Darfur: the politics of genocidedenial syndrome

MATTHEW LIPPMAN

On April 7, 2004, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan in marking thetenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide addressed the UN Commission onHuman Rights and unveiled a plan to halt the continuing crime of genocide.Annan expressed the hope that one aspect of his lasting legacy would be a UNorganization able to act “decisively” in combating genocide. In his five pointplan of action, Annan advocated attacking the root causes of genocide, protectingnon-combatants, ending impunity, creating an early warning system and respondingvigorously to halt genocide. He admonished: “let us not wait [to act] until the onlyalternatives to military action are futile hand-wringing or callous indifference.”1

At the same time that the Secretary General was proposing to halt genocidalviolence, UN Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland was warning of“ethnic cleansing” in Darfur, Sudan. Roughly two weeks earlier, MukeshKapila, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Darfur, had characterized theregion as “the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis.” He proclaimed that the“only difference between Rwanda and Darfur now is the numbers involved”and that this “is more than just a conflict, it is an organized attempt to do awaywith a group of people.”2

In July 2004, Kofi Annan reported that the African people of Darfur areexperiencing “terrible violence and suffering” and that many are living in “sub-human conditions” and that “[i]t is clear that serious crimes have been com-mitted and there has been gross and systematic abuse of human rights.” Headmonished the government of Sudan that it possessed a “sacred responsibility”to prevent the continuation of these atrocities.3

Several non-governmental organizations and American commentators charac-terized Darfur as a genocide. New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof,writing in the New York Review of Books, noted that of the 24,000 front-pagestories in the New York Times during World War II, only six directly addressedthe Nazi attack on European Jews and other groups. He argued that the samelack of attention and concern marked the massacres in Rwanda in 1994, the Arme-nian genocide of 1915, the Cambodian slaughter of the 1970s and the atrocities inBosnia in the 1990s. Kristof bemoaned that in each instance the global community

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only responded following the end of the killings. He noted that Darfur, in contrast,is a “slow motion” genocide that was methodically unfolding before our eyes.Kristof admonished that the world community cannot credibly claim to beunaware of what is transpiring in Darfur.4

In February 2005, Kristof confronted readers of his column with the “victims ofour indifference” and published four photos from a “secret archive” of photosgathered by African Union monitors, many of which portray attacks on childrenand were described by Kristof as too “horrific for a newspaper.” The archivealso included a document allegedly dictated by the President of Sudan to regionalcommanders and security officials. The text ordered the militia to “change thedemography of Darfur and make it void of African tribes” and called for“killing, burning villages and farms, terrorizing people, confiscating propertyfrom members of African tribes and forcing them from Darfur.”5 Kristoff wouldlater write that “[p]erhaps the most extraordinary aspect of Darfur isn’t thatgunmen . . . have heaved babies into bonfires as they shout epithets againstblacks. It’s that the rest of us are responding only with averted eyes and politetut-tutting.”6

Kristof’s accounts would later receive corroboration from Samantha Power,who although uncertain as to whether genocide was being carried out in Darfur,vividly described ethnically based attacks on African villages, mass rapes,murder and looting.7 In July 2004, philanthropist Daniel Wolf, writing in theWashington Post, recounted the story of a young woman who witnessed four ofher young brothers and three of her cousins being thrown into a raging fire andreported that a male villager who attempted to save the children was himselfbeheaded and dismembered.8

One of the most credible chroniclers of events in Darfur is Brian Steidle, aformer US Marine officer assigned as a military observer to the African Unionmonitoring group in Darfur. Steidle documents what he terms the systematic exter-mination and genocide of “black Africans.” He claims that in these attacks womenand children are singled out for slaughter and describes watching a village of20,000 people being burnt to the ground. Steidle, in an interview with the Austra-lian Broadcasting Corporation, recollects walking through villages in which“scores of women and children . . . had been killed . . . people had their ears cutoff, their eyes plucked out, men . . . had been castrated and left to bleed . . .[T]his was an everyday occurrence.” Outside the village of Adwah he describesa field on which “you couldn’t walk around without stepping on humanbones.”9 Steidle reflects that he did not want to “look back years from now andask why we didn’t stop another genocide.”10

This article sketches the background, development and international responseto Darfur. The UN and associated regional organizations are very far fromfinding a solution in Darfur and this essay is in the nature of a preliminary com-mentary on the all too familiar inaction of the international community. In theaftermath of Bosnia and Rwanda, the world community avowed to prevent a recur-rence of the scourge of genocide. In 2003, various observers warned that conflictsover land, water and governance in Darfur Sudan between African agricultural

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tribes and Arab nomadic tribes threatened to escalate into mass atrocities andethnic cleansing. Security Council resolutions and political agreements haveproven unable to halt the violence, which arguably constitutes a genocide. Thereluctance of global powers to characterize Darfur as a genocide reflects a “geno-cide denial syndrome,” a reluctance to invoke the morally and politically signifi-cant term genocide. The focus is on the genocidal violence sponsored by theSudanese regime. This should not be interpreted as dismissing the complexityof the conflict and the fact that some of the daily death and destruction is attribu-table to insurgent and autonomous criminal groups.

The roots of the conflict in Darfur

The roots of the Darfur conflict can be traced to the economic pressures that havebeen building in the region over the last several decades. Darfur traditionally hasbeen an underdeveloped region of Sudan in which the indigenous Muslim popu-lation views itself as divided between African agriculturalists and Arab nomadicpastoralists. The non-Arabs are drawn from various tribes, including the majorityFur, and Masaalit and Zaghwa, while the semi-nomadic Arabic speaking tribes arecomprised of tribes such as Rizeigat, Mahaiya, Irayqat and Beni Hussein. Thiseconomic divide gradually has come to be viewed as corresponding to racial dis-tinctions. The perceived racial differences between Africans and Arabs, althoughblurred by intermarriage, have increasingly dominated the politics, sociology andpolitics of Darfur.11

The historical pattern has been for nomadic tribes to drift to the agriculturalregions in the dry season (November through April) in search of water andgrazing land. This migration led to a particularly intense conflict betweenAfrican and non-African over land in the mid-1980s when the region experienceddrought and increasing desertification. These conflicts escalated with the intro-duction of sophisticated weaponry into Darfur by outside powers competing forinfluence.12

The conflict over land has fuelled claims by the Arab tribes that they have beenunderrepresented in the Fur-dominated local governments and, in 1986, thesenomadic tribes established the “Arab alliance” with the goal of establishingregional hegemony. This was paralleled by a growing dissatisfaction amongAfrican tribal groups with the region’s historic underdevelopment and agrowing fear that the government in Khartoum was promoting Arab governanceof Darfur.13

A central issue in the conflict is the uneven distribution of wealth and develop-ment in Sudan. Sudan is one of the fastest growing economies in Africa and pro-duces roughly 512,000 barrels of oil a day, which propelled a growth in the grossdomestic product of 8% in 2005. Direct foreign investment from China, Malaysia,India, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates has increased from US$128 million in2000 to US$2.3 billion in 2006. This new-found wealth is concentrated inKhartoum which now is the site of luxury hotels, office towers, shopping malls,a BMW dealership, and a US$140 million dollar Coca-Cola plant. Roughly

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70% of the oil revenues is poured into the military build up of a country whose percapita income in 2005 was only US$640.14

