czechoslovakia as a military factor in british considerations of 1938

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Czechoslovakia as amilitary factor in Britishconsiderations of 1938Milan Hauner aa German Historical Institute, London

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Czechoslovakia as a Military Factorin British Considerations of 1938

Milan Hauner*

Much of the literature on the Sudeten crisis of 1938 concentrates ondiplomatic history. Other crucial factors have been neglected byhistorians and although more attention has recently been given toeconomic matters,1 references to the military strength have tended onthe British side to be purely from the subjective point of view.

In contrast to the case of Poland, an overall assessment of Czecho-slovakia as a military factor is still very much needed. One of the morerecent attempts to evaluate Czech military strength has been DavidVital's study.2 He argues that in almost all studies of Munich there havebeen two underlying assumptions: that German policy was fixed onceand for all and that Czechoslovakia was an object and not a subject ofpolicy. Consequently, Vital asks, why did Czech military and industrialstrength remain a mere potential and why was it never transformed intoa genuine deterrent to the Nazi aggressor? Why was her potential neverinvoked by the Western Allies or by the Czechs themselves in the momentof crisis? Why did Czechoslovakia design her entire strategy on the prin-ciple of being absolutely certain of receiving French political and militaryassistance from the first hour of the war under any circumstances?3

President Benes himself defined Czechoslovakia's policy as based ontwo principles. He insisted that the question of minorities was aninternal problem with which foreign powers had no right to interfere,and that Czechoslovakia was prepared to defend her democratic idealsand territorial integrity, if necessary, with arms in hand.4 To GeneralE. L. Spears, the Foreign Office emissary, he said on 14 March 1938:'We are prepared to fight to the last, but we must make sure that thispeople does not get massacred in vain and be utterly destroyed fornothing'.5

In Britain, however, very few people were prepared to sympathisewith such a proposition. Czechoslovakia was an unknown 'farawaycountry' and as part of Central Europe could never figure in Britishmilitary plans which were, in any case, designed primarily to defend thelifeline of Imperial communications through the Mediterranean and theIndian Ocean. The British concept of limited liability vis-à-vis theContinent required peace and hence appeasement in Europe.6

The German occupation of Austria in March 1938 created an entirelynew political and military situation for Britain. Since France reiteratedher pledge to fight if Czechoslovakia became a victim of German

*German Historical Institute, London.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA AS A MILITARY FACTOR 195

aggression, the British Government suddenly faced the horrible prospectof becoming involved along with France in a European war on a scalesimilar to that of 1914-18. Instead of the formation of a close militaryalliance with France and her eastern allies including the Soviet Union,in order to form an impressive deterrent to Nazi ambitions, as somepoliticians like Churchill advocated,7 Britain chose the policy ofappeasement towards Hitler which in the end meant the sacrifice ofCzechoslovakia.

The few anti-appeasers received no encouragement from the Chiefsof Staff, who reiterated their resolute opposition to any form ofContinental commitment on the grounds that Britain had no armyexcept 'a wretched corps of two divisions and a mobile division'.8 Sooverwhelmed were the Chiefs of Staff by Britain's unpreparedness for awar against Germany in Europe, so depressed by the financial con-straints hindering the creation of an adequate Expeditionary Force theyhad earlier proposed, that they showed neither imagination nor courageto press their government to adopt a policy which would lead to theestablishment of a collective European alliance capable of forestallingthe aggressive ambitions of Nazi Germany. Instead, what one heardfrom these professional pessimists were warnings against German airbombers and, occasionally, the utterly gloomy sigh 'what a mess we arein!'9 And yet, there was an adequate army in Europe already, wellequipped and stronger than anything Britain could assemble and trainin the next two years, anxious to meet the German attacker, which theChiefs of Staff refused to consider.

At this juncture it is important to investigate what place Czecho-slovakia did occupy in the strategic appreciations of British militaryexperts during the Sudeten crisis in 1938, and how the opinion of theChiefs of Staff was formed before it became part of the official mind ofthe British Government.

Very little of the evidence which both the Foreign Office and WarOffice possessed regarding the preparedness of the Czechoslovak Armyand the efficiency of her defence system found its way into the C.O.S.memoranda for the Cabinet meetings. The information which camethrough was usually twisted in favour of Germany and exaggeratedCzechoslovakia's vulnerability. For instance, the Military IntelligenceDepartment, Section Europe (M.I.3.), used for the War Office appreci-ations a Czechoslovak Military Handbook as compiled in the years1933 to 1935, and which was apparently never updated. Consequently,in the crucial year of 1938 it did not take into account the newly builtfortifications along the Czech borders with Germany, work on whichhad begun in 1935. The Handbook reckoned that after mobilizationCzechoslovakia was capable of putting 22 divisions in the field10—in factin September 1938 she put in twice that number though with reducedeffectives.11

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196 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

Was there already a preconceived view among the Chiefs of Staff,whom Michael Howard calls the third appeasement group,12 thatCentral Europe did not matter very much for the defence of the West,that it was not directly of Britain's concern, and that the French hadmade a cardinal error in having pledged to assist Czechoslovakia in theevent of an unprovoked attack by a third European power? The officialhistorian sums up his findings in a cautiously but firmly worded intro-duction, that the views of the Chiefs of Staff, and those leading politiciansresponsible for the appeasement policy of the British Governmentduring that period, were very similar. Moreover, 'the grand strategywhich evolved from these circumstances, at any rate until the last fewmonths before the war began, was essentially one of isolation fromrather than commitment to Continental Europe'.13

This attitude was in part due to the suppression of sound expertappreciations of the military situation in Central Europe, coming fromfirst-hand experts such as the services attachés and their assistantsposted in that area. 'Suppression' may appear as a strong word, butthere was certainly a strong tendency towards one-sided interpretationof the military dicta in London with the result that the real Czechmilitary strength never became apparent and that, on the other hand,German potential was disproportionately exaggerated.

Shortly after the annexation of Austria, Neville Chamberlain notedin his diary on 20 March that he no longer saw any possibility of savingCzechoslovakia from being overrun by the Germans if they wanted todo it. Guided by such military considerations as the fact that theAustrian frontier was practically open, that the great Skoda munitionworks were within easy bombing distance of the German aerodromes,the railways all passed through German territory, and that Russia was100 miles away, he decided to abandon any idea of giving guarantees toCzechoslovakia or the French in connection with the latter's obligationsto that country.14 The overrunning of Czechoslovakia was thus a fore-gone conclusion for Chamberlain. From the available military appreci-ation of the situation he and his close associates selected only those bitsof information which seemed to confirm his preconceived views.

On the following day, 21 March 1938, the Chiefs of Staff completedtheir comprehensive memorandum entitled 'Military Implications ofGerman Aggression Against Czechoslovakia',15 in which they putforward their views concerning the following hypothetical alternatives :(a) That Britain should concert with France, Czechoslovakia, Yugo-slavia, Romania, Hungary, Turkey and Greece, or any of them, anundertaking to resist by force any attempt by Germany to impose aforcible solution on Czechoslovakia; (b) That Britain should give anassurance to the French Government that she would at once lend hersupport in the event of an act of aggression by Germany againstCzechoslovakia and the ensuing French obligation to that country. The

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assumption in both cases was that Italy was to be at the best neutral,but possibly hostile like Japan; that Russia and Poland, together withBelgium, Holland, Denmark and the U.S.A. would be neutral, and sowould the remaining countries in the Balkans be at the outset.

The estimates of Czechoslovakia's military strength were still thoseof 1935 and thus inadequate. The cabinet paper spoke of a peace forceof 17 infantry and four cavalry divisions (sic). It admitted that thereserves were well-equipped and adequate, the morale good, butemphasised the multinational character of the Czech army, therebyimplying its unreliability since the German attack could be assisted bydisturbances among the Sudeten Germans engineered from Berlin.Moreover, the document stressed that there were no effective fortifi-cations on the Czech frontier facing Austria with the exception of afortified bridgehead at Bratislava. As for the rest of the fortified borderthe Chiefs of Staff spoke merely of 'field defences on the Bohemianfrontier' which must appear as a rather vague understatement in thelight of the detailed description of Czech fortifications supplied only afornight later by the British Military Attaché in Prague.16 The infor-mation about the Czech air force was, on the other hand, more or lessaccurate; her airfields could be organised so as to accommodate airreinforcements from the U.S.S.R. As regards the industrial strength ofCzechoslovakia the Chiefs of Staff underlined the vulnerability of hervital munitions centres at Pilsen and Prague to early enemy attacks.

By contrast, German military effectives were given in the document attheir maximum level of 70 divisions, including Landwehr divisionswhich had never been mobilised during 1938. The Chiefs of Staffestimated that Germany would be able to gather some 1,570 bombersand 540 fighters, mostly superior in range, speed and striking power tothe combined French and British force of 876 bombers and 675 fighters,which further contributed to the fear of an aerial knock-out blow fromGermany.17

The Chiefs of Staff concluded that:No pressure that we and our possible allies can bring to bear, eitherby sea, on land or in the air, could prevent Germany from invadingand over-running Bohemia and from inflicting a decisive defeat onthe Czechoslovakian Army. We should then be faced with thenecessity of undertaking a war against Germany for the purpose ofrestoring Czechoslovakia's lost integrity and this object would onlybe achieved by the defeat of Germany and as the outcome of aprolonged struggle, . . . if such a struggle were to take place it ismore than probable that both Italy and Japan would seize theopportunity to further their own ends, and that in consequence theproblem we have to envisage is not that of a limited European waronly, but of a world war.

