456.xxxvii Hoffman, Bruce. 1996. Intelligence and Terrorism: Emerging Threats and New Securi-ty Challenges in the Post-Cold War Era. Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 2: 207.doi:10.1080/02684529608432353.xxxviii Helmich, Donald. April 1977. Executive Succession in the Corporate Organization: ACurrent Integration. The Academy of Management Review 2, no. 2: 252-266.xxxix Ocasio, William. June 1999. Institutionalized Action and Corporate Governance: TheReliance on Rules of CEO Succession. Administrative Science Quarterly 44, no. 2: 384-416.xl Bergen, Peter, and Katherine Tiedmann. 24 February 2010. The Year of the Drone . NewAmerica Foundation. Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative.xli Shapiro, Jacob N., and C. Christine Fair. 1 January 2010. Understanding Support for Isla-mist Militancy in Pakistan. International Security 34, no. 3: 79-118.doi:10.1162/isec.2010.34.3.79.xlii Post, Jerrold. Summer 1987. Prospects for nuclear terrorism: Psychological motivationsand constraints. Conflict Quarterly: 47-59.xliii Kohlmann, Evan. May 2007. Two Decades of Jihad in Algeria: the GIA, the GSPC, andAl-Qaida. Washington, DC: NEFA Foundation.xliv Johnson, Thomas. November 2006. An Introduction to a Special Issue of Strategic In-sights: Analyses of the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC). Strate-gic Insights 5, no. 8.xlv Guidere, Mathieu. 2007. Al Qa'ida a La Conquete du Maghreb. Paris: Editions duRocher.xlvi Ibidxlvii Boudali, Lianne Kennedy. 2007. The GSPC: Newest Franchise in al-Qa’ida’s GlobalJihad. The North Africa Project. West Point: The Combating Terrorism Center, April.xlviii Guidere, Mathieu. 2007. Al Qa'ida a La Conquete du Maghreb. Paris: Editions duRocher.xlix Ibidl Ibidli Ibidlii Lecocq, Baz, and Paul Schrijver. 2007. The War on Terror in a Haze of Dust: Potholesand Pitfalls on the Saharan Front. Journal of Contemporary African Studies 25, no. 1: 141.doi:10.1080/02589000601157147.liii Boudali, Lianne Kennedy. April 2007. The GSPC: Newest Franchise in al-Qa’ida’sGlobal Jihad. The North Africa Project. West Point: The Combating Terrorism Center.liv Kohlmann, Evan. May 2007. Two Decades of Jihad in Algeria: the GIA, the GSPC, andAl-Qaida. Washington, DC: NEFA Foundation.

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http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefagspc0507.pdf.lv Johnson, Thomas. November 2006. An Introduction to a Special Issue of Strategic In-sights: Analyses of the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC). Strate-gic Insights 5, no. 8.lvi Steinberg, Guido, and Isabelle Werenfels. 2007. Between the ‘Near’ and the ‘Far’ Ene-my: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Mediterranean Politics 12, no. 3: 407.doi:10.1080/13629390701622473.lvii Carley, Katherine. 26 April 2008. Vulnerability Assessment on Adversarial Organiza-tion: Unifying Command and Control Structure Analysis and Social Network Analysis. SI-AM International Conference on Data Mining, Workshop on Link Analysis,Counterterrorism and Security, Atlanta, Georgia.lviii Shapiro, Jacob. 13 May 2008. Bureaucracy and Control in Terrorist Organizations.Princeton, NJ: Woodrow Wilson School. http://www.utdallas.edu/epps/terrorism-and-policy-conference/papers/Shapiro_Bureaucracy_Control_Terrorism_1.pdf.lix Post, Jerrold. 2005. Psychological Operations and Counterterrorism. Joint Force Quar-terly, no. 37: 105-111.lx Alshech, E. 18 November 2009. The Split Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement in Jordanand the Rise of a Takfiri Movement – A Historical and Doctrinal Analysis. MEMRI. TheJihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor.lxi Hernandez, Nelson. 5 May 2006. U.S. military airs video of a bumbling al-Zarqawi. SF-Gate.lxii Post, Jerrold. 2005. Psychological Operations and Counterterrorism. Joint Force Quar-terly, no. 37: 105-111.lxiii Wright, Lawrence. 2 June 2008. A Reporter at Large: The Rebellion Within . The NewYorker.http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/06/02/080602fa_fact_wright?currentPage=alllxiv Witty, David. 2008. Attacking al Qaeda’s Operational Centers of Gravity. Joint ForceQuarterly, no. 46: 98-104.

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Too Much Information: Europe’s SuccessfulSecurity Regime and its Elusive European Rapid

Reaction ForceAlexander Justice Moore

IntroductionFor scholars of international cooperation, the European Union is in many ways

an exemplary arrangement. A continent once regularly ravaged by war appears tohave crossed over into Immanuel Kant’s ‘perpetual peace.’i Initially conceived as avenue for economic cooperation, the Union now works towards an array of commongoals in a variety of issue areas including security. The most prominent element ofEU security cooperation is known as the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF).Plans for this crisis-response unit were announced in 1999 and it has elicited closeattention ever since. For its proponents, the ERRF is a potential vehicle foradvancing EU solidarity and global credibility. In institutional theory terms, theforce promises a considerable ‘mutual gain,’ serving EU interests and humanitarianvalues across the full spectrum of crisis contingencies. In addition to promotingEuropean values, enhanced EU military cooperation would likely also producetangible economic benefits through economies of scale, equipment standardization,and capability specialization in time.ii But ten years after its conception, the ERRFhas yet to reach operational maturity.

The investigation below explains what some might view as a surprising lack ofprogress by a uniquely integrated Europe. The security regimes literature usuallyemphasizes transparency problems and the barriers they pose to security cooperation.This study, however, finds that the European security regime’s unprecedentedsuccess in sharing information and restraining military buildups has actuallyundermined the ERRF development effort. Notable ERRF progress has onlyoccurred during periods of crisis-induced uncertainty. Lingering concerns aboutfuture crises explains EU leaders’ ongoing rhetorical support for the force andcontinuing, though slow and marginal, advances in its capabilities. Major gains areunlikely in the absence of serious extended crises prompting European states toquestion their security status quo.

The European Security Regime: Success Begetting Failure?Today, the development of ERRF remains elusive. If one accepts that that ERRF

does promise a mutual gain for participants—in terms of an autonomous Europeancrisis response capacity and long-term financial savings, if not a dramaticenhancement of physical security per se—this debility appears to reflect a traditionalcollaboration problem, also known as a prisoner’s dilemma. In such a scenario,states may, on the one hand, choose to collaborate, committing serious near-term

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financial resources and political support to the ERRF. On the other, they may electto defect, prioritizing near-term state-level concerns over the potential long-termadvantages offered by this joint force. According to neoliberal institutionalistthinking, such collaboration problems are best solved by providing information torelevant parties. This information would ostensibly help each state understand thebenefits of cooperation as well as the intentions of the other actors. Parties wouldthus be able to assuage fears that their own unilateral investments in the ERRFwould not be reciprocated by fellow EU members.

The theoretical literature on security regimes and collective security suggeststhat such information sharing and cooperation is especially difficult in the securityrealm. As a result, this literature largely focuses on the challenges involved in theseefforts. According to Robert Jervis’s seminal work on security regimes, the criticallyimportant, competitive, unforgiving, and uncertain nature of security politics usuallyobliges leaders to rely “on unilateral and competitive modes of behavior rather thanby seeking cooperative solutions…The result is that security regimes, with their callfor mutual restraint and limitations on unilateral actions, rarely seem attractive todecision makers.” iiiThe literature, thus, creates a behavioral dichotomy in thesecurity realm: cooperation entails mutual restraint while competition involvesunilateral action. Because power-oriented theorists perceive competitive behavioras more advantageous in the context of a worst-case scenario view of internationalrelations, they, are pessimistic about the likelihood of security regimes’ emergenceand resilience. As John Mearsheimer puts it:

Cooperation among states has its limits, mainly because it is constrained bythe dominating logic of security competition, which no amount ofcooperation can eliminate. Genuine peace, or a world where states do notcompete for power, is not likely, according to realism.iv

Nevertheless, however unlikely it may seem to realists, one region does exhibitsuch genuine peace. In Europe, Jervis’s challenges have been successfully overcome.Cooperation and restraint define state policies. A security regime, which Jervisdefines as “principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be restrained in theirbehavior in the belief that others will reciprocate,” developed in Western Europeafter World War II, chiefly because of the NATO alliance and its codification of theUnited States’ role as security guarantor.v The European security regime includedboth formal NATO members and friendly neutral countries such as Ireland whogained implicit U.S. protection. With the end of the Cold War, this regime expandedeast. Some states joined NATO outright while others, ostensibly neutral countriesentered the Alliance’s less-stringent Partnership for Peace. Their differing legalstatus within NATO belied implicit inclusion within the European security regime.

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This legacy of institutionalized, sustained cooperation in the security realm mightsuggest to some that establishing a joint European force should be a relativelystraightforward task. Instead, Europe’s institutionalized security regime is, in fact,the very cause of ERRF paralysis.

The source of the ERRF’s problems is not a lack of information, assurance, andrestraint. Rather, it is an overabundance of them. Charles Glaser defines securitycooperation as “coordinated policies designed to avoid arms races, whilecompetition refers to unilateral military buildups, which are likely to generate armsraces, and to alliance formation” [emphasis added].vi Building the ERRF, however,requires states to possess cooperative mentalities conducive to intense coordinationand to engage in the usually competitive behavior of military buildups. Suchcooperative action, if achieved, would defy categorization in the security regimeliterature’s behavioral dichotomy. Among states without aggressive intentions,military buildups are traditionally a fear-driven response to perceived threats.Security regimes, however, ameliorate these concerns, and “fear of exploitationgives way to increasing willingness to practice self-restraint and mutualassistance.”vii The stronger the supranational regime, the greater the nationalrestraint and the less likely any military buildups are to occur. Cooperative action todevelop a regional security force, then, appears difficult and unlikely if notunprecedented.

As I demonstrate below, Europe’s established commitment to cooperation hasresulted in atrophied military capabilities and a lack of political will at the nationallevel to engage in the sort of short-term military buildups required by the ERRF. Thecurrent security status quo—of intra-European cooperation underwritten by anAmerican security guarantee—suggests that continued ERRF debilities are not theresult of information failures, as neoliberals might assume. Member States knowexactly what the ERRF’s promised benefits are and exhibit remarkable transparencyin their security policies. Rather, by dramatically reducing Member States’ sense ofthreat and increasing their confidence in the security regime, EU militarycooperation has become a victim of its own unique success.

If the status quo promotes restraint and curtails military spending, why isEurope still discussing an ERRF? The answer lies in the anxiety provoked byexternal shocks. Uncertainty following the Cold War’s conclusion, the Kosovo crisis,and the September 11th attacks all cast doubt on the United States’ ability orwillingness to intervene on behalf of European interests. European concerns

“If the status quo promotes restraint and curtails militaryspending, why is Europe still discussing an ERRF? The answerlies in the anxiety provoked by external shocks.”

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regarding a potential U.S. retreat from international affairs in the early 1990s,America’s considerable reluctance to act in Kosovo, and recurring episodesinvolving transnational terrorism after 9/11 each inspired brief periods of ERRFprogress. But the uncertainty triggered by these occasions never constituted a totalinformational failure that seriously compromised regional security. Effective

“collective security allows states to develop a certain degree of immunity towardisolated developments and changes in the strategic setting that would, under anarchy,have far greater reverberations.”viii When these major shocks occurred, thisimmunity conditioned Europe’s response, as it chose greater defense integrationwith an eye towards crisis response over developing unilateral capabilities for majorinter-state warfare. Such policy prescriptions indicate that Europe’s sense ofinsecurity was considerable but not fundamental. In each instance, Europe’sinability to respond to crises was exposed, but at no point was its territorial securitythreatened in ways that undermined the foundations of its security regime. IfMember States had truly lacked substantial information about the potential shift tononcooperation by their neighbors or the United States, security regime theorysuggests that individual leaders would have pursued competitive, unilateralstrategies. Instead, leading European states pressed for more cooperation, not less.These high-watermarks of ERRF institutional impetus, however, lasted only as longas the crisis-induced uncertainty. Once it became clear that Europe’s status quo andAmerica’s security commitments would endure, cooperative action reverted back tocooperative restraint. Commitments to the ERRF then faltered and though progressslowed dramatically, it never stopped entirely.

Crises have happened before, and they are likely to happen again. With each ofthe three crises mentioned in this paper, Europe was not only caught off-guard, butstates were rendered incapable of independent action. It is only logical, then, thatEuropean states would continue to pursue some measure of ERRF progress. Andindeed they have, though it remains far from a top priority. The cooperativeinstitutions established during periods of ERRF progress did not disband whennational political priorities shifted elsewhere. They continue working, asorganizations do, in line with their missions but constrained by limited resources andpolitical support. Where ERRF contributions have required minimal financial andpolitical investment, countries have made them. Rhetorical support for the ERRF

“Crises have happened before, and they are likely to happenagain. With each of the three crises mentioned in this paper,Europe was not only caught off-guard, but states wererendered incapable of independent action.”

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remains strong among key nations and its halting but undeniable progress suggeststhat such sentiments are more than just ‘cheap talk.’ European leaders appear tounderstand that while the U.S. security guarantee offers a considerable degree ofimmunity from external shocks, this immunity is not absolute. When it comes to the

‘big-ticket’ items of a modern fighting force, the ERRF remains deficient. Lookingforward, Europe’s limited sense of vulnerability is likely to lead to limited ERRFprogress. Barring a massive shock or a sudden retreat of U.S. primacy, it is hard toimagine a serious and sustained European commitment to a muscular, independentlycapable ERRF.

The following analysis reveals a clear pattern of EU behavior. First, an externalshock prompts European uncertainty. Leading states respond with pressure for acooperative military buildup. However, this brief burst of progress subsides whenEurope’s security regime, and in particular America’s commitment to it, provesresilient. European nations, finding the costs of cooperative action excessive in lightof this commitment, revert to cooperative restraint. Such restraint inspires policiescontrary to military buildups, depriving EU joint forces of critical capabilities. Thisstatus quo persists until the next shock, when the cycle begins anew. After discussingthis behavioral pattern, I describe ERRF progress—or general lack thereof—sinceEU uncertainty after the last external shock waned EU uncertainty waned. I thendraw on neoliberal and constructivist thinking to offer alternative explanations forthe largely, but not completely, stagnant state of the ERRF. Finding these competinginterpretations insufficient, I conclude with a pessimistic evaluation of near-termERRF prospects in lieu of unanticipated shocks.

The First Shock: The End of the Cold WarThe demise of the Soviet Union caught the world off-guard. Concerned about

post-Soviet instability in Russia, the sudden opening of Eastern European society,and the unification of a long-divided Germany, much of Western Europe continuedto see great value in the American security guarantee. However, many Europeanleaders and publics feared that without asuperpower opponent, the United Stateswould revert to isolationism. This fearinspired defense cooperation within theWestern European Union, an EUpredecessor. In 1948, the WEU madeplans “involving the integration of airdefenses and a joint commandorganization.”ix Once the U.S. committedto underwriting European security in the1949 North Atlantic Treaty, however,

“... many European leadersand publics feared thatwithout a superpoweropponent, the United Stateswould revert to isolationism.This fear inspired cooperationwithin the Western EuropeanUnion, an EU predecessor.”

