damascus discourse

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3The Discourses of the Damascene

Sunni Ulama during the 2011Revolution

Jawad Qureshi

The Arab Spring and Religion

The events that sparked the Arab Spring date back to December 2010and occurred in the Tunisian city of Sidi Bouzid, where Muhamed

Bouazizi, a street vendor who could not afford to pay the bribes needed

for a permit, immolated himself after being harassed by the local police.Protests and rallies took off throughout Tunisia and led to the

unexpected ousting of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in January2011. Shortly thereafter, a wave of protests swept across the Middle Eastthat resulted in the resignations of both Egyptian president Hosni

Mubarak and Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh and the killing ofLibyan leader Muammar Qaddafi. Of the countries that saw mass

protests, only two regimes have so far resisted being toppled, the

monarchy of King Hamad al-Khalifa of Bahrain and the Syrian BaathParty under Bashar al-Assad. More than a year since the beginning ofthese events, the monarchy in Bahrain has successfully quelled the

uprising while in Syria the Baath regime remains engaged in fighting anemboldened populace that does not appear ready to give up.

Over the past year, the role of religion and religious actors has been

a recurring concern for many observers. At the start of the Arab Spring,

analysts were keen to note that the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutionswere not led by Islamists and that there was a general absence of

religion and ideology in the rhetoric of the protesters. In Egypt, theconspicuous absence of Al-Azhars leadership from the demonstrationswas made up for by images of Azharisrecognizable by their distinct

white turban and red tarboushstanding alongside protestors, including

also Coptic Christians, re-assuring many that sectarian fears and identity


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60 State and Islam in Baathist Syria

politics could be put aside in order to deal with the more fundamentalproblems posed by the thirty years of the Mubarak regime. Even Shaykh

Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the famous Egyptian religious scholar based in

Qatar, in his Friday sermon on February 18th

in Tahrir Square, wascongratulatory to the Egyptian revolutionaries for their display of

national unity across religious lines. After the revolutions, religionremains an issue of concern. While theocracies and the Iranian modelof wilyat al-faqh (the guardianship of the jurist) seem to be in little

favour, the focus of observers seems to centre on the role of religion inshaping policy and law, and the Turkish model of Islamism has

greater currency while the fear of Salafism looms large. This concern is

certainly justified, particularly after the victory of the Islamist al-Nahda

Party in Tunisian elections, the strong showing at the polls in Egyptselections of the Salafi al-Nur party and the Muslim Brotherhoods

Freedom and Justice Party, as well as the religious character of many ofLibyas revolutionary fighters.

At the time of writing, protests and government crackdowns

continue throughout Syria, where men of religion and their institutions

have played a prominent role in shaping both sides of the protests sincethey began. In an authoritarian regime such as Syrias, where political

gatherings are banned, Friday prayers are the only occasion when peoplecan legally gather en-masse. There are two consequences of this. Thefirst is that in a fairly religiously observant society such as Syrias,

ulama have been uniquely situated in being able to address large publicgatherings in a manner that other actors in society cannot. Secondly,mosques have been the primary sites from which protests are launched

and also the targets of government crackdowns. Each Friday thuspresented an opportunity for the ulama to intervene in events. Also, asthe government crackdown became increasingly violent and greater

numbers of protestors were killed, the funeral prayers held at mosquesre-inscribed the mosque as a site of opposition. Funeral processionscarrying the bier of Fridays dead to the graveyard often turned into

protests, drawing further government repression. In this way,particularly in the beginning of the Syrian Uprising, mosques served as

important sites for resistance and violence.

This paper presents a narrative of events in Damascus as protestsemerged from the last week of March to May 2011, focusing on thepublic interventions of Sunni ulama as events progressed.1 Throughout

this narrative, I pay attention to how the ulama in question positionthemselves with respect to both the government and the protestors,concentrating on their modes of reasoning. Rather than categorizing the

positions taken by the ulama under general frameworks, I have chosen


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Damascene Ulama and the 2011 Uprising 61

to provide a linear narrative to convey a sense of the progression andescalation of events. The materials analyzed include sermons, public

lessons and eulogies at funerals in addition to appearances on state and

satellite television.2 I focus on Damascus because, in addition to beingthe seat of power, it is difficult to gather and verify information from the

cities and towns where protests and government crackdowns have beenmost markedDaraa, Latakia, Douma, Banyas, Jisr Shughour, Hama andHoms. Also, the author was present in Damascus between March and

April 2011 and witnessed a number of the events mentioned below first-hand. Some of the incidents not witnessed directly were verified shortly

after their occurrence through interviews with eyewitnesses.

March, 2011: The Start of the Syrian Uprising

As protests were spreading throughout the Arab world in January andFebruary 2011, a series of isolated events took place in Syria thatunsuccessfully tried to spark the fire of revolution. These included the

self-immolation of a man in Hasaka la Bouazizi, a Day of Rage inDamascus on February 4-5, a protest in the Hariqa Souq in Damascus on

February 17 after the son of a shop owner was hit by a policeman,

protests in Damascus Marjeh Square on March 16th

and an anti-Qaddafirally in front of the Libyan embassy on March 22

nd(at which over one

hundred people were arrested). Each of these was put down relatively

quickly and failed to inspire a mass uprising.On March 6

thin the southern city of Daraa, fifteen boys aged 10 to

15 were arrested for writing anti-government graffiti on the wall of their

school, including the slogan of the Arab Spring, The people want tobring down the government (al-shab yurd isq al-nim). Family

members of the boys pleaded for their release with local authorities to

no avail. On March 18th

, several thousand protestors marched from theal-Umari mosque after Friday prayers demanding the release of theboys as well as greater political freedoms. The government met the

protestors with riot police, water cannons, tear gas and, eventually, liveammunition. Four protestors were killed that day and dozens more wereinjured. Throughout Syria, small protests flared up after Friday prayers,

including the Ummawi Mosque in Damascus. Throughout the week of

March 19-24, both the protests and the government crackdown in Daraaincreased proportionately, with the former growing in numbers and the

latter in violence. A circle of violence was created: each protest was metwith a heavy hand from the government, resulting in more funerals,whose processions became protests, which were met with more violence

and death. News from Daraa spread throughout the country primarily via


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satellite channels, in particular al-Jazeera and BBC Arabic. Throughoutthe day, they aired gritty images captured on cell phone cameras

accompanied by voice-overs from analysts still jubilant about events in

Tunis and Egypt. The Syrian Uprising had begun.

March, 24th

: Shaykh Said Ramadan al-Boutis Lesson

On the evening of Thursday March 24th, Shaykh Muhammad Said

Ramadan al-Bouti3 made his way to Damascus al-Iman Mosque in theMazra neighbourhood to deliver his weekly lesson. The main hall of themosque was filled near capacity. Boutis lessons are broadcast live on

satellite television and are uploaded on his website, and thus have an

audience greater than the few hundred in the mosque. That evening,Bouti broke from his scheduled lesson in order to address what had

come to fill peoples minds increasingly over the past week, saying,Perhaps it is good, if I daresay not a duty, to say something concerningthis strife (fitna) that has reared its head towards us.4

Bouti (b. 1929), an emeritus professor and former dean of thefaculty of theology at Damascus Universitys Sharia College, is Syrias

most prominent religious scholar. A longstanding personal relationship

developed between Bouti and Hafez al-Assad in the 1970s when Assadread one of Boutis books,Naqawhm al-mdiya al-jadaliya (Critiqueof the Delusions of Dialectical Materialism). This led to a series of

intermittent private meetings between the two men over the followingdecades. In the 1980s, after the Assad regime violently put down theuprising in Hama, religious practice in the public sphere came under

harsh repression and membership in the Muslim Brotherhood became acrime punishable by death. Bouti was able to use his relationship with

Assad to secure the release of thousands of prisoners in addition to

opening of the public sphere to religion again in the 1990s. During thisperiod, Boutis ties to the regime became stronger despite the fact thatBouti has never held an official position in the state religious apparatus.

