deception and media misinformation in wartime - the cases of private lynch and corporal tillman

7/23/2019 Deception and Media Misinformation in Wartime - The Cases of Private Lynch and Corporal Tillman

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Deception and MediaMisinformation in WartimeThe Cases of Corporal Tillman and Private

Lynch

University of Manchester POLI30300Dissertation 2015

Stdent !m"er# $35%3&'( De)ree Pro)ramme#Po*itics and Modern +istory( Spervisor# ,ristinaMasters( 1%-&30 .ords

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/"stract

Usin) the evidence from the 200$ eport "y the +ose ,ommittee on

Oversi)ht and overnment eform- to)ether .ith other sorces- this

dissertation ar)es that the U4S4 )overnment ti*ised the stories of Private

Lynch and ,orpora* i**man en)a)ed in tactics of deceptive 6or)anised

po*itica* persasion7- or propa)anda- in order to retain spport for their

6*o"a* War on error74

his dissertation ot*ines the historica* sa)e of propa)anda drin)

.artime- dra.in) para**e*s .ith these contemporary e8amp*es of

campai)ns of propa)anda- and conc*des that the se of deception has

*ed to an endemic fai*re of democratic acconta"i*ity concernin) or

po*iticians and *eaders4

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,ontents

19 Introdction:::::::::::::::::::44:::4:%

i9 esearch ;estions::::::::4:::::::4:44$

29 / +istory of Propa)anda in Wartime:::::::4:::::4:10

39 he ,ase of Private Lynch::::::::::::4:::::4420

i9

%9 he ,ase of ,orpora* i**man44:::::::::::::4::4432

i9


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Introdction,orpora* Patric= i**man and Private @essica Lynch are t.o of

the most famos so*diers from the IraA and /f)hanistan .ars1- and

their stories are amon) the most semina* .artime ne.s media

events of the 21st centry4 Private Lynch7s captre and s"seAent

resce in /pri* 2003 and ,orpora* i**man7s death in /pri* 200%

provided the media in the United States .ith compe**in) hman

interest stories- and provided- for the United States mi*itary and

)overnment- a .e*come distraction from diBc*t events in IraA and

/f)hanistan4 +o.ever- it *ater emer)ed that parts of "oth stories had

"een fa"ricated or manip*ated- fe**ed "y the propa)ation of

mis*eadin) information4 / 200$ eport "y the +ose ,ommittee on

Oversi)ht and overnment eform determined that the actions of

the US )overnment and mi*itary .ere- in *ar)e part- the reason for

the dissemination of this misinformation42

1 U4S4 +ose- ,ommittee on Oversi)ht and overnment eform- MisleadingInformation from the Battleeld: The Tillman and Lynch Episodes Together with

Additional iews C110 +4 pt4 $5$9- p414

2 U4S4 +ose- ,ommittee on Oversi)ht and overnment eform- MisleadingInformation from the Battleeld! p4%$4

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Usin) the ndin)s of the ,ommittee- to)ether .ith evidence from

other sorces- this dissertation .i** ar)e that the propa)ation of

misinformation .as a de*i"erate act on the part of the United States

)overnment and mi*itary in order to propa)andise the stories of

,orpora* i**man and Private Lynch4 hese t.o so*diers- .ho

sacriced everythin) in )htin) for their contry- "ecame too*s in a

campai)n of .artime propa)anda- desi)ned to retain spport for a

6*o"a* War on error7 that *ac=ed a reasona"*e Estication4

he centra* ar)ment of this dissertation concerns the isse of

propa)anda- and partic*ar*y its dep*oyment drin) .artime4

overnments thro)hot history have ti*ised tactics of propa)anda

drin) times of conFict for- "road*y spea=in)- simi*ar reasons# in

order to =eep a pop*ation on side- and in spport of a .ar eGort( as

soon as a )overnment *oses domestic spport for its forei)n po*icy- it

"ecomes very diBc*t to recover4 ,ampai)ns of propa)anda are

important too*s in preventin) this occrrence4 his dissertation

ar)es that- a*tho)h its dep*oyment has "ecome more covert- the

very same tactics of propa)anda are sti** "ein) sed today- and for

precise*y the same reasons4 ocsin) on the case?stdies of ,orpora*

i**man and Private Lynch specica**y- I ar)e that the U4S4

)overnment carried ot a concerted campai)n of misinformation- of

propa)anda- drin) the 6*o"a* War on error7- in an eGort to retain

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credi"i*ity and spport domestica**y for controversia* forei)n po*icy

decisions4 hat its dep*oyment has "ecome more covert is

partic*ar*y important- "ecase it has *ed to a fai*re of

acconta"i*ity and this is an isse that r)ent*y needs addressin)4

ric +errin) and Piers o"inson7s recent .or=- inc*din) their

artic*es 6eport H Mar=s the Spot# he


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a po*icy4J5overnments se or)anised po*itica* persasion in

attempt to inFence p"*ic opinion re)ardin) a po*icy- or set of

po*icies4 /ccordin) to +errin) and o"inson- it is not a*.ays a "ad

thin)- .ith sinister or nefarios motivations4 here is- .hat they

refer to as- non"deceptiveor)anised po*itica* persasion- .hich is

condcted honest*y and .ithot invo*vin) an eGort to deceive4J>


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dp*icitos manner4 +o.ever- in the cases of i**man and Lynch- this

dissertation ar)es that 6or)anised po*itica* persasion7 .as sed in

a deceptive manner- in an attempt to mis*ead the p"*ic4 his is .hy

these t.o case?stdies are of partic*ar importance# it is not that the

U4S4 )overnment simp*y tried to persade the p"*ic of the virtes of

its forei)n po*icy decisions in an honest manner( instead- they

mis*ed- and misinformed4 hey deceived the p"*ic into spportin)

their forei)n po*icy aims- and the cases of ,orpora* i**man and

Private Lynch .ere sed as part of these tactics of deception "t-

"ecase of the increased 6covertness7 of these tactics of 6or)anised

po*itica* persasion7- it has "ecome increasin)*y diBc*t to ho*d

anyone acconta"*e for this deception4

+errin) and o"inson7s frame.or= is partic*ar*y sef*

"ecase it distin)ishes "et.een these t.o types of 6or)anised

po*itica* persasion74 It reco)nises that the se of 6or)anised po*itica*

persasion7 is not of any partic*ar interest in and of itse*f- "t that

the =ey isse of importance is the se of 6deception7- "ecase this-

in eGect- artic*ates ho. )overnments de*i"erate*y *ie to and

mis*ead their citiKens on a *ar)e sca*e4


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campai)n of propa)anda drin) the 6*o"a* War on error7- and *ied

to its citiKens in an eGort to retain credi"i*ity and spport

domestica**y for controversia* forei)n po*icy decisions4

esearch ;estions

Usin) the concepta* frame.or= deve*oped "y +errin) and

o"inson- I .i** address the fo**o.in) t.o Aestions#

19 In the cases of "oth Lynch and i**man- .as misinformation

propa)ated- on the part of the U4S4 )overnment and mi*itary- in

an attempt to inFence p"*ic opinion ,an their actions "e

c*assied as organised political pers$asion C;19

29 o .hat e8tent .as there an attempt to intentionally deceive the

p"*ic ,an their actions "e c*assied as deceptive organised

political pers$asion C;29

he rst research Aestion concerns .hether the U4S4

)overnment and mi*itary attempted- on any *eve*- to appropriate the

i**man and Lynch stories for their o.n ends- i4e4 as part of a

propa)anda Cor 6or)anised po*itica* persasion79 campai)n4 If they

.ere en)a)in) in a practice of spreadin) misinformation re)ardin)

the t.o stories- .as this part of a .ider attempt to inFence p"*ic

opinion in re*ation to the 6*o"a* War on error7


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administration- at times .hen there may have "een a perception

that the .ar in IraA .as npop*ar- or n.inna"*e4 Do"t*ess- the

i**man and Lynch stories- at *east initia**y- represented somethin) of

a co$p for the )overnment- in terms of perception mana)ement4 he

rst research Aestion aims to ans.er .hether sch a co$p .as

mere*y fortnate timin)- or .hether it .as de*i"erate*y en)ineered

in an attempt to inFence p"*ic opinion4

he second research Aestion fo**o.s on from this4 If the

hand*in) of the i**man and Lynch stories amonted to an attempt to

inFence p"*ic opinion Cif it amonted to organised political

pers$asion'! can these attempts "e nderstood .ithin the conte8t of

an intention to deceive In other .ords- .as this deceptive

organised political pers$asion Were these stories propa)andised in

a more o"vios*y cynica* or nefarios .ay than mi)ht other.ise

have "een the case rthermore- if an intention to deceive .as

present- "y .hat means .as the deception emp*oyed With respect

to +errin) and o"inson7s concepta* frame.or=- can the deception

"e nderstood as# deception thro$gh lyingCma=in) a =no.in)*y

fa*se statement9- deception thro$gh omissionC=no.in)*y

.ithho*din) important information9 or deception thro$gh distortion

Cframin) statements in a =no.in)*y mis*eadin) .ay9

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his dissertation is divided into for sections# the rst entai*s a

