culture, religion, ethnicity and the meaning of work: jews and muslims in the israeli context

Culture, religion, ethnicity and the meaning of work: Jews andMuslims in the Israeli context

Moshe Sharabia,b*

aDepartment of Sociology and Anthropology, Yezreel Valley College, Yezreel, Israel;bGraduate School of Management, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel

The work values of Arabs in general, and of Muslims in particular, have notyet been studied in Israel. This study examines the meaning of work (MOW)of 1201 Jews and 219 Muslims, who work in the Israeli labour market.The findings reveal significant differences in the MOW dimensions anddemonstrate different perceptions and internalisation of work values betweenthe two ethno-religious groups. While the Jews have a higher economic andintrinsic orientation and a higher need for interpersonal relations than theMuslims, the Muslims have higher work centrality. The findings attributed tocultural differences, ethnic conflict, occupational discrimination and highdegree of segregation.

Keywords: religion; ethnicity; culture; meaning of work; Israel

Introduction

Schwartz (1999) claims that exploring the meaning of work (MOW) within a

cultural context is important, as the cultural context can shape and modify values.

Therefore, in order to understand the meaning one attributes to work, the personal

structure of values, the nature of the job the individual performs and the processes

linking these various components, it is necessary to study the cultural and the

social context in which the individual lives and works (Brief and Nord 1990).

Although ‘culture’ has been defined in many ways, we use Hofstede’s (2001)

famous definition that culture is the learned programming of the mind that

differentiates one group from the other. In his research, Hofstede (1980, 2001)

compared values, especially the dimension of individualism vs. collectivism,

between nations. Erez and Early (1993), who compared work values in different

countries, came to the same conclusion as Hofstede did. They found that the

MOW is expressed differently in different societies because, in their view,

culture shapes and directs the choices, commitments and standards of action,

which in turn influence a person’s attitudes and values.

Several comparative studies have found significant differences in work values

between societies, but none of them have compared the work values of different

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q 2011 Taylor & Francis

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14755610.2011.605157

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*Email: [email protected]

Culture and Religion

Vol. 12, No. 3, September 2011, 219–235

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14755610.2011.605157

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ethnicities in the same country (MOW International Research Team 1987; Sharabi

and Harpaz 2007; Super, Svirko and Super 1995). Hofstede (1980, 2001) also

compared values between nations, and not between ethnic groups within those

nations. Rodrigue and Richardson’s (2005) research on ethnic groups in Malaysia

(Chinese, Malays and Indians) indicated that there were few differences in cultural

values between the ethnic groups either at the individual level or at the cultural level.

Furthermore, while there are diverse empirical studies that compared between

various religions’ work values (e.g. Arslan 2001; Aygun, Arslan and Guney

2008; Harpaz 1998; Parboteeah, Paik and Cullen 2009), there is only one study by

Sharabi (2009) that compared central life domains and work goals between

Jewish and Muslim academic graduates. The goal of this study is to fill this void

and to examine the way in which religion, ethnicity, social and political

differences can affect the MOW of Jews and Muslims in Israel.

Religion and work values

Work plays a fundamental role in the life of individuals, and society in general,

all over the world. For many people, working and its outcomes are considered to

be a central aspect in life, as well as being an important source for the formation

of identification and self-image, and a necessity for fulfilling basic needs

(MOW 1987; Sharabi and Harpaz 2010).

Like work, religion also plays an important role in people’s lives, and it has

had an impact on world events for thousands of years (present-day examples

include the Middle East, Iraq, Iran, India, to name a few), and on individual

perceptions and attitudes. In various nations, religion is a pivotal institution of

culture; consciously or unconsciously, religious beliefs and practices affect

individual attitudes to important aspects of life (Harpaz 1998). Religion has been

found to be a strong predictor of the nature of important life domains for

individuals all over the world (Tarakeshwar, Stanton and Paragment 2003).

Perhaps the most prominent manifestation of the relationship between religion

and work was presented by Max Weber (1958) in his seminal work The

Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Weber (1958) examined Calvinism

and showed that this theology, like Protestantism as a whole, had led to economic

successes of the Protestant societies compared to the Catholic societies and other

societies of other religions. We can assume that the individual’s idea of success

depended on social conditions, as well as on religious ideals and values.