Boutis rank as a senior scholar and his influence with the governmenthas led to a pragmatic relationship between Bouti and the Assad regime.This relationship however is seen by many of his critics, including those

amongst the ulama, as reflecting Boutis political navet and his co-

optation by the state. 5That evening, his speech covered four points, which would

foreshadow part of the governments narrative concerning the protests.The first dealt with what was ostensibly the reason why protests tookplace throughout the Middle East, namely, the question of reform

(il). Reform here referred to changing those laws that block peoples


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freedoms, as well as the corruption that results from such repressivelaws. Bouti maintained that reform was a social and religious obligation,

but posed the question: by what means is reform to be achieved? For

Bouti, reform required two sides, those in power and those taking to thestreets. He argued that the path of reform consisted in these two sides

meeting (talaqq), consulting (tashwur), negotiating (mudhkara),cooperating (tawn), coming to agreements (ittifq) and then settingout to execute those reforms (inilq) on a timeline. Reform, he

emphasized, cannot be one-sided and cannot be realized by a faction ofpeople that take over some square or street, carrying banners and

chanting slogans. A revolution, he said, can destroy in hours,

whereas building does not come to completion except in stages

[namely], those mentioned previously.6The second point that Bouti addressed was the new reform program

that had ostensibly already begun in Syria, a program that he claimedentailed fundamental reform (al-isl al-jadhr) and that was a result ofthe steps just outlined. He was referring to a venture initiated by Syrian

president Bashar al-Assad, wherein the latter called a meeting (Bouti did

not mention when this took place) with a number of ulama and Syrianintellectuals in order to hear the needs of the country and the

shortcomings that those in positions of office needed to address.According to Bouti, in that meeting, everything that might occur to theminds of those that are raising banners was laid out and discussed,7

followed by pledges to see the proposed suggestions realized. He statedthat in the immediate future, announcements of fundamental reform (al-

isl al-jadhr) that the nation had been awaiting and was in desperate

need of were going to be made.The third point concerned the origins of the protests in Daraa. Here,Bouti echoed what was the government narrative concerning the

protests, namely that these protests did not truly reflect the concerns ofthe local citizenry and that they originated from outside Syria. Hedistinguished between the situation in Syria and what had occurred in

Egypt, pointing out that the protests in Egypt had been organizedlocally, by individuals that were well known to the populace. The same,

he argued, could not be said for Syria. Here he explained that the calls to

protest were received from anonymous sources electronically, in a pre-packaged manner, delineating what days to protest, what to call thosedays (Day of Anger, Day of Honour, etc.), the chants to use, what

slogans to write on banners and so on. Bouti mentioned that he hadhimself received a number of anonymous pleas to use the Friday prayeras an opportunity to stage protests and that he tried to determine the

source of these communiqus. The effort proved futile and this,


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according to Bouti, was reason enough to pause for consideration. Thequestion that concerned Bouti was, given the anonymous and pre-

packaged nature of these messages, how should one react in such a

situation? For Bouti, the Quranic verse, Pursue not that which you lackknowledge of, (Q. 17: 36) spoke to the current situation. The verse said

to him,

Do not follow those who would take you by the hand to whence youdo not know; do not follow someone you do not even know who theyare; do not put your hand in the hand of someone you do not know;and do not put your hand in that of someone you know, but you do notknow to what end they will take you.8

Given the unknown source of these calls, a number of possibilitiesseemed reasonable to him. Reflecting a culture where conspiracy

theories of all sorts are given credence, he asked: was it not possible thatZionist Israeli hands were instigating matters? Is there not a likelypossibility that those that lie in wait against Syria are behind this?

Could it not be conceived that the American right-wing is behind theseprotests? Similarly, is it not a possibility that they are using the name of

reform and rights to ignite the fire of civil strife in Syria? (The

possibility that the protests were based on legitimate long-standingpolitical, social and economic grievances of the population isconspicuously absent.) Thus, based on the intimations of this Quranic

verse just cited and the unknown sources of these calls, discernment(wa) told him that it was not possible for him to blindly obey thesecalls.

He then described the situation of the previous Friday (March 18th

),when a group of people had tried to start a protest after the prayer in theUmayyad Mosque. According to Boutis account, the situation in the

mosque after the prayer had ended was normal. However, outside of themosque, according to Bouti, a group of people that had not been part ofcongregation lay in wait for the prayer to end and then had started

shouting anti-government slogans. The congregation making its way outof the mosque sought to drown the protestors out by chanting religiousinvocations. Boutis description of themtheir foreheads do not know

prostration, their bodies do not know how to bow, etc. pointed

towards their lack of concern for religion and the instrumental usage ofthe mosque as the communiqus had urged. This indicated to Bouti that

these protests were ill intentioned, lacking any concern for religiousteachings.

9


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For Bouti, the sum of all this, and this was the purpose of hisintervention that night, was that such a method of reform (i.e. public

protests) could only lead to violence and destruction and that the only

way of attaining the desired reforms was through engaging thegovernment through dialogue. The Sunni juristic principle that

preventing harm takes precedence over attaining benefits (dar al-mafsid muqaddam ala jalb al-mali) needed to be applied. Giventhat the harm from protestscivil strife (fitna) and destruction

outweighed any potential good that might come from protests, Islamicreasoning could not mandate the protests.

The fourth point of his lesson that night was a heart-felt plea for

people to turn to God in supplication during this period of trial to help

see the nation through it. He repeated these four points in an interviewfor Syrian national television, which only convinced the opponents of

the protesters. The next morning Bouti travelled to the Emirates andthen to Brunei to participate in a conference for the following twoweeks.

March 25th

: Shaykh Usama al-Rifais Sermon

The day after Boutis lesson, on Friday March 25th, the slow-brewing

tension felt throughout Syria boiled over into Damascus. The day beforesaw the most violent crackdown in Daraa since protests began and

human rights groups reported over one hundred people killed.10 ThatFriday, Shaykh Usama al-Rifai, one of Damascus most influentialulama, made the demands of the protestors the subject of his sermon.

Rifai is the eldest son of Shaykh Abd al-Karim al-Rifai (d. 1973), aDamascene scholar that set up a network of charitable organizations

based at the Zayd Mosque in the Bab Srije neighbourhood. In addition to

his outreach and charitable work, Shaykh Abd al-Karim was aprominent figure in the revival of religious knowledge in the middle ofthe last century.11 His two sons, Usama and Sariya, had lived in exile in

Saudi Arabia from the 1980s onwards, during which the charitableorganizations of their father functionally ceased working. Upon theirreturn in the mid-1990s these charitable networks were infused with new

life and activity and came to be important religious institutions. Based in

their fathers former mosque and the Abd al-Karim al-Rifai Mosque(named after their father) in Kefer Souseh, the two brothers continue

their fathers method of outreach, focusing on charity and religiouseducation. As Thomas Pierret and Kjetil Selvik12 have illustrated, theZayd movement (Jamat Zayd) has maintained an ambiguous

relationship with the regime. On the one hand, their charitable work


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relieves poverty-related problems that the regime is unable to address,and for this reason is welcomed by the state. A sign of this approval is

that president Assad met with Usama al-Rifai and that the organization

has received various state benefits (permission to raise funds, control ofmosques, etc.). Yet, the movement has successfully maintained its

independence and has resisted becoming a mouthpiece of the regime.They have been able to do this because of the movements middle classmerchant social base from which it derives financial independence. This

pointremaining free of state money or interferencewas emphasizedby their father and is an important part of the movements image. Their

ideological independence is manifest in their sermons and lessons, in

which they openly criticized elements of the state that they see as acting

contrary to Islamic norms.13 Rifais sermon that Friday reflected thisindependence.

After opening his sermon with a short discursus on security and theduty of preserving security, he said, What we see in our countrywhatis going on from a week ago, more or less, and continuing until todayin

Daraa and in other places, all of this obligates us to consider the duty of

naa that the prophet has commanded us to perform. Naa is thenotion of sincere counsel or advice and in Islamic discourse derives

from the hadith, stating that religion consists of sincere counsel torulers of the Muslims as well as the common Muslim.14 The act ofnaa is a morally corrective form of criticism delivered when the

advisor senses that a particular matter needs to be addressed. Whendirected to a sovereign by a religious scholar it is not an act ofrevolution or rebellion but rather an act of moral and corrective

criticism. In his study of the naa delivered by Saudi ulama to KingFahd during the Gulf War, anthropologist Talal Asad notes that theircriticism did not offer a political alternative or attack the government but

rather took the stance of a moral critic.15

Criticism of the ruler in thisform should not be conflated with civil disobedience and certainly notrebellion (khurj), which in fact is disclaimed and deemed strife (fitna).

Rifais sermon should thus not be seen as anti-regime or conflated withthe Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, which called for outright regime

changethe masses want to bring down the regime (al-shab yurd

isqat al-nizam). Rather, his sermon should be seen as a moral witness tothe regime regarding the events in Daraa.

In his calm and reflective tone, Rifai directed his sermon to the

president of the republic and to all those brothers in positions ofresponsibility (al-masliyn) and then articulated the demands of theprotestors. The key issue that everything rested upon was the notion of

freedom. Freedom, Rifai argued, is an essential component to ones


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humanity that distinguishes mankind from other creatures. To haveones freedoms taken away from them, completely or partially, is to lose

part of ones humanity. He cited the saying of the second caliph Umar

ibn al-Khab, rebuking one of his governors that mistreated a CopticChristian, Why have you enslaved people whose mothers gave birth to

them as freemen? The connection to Syria is clear: the populationdeprived of freedoms by the state has functionally been reduced toslavery and deprived of part of their humanity. The way in which

Syrians have been deprived of their freedoms has been through theemergency laws implemented in 1963, which enshrined the authoritarian

structure of the Baath government: The emergency laws, Rifai said,

have curtailed all of the freedoms that should be enjoyed by any non-

colonized nation. To restore these fundamental human freedoms andthe humanity of the protestors, the emergency laws had to be repealed.