"rief history of the se of propa)anda in .artime4 his fnctions as a

*iteratre revie.- ot*inin) the crrent academic standpoints on the

isse- and dra.in) historica* para**e*s .ith the contemporary se of

propa)anda4 he second and third sections app*y +errin) and

o"inson7s concepta* frame.or= to the cases of Private Lynch and

,orpora* i**man in trn- in an attempt to ans.er the a"ove research

Aestions- .hi*st the na* section considers the si)nicance of the

t.o case?stdies- as=s Aestions a"ot the endemic *ac= of

acconta"i*ity in contemporary propa)anda campai)ns- and

conc*des the paper4

/ +istory of Propa)anda inWartime

6Propa)anda7 has- over time- "ecome an navoida"*y *oaded

term4 Perhaps its most common association no. is .ith !aKi

ermany and @oseph oe""e*s- .ho perfected the art of .artime

propa)anda4 One tends to thin= of propa)anda as inherent*y

dishonest and manip*ative4 Indeed- oe""e*s himse*f *amented the

.ord7s ne)ative reptation# Propa)anda is a mch ma*i)ned and

often misnderstood .ord4 he *ayman ses it to mean somethin)

inferior or even despica"*e4 he .ord propa)anda a*.ays has a

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"itter aftertaste4J$It is perhaps ironic then that his actions- more

than anyone e*se7s- perpetated the peEorative and sinister

app*ication of the term4 +o.ever- in its "roadest sense- propa)anda

does not necessari*y have to "e a nefarios- or cynica**y

manip*ative practice4 anda* Mar*in descri"es propa)anda as

simp*y the attempt to shape the tho)hts and fee*in)s of others in

.ays conrmin) to the aims of the commnicator4J&Simi*ar*y- David

We*ch# propa)anda is the dissemination of ideas intended to

convince peop*e to thin= and act in a partic*ar .ay and for a

partic*ar persasive prpose4J10overnments en)a)in) in

propa)anda Cand a** )overnments do9 are not a*.ays doin) so for

entire*y sinister reasons# there is propa)anda aimed at )ettin)

peop*e to )ive p smo=in)- for e8amp*e4 !o?one .o*d ar)e the

merits of en)a)in) in that =ind of propa)anda ho.ever- .hen one

considers the emp*oyment of propa)anda in times of .ar- the term7s

more sinister and manip*ative tendencies often come to the fore4

$ David We*ch- Propaganda: Power and Pers$asion CLondon- 20139- p424

& anda* Mar*in- Propaganda and the Ethics of Pers$asion CPeter"oro)h O!-2013 C2nd ed499- p4354

10 We*ch- Propaganda: Power and Pers$asion- p424

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he idea of propa)anda can "e traced "ac= to /ncient reece- and

is c*ose*y associated .ith 6rhetoric7- the ancient .or*d7s eAiva*ent of

contemporary propa)anda4 he orator Peric*es7 speech drin) the

Pe*oponnesian War in %31


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fe**in) the .ars of the ,rsades- startin) in the t.e*fth centry4 /s

descri"ed "y o"ert the Mon=- Pope Ur"an II in partic*ar made se

of vivid ima)ery depictin) )ross acts of cre*ty "y the r=s to

motivate ,hristians to ta=e p the s.ord a)ainst them4J13Li=e.ise-

it .as an important too* in the rench evo*tion and .as sed

eGective*y "y !apo*eon to conso*idate his dominance over rance-

and mch of rope41%One can see- thro)hot history- ho.

propa)anda .as sed in times of .ar and conFict in order to =eep a

pop*ation on side- in spport of a .ar eGort and inspired to

contine )htin)4 It .o*d not "e an e8a))eration to s))est that

many .ars on*y *asted as *on) as they did as a res*t of propa)anda4

his is possi"*y .hy the term has attracted so many ne)ative

connotations over the years- partic*ar*y .hen considered in re*ation

to .ar4


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the ne)ative connotations .e sti** associate .ith the term to this

day- as We*ch states# it .as:"et.een 1&1% and 1&1$ that the

.ho*esa*e emp*oyment of propa)anda as an or)anised .eapon of

modern .arfare served to transform the pop*ar nderstandin) of its

meanin) into somethin) more sinister4J15he )overnments of those

contries en)a)ed in conFict sa. the importance of en)a)in) in a

sstained propa)anda campai)n in order to =eep mora*e hi)h in the

home contries- sap the enemy7s .i** and even persade other- non?

"e**i)erent contries- to their case4 Li=e Pope Ur"an in the t.e*fth

centry- "oth the Li=e.ise- ermany pointed to the

"ar"aric actionsJ of the ssians on the astern ront- as proof that

the ermans .ere )htin) to defend civi*ity and hmanity a)ainst

"ar"arism41'Most scho*ars a)ree that the irst Wor*d War mar=ed

15 We*ch- Propaganda! p4154

1> Phi*ip M4 ay*or- M$nitions of the Mind:A )istory of Propaganda from theAncient *orld to the Present +ay CManchester- 20039- p41'$4

1' roy Paddoc=- *ord *ar I and Propaganda CLeiden- 201%9- p424

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the emer)ence of the proper*y or)anised- heavi*y fnded-

)overnment propa)anda machines- aimed at a mass adience4 In

other .ords- the irst Wor*d War .as the rst rea* 6propa)anda .ar7-

in the contemporary sense4 he Second Wor*d War "i*t pon and

deve*oped these propa)anda machines sti** frther4 Propa)anda

eGective*y "ecame an essentia* part of .arfare- a*most as important

as the physica* act of )htin) itse*f4 !aKi propa)anda .as ar)a"*y

the c*mination of the m*ti?*ayered- m*ti?faceted comp*e8

propa)anda machine- that manip*ated and deceived on an

immeasra"*y *ar)e sca*e41$he Second Wor*d War .as- accordin) to

ay*or- the )reatest propa)anda "att*e in the history of .arfare4J1&

!everthe*ess- propa)anda has contined to p*ay a crcia* ro*e in

internationa* conFict post?WWII4 ramed as a monmenta* "att*e

"et.een t.o contestin) ideo*o)ies- "oth sides in the ,o*d War re*ied

heavi*y on domestic propa)anda campai)ns- predicated on fear and

paranoia- in order to retain spport for their actions and the mass

media- no. a po.erf* and pervasive inFence in citiKens7 everyday

*ives- p*ayed a .i**in) ro*e in fe**in) the paranoia- as ay*or e8p*ains

.ith reference to the propa)anda campai)n in the US/#

1$ Mar*in- Propaganda! p4'54

1& ay*or- M$nitions of the Mind! p420$4

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C$lminating in the sordid McCarthyite ,witch"h$nts- of the early

./01s! this campaign created a climate of fear in which

sympathy for the ,Enemy- was e%$ated with sympathy for the

+evil2 The conversion of a former wartime ally into a peacetime

enemy was f$elled 3y media representation of post"war

events in a specically hostile light2 The ,(ed Menace- was not 4$st

a threat to E$rope and Asia: it threatened the very e5istence of the

,American way of life- itself2 Boo6s! maga7ines! lms and even

the new medi$m of television were scr$tini7ed 3y self"

appointed watchdog gro$ps of red"h$nters! often sponsored 3y the

8BI to create an atmosphere in which no view of the ($ssians

other than as demons co$ld 3e tolerated291

hree thin)s are important to note a"ot ,o*d War propa)anda#

rst*y- it .as a*most niform*y manip*ative# it shaped citiKens7 fear

and paranoia in *ine .ith )overnment .i**4


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that the media .as independent of )overnment he*ped to *e)itimise

the propa)anda4 hird*y- for those .ho .anted to see it- it .as Aite

open and o"vios( it .as not diBc*t to identify the propa)anda

campai)ns that "oth the /merican and Soviet )overnments .ere

en)a)ed in thro)hot the ,o*d War4

In the post?,o*d War era- propa)anda- .hi*st sti** manip*ative and

re*iant on a comp*iant media- has "ecome more covert4 Whi*st most

scho*ars sti** reco)nise the ro*e it has p*ayed in 21st centry

conFicts- the )enera* p"*ic7s perception of propa)anda appears *ess

acte4 One of the reasons for this is possi"*y the near tota*

a"andonment of the term 6propa)anda7 .hen referrin) to

contemporary persasion tactics4


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&ince .. &eptem3er 911.! 3oth the & and ; governments

have comprehensively overha$led their internal and

e5ternal propaganda apparat$s2 These have 3een glo3ally co"

ordinated as never 3efore to 4$stify the cial line2

Conse%$ently there has 3een serio$s investment in an

e5tensive machinery of propaganda29.

We*ch emphasises the 6psycho*o)ica* operations7 Cpsyops9 that

/merican and


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citi7ens to reveal Tali3an and al" @aeda factions2 In the Ira% *ar! the

nited &tates engaged in a comprehensive airwaves

campaign to soften its enemy and soothe its pop$lation at

home299

Scho*ars sch as Deepa mar and @ohn Pi*)er ar)e that

propa)anda p*ayed an important ro*e in Estifyin) the .ars in

/f)hanistan and- partic*ar*y- IraA4 mar ar)es the


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)overnment4 he scho*ar*y consenss is that the contemporary

Western media- most nota"*y in the US/- tend to conform to an

e*ite?driven mode* of media?state re*ations( that is to sayin the

conte8t of .ar- the media is "road*y spportive of the )overnment

and its aims425+erman and ,homs=y advocate a 6Propa)anda Mode*7

.hich *ists ve *ters thro)h .hich media covera)e is shaped "y

e*ites# o.nership- fndin)- sorcin)- Fa= and anti?commnismNfear

ideo*o)y4 Simi*ar*y- adi Wo*fsfe*d smmaries the media7s ro*e in

.artime as a=in to that of a faithf* servant dtif**y providin)

services to their /**ied masterJ2>- Lance


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administration e*ites- and on to ne.s or)anisations- their te8ts- and

the p"*ic4J2$

here is *itt*e serios academic disa)reement on the fact that the

media conform to an e*ite?driven mode* of media?state re*ations4

What this eGective*y means is that- in the e*ite?driven mode*- the

media has "ecome an important and faithf* too* of )overnment *ed

propa)anda4 Whi*st academics are )enera**y a)reed pon this theory

of media?state re*ations- and most tend to reco)nise the important

ro*e propa)anda has p*ayed in the .ars in /f)hanistan and IraA- the

de"ate has- for some time- *ac=ed a c*ear concepta* frame.or= to

)ide discssion4 he notion of 6propa)anda7 has "een thro.n

arond freAent*y .hen discssin) the /merican and


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and 6non?deceptive7 or)anised po*itica* persasion- and detai*in) the

specic .ays in .hich )overnments deceive- i4e4 thro)h *yin)-

omission and distortion4

In smmary- tho)h contemporary propa)anda has "ecome

more covert- there are c*ear historica* constants from .hich to dra.