In their view the only pressure Britain could exert on Germany was the

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economic one, but this would have taken a considerable time to takeeffect and would be largely discounted by the fact that Germany didnot envisage a long war. Furthermore, they also believed that thealliance with such countries as Yugoslavia, Romania, Hungary, Turkeyand Greece would be of limited assistance to Britain and France 'andthey might ultimately constitute an additional embarrassing commit-ment by virtue of our moral obligation to assist them against Germaninvasion'. Moreover, they feared that this association with allies ofrather doubtful military value might have precipitated a definite militaryalliance between Germany, Italy and Japan.18

This 'extremely melancholy document' was discussed the followingday at the Cabinet meeting. The view held by Chamberlain and Halifax,that no obligation should be given to Czechoslovakia, prevailed in theend. On the same day the British verdict was conveyed to Paris with therecommendation that instead of trying to aid Czechoslovakia the twogovernments were to help 'to remove the causes of friction or even ofconflict by using their good offices with the Government of Czecho-slovakia to bring about a settlement of questions affecting the positionof the German minority'.19

Chamberlain then appeared before the House of Commons on 24March, to defend his policy of non-commitment to Czechoslovakia. Itwas Churchill who replied that peace in Europe could only be preservedby means of an 'accumulation of deterrents against the aggressor' anddeplored the fact that no effective military convention between Britainand France had yet been concluded.20

During the Anglo-French conversation on 28 and 29 April still noagreement between the two partners was reached, as the French dis-agreed with the gloomy perspective of the British assessments on theCzech military position.21 Despite the unmistakable warning given bythe first military crisis between Germany and Czechoslovakia in May ofthat year, no change in the British attitude could be discerned.

The Chiefs of Staff repeated their negative views to the Cabinet intheir 'Appreciation of the Situation in the Event of War AgainstGermany' on 14 September 1938. Although this time the figuresregarding the Czechoslovak armed forces were upgraded and the Chiefsof Staff at least took notice of the 'considerable work carried out on thedefensive works in Bohemia and Moravia', they nevertheless felt theirduty to warn against a simultaneous war with Germany, Italy andJapan in 1938 which 'neither the present nor the projected strength ofour defence forces is designed to meet, even if we were in alliance withFrance and Russia'.22

It was certainly Britain's appalling weakness in her air defences whichalso led General Ismay, Hankey's successor as Secretary of the Com-mittee of Imperial Defence, to present on 22 September—the day whenChamberlain met Hitler at Bad Godesberg—a memorandum in which

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he drew a balance sheet between the comparative advantages of fightingGermany immediately or by postponing the showdown for a year. Heforecast that during this period the Germans would increase their warpotential on land as well as their moral prestige, but that the increaseon the British side in the air defences, both active and passive, wouldthen be more important and would more than make up for any increasein the Luftwaffe over the same period.23

The Chiefs of Staff reported five days later that they were definitelyfor postponement.2* Their conclusion was not so astonishing—for itdepended upon an assessment of complex extra-European factors—aswas their refusal to seek what Czechoslovakia's strength, military andindustrial, really was. They ignored the deterrent value of the Czechfortifications and that, with the disappearance of Czechoslovakia as amilitary factor in Central Europe, France's eastern alliances, too, werebound to disintegrate. This disappearance of an effective eastern frontmeant a fundamental transformation in the strategic situation whichthe British were slow to realise.25

Whether an unequivocal support of the Czechs by the British Govern-ment would have stopped Hitler from realising his aggressive plansagainst Czechoslovakia, or whether it have would just precipitated theoutbreak of another world war in Europe twelve months earlier as theChiefs of Staff feared, must remain open to speculation. These alter-natives were, nevertheless, clearly outlined by General Gamelin, thewould-be generalissimo of all French armed forces during his exposé inLondon before the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, Sir ThomasInskip, the Service Ministers, General Viscount Gort, Chief of theImperial General Staff and senior staff officers on 26 September26—three days after the Czech general mobilisation. Gamelin said thatFrance, when fully mobilised, would put five and a half million men(100 divisions) into the field, and that at present she had about one and ahalf million men mobilised. He had no intention of sitting behind theMaginot line and waiting for a German offensive but wanted to advanceimmediately into Germany in view of the Germans only having eightdivisions on their western frontier. He would then withdraw under theprotection of the Maginot line only after he had met really seriousresistance, leaving the Germans to break their strength against thepermanent fortifications.

Gamelin said that the Czechs could mobilise about 54 divisions—obviously too optimistic a forecast27—and expressed his belief that theywould put up a good show, though it was impossible to predict howlong they could resist the German onslaught. Their intention was toprotect their flanks at all costs, to retreat from their western assailants,abandon Prague if necessary, and take up a strong defensive line fromnorth to south across Moravia. When questioned, the French generalreiterated his opinion that the Czech army was a good one, had a good

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personnel and efficient command, and an excellent morale considering itwas an army of people fighting for their lives. He was convinced that shecould hold out certainly for a few weeks, but perhaps not for a fewmonths. Furthermore, he attached immense importance to the attitudeof Poland and her possible advance into Silesia—hardly ever consideredby the British as a serious military option. Even Polish neutrality, hemaintained, would be a very definite asset. His assessment of Russia'srole was realistic for he saw that she could not intervene directly onbehalf of Czechoslovakia since neither Poland nor Romania would giveher passage, even though the latter might perhaps let Russian aircraftfly over and allow war material to pass through. However, since theFrench and Czechoslovak armies were the only forces ready to fight, itwas necessary not to let Czechoslovakia down and make her fight inisolation without assistance. Finally, Gamelin addressed an urgentappeal for direct British support on the Continent. Even a smallcontingent to start with, he insisted, would have a tremendous moraleffect on the French army.28

Though not present at the meeting, the Foreign Secretary summed itup in a telegram which he sent the following day to Sir Eric Phipps,Britain's Ambassador in Paris, in which he distorted the whole meaningof Gamelin's exposé.29 Halifax was obviously very unhappy about theFrench generalissimo still being so enthusiastic about helping theCzechs and wanted Phipps to inform the French Foreign Minister thatthe defeat of Czechoslovakia by Germany was, in his view, a faitaccompli, which could not be prevented by any declarations or actionson behalf of France or Britain. In addition to misinterpreting Gamelin'sview, in his cable Halifax gave more coverage to the isolated opinion ofthe Military Attaché in Berlin, Colonel Mason MacFarlane who hadjust reported to Halifax personally, after a fleeting visit to the Czechborder, that the morale of the Czechs was poor and resistance would befeeble. Chamberlain did not hesitate to put this item on the agenda ofthe Cabinet meeting in the evening of 27 September.30

What, then, was the real strength of the Czechoslovak army in 1938?Would she have become a strong factor in deterring Hitler from aggres-sion in concert with other factors of deterrence? Had appeasement notprevailed among British politicians and staff planners, what would havebeen their estimate of Czechoslovakia's overall strategic potential?

1. Czechoslovakia's Strategic Position and Her Alliances31

If left alone without foreign support against Germany, Czechoslovakia'sstrategic position could scarcely be worse. Her sausage-shaped stretchof land formed a virtual corridor, almost 1,000 km long, penetratingdeeply into Germany. The total length of her frontiers was over 4,000km, of which only 200 km were between a friendly neighbour—

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Romania. Half of her border line, more than 2,000 km (i.e. after theAnschluss of Austria) was between Germany, almost 1,000 km betweenfairly hostile Poland and over 800 km between hostile, but militaryweak, Hungary. Against this France's border between Germany wasless than 400 km long and Italy slightly over that figure. However, theseborder regions had been inhabited for centuries by the Sudeten Germans.It was easy to make the necessary conclusion simply from glancing atthe map of Central Europe: Czechoslovakia appeared militarily in-defensible against her many foes.

This extreme geographical disadvantage presented a serious problemto the Czech General Staff. If they wanted to post troops along theborder against Germany, they would have needed to disperse about200 infantry divisions, each defending a line 10 km long. Short ofsurrender this dilemma called for two possible solutions: immediatemilitary assistance from outside in the event of attack, and an alter-native means of defence to substitute for the lack of manpower in case ofa surprise attack which could come from three different directions. Theanswer was found in the construction of border fortifications capable ofholding off the attackers until help arrived.

The vulnerability of strategically important industrial and com-munication centres to air attacks, particularly from Germany, wasanother serious problem. Most vulnerable, even to artillery fire fromacross the border, were Bratislava and Ostrava but even Plzen (Pilsen),Brno and Prague, where 90 per cent of the armaments production wasconcentrated, were within half-an-hour's flying distance for modernbombers from the frontier. However, the same geometrical rule alsoapplied in the opposite direction, with regard to the German cities,including Vienna, which were close to the Czech border. Yet, despitethe frequent outcry by the Nazi propaganda that Czechoslovakia was aBolshevik aircraft carrier in the heart of Germany, the Czech air force,unlike the Luftwaffe, did not plan any aerial knock-out blows, besidesbeing incomparably weaker with less than 200 modern bombers.32

Czechoslovakia was the leading member of the Little Entente whichalso included Romania and Yugoslavia. Concerted offensive actionswere, however, only envisaged against Hungary. Since the early 1930sthe Little Entente had proved useless against such enemies as Germany.33

The only viable military alliance which might have presented a seriousobstacle to the Nazi Drang nach Osten would have been that betweenCzechoslovakia and Poland.