Judaism and Islam have also been concerned with the value of work. Early

Jewish thinkers considered the nature and MOW, and the contribution of work to

society and to the lives of its members. Judaism, like Protestantism, attributes

dignity to human labour and indicates that no one, regardless of one’s social

position, should consider oneself above doing manual labour (Harpaz 1998;

Snir and Harpaz 2005). There is also a contrasting view that emphasises the notion

that only right kind of work is worshipping God. For instance, ‘This book of the

law shall not depart out of thy mouth but thou shalt meditate therein day and night,

M. Sharabi220

that thou mayest observe to do according to all that is written therein: for then

thou shalt make thy way prosperous, and then thou shalt have good success’

(Joshua 1,8). There is a compromise between these two approaches, suggesting an

integration of work and studying the scriptures. ‘If there is no flour, there is no

Torah (the Pentateuch); if there is no Torah, there is no flour’ (Avot 3:17). This

dilemma in Judaism about the best way to serve God, whether by studying the

Torah or by working, is prominent among religious Jews.

The Muslims’ holy book, the Koran, instructs the faithful to be involved and

committed to work, since work enables people to realise their goals. ‘This person

can have nothing but what is striven for’ [Koran 53:39] (Abbas and Al-Kazemi

2007). Prophet Mohammed preaches that through hard work sins will be

absolved, and that ‘no one eats better food than the one who eats out of his work’.

He presented work as the highest form of worshipping God. Prophet Mohammed

also emphasised that one should perform one’s work to the best of one’s ability.

‘God loves a person who learns precisely how to perform his work and does it

right’. According to the Koran, work has also a social meaning by providing

benefits for others. ‘The best people are those who benefit others’ (Abbas and Al-

Kazemi 2007). The ‘Islamic work ethic’ perceives laziness as a sin that causes

failure in life, focusing on hard work as a way of worshipping God and fulfilling

ones’ purpose on earth (Abbas and Al-Kazemi 2007; Ali 2005; Bouma et al.

2003).

Research involving Christians and Muslims show that Muslims have higher

work centrality than Christians. Arslan (2001) compared between British and

Turkish managers and found that Protestant and Catholic managers have lower

orientation to hard work and a higher orientation to leisure than Muslim

managers. Another research between Turkish and American university students

found that the Turkish students reported higher Protestant work ethic scores than

the American students (Aygun, Arslan and Guney 2008). On the other hand, other

studies reveal that Jews have higher work centrality than Christians. Sharabi and

Harpaz (2007) found that work centrality among Israeli Jews in the 1990s was

higher than in the USA and Germany. Harpaz’s (1998) findings also show that

work centrality in Israeli Jews was higher than among the Dutch and the

Germans. From the above findings it is evident that the Muslims and the Jews

have higher work centrality than the Christians, but it is not clear whether there

are differences between Jews and Muslims. The only study on Jews and Muslims

work values is a comparison between academic graduates in Israel. The findings

showed that among Muslim academic graduates work centrality was higher than

among their Jewish counterparts. In addition, other life domains that compete

with work (family and leisure) were more important to Jews than to Muslims

(Sharabi 2009). Based on the above literature review and the findings, the

following hypothesis was formulated:

Hypothesis 1: Work will be more central and important among Muslims than

among Jews.

Culture and Religion 221

Culture and work values

A review of the literature shows that there are differences between cultures and

nations in their individualist or collectivist orientation, in addition to

interpersonal differences (Hofstede 1980, 2001; Schwarts 1994; Triandis

1995). According to Triandis (1995), ‘collectivism’ is a social pattern based on

closely connected individuals, who see themselves as part of a specific collective

(family, colleagues, tribe or nation). They are motivated by the norms of the

collective and by the duties imposed on them by it. They are ready to give priority

to collective goals over their own personal goals and to put an emphasis on the

relationship among members of the collective. In contrast, ‘individualism’ is a

social pattern based on loosely connected individuals, who see themselves as

being independent of the collective. They are motivated by their preferences,

needs, individual rights and contracts made with others. They give priority to

their personal goals over the goals of others or those of the collective, and place

an emphasis on a rational analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of

cultivating relationships with others (Triandis 1995). In his classic study,

Hofstede (1980) details social norms that are associated with ‘individualism’

and they are caring for the self and the nuclear family; self-awareness;

self-orientation; individual self-identification; the individual’s emotional

independence from the organisation/institution; emphasis on private enterprise

and achievement; a right to private life and opinions; autonomy; variety; leisure;

financial and personal security; a need for friendships; decisions that are made on

an individual level; and the universal application of criteria. According to

Hofstede (1980), the highest values of the individualism index were found in the

USA and the lowest in Venezuela, while Israel was ranked slightly above the

average.

