CULTS ANDNEW RELIGIOUS

MOVEMENTS

BLACKWELL READINGS IN RELIGION

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Cults and New Religious MovementsA Reader

Edited by Lorne L. Dawson

CULTS ANDNEW RELIGIOUS

MOVEMENTSA READER

Edited by Lorne L. Dawson

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v

Contents

Acknowledgments vii

Introduction: The Book and the Subject 1

I The Study of New Religious Movements 5

1 The Scientific Study of Religion? You Must Be Joking! 7Eileen Barker

2 The Continuum Between “Cults” and “Normal” Religion 26James A. Beckford

II The Nature of New Religious Movements 33

3 Three Types of New Religious Movement 36Roy Wallis

4 Cult Formation: Three Compatible Models 59William Sims Bainbridge and Rodney Stark

III New Religious Movements in Historical and Social Context 71

5 False Prophets and Deluded Subjects: The Nineteenth Century 73Philip Jenkins

6 The New Spiritual Freedom 89Robert Wuthnow

IV Joining New Religious Movements 113

7 Who Joins New Religious Movements and Why: Twenty Years of Research and What Have We Learned? 116Lorne L. Dawson

8 The Joiners 131Saul Levine

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CONTENTS

V The “Brainwashing” Controversy 143

9 The Process of Brainwashing, Psychological Coercion, and Thought Reform 147Margaret Thaler Singer

10 A Critique of “Brainwashing” Claims About New Religious Movements 160James T. Richardson

11 Constructing Cultist “Mind Control” 167Thomas Robbins

VI Violence and New Religious Movements 181

12 The Apocalypse at Jonestown 186John R. Hall

13 “Our Terrestrial Journey is Coming to an End”: The Last Voyage of the Solar Temple 208Jean-François Mayer

VII Sex and Gender Issues and New Religious Movements 227

14 Women in New Religious Movements 230Elizabeth Puttick

15 Women’s “Cocoon Work” in New Religious Movements: Sexual Experimentation and Feminine Rites of Passage 245Susan J. Palmer

VIII New Religious Movements and the Future 257

16 Why Religious Movements Succeed or Fail: A Revised General Model 259Rodney Stark

17 New Religions and the Internet: Recruiting in a New Public Space 271Lorne L. Dawson and Jenna Hennebry

Index 292

vii

The editor and publishers gratefully acknowl-edge the following for permission to repro-duce copyright material:

Eileen Barker, “The Scientific Study of Reli-gion? You Must Be Joking!” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 34, 1995:287–310.

James A. Beckford, “The Continuum Between‘Cults’ and ‘Normal’ Religion.” In PaulineCote (ed.) Chercheurs de dieux dans l’espacepublic, University of Ottawa Press, 2001:11–20; reprinted by permission of the publisher.

Roy Wallis, “Three Types of New ReligiousMovement.” In Roy Wallis, The ElementaryForms of New Religious Life, Routledge andKegan Paul, 1984: 9–39; reprinted by per-mission of Mrs Veronica Wallis.

William Sims Bainbridge and Rodney Stark,“Cult Formation: Three CompatibleModels.” Sociological Analysis 40, 1979:283–95.

Philip Jenkins, “False Prophets and DeludedSubjects: The Nineteenth Century.” InPhilip Jenkins, Mystics and Messiahs: Cultsand New Religions in American History,Oxford University Press, 2000: 25–45;copyright 2000 by Philip Jenkins; used bypermission of Oxford University Press, Inc.

Robert Wuthnow, “The New Spiritual Free-dom.” In Robert Wuthnow, After Heaven:Spirituality in America Since the 1950s,

Berkeley: University of California Press,1998: 52–84; copyright © 1998 theRegents of the University of California.

Lorne L. Dawson, “Who Joins New ReligiousMovements and Why: Twenty Years ofResearch and What Have We Learned?”Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 25,1996: 141–61.