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progress in strictly European defense cooperation ceased until after the collapse ofthe Iron Curtain. In 1993, the WEU instituted a military Planning Cell, establisheda relationship with NATO’s Military Committee, and built early, yet promising, jointframeworks for non-member observation, armaments research and development,and collective security.x As the decade progressed, NATO and the U.S. securityguarantee did not wither as many predicted. Instead, NATO maintained its vitalityand even expanded to include former Soviet republics. European doubt of America’scommitment eased gradually.

In 1997, efforts to unify existing European institutions into a broader, deeperEuropean Union were in full swing. The long-standing WEU and its more recentsecurity cooperation mechanisms would have provided valuable organizationalplatforms for the EU to build upon. But formerly neutral states—Sweden, Denmark,Austria, and Ireland chief among them—vociferously opposed integrating theWEU’s security apparatus “with an open-ended protocol containing the collectivedefence guarantee for those who wished to sign it. The formerly ‘neutral’ membersof the EU, particularly Sweden, had objected to integrating the WEU ‘lock, stockand barrel’.”xi The partisan nature of this debate proves puzzling for security regimetheory, as both sides were part of the same European security regime—one formallytied to the NATO apparatus and the other protected implicitly by its continuedexistence. If both believed in cooperative security, why did WEU integrationdiscussions become so uncooperative?

The answer lies in the difference between cooperative action and cooperativerestraint. WEU members perceived mutual defense clauses and military integrationto be highly cooperative measures requiring serious, sustained engagement with oneanother. The neutral objectors, meanwhile, felt their obligations to the securityregime demanded national restraint, specifically avoiding the ‘competitive’behaviors of military buildups and alliance formation. These latter countriesinterpreted the concept of military restraint in an extreme manner. Looking back to1961, Kollias et al. find that Ireland, Denmark, and Austria’s defense spending “has

“WEU members perceived mutual defense clauses and military integration to be highly cooperative measures requiringserious, sustained engagement with one another. The neutralobjectors, meanwhile, felt their obligations to the securityregime demanded national restraint, specifically avoiding the

‘competitive’ behaviors of military buildups and alliance formation.”

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consistently been lower than the EU average.”xii By avoiding excessive Cold Warentanglements—and with them, commensurate military responsibilities—thesecountries were able to apply a ‘neutrality dividend’ toward other political priorities.When whatever specter of danger they faced diminished after the Cold War, thisdividend only increased. Today, Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, and Austria possess,respectively, the 33rd, 51st, 55th, and 37th-ranked economies in the world.Comparatively, the percentages of GDP they devote to military expenditures vis-à-vis the rest of the planet are disproportionately small, as they rank respectively, 106th,125th, 146th, and 140th.xiii

Figure 1: EDA Participating States Defense Spending 2006xiv

These countries were able to evolve as military dwarves because of the ampleinformation they possessed on other states’ intentions—especially those of theirlarger Western European neighbors and American security benefactor. Ireland, forexample, could engage in a policy of ‘disarmed neutrality’ because “NATOimplicitly guarantees the security of Ireland. Furher, during the Cold War…Irelandwas safely tucked away behind Britain.”xv Given the contentious history of Irish-British relations, the UK’s de facto security relationship with the Emerald Islespeaks to a remarkable advancement toward mutual assurance. Belfast’s awarenessof other countries’ intentions encouraged both restraint of its own military spending,and total confidence that neglecting WEU security institutions would not inspireretaliatory action from powerful neighbors. Had leading European states been moresensitive about the security status quo’s resilience to external shocks, some measureof political or diplomatic retaliation for shirking regional security commitmentswould have been implemented as a predictable practice of statecraft. Instead,objections from Ireland and similarly situated states led the EU “to dismantle theoperational institutions recently established by the WEU and build them up againfrom scratch as the new EU Military Staff and the EU Military Committee.”xvi

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Without sufficient fear and uncertainty to inspire cooperative action, small EUstates were able to derail efforts by leading Western European nations to improvetheir joint military capability. Notably, the ERRF specifically was not yet a part ofthis continental discussion. But because the EU, as an institution, lackedmechanisms for military cooperation and the ability to respond to crises with jointforce, it found itself wholly incapable of responding to a major shock in its ownbackyard.

The Second Shock: The Kosovo CrisisEurope knew Slobodan Milosevic was a villain. In 1998, when he launched

another campaign of ethnic cleansing, this time in Kosovo, Europe should have hadan answer for his provocations. It did not. Without American military support,Europe lacked the physical and organizational capacity to carry out a major,coordinated humanitarian intervention—even one on its own continent. Europe’sreliance upon the United States led its leading states to two conclusions, one political,one practical. On the political side, a sense of “embarrassment” at their relativeweakness vis-à-vis the U.S. meant key European leaders felt acute pressure to worktogether.xvii The readily apparent “capabilities gap thus added even greater impetusto the convergence of British, French, and eventually German thinking on aEuropean security and defense policy.”xviii Before Kosovo, Europe could largelyassume that the U.S. would consistently come to its aid in regional matters. Afterwitnessing how close the United States came to not intervening, leading Europeanstates felt uncomfortable with a status quo built upon their trans-Atlantic partner’sresolve. Future crises were bound to demand forceful measures, and if Europe wasto respond appropriately, it would have to embrace cooperative action.Figure 2: Kosovo Force Sectors in Kosovoxix

Practically, the lessons of Kosovoindicated to Europe that the U.S. mightnot always be an ideal partner inpeace-keeping and crisis-responsesactivities. America’s military wasgeared for large-scale, state-to-statewarfare. Domestically, popularconcerns about distant adventurismand military casualties handcuffed U.S.campaign planners and led to an over-reliance on technology. In particular,the Kosovo conflict underscored thelimits of precision bombing. While

‘smart bombs’ are great for smashing

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traditional military infrastructure, they proved ill-suited for stopping small, low-techgroups of armed thugs from victimizing civilians—a much more common foe insituations calling for humanitarian intervention. In fact, the seventy-eight days ofNATO air strikes were the period of the “most egregious abuses,” inciting moreviolent behavior among Serbs, not less.xx Going forward, Europe was notexcessively worried that America would neglect it in the event of an outside invasion.It did, however, have legitimate doubts about the reliability and efficacy of futureU.S. involvement in lesser crises that involved European interests rather thanAmerican ones. These concerns, political and practical, explain the EU’s response toKosovo: the ERRF.

In June 1999, the European Council (EC)—a collection of each EU member’shead of government—met in Cologne. There they declared their commitment “thatthe European Union shall play its full role on the international stage…The Unionmust have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces,the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond tointernational crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.”xxi The EC’s word choiceis curious, as it was far more concerned about NATO inaction than any potentialAlliance actions jeopardizing European interests. The EU reached a consensusaround seeking the ability to stand, at times, on its own. The proposed ERRF wasquickly judged by some observers as an exercise in balancing against the U.S., butsuch realist-style behavior would presuppose that Europe perceived a threatemanating from Washington—which it certainly did not. Pursuit of an independentintervention capability suggested a course of cooperative action between EU statesrather than one of competitive action (balancing) versus the U.S.

That August, the EC met in Helsinki and produced the Headline Goal. It grabbedboth headlines and world attention. Europe’s leaders expressed an ambitious desireto possess a force of 50,000 to 60,000 troopsby 2003. These fifteen brigades wouldbe deployable in less than 60 days with smaller units available in a week or less.Once in the field, the ERRF would be sustainable for one year with the support ofready reinforcements, intelligence capabilities, and naval and air assets. Theseforces would be capable of performing the full spectrum of ‘Petersberg tasks’:

“humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces incrisis management, including peacemaking.”xxii These vague concepts are betterdescribed as ‘peace support operations’ (PSOs), which fall into four categories:

“Pursuit of an independent intervention capability suggesteda course of cooperative action between EU states ratherthan one of competitive action (balancing) versus the U.S.”

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warfighting, stabilization, state-building, and observation and separation.xxiii Formany, the idea of a highly trained, modern fighting force to defend European idealswas appealing. But the Helsinki agenda proved too ambitious—politically,financially, and practically. 2003 came and went, and the ERRF imagined atHelsinki remained largely imaginary.

This disappointing outcome is a byproduct of an overly successful securityregime. The impetus for cooperative action waned along with post-crisis uncertainty.However, even before the momentum died, much of this ‘action’ focused oninstitution-building, not the development and acquisition of hard militarycapabilities. The EU’s organizational preoccupation with acquiring acronyms overarms was caused by concerns about the role of its security guarantor, the UnitedStates. In the end, Europe’s leading states reverted to a strategy of cooperativerestraint—interested in a stronger ERRF, but unwilling to take the proactivemeasures necessary to achieve its autonomous maturity.

The 1997 demolition of WEU defense institutions re-opened the question ofwhat European military cooperation should look like. In time, two factions withcompeting visions, one led by Britain and the other by France, proposed solutionsto this institutional ‘vacuum.’ Initially, however, uncertainty in the midst of theKosovo crisis prompted an encouraging British-French statement at the December1998 St. Malo Summit. There, the two states asserted that the

Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by crediblemilitary forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so,in order to respond to international crises…In strengthening the solidaritybetween the member states of the European Union, in order that Europe canmake its voice heard in world affairs, while acting in conformity with ourrespective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of amodernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collectivedefence of its members.xxiv

But this joint statement, reflecting the later consensus at Cologne and Helsinki,did not reflect a genuine, common understanding. It soon became clear that Britainand France possessed dramatically different visions of the EU’s military future andof cooperative action itself. France proceeded to emphasize the autonomy of a futureEU force from the Alliance and its American sponsor. Britain, meanwhile, workedvigorously to convince Washington that a new European commitment to defensespending “would not supplant Europe’s transatlantic link with the United Statesthrough NATO but would enhance it.”xxv These divergent concepts stem from eachcountry’s unique history, which conditions its approach to the European securityregime. As Constantine Pagedas puts it, “While Great Britain is one of America’s

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closest and most trusted allies, as well as one of the strongest supporters of NATO,France has traditionally sought to enhance its own power and prestige in Europethrough the deliberate diminishment of NATO and U.S. influence on thecontinent.”xxvi British tradition informed the UK’s position of enhancing the existingsecurity regime by adding independent capabilities and interdependent EU-NATOinstitutions to direct them. French pride inspired a desire for independent EUcapabilities and institutions. France had nothing more to fear from the U.S. thanBritain (which is to say nothing at all), suggesting that its behavior was not intended,as a realist might surmise, to balance against America. Paris perceived theinconsistency of American commitments in the same manner as London and wasequally committed to advancing the European security regime. Their conflictingvisions of cooperative action were informed by different national histories, notdifferent perceptions of threat.

Aware that theembryonic ERRFhad the potential toboth enhance anddiminish EU-NATOcooperation, theUnited States enteredthe discussion.Alhough Washingtonwelcomed additionalEuropean defense spending, it demanded that the ERRF in no way duplicateresources, decouple the EU defense structure from NATO, or discriminate againstnon-EU NATO members. These actions, the U.S. believed, would foster competitionand undermine the European security regime. Britain, which so often aligns withU.S. on foreign policy priorities, saw little conflict between its ERRF vision andthese U.S. conditions. Britain’s version of autonomy demanded the ability toconduct operations where the Alliance was not engaged—essentially, instanceswhere the U.S. was not opposed to action per se but lacked the political will orstrategic interest to commit forces and resources. France, meanwhile, resisted eachAmerican stipulation. For Paris, autonomy necessitated duplication of capabilities,an independent planning apparatus, and the ability to proceed without interferencefrom non-EU NATO members like the U.S. and Turkey. The British vision ofcooperative action—a European military buildup with U.S. support and input—wascostly. The French vision of cooperative action—a European military buildup thatexcluded the U.S. from its governing institutions—was even more so.

As time passed and the post-Kosovo sense of urgency faded, neither side waswilling to shoulder the costs of enhanced military capabilities alone. A neoliberal

“The British vision of cooperative action—a European military buildup with U.S. supportand input—was costly. The French vision ofcooperative action—a European military buildup that excluded the U.S. from its governinginstitutions—was even more so.”

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would have been encouraged by the cautious institution-building process that beganin 2000, as joint EU-NATO working groups initiated discussions on intelligencesharing, joint planning, and future “more permanent consultationarrangements.”xxviiBut the main barrier to ERRF progress was not disputes betweenBritish and French-led factions. Both parties eventually agreed on a shortcut to getthe ERRF up and running: borrowing NATO assets to fill in EU capability gaps. Ina telling response to the obstacles posed by insufficient capability, both sidesreverted to a strategy of indefinitely relying on NATO and implicitly American,resources. However, once this issue was resolved, Turkey—a nation inside NATO’ssecurity apparatus possessing an ambivalent attitudes toward Europe—blockedERRF-NATO collaboration for it “wanted to have assured participation in theplanning of operations before agreeing to assured EU access to NATO assets.”xxviiiNeoliberal emphases on information deficits can explain objections by Turkeyand Greece—traditional Mediterranean rivals—to EU-NATO cooperation, but donot offer explanations for why leading states with an interest in cooperative actiondid not press forward without their operation. On the contrary, shared confidence inthe security regime that diminished the impetus for ERRF progress does explain thisphenomenon. Unwilling to step outside the existing regime and engage in costlyforms of cooperative action or outright competition, Europe reverted to a status quoof cooperative restraint Willem Van Eekelen calls the “Malaise in 2001.”xxix

The Third Shock: September 11th, 2001The malaise was largely broken on a clear morning that September. Al-Qaida’s

attacks on New York and Washington underscored the importance ofcounterterrorism efforts and gave new impetus for serious cooperation between theEU and NATO. Cornish and Edwards assert that the ‘long-term effect’ of 9/11 wasthe expression of “wide support…for the various procedures and initiatives whichhad been put in train before the attacks.”xxx The new trans-Atlantic emphasis onterrorism quieted—but by no means eliminated—neutral country complaints aboutdefense cooperation. Sweden, the most vociferously uncooperative of the bunch,found itself on the outside of European security discussions, “excluded from talksbetween the larger member states following 9/11.”xxxi After September 11th, Europe’sleading powers increasingly turned to ‘mini-summits,’ making “no effort to hide ordownplay their desire to coordinate among themselves without the interference ofsmall Member States.”xxxii Quiet diplomatic exchanges hushed Turkish and Greekobjections.xxxiii In a time of particular sensitivity to their own security concerns, theleading nations of Europe ensured that they would not be impeded by small-stateobjectors as they had in 1997.