Triandis (1995) claims that an important factor that influences individualism

is relative societal wealth; also other important factors which influence

individualism are social complexity, social and geographical mobility, and

exposure to mass media. Hofstede (1980, 2001) characterises the source and

background of international differences according to his original individualism

index. The main characteristics of individualistic societies were higher economic

development, high social mobility, strong development of the middle class, less

traditional agriculture, modern industry, intense urbanisation, nuclear family

structure (rather than extended or tribal structure), pragmatic education system

for the majority of the population, large multinational organisations and greater

dependence on private initiatives for survival.

Likewise, individualism and collectivism are related to various values,

especially work values. Individualism is related to opportunity for promotion,

independence and self-actualisation (Hofstede 1980; Triandis 1995); autonomy,

creativity, curiosity and challenge attainment (Schwarts 1994, 1999); self-

sufficiency (including financial rewards) and financial security (Hofstede 1980;

Schwartz 1999); preference for personal needs, rights and abilities and personal

M. Sharabi222

success (Triandis 1995). Collectivism is related to good personal and social

relations, sociability, internal dependence and unity (Triandis 1995); group

membership and relations as a central aspect of identity (Hofstede 1980);

tradition, conservatism, commitment, obligation, general security, conformism

and obedience to authority (Shwarts 1994; Triandis 1995).

The Israeli society

The state of Israel was founded in 1948 by the Jews, and the dominant culture

is Jewish and secular, with a Western orientation. One fifth of the Israeli

society consists of Arabs (or Israeli Palestinians), and this minority includes

mainly Muslims (Statistical Abstract of Israel 2009). Since its establishment,

the Israeli society has undergone significant economical, political and social

changes, especially from more collectivist to more individualist values. It

would seem that a number of causes account for this transformation, as in

other countries in the past. A number of factors that Hofstede (1980) suggests

as characterising high individualism do, in fact, apply to Israeli society, such as

rapid economic growth, a high degree of social mobility, strong development

of the middle class, support of private enterprise, less traditional agriculture,

modern industry and progressive urbanisation. Triandis (1995) claims that

there is an important factor that influences the degree of individualism – the

relative level of wealth in a given society, and the Israeli society has indeed

been enjoying a relatively high level of economic success in the last decades.

Another factor that Triandis (1995) mentions is the exposure to international

communication networks and mass media, the influence of which is certainly

felt in Israel. The Muslims in Israel, as an ethnic religious subculture, have not

only been affected by these economic and social changes, but have also been

affected by the Jewish–Arab conflict. This conflict has existed for more than a

hundred years (before the establishment of the Israeli state) and has escalated

over the years, especially with the Palestinians in the occupied territories.

The Israeli-Muslims, who are Palestinians too, are experiencing a strengthened

dual identity problem as Israeli citizens and as Arab Palestinians (Sharabi

2010).

Ethnicity, culture and values in Israel

The Jewish-Israeli society has undergone a gradual change in values, similar to

that of the Western world, moving from a collectivist society in its early years to

an individualist society. These global processes have left their mark on Israel and

can be seen in the rapid change that has occurred since the late 1970s. Today, the

Jewish-Israeli society places great emphasis on the different dimensions of

individualism, cultivating personal independence and autonomy, while granting a

high degree of social permissiveness (Harpaz 1999; Kenny-Paz 1996;

Schwartz 1994; Sharabi and Harpaz 2007). As part of an Americanisation


process, the Jewish-Israeli culture has become more and more materialistic,

emphasising instrumental achievements (Harpaz 1999; Kenny-Paz 1996).