Rifai provided an example of how the emergency laws suppressfreedom by mentioning the countless political prisoners and prisoners ofconscience in Syrian jails whose crime amounted to little more than a

thought-crime.

Rifai turned his focus to speak about matters relating to religion,given that he was speaking from a pulpit as a preacher, and left it to

specialists of other fields to speak about those. As an example of wherefreedoms relating to religion were curtailed, he mentioned the increasingsecularization of public spaces that intruded on personal freedoms.

Rifai was referring specifically to the 2010 ban by the Ministry ofEducation on female teachers in public schools and female students atuniversity wearing face-veils (niqb). The ban resulted in over one-

thousand teachers being dismissed from their jobs. The Minister ofEducation, Ali Sad, said in newspaper interviews that these decisionswere meant to preserve secularism by fighting fundamentalism and that

they would be followed up by more decisions of this kind. 16 Theproblem for Rifai was not secularism per se, which he understood as thestate not adopting or promoting a particular religion; the problem was

that the state was overstepping its bounds and obstructing personalfreedoms, proscribing individual choice. Such acts, Rifai said, evoked

memories of September 29, 1981 when the Daughters of the Revolution

went through the streets of Damascus and tore off womens hijabs.Related to this, the Ministry of Education had verbally given orders

prohibiting any manifestation of religion in schools, in addition to

prohibiting the promotion of any form of religious activity, such asreciting Quran on the bus to and from school, memorizing hadith,conducting prayers in school, etc. These decisions were particularly

intrusive in that inspectors were sent to schools to ensure that they were


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in conformity. In addition to repressing religion, this re-enforced aculture of spies and informants that has kept Syrians in a state of

perpetual suspicion and mistrust for decades. Such orders were given

verbally, Rifai claims, so that there would not be a paper trail and sothat the Minister of Education could claim deniability.

Another example of the aggressive secularization pertained to thegovernor of Damascus, Bishr al-Sabban. Sabban purged the bureaucracyunder him of dozens of employees because of their open religious

practice. Further, Sabban changed ten of Damascus neighbourhoodparks (out of 120) from being womens-only to being inclusive of men

as well. Rifai remarked that after sitting in extended meetings with the

governor and his representatives, the latter were unwilling to recognize

requests for such segregated parks as legitimate rights of citizens i.e. ofthe residents of the neighbourhoods that asked for such parks in the first

place. What compounded the frustration was the disrespectful,dismissive and harsh treatment they received from Sabban and hisoffice. While the particular examples mentioned by Rifai might not

have been shared by his audience, they told a story that they were all too

familiar with, namely, an intrusive and repressive state bureaucracy thatcurtailed individual and group liberties.

Lastly, Rifai mentioned the corruption that pervades every level ofthe vast state bureaucracy and how repressive laws are only applied tothe poor while the wealthy few are able to bribe their way out of any

legal problems. He closed his sermon saying,

If our brothers that are in charge, and foremost amongst them thepresident, want to placate Daraa and places other than Daraathroughout the region, the key to placating them is in the hands of thepresident and all of those in charge. The key is in their hands! And it isto change all these things that I have just mentioned.

He closed the first half of his sermon by thanking President Assad forfreeing a number of political prisoners as well as for increasing the

salaries of government employees but did not fail to reiterate the above-mentioned points.

Immediately after the prayers, the congregationin the hundreds

started chanting slogans of solidarity with the people of Daraa as well as

what has become a popular slogan of the Syrian protesters, God, Syria,freedom and nothing else (Allah, sriyya, urriyya, wa bass). Security

around mosques had been heightened since February and as soon as theprotesting congregation came within range of security forces, the latter

first locked the doors to the mosque to prevent the congregation in the


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mosque from joining the protest and then began beating the crowdoutside with batons and tasers and rounding them up into buses.

According to witnesses, Rifai made his way out of the mosque with a

group of worshippers surrounding him and, when he came face-to-facewith the security forces, he ordered them to stop the violence and to let

the crowd protest peacefully. Witnesses state that the security forcesceased for a period until Rifai had left, at which point they renewedtheir crackdown.

A number of features from Rifais sermon stand in contrast toBoutis lesson. Rifais sermon addressed not only the congregation

present in his mosque but more importantly was directed towards the

government, president Assad and those in positions of responsibility. By

addressing the government, Rifai distanced himself from it but did notdo so by adopting an oppositionist stance. Rather, Rifais stance was

that of a mediator between the government and the protestors. He wasthus able to give voice to the protestors, articulating a number of theirconcerns while successfully managing to avoid establishing himself as

an ideological leader of the protests. Further, his address to his

congregation extended beyond those present to include inevitably thosethat would hear recordings of his sermons (which are regularly put

online as well as distributed in bootleg copies) and he thus providedreligious guidance pertaining to the protests. In addressing thegovernment and the protestors, Rifai acted as a moral intermediary

between the two, providing both sides with the requisite guidance torealizing security. Lastly, Rifais stance vis--vis the protestors is oneof qualified endorsement. Rifai said, in a statement that he has repeated

many times that he supports protests so long as they are peaceful,demanding legal rights and the lifting of oppression. However, if theprotests entail carrying weapons, killing, spilling blood, destroying

public and private property (i.e. all of the things that constitute fitna)such protests are prohibited by Islamic teachings.

Boutis lesson by contrast was aimed at the populace. This stance

was not a mediating position like Rifais, rather it placed him on theside of power, making a case by providing a series of reasons for why

the general populace should not participate in the protests and in fact be

suspicious of them. By re-assuring the populace that reforms wereunderway, Bouti rejected the possibility of protests achieving reformsbecause whatever one might hope to gain from protests was already

ostensibly in the process of being realized. What is absent from Boutislesson was any sense of the demands of the protestors besides a vaguelyconceived notion of reform. Where Rifais sermon sought to have the

government soften its heavy-handed crackdown and to give ear to the


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protestors, Boutis lesson sought to reduce the protests by having theprotestors give ear to the promise of reform. Both however did not take

the government to task for its use of violence.

These differences notwithstanding, naa as a means of engagingthe government is not precluded as an option for Bouti or any figure that

takes a stance with the government. In the case of Rifai, this naa isvery public, made on the pulpit in front of hundreds and distributed towider publics through electronic media. Naa, however, can also be

carried out in private and in most situations this is favoured because itsafeguards other aspects of Islamic ethical teaching, such as protecting

peoples reputation, saving them from slander, backbiting, tale-bearing,

etc.17 In the case ofnaa to the state, delivering the naa in private

safeguards against riling up the populace and does not publicly questionthe authority of the state. Bouti, for his part, has shown that this is how

he employs naa and his ability to influence the regime in the pastdemonstrates the utility of this approach.

March 25th

: Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawis Sermon

That same Friday, Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi delivered a sermon in

Qatar that also focused on the uprising in Syria.18 The Azhari trainedscholar has a history of political agitation from his youth and had beenarrested by King Farouq of Egypt and the regime of Gamal Abdel

Nasser a number of times. He left Egypt in the 1960s to head the QatariSecondary Institute of Religious Studies and has lived in Qatar since. Asa prolific writer, many of his key books have been re-published by local

presses in the Arab world, ensuring greater distribution and readership,and have even been translated into European and other Islamicate

languages (Urdu, Malay, Turkish, etc.). When the al-Jazeera network

was launched in 1996, the weekly show al-Sharia wa al-Hayat(Shariaand Life) became a stage for Qaradawi to reach a greater audience andconvey his message of Islamic modernity. Through these means, as well

as tireless lectures given throughout the world, Qaradawi is undoubtedlyone of the foremost transnational ulama today. Additionally, he isperhaps the most prominent and vocal champion of the Arab Spring

amongst the ulama. In the heat of the protests in Egypt, many protestors

looked for support from Egyptian ulama that had become popular in thelast decade amongst a new generation, in particular the Mufti of the

Republic Shaykh Ali Gomaa and the Shaykh of al-Azhar ShaykhAhmad al-Tayyib. Both scholars however, cautioned the populaceagainst descending on Tahrir Square and in fact told the protestors to

return home.19 Qaradawi, by contrast, encouraged not only the youth but


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the entire countryMuslims, Copts, secularists, young, old, the entirespectrumto descend on Tahrir Square. It is with little surprise that

days after Mubaraks resignation it was Qaradawi that led the Friday

prayers at Tahrir Square, crowning him, in a sense, the shaykh of therevolution.20

An important element of Qaradawis thought dovetails with histransnationalism, namely his vision of pan-Islamism. The entirety of theMuslim umma thus falls under his sphere of concern. Reflecting this,

three days after his sermon at Tahrir Square, Qaradawi pronounced afatwa during an al-Jazeera interview, calling on the Libyan army to turn

its guns away from the people and to turn them on Qaddafi. This pan-

Islamic concern was also reflected in how Qaradawi conceived of

Syrias status in the Arab Spring. For Qaradawi, there was an intrinsicbond between Syria and Egypt and for this reason he argued staunchly

against the notion of Syrian exceptionalism. This notion had beenarticulated by various voices (including president Assad in a January31

st, 2011 interview with the Wall Street Journal21) to different ends but

essentially maintained that Syria was somehow different from its

neighbours and thus immune to the protests and the awakening that wassweeping the Arab world. While Syria clearly resisted the initial

revolutionary surge in January and February 2011, the reactionsthroughout the country after the March crackdown in Daraa proved forQaradawi the ineluctability of the revolutionary spirit and Syrias place

in it. Today the train of the revolution reached a station that it wasbound to reach, he said, it is the station of Syria.