In a secret memorandum prepared in 1933 the Czech General Staffstated explicitly:

'It is our fundamental demand that from the first day of the war,all states of Central Europe, which Germany with her allies couldfinish off individually one after another, should politically andstrategically defend themselves jointly' (emphasis in the original)34

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The authors were drafting the memorandum with Poland on theirminds in the first place. Unfortunately, military alliances of smallpowers are rarely arranged according to sound strategic criteria. Since1919 Czech-Polish relations had been marred by the Teschen question—a border town with an adjacent area inhabited by a Polish minoritywhich the Czechs annexed when the Poles were preoccupied with theinvading forces of Bolshevik Russia. But more important were therelations of the two countries with their powerful eastern and westernneighbours, Russia and Germany. While it was perhaps possible duringthe earlier period for Prague and Warsaw to formulate a joint policyvis-à-vis Berlin, to find a common platform for the two countries withregard to Moscow proved utterly illusory during the entire interwarperiod. Despite some promising attempts in the early 1920s, and againaround 1932, to bring about military co-operation between the twogovernments, Benes constantly refused to negotiate a military clause tothe Czechoslovak-Polish Pact for fear that Poland might dragCzechoslovakia into a war against Germany or Russia. Similar cautionguided Benes during the Franco-Czechoslovak negotiations leading tothe Friendship Treaty of 1924 when he refused to sign a binding militaryconvention, whereas the Poles had no such scruples when they signedthe secret French-Polish Military Convention of 1921, which containedvery specific military clauses for mutual assistance in the event of a directGerman attack.35

The fronts between Prague and Warsaw polarized after Hitler's seizureof power in Germany, when the two governments decided to settle theirstrategies single-handed. Thus, the Polish-German Non-AggressionTreaty of January 1934 was seen in Prague as an anti-Czech conspiracy,36

and the the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of May 1935 must have beeninevitably regarded in Warsaw as part of a sinister anti-Polish design.From then onwards Czech-Polish relations deteriorated with irresistiblelogic. Those opposition circles in Polish politics and in the armed forceswhich saw the value of the Czech alliance proved indecisive and weak.37

Mutual distrust also penetrated the only remaining sphere of practicalmilitary co-operation between Prague and Warsaw, which was theexchange of intelligence information between the two general staffs;at the beginning of 1936 a complete break took place when the Czechsrefused to conduct intelligence operations against their new ally, theSoviet Union.38

However speculative the theme of Czech-Polish military alliance mustappear today, the Czech staff planners who drafted the above mentionedmemorandum in 1933, had assessed the strategic advantages of such analliance correctly. The perilous geographical position of Czechoslovakiavis-à-vis Germany could thereby have been radically improved, elimin-ating the major threat to the Czech defences, the prospect of a pincerthrust carried against Moravia from both north and south simul-

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taneously which would cut the country in half. Moreover, the oldgeographical disadvantage could have been reversed by a permanentthreat to Germany that Polish and Czech armies could advance jointlyagainst Prussian Silesia, thus allowing the Czechs to defend Moravia andSlovakia with second-line troops only. There would have been furtheradvantage for the prospective co-operation between the two countries inthe economic field, which also included the armaments industries.38

Indeed, one post-war Polish historian even speaks in retrospect of aunited bloc of more than 40 million people which, though weaker thanGermany, but with more trained soldiers, might have been able to putgreater pressure on France and draw her away from Locarno andsubsequent dependence on England.40

2. Czechoslovakia's Economic and Military Strength

Czechoslovakia had five times less population than Germany had, whenincreased by the addition of Austria. The annual output of steel inCzechoslovakia equalled one month's output in Germany. Measured bythe GNP per head of population, Czechoslovakia was perhaps two totwo-and-half times below the German level. About 75 per cent of hertrade by weight passed through Germany and Austria. On the otherhand, Czechoslovakia had two of the best known armaments works inthe world, 'Skoda' in Pilsen and 'Zbrojovka' in Brno, which not onlycould provide abundant arms and munitions, but supply the LittleEntente as well as many other countries at the same time. In 1935Czechoslovakia became the leading world exporter of small arms.42 Inany case, the acquisition by Germany of this important armamentsindustry in Czechoslovakia as a consequence of Munich and the eventswhich followed, must be regarded as one of the most serious strategicimplications for off-setting the military balance between the WesternPowers and Germany in the latter's favour.

Although the instruments of a parliamentary state were somewhatlimited if measured against the possibilities at the disposal of atotalitarian power like Germany, Czechoslovakia took the challengevery seriously and tried to mobilize all available human and financialresources for the purposes of defence, without destroying her economicequilibrium. Thus, between 1936 and 1938 a combination of legislative,economic and financial measures yielded for defence purposes almost24,000 million Kc (Czech crown), which equalled half of the totalordinary and extraordinary public expenditure.42 This sum included2,600 million Kc spent between 1936 and September 1938 on fortifi-cations. It is estimated that about half private savings went into raisingspecial defence loans and contributions, so that Czechoslovakia'sarmaments race in the face of the German threat was financed almostexclusively through mobilizing her internal resources.43 While in

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Germany the share of military expenditure in the GNP increased from13 to 17 per cent between 1936 and 1938, in Czechoslovakia it hadalready reached 12-5 per cent in 1936.44

Indeed, Czechoslovakia was perhaps the only anti-fascist countrytaking these strenuous and expensive precautions seriously and in goodtime. As early as July 1932, the then Foreign Minister Benes, justreturning from Geneva, called a meeting of senior officers of the GeneralStaff and told them that the disarmament conference might fail andthat he expected a terrible European crisis to come, perhaps already in1936 or 1937. 'Gentlemen', he is alleged to have told them, 'I give youfour years. By then the Republic must be militarily fully prepared!'45

A series of complex and far-reaching legislative measures were soonput into operation. In the autumn of 1933 the 'NROS', Supreme StateDefence Council, was established and given almost dictatorial powers toco-ordinate economic affairs with defence requirements. In the followingyear conscription was extended from 18 to 24 months.46 In 1935 thefortifications scheme started. In 1936 the No. 131 Emergency Law forState Defence was passed which, although never fully implemented, setout legal prerogatives for an almost completely state-controlled wareconomy aiming at a full mobilization of economic life for the purposesof defence, with a drastic restriction on private enterpreneurial activities.In the same year the so-called State Defence Guards, 'SOS', were set up.They were a paramilitary body to support the army in maintaining lawand order in the troublesome Sudeten areas. The process of militarisationof ordinary civil life was further confirmed in the Law on Pre-militaryEducation of 1937, which became compulsory for citizens from schoolage up to the age of 30.

Therefore it was with both justification and a sense of pride thatPresident Benes wrote in his memoirs:

In the summer of 1938, our army was, despite all its shortcomingsI became very well aware of during the days of Munich, one of thebest in Europe. Its morale, equipment, as demonstrated during thetwo mobilizations, in May and September 1938, were up to thestandard.47

This optimistic view had been largely supported by the evidencereaching the Foreign Office and War Office from Czechoslovakia. TheBritish Military Attache in Prague, Lt. Col. Stronge wrote in hissummary note on the prospects of Czech defences, dated 6 October1937, that the Czech Army was well equipped and that it would be agreat mistake to underrate its value. He speculated that in the event ofa German attack, the Czechs would resist the enemy from the outsetbehind the fortifications and then withdraw by stages to the Moravianplateau since the countryside offered, as he put it, 'what must almost bea unique succession of natural rearguard positions right into Slovakia—still the last and least accessible stronghold'.48

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA AS A MILIARTY FACTOR 205

Shortly after the occupation of Austria Stronge met several CzechGeneral Staff officers who expressed the belief that either an earlyshowdown with Germany, or surrender to impossible terms, wasinevitable. They were, however, confident that with the aid of Franceand Russia, and possibly Britain, they would, regain their land intactin the end. A British declaration to stand by France and Russia wouldprobably prevent the war. But he stressed that the nation was wellorganized for war, its army probably the best among the smaller statesof Europe, especially in regard to equipment and weapons, though heindicated that it was not as ready for war as the process of replacingobsolescent arms with new models was still far from complete. Under-standably, Stronge regarded the mobilisation factor as the crux of thematter and wondered whether the Czechs would fight if their defenceswere overrun before they had time to mobilise properly. But he wasconfident in the excellent work of the Czech intelligence service andconcluded that 'if they have time to get ready and are assured of supportfrom France, I believe they will stand.' His personal view was that thebulk of the Czech army with reserves would be disposed in Moravia asindeed they were in the last week of September. The troops holding outin Bohemia were of course running the risk of being cut off from the restof the army but Stronge was, nevertheless, quite optimistic about theprospects of the Czech army holding out in Slovakia 'for a considerableperiod of time'.49

General Faucher, the Head of the French Military Mission inCzechoslovakia, shared Stronge's views, though he attributed an evengreater power of resistance to the Czech fortifications.50 GeneralSyrovy, Inspector General of the Czechoslovak Army, elaborated toStronge what he saw as the two most important military problems forthe Czechs : to effect rapid mobilisation and not to be taken by surprise.51

It was obvious to Stronge that Czechoslovakia could not afford thelatter, either by unexpected German troop movements or by distur-bances manipulated among the Sudeten Germans from across theborder. For this reason he sympathised with the preventive measuresput into effect by the Czech General Staff during the May crisis, whichled to the partial mobilisation of two classes of reservists and manningof the frontier defences.52

The Czech fortification system, which played a prominent part in thecalculations of the Czech General Staff, consisted of about 10,000 lightand medium works, of which over 8,000 existed in Bohemia andMoravia and the rest stretched along the frontier with Hungary. FromMarch 1938 fortifications were hastily built on the uncovered southernborder facing Austria. Bohemia was covered in depth mostly by lightmachine-gun pill-boxes and blockhouses spread in several half-circleswhich had Prague as their imaginary centre. The strongest fortified linespanned in the North from the river Odra (Oder) to the Giant Mountains