The frustration among African tribal groups boiled over in April 2003, whenan African-based insurgent group now known as the Sudanese Liberation Army(SLA) attacked El Fashir, the capital of North Darfur. This was followed by anattack and the looting of government food and arms stocks in Mellit, the secondlargest town in North Darfur. Another insurgent group, the Justice and EqualityMovement, also emerged to challenge Khartoum.15

A number of prominent Darfurians residing in Khartoum petitioned PresidentOmar el-Beshir of Sudan to open negotiations towards a peaceful solution tothe inchoate conflict in Darfur. President Beshir, however, was determined topursue a military solution and assembled a Special Task Force on Darfur. The gov-ernment was reluctant to rely on the standing army which was dominated bymembers of the Fur tribe and enlisted the assistance of Arab militias commonlyreferred to as the Janjaweed (men on horseback).16

The Janjaweed are recruited from the Arab nomadic camel herding tribes inDarfur and Chad. They are equipped by the government with modern weaponryand satellite phones and launch their attacks in conjunction with the Sudanesearmed forces and are paid by Khartoum, which also provides them with a rationof cooking oil and sugar.17 President Beshir, in September 2003, directed theJanjaweed to “eliminate the rebellion.”18

The Sudanese government’s denial that it sponsors and supports the Janjaweedwas effectively challenged in October 2006, when a Sudanese Arab defectormanaged to flee to England. He recounted being recruited along with otheryoung men by the Sudanese from Arab nomadic tribes. They were armed andtrained and told that they must defend their tribes by ethnically cleansing theAfricans. The defector recounted that for three years his unit raped, looted,seized the cattle and killed the residents of roughly 30 farming villages whileshouting “Kill the slaves. Kill the slaves.” The homes were burned to theground, the residents killed and the survivors left to die of thirst or starvation.19

A quarter of a million Africans have fled to refugee camps in Chad andothers have found sanctuary in isolated areas of Darfur. Most of the almost2.5 million displaced persons have been transported to Internally DisplacedPersons Camps where they depend on humanitarian assistance from the inter-national community. The Sudanese have deliberately impeded the delivery offood and medicine by obstructing transports and delaying visas, and both theJanjaweed and insurgents have targeted the humanitarian relief convoys.20

Darfur today is considered the single most dangerous locale for humanitarianworkers21 and groups such as a Norwegian relief organization have withdrawnfrom the region, leaving hundreds of thousands without food or medicine.22 Thechild mortality rate in the camps hovers well above the crisis level. JournalistLydia Polgren reports that at the Twaila Camp death is no “stranger . . .[m]alaria and diarrhea course through the camp, picking off children first,then the old. There are no doctors or nurses or medicine. There is no cleanwater. There are no toilets or latrines.”23 The camps also have been attacked

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and are the site of a systematic campaign of sexual harassment and rape by theJanjaweed.24

The numbers are staggering. As many as 10,000 expire each month, roughly350,000–400,000 have died, and 2.5 million of Darfur’s population of sixmillion have been displaced. The Sudanese regime has insisted throughout that itdoes not support the Janjaweed and that the number of deaths is exaggerated andnumbers no more than 10,000.25 The regime has engaged in a concerted effort tolimit both domestic and international reporting on the conflict, the most visibleexample being the jailing of Chicago Tribune correspondent Paul Salopek for 34days on charges of espionage, spreading false rumours and entering the countrywithout a visa.26 The conflict now is rapidly spreading into Chad and the CentralAfrican Republic.27

Diplomatic initiatives

A number of diplomatic initiatives aimed at halting the Darfur crisis have beenundertaken over the past several years. In April 2004, the insurgents and Sudanesegovernment entered into the N’djamenaHumanitarian Ceasefire Agreement nego-tiated under the auspices of the African Union and Chad. The parties agreed to a 45day ceasefire and pledged to meet in the future to negotiate a settlement.28 A sep-arate agreement signed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia established a Ceasefire Commis-sion to monitor the ceasefire.29 In early July 2004, the Sudanese government andSecretary General Kofi Annan issued a joint communique in which Sudan com-mitted herself to permitting access for humanitarian workers, investigating alle-gations of human rights violations and resuming talks towards a settlement inDarfur.30

Despite these agreements, the violence continued to escalate and, in November2004, the Sudanese government and insurgents met in Abuja Nigeria and nego-tiated a Protocol on the Improvement of the Humanitarian Situation in whichthe participants guaranteed the free movement of humanitarian workers,pledged to avoid violence against civilians and agreed to cooperate withAfrican Union monitors in Darfur.31 The parties also expressed concern overthe repeated violation of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement signed inN’djamena and pledged to respect the text.32

In November 2005, the insurgents and government of Sudan signed a Declara-tion of Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur. The agree-ment addressed democracy, federalism, the distribution of national wealth,humanitarian assistance, the right of return for internally displaced persons andrehabilitation and reconstitution. The signatories pledged to promote reconcilia-tion and peaceful coexistence based on mutual respect and a commitment toprevent future divisions.33

The failure of these agreements to stem the violence led to a growing movementin the United States to adopt a more aggressive stance towards Darfur.

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Darfur and the American response

In June of 2004, two conservative Republican legislators, US Senator SamBrownback of Kansas and Congressman Frank Wolf of Virginia, visited Darfur.They concluded that the world was witnessing the “systematic destruction of apeople or race” that “may very well” constitute genocide. The two lawmakersreported that the Janjaweed was employing a “scorched earth policy” to drivethe “black Muslim farmers” “out of the region . . . and perhaps to extinction.”They also alleged that the Sudanese government was engaged in slowing andimpeding humanitarian assistance to the refugee camps, which had turned into“breeding grounds for disease and sickness” with mortality rates reaching “alarm-ing levels.” Brownback and Wolff described visiting “pillaged villages” and inter-viewing refugees who had experienced “rape, murder and plunder.” Theircongressional report strongly condemned and indicted the Janjaweed as“[r]uthless brutal killers” supported and equipped by the Sudanese governmentand who were allowed to “operate with impunity.”34

A number of non-governmental organizations rallied around the allegation thatSudan was committing genocide in Darfur and urged the United States to inter-vene. For example, Salih Booker and Ann-Louise Colgan of African Actionargued in the left-leaning magazine The Nation that “unless there is an immediatemilitary intervention in Darfur, up to a million people could die this year. Weshould have learned from Rwanda that to stop genocide, Washington must firstsay the word.”35

The US Congress responded to the Brownback and Wolff report by passing ajoint resolution that declared that the “atrocities unfolding in Darfur, Sudan aregenocide” and reminded President Bush and the international community oftheir “international legal obligations” under the 1948 UN Convention on the Pre-vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The Congress urged PresidentBush to call the atrocities in Darfur by their “rightful name: ‘genocide’” and calledon him to “seriously consider multilateral or even unilateral intervention to stopgenocide in Darfur, Sudan should the UN Security Council fail to act.”36 This res-olution was reinforced over the next several years by an extension of a PresidentialExecutive Order and two acts of Congress that imposed an American tradeembargo on Sudan.37 There also is a continuing student-led initiative in theUnited States to persuade the 50 State legislatures and various public andprivate universities to divest their pension funds and stock portfolios from multi-national corporations doing business in Sudan.38

On September 9, 2004, United States Secretary of State Colin Powell testifiedbefore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to report the findings of an inves-tigative mission to Sudan. Powell stated that interviews with refugees revealed a“consistent and widespread pattern of atrocities: Killings, rapes, burning ofvillages committed by Janjaweed and [Sudanese] government forces againstnon-Arab villagers.” Secretary of State Powell contended that Sudan met thethree criteria for genocide. First, Sudan had committed “specified acts” that“raise the likelihood that genocide is being committed.” Second, these acts are