.hen assessin) its modern day sa)e4 hro)hot history-

propa)anda has "een dep*oyed in .artime in order to retain

domestic spport- to convince the p"*ic of the virtes of the .ar

that is "ein) fo)ht- and to remind them that their fe**o. citiKens

are not dyin) in vain4 /s I .i** no. discss frther- these are

precise*y the reasons .hy the U4S4 )overnment ti*ised the stories of

Private Lynch and ,orpora* i**man in their campai)n of or)anised

po*itica* persasion drin) the 6*o"a* War on error47

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he ,ase of Private Lynchhe case of Private Lynch .as one of the most si)nicant

media stories drin) the .ars in /f)hanistan and IraA4 @ohn

ampfner descri"es it as one of the most stnnin) pieces of ne.s

mana)ement yet conceivedJ

2&

- .hi*st o"inson et a*4 refer to it as a

psedo?event:4a sta)e?mana)ed aGair desi)ned to achieve

ma8imm p"*icity4J30Scho*ars have e8p*ored the story7s

imp*ications for or nderstandin) of the comp*e8 re*ationship

2& @ohn ampfner C15 May- 20039- 6he rth a"ot @essica7- The D$ardian!retrieved from )ardian4com4

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http://guardian.com/http://guardian.com/


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"et.een )ender and .ar31- amon)st other thin)s "t there has "een

*itt*e sstained en)a)ement .ith the case from a standpoint of

deception2his chapter .i** e8amine the ti*ity of the case of Private

Lynch as a too* of organised political pers$asion and the ro*e

deception p*ayed in craftin) @essica Lynch7s story into the perfect

piece of po*itica* propa)anda4


26/81

to.ards the pro)ress of the .ar4J33!o. .as an idea* time for a

6)ood ne.s7 story to emer)e- a story that .as favora"*e to the US

)overnment and diverted attention a.ay from the diBc*ties that

.ere "e)innin) to characterise the coa*ition7s pro)ress in IraA4 he

captre and s"seAent resce of Private @essica Lynch .as the

idea* 6)ood ne.s7 story for the )overnment- seemin)*y a trimph of

)ood timin) and coincidence# the Lynch story contri"ted to a

trnarond in ear*y /pri* .hen spportive covera)e retrned to

dominate media representation of the .ar4J3%In other .ords- the

Lynch story did its Eo" of mana)in) perceptions and re"i*din) media

and p"*ic spport for the .ar eGort4 Private Lynch7s persona*

narrative provided a 6hman interest7 an)*e to the .ar- an an)*e

.hich- in my vie.- serves to sanitise the vio*ence and death of a

conFict "y dra.in) attention a.ay from the deaths of civi*ians and

mi*itary personne* and focsin) instead on the "rave actions of

certain specic individa*s4


27/81

@essica Lynch7s story- ho.ever- is some.hat more comp*icated than

simp*y a trimph of )ood timin) and coincidence# as one di)s

deeper- a sense "e)ins to emer)e that the .ho*e event .as

de*i"erate*y en)ineered in an attempt to inFence p"*ic opinion4 It

"e)ins to *oo= *i=e propa)anda- or organised political pers$asion2

mar ar)es that @essica Lynch- rather than "ein) a sym"o* of

pro)ress for her )ender- .as Est another too* in the US

)overnments tactics of propa)anda#

This is not a step forward for women2 Instead! the Lynch

resc$e narrative! I arg$e! served to forward the aims of war

propaganda2 The story of the ,dramatic resc$e of a yo$ng!

v$lnera3le woman! at a time when the war was not going well

for the &! acted as the means 3y which a controversial war co$ld

3e tal6ed a3o$t in emotional rather than rational terms In short!

the Lynch story! far from p$tting forward an image of women-s

strength and a$tonomy! reveals yet another mechanism 3y

which they are strategically $sed to win s$pport for war20

6Savin) Private Lynch 7

35 Deepa mar- 6War Propa)anda and the Ca"9ses of Women# Media,onstrctions of the @essica Lynch Story7- 8eminist Media &t$dies %- pp4 2&'?313Cp42&'94

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Private irst ,*ass @essica Lynch- a mem"er of the US /rmy7s 50'th

Maintenance ,ompany- .as captred "y IraAi forces on March 23-

2003- after her convoy had ta=en a .ron) trn and headed into

territory contro**ed "y IraAi forces4J3>Severe*y inEred .hen her

vehic*e crashed into another convoy vehic*e- Lynch .as ta=en "y her

captors to a mi*itary hospita*- and *ater to the Saddam +ssein

enera* +ospita* in /n !asiriyah4 /ccordin) to the +ose eport#

8or the ne5t seven days! Ira%i hospital staF treated Private

Lynch-s life"threatening wo$nds! which incl$ded n$mero$s

shattered 3ones2 +$ring that time! Marines cond$cting

operations in the area learned that Private Lynch was 3eing held at

the hospital Late on the night of April .! 911! a & special

forces $nit resc$ed Private Lynch Gfrom the hospitalH2

hese esta"*ished facts have never "een in dispte- ho.ever- as

ne.s of the story "e)an to "rea= across US ne.s media- the

narrative of Private Lynch "e)an to diver)e from these facts and the

story "ecame em"e**ished .ith misinformation4 his occrred in t.o

main .ays# rst*y- a narrative emer)ed that Lynch had "rave*y

3> U4S4 +ose4 Misleading Information from the Battleeld! p4%14

3' U4S4 +ose4 Misleading Information from the Battleeld! p4%14

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resisted her captre- and had shot at the IraAi forces4 She- in trn-

had prported*y "een shot4 he ori)in of this narrative .as an /pri*

3rd Washin)ton Post story- entit*ed ,&he *as 8ighting to the

+eath2-J,itin) )overnment oBcia*s- this artic*e .as the rst sorce

to s))est Private Lynch .as rin) her .eapon nti* she ran ot of

ammnitionJ- and that she sstained m*tip*e )nshot .onds4J3&

rom here on in- this idea .as .ide*y reported "y US ne.s media as

fact4

%0

he narrative- ho.ever- .as fa*se- as Lynch herse*f *ater

e8p*ained# ta*es of )reat heroism .ere "ein) to*d:4the story of the

*itt*e )ir* am"o from the hi**s .ho .ent do.n )htin)4 It .as not

tre4J%1rthermore- the IraAi doctor .ho treated her- to*d @ohn

ampfner that Private Lynch did not sstain any "**et .onds#

there .as no shootin)- no "**et inside her "ody- no sta" .ond ?

on*y /- road traBc accident4J%2

3$ Ssan Schmidt and ernon Loe" C/pri* 3- 20039- 6She Was i)htin) to theDeathJ( Detai*s mer)in) of W4 a4 So*dier7s ,aptre and esce7- *ashingtonPost2

3& Schmidt and Loe"- 6She .as i)htin) to the DeathJ74

%0 o"inson et a*4- Poc6ets of (esistance! p413%4

%1 o"inson et a*4- Poc6ets of (esistance! p413%4

%2 @ohn ampfner- 6he rth a"ot @essica74

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he second narrative constrction concerned Lynch7s resce "y US

specia* forces4 he impression that )overnment and mi*itary oBcia*s

)ave to the media .as that this .as a darin) and spreme*y

dan)eros ni)ht?time resce- and that- in the .ords of enera*

incent


31/81

U*timate*y it .as revea*ed *ar)e parts of Private Lynch7s story had

"een entire*y fa"ricated4 he circmstances .ere- in acta* fact-

re*ative*y mndane and .o*d have "een of minima* interest to the

)overnment as a 6)ood ne.s7 story or- indeed- to the media as a

goodne.s story4 With re)ards to ;1- it appears that a ne. version

of the story .as created- .ith hi)h*y em"e**ished facts- and sed as

a too* of organised political pers$asion2 /s noted a"ove- the

narrative that emer)ed proved favora"*e for the )overnment-

retrnin) media covera)e to favora"i*ity after the .ee= of

.o""*e4J / Washin)ton Post story from 3rd /pri* 2003 e8p*ained ho.

sef* the Lynch story .as for the 6White +ose is evisin) its War Messa)e( Set"ac=s Providin) Lessons7-*ashington PostC/pri* 3- 200394