22

He spoke directly about the crackdown in Daraa and belittled the

governments efforts to address the problem. The previous day,Bouthaina Shaaban, president Assads political and media adviser,announced that the Regional Supreme Council of the Arab Socialist

Baath Party was considering lifting the emergency laws and consideringimplementing a law of political parties.

23Qaradawi was dismissive not

only of these considerations and the Regional Supreme Council, but

the entire way of thinking.

What is this body? Who gave them authority over Syria? The BaathParty has ended in the entire Arab world! All of these old politicalparties, their time has passed, their end has come. The ConstitutionalParty in Tunis, the National Party that is in authority in Egypt theseparties are finished. [] What remains? The Baath Party [] Who areyou, Baath Party? [] These people are backward. They live in adifferent time than we live in. We are in the age of the Arabrevolutions! These people have not opened their eyes or ears! They do


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not open their eyes to see, or their ears to hear. They do not open theirheads and minds to think. They think with a different mind!24

After dismissing the Assad regimes efforts to quell the uprising inDaraa, he turned his attention to Bouti, not mentioning his name

explicitly but clearly intending him. He criticized Bouti on two

accounts, what Qaradawi saw as Bouti setting himself up as a lawyermaking the case for the government and Boutis pejorative descriptionof the protestors a mob, foreign infiltrators, their foreheads do

not know prostration, etc. Qaradawi held the accomplishment of theEgyptian youth in the highest esteem and saw the Syrian youth as beingessentially the same. To disparage the reputation of the Syrian protestors

was to disparage the Egyptians and their revolution. Referring to Boutiscriticism of the Syrian protestors, Qaradawi said,

How unfortunate that the ulama have lowered themselves to thislevel! Rather than telling the tyrant to stop his oppression of people, toestablish justice amongst the people, he praises him and insults thoseyouth! The youth that established the Egyptian revolution, the youth ofTahrir Square!

25

More brazen than this however was his swipe at the Assad regimes

sectarian affiliation and the real power in the country. One sentence, said

almost in passing, was to become the focus of much ire in Syria.Recounting a rare visit that he made to Syria during the Gaza War in

2008, Qaradawi described the relationship between the Syrian peopleand the Assad regime as follows: I saw that the Syrian people treat him

[i.e. Bashar al-Assad] as though he were a Sunni! He expanded on thiswith an observation about Assad, namely that, despite being anintelligent, cultured and capable young man, he was the prisoner of a

cadre, the prisoner of a group that he cannot free himself of, and as a

result saw everything through their prism. This is no doubt an allusion tothe power structure that Bashar al-Assad inherited from his fatherstenure as president, namely the army, the Baath party and the

infrastructure of secret police. Qaradawi thus hits at the minorityreligious affiliation of Assad as well as the political arrangement ofpower at the top of the Syrian regime. For these reasons, Qaradawi was

convinced that the problems could not be solved at their source.26

However, his call for the Syrian people from all of its religious and

ethnic groups to rise against the Assad regime fell on deaf ears. The

sectarian swipes and calls for solidarity were all understood as sowingfitna.


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Mufti of the Republic, Shaykh Ahmad al-Hassoun and TheRegimes Narrative

In Boutis absence, the Mufti of the Republic, Shaykh Badr al-Din

Ahmad Hassoun (b. 1949), stepped up his own media appearances to get

across the narrative of the government. Hassoun was formerly the muftiof Aleppo and succeeded Shaykh Ahmad Kuftaro (d. 2005) to theposition of mufti of the republic upon the latters death. A cadre of

prominent senior ulama (including Bouti, Wahbe Zuhayli, Mustafa al-Khinn, Mustafa al-Bugha, etc.) were stepped over to appoint a more

junior figure. One explanation circulated regarding his appointment isthat the senior ulama were offered the position but had each declined.His short tenure as mufti has not been without controversy, as we shall

see. Contrary to Kuftaro, who functioned as a spiritual leader of

thousands of Syrians and was quietist and accommodationist in hisengagement with the government, Hassoun functions more like apolitician and spokesperson for the government than a mufti.

Hassoun began his March 26th

al-Jazeera interview by saying,

We in Syria, dearly beloveds, rejoice in a joy that cannot be exceededbecause we have attainedas a people and as leadersthat which ourbrothers in Tunis and Egypt and the rest of the Arab world haveattained, without their being anguish and spilling of blood, [contrary towhat] many brothers have claimed and as many noble scholars havecalled people to [spilling of blood] yesterday in their Friday sermons

throughout the Arab world.

27

He referred to such people, with Qaradawi clearly in mind, as

sermonizers offitna, that want the Syrian people to be torn apart withsectarianism.28 When asked about the reported deaths of dozens ofprotestors, Hassoun promised swift justice against the excesses of those

involved in the Daraa crackdown but stayed on point about the foreignsource of the protests. Throughout the interview, images from cell

phones showing the crackdown of protests spoke louder and clearer than

Hassouns narrative.That week, Hassoun made a trip to Daraa and visited the Umari

mosque, which had become the centre of the protests and thus the scene

of the most violent crackdowns. After seeing matters with his own eyes,he seems to have been deeply moved, as is testified to by the recordingof a speech that he gave there and as some of my contacts close to the

mufti informed me. Thereafter he maintained a low profile, working


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behind the scenes to calm the masses and appeared on Syrian televisiononly occasionally, staying on point with the governments narrative.29

The governments narrative against the protestors was in full swing

by this time. Syrian television had replaced its regular programmingwith almost round the clock coverage of events from the governments

Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA). Their narrative of the events wasthat the source of the protests was not Syrian in origin, but wasinstigated by foreign infiltrators (mundassn)Israel, America or

someone elsepreying on the navet of teenagers. Syria, the argumentcontinued, was unique in the Middle East because of its stability, its

security and the absence of sectarian fighting. This foreign hand, so the

logic of the narrative went, was seeking to disrupt these achievements

through protests and civil strife because of Syrias oppositionist stancein world politics (i.e. anti-Israeli and anti-American expansionism). In

other versions of this narrative, the protestors were being instigated bythe Assad regimes bogeyman, the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi-cum-Jihadi activists or the global bogeyman, al-Qaeda. Regardless of who

exactly was the source of troubles in Syria, this looming threat

necessitated the emergency laws, whose fruit was the relative stabilityand security that existed in Syria.

April 1: More Protests in Damascus, Shaykh Kuraym RajihsSermon

The following week, on Friday April 1st, protests occurred in Damascus

again, this time in two locations: again at the Rifai Mosque in Kafar

Souseh after Rifais sermon and, this time also, in the Midanneighbourhood after Shaykh Kuraym Rajihs sermon at the al-HasanMosque. Rajih (b. 1926) is an internationally recognized authority in

Quranic recitation, which has a strong popular base in Midan. He is also

an heir to the efforts of Shaykh Hasan Habannaka (d. 1978), who, alongwith Shaykh Abd al-Karim al-Rifai, was instrumental in reviving

Islamic practice in Damascus during the middle of the last century.Habannaka, in addition to being the teacher of a generation ofDamascus most pre-eminent scholars (including Bouti), is also noted

for his opposition to the political moves made by the Baath Party in the1960s and 70s that consolidated its control of the state. In 1965, for

example, Habannaka led a march of 20,000 people through the city as a

response to an anti-religious article published by an army magazine.When Habannaka was arrested, the souqs of Damascus closed in protest,demanding his release.30 Rajih was Habannakas most valued student

and had accompanied his teacher in these various incidents.