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(Riesengebirge) with 250 heavy and medium works provided with gunemplacements and capable of sheltering several hundred men each. Thesystem was described in great detail by Stronge in two important reportswhich, however, arrived too late to London as to have any effect on therecommendations of the C.O.S. But even had they arrived three weeksearlier it is doubtful, in the light of the present knowledge about thelimited options of the appeasers, whether Stronge's valuable informationabout the Czech fortifications would have been brought before theCabinet meeting on 22 March.53 He first hurried down to see the ex-posed southern border against Austria which he found protected onlyby small pill-boxes, except for heavy fortifications protecting theBratislava bridgehead. But he noticed some heavier works underconstruction, though he was not allowed any nearer.54 One weekthereafter Stronge, with the permission of the Czech military authoritiesinspected the entire northern sector.55 He gained the impression that thefrontier defences would be completed by the autumn. At all importantpoints, he reported, work was carried out day and night in three shifts.He was impressed by the architectural arrangements, grouping ofweapons, good tactical siting and regarded the whole system as animproved Maginot Line. With regard to the weakest sector on theAustrian frontier, Stronge reflected that 'most of the works which arenot yet complete are already defensible up to a point by bringing inweapons and every month henceforth will see marked progress in thisrespect. . .'56

It is impossible to produce a definite estimate on the real defencevalue of Czech fortifications and on the time German troops would haveneeded to overcome the system since the bloody test has never takenplace. The almost legendary fortification system has become part ofpopular Czech mythology of defiance to the Munich Diktat. It has alsospawned all sorts of speculations on the basis of German tests carriedout under the most favourable conditions after the entire system ofCzech fortifications had fallen into German hands. The Czechs hadoriginally planned to complete their fortifications in 1942 but Hitler'saggressive intentions forced them to cut down on the schedule, as if theywere building, according to the judgement by a German expert Col.Biermann, 'a retaining dam before an oncoming flood'. Given another12 months however, the fortifications could have been 100 per centready, and in that case 'the Czech soldiers would never have abandonedtheir line of fortifications without fighting . . . even if their allies had notat once come to their assistance.'57

One can easily enumerate the weaknesses of the Czech fortificationsystem which had been built to make up for the extremely disadvan-tageous geographical position, and for the shortage of manpowercombined with an excessive proportion of disaffected minorities. InSeptember 1938 the fortified line was still incomplete with many gaps

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and weak sectors easy to penetrate. Furthermore, its location in theSudeten districts made it an easy prey to German intelligence. Althoughthe Czech tactical doctrine showed similar deficiencies with its Frenchmodel,58 the Germans themselves adopted exactly the same principle ofstatic defence on a broad front in their construction of the SiegfriedLine—which in actual fact fulfilled its purpose and did work as aneffective deterrent against the French, albeit even less completed thanthe Czech fortifications and hopelessly undermanned. The numerousodds on the Czech side notwithstanding, it would have been within therealm of possibilities to imagine at least one sector of the fortified lineoffering resistance for several weeks following German aggression, withserious repercussions for Hitler's future plans.

However, there is no evidence that Hitler seriously wished tomassacre his attacking columns in frontal assaults against the Czechbarrage of steel and concrete. Although after the war several Germangenerals testified that the Wehrmacht of 1938 did not possess the neces-sary heavy artillery to penetrate the Czech fortifications, most of thesestatements must be considered biased for the obvious reason that thegenerals were anxious to shift the main responsibility onto Hitler andto save their necks. On the other hand, it is equally well known that theGerman army, possessing all the necessary details about the Czechfortifications, was preparing itself methodically for the confrontation.58

The most dangerous instrument against the static Czech defences wasthe revolutionary German method of mobile warfare—the Blitzkrieg.The operational plan against Czechoslovakia, Fall Grün, whose finalversion was signed by Hitler on 30 May 1938,60 exemplified theblitzkrieg doctrine in its bold assertion that the Czech Army was to bedestroyed within two or three days. It gave the maximum considerationto the element of surprise to achieve a decisive breakthrough during thefirst hours of the onslaught. Airborne troops were expected to co-operate closely with the ground forces. It demanded the indiscriminateuse of the air force, not only to paralyze the mobilisation efforts of theCzech army, but also to cause havoc among the civilian population.Moreover, the entire Nazi propaganda machine was to be granted asmuch importance as the deployment of armed forces.61 In addition, fifthcolumnists from the Sudeten German 'Freikorps' were trained forsabotage actions and instructed to engineer 'an accident' to provide apretext for a large-scale attack from across the border.

It was not difficult to anticipate the primary objective of the GermanGeneral Staff: Czechoslovakia was to be cut in half from north to southacross Moravia. It was an open secret that the attack was to begin on1 October. But during the commanders' conference at Berghof on 3September Hitler admitted to being still haunted by the vision of Verdunwhen he realized how strong the Czech fortifications were in northernMoravia. He therefore began to insist that the breakthrough should take

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place against southern Bohemia from the Bavarian frontier in thedirection of Pilsen and Prague.62

The senior officer corps of the Wehrmacht did not share Hitler'senthusiasm for a blitzkrieg against Czechoslovakia. Their oppositionwas exemplified by General Beck, Chief of Army General Staff, who didnot believe that Czechoslovakia could be defeated in less than three orfour weeks. He repeatedly warned Hitler against the dangers of a two-front war, for he was convinced that France was bound to intervene inthe event of a German attack upon Czechoslovakia. Thus, a localconflict could have been easily transformed into a European war, withthe difference that Germany in 1938 was less prepared than in 1914 towage a long war in terms of human and material resources. In this hewas supported by General Thomas, Head of Army Armaments Bureau,who criticised the inadequate provisions for the build-up of strategicreserves and the pursuit of an armament policy 'in breadth' rather than'in depth'. Beck's verbal and written protests were all in vain and he wasleft alone with no choice but to resign. Although his views were sharedin private by the majority of his conservative colleagues, they werereluctant to assert them in front of Hitler who easily shouted them down,reluctant to assert them in front of Hitler who easily shouted themdown.63 Arithmetically, the Wehrmacht enjoyed a clear superiorityover the Czech armed forces. Against eight fully motorised formations(three panzer, four motorized infantry and one light divisions) theCzechs had merely one motorized infantry division and four so-calledmobile divisions which represented a heterogenous combination of acavalry and a motorized brigade improved by a tank regiment. Althoughboth countries depended heavily on requisitioned civilian motorvehicles, there was a substantial disproportion between them: in 1937the number of lorries and coaches combined in Germany and Austriawas over 400,000, in Czechoslovakia about 30,000.64

The Czech tanks, however, if deployed in larger mechanized forma-tions to counter-strike, might have been developed into one of the mostvaluable instruments of manoeuvrability. Almost 350 were of thestandard model 'LT 34' and 'LT 35', superior in guns and armour toany of the available German types 'Mk I' and 'Mk II'. A further 100new tanks earmarked for exports were requisitioned in September 1938by the Ministry of National Defence which also ordered two entirelynew series of light and medium tanks, 700 altogether, but none ofwhich could have been delivered before 30 September. Thus, Czechtanks became perhaps the most important part of German war bootyand played their part in the French campaign of 1940. Three out of tenGerman panzer divisions incorporated them, and every third Germantank which attacked France was Czech-built.65

Most depressing for the Czech General Staff, however, must havebeen the superiority of German air force. It was not only the number

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of first-line squadrons, half of them equipped with modern bombers, butalso the incredibly high rate of output of the German aircraft factorieswhich so alarmed the British and French, whereas Germany possessedsome 36 major aircraft firms spread throughout the country, the Czechshad all their four major factories concentrated in or around Prague.The Czechs also lacked adequate numbers of anti-tank and anti-aircraftguns, but were well equipped in infantry weapons and field artillery—inheavy guns even better than the Germans. The table below attempts toshow the military balance between the two countries.

TABLE

MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND GERMANYBY THE END OF SEPTEMBER 1 9 3 8 6 6

Large units (divisions) availableOn the German-Czech frontierField artilleryTanksCombat aircraft (first-line)

Czechoslovakia42 (a)332,250(d)418

cc. 600

Germany47 (b)35-38 (c)

cc. 3,000 (e)2,100(01,230 (g)

NOTES (for Table )

(a) After full mobilisation the Czech army consisted of 22 infantry divisions,four mobile divisions and 12 divisional units designed for the fortifications; therewere additional four 'groups' of third-line troops assigned to defensive purposes.

(b) This was the peace strength of the Wehrmacht after the incorporation of theAustrian units. Further eight reserve and 21 'Landwehr' divisions could be mobilisedif Hitler had ordered full mobilisation.

(c) Three divisions kept in reserve.(d) Not counting anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns and the fortress artillery.(e) This is an overall estimate for the number of field guns in the German army,

i.e. not only those concentrated on the Czech border.(f) In September 1938 the Wehrmacht had only very light tanks—called tankettes

—armed with machine-guns only (types Mk. 1 and Mk. 2).(g) Estimated to be about half of the effective strength of the Luftwaffe. Not

counted are 250 'Ju-52' transport planes of 7th air division under Gen. Student,designed for airborne operations over Czechoslovakia.

Compiled from: W. Bernhardt: Die deutsche Aufrüstung 1934-1939, (Frankfurt,1969); W. A. Boelcke: Deutschlands Rüstung im 2. Weltkrieg (Frankfurt, 1969);W. Green: The Warplanes of the Third Reich (London, 1970); V. Hyndrak, op. cit.;V. Karlicky: Czechoslovenske delostrelecke zbrane (Prague, 1975); B. Mueller-Hillebrand: Das Heer 1933-1945, Vol. 1 (Darmstadt, 1954); V. Nemecek:Ceskoslovenska letadla (Prague, 1958); M. Sada: Umlcene zbrane (Prague, 1966);G. Tessin: Formationsgeschichte der Wehrmacht 1933-1939 (Boppard/R, 1959);K. H. Völker: Die deutsche Luftwaffe 1933-1939 (Stuttgart, 1967).