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rthermore- it a*so provided an opportnity to reinforce the =inds of

patriotic and nationa*ist discorses that nderpinned the .ar

eGort4%'o"inson et a*4 note the se of prod- patriotic *an)a)eJ%$

at the press "rien)- and the .ords of @im Wi*=inson- a ,!,OM

spo=esman- that /merica doesn7t *eave it7s heroes "ehind:!ever

has4 !ever .i**4J%&demonstrate ho. the Lynch myth .as im"ed

.ith discorses of heroism and nationa*ism- mch *i=e ,orpora*

i**man7s story .o*d "e one year *ater- ho. it "ecame an

opportnity to re?emphasise the "ravery and e8emp*ary attitde of

the United States mi*itary and- indeed- the contry in )enera*4 It .as

a*so a sccessf* app*ication of the techniAe of otherin)J- a

constant featre of .artime propa)anda thro)hot history4 In mch

the same .ay as the


33/81

resce seemed to reinforce a ne)ative portraya* of /merica7s

enemies in its 6*o"a* War on error7 as- once a)ain- someho. evi*-

"rta* and .ith a ca**os disre)ard for hman *ife4 hat 12-125

civi*ians had "een =i**ed in IraA drin) the year 2003 as a direct

res*t of U4S4 invo*vement in the contry50- hard*y seemed to matter

mch at a**4

he myth of Private Lynch7s captre and s"seAent resce .as an

attempt to inFence p"*ic opinion in certain .ays4 rther- this

attempt to inFence p"*ic opinion .as made possi"*e "y the spread

of misinformation concernin) the facts of the case4 /s noted a"ove-

the misinformation ori)inated .ith )overnment and mi*itary sorces4

hs- .hen ans.erin) the rst research Aestion ? .as

misinformation propa)ated- on the part of the U4S4 )overnment and

mi*itary- in an attempt to inFence p"*ic opinion ? in the case of

Private Lynch- the ans.er is yes4 he story of Private Lynch- as

propa)ated "y the U4S4 )overnment and mi*itary- .as not on*y an

attempt to persade the p"*ic that this .as a sccessf* resce

mission a)ainst a** the odds- it .as a*so ti*ised as a sym"o*ic story

of the inherent "ravery and virte of the /merican peop*e4 It

perhaps even a**ded to the inherent "ravery and virte of U4S4

50 IraA


34/81

forei)n po*icy# that the .ars in /f)hanistan and IraA .ere Estied4

Moreover- it frthered the creation of a dan)eros and disin)enos

s vs4 themJ narrative that- at one stro=e- condemned /merica7s

enemies for the very same crimes it had a*ready a"so*ved itse*f of4

In this .ay- the actions of the US )overnment and mi*itary can "e

c*assied as organised political pers$asion2

Deception

+avin) esta"*ished that the hand*in) of the Lynch story

constitted an attempt at organised political pers$asion- it is no.

necessary to e8amine .hat ro*e deceptionp*ayed in spportin) and

stren)thenin) these tactics of persasion4 etrnin) to the

Washin)ton Post story from /pri* 3rd#

After nearly two wee6s of disco$raging news from Ira%! the

*hite )o$se viewed yesterday as an e5cellent message

day2 There were new details on the resc$e of prisoner of war

#essica Lynch 3y & &pecial Kperations forces20.

51 6White +ose is evisin) its War Messa)e( Set"ac=s Providin) Lessons7-*ashington PostC/pri* 3- 200394

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/s the ,ommittee7s eport noted- those ne. detai*s- ho.ever-

inc*ded an entire*y ctiona* accont of her captre4J52Se*f?

evident*y- this points to the se of deception: the Lynch story that

had "ecome the too* of organised political pers$asion.as not .hat

happened to @essica Lynch( as the eport stated- it .as pre ction4

If the story .as fa*se- then that s))ests that deception .o*d have

had to p*ay a ro*e some.here4 rthermore- this .as not simp*y a

case of i)norance of information# the initia* reports of Private Lynch7s

captre and resce .ere entire*y facta**y accrate- it .as on*y after

the story7s potentia* ti*ity as a propa)anda too* .as identied- that

the fa*se information "e)an to spread4 he ,ommittee7s eport

concrs#

It is not $ncommon for initial 3attleeld reports to have fact$al

inacc$racies! since they are often written in di>c$lt

circ$mstances and $nder intense time press$res2 &$3se%$ent

reports then correct the record2 The opposite was tr$e! tho$gh!

in Private Lynch-s case2 The initial reporting was acc$rate2 It was

the s$3se%$ent stories that invented new facts2 This $n$s$al

52 U4S4 +ose4 Misleading Information from the Battleeld! p4%%4

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36/81

sit$ation raised concerns that the misinformation might 3e

part of a deli3erate propaganda strategy20

My e8amination of the case identied deception occrrin) in

t.o maEor .ays# there .ere certain specic e8amp*es of deception

thro$gh lying "t- more "road*y- deception thro$gh distortion .as

practiced4Deception thro)h *yin) occrred .ith the m*tip*e

=no.in)*y fa*se statements that .ere made "y )overnment and

mi*itary spo=espeop*e# enera*


37/81

one- the sorce of this fa*se information is n=no.n4 +o.ever- the

)overnment and mi*itary made no attempts to correct the fa*se

information# it .asn7t nti* ne.spaper stories emer)ed in The

D$ardian and the *ashington Post! in May and @ne 2003

respective*y55that the p"*ic *earnt the more accrate version of

Private Lynch7s story4 If there had "een no de*i"erate attempt to

deceive- one .o*d e8pect the misinformation to have "een

corrected- "y the )overnment and mi*itary themse*ves- mch

sooner4

In smmary then- the organised political pers$asion in part re*ied on

specic e8amp*es of deception thro$gh lying in order to direct*y

spread misinformation and "i*d a media narrative favora"*e to the

)overnment and mi*itary4 +o.ever- I fond that the constrction of

sch a narrative re*ied more heavi*y on the "roader tactics of

deception thro$gh distortion2his did not invo*ve otri)ht *yin)-

rather it invo*ved more s"t*e techniAes of framin) statements and

events in sch a .ay so as to shape the media narrative in a

favora"*e manner4 o"inson et a*4 e8p*ain#

55 ampfner C15 May- 20039- 6he rth a"ot @essica7( 6/


38/81

*hat made it Gthe storyH so s$ccessf$l was the con4$nction of

coalition aims to promote a good news story and

news media imperatives for an e5citing story that wo$ld appeal to

readers and viewers2 In this sense! media management involved

channelling the ,right- 6ind of information " not only good news for

the coalition! 3$t also good copy for 4o$rnalists " towards an

attentive and ,h$ngry- media2 In practice! coalition 3riefers only had

to s$ggest the possi3ility of a dramatic and daring resc$e

+irected in this way! 4o$rnalists co$ld then 3e relied $pon to ll

in the gaps and present! $ltimately! a dramatically distorted acco$nt

to the p$3lic which! in t$rn! 3enetted the coalition20

he focs .as on 6nd)in)7 the media in the ri)ht direction and

a**o.in) them to ** in the )aps4 /*tho)h I have demonstrated

certain e8amp*es of deception thro$gh lying- this tactic .as "y no

means .idespread4 o"inson et a*4- Poc6ets of (esistance! p41%04

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39/81

In *ine .ith +errin) and o"inson7s concepta* frame.or=- I am

descri"in) this tactic as deception thro$gh distortion2he for?

minte video of the resce mission- .hich .as re*eased "y

,!,OM drin) the initia* press "rien)- is not fa*se in the sense

that the events "ein) portrayed did not occr4 he video contains

acta* foota)e of the resce operation- shot sin) )reen?tinted ni)ht

vision cameras that )ive it an a*most video?)ame *i=e fee*4 he

deceptive aspect of the video occrred .ith the .ay the operation

.as carried ot and- *ater- edited4 It .as entire*y sta)e?mana)ed- in

order to constrct the perfect conc*sion to the Lynch captre and

resce story4 /n IraAi doctor present on the )rond descri"ed the

resce *i=e a +o**y.ood *m4 hey cried- 6o- )o- )o7- .ith )ns and

"*an=s and the sond of e8p*osions4 hey made a sho. ? an action

movie *i=e Sy*vester Sta**one or @ac=ie ,han- .ith Empin) and

shotin)- "rea=in) do.n doors4J5'he rea*ity of the resce operation

.as so thoro)h*y distorted "y caref* sta)e mana)ement and

editin) that the Eorna*ists .ho .ere at the press "rien) and

.atched the video had on*y one conc*sion to dra.4 his distortion-

com"ined .ith the fe. instances of otri)ht deception thro$gh lying

noted ear*ier- .as eno)h for the mi*itary and )overnment7s

5' ampfner C15 May- 20039- 6he rth a"ot @essica74

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40/81

preferred narrative Cthe narrative that ma8imised the organised

political pers$asion potentia* of the story9 to "ecome- eGective*y-

esta"*ished fact in the media4 his *ar)e*y fo**o.ed ntman7s mode*

of 6,ascadin) /ctivation7- in .hich interpretative frames activate

and spread from the top *eve* of a stratied system Cthe White

+ose9 to the net.or= of non administration e*ites- and on to ne.s

or)anisations- their te8ts- and the p"*ic4J5$he )overnment re*ied

pon the media to accept the deceptive organised political

pers$asion they had caref**y desi)ned .ho- in trn- passed it on to

their consmers- i4e4 the )enera* p"*ic4 In this .ay- the media

p*ayed a =ey ro*e in ma)nifyin) the tactics of deception the US

)overnment and mi*itary emp*oyed in the @essica Lynch case4

he ,ase of ,orpora*i**man

Li=e Private Lynch7s story- the case of the death of ,orpora* Pat

i**man has "ecome one of the most controversia* and .ide*y

discssed media stories of the War on error45&here have "een

5$ ntman- 6,ascadin) /ctivation# ,ontestin) the White +ose7s rame /fter&N117- p4%154

5& U4S4 +ose4 ,ommittee on Oversi)ht and overnment eform4 MisleadingInformation from the Battleeld: The Tillman and Lynch Episodes Together with