Unlike the Jewish society, the Muslim society in Israel (as other Muslim

subcultures elsewhere) is more conservative, emphasising tradition, the welfare

and safety of the group, rigid hierarchy and little autonomy – all

fundamentally collectivist characteristics. In the Muslim society, there are

more conservative homogenous groups than in the Jewish society (Al-Haj

1996; Nabil 2005; Sharabi 2009). In the past, the Muslim work force was

mainly agricultural, but over time the numbers of farmers has decreased,

whereas the number of those employed as hired workers in the Israeli labour

market has increased (Al-Haj, Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov 1994; Nabil

2005). The Muslim society has been undergoing a process of rapid

modernisation and it, too, perceives work as a means of achieving higher

income and improved physical conditions. Moreover, having an income

enables a person to have a say in internal family affairs and decision-making

processes, as well as achieving independence and shaping one’s own destiny

(El-Ghannam 2002; Ganaim 2001; Nabil 2005).

Schwartz (1999) found that while the Israeli Arabs and the Muslim nations

were related to ‘conservatism’ and ‘hierarchy’ dimensions (which are associated

with collectivism characteristics), the Israeli Jews (similar the US society) were

related to ‘mastery’ and ‘affective autonomy’ dimensions (which are associated

with individualism characteristics). Since the Jewish society is more

individualistic and materialistic than the Muslim society, based on the

characteristics and the studies of Triandis (1995), Hofstede (1980, 2001) and

Schwarts (1994; 1999), the following hypotheses were formulated:

Hypothesis 2: Given that individualism bestows higher importance to

self-actualisation, preference for personal needs, emotional

and economic independence, we can assume that Jews will have

higher intrinsic and economic orientation than Muslims.

Hypothesis 3: Given that individualism is a social pattern based on loosely

related individuals, who see themselves as being independent of

the collective, we can assume that Muslims will value

interpersonal relations more than Jews.

Muslims in the Israeli labour market

Muslim-Israeli citizens (as part of the Israeli Arabs) comprise, to date, 15.2% of

the Israeli population (Statistical Abstract of Israel 2009). The Muslim-Israeli

economic market is dependent on the Jewish-Israeli economic market and the

work options it provides. This situation stems mainly from the fact that the

modernisation process in the Israeli-Muslim society has not been accompanied

by an internal economic development of the Israeli-Arab market, partially due to

the lack of government investment and private funding (Al-Haj 1996; Kraus and

Yonay 2000; Nabil 2005). Many Israeli-Muslims remain dependent on the

M. Sharabi224

Jewish-Israeli economy to earn a living, concentrated in fields and professions

that are characterised by tough competition and no collective wage agreements.

Their integration into the Jewish-Israeli economy was limited from the

beginning, enabling them mainly inferior occupations that only enhanced their

dependency. For the sake of comparison, 1.5% of Arabs hold managerial

positions, whereas 5.8% of Jews hold such positions (Jerby and Levi 2000).

In addition, some areas of employment, such as the military industry and other

security-related fields, are off-limits for Muslims, as they usually do not have

adequate security classification. At the same time, most of the industries in the

Arab sector consist of manual labour and low wages (Jerby and Levi 2000;

Kraus and Yonay 2000; Nabil 2005).

The inequalities between Jews andMuslims in the labour market are also seen

among well-educated Israeli-Muslims. Muslims with an academic education are

often disappointed because they are unable to find jobs that suit their academic

qualifications. Forty-two per cent of Arab academic graduates have noted that

they are dissatisfied with their work because it is irrelevant to their area of

speciality (Al-Haj 1996). Gera and Cohen (2001) and Nabil (2005) noted that

many Arab academic graduates (mainly Muslims) are employed within little

Arab towns and villages because they are not granted sufficient work

opportunities in the Jewish sector, and therefore cannot find work outside of

the Arab sector.

The Israeli education system does not allocate many resources to the Arab

education system, compared to those allocated to its Jewish counterpart.

Throughout most of the education system, with the exception of the academic

world, there is a separation between Jews and Arabs (Jerby and Levi 2000;

Yaish 2001). The proportion of students in academic or other post-matriculation

programmes is lower among the Israeli-Arab population than the Jews

(Yashiv 2001). Today, despite the change in the level of education among

Israeli-Muslims and the decrease of educational gaps between Jews and

Muslims, the labour market has only slightly adapted itself, as is evident in its

occupational structure. There are still only very few opportunities open to

Israeli-Muslims in the higher education and managerial fields, whereas most of

the opportunities are centred in blue-collar occupations and unskilled labour.