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directed against members of national, ethnic, racial or religious group, and third,the acts are engaged in “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the group, assuch.” Secretary of State Powell concluded that “genocide has been committedin Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear res-ponsibility—and that genocide may still be occurring.” Sudan as a contractingparty to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocideaccording to Secretary of State Powell has failed to prevent and to punish actsof genocide and risked “wholesale condemnation by the international commu-nity.”39

This was the first time that the United States had alleged that a foreign govern-ment was in the process of committing genocide. Secretary of State Powell lateralso informed Kofi Annan that America was invoking Article VIII of the GenocideConvention which provides that Contracting Parties may call upon the “competentorgans of the United Nations” to take “such action as they consider appropriate” toprevent and to suppress acts of genocide. Secretary Powell ultimately disappointedthose who had been calling for the United States to take a vigorous role in Darfurwhen in his closing remarks he observed that the accusation of genocide did notcarry any more significance than allegations of crimes against humanity or warcrimes and that “no new action is dictated” by the allegation of genocide. He con-cluded his remarks by stating that he looked forward to working with Sudan to endthe conflict in Darfur.40

The Department of State report was based on interviews with 1,136 randomlyselected refugees in 19 locations in eastern Chad. The interview data indicatethat 67% of respondents witnessed the killing of a non-family member; 61%viewed the killing of a family member; 81% had their villages destroyed; 80%experienced the theft of livestock; and 67% had been the victim of aerialbombing. Thirty-two percent heard the attackers invoke “racial epithets.” Thereport documents the complete destruction of 405 villages populated by Africansand substantial damage to another 123. Nearly 90% of the refugees responded thatthere was no rebel activity in or near their village prior to the attack. The reportfinds that the assaults followed a pattern in which government aircraft or helicop-ters bomb villages and soldiers arrive in trucks and surround the village. TheJanjaweed and government soldiers then enter the camps and loot, kill andabduct and rape the young women. Those who flee are targeted by aerialattacks.41 President Bush in a September 21, 2004 address to the General Assem-bly proclaimed that the “terrible suffering and horrible crime in the Darfur Regionof Sudan . . . are genocide.”42

How can we explain these bold pronouncements? The invocation of the termgenocide by Secretary of State Powell undoubtedly was the product of a methodi-cal and reasoned analysis. There nevertheless were various factors that coalescedto influence this determination. First, the Bush Administration allegedly enteredoffice with a commitment to take aggressive action to prevent another Rwanda.There also is little love lost for Sudan, which has alienated the evangelical com-munity in the United States by its actions against Christians in the south andwhose fundamentalist Islamic regime is suspected of supporting international

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terrorism. The fact that these actions were undertaken against Africans mobilizedthe Congressional Black Caucus and Democratic Party liberals to join the choruscondemning Sudan.43 The criticism of Sudan also reflects popular opinion in theUnited States. Polls indicate that the electorate believes that genocide is beingcarried out in Darfur and supports American participation in any UN force thatmight be sent to halt the atrocities in the future.44

The United States government stood virtually alone among nation-states andnon-governmental organizations in labelling Darfur as genocide. The EuropeanParliament by a vote of 566 to 6 with 16 abstentions did urge Sudanese authoritiesto “end impunity and bring to justice the planners and perpetrators of crimesagainst humanity, war crimes and human rights” which can be “construed as tan-tamount to genocide.”45 The movement for action against genocide continued tobuild in the United States. The Holocaust Museum in Washington, DC, forexample, featured photographs of Darfur projected onto the exterior walls of thebuilding.46

The United Nations Security Council

In April 2004, the UN Commission on Human Rights disregarded reports of warcrimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur, expressed its deep concern aboutDarfur, called for a ceasefire and articulated “its solidarity with the Sudan in over-coming the current situation.” The Commission then requested an independentreport on the situation in Darfur.47 The UN High Commissioner for HumanRights, Bertrand Ramcharan, issued a report on Darfur on May 7, 2004, inwhich he concluded that there is a “reign of terror in Darfur” involving “repeatedattacks on civilians” by Sudan. High Commissioner Ramcharan went on toobserve that these attacks appear to have been “largely ethnically based”against tribes of African origin and that these “patterns of violence point to anintent on the part of the Sudanese authorities to subjugate those . . . perceived tobe providing a support base for the rebels.”48

On July 10, 2004, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1556 under ChapterVII of the Charter of the UN which affirms and endorses the Declaration ofPrinciples agreed upon by Sudan and the Secretary General for the settlementof the Darfur conflict. Resolution 1556 proclaims that the government of Sudanis responsible for respecting human rights, maintaining law and order and protect-ing individuals within its territory. The resolution goes on to endorse the deploy-ment of African Union monitors and urges the parties to conclude a politicalagreement without delay. Sudan is instructed to disarm the Janjaweed and toapprehend and bring to justice Janjaweed leaders responsible for violations ofhuman rights and international humanitarian law. The Security Council furtherstressed that internally displaced persons and refugees were to be returned totheir homes and provided with adequate assistance and security. The Council con-cluded by requesting the Secretary General to report back on progress within 30days and warned that sanctions may be imposed in the event of a lack of progress.

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In the interim, the Security Council imposed an arms embargo on the Janjaweedand insurgent groups.49

On July 21, 2004, Kofi Annan gave a press conference reporting on his visit toSudan and observed that it “is clear that serious crimes have been committed andthere has been gross and systematic abuse of human rights.” He called on Sudan torespect its commitments and to disarm the Janjaweed and other armed groups andurged the Security Council to take appropriate measures in the event of a continu-ing failure by Sudan to act.50

Sudan responded on August 11, 2006, with a letter to the President of theSecurity Council pledging an “action plan” to restore “peace, security, stabilityand development in Darfur.” The plan provided for “safe areas” for displacedindividuals, the disarming of the Janjaweed and the opening of political nego-tiations with insurgent groups in Sudan.51

On August 30, 2006, Kofi Annan submitted a report requested by the SecurityCouncil regarding Sudan’s fulfillment of the commitments contained in the July2004 joint communique. The Secretary General concluded that there were “noindications . . . that the Government has taken any measures to immediatelystart to disarm the Janjaweed and other armed outlaw groups.” Kofi Annan alsoobserved that the “wanton destruction of the villages and the killing of a largenumber of civilians constitutes a serious breach of the Government’s commit-ments.”52 The Security Council, on September 19, 2004, adopted a resolutionexpressing grave concern that Sudan had not fully met its obligations, particularlythe commitment to ensure the security of the civilian population of Darfur againstcontinued depredations. The resolution went on to repeat the central points articu-lated in Security Council Resolution 1556 and requested the Secretary General toestablish an international commission of inquiry to investigate reports of violationsof international humanitarian law and human rights in Darfur, to determinewhether acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of suchviolations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable. Inan intensely debated provision, the Security Council stated that in the event of alack of progress it will consider “taking additional measures . . . such as actionsto affect Sudan’s petroleum sector and the Government of Sudan or individualmembers of the Government of Sudan.”53 On November 19, 2004, the SecurityCouncil repeated its call for a political settlement and endorsed the decision ofthe African Union to increase the size of its monitoring team in Darfur.54