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Continued EU-NATOnegotiations resulted in the 2003Berlin Plus arrangements, whichauthorized ERRF access to NATOplanning, a NATO Europeancommand option for ERRFoperations, and Europe’s ability torequest NATO assets andcapabilities. Berlin Plus requiredEU-NATO planningcooperation—a stipulation thatcut to the core of the UK-Francedebate. France, Germany,Belgium, and Luxembourg hadinitially sought to establish amulti-nationalized EU planningunit that would comprise “a core European defense grouping distinct from the EU'scollective endeavour.”xxxiv Britain, meanwhile, wanted planning for particularoperations to be directed by a leading ‘framework’ nation and supported by

‘seconded’ staff from other countries, with the whole operation closely tied toplanners at NATO headquarters. Planning, in the British model, would be muchmore ad hoc and operational; in the French, more permanent and strategic.Negotiations settled on the UK model, eliciting a “significant concession from thoseEU governments which had long resisted the idea that the EU’s strategic ambitionsshould somehow be tied to or dependent on NATO.”xxxv This concession was

“considered a triumph for those governments—particularly the British—which hadbeen uneasy about…an alternative, full-scope European strategic and operationalplanning organization.”xxxvi

As of 2003, one could say that the UK and its supporters ‘won.’ The nations ofthe EU agreed that ERRF would be closely linked to NATO for the foreseeablefuture. The United States’ support for increased EU capabilities bolstered the Britishfaction and its model of cooperative action. France, meanwhile, found the costs ofexcluding the U.S. from any collective security arrangement prohibitive andconceded to Britain on this matter. Rather than investing its political and financialresources in an autonomous EU force, France would pursue greater influence withinthe existing security regime.xxxvii Political and strategic ERRF autonomy were onlyimportant so far as the ERRF was capable of physical and tactical independence—which it was not. If the EU wanted to act independently in a crisis, but had no wayof flying its personnel there, autonomous decision making became a moot point.Going forward, the ERRF would depend on NATO capabilities. After four years of

NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Schefferand European Union High Representative,Dr. Havier Solana mark the end of NATO’s SFOROperation and the establishment of the EU “AltheaOperation.”

http://ww

w.nato.int

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institutional conflict, the EU now possessed a brand-new military bureaucracy. It didnot, however, have anything resembling an autonomous crisis response forcecapable of the full PSO spectrum.

The sense of cooperative action that inspired institutional engineering was notmatched by similar cooperation towards a European military buildup. As part of itsplanning process, the EU broke down the Petersberg tasks into 144 separate militarycapabilities necessary to conduct them. In 2002, thirty of these requirementsremained unmet. Though “several countries had plans for meeting them…theirimplementation would take them well beyond 2003.”xxxviii As an overall percentage,114 successes out of 144 attempts sound impressive. But those left unachieved felldisproportionately in the high-intensity realms of warfighting and stabilization.Most of the satisfied 114 capabilities achieved simply codified what EU states couldalready do, together or separately. Meanwhile, the elusive thirty included airlift,sealift, air-to-air refueling, and intelligence capabilities. Such tasks are not onlydifficult to learn and implement; they are also among the ‘big-ticket’ items of amodern fighting force. Cornish and Edwards report that meeting these requirementswould cost the EU and its members $25 billion.xxxix The remarkable transparency ofEU defense cooperation suggests that these thirty shortcomings were not caused bymisperception or misconception; every nation had a good idea of what the otherspossessed in terms of capabilities, and what they were likely to develop. With noapparent reason to compete with one another and insufficient will for cooperativeaction, the EU continued its pattern of cooperative restraint, allowing the UnitedStates to maintain its primacy. At a May 2003 meeting in Brussels, the EC stated:

The EU now has operational capability across the full range of Petersbergtasks, limited and constrained by recognised shortfalls. These limitationsand/or constraints are on deployment time and high risk may arise at theupper end of the spectrum of scale and intensity, in particular whenconducting concurrent operations.xl

Reading this statement, one might have assumed that the EU was actually capableof executing tasks for which it claimed operational capability. This assumptionwould be incorrect. In fact, “the notion of becoming ‘operational’ referred primarilyto the organisational set-up of the PSC [Political and Security Committee], the MC[Military Committee] and the EUMS [Military Staff].”xli Though these institutionsrepresented bureaucratic victories, they were not yet capable of achieving militaryones. Despite the EC’s assertion of operational capability, the functional value of theERRF as a joint force capable of warfighting and stability operations was overstated.The EU had good reason to be proud of its 2003 peace-support operations inMacedonia and DPR Congo—but these small-scale, low-intensity efforts were not

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the sort of major humanitarian interventions envisioned at Helsinki. Thus, EUMember States in 2004 faced a choice: change their policies in pursuit of their goalsor change their goals. They chose the latter.

The Status Quo: Cooperative RestraintAfter the failures of 2003, the EU released Headline Goal 2010. This 2004 vision

shifted “the emphasis away from the full force” of 60,000 men capable ofwarfighting and stability operations “to the component forces thereof.”xlii JulianLindley-French characterizes the practical difference between the two goals thusly:

Headline Goal 2010 decapitates the Helsinki Headline Goal and extends thetime required for the realisation of a force a third the size, by roughly threetimes as long. Indeed, thirteen times 1,500 [the size of an ERRFBattlegroup] equals 19,500, which is roughly one third of the originalHeadline Goal…Helsinki Goal 2010 is, therefore a sub-division of a sub-division.xliii

The ERRF vision thus shrank from fifteen brigades to thirteen battalion-sizedBattlegroups of roughly 1,500 men. A 2009 EU document declares that on “1January 2007 the EU Battlegroup Concept reached Full Operational Capability.”xliv

Alhough the new Headline Goal is markedly less ambitious, since 2007, a six-monthrotation of Battlegroups has successfully placed two of its number ‘on call’ torespond to crises. These smaller, lighter forces certainly have value. They arewell-suited for the sort of actions the EU has found itself undertaking: policetraining, rule-of-law promotion, and disaster relief chief among them. In light ofSeptember 11th, the 2010 goal also states that ERRF tasks “might also include jointdisarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism andsecurity sector reform.”xlv The past two decades suggest that crises can occur at anytime. EU institutions and Member States agree that “to respond rapidly to emergingcrises... [they] need to be ready.”xlvi This desire to enhance preparedness explains EUprogress—limited but real—in certain areas of ERRF capability.

Political support for continued, though circumscribed, ERRF progress appearsgenuine. In 2008, French President Nicholas Sarkosy presented the acquisition of aBritish carrier for the ERRF “a central plank of [his] plans for his EU presidency.”xlvii

Even the neutral countries have warmed up to the 2010 goal; Sweden now leads anoperational Nordic Battlegroup. Influential Swedish Defense Minister Sten Tolgforsbelieves “there is so much to gain. It allows us to reach a greater depth in capability.Such supportive rhetoric suggests awareness that future humanitarian, if notexistential, crises merit attention. In a later speech justifying Sweden’s military

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cooperation with the EU and defense modernization efforts, Tolgfors warned that “Ifanyone were to act against a Baltic State—the way Russia acted against Georgia—that would have fundamental security policy implications.”xlviii

The rhetoric of cooperative action, however, has been belied by the reality ofcooperative restraint when it comes to high-end asset acquisitions. Sarkosy’s carrierambitions elicited a curt response from the UK Defense Ministry: “We have no plansto use an aircraft carrier in this way.” xlix The capability gap that needs to beaddressed through cooperative action most urgently is airlift capability, which iscurrently provided only by a revealing stop-gap measure. The ERRF’s StrategicAirlift Interim Solution (SALIS) depends on leased, privately-owned Russian andUkrainian planes, with two “on full-time charter, two more on six days notice andanother two on nine days notice.” lReliance on private firms in the former SovietUnion (Volga-Dnepr and ADB, respectively) for timely delivery of lift servicesstands in stark contrast to the Helsinki vision of autonomous action, credible forces,and Europe playing its ‘full role on the international stage.’ But continued access to

An Antonov AN-124-100 giant caro transport jet stands with its front cargo door open at theLeipzig-Halle international airport March 23, 2006 in Leipzig, Germany. Two of theAntonovs is stationed at Leipzig as part of the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS),whereby NATO and the European Union will use the giant planes for military andhumanitarian missions.

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NATO and U.S. resources provides a critical safety-net should SALIS fail or anemergency demand use of an aircraft carrier. European awareness of America’songoing commitment to its security regime continues to stunt EU progress towardautonomous crisis-response capability.

Alternative ExplanationsThere are other possible means of explaining ERRF shortcomings besides a

robust security regime and dynamic between cooperative action and cooperativerestraint posited by the author. Notably, realist pessimism about the prospects forgenuine peace and security cooperation render this major theoretical school silent onthe subject of successful security regimes. For neoliberal institutionalists,meanwhile, information is everything. When mutual gains are to be had, improvedawareness of those gains and of other players’ intentions can help achieve them.According to this line of thought, greater public disclosure of state security policiesand stronger institutions would aid ERRF development. For example, a neoliberalmight suggest that the more ad hoc British model of EU military planning indicatesa resistance to more involved institutional cooperation. But at no point have EUstates questioned the benign intent of fellow members. I have found no evidencesuggesting that some states are predisposed to making sizeable individualcontributions, but elect not to do so based exclusively on their that other states willfail to reciprocate.

Uncertainty after crises, rather than assurance, has thus far been the key toprogress. Inadequate information regarding American commitments did not sparkcompetition and balancing, but did incite calls for deeper, more active cooperation.The British planning model ‘won’ only because proponents of an independentstrategic planning unit—France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg—found thecosts of this provision prohibitive and unnecessary, especially in light of theendurance of post-9/11 U.S. commitments to Europe and NATO. Had anxietyregarding American intentions persisted, perhaps the French faction would have hada stronger case. The strength of the European security regime allows it to dispeluncertainty with impressive speed. The myriad diplomatic and institutional conduitsof U.S.-European communication have been vital to the rapidity of this reassurance.

A neoliberal might also argue that if sufficient information is available, perhapsthe mutual gains of the ERRF are simply not worth its considerable short-term costs.But these gains are hard to ignore. Though EU defense expenditures equate to 65%of America’s, what Member States do spend is riddled with duplication and waste,leaving Europe “only packing about 10% of the U.S. punch” [emphasis mine]. liJointforces and sustained cooperative action would almost certainly reduce waste,promote economies of scale, and allow for national specialization. If EU states are,contrary to much IR thinking, favoring other spending priorities over security-

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related ones, such action demands an explanation. The enduring, reassuring natureof the European security regime offers a potentially powerful account.

Rather than information, a constructivist interpretation of ERRF developmentmight instead emphasize the importance of identity and social roles. Initially,Jennifer Mitzen’s insights regarding ontological security appear instructive. AsMitzen puts it, states’ “first response to uncertainty is thus not necessarily

‘information search’, but to reduce psychological stress.”liiliii This stress can bereduced by routinizing relations with other states, relations that individual statesmay ultimately use to define their identities. Mitzen largely focuses on how states inconflict can create identities contingent upon continued struggle. But Europeanidentities—and indeed, the much discussed ‘European identity’—are predicatedupon peaceful relations. For Mitzen, Europe’s ability to learn from previous positiveinteractions and pursue higher Maslowian needs would suggest its members’internationalization of a healthy “basic trust system.”liv A “rigid or maladaptive basictrust,”lv however, causes actors to perceive all disruptions as threatening. Thehealthy-maladaptive dichotomy implies that the former is positive, the latterundesirable.

What Mitzen does not consider is the potential of a healthy basic trust toundermine state capacity for threat response. Enduring U.S. support has allowedEurope to ‘bracket’ a wide array of potential threats, perhaps too wide. Generallyhealthy ties with the U.S. have created a yawning gap in military capabilities. In1999, Europe found itself unable to respond to a relatively predictable provocationby Slobodan Milosevic. A decade later, the tenuous state of SALIS, ongoing NATOdependence, and the stripped down Battlegroup model suggest more inability thancapability. If Europe has engaged in excessive bracketing, then its basic trust systemmay be so rigid as to render it incapable of adapting to potential threats. In otherwords, Europe’s trust system may be too healthy for the ERRF’s future viability.This is not to say that European security absolutely demands a rapid reaction force,only that the way Europe perceives and produces its ontological security is likely topreclude major success in ERRF development. Overly healthy basic trust thus hasits downsides. Mitzen’s conceptualization is not necessarily inaccurate, but in lightof the unprecedented nature of European inter-state cooperation and basic trust, itappears incomplete.

ConclusionBarring a massive shock with ongoing effects or a sudden retreat of U.S.

primacy, it is hard to imagine a serious and sustained European commitment to amuscular ERRF. Ironically, it is in just such instances that Europe would wish it hada strong, capable joint force on hand. Despite the EU’s ability to articulate grandintegrative visions, the Union’s successful security regime favors cooperative re-

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straint over cooperative action. Limited progress continues, but only in proportionto the level of uncertainty perceived by Member States. Without renewed uncertain-ty, the ERRF, already ten years in the making, is likely to remain inert for years tocome.

Alexander Justice Moore is a PhD student in political science at the University ofMinnesota. He holds an MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University.

i Kagan, Robert. 2003. Of Paradise and Power: America and Eur�ope in the New WorldOrder. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.ii Kollias, Christos, George Manolas, and Suzanna-Maria Paleologou. July 2004. “Defenceexpenditure and economic growth in the European Union: A causality analysis” Journal ofPolicy Modeling 26, No. 5: 553-569.iii Jervis, Robert. Spring 1982. “Security Regimes” International Organization 36, No. 2,International Regimes: 359.iv Mearshimer, John. Winter 1994-1995. The False Promise of International Institutions”International Security 19, No. 3: 9.v Jervis, Robert. Spring 1982. “Security Regimes” International Organization 36, No. 2,International Regimes: 359.vi Glaser, Charles. Winter 1994-1995. “Realists as Optimists” International Security 19, No.3: 51.vii Kupchan, Charles and Clifford Kupchan. Summer 1991. “Concerts, Collective Security,and the Future of Europe” International Security 16, No. : 134.viii Ibid: 135-6.ix Staff, Western European Union. “History of the WEU”<http://www.weu.int/History.htm>x Van Eekelen. From Words to Deeds, Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies Press:11.xi Ibid: 27.xii Kollias, Christos, George Manolas, and Suzanna-Maria Paleologou. July 2004. “Defenceexpenditure and economic growth in the European Union: A causality analysis” Journal ofPolicy Modeling 26, No. 5: 553-569.xiii Both rankings from Staff, 2009. Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.). “CIA World Fact-book.” <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>xiv Staff, 2006. European Defense Agency, “2006 National Breakdowns of European De-fense Expenditures”<http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3027/2544647319_7edc746761.jpg?v=0>xv Jesse, Neal G. “Choosing to Go It Alone: Irish Neutrality in Theoretical and Compara-tive Perspective.” International Political Science Review, 27: 7 (2006), pp. 17.<http://ips.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/27/1/7>

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xvi Van Eekelen. From Words to Deeds, Brussels: Center for European Policy StudiesPress: 11.xvii Pagedas, Constantine. Fall 2001. “Post-Ismay Europe: Britain and the Rebalance of Eu-ropean Security” Mediterranean Quarterly: 114.xviii Ibid: 115.xix Planken, Stephan. 1999. “Timeline”<http://planken.org/images/balkans/map_kfor_troops.gif>xx Staff, 1999. Human Rights Watch. “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Human Rights De-velopments” <http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Eca-26.htm>.xxi Staff, 4 June 1999. European Council. “European Council declaration on strengtheningthe Common European Policy on Security and Defence” Quoted in European Union.