Additional iews C110 +4 pt4 $5$9- p414

$35%3&' P/ %0 O $1 1%-&30 WODS


41/81

nmeros discssions and interpretations of the events srrondin)

his death- .ith conte8ta* framin)s ran)in) from the fai*in)s of the

U4S4 )overnment and mi*itary>0- to .hat i**man7s *ife and death te**s

s a"ot .hat it means to "e /merican- or .hat it means to "e a

6hero74>1Whi*st there has "een sstained en)a)ement .ith the

misinformation and 6perception mana)ement7 imp*ications of the

case- fe. scho*ars have focsed specica**y on the ro*e 6deception7

p*ayed in the )overnment and mi*itary7s hand*in) of events4 In this

chapter- I .i** e8amine more c*ose*y the response of the U4S4

)overnment and mi*itary to ,orpora* i**man7s death- and ans.er

the a"ove research Aestions .ith specic reference to this case

stdy4 U*timate*y- to)ether .ith the case stdy of Private Lynch- this

sho*d provide a focsed and compe**in) e8p*oration of the "roader

isse of deception in po*itica* propa)anda4


42/81

a"oard the U4S4S4 /"raham Linco*n and dec*ared to the nation that it

.as mission accomp*ishedJ in IraA4>2+o.ever- operations did not

cease there and- contrary to 2 Lind*a.- 63 IraA ,oa*ition ,asa*ty ,ont- accessi"*e at icasa*ties4or)2

>% Sean /day- 6,hasin) the % Cp41%%94

>5 Pew (esearch Centre! 6P"*ic /ttitdes o.ard the War in IraA# 2003?200$7-C200$- March 1&9- retrieved from pe.research4or)4

$35%3&' P/ %2 O $1 1%-&30 WODS
http://icasualties.org/http://pewresearch.org/http://icasualties.org/http://pewresearch.org/


43/81

tho)ht it .as )oin) fair*yJ or veryJ .e**9( "y March 200%- 3' fe*t

it .as not )oin) .e**4>>hese )res .o*d on*y increase as time

.ent on- ho.ever it is c*ear that there .as some case for concern

for the ' ntman- 6,ascadin) /ctivation# ,ontestin) the White +ose7s rame /fter&N117- Political Comm$nication! p4%154

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44/81

en*ist- a*on)side his "rother- in the /rmy fo**o.in) &N11>$a*ready

constitted a maEor propa)anda victory for the mi*itary and the

)overnment# he .as an a**?/merican patriot and hero .ho- more

than anyone- em"odied the "ravery and cora)e of those .ho serve

in the U4S4 mi*itary4>&Stories sch as i**man7s dre. attention a.ay

from isses sch as mi*itary and civi*ian casa*ties in IraA and

/f)hanistan or the motivations "ehind the U4S4 invasions of those

contries( *i=e @essica Lynch7s story one year ear*ier- the story of

,orpora* i**man provided a compe**in) 6hman interest7 narrative to

the .ar- .hich- in my vie.- served to sanitise its more vio*ent and

npa*ata"*e aspects4 i**man7s decision to en*ist in May 2002 .as

the s"Eect of prominent ne.s covera)e at the time4'0/*ready

famos in the .or*d of /merican foot"a**- he "ecame a hoseho*d

name4 he then Secretary of Defense- Dona*d msfe*d- too= a

persona* interest in i**man7s story- and sent him a persona* note

Est after he en*isted- in .hich he commended him for his prod

>$ @osh White C2005- % May9- 6/rmy Withhe*d Detai*s /"ot i**man7s Death7- The*ashington Post! retrieved from .ashin)tonpost4com4

>& /rthr W4 +er"i)- 6Discrsive ,haracteriKation as m"odiment and ,ritiAe#he Diver)ent hetorica* raEectories of Pat i**man as an /merican +ero74

'0 See- for e8amp*e# Mi=e reeman C2002- 1 @ne9- 6i**man Leaves !44L to @oin/rmy7- ew Nor6 Times! p4D'( Sam armer C2002- 31 May9- 7!44L P*ayer Passesp 4

$35%3&' P/ %% O $1 1%-&30 WODS
http://washingtonpost.com/http://washingtonpost.com/


45/81

and patrioticJ decision4'1ven "efore his death- he "ecame a sef*

too* of organised political pers$asion for the )overnment and

mi*itary# @ohn Mc,ain hi)h*i)hted his se as a recritin) too*J-

reca**in) days not *on) a)o .hen it .as seen as ncoo*J to Eoin or

spport the army# perhaps QthoseR *ast vesti)es of the ietnam War

have disappeared in the r""*e of the Wor*d rade ,enter4 I don7t

thin= there .i** "e any do"ts a"ot his capa"i*ities as a so*ider- "t

a*so as a recritin) too*4 +e7** motivate other yon) /mericans to

serve as .e**4J'2

In many .ays- Pat i**man .as the most famos and reco)nisa"*e

so*ider in the U4S4 mi*itary4 !atra**y therefore- ne.s of his death

near*y t.o years *ater had the potentia* to dea* an enormos "*o.

to the ima)e of the /rmyJ and the )overnment4'3his .o*d have

"een frther e8acer"ated "y the manner of i**man7s death# not in

the *ine of devastatin) enemy reJ'%as the story"oo= narrative

'1 U4S4 +ose4 ,ommittee on Oversi)ht and overnment eform- Misleading

Information from the Battleeld: The Tillman and Lynch Episodes Together withAdditional iews C110 +4 pt4 $5$9- p434

'2 Sam armer C2002- 31 May9- 7!44L P*ayer Passes p


46/81

mi)ht )o- "t =i**ed "y mem"ers of his o.n "atta*ion in a friend*y

re sitation4

It is perhaps crios then- that .hen the ne.s of i**man7s death

emer)ed- the reaction of the media and p"*ic .as not one of

hosti*ity to.ards the mi*itary and the )overnment( there .ere fe.

.ho criticised the fact that yet another yon) /merican had died on

forei)n soi* )htin) an nEst .ar on "eha*f of the U4S4 )overnment4

here .ere fe. .ho *amented the series of .ho**y preventa"*e

mista=es that *ed to i**man "ein) shot "y one of his o.n4 ather-

the story of Pat i**man7s death nited the nation in .orship of the

6a**?/merican patriot and hero7- in ce*e"ration of ho. this yon) man

sa. the ima)es of Septem"er the 11th- and seein) that evi*- fe*t

ca**ed to defend /merica4J'5hose are the .ords of President


47/81

ns"stantiated4'>his is one e8amp*e of ho. the *e)acy of Pat

i**man .as appropriated "y others and *aden .ith overt*y

nationa*istic discorse- to sit their o.n ends4!onethe*ess- .hy .as

the initia* reaction to his death in the media and amon)st the

)enera* p"*ic so niform*y nitin) and positive +o. did this

"ecome a 6)ood ne.s7 story for the )overnment he ans.er *ies in

the fact that the trth a"ot ho. ,orpora* i**man died .as =ept

secret "y the United States mi*itary and )overnment for over a

month4

he cover?p

On 22nd /pri* 200%- on a dirt road near the vi**a)e of Sperah in

eastern /f)hanistan- ,orpora* i**man .as shot and =i**ed4 Initia**y-

the U4S4 /rmy c*aimed that the former professiona* foot"a** p*ayer

had died in the *ine of enemy re- a c*aim .hich- s"seAent*y- .as

.ide*y reported as fact across U4S4 and internationa* ne.s media4 ''

+o.ever- it soon "ecame evident to the /rmy that the

circmstances of i**man7s death .ere rather more pro"*ematic# a

'> U4S4 +ose4 ,ommittee on Oversi)ht and overnment eform- MisleadingInformation from the Battleeld: The Tillman and Lynch Episodes Together with

Additional iews C110 +4 pt4 $5$9- pp4 2%?2>4

'' See- for e8amp*e#


48/81

15?>J investi)ation condcted in the days fo**o.in) ,orpora*

i**man7s death reported*y conc*ded that:QitR:.as a *i=e*y

fratricideJ'$- a term sed "y the U4S4 /rmy to refer to a death "y

friend*y re4 Mem"ers of i**man7s "atta*ion =ne. .hat had

happened- sayin) they .ere immediate*y sre i**man .as =i**ed "y

a "arra)e of /merican "**ets4J'&ho)h a s"seAent revie. of the

investi)ation fond it to "e tainted "y the fai*re to preserve

evidence- a *ac= of thoro)hness- and the fai*re to prse

investi)ative *eadsJ$0- the investi)ation7s main conc*sion- i4e4 that

i**man .as =i**ed "y friend*y re- se*f?evident*y he*d tre4 In other

.ords- the U4S4 /rmy =ne. a*most immediate*y that i**man .as not

=i**ed in the *ine of enemy re- as .as "ein) reported- "t that his

death .as the res*t of fratricide4 hat the story "ein) reported in

the mainstream media diGered mar=ed*y from the /rmy7s

ascertainment of the tre circmstances of i**man7s death .as no

mere coincidence- rather it .as a res*t of the re*ease of

misinformation "y the Defense Department# on 23rd /pri*- a

'$ U4S4 +ose4 ,ommittee on Oversi)ht and overnment eform- MisleadingInformation from the Battleeld: The Tillman and Lynch Episodes Together with

Additional iews C110 +4 pt4 $5$9- p4>4

'& @osh White C2005- % May9- 6/rmy Withhe*d Detai*s /"ot i**man7s Death74

$0 Department of Defense OBce of Inspector enera*- (eview of Matters(elated to the +eath of Corporal Tillman! 2&2 Army! at 2 CMar4 2>- 200'9CIPO200'0019- ori)ina**y cited in U4S4 +ose4 ,ommittee on Oversi)ht andovernment eform- Misleading Information from the Battleeld2