In January 2005, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur concludedthat that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible for “seriousviolations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting tocrimes under international law, including the killing of civilians, torture, disap-pearances, destruction of villages, rape and other sexual assaults, pillage andforced displacement, throughout Darfur.” These acts, according to the Commis-sion, had been committed on a “widespread and systematic basis and may consti-tute crimes against humanity.” The Commission rejected the explanation thatthese acts were part of a counter-insurgency campaign, pointing out that attackshad been indiscriminately directed at civilians from the Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit,

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Jebel, Aranga and other “so-called African tribes.” The Commission, however, didnot find support for allegations of genocide.55

On March 29, 2005, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1591 establishinga Committee of the Security Council charged with designating individuals subjectto sanctions. Disabilities were to be imposed on individuals who “impede thepeace process, constitute a threat to stability in Darfur . . . commit violations ofinternational humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities or provideassistance to insurgent groups in Darfur.” The sanctions were to include a prohibi-tion on entry or transit through Member States as well as the freezing of funds,financial assets and economic resources.56 The Security Council, roughly a yearlater, imposed restrictions on the assets and international travel of MajorGeneral Gaffar Mohamed Elhassan, Commander of the Western MilitaryRegion for the Sudanese Air Force, and Sheikh Musa Hilal, the ParamountChief of the Jalul Tribe in North Dafur and leader of the Janjaweed. Sanctionsalso were imposed on two insurgent leaders, Adam Yacub Shant, Commanderof the Sudanese Liberation Army rebel group, and Gabril Abdul Kareem Badri,Field Commander of the National Movement for Reform. Russia and China con-tinued to oppose Security Council consideration of matters involving Darfur andabstained from voting.57

Darfur Peace Agreement

On March 31, 2006, the Security Council voted to refer individuals that theInternational Commission of Inquiry identified as being involved in war crimesand crimes against humanity to the Prosecutor of the International CriminalCourt. The United States, along with Algeria, Brazil and China, abstained.58 AliOsman Taha, Sudan’s First Vice President, responded that Sudan was fullycapable of maintaining the rule of law without international assistance and thatthe government would not cooperate with the newly established Criminal Court.59

In yet another effort to halt the spiraling conflict in Darfur, the African Union inApril 2006 negotiated the Darfur Peace Agreement between Sudan and theprimary rebel groups. The Sudan Liberation Movement, led by Mini Menawi,was the only insurgent group that ultimately agreed to sign the document. MiniMenawi represents the Zaghawa, a small but militarily potent tribe. The otherfaction of the Sudan Liberation Movement, led by Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nur,along with the Justice Equality Movement refused to sign. The refusal of Nur toenter into the agreement is significant because Nur represents the demographicallydominant Fur people in Darfur. The agreement provided for a referendum in 2010to determine whether the three states comprising Darfur should be consolidatedinto a unitary region with a single government. The primary objections by theinsurgents appeared to centre on a lack of confidence that the Sudanese govern-ment would disarm the Janjaweed and the failure to guarantee rebel groups signifi-cant roles in the central government in Khartoum and in the local Darfurgovernment. There also were objections to the limited share of oil revenues forDarfur and to the modest victim compensation fund.60

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On May 16, 2006, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1679.The resolution calls on signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement to comply withtheir commitments and urges the insurgent groups that failed to sign the agreementto accept the peace treaty. The Security Council also expressed an intent to intro-duce UN peacekeeping forces.61 OnAugust 31, 2006, the Security Council adoptedResolution 1706 in which it “invites the consent of the Government of NationalUnity [of Sudan]” to a transition to a UN force in Darfur. The Council reassuredSudan that it was determined to work with the Sudanese “in full respect of its sover-eignty” and affirmed that “a United Nations operation in Darfur shall have, to theextent possible, a strong African participation and character.”62

The introduction of a UN force was premised on the fact that the 7,000 memberAfrican Union (AMIS) contingent lacked the fuel, food, funds, administrativeexpertise, equipment and air and ground transport to fulfil its mission. AfricanUnion troops only carried AK-47 assault rifles and their rules of engagement gen-erally restricted them to monitoring adherence to the 2004 ceasefire and to record-ing violations, rather than intervening and preventing atrocities against civilians.63

The number of troops in Darfur, which is roughly the size of France or Texas, issaid to be equivalent to one soldier being assigned to cover the entire island ofManhattan in New York. In contrast, Liberia, which is less than one-quarter thesize of Darfur with half the population, has had a UN peacekeeping force whichis more than double the force level in Darfur.64 The ability of the AfricanUnion forces to assume an active role was further compromised when the Janja-weed began to target monitors for attack. The proposed UN force was to have morerobust rules of engagement than the African Union and was to be authorized tointervene to protect civilians and to confront militias engaging in offensivemilitary actions.65

The UN and African Union reached an agreement with Sudan for a hybrid forceof roughly 20,000 police and military peacekeepers to enter Darfur and absorb theAfrican Union forces. There was some sense of urgency as Jan Egeland, the UNUnder Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, warned that Sudan and govern-ment-supported militias were committing acts of “inexplicable terror” against civi-lians and that the fighting had reached the worst level since the conflict began threeyears ago. Sudanese Foreign Minister Lam Akol, however, began to qualify hiscountry’s agreement to permit UN intervention when he stated that the forcemust remain predominantly African and under the control of the African Unionand that the UNmust limit itself to a subsidiary role. ForeignMinister Akol insistedthat “[t]here is no way the main fighting force would be a mixed one.”66 TheSudanese government shortly thereafter seemingly rejected the entry of any UNforces whatsoever when President Omar Hassan al-Bashir presented the SecurityCouncil with a plan to bring peace to Darfur by sending 10,500 additional Sudanesetroops to crush the rebels in the region. Sudan also warned that any UN force wouldbe viewed as a violation of its sovereignty and would be met by armed resistance.67

President al-Bashir responded to a statement by President George Bush urging theUN to protect the people of Darfur by proclaiming that “[w]e [Sudan] . . . totallyreject a transition from the African Union force to a UN force.” He further

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condemned what he characterized as fictitious reports of “deaths and displacements”in Darfur that he alleged were being “spread by Jewish organizations.”68

The African Union refused an entreaty from Sudan to remain in the countrywith support from funds donated by the Arab League and insisted that it wouldwithdraw if Sudan did not accept a UN force.69 President Olusegun Obasanjo ofNigeria explained that “[i]t is not in the interest of Sudan nor in the interest ofAfrica, nor indeed, in the interest of the world for us all to stand by and see geno-cide being developed in Darfur.”70

The UN, however, softened its stance when confronted with Sudanese intransi-gence and the African Union agreed to an extension of the mandate of its forces.71

As 2006 drew to a close, Kofi Annan further acquiesced to Sudan’s demands andannounced that he had agreed that the UN force would be under the command andcontrol of the African Union and that the UN would be restricted to a limitednumber of consultants, technical assistance and military and police experts andthat, in return, Sudan would agree to a ceasefire and would make renewedefforts to open peace negotiations.72

Sudan, however, continued to accelerate its military campaign in what JanEgeland described as a “scorched earth onslaught.”73 In November 2006 alone,60,000 Darfurians were forced from their homes, hundreds of aid workers wereevacuated and the conflict spread 100 miles into Chad.74 On January 11, 2007,Governor Bill Richardson of New Mexico, the former American Ambassador tothe UN, announced that President al-Bashir and the insurgent groups had agreedto a 60 day ceasefire and Richardson expressed guarded optimism that thismarked the first step towards a political settlement.75