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Rajihs sermon, like Rifais, did not actively promote protests;rather, he framed his sermon in a call for people to turn to God and for

there to be a greater place for religious practice in peoples lives. He

then spoke at length about freedom and the demands of the people. Indoing so, he targeted two elements of the governments narrative vis--

vis the protests. The first was the governments claim that emergencylaws guaranteed the security that all Syrians enjoy; he said, We want tolive, we want freedom, we want dignity [we want] that people feel that

they can sleep at night without any fear in their heart that they might becalled in [the next morning], to go there, to go here, etc. The emergency

laws are a problem; if they go and are replaced with laws against

terrorism, this is worse!31 (This was what the government was

considering and eventually did enact)More importantly, he targeted the claim that these demands were a

result of instigators from outside:

I hope that this sermon which I delivered with the intention of a briefword, from the mouth of a man giving sincere counsel (ni), fromthe mouth of a man that has jealous concern for Syria, jealous concernfor the Arab world, jealous concern for the Islamic world. Right now, Ido not hold a position, nor do I run a centre [of learning], nor do Idemand a greater salary than what I have; I am on the edge of mygrave, so understand that with these words I intend an exhortation. It isfitting for a person after reaching 90 years of age to address the rulerof the land, to address the leader of the people, to address the army andto address the secret police. A man that has reached this age, who haslived close to a century of time, with everything that has happened tohim, he has the right to say these words. Indeed, so take my words as

those coming from a sincere counsellor. I am a Syrian man, I live inSyria, my father is in Syria, my grandfather is in Syria, my greatgrandfather is in Syria, my children are in Syria, my family is in Syria,I desire of Syria that Syria be the leader of the world. Syria, Syria!That Islam lead the world, that la ilaha illa Allah (there is no deityexcept for God) lead the world. [] This is what I want.32

By emphasizing his age, his words invoked in the audience the respectdue to an elderly and revered scholar; coupled with his emphasis of hisautochthonous lineage it allowed him to take a nationalist stance

justifying demands that could be claimed by the government to threaten

the sense of national unity. In this rhetorically powerful manner herefuted the claim of foreign infiltration and grounded the demands of the

protestors in the Syrian people. After addressing the government, heturned his address to the attendees demanding of them not to confuse

matters (i.e. not to participate in protests), warned against using the


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mosques for other than devotions and threatened to not give sermonsanymore should they protest from his mosque. Despite his request, that

afternoon, a group of over 200 people made their way from the mosque

to a local police headquarters. This protest was eventually broken up.

Boutis Return

Bouti returned from his overseas travels to deliver his April 4th

lesson at

the al-Iman Mosque and used it to address the escalating events inDaraa.33 His tone was sombre as he expressed his condolences to thefamilies that had lost relatives in the crackdowns. He re-iterated the

argument that he had laid out before his travels, namely that the only

path to true reform was that of dialogue between the state andrepresentatives from civil society. A revolution, he re-iterated, and the

protests that precede one, are one-sided attempts at reform that willrequire the nation to pay a price that will far outweigh the benefit thatmight conceivably be achieved through a revolution. The point of his

talk that evening was that real reform was attained through dialogue andhe wanted to illustrate that point with a real example. He informed his

audience that, before the protests, he had sat with president Assad and

mentioned the need to open the door to freedoms and that the time ofsingle-party rule was over. According to Bouti, Assad had agreed tothese suggestions and stated that he was going to take steps towards

realizing these goals. The president had initiated a series of meetingswith prominent figures in Syrias civil society wherein the path toreform was laid out. As evidence of the success of these dialogues,

Bouti announced the following reforms that the Assad regime hadpromised pertaining to religion:

All women that lost their jobs as teachers in the previous year forwearing the niqb would be allowed to return.The establishment of a national institute for Arabic and Islamic

studies with campuses throughout the country, whose degreeswill be recognized by the government.The establishment of an Islamic satellite channel based in Syria

that teaches true Islam.

As for political reformsspecifically the lifting of Syrias emergency

law, eliminating single-party rule and changing laws that limitedfreedomsBouti mentioned that the president has already enactedchanges and that all that remained was to announce them, which would

happen in the immediate future. Bouti closed the first half of his talk by


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asking rhetorically, So let me ask you now, did dialogue benefit ornot?34

The second half of his talk focused on Qaradawis sermon from ten

days before. Bouti and Qaradawi have a history of disagreement, animportant aspect of which pertains to relations to their respective

governments, so it surprised no one that Qaradawi would makereference to Bouti in the same way that it surprised no one that therewould be a response. Bouti expressed surprise at Qaradawis

encouragement of protests, what Bouti called a mob method ofreform. He wondered at how a scholar of Qaradawis calibre could

prescribe a destructive method instead of a constructive one embodied in

dialogue. He further expressed wonder that Qaradawi had not employed

naa when he had visited Syria in 2008 and had an audience withpresident Assad. Rather than singing praises of Syria as a resistance

state and its continued opposition to Israel and America, he should havespoken frankly while in the presidents presence instead of from a pulpitin Qatar. Bouti pleaded with Qaradawi to not let sectarianism cloud his

thinking and to let religion arbitrate.

Lastly, Bouti closed the evening by praying alt al-ghib, afuneral prayer for those who have died in a distant place. This sent a

mixed message. On the one hand, to pray alt al-ghib for the dead inDaraa and Douma was to treat them in some form or another as martyrs.To suggest that they were martyrs further entailed that they were killed

unjustly, which was suggestive of the governments culpability. Thus,rather than deflecting from the governments excesses and heavyhandedness, the prayer in fact brought the question of the moral status of

the government and the protestors to the fore, valorizing the latter andblaming the former.The exchange between Qaradawi and Bouti is particularly

significant because it figures prominently and exemplifies the war ofnarratives surrounding the Syrian protests. As noted above, Qaradawimade indirect reference to Bouti and the Syrian ulama that stood by the

regime to which Bouti and Hassoun responded, directly and indirectlyrespectively. The regime maintains that foreign agents are the cause of

problems and can point to figures such as Qaradawi as examples of

irresponsible foreign sermonizers sowing discord and sectarianism inSyria. Boutis dispute with Qaradawi however is different in nature thanthat between Qaradawi and the regime. Qaradawi, as noted earlier, is a

pan-Islamic transnational scholar and is therefore not bound to a nation.He can thus maintain ideals of Islamic governance and adopt aconfrontational stance because he is a scholar in exile.35 Bouti, however,

is a scholar bound to a nation. When the majority of Syrias most


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prominent scholars fled in the late 1970s and 80s, Bouti and a few othersstayed behind and fought to keep Islam in the public sphere. Despite

having a transnational influence (though substantially less extensive

than Qaradawis), Boutis particular concerns are tied to the interests ofthe Syrian nation but not necessarily the Syrian state. In his own way, he

distances himself from the regime and uses his influence to ensure thatthe goods of religion are realized, but he does so with a concern forSyrian society in mind. His pragmatic approach to engaging the Assad

regime therefore requires a far more diplomatic posture than that ofQaradawi. The national concerns thus impose a constraint on Boutis

discourse that Qaradawi does not have.

April 8th: Shaykh Muhammad al-Yaqoubis Sermon

In early April, Maher al-Assad, the presidents younger brother and headof the armys Fourth Division and the Republican Guard, wasdispatched to Daraa to deal with the protests. His forces led a systematic

and brutal crackdown. Images and reports of the violence spread quicklythroughout the country and evoked memories of the Hama Massacre in

1982. The parallels were not lost on anyone: Rifat al-Assad, who

oversaw the month long crackdown in 1982, is the younger brother ofthen-president Hafez al-Assad. Outrage at the escalation of violence waswidespread. Shaykh Muhammad Abu al-Huda al-Yaqoubi (b. 1963),

who used to give sermons in the al-Hasan Mosque in the heart ofDamascus, was one of the few Damascene ulama to express thisoutrage and demand that the violence cease. Yaqoubi is a descendant of

the Prophet (sayyid) and comes from a family of ulama. He studied atthe graduate level in Sweden and has a large international following as a

result of years of teaching in North America and Europe. Upon returning

to Damascus in 2006, Yaqoubi taught at various mosques, including theUmayyad Mosque, the mosque-shrine of the Sufi Muhyiddin ibn al-Arabi and most recently the al-Hasan Mosque in the Abu Rumaneh

neighbourhood in the heart of Damascus.Yaqoubi directed his sermon in the al-Hasan Mosque on April 8

thto

the state administration. Dear brothers, he said,

our land is being afflicted with strife (fitna) such that those near andfar are speaking about what they see and hear, namely strife, affliction,killing and harm. We must provide an answer and advice ( nu) to thebig and the small, the ruler and the ruled, the leader and the lead. Thebest advice is that which comes from the heart of a lover, one jealousof the religion of God, a lover of the country, jealously concerned that


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it might be torn apart, jealously concerned about the blood of Muslimsthat it be shed unjustly.