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spo=esman in /f)hanistan indicated that a U4S4 so*ider C.ho .o*d

"e identied as i**man *ater that same day9 had died after a

re)ht .ith anti?coa*ition mi*itia forces a"ot 25 mi*es soth.est of

a U4S4 "ase at host- .hich has "een the scene of freAent

attac=s4J$1!one of the information re*eased "y /rmy or )overnment

sorces in the days immediate*y fo**o.in) i**man7s death made any

mention of- or even a**sion to- the possi"i*ity of fratricide "ein) the

*timate case of death4 Instead- statements sch as the one Aoted

a"ove .ere framed in sch a .ay that made it appear as if i**man

had "een =i**ed "y enemy re- .ithot e8p*icit*y statin) it in those

terms# indicatin) that he had died after a re)ht .ith anti?

coa*ition mi*itia forcesJ *eads to on*y one conc*sion a"ot case of

death- a conc*sion that .as seiKed pon and .ide*y reported "y the

U4S4 and internationa* ne.s media4 !o initia* attempts .ere made "y

/rmy or )overnment sorces to correct the spread of misinformation

Cmisinformation that .as cased "y the very same sorces7 s"t*y

o"*iAe framin)9# the 200' investi)ation "y the +ose ,ommittee on

Oversi)ht and overnment eform into i**man7s death fond that-

.hi*e mi*itary oBcia*s at hi)hest *eve*s =ne. .ithin a matter of

days that ,orpora* i**man7s death .as a *i=e*y fratricide- they did

$1 U4S4 +ose4 ,ommittee on Oversi)ht and overnment eform- MisleadingInformation from the Battleeld! p4124

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not share this information .ith the i**man fami*y or the p"*ic for

another month4J$2

With re)ards to ;1- this is evidence of the propa)ation of

misinformation on the part of the U4S4 mi*itary4 rthermore- that it

too= another month to correct the misinformation s))ests an

attempt to inFence p"*ic opinion4 he story of ,orpora* i**man7s

death had- "iKarre*y- trned into somethin) of a 6)ood ne.s7 story

for the )overnment and the /rmy- and provided .e*come re*ief from

the torrent of "ad ne.s that the .ars in IraA and /f)hanistan had

"ecome4 In order to ensre that i**man7s death remained a )ood

ne.s story- mi*itary sorces made no discerni"*e eGort to correct the

misinformation that .as circ*atin) in the nationa* and internationa*

ne.s media4 hs- in the case of ,orpora* i**man- an initia* ans.er

to ;1 is that yes- misinformation .as propa)ated- on the part of

the U4S4 )overnment and mi*itary and- yes- this did amont to an

attempt to inFence p"*ic opinion4 hs- their actions mi)ht

Estia"*y "e c*assied as organised political pers$asion2

In order to "i*d pon this initia* ans.er- one needs to accont

for the reasons "ehind the discrepancy "et.een .hat )overnment

$2 U4S4 +ose4 Misleading Information from the Battleeld! p4134

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and mi*itary oBcia*s =ne. and .hat the media and p"*ic =ne.- in

more detai*4 Why .ere the media a**o.ed- even ena"*ed- to contine

spreadin) misinformation re)ardin) ,orpora* i**man7s death for a

f** month- even .hen )overnment and mi*itary oBcia*s .ere

o"vios*y in possession of the f** facts of the case evin i**man-

,orpora* i**man7s yon)er "rother .ho served .ith him in

/f)hanistan- a**ded to one possi"*e ans.er in his testimony to the

con)ressiona* hearin)# o or fami*y and friends- it .as a

devastatin) *oss Q,orpora* i**man7s deathR4 o the nation- it .as a

moment of disorientation:


52/81

.as frantic to come p .ith somethin) to divert attention a.ay from

the dead*y Aa)mire that IraA had "ecome4J$5or ra=aer- this .as

a c*assic case of perception mana)ement on the part of the White

+ose4 It .as pre propa)anda4 With respect to +errin) and

o"inson7s concepta* frame.or=- one mi)ht term it organised

political pers$asion2

It is no. necessary to ascertain .hen White +ose oBcia*s "ecame

a.are of- at the very *east- the s$spicion that ,orpora* i**man7s

death .as a res*t of fratricide4 If the )overnment .as not intendin)

to ti*ise the death as part of a strate)y of organised political

pers$asion! and there .as even the s*i)htest sspicion that i**man

.as =i**ed "y fratricide- their hand*in) of the story sho*d have "een

very diGerent- and the actions ta=en in the .ee=s fo**o.in) vast*y

a*tered4 Determinin) precise*y .hen White +ose oBcia*s "ecame

a.are proves diBc*t- as the +ose ,ommittee on Oversi)ht and

overnment eform fond ot- "ecase of the seemin)*y co**ective

ina"i*ity of these oBcia*s to reca** any specic detai*s# none of the

White +ose oBcia*s intervie.ed "y ,ommittee staG had any

reco**ection of ho. they *earned of the fratricide or .hat they did in

$5 ra=aer- *here Men *in Dlory! ch4334

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response4J$>


54/81

i**man7s death "efore they "e)an draftin) their statements and

press re*eases4 Moreover- the eport fond that no one in the White

+ose conrmed .ith the mi*itary .hether ,orpora* i**man had

acta**y died4 he White +ose a*so did not conrm .ith the mi*itary

that it co*d ta*= p"*ic*y a"ot ,orpora* i**man4J$$hs- the

assmption the ,ommittee and- indeed- the )enera* p"*ic is

presma"*y spposed to ma=e is that there .as a "rea=do.n in the

channe*s of commnication "et.een )overnment and mi*itary

oBcia*s- and the mi*itary7s =no.*ed)e of the fratricide did not reach

the White +ose for some .ee=s# this is spposed to e8p*ain .hy

the )overnment acted as it did- ma=in) i**man into a posthmos

poster "oy for its fai*in) .ar- the theory perhaps "ein) that

i)norance of information is not as serios as .ithho*din)- or

manip*atin) information4

+o.ever- evidence ncovered "y the ,ommittee7s investi)ation

stron)*y s))ests that information re)ardin) ,orpora* i**man7s

fratricide reached the White +ose and pro"a"*y the President

himse*f arond a .ee= after his death4 President


55/81

The loss of Army Corporal Pat Tillman last wee6 in Afghanistan

3ro$ght home the sorrow that comes with every loss and

reminds $s of the character of the men and women who serve

on o$r 3ehalf2 8riends say that this yo$ng man saw the images of

&eptem3er the ..th! and seeing that evil! he felt called to defend

AmericaJ/

/t no point drin) his remar=s a"ot ,orpora* i**man does he refer-

or even a**de to possi"*e case of death4 here is no s))estion

that he .as =i**ed in the *ine of enemy re and- of corse- there is no

s))estion that he .as =i**ed "y fratricide4 It seems odd that the

President .o*d ma=e no mention of this in his remar=s a"ot a

recent*y fa**en so*dier( this conspicos a"sence of detai* may "e

e8p*ained "y a 6P%7 messa)e- sent "y enera* Stan*ey Mc,hrysta*-

,ommander of the @oint Specia* Operations ,ommand C@SO,9- on

2&th /pri* 200%4 Sent to the commandin) )enera* at United States

,entra* ,ommand C,!,OM9- as .e** as the commanders of

Specia* Operations ,ommand CSO,OM9 and /rmy Specia* Operations

,ommand CUS/SO,9- the messa)e cited nconrmed "t

sspected reports that POUS Qthe President of the United StatesR

and the Secretary of the /rmy mi)ht inc*de comments a"ot

$& President eor)e W4


56/81

,orpora* i**man7s heroism and his approved Si*ver Star meda* in

speeches QsicR crrent*y "ein) preparedJ- stressin) it essentia*J to

inform or contry7s *eadersJ a"ot the fratricide- to prec*de any

n=no.in) statements "y:QthemR:.hich mi)ht case p"*ic

em"arrassment if the circmstances of ,orpora* i**man7s death

"ecame p"*ic4J&0.o days after this messa)e .as sent- President


57/81

have fond ot Est "efore it .as made p"*ic on 2&th May4 &2he

President himse*f .as as=ed direct*y "y a Eorna*ist in 200' .hen he

*earned of the fratricide( not even he co*d reca** .hen he fond ot#

I can7t )ive yo the precise moment4


58/81

)overnment and mi*itary on an nprecedented sca*e4 It re*ies on the

President- the Secretary of Defence and their staG not meetin) or

spea=in) .ith the commanders of @SO,- ,!,OM- SO,OM and

US/SO, for near*y a month- "et.een i**man7s death and the p"*ic

annoncement of his fratricide or- if they did- it re*ies on these

commanders not thin=in) to correct the misinformation that .as

"ein) reported re)ardin) the nation7s foremost ne.s story4 It seems

to reAire a si)nicant sspension of dis"e*ief to accept that the

White +ose .as as mch in the dar= a"ot ,orpora* i**man7s

death as the rest of the )enera* p"*ic4

he rea*ity is that "oth mi*itary and )overnment oBcia*s *i=e*y =ne.