Kofi Annan, in a December 2006 address to mark International Human RightsDay, sadly noted that, judged by what is happening in Darfur, “[s]ixty years afterthe liberation of the Nazi death camps, and thirty years after the Cambodian killingfields, the promise of ‘never again’ is ringing hollow.”76 A few days later KofiAnnan urged the newly established UN Human Rights Council to take steps toend the violence in Darfur. He implored the Council that the “people in Darfurcannot afford to wait another day.” Several Muslim states disputed the seriousnessof the situation in Darfur and contended that a link between Sudan and the Janaja-weed had yet to be established. Sudan dismissed the allegation that it was sponsor-ing violence in Darfur as a falsehood concocted by the Western media. TheHuman Rights Council defeated both a weak resolution offered by Algeria anda stronger text sponsored by the United Kingdom and accepted a compromise res-olution authorizing a five person “fact finding” committee to report back on thesituation in Darfur in March, 2007. Sudan also rejected calls for the impositionof a “no-fly zone” over Darfur.77

The events in Darfur have been meticulously documented by non-governmentaland international organizations. Yet, a review of the diplomatic record indicatesthat while the Security Council has threatened sanctions and interventionagainst Sudan, it has remained paralysed and unwilling to confront the Sudaneseregime. The UN resolutions are in the nature of symbolic statements of concernwhich have proven to be of limited practical import. Romeo Dallaire, the Canadian

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General who was in charge of UN forces in Rwanda during the genocide in 1993,writes that the inflated prose of the United States’ resolutions on Darfur is remi-niscent of the Security Council’s “indifference to the horrors [of Rwanda].”78

One promising development is the announcement of Louis Moreno-Campo, thechief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, that he plans to indict asyet unnamed individuals in Sudan for international crimes. It is unlikely thatSudan will turn individuals over to the International Criminal Court for trialand, in any event, various members of the Security Council may persuade theCouncil to delay prosecution.79

The “Responsibility to Protect”

The failure of the UN to intervene in Darfur stands in stark contrast to contemporarystatements affirming the responsibility of nation-states and the international com-munity to protect individuals against mass atrocities. In 2001, an international com-mission organized and funded by Canada issued a report on the “Responsibility toProtect.” The Commission asserted that sovereignty no longer means that a State isfree to act without restraint within its territorial boundaries. Sovereignty in the con-temporary world, instead, entails the duty of a State to safeguard and to secure itsindigenous population against impending or actual massacre, genocide, ethniccleansing and large-scale human catastrophe. The Commission further arguedthat the international community acting through the Security Council is obligatedto undertake military action across international borders in those exceptional cir-cumstances in which a State proves unwilling or unable to act to halt situationswhich genuinely shock the conscience of mankind, or which present a clear andpresent danger to international security. This collective military action is to beundertaken as a last resort, the duration and intensity of the military action shouldbe proportionate to the threat, and there must be a reasonable chance of success.Primary responsibility to act is centred in the Security Council and, in the eventthat the Council fails to respond, the General Assembly or regional organizationsmay undertake collective action.80

The notion of a “responsibility to protect” was embodied in the World SummitOutcome Document adopted by the UN General Assembly on October 24, 2005.Resolution 60/1 provides that each individual State has the responsibility toprotect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimesagainst humanity. The resolution further provides that in the event that a Stateis unable or unwilling to fulfil this responsibility, the international community,acting through the UN, has the responsibility to employ peaceful means toprotect a population. The text further proclaims that the international communityis “prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through theSecurity Council . . . on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevantregional organizations . . . should peaceful means be inadequate and national auth-orities manifestly fail to protect their population.”81

Resolution 60/1 clarifies and reinforces the text of the UN Charter, which, in itspreamble and text, establishes human rights as a “purpose and principle” of the

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organization.82 The Security Council’s authorization of forcible action to protectethnic minorities in northern and southern Iraq and its establishment of inter-national criminal tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda clearly indicate that the pre-vention and punishment of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide andethnic cleansing are part of the jurisdictional brief of the Security Council andassociated regional organizations.83 The Constitutive Act of the African Union,in fact, recognizes “[t]he right of the Union to intervene in a Member State . . .in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide, and crimesagainst humanity.”84

There now can be little doubt in light of Security Council resolutions over thepast 15 years that war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing andgenocide are matters of international concern and that international interventionto protect individuals against these depredations is permissible under Article2(7) of the UN Charter, which prohibits intervention in “matters which are essen-tially within the domestic jurisdiction” of a State.

Darfur and genocide

There is an added legal obligation and imperative to act against genocide. Article 1of the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime ofGenocide obligates the High Contracting Parties to “undertake to prevent and topunish” genocide. In drafting the Convention in 1948, the Sixth Committee ofthe UN General Assembly shifted this language from the Preamble to Article 1to strengthen the duty to prevent and punish the crime of genocide. This solemncommitment is reinforced by the last paragraph of the Preamble, which providesthat “in order to liberate mankind from such odious scourge [of genocide] inter-national co-operation is required.”85 In 1970, the International Court of Justicerecognized that that the obligation to prevent and to punish genocide is a universalduty that is binding on all States.86

Security Council resolutions characterize Darfur as the site of “violations ofhuman rights and international humanitarian law.” The failure to characterizeDarfur as genocide reflects the findings of the International Commission appointedby the Security Council. The Commission recognized that “some of the objectiveelements of genocide materialized in Darfur.” There was evidence, according tothe Commission, demonstrating the systematic and large-scale killing of civiliansbelonging to particular tribes, along with the “large-scale causing of serious bodilyor mental harm” and the “massive and deliberate infliction of conditions of lifebringing about their [the African tribes’] physical destruction in whole or inpart.”87 The Commission further determined that despite the fact that the attackersand victims shared a language, religion and physical characteristics, the economicand political differences between the two groups in Darfur has hardened into a per-ceived difference in racial identity. In a significant number of cases, the Janjaweedwere determined to have directed derogatory racial epithets at the victims,suggesting that they were viewed as racial and social inferiors.88

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The Commission of Inquiry concluded, however, based on four “elements” ofevidence, that the government sponsored Janjaweed lacked a genocidal intent.First, in a number of instances the attackers “refrained from exterminating thewhole population [of a village] and selectively killed groups of young men.” Inparticular, in January 2004, the Janjaweed and Sudanese forces attacked WadiSalehi, a group of 25 villages. The Janjaweed executed 15 persons whosenames were read from a list as well as seven village leaders. They then sent theelderly, boys, men and women to a nearby village where 205 alleged rebelswere executed. Second, the populations surviving the Janjaweed attacks are notkilled, but instead are collected and live together in internally displaced personscamps (IDPC). Third, the Commission noted that villages with “mixed compo-sition have not been attacked.” Fourth, in one instance, an individual did notresist the Janjaweed seizure of 220 camels and was beaten. His brother objectedto the confiscation of a single camel and was shot dead. The Commission con-cluded that this illustrates that the attackers are motivated by the desire to appro-priate cattle and property rather than to exterminate the population.89

In the view of the Commission, the Janjaweed’s crimes against humanity inDarfur are undertaken as part of a strategy of counter-insurgency warfare ratherthan with the specific intent to annihilate African tribes in whole or in part.90

The Commission cautioned that it did not “rule out the possibility that in someinstances single individuals, including Government officials, may entertain agenocidal intent.”91 The report, after noting that genocide is generally recognizedas the “most serious international crime” because of its scope and intent to deprivehumanity of its “manifold richness,” explained that the widespread commission ofcrimes against humanity in Darfur may be “no less serious and heinous thangenocide.”92