The proportion of Israeli-Muslims in these occupations has increased in the

course of time, whereas their proportion in higher education occupations is low

and fairly stable across time. The explanation for this trend is the lower return

for the investment among Muslim population, compared to the Jewish

population, since almost all the occupational opportunities for Muslims require

low levels of education (Weinblatt 1998).

A comparison between Israeli Jews and Muslims, living in the same country

as members of a dominant culture and a subculture, respectively, highlights

cultural differences between them and points out work-related discrimination.

The question that needs to be addressed is how this affects the work values of

Jews and Muslims.


MOW conceptualisation

Awell-articulated theory of the MOW (1987), including a multilevel perspective,

is still not available, so our guiding model for all variables measured must be

basically heuristic. It holds that MOW is determined by the people’s individual

choices and experiences and by the organisational and environmental context in

which they work and live (1987). The MOW has been addressed and

conceptualised by five MOW variables; here we use only four central variables

(excluding norms regarding work), which are listed hereafter (for more details

see MOW 1987):

Centrality of work as a life role: This concept, which refers to the degree of

general importance that work has in the life of an individual at any time, was

developed by Dubin and others (Dubin, Hedley and Taveggia 1976;

Mannheim 1975). In general, work has been found to be the most important

component (after family) compared with other areas of life in most of the

countries over the course of time (Sharabi and Harpaz 2007). Work was

ranked before family only in Japan in the early 1980s (MOW 1987), in China

at the end of 2000 (Westwood and Lok 2003), and among high-tech workers in

Israel (Snir, Harpaz and Ben Baruch 2009). Various findings show that people

who have higher work centrality become more involved in their work. This

manifests itself in greater willingness to work longer hours (Hirschfeld and

Field 2000; MOW 1987; Sharabi and Harpaz 2010), a higher level of

performance (Mannheim, Baruch and Tal 1997), job involvement and

commitment to the organisation (Diefendorff et al. 2002; Hirschfeld and Field

2000; Sharabi and Harpaz 2007).

Valued work outcomes: What are the general outcomes one seeks through

working, and what is their relative importance? The valued outcome measure

draws on the typology of six general MOW, as developed by Kaplan and

Tausky (1974) from a review of the literature on the functions and meanings of

work. These include status and prestige, income, time absorption, interesting

contacts, service to society, and interest and satisfaction. Findings from Israel

show a meaningful decrease in the perception of work as service to society

between the 1980s and the 1990s. The findings reflect the transformation from

collectivism to individualism among Israeli Jews (Harpaz 1999).

Importance of work goals: This means that the relative importance of various

goals and values is sought through work for individuals. The preferred work

goals were based on the literature on the areas of job satisfaction, work values

and work needs (see MOW 1987). An investigation of the kinds of goals

sought by individuals from work may shed light on the fundamental question

of why people work. Work goals, such as expressive, instrumental and

comfort, and learning proved important in various cultures (1987). Findings

from varied countries showed that the two most dominant work goals were

‘interesting work’ and ‘good pay’ (Sharabi and Harpaz 2002; Westwood and

Lok 2003). Sharabi and Harpaz (2002) found that the Jewish society in Israel

M. Sharabi226

became more materialistic between the 1980s and the 1990s, since the

importance of ‘good pay’ and ‘job security’ increased dramatically during this

period of time.

Work role identification: This covers the extent to which people define and

identify working in terms of various roles (e.g. money, occupation and

profession). Role theory and attribution theory (see MOW 1987) provided the

conceptual rationale for the development of work role identification notions.

Westwood and Lok (2003) found that the identification with money was

ranked first in China (Hong Kong and Beijing) and in four of six Western

countries (Belgium, Germany, Israel and the Netherlands).

Through the assessment of these four major domains we attempted to portray

the MOW structure among Jews and Muslims and to find explanations for the

similarities and distinctions.

Method

Data collection

Data for the present study were collected in 2006 via the Meaning-of-Working

questionnaire, developed by the MOW – International Research Team (1987).

The interviews were conducted at the respondents’ homes by trained

interviewers, and the average interview lasted 25 minutes. The research was

conducted on 1420 working respondents: 1201 were Jews and 219 were Muslims.

The demographic distribution is presented in Table 1.