“Development of European Military Capabilities” June 2009.<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/esdp>xxii Staff, European Union. “Europa Glossary”<http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/petersberg_tasks_en.htm>xxiii Ulriksen, Stale. August 2003 “Military Europe: Capabilities and Constraints.” NUPI,<http://www.arena.uio.no/ecsa/papers/StaleUlriksen.pdf>xxiv “Joint Declaration on European Defence.” 18 December 1998. British-French Summit,St. Malo, France<http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/news/2002/02/joint-declaration-on-eu-new01795>xxv Pagedas, Constantine. Fall 2001. “Post-Ismay Europe: Britain and the Rebalance of Eu-ropean Security” Mediterranean Quarterly: 115.xxvi Pagedas, Constantine. Fall 2001. “Post-Ismay Europe: Britain and the Rebalance of Eu-ropean Security” Mediterranean Quarterly: 117..xxvii Ibid.xxviii Van Eekelen. From Words to Deeds, Brussels: Center for European Policy StudiesPress: 62xxix Van Eekelen. From Words to Deeds, Brussels: Center for European Policy StudiesPress: 62xxx Cornish, Paul and Geoffrey Edwards. 2005. “The Strategic Culture of the EuropeanUnion: A Progress Report” International Affairs, 81, No. 4: 816.<http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118735024/PDFSTART>xxxi Eliasson. “Traditions, Identity and Security” pp. 10xxxii Wivel, Anders. 2005 “The Security Challenge of Small EU Member States: Interests,Identity and the Development of the EU as a Security Actor” Journal of Common MarketStudies, 43, No. 2: 404.xxxiii Anon. 30 May 2001. “Turkey drops veto on EU-NATO defence agreement” EurActiv<http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/turkey-drops-veto-eu-nato-defence-agreement/article-110804>xxxivAnon. December 2003. “EU operational planning: the politics of defence” Strategic

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Comments, 9, No. 10 <http://www.nsrf.com/Backgrounders/back_EU2.htm>xxxv Cornish, Paul and Geoffrey Edwards. 2005. “The Strategic Culture of the EuropeanUnion: A Progress Report” International Affairs, 81, No. 4: 817.<http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118735024/PDFSTART>xxxvi Ibid.xxxvii Howorth, Jolyon. October 2002. “France, NATO and European Security: Status QuoUnsustainable, New Balance Unattainable?” IFRI<www.ifri.org/files/PEhiver2002howorth.pdf> AOriginally published in French: “La Fran-ce, l’OTAN et la sécurité européenne: statu quo ingérable, rééquilibre introuvable” April2002 Politique Etrangère; 1001-1016.xxxviii Van Eekelen. From Words to Deeds, Brussels: Center for European Policy StudiesPress: 66.xxxix Cornish, Paul and Geoffrey Edwards. 2005. “The Strategic Culture of the EuropeanUnion: A Progress Report” International Affairs, 81, No. 4: 816.<http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118735024/PDFSTART>xl Staff, 19 May 2003. European Council. “Press Release: 2509th Council meeting – Exter-nal Relations - Brussels, 19-20 May 2003”xli Ulriksen, Stale. August 2003 “Military Europe: Capabilities and Constraints.” NUPI,<http://www.arena.uio.no/ecsa/papers/StaleUlriksen.pdf>xlii Lindley-French, Julian. December 2005: “Headline Goal 2010 and the Concept of EUBattle Groups” Lecture:3.<www.cicerofoundation.org/pdf/lecture_lindleyfrench_dec05.pdf>xliii Ibid.xliv Staff, July 2009. European Union. “EU Battlegroups”<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1349&lang=EN>xlv Staff, 18 June 2004 European Council. “Headline Goal 2010.”<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf>xlvi Staff, July 2009. European Union. “EU Battlegroups”<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1349&lang=EN>xlvii Pascoe-Watson, George. 18 June 2008 “French President Nicholas Sarkosy has plans touse British aircraft carrier for EU navy when he takes over EU presidency” The Sunxlviii O’Dwyer, Gerard. 17 May 2009. “Interview: Sten Tolgfors” Defense News, 17 May2009. <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4094490&c=FEA&s=INT>xlix Ministry of Defence (Sweden), 3 July 2009. “Speech by the Minister for Defence StenTolgfors at Almedalen on the Baltic Sea Co-operation”<http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/12091/a/129883>l Ibidli Staff, 23 March 2006. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “Strategic airlift agreemententers into force” NATO Update <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/03-march/e0323a.htm>lii Howorth. “France, NATO and European Security” pp. 8.

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liii Mitzen, Jennifer. “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the SecurityDilemma” European Journal of International Relations, 2006, Vol 12, No. 3, pp. 349.liv Ibid. pp. 350.lv Ibid. pp. 350.

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AFRICOM: An Independent Review for theObama Administration

Daniel Lawner; Sarah Khederian

On October 28, 2009, the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (CADS), incooperation with Representative John Tierney, Chairman of the Subcommittee onNational Security and Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the House Committee onOversight and Government Reform, brought together a group of African embassyrepresentatives, U.S. civilian government personnel, U.S. military personnel, con-gressional staff members, and representatives from non-governmental organizations,think tanks and universities to discuss the challenges faced by and the future of theU.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).

The half-day event, held in the hearing room of the House Committee on theBudget, consisted of speeches from nine distinguished individuals representing aspectrum of highly informed perspectives on AFRICOM, ranging from enthusiasmfor the command’s potential to measured skepticism of its goals and activities tostern warnings against U.S. military assistance for African nations. CADS intention-ally recruited speakers with a diversity of viewpoints and expertise to highlight themultitude of opinions on the controversial combatant command and the complexityof the issues that it raises. Although the event was open to the public, the CADSstaff recruited an audience to represent a similar balance of opinions and areas ofexpertise.

The conference was chaired by Mr. Lester Hyman, CADS Vice Chairman, andwas moderated by Daniel Lawner, CADS Program Director. Representative JohnTierney—in his capacity as chairman of the National Security and Foreign Affairssubcommittee—graciously cooperated with CADS to make the event a success bysponsoring the Center’s use of congressional meeting space and delivering the day’skeynote remarks. The event would not have been possible without the generousfinancial support of the Center’s donors and the hard work of the Center’s staff andinterns.

This paper is not a verbatim account of the day’s proceedings. It is a reportbased on the speakers’ remarks. The paper’s authors sought to summarize argu-ments and evidence that the speakers presented and capture their concerns and theirsentiments. The authors tried to offer a concise account in order to distill the day’smain points into a form that is understandable to lay people and helpful forpolicy-makers.

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Representative John Tierney (D-MA) is the Chairman ofthe Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

Chairman John Tierney, the event’s keynote speaker,began the day’s discussion by voicing specific and practicalconcerns related to the Command’s purpose and approach.His comments were derived from his subcommittee’s inqui-ry into AFRICOM in 2008. The questions the NationalSecurity and Foreign Affairs subcommittee initially askedwere fairly fundamental. “At our first hearing over a yearago,” Chairman Tierney recounted, “we asked the question, ‘What is AFRICOM?’To a certain extent, we are still asking that question today.” Representative Tierneydivided his fundamental inquiry regarding the identity of AFRICOM into twodigestible questions, namely what is AFRICOM meant to accomplish and how canthe new organization effectively accomplish its goals?

Representative Tierney first addressed the widespread confusion surroundingthe “two alternate visions of AFRICOM.” While some consider AFRICOM to be areorganization of programs within the Department of Defense, others think that it isa “new kind of command”—an experimental interagency project. RepresentativeTierney contested the notion that AFRICOM could be treated as a basic reorganiza-tion of existing programs. He observed that any significant shuffling of Defenseprograms is a complex and ambitious task requiring robust oversight of issues suchas transition of responsibility for programs to staffing to the location of headquartersand components. Potential second and third-order effects such as strong profession-al militaries outsizing civilian institutions like police forces also demand attention.

The perception of AFRICOM as a “new kind of command” seemed even moretroubling to Representative Tierney. He noted that the comments regarding the birthof an innovative interagency command promulgated during AFRICOM’s rolloutcaused confusion amongst Africans and U.S. civilian agencies. Nevertheless, thesame language describing “a new and different approach” persists.

Representative Tierney underscored how important it is for the U.S. Govern-ment to strike a proper civilian-military balance in its relations with Africa. Hestressed his concern that the U.S. military has taken the lead on traditionallycivilian-led foreign policy functions like diplomacy and development.

Locating a whole-of-government approach within a military commandpresents a tension between the importance of representing U.S. activities inAfrica as peaceful and respectful of national sovereignty and the perceptionthat DOD is the lead agency for the U.S.’s relationship with Africa.

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His staff noted that personnel from lead civilian agencies often become over-whelmed with the requirements of coordinating with the DOD. One civilian officialreported spending fully one-third of her time coordinating with DOD personnelwhile her office was already stretched thin in resources and personnel. With theseriousness of African security concerns—including violent extremism, ethnicconflicts and HIV/AIDS—Chairman Tierney urged us to “ask whether the continentof Africa is the right place to experiment with a new U.S. interagency model.”

Representative Tierney stressed the importance of the U.S. Government unify-ing its message about AFRICOM’s goals, strategies, and its role in foreign policy.He emphasize the continuing uncertainty about whether AFRICOM is designed tobe a purely military outfit or a venture to tackle broader security challenges. “Beforewe are able to clearly and effectively communicate to Africans what our plans arefor AFRICOM,” he urged, “we need to figure them out for ourselves.”

In closing, Representative Tierney underscored how “the AFRICOM experi-ence” might be instructive to future interagency efforts. The U.S. government canlearn lessons about cases where agency-specific expertise should be preserved. TheAFRICOM example also demonstrates how the National Security Council canmanage the interagency at an operations level. Ultimately, Representative Tierneyrecognized the emergence of a new national security environment where failedstates are more dangerous than strong ones. He stressed the need to “show leadershipand foresight” in coordinating a broader policy toolkit while heeding the “troublingimplications for the civilian-military balance of U.S. foreign policy.”

Ambassador Princeton Lyman is Adjunct Senior Fellow atthe Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), and formerlyserved as Assistant Secretary of State for InternationalOrganizational Affairs as well as Ambassador to both SouthAfrica and Nigeria.

Ambassador Lyman brought the audience back to a timebefore AFRICOM’s creation by tracing the rise of Africaas a priority for the foreign policy community and by re-counting CFR’s arguments regarding Africa’s strategic rele-vance to the United States. The Council’s 2006 reportentitled “More than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach toward Africa,”presented security challenges of direct relevance to the United States and recom-mended a devoted military command to deal with problems in Africa. AmbassadorLyman frankly noted that AFRICOM “got off to a very bad start in part for trying todo the right things but unfortunately in the wrong way.”

The “wrong way,” to which Representative Tierney also alluded, involvedpresenting AFRICOM as a source not only of security assistance but of development,

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education, health and other areas ofcivilian assistance. The result wasAfricans seeing AFRICOM as evi-dence of the militarization of U.S.policy toward Africa. Another mis-take in AFRICOM’s rollout was thediscussion of establishing the AFRI-

COM headquarters on the African continent. This discourse stoked fears that theU.S. might be planning military interventions in Africa and “provided fodder topoliticians who wanted to…conjure up conspiracy theories about what the U.S. wasabout.”

Ambassador Lyman recognized the efficacy of AFRICOM’s recent efforts tolimit its responsibilities to traditional military assistance programs. Consequently,nations like Nigeria and South Africa that are harshly critical of AFRICOM havebegun to cooperate in military-to-military programs. He explained that most ofAFRICOM’s programs are no different than those that African countries had previ-ously implemented in a more efficient and coordinated manner.

Ambassador Lyman proceeded to explain some of the security issues in Africa,distinguishing the issues that concern Africans from those that concern the UnitedStates and examining AFRICOM’s role in addressing each set of challenges. Hebegan this analysis from the viewpoint of U.S. energy supplies in Africa:

Energy security is a major U.S. concern. We shouldn’t pretend that we’renot concerned if there is danger to that supply. Africa now provides 15 to20 percent of our oil imports. Let’s be honest about it; we’re concerned.But Africa is also concerned because for the oil-exporting states the securityof those areas and those supplies are also important.

Ambassador Lyman, however, clarified that although the security of oil suppliesrepresents a joint security concern—and an important one—it is not just a militaryproblem and thus it should not necessarily be AFRICOM’s job to lead the effort. With regards to terrorism, Ambassador Lyman questioned the efficacy of theTrans-Sahara Counterterrorism Program (TSCTP), and asked “whether the UnitedStates is (a) exaggerating the threats in this area, and (b) creating demands uponthese states that create problems for them greater than they had before.” In poorstates like Mali and Niger, counterterrorism programs have, in some cases, exacer-bated tensions between ethnic groups. Ambassador Lyman ultimately questionedthe premise that AFRICOM should and would be able to address insecurity andterrorism in the Sahel, especially when many of the terrorist groups have a purelydomestic agenda.

“...most of AFRICOM’s programsare no different than those thatAfrican countries had previouslyimplemented in a more efficientand coordinated manner..”

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In the Horn of Africa, where concerns regarding international terrorism aresalient due to the presence of the al Shabaab movement in Somalia, AmbassadorLyman addressed the challenges of coordinating U.S. military activities. Specifical-ly, he presented the example of the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa(CJTF-HOA), AFRICOM’s only major troop presence on the continent. CJTF-HOAis charged with carrying out a “hearts and minds” campaign oriented towardsmall-scale public works and was responsible for basic intelligence-gathering whenthe Pentagon ordered airstrikes on Somalia. “For a while,” Ambassador Lymanrecalled, “you had the Pentagon and CJTF-HOA and AFRICOM saying, ‘Well,that’s not us doing the bombing; that’s another part of the military.’ But if you werea victim of the bombings, you don’t look up and say, ‘Don’t worry, it’s notCJTF-HOA, it’s somebody else.’” In that case, kinetic military programs complicat-ed the “hearts and minds” type of work which AFRICOM sought to conduct. Thisexample reveals the clash between the U.S. military units located in Africa that areassigned different roles and responsibilities.

Alhough AFRICOM has been more successful when focusing on a narrowertraditional military assistance track, there is still political pressure coming fromofficials who believe that “because security is such a complex issue and you’redealing with problems of development and governance,” all combatant commandsshould be restructured as fully interagency organizations. This mindset, Ambassa-dor Lyman pointed out, originated with the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, buthe questioned whether it has relevance in the African context.

As a counter to this belief, he carefully distinguished between small-scale civicaction programs—building a school or digging a well—that a military outfit mightdo well, and true development projects. Implementing real development efforts,Ambassador Lyman explained, requires a long term focus on building stable andeffective institutions that would, for example, “have the capacity and the will to payfor the teachers for the school and [ensure] that there is enough money to buy dieselfor the wells.” He clearly stated that long-term development is not the job ofAFRICOM (or any other combatant command) but of other agencies.

Finally, he closed with a recommendation to AFRICOM to “distinguishbetween being an advocate and a participant.” Because of DOD’s heavy influence

“...kinetic military programs complicated the ‘hearts andminds’ type of work which AFRICOM sought to conduct.This example reveals the clash between the U.S. Militaryunits located in Africa that are assigned different roles andresponsibilities.

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within the government, it is important for AFRICOM to be vocal about issues likegovernance, development and health without insisting on leading these activities:

AFRICOM can be a very important advocate for these programs, but I thinkit ought to be very careful about the degree that it gets involved with thembeyond its traditional roles—and very welcome roles in most Africancountries—of working with and strengthening the security and defensecapabilities of African countries.