of the circmstances re)ardin) ,orpora* i**man7s death .ithin a

matter of days- yet did not share this information .ith the media-

the p"*ic nor- indeed- the deceased7s fami*y- for another month4

he manner in .hich ,orpora* i**man .as spo=en of posthmos*y-

"y the media- "y po*iticians- "y the President himse*f Che reminds

s of the character of the men and .omen .ho serve on or

"eha*fJ&%9 demonstrates Est ho. favora"*e this ne.s story- in its

crrent )ise- had "ecome for the /merican )overnment and

&% President eor)e W4


59/81

mi*itary4 i**man7s death in the *ine of devastatin) enemy reJ&5.as

the c*mination of his story"oo= narrative- from mi**ionaire foot"a**

p*ayer to va*iant so*dier .ho )ave p his *ife in service and

protection of his contry4 It .as a story"oo= narrative that .as an

idea* too* of organised political pers$asion- in that it "oth diverted

attention a.ay from the dead*y Aa)mireJ&>of IraA- and reaBrmed

the =ind of nationa*istic va*es pon .hich domestic spport for a

.ar is invaria"*y "i*t4 It .as ndo"ted*y a p"*ic re*ations co$p for

the ra=aer- *here Men *in Dlory! ch4334

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Deception

MaEor enera* Mc,hrysta*7s .rote in his 6P%7 messa)e that it .as

essentia*J to inform or contry7s *eadersJ a"ot the fratricide- to

prec*de any n=no.in) statements "y:QthemR:.hich mi)ht case

p"*ic em"arrassment if the circmstances of ,orpora* i**man7s

death "ecame p"*ic4J&'+ere- the shortest .ord is perhaps the most

meanin)f*# ifJ4 en4 Mc,hrysta* .rites that the President sho*d

not spea= of ho. i**man died va*iant*y in the *ine of enemy re-

"ecase if the trth .ere to come ot and the p"*ic .ere to nd ot

he .as acta**y =i**ed "y fratricide- then that .o*d "e incredi"*y

em"arrassin) for the )overnment4 hat he ses ifJ- rather than

.henJ s))ests that there .ere those- possi"*y himse*f inc*ded-

.ho tho)ht that the trth co*d "e covered p4 ,orpora* i**mans

fratricide .o*d not necessari*y have to "e revea*ed( perhaps the

crrent misinformation circ*atin) in the media .o*d eventa**y

"ecome esta"*ished trth and i**man .o*d remain as the /rmy and

the .ar eGort7s poster?"oy4 It is a sma** *in)istic s*ip "t it has

serios imp*ications# it s))ests that the hi)hest?ran=in) oBcia*s in

the US /rmy .ere at *east prepared to consider the se of deception

to ensre the media narrative remained favora"*e to them( if they

&' Persona* orJ messa)e from MaEor enera* Stan*ey Mc,hrysta*4

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61/81

.ere committed to re*easin) the trth a"ot ,orpora* i**man7s

death- if it .as Est a matter of timin) Ci4e4 .hen they .o*d ma=e it

p"*ic9- then it seems n*i=e*y- hi)h*y impro"a"*e even- that en4

Mc,hrysta* .o*d choose to phrase his messa)e in the .ay he did4

ho)h it is "t one sma** .ord- en4 Mc,hrysta*7s se of ifJ

"etrays a "roader pattern of deceptionat .or= .ithin the

)overnment and the /rmy concernin) the i**man aGair4

/s +errin) and o"inson7s frame.or= ot*ines- deception .ithin

organised political pers$asion can "e carried ot in three main .ays#

deception thro$gh lyingCma=in) a =no.in)*y fa*se statement9-

deception thro$gh omissionC=no.in)*y .ithho*din) important

information9 and deception thro$gh distortionCframin) statements

in a =no.in)*y mis*eadin) .ay94&$his section .i** e8amine the

e8tent to .hich deception .as sed in the organised political

pers$asion tactics emp*oyed fo**o.in) ,orpora* i**man7s death- and

identify .hether sch deceptionscan "e c*assied as# lying!

omission or distortion2 or e8amp*e- en4 Mc,hrysta*7s choice of

*an)a)e s))ests a .i**in)ness- or intention to deceive thro)h

omission2 +e .as imp*yin) it .as not a"so*te*y necessary for the

f** facts of i**man7s death to "e re*eased to the p"*ic- a.are of the

&$ Piers o"inson and ric +errin)- 6Deception and 1 O $1 1%-&30 WODS


62/81

imp*ications sch reve*ations mi)ht have pon the prevai*in)

narrative4 In other .ords- in order to ensre the organised political

pers$asion tactics .ere not compromised- en4 Mc,hrysta* .as

prepared to omit =ey detai*s re)ardin) the case from statements

made "y oBcia*s to the p"*ic and the media4 his .o*d constitte

an intention to carry ot deceptionO indeed- =ey detai*s re)ardin) the

case were omitted for over a month- meanin) the deception .as

carried ot4

One can identify other e8amp*es of deception in some of the

statements Aoted a"ove4 he initia* statement from the DoD

concernin) ,orpora* i**man7s death- .hich "ecame the "asis for the

narrative of misinformation that deve*oped in the ensin) .ee=s-

.as deceptive in its .ordin)# it indicated that i**man had died after

a re)ht .ith anti?coa*ition mi*itia forces a"ot 25 mi*es soth.est

of a U4S4 "ase at host- .hich has "een the scene of freAent

attac=s4J&&It has a*ready "een esta"*ished that the mi*itary =ne.-

a*most immediate*y- that i**man died as a res*t of fratricide- and

tho)h this statement does not direct*y contravene that trth

Ctho)h it does not constitte deception thro$gh lying9- it is framed

in a =no.in)*y mis*eadin) manner- ma=in) it deception thro$gh

&& U4S4 +ose4 ,ommittee on Oversi)ht and overnment eform- MisleadingInformation from the Battleeld! p4124

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63/81

distortion2 Statin) that i**man died after a re)ht .ith anti?

coa*ition mi*itia forcesJ stron)*y imp*ies a case of death that .as

contrary to the trth- i4e4 it imp*ies he died in the *ine of enemy re-

rather than thro)h fratricide4 Moreover- no attempts .ere made "y

either the mi*itary or the )overnment to correct the distortion# if the

distortion had "een accidenta*- one e8pects it .o*d have "een

corrected mch sooner than it acta**y .as4

President


64/81

patriotism Citse*f an e8amp*e of organised political pers$asion9

ho.ever- as .as a*so esta"*ished- the reason for the omission does

not simp*y appear to "e i)norance# "y a** reasona"*e measres- this

.as a de*i"erate omission fo**o.in) the advice of en4 Mc,hrysta*7s

6P%7 messa)e4 o ar)e that the


65/81

seein) that evi*- he fe*t ca**ed to defend /mericaJ is a c*ear e8amp*e

of deception thro$gh lying2he c*aim that i**man .as motivated to

en*ist after seein) the ima)es of Septem"er the 11thJ is .ho**y

ns"stantiated ? i**man never disc*osed his reasons for en*istin) ?

and White +ose fact chec=ers .ere .e** a.are of this102- yet the

c*aim .as never removed from the speech- instead it .as simp*y

accredited to n=no.n friendsJ4 he notion of i**man "ein)

motivated to en*ist as a res*t of the terrorist attac=s on Septem"er

the 11th 2001 .as an inte)ra* part of the constrction of his

story"oo= narrative# fore)oin) mi**ions of do**ars in order to )ht for

the safety of the /merican peop*e in President 4

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+o.ever- the narrative .as ntre and President 00?$?22- 3?10C"9 C200>94

105 ra=aer- *here Men *in Dlory! ch4334

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67/81

acta* case of death- .hen he =ne. .ith near certaintyJ that it

.as fratricide410>Moreover- the na* citation asserted that i**man

had pt himse*f in the *ine of devastatin) enemy reJ410'he

decision to a.ard the Si*ver Star had t.o possi"*e motivations#

rst*y- it neat*y comp*eted ,orpora* i**man7s narrative of heroism-

"ravery and se*f?sacrice and- second*y- it imp*ied to the p"*ic that

the circmstances srrondin) his death .ere not sspicios and

that he had- in fact- "een =i**ed "y the enemy4 Indeed- the inc*sion

of the phrase pt himse*f in the *ine of devastatin) enemy reJ

does more than simp*y imp*y he .as =i**ed "y the enemy- it more?or?

*ess states it e8p*icit*y4 his .as deception thro$gh lying: the mi*itary

.ere a.are of ho. i**man .as =i**ed- yet .hen citin) him for his

a.ard they stated he had "een =i**ed "y the enemy4 rthermore-

the ,ommittee investi)ation ncovered that "oth of the eye.itness

statements s"mitted .ith the Si*ver Star paper.or= .ere a*tered

"y some"ody .ithin the '5th e)iment7s chain of command4J10$he

statements .ere attri"ted to Private O7!ea* and Ser)eant Me*

Ward4 In their testimonies- O7!ea* said he typed ot a statement "t

10> ra=aer- *here Men *in Dlory! ch4334

10' Si*ver Star /.ard ,itation for ,orpora* Patric= D4 i**man- United States /rmyCndated94

10$ U4S4 +ose4 Misleading Information from the Battleeld! p4154

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68/81

after he .rote it- his .ords .ere em"e**ished so e)re)ios*y that he

never si)ned itJ10&- .hi*st Ser)eant Ward had no reco**ection of even

.ritin) sch a statement4 his is perhaps the most "raKen e8amp*e

of deception thro$gh lying that I fond thro)hot the .ho*e i**man

aGair# the eye.itness statements of t.o servin) U4S4 so*diers .ere

either entire*y fa"ricated or em"e**ished to the point .ere they .ere

comp*ete*y inaccrate4 he t.o so*diers .ere a.are of the fratricide

a**e)ations- yet their a*tered statements made no mention of it

.hatsoever4 ra=aer sms p the state of aGairs accrate*y# a**

the recommendation materia* that Mc,hrysta* approved and

s"mitted:.as painsta=in)*y .ritten to create the impression that

i**man .as =i**ed "y enemy re4


69/81

received en Mc,hrysta*7s P% messa)e that conrmed the fratricide4

he press re*ease stated that i**man .as "ein) )iven the a.ard#

for his seless actions after his (anger element was am3$shed

3y anti"coalition ins$rgents d$ring a gro$nd assa$lt

convoy thro$gh so$theastern Afghanistan GTillmanH was

shot and 6illed while foc$sing his eForts on the elimination of the

enemy forces and the protection of his team mem3ers2...