Measures

The measurement of the MOW

The four MOW (1987) major domains (or central variables) that have been used

in this study were: centrality of work as a life role, valued work outcomes, work

role identification and the importance of work goals. Following are descriptions

of each MOW domain and the measurement scales used.

1. Centrality of work as a life role: Two measures of work centrality were

used. The first was an absolute measure (Likert-type scale) that indicated

the importance of work (from 1 ¼ low to 7 ¼ high). The second was a

relative measure in which respondents had to assign up to a total of 100

points to the following areas of their lives: leisure, community, work,

religion and family.

2. Valued work outcomes: What are the general outcomes sought from

working and the relative importance of each outcome? Respondents were

asked to assign up to a total of 100 points to the following six outcomes

that work provides: status and prestige, income, time absorption,

interesting contacts, service to society and interest and satisfaction.


3. Work role identification: This domain examined to what extent people

define and identify working in terms of various roles. Respondents ranked

six work roles in order of importance: task, company, product/service, co-

workers, occupation and money.

4. Importance of work goals: Respondents ranked 11 goals or aspects of their

work life according to their importance: opportunity to learn, interpersonal

relations, promotion, working hours, variety, interesting work, job

security, match between job and abilities, pay, working conditions and

autonomy.

The four MOW domains described above were measured by 25 different

items altogether, only 12 of which were explicitly related to the four MOW

aspects studied in the current research. As indicated above, the responses to the

MOW survey were collected by a variety of methods, including (1) scoring

items on a seven-point Likert scale, (2) allocating 100 points among several

items according to their importance and (3) ranking items according to their

priority. This utilisation of different measurement approaches was a unique

Table 1. Demographic distribution of Jews and Muslims in Israel.

Jews Muslims

n % n %

All 1201 84.6 219 15.4GenderMen 612 51.0 121 55.3Women 589 49.0 98 44.7

EducationPrimary school 64 5.3 19 8.7Secondary school 370 30.8 68 31.1Additional education (non-academic) 405 33.7 59 33.9Academic degree 362 30.1 73 26.9

Religion: degree of observanceSecular 791 65.9 54 24.7Traditionalist 334 27.8 132 60.3Religious 76 6.3 33 15.1

Residence areaCity 757 63.1 72 33.2Little town 101 8.4 22 10.1Rural areas 339 28.3 123 56.7

Net income (NIS)a

,3000 119 10.0 26 12.03001–4000 144 12.1 40 18.54001–5000 207 17.4 64 29.45001–6000 219 18.4 30 13.9.6000 504 42.1 57 26.2

aMonthly net income in NIS (New Israeli Shekels). (1$ ¼ 4.2 NIS in 2006).

M. Sharabi228

characteristic of the MOW study. However, comparing relationships among all

items proved to be problematic, affecting the ability to create facets and

examine their reliability with standard psychometric procedures. In order to

resolve this difficulty, an alternative procedure, called multidimensional scaling

(MDS), was employed. For the reader who is unfamiliar with this process, MDS

is a scaling method that attempts to estimate the number of variables underlying

an attribute or issue. It is based on the same mathematical models as factor

analysis and can be applied when it is not known which facets individuals will

use in response to a group of stimuli. Hence, it enables the researcher to

determine the composition of those facets (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). The

objective of the MDS is first to determine the number of facets and then obtain

scale values for the stimuli on a selected set of indices (Ghiselli, Campbell and

Zedeck 1981). In order to measure the relationships among the miscellaneously

scaled items, an ordinal distance matrix was formed by the absolute difference

between normalised item scores, corrected for central tendencies and

interdependencies. An alternative transformation of the ordinal relationship

among the 25 MOW items to an interval scale was carried out by using the

MDS method (Klahr 1969). Ordinal multidimensional scaling was accom-

plished by the SPSS MDS procedure.

The inability to show the complete picture (BOF – badness of fit/stress) in

terms of the location of each MOW dimension relative to the others was

relatively good (BOF ¼ .18). The dispersion of work values along the X-Y axis

shows a four-factor pattern of the following MOW facets: work centrality,

instrumental orientation, expressive orientation and interpersonal relations.

The indices, the variables comprising them and the modified scales are the

following:

1. Work centrality: absolute importance of work and relative importance of

work. The range of scores: 1–7.

2. Intrinsic orientation: satisfying work, variety, interesting work and job

abilities match. The range of scores: 1–6.