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The successful execution of a blitz attack against Czechoslovakiadepended on a number of imponderables. First of all, the blitzkriegtactics in its entirety had not been tested yet. The Luftwaffe requiredperfect weather conditions. The timing of the 'incident' inside Czecho-slovakia seemed to have failed when the Czech troops quicklysuppressed the unrest among the Sudeten Germans, which followedHitler's inflammatory speech of 12 September in Nuremberg. Last butnot least, the Czechs succeeded in putting their measures into full effectfor general mobilisation after 23 September and had, by 1 October, overone million men under colours. Thus, the chief precondition for theexecution of 'Fall Grün', the element of surprise, was simply notavailable to Hitler on the date of the contemplated attack.67

As for the Czech military leaders, they accepted the prospect of animmediate war with sound professional confidence, based on the knowl-edge that Germany, because of her late re-introduction of conscriptionin 1935, could not put more troops in the field than she had trained.The most important element of their confidence, as the Chief of theGeneral Staff General Krejci reiterated in his memorandum of 9September to the members of the Supreme State Defence Council, wasthe belief that the French ally would come to help if called upon.68

When interviewed 30 years later in 1968, General Krejci said that thetotal of Czech forces with reserves roughly equalled in numbers thestrength of the German attacker in the expected zones of thrust. He alsoconfirmed the assumption that Czech troops had been expected toretreat from Bohemia in the direction of Slovakia, containing theGerman attacker until the arrival of allied assistance.69 This was sup-posed to take the form of Russian and French aircraft; preparationshad been made to absorb between 450-675 bombers.70

The British Military Attaché tried to answer the question as to howlong could Czechoslovakia hold out single-handed in his analyticalmemorandum of 3 September. As a military professional Strongerejected Hitler's boast that Germany would overrun Czechoslovakia inthree weeks (actually at one stage three days were demanded by Hitler).He observed that the average standard of Czech equipment was at leastthe equal to that of the German army, but admitted that it was mostdifficult to assess their morale on which all now depended, since hesaw no material reason why the Czechs should not put up a protractedresistance single-handed. Should the morale give way, the war wouldnot last more than a week or two. 'If it holds', Stronge concluded, 'itmay drag on for months. The fall of Prague should not be vital'.71

3. The Moral Factor

Whilst the military balance can be established arithmetically nocommensurable methods can be applied to measure the prospective

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behaviour of Czechoslovakia's multinational army in a war againstGermany as it could have been unleashed in 1938. For Czechoslovakiathis question was of crucial importance since every fifth soldier andevery seventh officer of her army in the event of mobilisation would havebeen of German origin.

During the twenty years of her existence, Czechoslovakia's populationshowed an unstable attitude towards armed forces. The Czechs them-selves, who formed about 50 per cent of the population, had beenknown for their antimilitaristic views, and the army was even lesspopular among the non-Slav minorities subject to conscription, of whomthe Germans formed 22-5 per cent and the Hungarians about 5 per cent.It was only through the artificial union with the Slovaks (15-6 per cent)that the Czechs were able to maintain their control and to enjoy as'Czechoslovaks' an undisputed numerical superiority. Together withthe Ukrainians from Ruthenia the Slav majority in Czechoslovakiaaccounted for about 70 per cent.72

As in all successor states which emerged after the First World War,Czechoslovakia's army consisted of many heterogeneous elements. The'revolutionary' ingredient of dominant influence were the formerlegionaries who had fought during the last war on the side of theEntente against Germany and Austria, most of them in Russia. The'conservative' component consisted of former officers of the Austro-Hungarian army of both Czech and German (especially Hungarian)nationality, who in the early 1920s supplied the professional hard core.There was also the French Military Mission whose head was also theChief of the General Staff. But it was the conscription system whichexposed most vulnerably the predicament of this multinational state,for, in contrast to the democratic recruitment of the rank and file, theofficer corps was entirely dominated by the Czechs. For instance,according to the mobilisation plan for the year 1936 the Ministry ofNational Defence envisaged to call under colours 970,000 men in theevent of war, of which about 720,000 would have been 'Slav', almost200,000 German, and 62,000 Hungarian. This mobilised army was tohave 43,500 officers, of which 37,575 would be 'Slavs', 5140 Germansand 759 Hungarians. Compared with the overall ethnic balance, the'Slavs' thus made up 86-4 per cent of officers, whereas the Germans andHungarians a mere 11-8 and 1-7 per cent respectively. Moreover, the'Slav' label was also misleading as was the 'Czechoslovak' one, for theCzech element acquired a disproportional majority over their fellow-Slovaks. According to official statistics the number of active officers on2 January 1938 amounted to 11,820, of whom only 442 were Slovak(i.e. 3-6 per cent). Among 8,333 active N.C.O.s not more than 421 wereSlovak (5 per cent). The number of active German officers as quoted inFebruary 1937 was 457 (i.e. 7 per cent). As against more than one hundredCzech generals, the Slovaks and the Germans had merely one each.73

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Before the threat of Nazism became real the Czechs had remainedmore or less phlegmatic in their attitude to national service. The growinghostility of Czechoslovakia's disaffected minorities was countered byhardening stubbornness of the Czechs who began to anticipate themilitary solution as the only alternative to the surrender of their nationalindependence. Throughout the 1930s the War Office in London had alow opinion of the moral cohesion of the Czech army. Replying to anenquiry from M.I.3. the Military Attaché in Prague, Lt. Col. DenisDaly, suggested in a memorandum, dated 2 April 1934 that the marginof the 'actively disloyal population' ranged from a minimum of 5-5 percent (counting Hungarians only) to a maximum of 44 per cent(Hungarians, Germans and Slovaks together).74

After Hitler's victory in neighbouring Germany, the Sudeten questionquickly grew into Czechoslovakia's major domestic and internationalproblem. In the parliamentary elections of 1935 Henlein's SudetenGerman Party polled 1,250,000 votes which accounted for 66 per centof the German voters in Czechoslovakia and thus became the strongestsingle political party in the country. After the Anschluss of Austria thepolitical loyalties of Czechoslovakia's German citizens were put injeopardy since they could hardly resist the temptation of joining theirAustrian brothers in the Greater German Reich. Among the largerpolitical parties only the German Social Democrats and Communistsremained loyal to the idea of the Czechoslovak Republic and were ableto resist the nationalistic frenzy. Already in November 1933 the WarOffice unofficially took the line that the Anschluss of Austria would beeffected without recourse to war, but that it would have a profoundlydisturbing effect on the relations between Czechoslovakia and Germany,creating more discontent and dissension among the former's minorities.7 5

In preparation for the four-power conference in Stresa the ForeignOffice sounded out the views of the War Office whose spokesman thenmade a truly depressing forecast:

We believe, however, that once Austria has acheived some form ofunion with Germany, the pressure on Czechoslovakia would be sogreat that the 3-5 million Germans in Western Bohemia wouldnaturally join in the German Reich, and that the Czech remnantwould be reduced to a petty State, dependent on Germany although

\ the Germans would probably not want to annex any purely Czechdistricts.78

Needless to say, during his overall military assessments in 1938, theBritish Military Attaché saw in the unpredictable attitude of SudetenGerman soldiers, if called upon to fight against the Reich, one of thecrucial factors of the likely conflict. He himself did not share thepopular view that the Sudeten Germans would all either fight or abstain,but believed that this decision was likely to depend upon the conscienceof the individual—assuming perhaps that the military machine, as put

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into motion during mobilisation, would not really affect the individual.Some of the Sudeten Germans emphasised the German tradition of theNiebelungstreue, that is to say to honour one's oath even though itinvolved killing one's own kith and kin."

In August Stronge wrote to London that those Sudeten Germansalready under colours would fight, but that reservists would not answerthe call. 'There is', he wrote, 'no Czech or German alive who can bequite certain what would happen as regards the Sudeten soldiers. Theywill not know themselves till the time comes . . ,'78 General Faucher,Head of the French Military Mission, who had very strong pro-Czechfeelings, was convinced that the bulk of the Sudeten Germans wouldcertainly have conducted themselves very well.79

The supreme test for the reliability of the minority soldiers inCzechoslovakia's armed forces was the general mobilisation which wasannounced by radio in the night of 23 September 1938. Although thereis no reliable statistical evidence, most of the observers were unanimousthat as far as the Czechs were concerned the response to the call-up wasspontaneous and enthusiastic.80 Hubert Ripka, a close associate ofPresident Benes, maintains in his book that the morale of the Czecho-slovak army was exceptionally high and that 'it represented the con-centrated essence of a united Czechoslovak nation, grimly determinedto defend itself to the last breath'.81 Ripka insists that despite Henlein'sradio announcement from Germany that those Sudeten Germans whoobeyed their mobilisation orders would be committing an act of treasonagainst the German nation, 'apart from a few isolated exceptions, theSudeten Germans obeyed unhesitatingly . . . the anti-Nazi Germans didso with the same enthusiasm as the Czechoslovaks themselves'.82 Tosupport his argument he quotes, among other sources, from a manifestoissued by the German Democratic Youth Movement on 27 September,which reiterated the pledge of young Sudeten Germans to defend thedemocratic ideals of Czechoslovakia against 'social and mental slaveryof German Fascism' even with arms in hand . . ,83 But the publicationof a single leaflet does not constitute a proof. How much direct evidencehas been uncovered since, and how much of it still remains part of thepopular mythology?