The respected genocide scholar William Schabas has applauded the Commis-sion’s determination that Darfur is witness to crimes against humanity ratherthan genocide, observing that the Commission “refuses to make the quantumleap from the extermination of rival combatants to the intentional destruction ofan ethnic group.” Professor Schabas goes on to observe that characterizingDarfur as a genocide appeals to conservative political elements in the UnitedStates who portray Sudan as a “battleground for the crusade against Islam.”93

This view from Europe is in stark contrast to commentaries in the United Statesthat are dismissive of the Commission’s conclusions and have little difficulty inconcluding that Darfur is a genocide.94 Nsongurua Udombana, writing in theAmerican Bar Association sponsored International Lawyer, rejects the Inter-national Commission of Inquiry’s conclusions as “convoluted and contrived,”“fictitious and factitious” and intended to avoid the attendant legal obligationsassociated with a finding of genocide.95 David Luban of the Georgetown Univer-sity Law Center observes that the analysis presented in the UN report is “soremarkably shabby that they [the reasoning] reinforce the suspicion that the . . .Commission was bending over backwards to find no genocide in Darfur.”Professor Luban, in particular, cites the precedent of the Yugoslav War CrimesTribunal in Kristic to support the claim that Sudan is committing genocide in

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Darfur.96 In Krstic, the Appellate Chamber of the Yugoslav International WarCrimes Tribunal held that Serbian forces had committed genocide againstBosnian Muslims in Srebrenica. The Appellate Chamber inferred a genocidalintent from the systematic murder of 7,000 Muslim men. This was the first stepin the anticipated ethnic cleansing of the 40,000 Muslims living in Srebrenicaand the surrounding area, a region which was central to the creation of a contig-uous Serbian state in Bosnia.97

The murder of 7,000 male inhabitants, according to the appellate court, consti-tuted a “substantial part” of the relevant Muslim population and satisfied the stan-dard required by the contemporary jurisprudence of genocide. The Krstic courtexplained that the “substantial part” requirement not only is to be viewed innumerical terms. The number killed or targeted also should be evaluated inrelation to the numerical size of the group. A “substantial part” may be further sat-isfied by targeting “prominent” individuals or by targeting individuals who are“emblematic of the overall group or who are essential to the group’s survival.”The appellate chamber cautioned that genocide does not require an attackagainst every member of a group across a region or a country and that the numeri-cal size of the group for the purposes of the crime of genocide is premised on the“geographic reach” of the perpetrators.98

The percentage of the Serbian population in Srebrenica that was killed isroughly equivalent to the percentage of African inhabitants who were killed inWadi Salehi. The major difference is that in Krstic the court stressed that menof military age were targeted while in Wadi Salehi only suspected rebels allegedlywere singled out for extermination. The Yugoslav Tribunal held that the destruc-tion of such a significant number of men along with the transfer of women, chil-dren and the elderly limited the ability of the Muslims in the area to procreate andto reconstitute the Muslim community. The same type of analysis pertains in WadiSalehi. Although the transfer of the bulk of the population to an IDPC appears asan indirect and inefficient method to accomplish the Janjaweed’s genocidal goal,genocide does not require that individuals employ the “most efficient method” toaccomplish their goals. The Krstic appellate court speculated that the Serbs mayhave employed mass deportation as a tactic to persuade the global communitythat they lacked a genocidal intent. This would seem to parallel the situation inWadi Salehi.99

The International Commission in discussing genocide also devotes little atten-tion to the systematic and mass rape of African women in Darfur. The Janjaweed’sassaults against women in Darfur are similar to the type of sexual assaults that theRwandan tribunal (in Akayesu) considered to have been intended by the Hutu tophysically and psychologically destroy Tutsi women, their families and commu-nities and constituted genocide.100

In parenthesis, it should be noted that theWadi Salehi example does not seem tobe a wholly representative case. The Commission of Inquiry itself noted that theJanjaweed generally targets civilians and that in most of these attacks there is noevidence that insurgents are in or near the village.101

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Despite the Commission’s assertion that the camps in Sudan are well-suppliedwith food, clean water, medicine and logistical assistance, there is overwhelmingevidence that individuals removed to camps in Darfur are subjected to far morethreatening conditions than the individuals deported from Srebrenica. TheSudanese government has intentionally frustrated humanitarian assistance andindividuals in most camps are subjected to desperate, deprived and destitute con-ditions. The Commission also overlooks that Sudan has prevented additionalDarfurians from fleeing to Chad while others are hiding and living in isolatedrural areas beyond the reach of humanitarian organizations.102

The Commission’s conclusion that the Janjaweed’s decision to avoid attacksagainst villages with mixed populations once again seems to reflect the Commis-sion’s seeming failure to grasp that a genocidal intent does not require the exter-mination of every member of a group. The avoidance of attacks against mixedvillages simply may indicate that the Janjaweed are intent on targeting Africansand do not want to harm tribes that may potentially support their cause. The vign-ette concerning the fate of the two brothers who differed in their willingness toturnover their cattle to the Janjaweed has been compared to arguing that AdolfEichmann lacked a genocidal intent because of his willingness to trade Jews formoney. The point simply is that a genocidal intent may coexist with an economicmotive and that it is well documented that the Janjaweed militias freely loot andsteal from their victims, many of whom are subsequently killed.103

The Commission’s central flaw is a failure to place its admittedly limited studyof the situation in Darfur into the larger context of events in the country over thepast three years. It is well established that in the absence of explicit statements agenocidal intent may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances. Thisincludes the systematic nature, scope and similarity of attacks, the existence ofa plan, the targeting of members of specific groups and statements that indicatea genocidal intent.104 The US Department of State and various NGOs havethoroughly documented that the assaults on African villages follow a choreo-graphed plan of attack against civilians and are accompanied by racially inflam-matory rhetoric. The numbers of individuals killed and the number living underdesperate conditions are almost beyond comprehension. It must be kept in mindthat the Commission of Inquiry’s determination that there is a lack of genocidalintent, in part, may reflect the fact that although this was not a judicial inquiry,the investigators inexplicably required that a criminal intent must be “unequi-vocally established.”105

Genocide denial syndrome

The question arises why the international community has insisted that Darfur is nota witness to genocide. The simple answer is that Darfur has fallen victim to a toxicmix of the politics of oil, multinational investment and arms sales and that eventsin the Middle East and Africa have made the international community reluctant tointervene in the affairs of a fundamentalist Islamic regime.106

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There is, of course, the obvious fact that African victims do not possess the pol-itical appeal and potency of Europeans. We also can speculate that there is adeeper explanation for this syndrome of “genocide denial.” The historical associ-ation of genocide with the Holocaust has provided the term with enormous moralweight. The term is a clarion call to action. The acknowledgement of genocide,however, reminds us once again that there are victims, victimizers and morallyculpable bystanders and that there are limits to our resources and compassion.An admission of genocide is a recognition that there are primordial forces atwork that call into question our faith in the inevitability of democracy andhuman rights.

Our image of genocide remains identified with the “Nazi Super State.” Theacknowledgment of genocide at times seems more a matter of politics than analyti-cal precision. The international community in a seemingly choreographedresponse invariably characterizes contemporary slaughters as ethnic conflicts inwhich both sides are equally guilty, violence is inevitable, and intervention istoo little too late. These events are viewed as of regional rather than internationalconcern and are portrayed as “humanitarian crises” rather than as criminal con-spiracies. The atrocities are labelled as ethnic cleansing and the international com-munity relies on rhetorical acrobatics to avoid invoking the term genocide.