Louis Mazel is Director of the Office of Regional andSecurity Affairs at the Bureau of African Affairs in the U.S.Department of State.Mr. Mazel presented the State Department’s perspective onAFRICOM and the nature of its relationship with the StateDepartment. He stressed that the State Department AfricaBureau supports AFRICOM’s mission of military-to mili-tary engagement on-continent and that State has workedclosely with it by providing “policy guidance.” He alsoinsisted that the establishment of AFRICOM represents nomajor change in U.S. policy toward Africa:

While AFRICOM’s structure and character differs from that of the unifiedcommands as historically implemented…the role of the U.S. military in U.S.foreign policy on the continent basically has not changed.

He went on to argue that the State Department continues to take the lead on thedevelopment and execution of U.S. policy in Africa. This leadership requires thatU.S. representation in Africa, through its embassies retains a civilian face. Heconveyed the State Department view that the creation of AFRICOM was “animportant and natural part of the evolution of our strategic vision in Africa.” At thesame time, the creation of AFRICOM will give Africa greater visibility within theDOD. DOD officials will now regard Africa as a major strategic center of gravity,thus, DOD will be more inclined to support U.S. foreign policy in Africa. In time,the creation of AFRICOM will allow DOD to appreciate Africa’s importance as amajor supplier of important resources, a potential haven for terrorism and the sourceof other security challenges like narcotics and human trafficking and piracy.

Mr. Mazel described his organization’s perception of AFRICOM as “an oppor-tunity to strengthen and deepen the U.S. and African military relationships in sucha way that our combined efforts will generate more sustainable peace and securityon the continent.” He reiterated the State Department’s strong support ofAFRICOM’s military-to military security cooperation mission and repeated State’s

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encouragement for AFRICOM’s contributions to defense sector reform and for theformation of partnerships in peacekeeping, military professionalization, coastal andborder security and counterterrorism.

He then outlined some of the specific regionally-based AFRICOM efforts thatthe State Department sees as especially valuable:

� In Liberia, the State Department considers AFRICOM to be strategicallypositioned to help the country develop its maritime security capacity. TheState Department hopes that AFRICOM will continue to assist the profes-sional development of Liberia’s U.S.-trained armed forces, currently in theend of a contractor-led phase of security sector reform.

� In the Democratic Republic of Congo, State supports AFRICOM’s trainingof the DRC’s military—Forces Armées de la République Démocratique duCongo (FARDC)—so that it may be transformed into a “professional andtrustworthy provider of security for the people of that vast nation,” withrespect for human rights and sensitivity to sexual and gender-based vio-lence.

� In South Sudan, State welcomes the involvement of AFRICOM in profes-sionalizing and building the capacity of the Sudan People’s LiberationArmy (SPLA).

� In the Gulf of Guinea, State is enthusiastic about the Africa PartnershipStation (APS), which aims to build maritime security capacity “to ensurethat nations can protect their vast fisheries resources, curb trafficking ofdrugs, weapons, people and other illicit goods, and protect growing off-shore oil resources.”

� Off the Horn of Africa, State supports AFRICOM’s efforts to help combatpiracy (33,000 vessels transit the Gulf of Aden each year) and to protecthumanitarian aid shipments, a major area of U.S. investment (80 percent ofWorld Food Program shipments into the Horn of Africa are U.S.-funded).

State also welcomes AFRICOM’s participation—as mentors and observers—inthe State Department-led Africa Contingency Operations and Training and Assis-tance (ACOTA) program. He highlighted that the program has trained over 100,000African peacekeepers and that “now six of the top 12 contributing countries tointernational peacekeeping operations are African countries.”

Although Mr. Mazel communicated the State Department’s expectation thatAFRICOM will stay in its lane by attending to the military aspects of securitycooperation, he noted that AFRICOM must also be aware of and cooperate withother U.S. government agencies. “We have recognized from the start that U.S.security engagement with Africa requires a coherent and coordinated effort by allrelevant arms of the U.S. government including the Department of Defense.”

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He then clarified how the State Department works with AFRICOM specifically.Initially, the State Department offered input to AFRICOM’s theater security cam-paign plan and the DOD’s global employment of forces. State has also sent and willcontinue to send representatives from its African embassies to the security coopera-tion meetings and conferences in Germany “to shape AFRICOM’s engagement onthe continent.”

Challenges to effective cooperation with AFRICOM still exist, however. Thesechallenges are primarily based on the “tremendous imbalances in personnel resourc-es [between State and DOD].” AFRICOM has 1300 personnel in Stuttgart, morethan all of State’s political, economic and public affairs officers in Africa. Thechallenge then for State is to “exert political and civilian oversight of DOD and

AFRICOM’s activities [inAfrica].” State’s primarymethod to ensure such over-sight is to make certain thatall of AFRICOM’s activi-ties are military-to-militaryand are coordinated withcountry teams. “No DODactivities,” Mr. Mazelstressed, “are to be carriedout in a country without thefull knowledge and concur-rence of our chief of mis-sion and other elements ofthe country teams.”

He explained the necessity that AFRICOM defer to State’s authority specifical-ly in the areas of counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and humanitarian activities.Alhough AFRICOM has authorities and funding for counternarcotics programs,State has the lead on international law enforcement programs in Africa through itsBureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL Bureau). Mr.Mazel explained that the test “is to ensure that they follow the State lead in terms ofcounternarcotics activities to be conducted particularly in West Africa.” Concerningcounterterrorism, he urged that those activities should be closely coordinated withthe country team and that the chief of mission must be fully aware of all initiatives.

On the humanitarian front, AFRICOM’s activities through the CJTF-HOA andAfrica Partnership Station must be coordinated with the country team to ensure thatUSAID is “setting the focus and tone for community relations, humanitarian andother development-type activities.” He then pointed out the importance ofAFRICOM’s humanitarian work being synchronized with host-country militaries sothat African populations can see their own militaries doing positive and productive

“Challenges to effective cooperationwith AFRICOM still exist, however.These challenges are primarily basedon the “tremendous imbalances inpersonnel resources” between State andDOD—AFRICOM has 1300 personnelin Stuttgart, more than all of State’spolitical, economic and public affairsofficers in Africa.”

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work. This observation is particularly applicable in countries where militaries haveplayed a historically problematic role.

Mr. Mazel elucidated “the strategies for ensuring closer State-AFRICOM coop-eration,” which essentially boiled down to the more efficient and effective sharingof information. On a practical level, Mr. Mazel recommended that the defenseattaché or senior defense officer be fully integrated into the country team so that hemay share information about AFRICOM plans and activities. In Washington, Mr.Mazel cited successes on the State/AFRICOM coordination front: there is an AFRI-COM liaison at the weekly Africa bureau meeting and General Ward and AssistantSecretary Johnnie Carson maintain frequent communication. Additionally, AFRI-COM participated in the Africa Bureau Chiefs-of-Mission Conference—GeneralWard spoke and took questions for more than an hour—and State and AFRICOMsmoothly divvied up leadership responsibilities for various training-related pro-grams at the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) conference.

“It’s all to say,” Mr. Mazel closed, “that we are making every effort through theState Department to ensure that AFRICOM remains in its military-to-military lane,that our foreign policy in Africa is led by State, and that we have a strong imprint onAFRICOM planning for activities on the African continent.”

Dr. Patrick Cronin is Senior Director of the Asia-PacificSecurity Program at the Center for New American Security.

Dr. Cronin presented the results from the StanleyFoundation’s 50th Strategy for Peace Conference roundta-ble, entitled “African Security and the Future of AFRI-COM,” which he had chaired. He began by highlightingthe issues that roundtable participants recognized as theprimary African security challenges, which differ from thesecurity threats that the United States encounters in otherregions. Some of the security challenges were more gener-al and common—weak or absent institutions and weak

governance; the demographic explosion exacerbated by brain drain and “the digitaldivide”; climate change; violent extremism—and some were more regionallyspecific—ongoing conflicts, for example, in Somalia, Sudan, and the DemocraticRepublic of Congo.

He then recapitulated the group’s evaluation of AFRICOM’s potential to ad-dress these issues. First, the group discussed whose security AFRICOM wasdesigned to protect. In Washington, the focus is on U.S. Security. Conversely, thefocus of our African partners is African security. For example, while the U.S. ismostly preoccupied with issues of violent extremism and maritime security alongsupply routes, Africans will be focused on more localized issues: law and order,

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corruption, breakdown of services, population demographic issues like the youthbulge and leadership transitions that may lead to instability. The persistence of thisdivide begs the question: “Can AFRICOM help the United States government betteralign its own security issues and concerns with those of African states in society?”

Part of the difficulty, Dr. Cronin explained, is the sheer number of securitychallenges. Thus, it is important that policymakers organize and prioritize issues sothat they can actually create practical and targeted solutions. “Americans arefamous for our reductionism,” Dr. Cronin acknowledged. “It allows us to invent andcreate solutions but it also means that you’re doing damage by oversimplifying, soyou constantly have to come back and make sure you’re doing the qualitativeassessment.”

Dr. Croninshared the group’sclose examination ofthe structure of AFRI-COM, the ways it isunique, and the po-tential it holds to be-come a model forother U.S. securityefforts. He returned

to a central theme of the day, which is whether AFRICOM is, in fact, a “differentkind of combatant command.” He clarified the distinction between AFRICOM’sfocus on conflict prevention and that of other combatant commands—CentralCommand or Pacific Command, for example—which focus mainly on respondingto conflict and which use a primarily kinetic approach. AFRICOM’s focus onconflict prevention required the creation of a platform so that the command couldmaintain its attention to Africa as opposed to an approach based on the attitude that

“We’ll focus on it when we see a problem; we’re there for a day; now we’re goneuntil the next problem.” This ongoing immersion requires the U.S. government tobuild the relationships to support that continued involvement and to develop agenuine understanding of situations on the ground.

With regard to its interagency nature, the Stanley group identified AFRICOM’spotential as a model for the creation of “nested strategies”—the integration ofcountry teams, who in theory should be aware of everything that the U.S. govern-ment and U.S. agents are doing in a specific country, into the military planningprocess. This avoids the situation that Mr. Mazel implied where the military plansoperations in a country without the input or sometimes even knowledge of thecountry team. “AFRICOM potentially knits together and creates linkages that didn’texist…but whether it can be successful in creating better whole-of-governmentapproaches remains to be seen. This is still a work in progress.”

“He clarified the distinction betweenAFRICOM’s focus on conflict preventionand that of other combatant commands—Central Command or Pacific Command, forexample—which focus mainly on respondingto conflict and which use a primarily kineticapproach.”

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Dr. Cronin and theStanley Group alsoidentified AFRICOM’spotential for bolsteringAfrican state securityinstitutions. Hestressed the importanceof African states be-coming contributors tosecurity as opposed todetractors and stressedAFRICOM’s role inthat process. Specifically, AFRICOM has the potential to collaborate with andbolster regional institutions—like the African Union—and can work on issues thattranscend national boundaries (whereas, for example, the State Department mustwork with each country individually).

Dr. Cronin highlighted a number of recommendations from the group’s discus-sions. The first recommendation was for AFRICOM to fill State Department andUSAID positions close to their initially promised levels (out of thirteen promisedpositions, only four had been filled at the time of the conference). This guidance wasbased on recognition that AFRICOM will face difficulties planning for complexcontingencies if it does not strengthen the civilian side of its organization. Movingbeyond their concerns regarding proper levels of civilian staffing, the group focusedon the necessity of examining the specific areas of expertise housed within thecommand. They suggested identifying gaps, and ensuring that key areas—forexample, natural resource-related conflict—are covered.

Dr. Cronin then applied the theme of “reducing the problem set and prioritizingefforts” to the group’s discussion of Somalia. By dividing the country into differentsub-regions, one can recognize that the territories of Somaliland and Puntland areactually relatively operational. This approach allows policymakers to focus on theproblem areas. The group also explored the possibility of looking for ways to workwith civil society and businesses on the ground in a comprehensive and cost-effective manner in addition to top-down solutions.

Discussion of Somalia led to conversation on maritime security and piracy. Thegroup identified piracy as an enduring and shared challenge, not just an issue du jour.They discussed the need and the opportunity for the U.S. to work with otherinternational actors who share the same waterways. Piracy is also a challenge in theGulf of Guinea and the group acknowledged efforts underway to build indigenousmaritime security capacity as a longer-term solution to this problem.

Dr. Cronin closed by sharing the group’s lingering questions—the foremostbeing whether AFRICOM will serve as a prototype to develop an improved U.S.

“With regard to its interagency nature,the Stanley group identified AFRICOM’spotential as a model for the creation of

‘nested strategies’—the integration ofcountry teams, who in theory should beaware of everything that the U.S.government and U.S. agents are doingin a specific country, into the militaryplanning process.”

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government model for interagency national security efforts and for conflict preven-tion strategy. Other questions included:� How does AFRICOM engage civil society?� How does AFRICOM determine the political will of African partners in

leadership?� How can AFRICOM be successful without a similar push to increase U.S.

government capacity?� How can contractors become involved in AFRICOM’s initial planning

stages as opposed to just being an afterthought?� Can AFRICOM address gaps in governance and institutions? How do you

balance when to intervene with when to resist intervention?� What are and what will be AFRICOM’s metrics for success?� How can AFRICOM leverage its relatively scarce resources to “build state

capacity and help secure the global commons?”

John Pendleton is Director of Force Structure andPlanning Issues of the Defense Capabilities and Man-agement Team with the U.S. Government Accountabil-ity Office.Mr. Pendleton emphasized the absence of a standard forinteragency collaboration while postulating that AFRI-COM may be a useful experiment and potentially aneffective template for interagency structuring and coordi-nation. Mr. Pendleton insisted ultimately that “AfricaCommand…is not the problem. It reveals the problems;

the difficult structural and organizational things that underlie the way we’re orga-nized in the U.S. government…and perhaps the way we approach things.”

Mr. Pendleton recounted his participation in the National Security and ForeignAffairs Subcommittee’s investigation of AFRICOM in 2008, focusing primarily onissues surrounding the command’s mission, worries over militarization of foreignpolicy, and the interagency command structure. He maintained that the query , as itpertained to the interagency, concentrated more specifically on how the DOD “wasgoing to bring in the many, many often disparate views from all the differentagencies and partner nations.”

Assessing AFRICOM’s structure was difficult, Mr. Pendleton explained, be-cause “there were really no criteria for what a good interagency command lookedlike.” Furthermore, information provided by AFRICOM itself and DOD was un-clear; Mr. Pendleton provided an example of this opacity when he recalled officialsfrom the DOD stating “we’re going to have this new type of command, it’s going tobe 25 percent interagency.” However, Mr. Pendelton explained, “Nobody could tellme 25 percent of what, or what these folks were going to do.” Even after AFRICOM

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identified their desired levels of civilian support, challenges remained insecuring personnel commitments from thinly-staffed civilian agencies, espe-cially because it was unlikely that an AFRICOM assignment would be per-ceived as an attractive or career-enhancing position.

Mr. Pendleton pointed out that even if all of these agencies come togetherin Stuttgart their approaches may be vastly different, and stakeholders inpartner nations may have divergent views as well. In this sense, “interagencyparticipation is a little bit of a red herring.” And focusing on creating civilianstaff positions in Stuttgart will not get to the root of the problem.