A secret memorandum on Czechoslovak armed forces issued in June1938 by the High Command of German Ground Forces (OKH) stillmaintained that the nationality question must be regarded as the mostvulnerable aspect of the Czechoslovak army; in spite of this the armyitself, thanks to good equipment and fortifications, was to be seen as arespectable adversary in defence.84

Primary evidence which has now come out from Czechoslovakmilitary archives, reveals a rather different state of affairs than usuallycited in official Czech publications. It shows that the First Departmentof the General Staff, in charge of organisation, was all the time aware of

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the precarious situation caused by the multinational composition of thearmy. As early as 1936 two alternatives were anticipated in the event ofgeneral mobilisation: (1) That the non-Slav recruits and reservists wouldrefuse to answer the call-up and start sabotage activities in order todelay and hamper the mobilisation efforts; (2) That they would enlist,but only with the intention of turning their weapons at an opportunemoment against their own commanders and in order to sabotage thearmy from inside.85 As from 1936 onwards new non-Slav recruits werebeing sent to non-combatant units, non-Slav officers not allowed to fillin responsible posts. The General Staff also envisaged setting up speciallabour camps for unreliable non-Slav soldiers under Czech guards, buthad neither the time nor the manpower to undertake this in the lastweek of September 1938. To safeguard a Slav majority in every regiment,amalgamation was widely used with the result that German recruitswere carefully mixed up with the Czechs or sent to distant Slovakgarrisons.86

However, it was not always possible to adhere strictly to the principleof amalgamation because some units required more skilled and educatedsoldiers than others. So it happened that a high number of Germansserved as lorry drivers and that several artillery regiments were amplymanned by them (e.g. the heavy artillery regiments in towns like Plzen,Rokycany, Litomerice and Libérée had more than 50 per cent non-Slavsoldiers). After the abortive Henlein putsch the First Department of theGeneral Staff ordered on 16 September that the new German recruits,due for the annual call-up, would receive uniforms only but no weapons.During the general mobilization a relatively large number of Germanreservists, particularly from the frontier districts, either deserted orrefused to turn up. So, for instance, the First Army Corps (south-westBohemia) intimated that only 30 to 40 per cent of registered reservistsreported for duty; the Second Army Corps (northern Bohemia) reportedabout 60 per cent on duty and the Third Army Corps (southernMoravia) showed the lowest figure—slightly over 20 per cent. Extensivesabotage activities among the German population were reported fromthe same areas, especially with regard to delivery of requisitioned motorcars and lorries: in some units up to 20 per cent of registered motorvehicles were not delivered, up to 45 per cent delivered motor carsreported breakdowns, and up to 75 per cent drivers were missing. Thereliability of the entire Third Division in Terezin (Theresienstadt) wasdoubtful, since it had a very high percentage of Sudeten Germans andwas commanded by General Richtermotz who served with theWehrmacht after Munich and was executed by the Czechs after the warfor high treason.87

As for the fifth-column activities inside Czechoslovakia, the rebellionwhich had been started after Hitler's inflammatory speech on 12September 1938 by the Freikorps and the militant elements of the

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Sudeten German Party was put down resolutely by the CzechoslovakGovernment. Martial law was proclaimed in several districts and armyand security troops sent into the frontier regions. The ringleaders,realizing the fiasco, fled with Henlein across the border.88 From thesecurity point of view, it was important that the entire fortificationsystem remained intact in Czech hands. Furthermore, the failure of theHenlein putsch must have seriously upset Hitler's timetable for theattack against Czechoslovakia as his secret plan to stage an incidentinside that country, which would have justified German military inter-vention, also misfired. On the other hand, one cannot dismiss the factthat unsuccessful as the rebellion was, it must have made the SudetenGermans the least reliable element in the Czech army barely ten daysbefore the general mobilisation call-up.

However, the main body of reliable troops had been concentratedsince the May crisis in some 20 élite divisions, almost entirely Czech andSlovak. These so-called 'A' units comprised the two existing annualclasses of recruits plus the youngest contingent of reservists and werethus equal in the standard of training the Wehrmacht divisions.89 Asstated above, the Czech high command had full confidence that theSlav units would hold the ground in the event of a German attack. Asfor those Sudeten German troops serving in the exposed areas ofanticipated enemy thrusts, they would presumably have to be writtenoff as unavoidable casualties and not counted on during the envisagedstrategic withdrawal of the Czech army from Bohemia eastwards toSlovakia.

In Germany itself there was little enthusiasm for a general war. TheBritish Military Attaché in Berlin, Colonel MacFarlane, expressed hope'that the bad spirit in the country may deter Herr Hitler from risking awar in which the country is not really behind him.' He reiterated theview that 'the army has absolutely no wish to embark on a war so longas there is any possibility of its developing into a general conflagration'.9Û

Indeed, the conservative generals feared that something similar to thechain reaction of August 1914 when Germany had led to fight a two-front war right from the start, was bound to happen again. Despite theaggressive tone of Nazi propaganda the mood of the population con-trasted sharply with that in August 1914. On 19 September 1938 theCzech Military Attaché in Berlin, Colonel Hron, cabled to Prague thatthe morale of the Wehrmacht did not seem particularly high, especiallyamong those soldiers who had experienced the First World War. Headvised his superiors in Prague to be firm and not to move an inch.91

When on 27 September Hitler let the units of the Second PanzerDivision pass through Berlin to test the mood of the population, he issaid to have angrily exclaimed after seeing no enthusiasm for war: 'Withthis people it is impossible to go to war!'92

As the Sudeten crisis reached another critical point between the

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Chamberlain-Hitler meeting at Godesberg and the Munich Conference,the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence in the War Office,Major-General Pownall, tried to sum up the moral imponderables inGermany, Britain and Czechoslovakia 9S He was convinced, despite thereports he had from his military attachés and other sources, that theGermans would obey Hitler and that their morale could be sustainedfully for three months if not longer. Public feeling in Britain seemed tohim at the moment 'swayed by emotions' and he was worried that theHouse of Commons, 'likely to be bellicose', might 'well drive theGovernment into war'. On the other hand, he rightly saw that theattitude of the Dominions was far from helpful. As for the prospects ofCzech resistance, Pownall sadly admitted that it could not last long evenin the best circumstances. Though 'a gallant defence will arousesentimental feelings and increase the clamour to go to her aid', andthough it was better to go at once than to be dragged into the war whenCzechoslovakia would be more than half beaten, he considered theadvantages of such a move 'evanescent'. He did not expect Russia tocome in aid of Czechoslovakia associated with the Western Allies, andregarded the attitude of Hungary and Poland with justified suspicion.He thus concluded that from the military point of view the balance ofadvantage was definitely in favour of postponement and added, ratherparadoxically, that 'our real object is not to save Czechoslovakia—thatis impossible in any event—but to end the days of the Nazi regime.'Pownall was not able to see that there was no contradistinction betweenthese two aims, and that by sacrificing Czechoslovak democracy toHitler's tyranny the Nazi regime would be strengthened with terriblerepercussions for the rest of the world. He failed to see that these twoobjectives were complementary.

Hitler must have been very pleased with himself after his riskygambling had borne him fruit in the acquisition of the Sudentenlandwith the Czech fortresses. No democratic politician could compete withhim in the art of deception, as he himself triumphantly boasted: 'At themoment of ultimate and decisive pressure the nerves of the other sidecracked, without any need at the final stage for us to take up arms'.94

4. Conclusions

The military and moral consequences of Munich were disastrous. Thesurrender of the Sudeten districts with their fortifications meant not onlyabandoning Czechoslovakia's natural strategic frontier, but, as LiddellHart put it, the loss of an invaluable 'shock absorber'.95 He pointedout that after Muich the strategic balance had changed markedly forthe worse since the military nullification of Czechoslovakia removed thepolitical distraction that the French could rely on in Central Europevis-à-vis Germany.96 Moreover, Czechoslovakia's military potential had

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not only just been nullified by the disbandment of her excellent armyand by the occupation of her fortresses. Equipment and stocks for 40divisions and her entire powerful armaments industry was to be barteredaway, looted by Germany without a single shot six months thereafter.97

There were also the moral implications resulting from the surrenderof Czechoslovakia which the Western political and military leaderswere even less prepared to take seriously, though the appeasers appearedat the time of Munich as persons of highest moral integrity who kept onrepeating that they had saved peace 'for our time'. Their tragic errorwas, however, that they failed to grasp the very nature of Nazism, itsdesire to expand and to subject other races. And it was Churchill againwho warned the jubilant appeasers in the aftermath of Munich, in hismoving speech on 5 October in the House of Commons, that 'we havesustained a total and unmitigated defeat', and that they were mistakenif they believed they were only giving away the interests of Czecho-slovakia. 'It goes far deeper than that', he went on, 'you have to considerthe character of the Nazi movement and the rule which it implies!'98

If the Nazi occupation of rump Czechoslovakia in March 1939constituted the breaking point in the delusive development of appease-ment with Hitler, then the Anglo-French guarantees to Poland, Greeceand Romania were given against much greater odds. In 1939 Britainand France were strategically in a much worse position than before 30September 1938. Without the consistent anti-Nazi stand of Czecho-slovakia and her military potential, Eastern and Southern Europe founditself in a hopeless disarray. When, predictably, Germany attackedPoland on 1 September 1939, not only had she better defences on herwestern border against France, she was in addition aligned with SovietRussia against the Western Powers.

NOTES

N.B. If not stated otherwise, primary source material entered below comes from thePRO Archives: Foreign Office (FO) and War Office (WO).