Statistics on death and dying and eyewitness reports are dismissed as hyperboleand the motives and judgment of those who denounce the killings and urge inter-vention are questioned. We are told that the label genocide is of little consequenceand an unnecessary fixation. The economic advantages of good relations with theperpetrators are stressed while the national and humanitarian interest in protectingthe victims is minimized.

It is a sad fact that Sudan has remained a member in good standing of the inter-national community despite the fact that the regime has engaged in serial slaugh-ter, against the Darfurians in the west, the Nubian people in the north and theChristians in the south. In short, genocide, in effect, is a “victimless crime.”A crime without victims, victimizers or morally culpable bystanders.

The crime of the last century now is clearly established as characteristic of thetwenty-first. We can anticipate that future political leaders will one day visitDarfur and, with abject wringing of their hands, repeat President WilliamClinton’s pained apology to the Rwandans107—that he was unaware of whatwas transpiring and that the rapidity of events had outpaced the ability of theinternational community to respond.108

Notes and References

1 UN News Service, “10 years after Rwanda Genocide, Anan unveils plan to stop future massacres,” http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnewsAr.asp?nid¼10337 (accessed November 25, 2006).

2 Eric Reeves, “Kofi Annan on Darfur,” http://freeworldnow.blogspot.com/2004/06/kofi-annan-on-darfur-june-17-2004.html (accessed January 5, 2006).

3 Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary-General Kofi Annan at United Nations Headquarters, UN PressRelease SG/SM/9427, July 21, 2004, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sgsm9427.doc.htm(accessed November 25, 2006).

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4 Nicholas D. Kristoff, “Genocide in slow motion,” review of Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, Darfur: A ShortHistory of a Long War, and Gerard Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide, New York Review of Books,February 9, 2006, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18674 (accessed November 25, 2006).

5 Nicholas D. Kristof, “The secret genocide archive,” New York Times, February 23, 2005.6 Nicholas D. Kristof, “If not now, when?” New York Times, October 29, 2006.7 Samantha Power, “Dying in Darfur,” New Yorker, August 30, 2004, p 56.8 Daniel Wolf, “Death and deception in Darfur,” Washington Post, July 31, 2004.9 Tony Jones, “Cease-fire monitor describes Sudan abuse,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation TV: Lateline

Programme, April 21, 2005, http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2005/s1351006.htm (accessedNovember 25, 2006).

10 Brian Steidle, “In Darfur, my camera was not nearly enough,” Washington Post, March 20, 2005.11 Julie Flint and Alex De Wall, Darfur: A Short History of A Long War (London: Zed, 1978), pp 7–12.12 Ibid, p 6.13 Gerard Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp 76–78.14 Jeffrey Gettleman, “War in Sudan? Not where the oil wealth flows,” New York Times, October 24, 2006.15 Human Rights Watch, Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan (New York: Human Rights Watch,

2004), pp 7–9.16 Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide, pp 95–96.17 Human Rights Watch, Darfur in Flames, pp 23–24.18 Scott Straus, “Darfur and the genocide debate,” Foreign Affairs, Vol 84, No 1, 2005, p 126.19 Martin Fletcher, “Janjaweed defector confesses Sudan’s atrocities in Darfur,” Sudan Tribune, October 19,

2006, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article18203 (accessed November 27, 2006).20 “UN accuses Sudan of delaying aid efforts,” New York Times, November 23, 2006, http://www.nytimes.

com/2006/11/23/world/africa/23darfur.html?. . .1 (accessed January 7, 2007).21 Amnesty International, “Darfur threats to humanitarian aid,” December 1, 2006, http://web.amnesty.org/

library/Index/ENGAFR540312006 (accessed January 7, 2007).22 Eric Reeves, “Darfur humanitarian operations now in ‘meltdown’ phase,” Sudan Tribune, December 1,

2006, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article19429 (accessed January 7, 2007).23 Lydia Polgreen, “Darfur trembles as peacekeepers’ exit looms,” New York Times, September 10, 2006.24 Somini Sengupta, “Relentless attacks on women in West Sudan draw an outcry,” New York Times, October

26, 2004.25 Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, We Must Halt the Genocide in Darfur

Sudan Now, June 2005, http://www.ajc.org/atf/cf/%7B42D75369-D582-4380-8395-D25925B85EAF%7D/halt_genocide_darfur.pdf (accessed January 7, 2007).

26 Paul Salopek, “Humanitarian catastrophe unfolds in the troubled region of Sudan,”Chicago Tribune, October 8,2006. For a full discussion of the intimidation and censorship of the media, consult Amnesty International,“Sudan: intimidation and denial: attacks on freedom of expression in Darfur,” August 25, 2004.

27 Lydia Polgreen, “Arab gunmen kill hundreds of villagers in Chad,” New York Times, November 15, 2006.28 N’djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur, April 8, 2004 http://darfurinfor

mation.com/darfur-in-perspective/app-1.asp (accessed December 2, 2006).29 Agreement Establishing the Ceasefire Commission and Monitoring Force in Darfur, May 28, 2004, http://

darfurinformation.com/darfur-in-perspective/app-1.asp (accessed December 2, 2006).30 Joint Communique between the Government of Sudan and the United Nations on the Occasion of the Visit of the

Secretary General to Sudan, June 29–July 3, 2004, http://darfurinformation.com/darfur-in-perspective/app-5.asp (accessed December 2, 2006).

31 Protocol between the Government of the Sudan (GoS), the Sudan LiberationMovement/Army (SLM/A) and theJustice and EqualityMovement (JEM) on the Improvement of the Humanitarian Situation inDarfur, November9, 2004, http://darfurinformation.com/darfur-in-perspective/app-4.asp (accessed January 7, 2007).

32 Protocol between the Government of the Sudan (GoS), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) andthe Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on the Enhancement of the Security Situation in Darfur inAccordance with the N’Djamena Agreement, November 9, 2004, http://darfurinformation.com/darfur-in-perspective/app-4.asp (accessed January 7, 2007).

33 African Union, Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur, July 5, 2005,http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article10700 (accessed January 7, 2006).

34 Senator Sam Brownback and Congressman Frank Wolf, Trip Report Darfur, Western Sudan, June 27–29,2004, http://www.house.gov/wolf/images/frontimages/fullsize/Sudan%20Trip%20Report.pdf (accessedJanuary 7, 2007).

35 Salih Booker and Ann-Louise Colgan, “Genocide in Darfur,” The Nation, July 12, 2004, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20040712/booker (accessed December 2, 2006).

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36 United States House Congressional Resolution 467, September 7, 2004.37 Executive Order 13067 (October 2006); Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701, 2004.38 Lucien J. Dhooge, “Condemning Khartoum: the Illinois Divestment Act and foreign relations,” American

Business Law Journal, Vol 43, No 2, 2006, p 245.39 Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, The Crisis in Darfur, September 9, 2004 (Testimony before the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee), http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/36042.htm(accessed December 2, 2006).

40 Ibid, p 39.41 US Department of State, Documenting Atrocities in Darfur (Washington, DC: United States Department of

State, 2004).42 John R. Crook, “President and Secretary of State characterize events in Darfur as genocide,” American

Journal of International Law, Vol 99, No 1, 2005, p 266.43 Taylor B. Seybolt, “The Darfur atrocities documentation project: a precedent for the future?” in Samuel

Totten and Eric Markusen, eds, Genocide in Darfur. Investigating the Atrocities in Sudan (New York:Routledge, 2006), pp 164–165.