Mr. Pendleton briefly addressed the issue of the location of AFRICOM’sheadquarters. He praised AFRICOM’s decision to delay any discussion ofputting AFRICOM HQ on African soil as “pragmatic.” He insisted on theimportance of making a definitive decision on AFRICOM’s location when thetime comes. He underscored the need to communicate the decision effectively,but also noted that in the interim, policymakers should avoid spending a lot ofresources on temporary facilities.

He explained that AFRICOM’s challenges are not unique to AFRICOMbut reveal larger challenges of “how we’re organized and approach nationalsecurity across the federal government.” He referenced the GAO’s September2009 report on Interagency Collaboration for National Security in which hefound that national security efforts often lack a coherent unified strategy. Hewas clear to point out that he was not necessarily referring to “a nationallevel…glossy document,” or a larger national security strategy. More specificefforts like the TSCTP, he pointed out, lacked agreement on objectives. Therewas “a lot of confusion, a lot of people going in embassies and not necessarilydoing what they needed to do.”

Mr. Pendleton envisioned an end-state where governmental organizationshave workforces that understand the capabilities and responsibilities of theother agencies, allowing them to work in the “interagency ether.” He did notnecessarily recommend a full-scale restructuring like the effort that the Projecton National Security Reform (PNSR) insisted upon in their December 2008report, Forging a New Shield. On the contrary, he simply identified the needto set proper strategies and to build organizations that efficiently shareinformation.

“Mr. Pendleton pointed out that even if all of these agenciescome together in Stuttgart their approaches may be vastlydifferent, and stakeholders in partner nations may havedivergent views as well.”

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Mr. Pendleton ended his remarks by noting that any reform on the same scale asthe establishment of AFRICOM’s will be a long process. It will probably takearound five years to create a mature organizational culture. He placed AFRICOM’schallenges within the context of a “profound shift that’s happening right now whilethe Department of Defense tries to figure out what its role is in the future.” TheDOD, Mr. Pendleton commented, is still trying to figure out the role of StabilityOperations within the larger organization.

Ultimately, Mr. Pendleton shared his feeling that DOD probably set its expecta-tions for AFRICOM too high. “AFRICOM is not going to create whole-of-govern-ment approach for Africa,” he said. But, he ended his remarks on an optimistic note:

“By working with other agencies, they can build a better-informed Department ofDefense plan.”

Lauren Ploch is Africa Analyst with the CongressionalResearch Service.

Ms. Ploch examined some of the more successfulAFRICOM programs—the APS and the Natural Fire exer-cise in Uganda—and shared the example of AFRICOM’shumanitarian affairs branch, which implemented require-ments for civilian project approval. She suggested thatthese programs could serve as a positive model for inter-agency collaboration. She also addressed the relationshipbetween AFRICOM and civilian agencies with respect tofunding and personnel levels.

Ms. Ploch began her speech with an anecdote of Cameroon’s military intercept-ing a pirate vessel off the coast of the Bakassi Peninsula, between Nigeria andCameroon, to highlight the security concerns faced by West African coastal nationsand to provide an instance of AFRICOM training African militaries to independent-ly address those concerns.

The Gulf of Guinea, with over 40 pirate attacks in 2008, is the second-mostdangerous waters in the world. Over a billion dollars are lost annually to oil theft inNigeria alone and African countries lose another billion in revenue as a result ofillegal fishing. Coupled with the 50 tons of cocaine transiting Western Africa eachyear, Western Africa faces a multitude of serious maritime security challenges—challenges which affect not only West African nations, but the United States and thenations of Western Europe as well.

Ms. Ploch discussed some of the programs through which AFRICOM hassought to build indigenous maritime security capacity to address some of theseconcerns. First, AFRICOM has for the last several years been training Cameroon’srapid intervention battalion (BIR) and the Cameroonian Navy, through its navalcomponent, NAVAF. Her story of a Cameroonian vessel single-handedly capturing

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a pirate ship in the gulf wasparticularly telling. Secondly,she explained the work of theAfrica Partnership Station(APS), “basically a floatingschoolhouse, as the Navy likesto call it.” She stressed theinteragency nature of theeffort—which is staffed bypersonnel from the State De-partment, National Oceanicand Atmospheric Administra-tion (NOAA), USAID and anumber of NGOs. She alsoemphasized its internationalcharacter—there were repre-

sentatives from 20 to 30 countries on board last fall’s European-led deployment.In addition, she identified the Natural Fire 10 exercise in Uganda as an AFRI-

COM operation involving extremely complex issues—pandemic response, disasterand emergency response, humanitarian aid delivery—that cross borders. “I raisethese activities,” she explained, “because people often ask me what AFRICOM is,and it’s easy to throw back at them, well, it’s DOD’s combatant command for thecontinent of Africa, but it’s easier to explain what AFRICOM does.” She alsopointed out that many of AFRICOM’s initiatives, including the APS and the NaturalFire exercise, predated the creation of the command (natural fire was conducted byCENTCOM and the APS was conducted by EUCOM).

Ms. Ploch then moved to the theme of whether AFRICOM would serve as a newmodel for an interagency command within the context of a larger discussion of theideal capacities of U.S. military versus civilian agencies. “The timing ofAFRICOM’s announcement,” Ms. Ploch elaborated, “came at a time when there wasa bigger discussion ongoing about the appropriate roles of the civilian and themilitary in agencies and their sizes and their funding.” She cited the StateDepartment’s 2009 budget requests for over 1,000 new personnel including 300 newUSAID positions as an example of State’s efforts to “right size what it sees as animbalance in staffing.”

She then explicated the resource disparities between AFRICOM and the StateDepartment, breaking them down into funds and personnel. In terms of funding forsecurity-assistance programs in Africa, the State Department controls $250 million.While large portions of the programs are implemented by DOD personnel or bycontractors, they are “State Department-led, State-Department designed, they areState Department programs. They are title XXII programs.” DOD, in comparison,

A Ugandan military officer talks with officers fromAFRICOM as they prepare for exercise Natural Fire 10in Entebbe, Uganda.

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has only $50 million in their own DOD-led Title X security assistance programs.The discrepancy that she mentioned—which Mr. Mazel also echoed in hisremarks—concerns the number of personnel.

Ms. Ploch elaborated upon the personnel involved with AFRICOM. She clari-fied that AFRICOM does not have standing forces to draw from for an engagement.They have only about 300 people at CJTF-HOA in Djibouti that they can draw foronly certain types of training exercises—contingent upon proper skill sets and onlyin East Africa. Ms. Ploch predicted that the Pentagon and Congress would wrestlewith whether or not to devote standing forces to AFRICOM in upcoming years.

She then examined the issue of AFRICOM’s collaboration with other govern-ment agencies, describing her experience with the Theater Security Working Group(TSWG)—the same example Mr. Mazel had used to highlight AFRICOM/Statecooperation. “There had been a lot of skepticism as to why the State Departmentwas being allowed into the planning process, and it gave me the impression that thiswas a rather unprecedented step that AFRICOM had taken.”

Ms. Ploch then spoke about Dr. Diana Putnam, the head of AFRICOM’shumanitarian affairs branch, to provide an example of the level of AFRICOM’scivilian oversight that has been executed. Dr. Putnam is a USAID employee and anembedded anthropologist who—as chief of humanitarian affairs—has mandatedthat all of AFRICOM’s humanitarian affairs activities must be approved by both theambassador and the USAID chief of mission in a given country. Each activity,before it is carried out, must fit three-requirements: 1) it must meet U.S. foreignpolicy objectives, 2) it must fit in with AFRICOM’s objectives, and 3) it must fit inline with the mission’s strategic plan (the embassy’s plans and goals for activitiesfor the coming year). Dr. Putnam’s new regulations require that USAID and theState Department, buy into AFRICOM’s humanitarian affairs activities, Ms. Plochpointed out.

Ms. Ploch cited the the chairman of the Kenyan parliament’s foreign affairs anddefense committee, who maintains that AFRICOM’s humanitarian affairs activitiesin Northern Kenya have since been very well received. “We’ve found that theKenyan people see a tangible benefit to the U.S. military being in the area, which Ithought was interesting.”

To close, Ms. Ploch shared AFRICOM’s budget numbers: in 2010 AFRICOMrequested about $300 million, which doesn’t included CJTF-HOA’s costs. CJTF-HOA requested about $250 million for operating expenses alone, and $60 millionfor operations. “It’s challenging to figure out…how much benefit you get out of$300 million plus $250 million plus $60 million in terms of increasing the stabilityon the continent and building the capacity of African militaries. It’s [ultimately] anopen-ended question for Congress to deal with.”

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Dr. Sandra Barnes is Founding Director of the AfricanStudies Center at the University of Pennsylvania

Dr. Barnes discussed the historical background ofAfrica and colonial rule relevant to U.S. foreign policytoward Africa while emphasizing the danger of an imbal-ance between African militaries and civil societies. Sheadvocated stepping back to establish long-term goals de-vised to improve civil society in Africa.

Dr. Barnes began by discussing the impact of coloniallegacies on the structure of modern African states and their economies. She de-scribed how in the European colonies, “control of political and economic institutionsand policies was centralized under the colonial governor, who had full authorityover administration, economic affairs and the maintenance of order.” The state hadfull authority over extractive industries and trade relationships and colonial rulersmaintained a complete monopoly on economic, governmental, military and judicialpowers. In these states, the military was used by European rulers not to maintainexternal security but to ensure social order—sometimes by force. These structures,Dr. Barnes argues, were not dismantled after independence. Consequently, “thedecoupling of authority over the state’s primary economic resources and politicalinstitutions has not taken place.”

This “monopoly at the center of the African state” has created huge economicand political rewards for those with access to state institutions, thus creating intensecompetition for political office and often leading to poor leadership because “onlythe most ruthless are likely to succeed.” Dr. Barnes further argued that this kind ofgovernance demonstrates “the makings of ruling oligarchies which share the eco-nomic privileges and resources of the state among a powerful coterie of people whohold the highest offices.”

Within this vestigial system of colonial rule, African states are particularly proneto military involvement in politics. Dr. Barnes offered some figures: “there havebeen 80 successful military coups, 108 failed coups, [and] an additional 139 well-documented coup plots… By the 1980s, more than half of African governmentswere military in some ways in origin coups or handovers to elect the civilians.”These military governments are often more authoritarian, repressive and undemocrat-ic than the regimes they replace. They focus on expansion of the military and exploitthe assistance of foreign patrons to access training, technology and equipment.

The United States has served as one of these “foreign patrons.” When U.S.policies are carried out through its military, its leaders must build and maintainrelationships with their African military counterparts, who become their primarypoints of contact. Therefore it is the African militaries who are in the best positionto influence the decisions of U.S. military officials. Unfortunately, these decisionscan have deleterious effects on African populations.

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In that vein, Dr. Barnes described the “history of U.S. support for military rulesand military action [as] sorely blemished.” Dr. Barnes cited the figure of $1.5billion worth of weaponry sold from the U.S. to Africa between 1950 and 1989,much of which went to brutal regimes in the DRC, Liberia, Somalia and Sudan. TheU.S., Dr. Barnes insisted, continues to back the same types of authoritarian militaryregimes it did during the Cold War, in support of narrowly-defined and short-termgoals. These actions “can be self-defeating when it is not consistent with thedemocratic ideals and practices that are central to U.S. foreign-policy rhetoric.”

Dr. Barnes offered three examples in support of her claim. The first examplethat she provided was Equatorial Guinea, where the U.S. Government offeredmilitary aid to build up the nation’s coast guard to President Nguema (who seizedpower in a military coup). Although the U.S. had closed its embassy in 1996 toprotest President Nguema’s human rights record, tit subsequently reopened itsembassy when it was pressured by oil companies with an interest in the region. Atthe same time, U.S. military spending in Equatorial Guinea has remained andcontinues to stay at a constant level.

While aid is increasingly going to countries with more executive accountability,the U.S. continues to support countries with unlimited executive authority.

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Dr. Barnes’s second example focused on Mali. She pointed out that Mali’sinternal dissonant group, the Tuareg rebels who the U.S. claims have ties to al-Qaeda, inhabit the areas surrounding oil deposits (similarly, Tuareg rebels in Nigerare situated near uranium mines and deposits). And while the U.S. has trained theMalian and Niger militaries to combat these groups, Dr. Barnes questioned theserebels’ connections to al-Qaeda, adding that governments may be using the “specterof al-Qaida to gain U.S. support for their long-standing efforts to bring the Tuaregfinally under state control.”

Dr. Barnes’s third example focused on Somalia. She claimed that the presenceof U.S.-backed Ethiopian troops in Somalia served to further radicalize the Islamistopposition movements, thereby exacerbating rather than ameliorating the threat. Shealso stated that the Ethiopian intervention “curtail[ed] some nascent state-buildingactivities that [were] occurring in Somalia.” These examples, in which U.S. short-term strategic interests were put above state development issues, emphasize theinherent problems with both the direct and indirect U.S. influence that often sustainsmilitary leadership in the region.

Dr. Barnes’s offered two main policy recommendations to halt the cycle of U.S.assistance bolstering the power of military regimes. Her first was that U.S. policy inthe region should not revolve around “short term goals…based on the vague notionof national security.” Secondly, Dr. Barnes emphasized that “it is naïve to think thatsoft power, interagency cooperation, training programs in democratic processes orpractices will have effective, real reform.” Instead, she argued, the U.S. should lookinto longer-term infrastructural development (taken from the Chinese approach inAfrica). This kind of development has a real impact on transferring economic powerfrom the state to the people, thus removing what she called the “structural straitjack-et left over from the colonial era.”

Dr. Barnes continued her compelling reproach by questioning the future effica-cy and even the necessity of AFRICOM, asking “can we truly justify the extraordi-nary amount of money that goes into AFRICOM and near-invisible endeavors thatintensify the militarization of those states?” Finally, she concluded her remarks withanother thought-provoking inquiry, this time wondering whether it is possible forthe fulfillment of U.S. national interests and the enrichment of African lives to occursimultaneously:

Is it possible then, to step back and rethink our long-term goals and prioritiesand assess how better the U.S. can take part in building the kinds ofinstitutions and practices that improve the lives of the majority of Africanpeople, improve the lives of people in civil society while doing no harm toour own people and our own national interests?

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Thomas Callahan is Director of Strategic Planning with theReadiness and Stability Operations Unit at the LockheedMartin Corporation.

Mr. Callahan recognized the formation of AFRICOMas part of a shift in overall Department of Defense approachbased on the notion that diplomacy and development are ofequal importance to defense in foreign affairs and to themaintenance of a secure and stable Africa. Mr. Callahanconcluded by recommending further cooperation betweenagencies through research and development agreements, the inclusion of otherlayers in former military-to-military relations, and the establishment of proactivesupport plans.

Mr. Callahan began by acknowledging that AFRICOM has a handful of effec-tive initiatives, many of which were born out of EUCOM and thus actually predatedAFRICOM. He offered a handful of recommendations which he saw as necessary orbeneficial to AFRICOM’s success in the future.

First, Mr. Callahan noted the importance of recognizing that “AFRICOM andthe creation of AFRICOM and its duties occur in the context of a much largershift…in military doctrine in the U.S.” This, he stated, has come about due to theincreasing focus on new threats to U.S. security. A major aspect of this shift is therecognition of “the importance of human security issues and the legitimacy ofgovernments. Not just from some abstract objective point of view on a list ofgovernments but from the subjective point of view of the governed.” In this newframework, he argued, the State Department and USAID play a much more impor-tant role than ever before: now, civilian efforts have a much more direct effect onU.S. national security.