1. E.g. B.-J. Wendt: Economic Appeasement. Handel und Finanz in der britischenDeutschland-Politik 1933-1939 (Düsseldorf, 1971); A. Teichova: An EconomicBackground to Munich. International Business and Czechoslovakia 1918-1938(Cambridge, 1974).

2. D. Vital: The Survival of Small States. Studies in Small Power/Great PowerConflict, ch. 2: Czechoslovakia—the Classic Paradigm, (Oxford, 1971) pp. 13-53.

3. Ibid., pp. 51-53.4. E. Beneš: Mnichovské dny (Prague, 1968) p. 31f. From an interview on 2/3/38

between Beneš and a Sunday Times correspondent.5. FO 371/21716, C.3225.6. M. Howard: The Continental Commitment, (London, Penguin, 1974) ch. 5.7. W. S. Churchill : The Second World War, Vol. 1, The Gathering Storm (London,

1948) p. 213, cf. n. 20 below.

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8. The Ironside Diaries 1937-1940, ed. by R. Macleod and D. Kelly (London,1962) p. 47f.

9. Ibid., p. 62.10. WO 106/5388.11. See table further below, n. 66.12. Howard, op. cit., ch. 6.13. N. G. Gibbs: Grand Strategy, Vol. 1, Rearmament Policy (HMSO, 1976)

preface p. xxi, see also p. 648.14. K. Feiling: The Life of Neville Chamberlain (London, 1946) p. 347f. For

Churchill's scathing criticism of this letter see Churchill, op. cit., p. 214.15. C.O.S. 698, CAB 27/627.16. Ibid., see also below n. 55.17. Ibid. In a recent investigation 'German Air Power and the Munich Crisis',

W. Murray argues that in nearly every respect Luftwaffe was unprepared to launcha significant bombing offensive against the British Isles in 1938 (publ. in War andSociety, Vol. II, ed. by B. J. Bond and I. Roy, London 1977, pp. 107-17).

18. C.O.S. 698, para. 87-92. Characteristically, neither Poland nor Soviet Russiawere included in the contemplated alliance by the C.O.S., though concerted diplo-matic action of Britain, France and Russia had been urged by such politicians asA. Eden and W. Churchill (cf. their conversation with Lord Halifax on 14/9/38,C.P.200(38), CAB 24/278. Cf. also M. Gilbert: Winston S. Churchill, Vol. V,1922-1939 (London, 1976), chs. 46-7).

19. This report was discussed the following day 22/3/38 (CAB 23/93). Halifax toPhipps, 22/3/38, DBFP, iii, I, No. 106.

20. Gilbert, op. cit., p. 925.21. C.P.109, CAB 24/276.22. C.O.S. 765, C.P. 199(38), CAB 24/278; see also an updated version of 4/10/38,

D.P.(P)32, CAB 16/183A.23. CAB 21/544; see also Howard, op. cit., p. 125f.24. Ibid.25. Ibid., p. 128, Gibbs, op. cit., p. 689.26. WO 106/5142: Notes of Meeting at Richmond Terrace on 26/9/38; see also

CAB 23/95.27. Corrections by M.I.3. of 27/9/38 (in WO 106/5142): Maximum number of

Czech divisions: 34+8, not 54.28. No satisfactory English account of General Gamelin's expose survived. In the

French version prepared by General Lelong. Military Attaché in London, we read:'Les Armées française et tchécoslovaque représentent les seules forces prêtes: ellesconstituent la couverture des forces du monde entier qui, il faut l'espérer, serangeront du côté des puissances democratiques. Il est nécessaire de ne pas la fairebattre isolément par une action inconsidérée. Elle peut tenir ce rôle. Mais, pourgagner la guerre, elle aura besoin d'être aidée .'Les chefs d'E(tat) M(ajor) britan-niques -embarrassés- se déclarent incapables d'y repondre' (ibid.). See also GeneralGamelin: Servir, II (Paris, 1946) pp. 350-55.

29. DBFP, ni, II, No. 1143.30. Cf. the contrasting comments on the Czech strength by MacFarlane's

colleague in Prague, Lt. Col. Stronge, on the same day (ibid., No. 1148). For Frenchmilitary experts's comments, cf. ibid. No. 1202.

31. Most of the information from Czech sources in the following sections iscomprised in two earlier specialist studies: M. Hauner: 'Military Budgets andArmaments Industry', Papers in East European Economics No. 36, St. Antony'sCollege, Oxford, 1973, to be published in The Economic History of Eastern EuropeSince 1919, ed. by M. C. Kaser and E. A. Radice, OUP ; id. : 'Září 1938 : kapitulovatči bojovat', Svédectví (Témoignage), (Paris, 1975) No. 49, pp. 151-77.

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32. Ibid.33. Cf. R. Kisling: Die militärischen Vereinbarungen der Kleinen Entente 1929-

1937, (München, 1959).34. Quoted from V. Hyndrák's study in Historie a Vojenství, no. 1 (Prague, 1964),

appendix 1, p. 91, (see also n. 31 above).35. Ibid. For more details on the Polish factor see P.S. Wandycz: France and Her

Eastern Allies 1919-1925 (Minneapolis, 1962); O. Kánă and R. Pavelka: Téšínskov česko-polských vztazích 1918-39 (Ostrava, 1970).

36. On that occasion Beneš said reproachfully to Grzybowski, Polish Ministerin Prague: 'You have distorted the meaning of the entire French system of Europeansecurity!' (E. Beneš: Paměti, (Prague, 1948), p. 16.

37. Cf. S. Stanislawska: Polska a Monachium (Warsaw, 1967). See also conversa-tion between the French Military Attaché in Warsaw, General Musse, and thePolish Chief of Staff, General Stachiewicz, on 10/6/38, in: Documents DiplomatiquesFrançais (hereinafter 'DDF'), ii, X, (Paris, 1976) No. 12.; Gamelin, op. cit., p. 234ff.

38. The most detailed study of Czech-Polish military relations during the interwarperiod is by H. Bulhak in three instalments published in Studia z dziejów ZSRR iEuropy Srodkowej, Warsaw, Vols. V (1968), XI (1975), XII (1976). See also theCzechoslovak Military Intelligence, General F. Moravec: Špión, jemuz nevěřili(Toronto, 1977) p. 171.

39. See Note 37 above. S. Feret: Polska sztuka wojenna 1918-1939 (Warsaw,1972) p. 61. See also M. Hauner: 'Die Rolle der Rüstungsindustrie in Osteuropa unddie Verteidigungsanstrengungen Polens bis 1939', Wirtschaft und Rüstung amVorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges, ed. by F. Forstmeier and H.-E. Volkmann(Düsseldorf, 1975) pp. 331-63.

40. Wandycz, op. cit., p. 388.41. See Note 31. One of the major items of the Czechoslovak armaments industry

which Britain could secure for herself before the Germans took over, were thelicence and manufacturing rights for two types of machine-guns, 'Besa' and thefamous 'Brengun' (contraction of BRno and ENfield, after the location of the twomunitions plants).

42. My own estimates (see Note 31 above).43. Referring to the 'Jubilee Fund' inaugurated in June 1938, the Prager Presse

of 12 June 1938 commented: 'this financial levée en masse!'44. See Note 31 above, German figures from B. A. Carroll: The Design for Total

War (The Hague, 1968) pp. 179-90.45. Beneš, Paměti, p. 37f. General E. Faucher in: Les Evénements survenus en

France de 1933-45, Témoignages, Vol. V (Paris, 1947-55) p. 1195f.46. In June 1938 the Czech General Staff pressed on to obtain the three-years'

service, which would have added another 80,000 men to the permanent strength,but were discouraged by the Western Allies, (cf. FO 371/21770; DBFP, iii, I, No.404.).

47. Beneš, Pameti, p. 48.48. WO 106/5421.49. Memo by Lt. Col. H. C. T. Stronge, 29/3/38, FO 371/21714, C.2340 (for the

incomplete version see DBFP, iii, I. No, 120). More than thirty years later BrigadierStronge reiterates his view in a 20-page long 'Personal Memorandum Relating tothe State of Morale and General Readiness for War of the Army of CzechoslovakiaRepublic at the Time of the Munich Crisis in September 1938 and the PeriodImmediately Preceding It', Dept. of Western Mss, Bodleian Library, Oxford(reproduced in War and Society, Vol. 1, ed. by B. Bond and I. Roy, London 1976,pp. 162-177).

50. FO 371/21716; see also Les Evénements ... p. 1196ff.51. (Stronge) Newton to Halifax, 11/4/38, FO 371/21576, C.3149.

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52. FO 371/21768; DBFP, iii, I, No. 349.53. See Notes 15-19 above.54. M. A. Prague, 29/3/38, C.2322, FO 371/21578 (for the reference see DBFP,

iii, I, No. 120).55. M. A. Prague, 4/4/38, C.2805, FO 371/21715 (inadequate reference to this

important document in DBFP, iii, I, No. 129). See also the analysis of this memoran-dum which I have prepared for Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen (forthcoming).

56. Ibid. See also Note 49 above.57. Colonel Biermann: 'The Czech System of Fortification', in The Royal

Engineers Journal, No. 33 (1939), pp. 212-23. The most detailed study written on theCzech fortifications is the wartime analysis by the German Army High Command(OKH, Gen. St. d. H. : Denkschrift über die tschechoslowakische Landesbefestigung,Berlin, 1941).

58. E.g. the recent comprehensive study by J. Zorach: 'Czechoslovakia's Forti-fications', Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, No. 2 (1976).