3. Economic orientation: importance of pay, role of money and good pay.

The range of scores: 1–6.

4. Interpersonal relations: interesting contacts, type of people and good

interpersonal relations. The range of scores: 1–6.

Results

Data pertaining to sample characteristics, such as means, number of items and

range of scores, and correlations among indices are presented in Table 2.

Among the Jews and the Muslims there are negative correlations between

economic orientation, intrinsic orientation and interpersonal relations.

A positive correlation between intrinsic orientation and work centrality and

negative correlation between interpersonal relations and work centrality were

found only amidst the Jews, but we have to take into consideration that the


Muslim sample is much smaller. Furthermore, education and gender are

negatively correlated to economic orientation between the two ethnic groups.

The findings in Table 3 reveal significant differences between Jews and

Muslims in all the MOW indices. A significant multivariate difference was found

for the MOW indices (F(3,1420) ¼ 27.33, p , .001).

Among the Jews there is a significantly higher economic and intrinsic

orientation than among the Muslims, and these findings support Hypothesis 2.

The first hypothesis was also supported, since the Muslims have significantly

higher work centrality than the Jews. Our third hypothesis about interpersonal

relations was rejected, since a higher need for interpersonal relations was found

among Jews and not among Muslims.

Discussion

Although the Jews and the Muslims in our research live in the same country and

share the same dominant cultural values, they have a totally different MOW

structure. Since this is the first time that the work values of the Jews and the

Muslims are examined, we will try to interpret the meaningful differences

between the two ethno-religious cultures in Israel.

This study reveals that work centrality among Muslims is higher than among

Jews, similar to the findings among Jewish and Muslim academic graduates

Table 3. t-test of the MOW Indices for Jews and Muslims in Israel.

Jews Muslims

Mean SD Mean SD t

Work centrality 4.05 .82 4.44 .86 26.35***Intrinsic orientation 3.21 .67 3.09 .58 2.77**Economic orientation 3.88 1.08 3.60 1.11 3.43***Interpersonal relations 2.91 .82 2.74 .79 2.84**

**p , .01; ***p , .001.

Table 2. Correlations coefficients of MOW indices for Jews (upper diagonal) andMuslims in Israel.

MOW indices 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1. Age – 2 .14** 2 .23** .05 .10** 2 .04 2 .07*2. Gendera 2 .11 – .09** 2 .05 2 .03 2 .07* .07*3. Education 2 .30** .28** – .03 .17** 2 .17** 2 .014. Work centrality .06 2 .04 2 .02 – .11*** 2 .04 2 .09**5. Intrinsic orientation 2 .05 2 .05 .08 .04 – 2 .36*** 2 .24***6. Economic orientation .11 2 .18** 2 .17* .04 2 .17* – 2 .23***7. Interpersonal relations .02 .04 2 .05 2 .05 2 .27*** 2 .31*** –

a1-Men, 2-Women.

*p , .05; **p , .01; ***p , .001 (two-tailed).

M. Sharabi230

(Sharabi 2009). The differences can be explained by the internalisation and the

implementation of the religious work values. Elci (2007) found a positive and

significant association between the need for achievement, hard work and

religiosity among Turkish (mostly Muslims) MBA graduate students. Another

research among Turkish (mostly Muslims) and American (mostly Christians)

university students found that devout people showed a stronger Protestant work

ethics than the less religious ones, regardless of religious denomination

(Aygun et al. 2008). Conversely, all studies conducted in Israel, comparing work

centrality and religiosity among the Jews, showed detachment between religious

conviction and work centrality (Harpaz 1998; Shamir 1986; Snir and Harpaz

2005). The findings are the opposite of those reported by Christian populations in

other countries (Harpaz 1998). This phenomenon is unique to the Jewish society,

since religious Jews claim that individuals should dedicate their faculties to the

spiritual work of serving God, and it is more important than working life

(Harpaz 1998; Snir and Harpaz 2005). This perception leads to a decrease in work

centrality among the Jewish society compared to the Muslim society in Israel.

Moreover, the great importance Israeli-Muslims attribute to work can stem

from the fact that work is a means of social mobility, social status and prestige.