44 Jim Lobe, “U.S. public backs force against Sudan ‘genocide’,” IPS Inter Press Service News, July 20, 2004,http://www.ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews¼24711 (accessed December 2, 2006).

45 European Union, “Motion for a resolution on the humanitarian situation in Sudan,” September 16, 2004,http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_3810_en.htm (accessed January 9, 2006).

46 These photos are available at http://www.ushmm.org/conscience (accessed December 2, 2006).47 Eric Reeves, “Genocide in Sudan,” In These Times, May 2006, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Africa/

Genocide_Sudan.html (accessed January 7, 2006).48 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in the Darfur Region of the Sudan,

UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/3, May 7, 2004.49 Security Council Resolution 1556, July 7, 2004.50 United Nations, Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary-General Kofi Annan at United Nations Head-

quarters, UN Doc SG/SM/9427, July 21, 2004.51 Letter Dated August 10, 2004 from the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the UN Addressed to the President

of the Security Council, August 11, 2004.52 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraphs 6 and 13 to 16 of Security Council

Resolution 1556, UN Doc S/2004, UN Doc S/2004/703, August 30, 2004, pp 6, 20.53 Security Council Resolution 1564, September 19, 2004.54 Security Council Resolution 1574, November 19, 2004.55 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General,

January 25, 2005, pp 3–4 (Executive Summary).56 Security Council Resolution 1591, March 29, 2005.57 Security Council Resolution 1672, April 25, 2006.58 Security Council Resolution 1593, March 31, 2005.59 Warren Hoge, “Sudan rebuffs UN on trying Darfur war-crimes suspects abroad,” New York Times, February

9, 2006.60 J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Darfur: The Long Road to Disaster (Princeton: Markus Wiener,

2006), pp 307–312; Darfur Peace Agreement, May 5, 2005, http://allafrica.com/peaceafrica/resources/view/00010926.pdf (accessed December 10, 2006). The appendix provides copies of all previous agree-ments between the parties.

61 Security Council Resolution 1679, May 16, 2006.62 Security Council Resolution 1706, August 31, 2006.63 Lydia Polgreen, “Truce is talk, agony is real in Darfur war,” New York Times, May 14, 2006.64 Lydia Polgreen, “Obstacles test African force in grim Darfur,” New York Times, May 17, 2006.65 Joel Brinkley, “Security Council agrees to send troops to Darfur,” New York Times, January 4, 2006.66 “UN humanitarian official says Darfur crisis is at crucial moment,” New York Times, November 19, 2006,

p 18.67 Lydia Polgreen, “Sudan’s plan for Darfur involves its own force, not the UN’s,” New York Times, August 22,

2006.68 Warren Hoge, “Bush and Sudan’s leader at odds over sending UN troops to calm Darfur,” New York Times,

September 20, 2006.69 Lydia Polgreen, “African peacekeepers threaten to pull out of Sudan,” New York Times, September 6, 2006.70 “Nigeria leader warns Africa about strife in Darfur,” New York Times, October 11, 2006.71 Lydia Polgreen, “From cowed to defiant: Sudan balks at taking peacekeepers,” August 26, 2006.

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72 Mohamed Osman, “UN nears deal on Darfur force,” Chicago Tribune, December 23, 2006, http://www.-chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-0612230134dec23,1,5530242.story (accessed January 8,2007).

73 Lydia Polgreen, “Peace pact has yet to touch lives of Darfur’s refugees,” New York Times, May 8, 2006.74 Rich Shapiro, “Darfur crisis crosses borders,” Christian Science Monitor, December 11, 2006.75 Lydia Polgreen, “US governor brokers truce for Darfur,” New York Times, January 11, 2007.76 “Secretary-General urges human rights activists to ‘fill leadership vacuum’, hold world leaders to account,”

UN Doc SG/SM/10788/HR/4909/OBV 601, December 8, 2006, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sgsm10788.doc.htm (accessed January 8, 2007).

77 Human Rights Watch, UN: Rights Body Must Act Now on Darfur, December 11, 2006, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/12/11/global14808.htm (accessed December 14, 2006).

78 Romeo Dallaire, “Looking at Darfur, seeing Rwanda,” New York Times, October 3, 2004.79 Evelyn Leopold, “Court plans Darfur indictments by February,” Reuters, December 13, 2006. http://

www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N12364474.htm (accessed December 15, 2006).80 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development

Research Centre, 2001).81 2005 World Summit Outcome, General Assembly Resolution A/Res/60/1, October 24, 2005.82 Charter of the United Nations, 3 Bevans 1153, 1976 Y.B.UN 1043, June 26, 1945, art. 1(3).83 Security Council Resolution 827, May 25, 1993; Security Council Resolution 955, November 8, 1994.84 Constitutive Act of the Africa Union, July 11, 2006, art. 4(h).85 UN GAOR 6th Comm., 3rd Sess., pt. 1, 67th mtg. at 38, UN Doc A/C.6/SR. 67 (1948) (Mr Kaeckenbeeck,

Belgium).86 “Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd,” ICJ Reports, Vol 3, No 32, 1970.87 International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, p 507.88 Ibid, pp 508–510.89 Ibid, pp 513–517.90 Ibid, pp 518–519.91 Ibid, p 520.92 Ibid, pp 518–519, 522.93 William A. Schabas, “Genocide, crimes against humanity, and Darfur: the Commission of Inquiry’s findings

on genocide,” Cardozo Law Review, Vol 27, No 2, 2006, pp 1716–1718.94 Public International Law & Policy Group, Genocide in Darfur: A Legal Analysis (Washington, DC: Public

International Law & Policy Group, 2004).95 Nsongurua J. Udombana, “An escape from reason: genocide and the International Commission of Inquiry on

Darfur,” International Lawyer, Vol 40, No 1, 2006, p 58.96 David Luban, “Calling genocide by its rightful name: Lemkin’s word, Darfur, and the UN Report,” Chicago

Journal of International Law, Vol 7, No 1, 2006, p 315.97 Prosecutor v Krstic, ICTY-98-22 (Appellate Chamber, April 19, 2004), pp 15, 37–38.98 Ibid, pp 12–13, 16.99 Ibid, pp 32–38.100 Prosecutor v Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T (International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda, 1988), pp 731–732.101 International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, pp 262–268.102 International Crisis Group, Sudan: Now or Never in Darfur, Africa Report No 80, May 23, 2004.103 Luban, “Calling genocide by its rightful name,” pp 314–315.104 Prosecutor v Krstic, pp 34–35.105 International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, p 503.106 This section draws from observations in Matthew Lippman, “The Convention on the Prevention and Punish-

ment of the Crime of Genocide: fifty years later,” Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law,Vol 15, No 2, 1998, pp 415–514; Matthew Lippman, “Genocide: the crime of the century. The jurisprudenceof death at the dawn of the new millennium,” Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol23, No 23, 2001, pp 467–535.

107 David Corn, “Loyal opposition: Clinton allows genocide, new report says,” Alternet, July 25, 2000, http://www.alternet.org/story/9494/ (accessed January 8, 2007).

108 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court on February 27, 2006,indicted Ahmad Harun, Sudan’s deputy minister for humanitarian affairs, and Janjaweed militia leaderAli Muhammad Ali Abd-al-Rahman on 51 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity stemmingfrom their involvement in the conflict in Darfur.

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