Secondly, as these changes take place in DOD culture, AFRICOM must alsoevolve and must define the difference between “security” and “national security.” Inthis way, AFRICOM officials must put themselves in the shoes of the Africans withwhom they’re working and determine what concerns Africans have regarding borderissues, food security, drug or human trafficking, political instability or ethnicviolence, etc.

Third, Mr. Callahan recommended that AFRICOM play a “catalytic role” inworking with U.S. civilian agencies as well as multilateral institutions and Africanregional organizations. He recognized the political resources that DOD could bringto bear as well as its obvious economic advantages. Additionally, the DOD hastechnology and capabilities which would be extremely effective in a non-militarysphere. He gave the example of “remote mobile communications and globalvisualization using various sensors to enable decision support,” which could poten-tially facilitate the enforcement of illegal fishing on the West African coast. Mr.Callahan articulated that while there are flaws in this system, it is emblematic of the

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kind of work that can be done: products are “developed using research and develop-ment and DOD contracts over the years that [the] military-industrial complexproduces that can then be used in the developmental and diplomatic arenas to goodeffect.”

Mr. Callahan’s fourth recommendation focused on logistical readiness for rapiddisaster response. He cited the example of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide whenhumanitarian disaster was occurring, but the DOD was unable to respond logistically.He stated that now, even “with forward-operating sites in Djibouti up here andAscension Island out there in the middle of the Atlantic, there’s got to be a lot morecapability so that material and transportation can be brought in as needed.”

Mr. Callahan’s final recommendation was to continue incorporating industry—“the research-and-development pool”—into the State Department and AFRICOMarena. With the shift in DOD culture (mentioned earlier) from hard to soft power,Mr. Callahan argued “that soft power matters and things like appropriate technolo-gies and remote communications and remote power sources and transportablelogistical factors – that these things do matter in any contingency operation.” Andwhile the DOD has been doing well at articulating its needs to R&D firms, Mr.Callahan urged that the State Department and the civilian agencies in particularshould provide “incentive and direction” for the research and development industryso that they can create useful, relevant technologies.

He concluded by reiterating this sentiment, stating that “I don’t think the StateDepartment has ever done cooperative research-and-development agreements withindustry or folks like that. That’s an area in which, I think, whole-of-governmentsolutions could be brought together in a faster way.”

COL Paul Daniels is Chief of Strategy with the UnitedStates Africa Command.

Col. Daniels began by emphasizing that the prioritymission of AFRICOM is to safeguard American interests.In order to do this, the U.S. must first define its interests inthe region. Col. Daniels added that he agreed with Dr.Barnes’s assessment that U.S. policy in the region has beenshort-sighted and that longer-term interests must be de-fined. Col. Daniels then outlined the difficulty of this tasksince the Obama Administration had not formally definedU.S. policy in Africa at the time of the conference. He did, however, remark that

“President Obama’s July speech in Ghana, the administration’s preliminary reviewof national security priorities, Sec. of State Clinton’s visit to Africa and AmbassadorCarson’s remarks before Congress all provide clear signposts” of a broader policy.

Col. Daniels then emphasized that though “the United States and our Africanpartners sometimes use different language to describe the threats and challenges to

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be addressed in Africa, our concerns, our interests, are overwhelmingly sharedinterests.” He articulated that these interests include the threat of extremism andterrorism, failed states, humanitarian crises and maritime security – threats whichaffect both the U.S. and its African partners.

In addressing these issues, Col. Daniels identified the fundamental question incrafting DOD policy: “how do we use limited military resources to address thethreats to shared U.S. and African interests?” He also added as a side note that thecontroversial issue of the “militarization of foreign policy” is akin to an urbanlegend; AFRICOM’s funds are far more limited than those possessed by the StateDepartment or USAID.

In the allocation of mili-tary resources, AFRI-COM has chosen astrategic approach con-sisting of two distinctelements. To describethe first “indirect” ele-ment, Col. Daniels chose

a quote from President Obama’s speech in Ghana: “We must start from the simplepremise that Africa’s future is up to Africans.” Col. Daniels clarified that the indirectelement focuses on “assisting our African partners [and increasing] their capabilitiesand capacity to address security challenges on the continent.” Col. Daniels describedthis component as a long-term effort, a sustained policy to build and develop Africanstates’ capacities.

The second element is more direct and has a short-term emphasis. Col. Danielsstated that “in recognition that the indirect element is a long-term effort, [thiselement] entails targeted, direct Department of Defense contributions in Africa’smost troubled countries to mitigate the immediate threats posed by continuedinstability.” In countering these threats, Col. Daniels articulated that an interagencyapproach must be conceived to put forward a “whole-of-government approachaddressing these problems.”

In combining both the direct and indirect elements of AFRICOM’s strategicapproach, Col. Daniels addressed a concern that Dr. Barnes raised regarding U.S.collaboration with military-led African governments. He argued that PresidentObama has made it a clear priority to push for and reward better governments inAfrica. These “improved” governments are the partners with whom both AFRICOMand the President’s Administration want to interact.

Through our relationship with these partners, Col. Daniels argued, regionalsecurity can be obtained, especially as they assume a more active role in regionalpeacekeeping. He stated that “the Command partners with states that have devel-

“He argued that President Obama hasmade it a clear priority to push for andreward better governments in Africa, andthat these ‘improved’ governments arethe partners with whom both AFRICOMand President’s Administration wantto interact.”

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oped a degree of internal stability through improved governance and political andeconomic liberalization that allows them to employ or even export their securitycapacity for the greater good of their region and the continent as a whole.” Thispeacekeeping approach, he added, can only be successful with effective multi-national cooperation—this model has been proven successful in the DRC, wheremany non-African states are involved in ongoing peacekeeping operations.

In the spirit of cooperation, Col. Daniels also reemphasized the importance ofinteragency collaboration. In this regard, AFRICOM has been making improve-ments: “Rather than the problematic historical model of DOD planning and thenasking for input on a plan, many agencies were involved from the very beginning.”Col. Daniels concluded that, “Africa Command was a pilot case for more inclusiveplanning…and we think this kind of planning will be directed to other commands toplan in the same way…”

Daniel Lawner joined the CADS team as a researcher in 2007 and now directs theInitiative for a Comprehensive Approach to National Security (ICANS) . A graduateof Northwestern University, Dan conducted independent research on African history,which culminated in a research grant for travel to the National Archives in Londonand a paper entitled “Gateway to Africa: Exoticism, Commercialism and BritishPerceptions of Colonial Zanzibar.”

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Taking the Offensive: The Utility and Limitationsof Raiding

Adam Elkus

American participation in nation-building campaigns has heavily embedded theinterrelated concepts of counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations into theframework of American strategy. The prewar failure to plan for stability operationsin Iraq may become as admonitory to future policymakers as the appeasement ofHitler at Munich was to statesmen after World War II. Nevertheless, a contradictorystrain of American strategy is steadily emerging that advocates the use of standofffirepower and strategic raids as an alternative to population-centric engagement.COIN critics charge that population-centric strategies are wasteful, spotlightAmerica’s weaknesses, and are politically unsustainable. In turn, they argue thatvarious offshore raiding strategies draw on America’s chief strength: the disciplinedapplication of conventional military force.

What can broadly be considered raiding strategy deserves consideration as analternative to global counterinsurgency. However, its utility is limited and must bebounded within a broader review of American grand strategy. This paper addressesthe utility and limitations of raiding and punitive expeditions. Both raiding andglobal counterinsurgency are valuable approaches in pursuit of strategic goals butshould not be elevated to the centerpiece of national security policy--especially inlight of underdetermined grand strategy.

Raiding in Theory and Practice Raiding has a long and distinguished role in strategy. Historian Archer Jones

states that the two foundational military strategies are raiding strategies used as a“transitory presence in hostile territory to make a hostile incursion,” and persistingstrategies employed to put “significant portion of [opposed] territory under theadversary’s control.” Jones, in turn, juxtaposes these strategies with methods offorce depletion: destroying the enemy’s forces directly (“combat strategy”) orwearing down the opponent by depriving them of needed resources (“logisticstrategy”).i Combinations of both categories create comprehensive military strate-gies.

Methods of raiding have differed throughout history. Some raids punish anadversary by devastating civilian infrastructure, while others target the opponent’sarmed forces. Raids in war have featured highly mobile forces venturing deep intothe opponent’s operational and strategic depths. The Civil War, for example, finclud-ed countless deep cavalry raids against railroads. The famous 1864 raid on Washing-ton D.C. by Confederate General Jubal Early took on strategic importance, although

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its long-term impact on the war’s outcome was marginal at best. General Robert E.Lee sent the 2nd Corps under the Command of Jubal Early, a force of only 12,000men toward D.C. While the Union army ultimately compelled them to retreat,Early’s troops achieved some victories along the way causing confusion and conster-nation amongst the Union army.

Raids can be one-off events designed to achieve a single effect or sustainedconfrontations designed to wear down an adversary through successive operations.Some states extensively employ raiding to attrite terrorists and militant groups - theU.S. and Israeli policies of targeted killings are examples of such an approach.

The modern idea of the “strategic raid” has come to be equated with rapid,decisive operations like the conventional campaign of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.However, a true strategic raid in the classical sense refers to a self-contained tacticalor operational mission executed by self-sufficient elements against a target ofstrategic importance. Leadership targeting, the bombing of strategic facilities, andother such missions are commonly included under the classical category of the

“strategic raid.”ii The semantic confusion may be due to the fact that DonaldRumsfeld and other advocates of military transformation marketed and designedIRAQI FREEDOM as a high-tech variation on the classic punitive expedition.

However, punitive expeditions, because of their large scale, are not equivalentto raids. Punitive expeditions are military campaigns, not transitory events. Still,they are sometimes lumped together with raids because their objectives tend to bevery limited in scope. Punitive expeditions, a mainstay throughout military history,were common occurrences during the “savage wars of peace” of the 19th century andearly 20th century. These military campaigns were mainly carried out to enforce writ,open trading routes, and punish the periodic act of defiance against great powerauthority.iii In the translated American 1862 edition of Antoine-Henri Jomini’sSummary of the Art of War there is a section on “descents”—large naval punitiveexpeditions with limited aims.iv Some have pointed to the 19th century counter-raiding campaign against Barbary pirates as an early template for the Global War onTerrorism.v Such analogies, however, are unpopular because they suggest a connec-tion to colonial warfare and are consequently unpalatable to modern audiences.

“ The modern idea of the ‘strategic raid’ has come to be equatedwith rapid, decisive operations like the conventional campaignof Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. However, a true strategicraid in the classical sense refers to a tactical or operationalmission against a target of strategic importance..”

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Some supporters of raiding propose a modern variation on the punitive expedi-tion using a range of tactics and platforms. Bernard Finel, a Senior Fellow at theAmerican Security Project, proposes that the U.S. should “adopt a national militarystrategy that heavily leverages the core capability to break states and target anddestroy fixed assets, iteratively if necessary. Such a strategy — which might looselybe termed ‘repetitive raiding’ — could defeat and disrupt most potential threats theU.S. faces.”vi This is a different concept than the 19th century punitive expedition,but there are definite continuities.

Other supporters of raiding argue that air power and other forms of standofffirepower constitute an American asymmetric advantage over all adversaries.vii

While airpower’s advantages have been heavily oversold in the past, Edward Lut-twak is correct to note that air power can be used to disrupt and destroy anopponent’s operational cadre.viii George Will, an opinion columnist, famouslyproposed that the U.S. could combat terrorist organizations with rapidly deployablespecial operations forces, drones, and cruise missiles based offshore. An offshoreapproach would involve spo-radic airstrikes that couldtarget Taliban forces thathave concentrated in geo-graphic regions prior to anattack.ix This is not a newconcept either; the idea ofcontrolling unruly regionsthrough standoff firepowerwas used by the British in the form of “air control” of tribesmen in post-World WarI Iraq. Suppression by airpower, however, had mixed results overall. HistorianJames S. Corum suggests that while many people have been fascinated by theInterwar Royal Air Force’s application of air control, it was never as efficient asadvertised.x

The military and CIA heavily rely on drones and special operations forces to killterrorists and militants in what has been called “The Gap” or “Global South.” It isdifficult to evaluate the efficacy of drone and direct action killings because of thediffering nature of the theaters of operation in which they are employed. Additional-ly, the vagueness of American grand strategy and even in some cases regionalstrategy makes it difficult to evaluate these approaches quantitatively. Thankfully,the New America Foundation has facilitated future research into the Waziristan “aircontrol” operation by building up a database with information on drone strikes.xi Acombination of qualitative and quantitative methodology can be used to yield moredefinitive conclusions about the efficacy of the controversial drone killings.

In a similar vein, Israel has extensively utilized tactical raiding coupled withoperational and strategic deep raids. Israel has also employed punitive expeditions

“While airpower’s advantages havebeen heavily oversold in the past,Edward Lutwak is correct to notethat airpower can be used to disruptand destroy an opponent’s operationalcadre .”

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in Lebanon in 1982 and 2006, the West Bank in 2002, and Gaza in 2008-2009.Historically, Israel also participated in the French and British punitive expeditionagainst the Suez Canal in 1956. Evidence indicates that the strategic payoff for theseoperations has also been mixed. As Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff pointed out inForeign Policy, American strategic commentators may misinterpret Israelistrategy.xii We should also be careful not to extrapolate Israeli success or failurewith raiding and punitive expeditions to analyze our own situation since Israelenjoys advantages we do not when engaging in operations inside its own territoryand operating in neighboring regions. Control and isolation of the battlefield in anenvironment such as 2008-2009 Gaza is unlikely to be replicated in any Americanexpeditionary contest.

Evaluating Raiding and Punitive Expeditions in American StrategyWhat is the nature of the strategic problem we face? This is a question so broad

and contentious that it cannot be answered realistically in a single essay. A mushyconsensus view is emerging that is, while mostly unobjectionable, also analyticallylimited. The Joint Operating Environment 2010 (JOE) notes in its section onmilitary operations that the United States will face a bifurcated future securitychallenge with non-state actors assuming a higher prominence than before. Thedocument also echoes other assessments by arguing that trends such as persistenturbanization and the growth of the global media will complicate military operations.

“Hybrid” enemies will use asymmetric weapons and strategies to contraveneAmerica’s conventional advantage. Command and control warfare and physicalattacks against intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance (ISR) and commandand control networks will occur. Statesand non-state actors with “anti-access”weapons will threaten control of the glob-al commons. The chief U.S. logistic chal-lenge will be deployment to distanttheaters of operations. Taken together,these observations represent the conventional wisdom of American defense policy.xiii

While many of these statements are sound, the problem is that the analyticalimplications of this consensus can be interpreted to support a baffling variety ofproposed operations, strategies, and force structures. Nor are the themes voiced inconsensus documents necessarily new. Discussions about urban warfare have beenongoing since the early 1990s, with prominent Joint Urban Warrior exercises inChicago in 1998 and San Francisco Bay in 1999. The prolific irregular warfareanalyst Robert Bunker has edited nearly a decade’s worth of academic books dealingwith non-state threats. In Bunker’s volumes, researchers have accurately identifiedemerging opposing force (OPFOR) operational and tactical concepts before theybecame well known.xiv Chinese “anti-access” threats have also been extensively

“What is the strategic problemwe face? This is a question sobroad and contentious that itcannot be realistically answeredin a single essay.”

