JORDAN IN THE GULF WARS:

FOREIGN POLICY &

REGIME SURVIVAL

Debra Shushan, CIRS, Georgetown University

Jordan & Gulf War I (1990-91)

WHITE PAPER

issued by

Jordanian

government

after Gulf War I

17-page

statement plus

15 “background

documents”

Jordan & Gulf War II (2003+)

No similar

effort in Gulf

War II for

transparency

in Jordanian

foreign policy

Underscores

the difference

between

Jordan’s

foreign

policies in the

two Gulf

Wars

Outline of the Talk

Background

What is at stake?

My Argument: Regime Survival Strategy and

Foreign Policy

Jordan in the Gulf Wars

Conclusion / Implications

The Gulf Wars in Context

Background

•“This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait.” – President George H. W. Bush

• Bush recruits coalition to protect Saudi Arabia (Desert Shield) and ultimately evict Iraqi

soldiers from Kuwait (Desert Storm), emphasizing Arab participation

Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, August 2 1990

Jordan Does Not Join US-Led Coalition

Unlike the majority of Arab League members, Jordan does not condemn Iraqi invasion (abstains from Aug 10 vote)

King Hussein tries to remain neutral, pursue intra-Arab solution

Pres. Bush: King Hussein was “one of the worst offenders” and “almost a spokesman for his neighbor Iraq”

“Their strong personal bonds forged over

nearly two decades had made the King’s

support of Saddam Hussein during the

war an act of personal betrayal that

caused the President enormous anguish.”

- Secretary of State James Baker

•“You are either with us or you are against us in the fight against terror.” – President George W. Bush

• “We now have a coalition of the willing that includes some 30 nations who publicly said they could be included in such a listing and there are 15 other nations, for one reason or another, who do not wish to be publicly named but will be supporting the coalition.” – Secretary of State Colin Powell

US Invasion of Iraq, March 20 2003

Jordan as Tacit Coalition Partner

Active efforts to dissuade Bush Administration from launching war, convince Iraq to adhere to UN resolutions

Jordan hosts JOINT TASK FORCE-WEST out of ShaheedMuaffaq airbase near Azraq, home to 5,000+ US, coalition troops

Extensive GID cooperation with CIA, including “extraordinary renditions”

“There are many enablers that

aren’t with gun in hand.” –

Interview with State Dept official

Why study Jordanian foreign policy in the Gulf Wars?

What is at stake?

The Broader Context

Question: How do authoritarian regimes make foreign policy?

Political scientists have focused on democracies

My Project: draw insights from comparing foreign policies of three Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, and Syria) in two Gulf Wars

E, J, S forced to choose between: pleasing the US vs. following public opinion

Supported

US-led

coalition in

2003+

Opposed

US-led

coalition in

2003+

Supported

US-led

coalition in

1990-91

EGYPT SYRIA

Opposed

US-led

coalition in

1990-91

JORDAN

How do authoritarian regimes make

foreign policy?

Structural Realists:

All states determine foreign policy based on

calculations of external power and threats

Norm-driven:

Leaders follow international norms/law or regional

norms (e.g. Arab consensus)

Autocratic Exceptionalism:

Non-democratic leaders follow personal preferences,

unconstrained by domestic actors

1) Leaders care first and foremost about retaining power.

2) They have regime survival strategies, based on maintaining the support of key backers (“winning coalition”).

3) Leaders choose foreign policies according to their regime survival strategies, calculated to keep them in power at home.

My Argument

Focus on Domestic Politics

Challenge to the conventional wisdom about the insignificance of domestic politics in non-democracies

Assumption that leaders’ primary goal is retaining power

In democracy: focus is on winning coalition for next election

In autocracy: need to please winning coalition to maintain stable rule, prevent overthrow

Key issues: ECONOMICS and PUBLIC OPINION

Possible Winning Coalition Members

POPULIST VS.

ELITIST nature

of strategy

depends on

the extent to

which it relies

on support

from the mass

public.

Elites

military, finance,

community, technocratic

Mass Public

Foreign Benefactor ($)

Regime Survival in the Gulf Wars

Join US-led coalition? Do not join?

RECEIVE AID:

Bolsters

economic

interests of

elites and

mass public

GAIN SUPPORT:

Especially from

mass public

Understanding Jordanian Foreign

Policy in the Gulf Wars

Gulf War I: Economic Considerations

US, Gulf states held substantial financial leverage over Jordan: Relied on Saudis, Kuwaitis, and US for remittances, aid,

and trade Saudis offered to grant Jordan half its oil needs in

return for joining US-led coalitionGulf aid went from over $400 million to zero

Jordan was also economically dependent on Iraq: Transit trade through the port of Aqaba 75% of Jordan’s industrial exports went to Iraq 80-90% of Jordan’s oil FREE from Iraq

GW1: Role of Mass Public Opinion

Interviews with King Hussein’s advisors indicate that he feared domestic instability, overthrow, or civil war if he did not side with public opinion Saddam’s appeal cut across parties and social strata:

Palestinians and East Bank Jordanians, Muslim Brotherhood and Leftists

Liberalized domestic political structure (1989-1993) enables public to reach consensus, voice opinion

Populist regime survival strategy increases importance of mass public

GW2: Economic Considerations

Cost-benefit analysis was clear, due to stronger aid, trade relations with US Jordan signed FTA with US in 2000, making US #1

destination for Jordanian exports in 2003

Jordan has become 4th-largest recipient of US aid

US added $1.1 bn to Jordan’s annual aid ($450 mil) in 2003 as thanks for support in GW2

Post-GW1 Turning Point: King Hussein adopts less populist regime survival strategy, signs Wadi Arabapeace treaty with Israel

King Abdullah’s economic focus

GW2: Economic Considerations

Aid to Jordan from US, Gulf States (in USD million)

Jordan’s Exports to Iraq, US (as % of total exports)

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001

Gulf States

US

0

5

10

15

20

25

1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001

Iraq

US

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit

GW2: Jordanian Public Opinion

Perceptions re: reasons for looming US strike vs. Iraq:

Control of Oil 83%

Saving Israel 63%

Should Jordan aid US?

No to facilities 88%

Yes to facilities 2%

67% report supporting Jordanian government’s stance after the war

Government succeeds in hiding nature of its policy from the Jordanian people?

People afraid to report true opinion in government poll?

CSS Poll (Jan 2003) Government Poll (May 2003)

GW2: Why was public opinion ineffectual?

Change in winning coalition de-emphasizes importance

of mass public

Economic incentive trumps public opinion

Political deliberalization since opposition around peace

with Israel in 1994

Committee for Resisting Submission & Normalization

Demonstrations around 2000 Intifada, 2001 Afghan

war led King Abdallah to deliberalize further

Changes in election laws hurt opposition, esp. Islamists

Restrictions on the press

Conclusion / Implications

Demystifying the Autocratic State

Importance of domestic politics

The key is to elaborate how they matter

Differences among non-democratic states

Centrality of economic interests in foreign policy

Public opinion: How can we best gauge it? How do

regimes estimate it? How often does the mass public

feel strongly about foreign policy, and on what

issues?

JORDAN IN THE GULF WARS:

FOREIGN POLICY &

REGIME SURVIVAL

Debra Shushan, CIRS, Georgetown University