36

Yaqoubi explained the origin of the protests as follows:

We had hoped that path to reform would be hurried, because peopleare led by their aspirations. People were led to the streets [in protest]by long years of state oppression, when all they want is a bite to liveon and freedom of expression. Between this and that, however, theytook to the streets and we saw that our own people were being killedone after another in Daraa and in Douma, as though there were nodignity to human life.37

Yaqoubi proceeded to recite a litany of Quranic verses and hadiths aboutthe nobility of Gods creating man, the prohibition against oppressionand the killing of innocents and the freedoms that God has madeintrinsic to humanity. These textual citations were interspersed with

commentary relating to the state of affairs in Syria pertaining to freedom

of speech, to the information revolution that belied the states narrativesas well as to the equality between Muslims and non-Muslims in Islamic

teachings in matters of justice. He advised the protestors and thosewitnessing them to stay within the bounds of Islamic teachings; that is,to keep the protests peaceful. The sermon was bold because many of the

textual sources that he cited judged violence, oppression, the killing ofinnocents and tyranny as being tantamount to disbelief. While Yaqoubi

never stated this conclusion explicitly, his sermon was meant to serve as

a warning to the state of its grave moral position.This sermon was uploaded to YouTube and created a buzz amongst

Damascene and overseas watchers. Because of his April 8th sermon,

Yaqoubis mosque drew a substantial crowd the following week.Attendees from outside of the Abu Rumaneh neighbourhood came to al-Hasan Mosque, expecting to become an epicentre for protests in

Damascus. The secret police had expected the same and were out in

great numbers. Yaqoubi however diffused the situation, giving a five-minute sermon, stating:

Many new faces have come to this mosque from various parts of thecity. Some are expecting that there are going to be protests here andsome have come to put an end to those protests, should they start. Letme state clearly, that I delivered a message last week that was my dutyas an imam to give. The people of this neighbourhood are pleased withthe leadership of Bashar al-Assad and are not interested in causingsedition and trouble. We welcome his efforts of reform and support

him in that. If you came here for other purposes, please return back to


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your own neighbourhoods and do what you want over there. We thankthe president for his listening to the people and hope in his promise toimplement reforms.38

This move by Yaqoubi should not be seen as a retraction of his previous

position. Rather, it is consistent with the form of Sunnism shared byYaqoubi, Rifai and Rajih, namely that provoking state-violence wouldbe a greater harm than failing to hold the state morally accountable.

The Question of Sectarianism:Shaykh Moaz al-Khatibs Eulogies

The ulama thus far consideredBouti, Hassoun, Rifai, Rajih andYaqoubiavoid the question of sectarianism almost completely, only

addressing it as a danger to be cautioned against. This fear has promoteda culture that seems convinced that, if the Assad regime falls, Syriasheterogeneous religious and ethnic populationSunnis, Alawis, Druze,

Christians and Kurdswill turn against one another. The Assad regime,according to this logic, holds their mutual hostility at bay and inexchange for loss of certain freedoms it guarantees a certain amount of

safety and security. For an older generation of Syrians, the civil war in

Lebanon in the 1970s and 80s made the case for the previous Assadregime, while the sectarian fighting that has torn apart Iraq in the past

decade looms large in the minds of many Syrians today. In such amilieu, Qaradawis passing mention of the Alawi religion of theAssads is construed as instigating civil war.

Shaykh Moaz al-Khatib (d. 1960) is one of the few ulama that has

tackled the issue of sectarianism head on. As Maher al-Assads forcescracked down in Daraa, Douma, a town on the northern outskirts of

Damascus, erupted as another centre for anti-government protests thatwere also put down violently. Khatib is a scion from a family of ulamaand is a geographer by training that worked for a petrochemical

company for six years. He is the current president of Jamiyat al-tamaddun al-islami, a reformist society formed in the late 1930s thatpublished an influential journal.39 He delivered a series of impassioned

speeches at the funeral receptions in Douma, touching on a variety of

issues. In one eulogy on April 6th, he addressed the fear of sectarianism

in the following manner:

We, in Syria, dear brothersand this is not a blessing from thegovernment but rather a blessing from Godwe have lived all our livesas Muslims Sunni, Shia, Alawi and Druze with one heart;


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alongside us, our noble brothers, those guided by the teachings ofJesus. [We have lived] with love, brotherhood and affection. The heartof one of us is not closed to his brother he opens his heart, house andhome to him. This is what we must persist in at all times. Ouremotions should never make us leave this noble principle that we liveby and that, God willing, we will die by.40

In the same eulogy, Khatib aptly expressed the feeling of the protesters

vis--vis the discourse of fear:

We do not look at anyone in this country in our emotions or in ourhearts, with any kind of dislike or hatred. God forbid! We do this notout of fear of the government, nor from the secret police. The age of

fear has ended. This is your country and you must save it (ibid).

The previous day, Khatib had delivered another eulogy that sought to

further refute the fear of sectarianism. In it, he went on the offensiveagainst the regime by highlighting how particular Alawi tribes havebeen favoured at the expense of others.

It is no sin, dear brothers, for someone to be Sunni, Shia, Alawi,Druze, Ismaili or to be Arab, or Kurdish The value of a person to Godis based on their piety. We are all one body. I say to you that theAlawis are closer to me than many people. I know their villages andthe misery and injustice that they live with. We speak with freedom forthe sake of every person in this country, for every Sunni, Alawi,Ismaili, Christian, the Arab people or the great Kurdish people.41

The result of these speeches was that Khatib was called in forquestioning by the security police on May 5th and was not heard from for

over a month. He has remained silent since his release.

Protests Spread to the Outskirts of Damascus

Many of the large families in Douma had relatives living in othervillages and towns surrounding Damascus, such as Saqba and Kafar

Batna, and protests spread to these villages as well. With matters slowlynearing the city, stories of firsthand accounts of protests and governmentviolence gained more circulation in Damascus. One such story that

spread extensively in the circles of Damascene ulama was that ofMutazz-billah al-Shaar, a twenty-two year old law student at theUniversity of Damascus whose family had links to the ulama. He was

killed on April 22nd

at a protest in his native Daraya. His story is

illustrative of why many Syrian youth took to the streets. Shaar had


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attended Friday prayers at the mosques of Rifai and Rajih the previousweeks and had seen the governments violence against unarmed

protestors firsthand. According to his father, witnessing these acts of

violence politicized his otherwise apolitical son. On April 22nd

, afterFriday prayers at Rajihs mosque in Midan, the bulk of the congregation

of a few hundred started chanting slogans of solidarity with the martyrsand made its way to a local police station. The young Shaar could nothelp but join. His father said that participating in the protest made him

feel like he had lived for the first time in his life. Later that evening,returning to their home with his father and two brothers, security forces

blocked the road into Daraya because a protest was taking place.

Mutazz asked his father to join and as he made his way to the crowd,

security forces opened fire. With nothing in his hand, chanting slogansof freedom, Mutazz stood his ground before the security forces and was

shot twice in the chest. His father and brothers saw this from a distanceand rushed to his body. The security forces prevented them from takinghis body to a hospital and beat his father with batons as he repeatedly

tried to take his sons dying body. Mutazz two brothers, aged 15 and

17, were taken away and his father was finally able to take Mutazzremains.42

This story spread quickly amongst many of Damascus ulamabecause of the Shaar familys ties to various ulama. Given thefamiliarity of the people involved, this gave greater credence to this

account as opposed to other stories filtering into Damascus aboutatrocities by the government. Yaqoubi referred to Shaars story inanother sermon on May 6

thsermon, calling it the story of one person,

but it is in reality the story of dozens, and who knows, maybe hundredsof people.43 He titled that weeks sermon The Illness and the Cureand was unflinching in his criticism of the regimes failures, not only in

the current crisis but also since the inception of the current regime.Yaqoubi emphasized that all of the problems that have led protestors tothe street had their root ten years ago, alluding to the failed Damascus

Spring when democratic hopes were dashed by Bashar al-Assadsgovernment. For Yaqoubi, matters had reached a point of no return

because of the levels of violence.

The problems of the past ten years could have been solved by thepeople and the government. [] But the problem today between thegovernment and the masses has reached a point of perhaps becomingunsolvable because it has reached the point of spilling innocent blood.Where can we get those innocent souls to give life to them again? Apoor person can be made happy with an increase in livelihood, an


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oppressed person can be made happy by freeing them; but how do youplease someone whose son was killed? Someone killed by a sniper? Ora soldier killed by a civilian? Or an empty-handed protestor beingkilled? Or those who have been taken to hospitals wounded and thenkilled on the hospital bed? How can these be healed?44

Like Rifai and Rajih, Yaqoubi defended the rights of people to protestbut emphasized that protests should not lead to fitna. He closed hissermon insisting (1) that the tanks and armed forces be called back from

residential neighbourhoods and from around the townships, (2) thatpolitical prisoners and prisoners of conscience since the 1980s to thepresent be released and (3) that Syrians living in exile be allowed to

return, mentioning the Muslim Brotherhood explicitly. At the end of this

Friday prayer, he led a prayer for the martyrs that week. Unlike Boutisperformance of the prayer weeks before, Yaqoubis prayer sent no

mixed messages. The regime was the cause of peoples grievances, wasresponsible for the violence and was unjustly killing its citizens whothus became martyrs.