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analyzed in RAND Corporation studies such as 2007’s Entering the Dragon’s Lair:Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States.xv

If we look fartherback we can see an evengreater continuity of re-search into what we con-sider modern threats.Fifty years earlier, theFrench strategist Gener-al André Beaufre usedthe concepts of

“exterior” and “interior”maneuver to address aproblem that manyAmerican strategists

would find very familiar. Beaufre divides “indirect strategy” into “exterior” and“interior” maneuvers. Both of these maneuvers are integrated parts of the indirectcampaign that should be used when resources are limited. The first maneuverprovides “maximum freedom of action” in the international arena while paralyzingthe enemy through psychological, economic, or diplomatic means like negotiationsand propaganda.xvi Once exterior cover has been obtained, interior maneuver is thenexecuted in the geographic area of question to achieve a policy-driven objective.Beaufre argued that the enemy would respond by utilizing strategies ranging from ashort but violent attempt to affect a fait accompli to protracted guerrilla warfare.xvii

This concept, while inelegant, is eerily prescient in the context of present discussionsabout American strategy and asymmetric warfare, as well as attempts to discusscombinations of irregular and conventional warfare.

Those who argue for an emphasis on raiding and punitive expeditions are wiseto point out that COIN can be wasteful and may not utilize America’s strategicadvantages. The United States is a maritime power that finds sustaining expedition-ary forces in far-off environments logistically difficult. COIN also does not allowU.S. military forces to exploit our advantages in firepower, airpower, or large-unitmaneuver. It does not take a strategic genius to realize that COIN is difficult tosustain politically as well, since domestic support is a perennial problem in democ-racies. Critics of COIN protest that it is based on outdated theoretical models. FrankHoffman, for example, has noted that modern irregular conflict defies the oftensimplistic 1960s Maoist revolutionary model involving guerilla war tactics. Howev-er, American COIN theory heavily extracts from this model to describe the contem-porary battlespace.xviii While “classic” COIN is still painfully difficult, moderninsurgency is likely to be more fractured and feature more protracted politicalproblems that proscribe a more limited American approach.xix Conversely, the

“Those who argue for an emphasison raiding and punitive expeditionsare wise to point out that COIN isusually wasteful and does not utilizeAmerica’s strategic advantages. TheUnited States is a maritime power thatfinds sustaining expeditionary forces infar-off environments logistically difficult.”

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“whole of government” approach is more aspiration than reality, although civilianand military policymakers have in recent years called for a more robust civiliansector. It remains to be seen, however, whether these calls for change and policyshifts will be successful in bolstering “whole of government” capacity in counterin-surgency and what is generally referred to as “complex operations.”

However, even modern COIN thinkers agree that the American approach tocounterinsurgency needs to be dramatically overhauled. For example, Dr. DavidKilcullen, who was COIN advisor to Condoleeza Rice and to General DavidPetraeus, argues that neither counterterrorism nor traditional counterinsurgency isthe appropriate framework to fight the enemy we facexx Mark Safranski observesthat Kilcullen’s own ideas for dealing with “accidental guerrillas” are a kind ofindirect strategy emphasizing low-visibility, low-cost engagement that uses foreignproxies as the chief tool whenever possible.xxi Absent a few partisans of theprevious administration, most American defense thinkers seem to agree that non-military tools such as policing, intelligence, and public diplomacy are a better meansof handling modern security problems than the direct application of military force.Debate over counterinsurgency strategy seems to center more on the legacy of theIraq War and the current way forward in Afghanistan. It does not reflect a desire toengage in yet more massive nation-building campaigns.

On the other hand, raiding and punitive expeditions also have their own prob-lems. Projection of power requires intelligence. However, the intelligence providedto strategists and policymakers is frequently inaccurate. The failure of the strategicraid on the Dora Farms in 2003 and the accidental targeting of the Chinese Embassyin Belgrade in 1999 illustrate this point. The problem of developing intelligencefrom offshore will become more pernicious as forces must navigate and operate indeveloped environments. While air strikes can be carried out from naval and airplatforms, projection of landpower requires forward basing and cooperation fromnearby states. This collaboration is easier said than done, as the fracas over Turkishnoncooperation at the northern front of the Iraq invasion revealed. The “anti-access”challenge also requires, as Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. noted, a more robust long-range strike capability and the enhancement of expeditionary warfare options for amore assured advance.xxii More broadly, operational assumptions developed duringboth the operational renaissance of the 1980s and early 1990s and the Rumsfeld erashould be challenged as the diffusion of military technology continues.

International norms have changed since the 19th century heyday of the punitiveexpedition. While it is important to understand that the costs of a negative interna-tional reaction to military operations are often overestimated, costs do exist. Theymay not be apparent immediately but they manifest themselves later on whenmultilateral cooperation is needed. Israel’s Operation CAST LEAD, which involveda wave of airstrikes and a short ground offensive on the Gaza Strip with the aim ofstopping rocket attacks and arms smuggling into the territory, may have been

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successful. However, the Goldstone Report, which harshly condemned Israel forkilling civilians has lowered the Israeli Defense Force’s freedom of action in theinternational arena. There are also thorny legal issues surrounding combat withnon-state actors that have not been resolved satisfactorily, as the dispute over theGoldstone Report reveals.

The elephant in the room, of course, is planning for Phase IV (stabilization)operations in the case of a punitive expedition that fully incapacitates a nation’sgovernment. What should be the protocol for such a situation if long-term occupa-tion and stabilization is ruled out? The Powell “pottery barn” rulexxiii is not aninfallible law, but is one that many will expect the United States to uphold should apunitive expedition unseat a “rogue state” government.

It is also difficult to reliably calibrate the level of force needed to accomplishlimited objectives. Here, raiding runs into the same problems as the now-defunctdoctrine of Effects-Based Operations (EBO)—problems of perception, mispercep-tion, and knowledge of our enemy (especially in a vastly different cultural context)make mirror imaging tempting. Political scientists endlessly dissected this issueduring the Cold War and developed sophisticated formal models of adversarialbehavior, but these calculations are likely to remain crude and impressionistic inpolicy practice outside the context of the bipolar system.

Even if we could develop a metric for the requisite amount of force to beemployed, we would still encounter objections to raiding based on an awareness ofpolitical affairs and bureaucratic infighting. Defense pundits discussing proposedstrategies seem to implicitly assume that the United States is a state with strongexecutive planning organs and a political culture capable of digesting sophisticatedstrategies; a kind of 21st century version of Moltke’s Prussia. Instead, we live in apolitical culture more aptly chronicled by the creators of South Park. The executivebranch, though highly powerful, is not known for its ability to carry out long-rangeplanning. Moreover, the interplay of interest groups frustrates the execution ofstrategy.

A Global “Indirect Approach” Synthesis/Questions of Grand StrategyAs an academic exercise, we can devise a possible synthesis of the approaches

profiled here. As previously established, the current consensus on strategy amongboth COIN advocates and those favoring a broad kind of raiding strategy is thatAmerican power should be increasingly applied in an indirect fashion instead ofthrough massive occupations. This is broadly compatible with the ideas advocated

“Even if we could develop a metric for the requisite amount offorce to be employed, we would still encounter objections basedon an awareness of political affairs and bureaucratic infighting.”

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by some realists, like an “offshore balancing” grand strategy and the paring back ofstrategic commitments.xxiv With some effort, both raiding and punitive expeditionscould be integrated with the “indirect” COIN theory put forth by those advocating amore pared-down global counterinsurgency effort. A synthesis of “indirect ap-proaches” could heavily emphasize the traditional (and largely nonmilitary) SpecialForces, police, and intelligence approaches to combating radicalism with high-endcombat assets utilized for the “repetitive raiding.” In order to operationalize

“repetitive raiding” capabilities, planners need to think strategically and operationallyabout modernizing the concept of the “descent” and punitive expedition. Additional-ly, the current drone/special operations direct action campaign needs to be subjectto a means-testing before it drifts into policy inertia.

Mark Safranskiargues quite percep-tively that the lackof grand strategicfoundations in cur-rent American for-eign policy mayensure that any kindof militarydoctrine—COIN or anti-COIN—could be used to justify purposes at variance withits original intent. It is also useful to point out that both partisans in the COIN andanti-COIN debate seem to operate with an implicit framework that continuing globalmilitary operations are likely in the near future. The strategy or political aims behindsuch military operations, however, or the assumption that American participation inmilitary operations is a permanent feature of the security environment, has not beenexplored in great depth. It is largely without dispute that 21st century operationalconditions are associated with certain forms of conflict. But it is one thing to pointout that slums in West Africa will be difficult for military forces to control andanother to spell out in convincing detail the political rationale that would putAmerican boots on the ground in Lagos.xxv

We are unlikely to break any new ground in policy discussions about militaryoperations without undertaking a review of the United States’ global posture,commitments, and our process of determining “vital interests.” While a rich butsometimes circular conversation ensues about military operations, tactics, andstrategies, discussions of the deeper, foundational issues that explain the prevalence(or absence) of force in American grand strategy remain political landmines. Oneunfortunate result of this inertia is that nearly everything is seen as a “vital interest”that must be resolved through the application of military force. Bernard Finelcorrectly responded to criticism of his article on “repetitive raiding” by noting thatwhile his military concept is narrow in application, we expect military operations to

“...the lack of grand strategic foundationsin current American foreign policy mayensure that any kind of military doctrine —COIN or anti-COIN—could be used tojustify purposes at variance with its originalintent.”

on an awareness of political affairs and bureaucratic infighting.”

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solve too many of our foreign policy issues.xxvi Observers such as The WashingtonPost’s Dana Priest have observed that one of the most important reasons for theimpoverishment of civilian capacity is the structure of regional commands that adopta role assumed more traditionally by diplomats.xxvii

The correct answers regarding counterinsurgency, raiding, and punitive expedi-tions are likely to emerge when put in grand strategic context. It is our resistance tohaving an honest conversation about these foundational issues that keeps us in a loopof increasingly circular discourse over the use of force. These deliberations do notcomprehensively address the premises by which certain operational or strategicapproaches derive their explanatory power.xxviii Until we inquire on a more abstractlevel, our strategic dysfunction is likely to continue regardless of whether our forceshobnob with tribes in Anbar or raid from offshore.

Adam Elkus is an analyst specializing in foreign policy and security. His articleshave been published in Small Wars Journal, Athena Intelligence Journal, Defenseand the National Interest, Foreign Policy in Focus, SWAT Digest, GroupIntel, andother publications. He blogs at Rethinking Security.

i Jones, Archer, 1996. Elements of Military Strategy: A Historical Approach, Westport:Praeger, xiv.ii Stephens, Alan, 2007. “From the Decisive Battle to the Strategic Raid,” paper presentedto the United Service Institute of Sydney and Canberraiii See Max Boot, 2002 The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of AmericanPower, New York: Basic Books,iv See Antoine-Henri Jomini, Capt. G.H. Mendell (trans), and Lt. W.P. Craighill (trans),1984. The Art of War, New York: G.P. Putnamv See Colonel Bradley E. Smith, December 2005 “America’s First Response to Terrorism:The Barbary Pirates and the Tripolitan War of 1801,” Military Reviewvi Finell, Bernard, February 2010. “An Alternative to COIN,” Armed Forces Journalhttp://www.afji.com/2010/02/4387134vii See Maj Gen. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., September 2006. “America’s Asymmetric Advan-tage,” Armed Forces Journal http://www.afji.com/2006/09/2009013viii Luttwack, Edward, March/Aptril 2010 “In Praise of Aerial Bombing,” Foreign Policyhttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/in_praise_of_aerial_bombingix Will, George F.1 Sept. 2009, “Time to Get Out of Afghanistan,” Washington Posthttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/31/AR2009083102912.htmlx See Dr. James S. Corum, Winter 2000 “The Myth of Air Control: Reassessing The Histo-ry,” Air and Space Power Journal.http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/win00/corum.htmxi See the database at counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones

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xii See Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, 20 January 2010 “A New Kind of War,” ForeignPolicy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/20/a_new_kind_of_war?page=0,0.Also see Ariel Siegelman, March 2009 “From Lebanon to Gaza: A New Kind of War,” U.S.Army Combined Center Counterinsurgency Colloquium, Vol. 2, no.1.2.xiii Staff, February 2010 Joint Operating Environment 2010, Norfolk: U.S. Joint ForcesCommand, 6-8.xiv See, for example, Robert Bunker (ed), 2002 Non-State Threats and Future War, Lon-don: Cass,xv Roger, Cliff and Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, and Kevin L. Pollpeter,2007. Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implicationsfor the United States, Santa Monica: RANDxvi Andre Beaufre, 1965. An Introduction to Strategy, New York: Praeger, 111.xvii Ibid, 119xviii See Frank G. Hoffman, Summer 2007. “Neo-classical Counterinsurgency?” Parame-ters, 71–87.xix See Steven Metz, 2007. Rethinking Insurgency, Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Insti-tutexx See Kim Sengupta, 9 July 2009“David Kilcullen: The Australian Helping to Shape aNew Counterinsurgency Strategy, . http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/david-kilcullen-the-australian-shaping-operations-in-afghanistan-1737451.htmlxxi Safranski, Mark, 29 May 2009. “The Kilcullen Doctrine,” Zenpundithttp://zenpundit.com/?p=3116xxiiKrepinevich Jr., Andrew F. July-August 2009. “The Pentagon’s Wasting Assets: TheErosion of American Power,” Foreign Affairshttp://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65150/andrew-f-krepinevich-jr/the-pentagons-wasting-assetsxxiii The Powell Pottery Barn Rule is American political jargon alluding to the “you breakit, you buy it” policy exercised by retail storesxxiv See Barry R. Posen, 15 July 2008. "A Grand Strategy of Restraint and Renewal," testi-mony before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight andInvestigations. Available athttp://web.mit.edu/ssp/people/posen/A_Grand_Strategy_of_Restraint_and_Renewal_testimony_for_congress_july_ 15.pdfxxv Metz, Steven 20 March 2009 “Trends, Threats, and Expectations”http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/03/trends-theats-and-expectations/xxvi Finel, “An Alternative to COIN.”xxvii See Dana Priest, 2003 The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace With America’sMilitary, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2003xxviii An exception to this rule is Maj. Jeremy Kotkin, “The Shadow Course of Action: HowI Learned to Stop Worrying and Love NSC-68,” Defense Concepts, January 2010, 66-79.

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ABOUT DEFENSE CONCEPTS

Defense Concepts is a quarterly publication by the Center for AdvancedDefense Studies. Defense Concepts publishes informative, provocativeand comprehensive essays and reports on all aspects of contemporarysecurity issues. While some articles address traditional topics, such aswar and peace and diplomatic and military history; others address is-sues of growing importance, such as environmental and demographicchallenges and the rise of global terrorist networks, that have not beenas salient in the media. Because it includes diverse perspectives fromglobally recognized executives, leading academics, and political leaders,Defense Concepts serves as a forum for leading thinkers and strategiststo discuss the critical issues of global security.