It constittes deception thro$gh distortion "ecase- a*tho)h not

e8p*icit*y statin) ho. ,orpora* i**man died- the inference is c*ear*y

that he .as =i**ed "y enemy re4 US/SO, =ne. that i**man .as

a*most certain*y =i**ed in a fratricide incident- yet their press re*ease

stron)*y imp*ied other.ise4 US/SO,7s depty commander at the

time-


70/81

press re*ease in a =no.in)*y mis*eadin) .ay- so as not to disrpt the

on)oin) narrative that ,orpora* i**man had "een =i**ed "y enemy

re4

In smmary- in attemptin) to ans.er ;2 ? to .hat e8tent .as

there an attempt to intentionally deceive the p"*ic ,an the U4S4

)overnment and mi*itary7s actions "e c*assied as deceptive

organised political pers$asion ? .ith re)ards to the case of ,orpora*

i**man- my research has identied nmeros e8amp*es of decisions-

actions and statements that can a** "e c*assied as deceptive2

rthermore- there are c*ear e8amp*es of every =ind of deception

noted "y +errin) and o"inson# thro)h lying! omission and

distortion2here is no Aestion that the deception .as de*i"erate

and intentiona*- and I have pt for.ard some s))estions as to the

motivations "ehind this deception2 One needs to ta=e into accont

the po*itica* sitation# a time of acte po*itica* pressre for the


71/81

si)nicant*y dama)in)4 he deception .as motivated "y a desire to

avoid sch dama)e- and "y a desire not to disrpt ,orpora* i**man7s

story"oo= persona* narrative that had "een- and sti** .as- sed as a

too* of organised political pers$asion "y the po*itica* e*ite- in attempt

to retain spport for increasin)*y npop*ar forei)n invasions of

soverei)n states4 he case for )oin) to .ar- partic*ar*y in IraA- had

a*.ays "een rather sha=y and- as sch- these tactics of organised

political pers$asion .ere reAired4

11%

What my research s))ests is

that the po*itica* and mi*itary e*ite in the US .ere certain*y not

averse to invo*vin) deception in these tactics4 his .as not simp*y

organised political pers$asion of the =ind .hich invo*ves the

dissemination of information in an attempt to persade4 his .as the

dissemination of misinformation- in an attempt to mis*ead4

11% or frther discssion- see- for e8amp*e# mar- 6Media- War andPropa)anda# Strate)ies of Information Mana)ement Drin) the 2003 IraA War74

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,onc*sions

his dissertation has e8amined the case stdies of Private Lynch and

,orpora* i**man in an eGort to deve*op nderstandin) of the

techniAes of- and motivations "ehind- contemporary .artime

propa)anda- or organised political pers$asion2 With re)ards to

organised political pers$asion! the ndin)s of this dissertation are

"road*y in *ine .ith the ndin)s of o"inson and +errin)7s 6eport H

Mar=s the Spot7- in that these t.o case?stdies have a*so

hi)h*i)hted ho. sch activities Qi4e4 the activities of organised

political pers$asionR! desi)ned to persade or promote po*icy- can

*ead to inaccracy and deception in )overnment commnication4J115

hese ndin)s not on*y raise simi*ar Aestions re)ardin)

democratic acconta"i*ityJ- they a*so raise important and essentia*

Aestions re)ardin) the se of deception as a too* of po*iticians and

115 o"inson and +errin)- 6eport H Mar=s the Spot7- p45$24

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)overnments4 his dissertation has dra.n nmeros historica*

para**e*s .ith past e8amp*es of .artime propa)anda- and has fond

"road simi*arities in terms of "oth motivation- and e8ection#

certain*y .ith re)ards to the Lynch and i**man case?stdies- the

U4S4 )overnment7s campai)n of organised political pers$asion drin)

the 6*o"a* War on error7 re*ied heavi*y on the dissemination of

misinformation- assisted "y an a*most niform*y comp*iant media- in

order to mis*ead its citiKens in a manner desi)ned to retain

credi"i*ity and spport domestica**y for controversia* forei)n po*icy

decisions4 Most important*y- this dissertation has conc*ded that

they deceived the p"*ic into spportin) their forei)n po*icy aims-

and the cases of ,orpora* i**man and Private Lynch .ere sed as

part of these tactics of deception4

hese t.o case?stdies have a certain de)ree of "roader

si)nicance4 he .ay they .ere hand*ed "y the United States

)overnment and mi*itary certain*y s))ests that there .as- and is-

no partic*ar aversion amon)st the e*ite in that contry to sin)

tactics of deceptive organised political pers$asion in order to

inFence p"*ic opinion in a =no.in)*y mis*eadin) manner4 he

case?stdies perhaps s))est that the se of deception is

.idespread amon)st po*itica* e*ites- tho)h frther- more e8tensive-

research .o*d need to "e condcted4

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What is partic*ar*y .orryin)- and .hat ma=es these

conc*sions so important and frther research so vita*- is that- n*i=e

historica* e8amp*es of .artime propa)anda- these contemporary

campai)ns of organised political pers$asion have "ecome innite*y

more covert in their e8ection- a fact not he*ped "y the de*i"erate*y

o"fscatory ephemistic )ise that sch campai)ns tend to )o "y in

the 21st centry4 Whether it is referred to as 6perception

mana)ement7- 6spin7 or in any other meanin)*ess com"ination of

terms- the fndamenta*- na*tered fact is that the 6propa)andisation7

of the stories of Lynch and i**man- *i=e the cont*ess other

e8amp*es of .artime propa)anda thro)hot history- re*ied heavi*y

on the se of deception2 +o.ever- its inherent 6covertness7 has *ed

to an endemic fai*re of acconta"i*ity- an ina"i*ity to conc*sive*y

point to certain po*iticians and *eaders- and ho*d them to accont for

deceivin) their o.n citiKens4 ho)h this dissertation has "een a"*e

to *ay the "*ame at the door of the United States )overnment and

mi*itary for the deception invo*ved in the i**man and Lynch cases-

*i=e the +ose ,ommittee7s investi)ation- it .as na"*e to

determine precise*y .hich individa*s .ere "ehind campai)n of

deception2 !o?one .ithin the United States )overnment or mi*itary

has ever "een he*d to accont for their ro*e in the Lynch and i**man

cases- nor faced any si)nicant conseAences4 !onethe*ess- as the

contemporary propa)anda machine "ecomes more .e**?fnded and

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.e**?hidden- no.- more than ever- it is important to research-

identify- and commnicate e8amp*es of the dissemination of

misinformation- even if or *eaders are "ecomin) increasin)*y *ess

acconta"*e4


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/day- Sean4 6,hasin) the %4

/day- Sean- Steven Livin)ston and Maeve +e"ert4 6m"eddin) the

rth# / ,ross?,*tra* /na*ysis of O"Eectivity and e*evision

,overa)e of the IraA War7- The )arvard International #o$rnal

of Press?Politics 10 C20059- pp4 3?214

/ristot*e4 The Art of (hetoric CLondon- 1&&194

Associated Press C2003- 1 /pri*94 6/merican roops esce IraA POW

Lynch74


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armer- Mi=e C2002- 31 May94 7!44L P*ayer Passes p 4

reeman- Mi=e C2002- 1 @ne94 6i**man Leaves !44L to @oin /rmy7-

ew Nor6 Times! p4D'4

+er"i)- /rthr W4 6Discrsive ,haracteriKation as m"odiment and

,ritiAe# he Diver)ent hetorica* raEectories of Pat i**man

as an /merican +ero7- in @ason d.ards and David Weiss

Ceds49- The (hetoric of American E5ceptionalism: Critical

Essays C@eGerson- 201194

IraA ,oa*ition ,asa*ty ,ont- accessi"*e at icasa*ties4or)2 8irst

Accessed 20th March- 20154

IraA 9- pp4

%$?>&4

$35%3&' P/ '' O $1 1%-&30 WODS
http://icasualties.org/http://www.iraqbodycount.org/databasehttp://guardian.com/http://icasualties.org/http://www.iraqbodycount.org/databasehttp://guardian.com/


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mar- Deepa4 6War Propa)anda and the Ca"9ses of Women# Media

,onstrctions of the @essica Lynch Story7- 8eminist Media

&t$dies % C200%9- pp4 2&'?3134

Lind*a.- Scott C2003- 2 May94 7


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http#NNEohnpi*)er4comNartic*esN.ar?"y?media?and?the?

trimph?of?propa)anda4

Pin?at- eroniAe and Maria Stern4 6he Scriptin) of Private @essica

Lynch#


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ay*or- Phi*ip M4 M$nitions of the Mind:A )istory of Propaganda from

the Ancient *orld to the Present +ay CManchester- 200394

The Tillman &tory2 Dir4 /mir


81/81

White +ose C200'- & /)st94 President B$sh +isc$sses American

Competitiveness Initiative +$ring Press Conference4

White- @osh C2005- % May94 6/rmy Withhe*d Detai*s /"ot i**man7s

Death7- The *ashington Post! retrieved from

.ashin)tonpost4com4

Wo*fsfe*d- adi4 Media and Political Conict: ews from the Middle

East C,am"rid)e- 1&&'94
http://washingtonpost.com/http://washingtonpost.com/

deception and media misinformation in wartime - the cases of private lynch and corporal tillman

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