As a result of this sermon, Yaqoubi was dismissed from his post on12

thMay and was banned from public speaking. This was not an

unfamiliar position for Yaqoubi. In the previous year, he had had a

public dispute with Hassoun over comments that the latter had made thatmany felt were contraventions of Islamic teachings. Addressing adelegation from George Mason Universitys Center for World Religions,

Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution in January 2010, Hassoun had said,If our Prophet Muhammad asked of me to disbelieve in Judaism orChristianity, I would disbelieve in Muhammad, and also, Had

Muhammad commanded me to kill people I would have said to him thathe was not a prophet. This meeting was reported in al-Quds al-Arabiand was widely covered in the Arab and even Israeli media.45 It was met

with universal condemnation throughout the Middle East by ulama ofvirtually every orientation, including Qaradawi and Bouti. The mostvocal critic of Hassoun on this issue however was Yaqoubi, who

delivered a sermon in which he called for Hassoun to resign. Inresponse, Yaqoubi was dismissed from giving sermons but was re-instated shortly thereafter but forbidden to teach. Thus, by being banned

from delivering sermons, Yaqoubi was in familiar territory.

Yaqoubi left Damascus for Egypt, then the UK, and was active inopposition meetings in Istanbul by the National Salvation Congress. He

has since based himself in Morocco. In September 2011, the al-Jazeeratelevision showAl-Sharia wa al-ayt(Sharia and Life) had an episode

on the Arab revolutions titled, The Revolution: Fitna or Mercy?


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Qaradawi was present in the studio and Yaqoubi was interviewed brieflyby phone where the latter made the case for not only the legality but the

obligation of protesting against oppressive rulers (al-imm al-jir).46

Further, Yaqoubi explained that those ulama in Syria that remainedsilent vis--vis the Assad regime were to be excused because of the

tremendous amount of pressure they are under. However, in regards tothose figures that have spoken in defence of the government andauthorized the latters activities, Yaqoubi deemed them as being just as

guilty as the government in tyranny and killing. The allusion to Hassounwas not lost on anyone. He closed by addressing the problem of the

concept offitna. Sunni thought has always held civil strife as anathema

but Yaqoubi explained why this attitude did not apply in this situation:

The hadith and the words of the Prophet (upon him be peace andblessings) concerning civil strife (fitna), that is widespread, pertains tothat [form of] strife wherein truth is not known from falsehood. As forthis [case], truth and falsehood are clear now. Truth and falsehood areclear. Turning away from tyranny and disavowing tyrants, this is wellknown and understood. Likewise, supporting tyrants is forbidden,while helping the oppressed is obligatory.47

As events progressed in the uprising, Yaqoubis stance as moral witness

quickly gave way to moral condemnation of the continued and

escalating violence. Though in exile, Yaqoubis opposition to a state thathe clearly deems illegitimate takes the form of providing discourses that

authorize and, in fact, obligate protesting against the regime. Few ofDamascus ulama have taken such an oppositional stance against the

government. The successes of the Arab Spring had emboldened somethat have adopted this strategy, but for those like Yaqoubi, the regimesviolence left them no other choice.

Developments over the Year 2011

The previous pages have documented developments amongst Damascus

ulama during the initial weeks in which the Syrian uprising began. Overthe course of the year, many other ulama in Syria and outside havecome to voice their opinions on the Uprising, virtually all of them

condemning the governments violence.48 During this time, the aboveconsidered positions taken by the various ulama have become more

differentiated. The unrestrained violence against protestors has

contributed to the hardening of the position of ulama like Rifai andRajih. Their discourses have shifted from pressuring the regime to cease


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violence and enact reforms to total condemnation and demands forregime change. This shift, as the above narrative has documented,

occurred much earlier for Yaqoubi.

The ulama that have remained in Syria, such as Rifai and Rajih,have been prohibited from speaking publicly at different times

throughout the year while Khatib has been effectively silenced sincerelease from his month-long incarceration in June. Perhaps the mosttelling sign of the regimes frustration with Rifai and Rajih occurred in

Ramadan 2011. Violence continued throughout the sacred month and onthe 27th night of Ramadan (August 27

th, 2011)one of the most sacred

nights in the Islamic calendarthe Rifai Mosque was attacked by the

government loyalist militia known as the Shabbiha. Rubber bullets were

fired on the congregation, the mosque was ransacked and Rifai waswounded.

Bouti and Hassoun have become increasingly isolated and the targetof harsher criticism by many inside Syria as well as sympathizers withthe protestors outside. Hassoun has drawn even closer to the government

after his 22-year-old son, Sariya, was killed in the town of Idlib on

October 2nd

. His sons killing has rhetorically been used by the regime toclaim victimization and thus to justify its violence as a form of self-

defence. Further, word of foreign powers potentially assisting theprotestors in toppling the Assad regime (similar to NATOs role inLibya earlier in 2011) provoked the Mufti to say that Syria and Lebanon

would send its sons and daughters to carry out suicide attacks on Europeand Palestine (i.e. Israel).49 Bouti has come under harsh criticism fromthe Syrian public and also by other ulama for his continued denigration

of the protestors and stubborn insistence on the governments account ofevents. In late June, he issued a fatwa on the impermissibility of proteststhat was met with scorn by the protestors.50

From the above narrative, I do not mean to suggest that ulama thatare part of the state apparatuswhether officially like Hassoun orunofficially like Boutiare unable to contest the state. Illustrative of

this is the case of Shaykh Ibrahim al-Salqini, the mufti of Aleppo. Asevents were escalating in Tunisia and Egypt, Salqini had warned

president Assad of the effects that the Arab Spring would have in Syria

and told him to take pre-emptive action to avoid civil strife. In August,he and other ulama of Aleppo issued a declaration condemning thegovernments atrocities during the protests. Additionally, he had given a

series of sermons condemning in strong terms the escalation over thesummer. Salqini passed away on the 6

thof September under conditions

that many felt were suspicious, suggesting that the visits by the secret


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police during his final illness contributed to his demise. Despite beingthe mufti of Aleppo, Salqini contested the states activities.51

By emphasizing the role of mosques and Friday sermons in the

preceding pages, I do not mean to suggest that the protestors were allnecessarily religious people. Despite the criticism that Bouti received, he

accurately described the instrumentalization of the mosques. Asprotestors became more emboldened and widespread, mosques nolonger served as the primary launching point for protests and other sites

emerged alongside them, such as public squares and souqs. Further, theulama seem to have lost (or perhaps never had) the ability to lead the

protests or guide them, particularly after the emergence of the Free

Syrian Army and other similar groups. The lack of reaction from the

protestors to the attack on Rifai in Ramadan is suggestive of theulamas inability to become symbols or even leaders of the protests.

Finally, there are many more engagements between Syrian ulama andthe regime that will need to be considered once the history of theseevents is written, particularly in the cities where the protests and

crackdowns were at their largest.

Closing Thoughts

By way of conclusion, a few observations can be gleaned from thenarrative provided above. Damascene ulama have taken a variety of

stances vis--vis enacting change, shaped by the constraints imposed bythe regime. Quietism is the predominant position adopted by Damasceneulama. As Yaqoubi explained, many have taken this position as a result

of the intense pressure placed on them by the government. There areothers still that are guided by Islamic teachings that label these events a

fitna, wherein, according to tradition, the one sitting is better than the

one standing, i.e. do not get involved.The practice of naa however counters quietism by imposing a

moral obligation to, at minimum, not remain a silent observer. It

presents a way of engaging the government as a moral critic, though (asdiscussed above), not placing one in confrontation with it. In the case ofRifai, Rajih and Yaqoubi, this naa was done in a very public

manner. The relationship of public naa to protests is a complicated

one. While naa is not explicitly a call for protests, Rifai and Rajihsmosques had become centres for civil disobedience in Damascus. An

unintended consequence of public naa in an authoritarian regime, itseems, is that it feeds protests. Where freedom of expression has beensuppressed for decades, voicing the opinions of the masses publicly

turns into an unintended rallying cry. In this way, it feeds the opposition


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but remains detached from it; Rifai, Rajih and Yaqoubi did not marchwith the protestors or lead the protests.