Work life and occupation (based on education) are also a means for the fulfilment

of other needs (such as influencing family decisions, working outside of the

community, achieving independence and shaping one’s own destiny) in a

collectivist traditional society (El-Ghannam 2002; Ganaim 2001). The lack of

opportunities and the occupational discrimination Muslims experience in the

labour market regarding finding occupations and positions that suit their

education and skills can also be attributed to this high work centrality (Sharabi

2009).

The higher importance that the Jews attribute to economic and intrinsic

orientation in comparison with the Muslims reflects higher materialism and

individualism of the Jewish-Israeli society. Many cultural scholars believe that

the collectivism–individualism aspect has a greater effect on human values than

other cultural aspects, but they compared values between nations, not between

ethnic groups in the same country (e.g. Erez and Early 1993; Hofstede 1980,

2001). This comparison between Jewish and Muslim societies is important since

the two ethnic and religious cultures live in the same country, in a cultural milieu

of collectivism vs. individualism.

The higher importance that the Jews attribute to interpersonal relations,

compared to the Muslims, contradicts our assumption that an individualistic

society will attribute less importance to social relations than collectivistic society.

Although Hofstede (1980, 2001), Triandis (1995) and Schwartz (1994) related

individualism to independence, autonomy, loosely related individuals and being

independent of the collective, Hofstede (1980) also indicates the need for

friendships in individualistic societies. This can be explained by the ‘scarcity

hypothesis’, which assumes that individual preferences reflect the socio-

economic surroundings, where individuals attribute a more subjective value to


the issues that have relatively little to offer them, and do not answer their needs

(Inglehart 1990; Sharabi and Harpaz 2002). The ‘scarcity hypothesis’ can explain

the greater importance that the Jews attribute to interpersonal relations, since the

Israeli society is more individualistic and experiences more social alienation and

a lack of close human relationships than the Muslims do. Solidarity, close

interpersonal contacts and traditional aspects are more characteristic of the

Muslim society than the Jewish society (Al-Haj 1996; Sharabi 2009). Table 1

demonstrates these aspects: a higher percentage of Jews than Muslims lives in

cities (63.1% vs. 33.2%, respectively) and they are more secular (65.9% vs.

24.7%, respectively).

In addition to the cultural differences, other sources for the wide value

differences are the high degree of residential, educational, occupational and

economic segregation between the two groups and the discrimination that the

Muslims experience in the labour market that leads to alienation towards the

Jewish society (Kraus and Yonay 2000; Nabil 2005; Yaish 2001). Rodrigue and

Richardson (2005) found that although there was economic and occupational

discrimination of the Chinese against the other ethnic groups in Malaysia

(Malays and Indians), there were few differences in cultural values between the

groups. They explain the values similarity by the good relationships between the

ethnic groups in Malaysia; hence it seems that the deep differences in the MOW

between the Muslims and the Jews in Israel stem primarily from the ethnic

conflict. The level of trust between the groups in general, and the ethnic groups in

particular, can affect individuals’ attachment to cultural values (Berry Segal and

Kagitcibasi 1997). In addition, the level of friendship, trust and collaboration

between individuals of different ethnic groups can affect the understanding

between ethnic groups, and their willingness to accept each other’s values

(Hewstone 2003). Higher levels of trust can lead to higher levels of cultural

similarity among societies and ethnic groups, whereas mistrust and conflict

among societies and ethnic groups may lead to rejection of the other’s culture and

values (Ward, Bochner and Furnham 2001).

The long and tough conflict between the Israel and the Palestine in the

occupied territories, as well as with other Arab countries, leads to a high level of

mistrust, social tension and a dual identity problem (as Israelis and Palestinians at

the same time), which prevents Israeli-Arabs, especially Muslims, from

identifying with the Jewish culture, values and norms. This will probably hold

true as long as the Palestinian/Arab-Israeli conflict is going on and escalating

(Sharabi 2010).

Future research can investigate to what extent each of the factors (ethnic

conflict, cultural and socio-economic differences, segregation and employment

discrimination) can explain the differences in the MOW between the religious

groups. They can also explore the effect of demographic variables (gender, age,

education, religiousness, etc.) on work values among the Jews and the Muslims.

Since there are other religious subcultures in Israel (mainly Christians and Druze)

among the Israeli-Arabs, comparing the MOW among all the religious groups can

M. Sharabi232

contribute to a better understanding of the differences and similarities between

the ethno-religious groups.

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