59. Cf. collection of 19 volumes entitled Bildheft: Landesbefestigungen derTschechoslowakei, published as a classified handbook to be used by the Wehrmachtduring Fall Grün (Berlin, 1938).

60. First draft of 'Fall Grün', taking into account Czech fortifications, appearedin December 1937 following the 'Hossbach' Conference of 5/11/37, See Trial of theMajor War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg,1946-48) (hereinafter am 'IMT'), Vol. XXV, documents 386 and 388-PS. Firstcomprehensive analysis in English by F. O. Miksche: The Blitzkrieg. A Study ofGerman Tactics 1937-41, in collaboration with Tom Wintringham (London, 1941).Miksche is a former Czech army officer who had helped to organize artillery duringthe Spanish civil war for the Republicans and subsequently served as intelligenceofficer with Gen. de Gaulle during the Second World War.

61. Cf. Hitler's secret address to representatives of the German press in Munichon 10/11/38; English version in Z. A. B. Zeman: Nazi Propaganda (London, 1973)p. 216. See also the so-called document 'Lightning Attack on Czecho-Slovakia' byGerman Army Colonel Conrad, published in the July issue oí Friends of Europe,No. 51 (1938) and the ensuing exchange of opinions between the War Office,Foreign Office and the services attachés (FO 371/21769 & 21770).

62. IMT, Vol. XXV, p. 462ff.63. Bundesarchiv-Militarachiv Freiburg: Gen. Obst. L. Beck Nachlass, N 28/2-4.

N. Reynolds: Treason was no crime—Ludwig Beck (London, 1976) pp. 148-70.J. W. Wheeler-Bennett: The Nemesis of Power (London, 1953) pp. 470ff. G. Thomas :Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft 1918-1943/45 (Boppard a.R.,1946) p. 8 .R. Meyers: Britische Sicherheitspolitik 1934-1938 (Dusseldorf, 1976)pp. 470ff. For the recent reappraisal of the German officers' opposition to Hitlersee D. C. Watt: Too Serious a Business (London, 1975) ch. 5.

64. Compiled from statistical yearbooks: Statistická ročenka Republikyčeskoslovenské, 1938; Statistisches Jahrbuch fur das Deutsche Reich, 1938 (see Note31 above).

65. Ibid. Note 37 above. The improved 'LT 38' model was to be manufacturedunder the designation 'Pz.Kpfw.38(t)' until 1942 and as a chassis for self-propelledguns until 1945.

66. Further sources cited under Note 31 above.67. (Stronge) Newton to Halifax, 28/9/38; details in Czech general mobilisation,

DBFP, iii, II, No. 1170.68. Quoted from M. Hauner: Svědectví, 49/1975, p. 165 (cf. Note 31).69. Ibid., p. 152. Cf. earlier communication Krejci-Gamelin, 7/4/38, DDF, ii, IX,

No. 128; Gamelin, op. cit., p. 356. It must not be forgotten that due to the latereintroduction of conscription in Germany in 1935, no more than 200,000 trained

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reservists were available during 1937/8 to back up 550,000 men of the active peace-time army. The remaining 250,000 reservists of the second-line were not in uniformsince 1918 (see Mueller-Hillebrand, op. cit., pp. 61ff under Note 66 above).

70. Memorandum by Air Attaché Prague, A. H. H. Macdonald, 30/8/38,reporting conversation with Chief of Air Staff, General Fajfr, FO 371/21770,C.9104. Britain's leading military expert, Basil Liddell Hart, believed that ifCzechoslovakia could be reinforced with enough aircraft, she should have been ableto offer a long resistance to the German forces alone, helped by the fact that shewould be fighting on interior lines. Despite his opposition to the Continentalcommitment by the British army, he fully realized the importance of air assistanceto France and Czechoslovakia, since 'the first few days of the air struggle may becrucial' (Memorandum written on 21 March 1938 for the War Minister, L. Hore-Belisha, reproduced in B. H. Liddell Hart: The Defence of Britain, London 1939,pp. 70-74). Consequently, he urged his personal friend Hore-Belisha, to exerciseall his influence in the Cabinet in order to strengthen the R.A.F. (see also TheLiddell Hart Memoirs, Vol. II (London, 1966) pp. 105, 139, 144).

71. DBFP, iii, II, No. 794.72. Population census in Czechoslovakia of 1930. For a comprehensive account

on the position of the Germans in Czechoslovakia see J. W. Bruegel: Tschechen undDeutsche 1918-1938 (München, 1967), Engl. version: Czechoslovakia Before Munich(Cambridge, 1973).

73. Figures in Hyndrak, op. cit., p. 86. see Note 31 above.74. WO 106/5388.75. Memorandum by M.I.3., 11/11/33, 'The War Menace in Western and Central

Europe', WO 190/230.76. M.I.3. note on conversation with Mr. O'Malley, FO Southern Dept., 1/4/35,

WO 190/316.77. (Stronge) Newton to Halifax, 31/5/38, DBFP, iii, I, No. 365.78. (Stronge) Newton to Halifax, 2/8/38, FO 371/21770.79. L'Epoque, 24/12/38 (reproduced in H. Ripka: Munich Before and After

(London, 1939) p. 296f.80. E.g. DBFP, iii, II, Nos. 1170, 1202. Colonel Toussaint, German Military

Attaché in Prague, admitted to his British colleague that the morale of the Czecharmy was excellent when they mobilised (ibid., Ill, No. 286).

81. Ripka, op. cit., p. 135.82. Ibid., p. 137. See also the memoirs of the leader of the Sudeten German

Social Democrats, Wenzel Jaksch: Europas Weg nach Potsdam (Stuttgart 1959)p. 321.

83. Ripka, op. cit., pp. 138-42. Bruegel, op. cit., Ger. ed., p. 494f.; id., Engl. ed.,p. 285. Cf. also Thomas Mann's appeal after he had been expelled from NaziGermany and became Czechoslovak citizen (Ripka, op. cit., p. 140).

84. OKH, 3. Abtl. Gen. Stb., 630/30gk.: 'Kurze Angabe über den derzeitigenStand d.Tschech. Kriegswehrmacht', 27/6/38, (NARS Film, T.79, Reel 128).

85. Hyndrak, op. cit., pp. 87-8.86. Ibid.; see also Note 31 above.87. Ibid. Hyndrák, loc. cit.88. Ibid. Cf. Ursachen und Folgen, Vol. XII, Das Dritte Reich, Das sudetendeutsche

Problem (Berlin, w.d.) Nos. 2705, 2706. M. Broszat: 'Das sudetendeutscheFreikorps', Viertelsjahrhefte fur Zeitgeschichte, 9 (1961), pp. 30-49.

89. They included four mobile divisions, 14th and 17th inf. divisions, 5th armycorps in southern Moravia and of about 12 to 14 divisions of troops earmarked toman the fortifications. (Cf. table under Note 66).

90. (MacFarlane) Henderson to Halifax, 24/8/38, DBFP, iii, II, No. 692.

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91. M. Hauner: Svedectvi, p. 174, see also compiled reports from MilitaryAttaché, Berlin, WO 106/5421.

92. Cf. J. Fest: Das Gesicht des Dritten Reiches (München, 1969) p. 66. W.Shirer, American journalist in Berlin witnessed the scene and commented that it was'the most striking demonstration against war I've ever seen' (W. Shirer: BerlinDiary 1934-1941, London, Sphere, 1970, p. 117).

93. Chief of Staff. The Diaries of Lt. Gen. Sir Henry Pownall, ed. by B. Bond,Vol. 1 (London, 1972), appendix II, pp. 380-3: Memorandum by Maj. Gen.Pownall, 27 Sept. 1938.

94. Hitler's secret address to representatives of German Press, 10 Nov. 1938(Engl. text by Zeman, op. cit., p. 215).

95. The Liddell Hart Memoirs, pp. 161 and 170. See also B. Bond: Liddell Hart.A Study of His Military Thought, London, 1977, ch. 4).

96. Defence of Britain, pp. 80, 87.97. Notes on the value of Czechoslovakia as a military power since Munich,

prepared by M.I.3. (WO 190/731, 738, 762); memorandum of 18/3/39 by Col.Mason MacFarlane, Military Attaché Berlin, to Henderson/Halifax (WO 106/5421)vreport by MacFarlane on conversations held with his Hungarian, Polish, Romanianand Yugoslav colleagues on the implications of the military domination ofCzechoslovakia by Germany, 19/3/39 (ibid.). In his speech of 28 April 1938 beforethe Reichstag Hitler gave figures of the Czech war booty: 1,090,000 infantry rifles,43,876 machine-guns, 2,175 field guns, 501 anti-aircraft guns, 469 tanks, 1,589aircraft, and over 3 million shells (cf. M. Domarus: Hitler. Reden und Proklamatinen1932-1945, Vol. II, Wurzburg, 1963, p. 1156). In his above mentioned secret addressto the representatives of the German Press Hitler exclaimed: 'It is a fabuloussuccess, so great that our present-day world is hardly able to assess its true sig-nificance. I myself became most aware of the grandeur of this success when I stoodfor the first time in the middle of the Czech fortified line. Then and there I realizedwhat it means to take possession of fortifications representing a front almost 2,000kilometres long without firing one single shot of live ammunition', (cf. Note 94above).

98. Churchill, op. cit., p. 225. Gilbert, op. cit., p. 100. The anticlimax to Churchill'sstatement is provided in A. J. P. Taylor's The Origins of the Second World War(London, Penguin, 1963, p. 235): 'Munich was a triumph of all that was best andmost enlightened in British life'.

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czechoslovakia as a military factor in british considerations of 1938

Documents

french military

liddell hart

british military

czech air

czech fortification

czech general

czech general

liddell hart