This practice ofnaa however can also be carried out in private,

as Bouti mentioned in his lessons, noting that he had employed it. In thismanner, it is consistent with a third option of engaging an authoritarian

regime, namely to work pragmatically with the government. As we haveseen, there is a difference in how this plays out as well. Ulama such asHassoun act as part of the state, whereas Bouti has a more complex

relationship. He stands apart from the official state apparatus but has aninfluence within it that he exploits towards securing goods pertaining to

religion (banning of casinos, freedoms of religious expression, etc.).

Working within the state apparatus thus does not preclude ulama from

working towards change. As noted above, the mufti of Aleppo, Salqini,took active efforts to have the regime change its behaviour while

holding office.The constraints that the state places on the ulama cannot be

emphasized enough. Ulama like Khatib have been thoroughly silenced

because of these constraints, while Yaqoubi, not willing to accept such a

fate, has been forced to leave Syria. Ulama in exile, such as Qaradawiand Yaqoubi, are able to be far more subversive and brazen in their

attacks on the government. Other series of constraints however comeinto play, such as discursive ones relating to the particular Islamictraditions of learning the ulama in question adhere to.

It should be noted that these optionsquietism, pragmaticengagement and moral witness and oppositionare not unique to theulama. A decade before the Arab Spring reached Syria, the same

options played out in the failed Damascus Spring, albeit not cloaked inthe garb of religion.52 On September 27th

, 2000, ninety-nine prominentfigures from Syrian society published a manifesto that came to be

known as The Statement of 99. This statement addressed virtually theexact same issues as those of the Arab Spring (as Yaqoubi alluded to inhis last sermon). It was prefaced with three paragraphs, a list of four

demands (repealing the emergency laws, amnesty for political prisoners,implementing state laws guaranteeing freedoms and freeing public life

from restrictive laws) and a concluding paragraph. The tone was

conciliatory and hopeful throughout. The statement did not sparkprotests but an increase in civil society, with the proliferation ofinformal gatherings and discussions on the future of Syrias politics

throughout the country. Two distinct approaches emerged as discussionsensued. One sought to engage the regime through a tacit alliance thatwould work toward gradual reform, consistent with The Statement of 99.

The second took a confrontational stance towards the regime, based on


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the conviction that the regime was incapable of reform. In January 2001,a second statement was released, titled The Statement of 1,000, which

reflected this second approach. This statement was prefaced by an essay

that rehearsed how civil society was destroyed in Syria, implicating theregime of Hafez al-Assad throughout, and was strongly worded in its

demands. The writing of this statement was contentious amongst thecivil society activists and its release was not without controversy, giventhat a Lebanese newspaper leaked it before all the names associated with

it signed it. The reaction of the regime was to turn the Damascus Springinto the Damascus Winter; the few steps towards liberalization taken by

Bashars government were pulled back and the most vocal opposition

figures were imprisoned. The differences between the Damascus Spring

and the Arab Spring are many, but the parallel that I am drawingattention to is how the ulama and the proponents of civil society sought

to engage the regime in similar manners.

1 For a broader picture of the various positions adopted by religious actorsinside and outside Syria see Thomas Pierrets, Syrie: lIslam dans larvolution, Politique trangre, 4 (2011): 879-891.

2 Many of the sermons and public lessons that I analyze have been recordedand uploaded to social media websites such as YouTube and Facebook as wellas websites maintained by followers of some of the ulama in question. By wayof documentation I provide the web addresses to the relevant pages. Alltranslations in this essay are the authors.

3 For more on Bouti, see Andreas Christmann, Islamic Scholar andReligious Leader: A Portrait of Muhammad Said Ramadan al-Buti. in Islamand Modernity. Muslim Intellectuals Respond(I. B. Tauris, London, 1998): 57-81. Also Jawad Anwar Qureshi, Islamic Tradition in the Age of Revival and

Reform: Said Ramadan al-Bouti and His Interlocutors (PhD diss., University ofChicago, forthcoming).4 This lesson was placed online on a website that hosts recordings of

Boutis lessons, http://www.naseemalsham.com/ but has subsequently beenedited to include only the last ten minutes of Boutis speech. The author waspresent at this lesson and has his own recording upon which he relied.

5 See Thomas Pierret, Baas et Islam en Syrie (Paris: Presses universitairesde France, 2011), 99-105.

6 Personal recording.7 Ibid.8 Ibid.9

It should be mentioned that eyewitnesses whom the present writer hasspoken with have disputed Boutis recollection of events. Videos uploaded toYouTube confirm their version of event. See for examplehttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oD-YduvMM58 Last accessed April 20,2012.


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10 For an account of this, see Human Rights Watch, Weve Never SeenSuch Horror Crimes against Humanity by Syrian Security Forces (New York:Human Rights Watch, 2011), 20-21.

11 See Muhammad Muti al-Hafiz and Nizar Abazas Trkh ulamDamishq fi al-qarn al-rbiashar al-hijri (Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 1986),2:905-906.

12 See their, Limits of Authoritarian Upgrading in Syria: Private Welfare,Islamic Charities, and the Rise of the Zayd Movement,IJMES, 41 (2009): 595-614.

13 Ibid.14 The entire hadith reads: The Prophet said, Religion is sincere counsel

(naa), three times, to which the Companions asked, To whom, messengerof God? He responded, To God, His Messenger, the leaders of the Muslims,

and their laity.15See Asads The Limits of Religious Criticism in the Middle East: Notes

on Islamic Public Argument, in his Genealogies of Religion: Discipline andReasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore, MD: Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 1993), 200-238. Compare with Malika Zeghals study thenaa of the Moroccan Sufi Shaykh Abdessalam Yassine to King Hasan II inher Islamism in Morocco: Religion, Authoritarianism, and Electoral Politics(translated by George Holoch, Princeton: Markus Weiner Publications, 2008),95-118. Yassines naa is more complex than that of Rifai or the Saudiulama considered by Asad in that it functions as an admonition that de-sanctifies the Makhzan (Monarch) and is thus is more confrontational andsubversive.

16 Wazr al-tarbiya yadur qarr al-munaqqabt min aql al-talmifan ala al-almniya, France 24, January 1, 2010, last accessed April 20,2012, http://www.france24.com/ar/20100701-religious-laic-interdiction-niqab-syrie-education

17 Cf. Asads The Limits of Religious Criticism, 223-227 for a discussion

ofnaa by Saudi ulama.18 For more on Qaradawi, see Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Ysuf al-Qaraw (edited by Bettina Grad and Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen London:Hurst & Co, 2009).

19 Cf. Malika Zeghal, What Were the Ulama Doing in Tahrir Square? Al-Azhar and the Narrative of Resistance to Oppression. Sightings, February 17,2011. Last accessed April 20, 2012.http://divinity.uchicago.edu/martycenter/publications/sightings/archive_2011/0217.shtml

20 I use this phrase because he is the most prominent religious scholar togive unconditional support to the Arab Spring and based on conversations withactivists in Egypt that have embraced Qaradawi because of this. The title ofshaykh of the revolutions however has since been attributed to Shaykh EmadEffat. An Azhar graduate and senior official in Egypts Dar al-Ifta, Effatattended every protest at Tahrir Square from the beginning of the revolution inJanuary. He was killed during a protest on December 16, 2011, by a gunshot tothe chest.


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21 Interview With Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Wall Street Journal,January 31, 2011, last accessed April 20, 2012,http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703833204576114712441122894.html

22 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WJQnE9XuR4o Last accessed

April 20, 2012.23

Ibid.24 Ibid.25

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ARhCWDjnI3o Last accessedApril 20, 2012.

26 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WJQnE9XuR4o Last accessed

April 20, 2012.27

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8vqcuIOXEks Last accessed April

20, 2012.28 Ibid.29 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=teQj_1aSRbg Last accessed April

20, 2012.30 See Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1988), 115.31 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TmMhGC-rTYQ Last accessed

April 20, 2012.32 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oito-uIOBOQ Last accessed April

20, 2012.33 For a transcript of this talk, see

http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages/download.php?id=9716&fid=&file=../Component/word%20new/Arabic/Activities/syria.pdf

34 Ibid., 7.35 It should be noted that in all of his talks about the Arab Spring, Qaradawi

has been conspicuously less vocal about the protests in Bahrain, which suggestshis concern for Qatars geopolitical interests.

36

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTQHumyN5kM Last accessedApril 20, 2012.37 Ibid.38 Personal recording.39 See Ahmad Mouaz al-Khatib, Al-Tamaddun al-Islami: pass et prsent

dune association rformiste damascne,Maghreb Machrek198 (2009): 79-92.40 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nQJfz1DtSpk Last accessed April

20, 2012.41 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAbBrpC8bWE Last accessed

April 20, 2012.42http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1VM9o64sfbA Last accessed April

20, 2012.43http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o7Oz

damascus discourse

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