Saul Levine, “The Joiners.” In Saul Levine,Radical Departures: Desperate Detours toGrowing Up, New York: Harcourt Braceand Company, 1984; copyright © 1994 bySaul V. Levine, reprinted by permission ofHarcourt, Inc.

Margaret Thaler Singer, “The Process ofBrainwashing, Psychological Coercion, andThought Reform.” In Margaret ThalerSinger, Cults in Our Midst, Jossey-Bass,1995: 52–82.

James T. Richardson, “A Critique of ‘Brain-washing’ Claims About New ReligiousMovements.” Australian Religious StudiesReview 7, 1994: 48–56.

Thomas Robbins, “Constructing Cultist‘Mind Control’.” Sociological Analysis 45,1984: 241–56.

John R. Hall, “The Apocalypse at Jonestown.”In John R. Hall, with Philip D. Schuyler andSylvaine Trinh, Apocalypse Observed: Reli-gious Movements and Violence in NorthAmerica, Europe, and Japan, Routledge,2000: 15–43; reprinted by permission ofTaylor and Francis Ltd.

Acknowledgments

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Jean-François Mayer, “ ‘Our Terrestrial Jour-ney is Coming to an End’: The Last Voyageof the Solar Temple.” Nova Religio 2, 1999:172–96.

Elizabeth Puttick, “Women in New ReligiousMovements.” In Bryan Wilson and JamieCresswell (eds.) New Religious Movements:Challenge and Response, Routledge, 1999:143–62; reprinted by permission of Taylorand Francis Ltd and the author.

Susan J. Palmer, “Women’s ‘Cocoon Work’ inNew Religious Movements: Sexual Experi-mentation and Feminine Rites of Passage.”Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion32, 1993: 343–55.

Rodney Stark, “Why Religious MovementsSucceed or Fail: A Revised General Model.”Journal of Contemporary Religion 11, 1996:133–46; reprinted by permission of Taylorand Francis Ltd; journal website http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals.

Lorne L. Dawson and Jenna Hennebry, “NewReligions and the Internet: Recruiting in aNew Public Space.” Journal of Contempo-rary Religion 14, 1999: 17–39; reprinted by permission of Taylor and Francis Ltd;journal website http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals.

“CHURCH OF THE POISON MIND”Words and Music by George O’Dowd, JonMoss, Michael Craig and Roy Hay© 1983, Reproduced by permission of EMIVirgin Music Ltd, London WC2H 0QY.

The publishers apologize for any errors oromissions in the above list and would be grate-ful to be notified of any corrections thatshould be incorporated in the next edition orreprint of this book.

viii

Most people in North America or Europe havenever met anyone who is a member of a“cult,” or what scholars prefer to call “newreligious movements.” Thousands of suchgroups exist in our societies, but they tend tobe so small or last for so short a time that theyattract little or no attention. Yet almost every-one has read articles or watched televisionshows about these groups. In our increasinglysecularized and supposedly rational societiesour curiosity is peaked by the intense andseemingly peculiar beliefs and practices of theminority of people who choose such alter-native worldviews and their accompanyinglifestyles. We are often simultaneously drawnto and repelled by their sense of commitmentand purpose in life. As social and ideologicaldeviants they are fascinating yet threatening.Their religiosity may seem strangely more real and compelling than the anemic variety ofmainstream religion so many of us experienceas children and young adults in the churches,synagogues, and temples of our parents. Butthe beliefs espoused are often subversive of thevalues and goals to which we have been social-ized by the dominant social institutions of oursociety. Where so often we have been condi-tioned to the pursuit of happiness through theacquisition of the right job or through roman-tic love, part of us suspects, as many of the newreligions declare, that these ambitions are illusory. Real happiness lies elsewhere. In thewords spoken by the leaders of these new

religions we often hear distinct echoes of thehigher values and sentiments, the spiritualinsights, of the great religious figures of the past. Surely there is more to life we allsense at times, and the teachings of Jesus,Mohammed, the Buddha and others, mayseem to be more genuinely present in the discourses of these still largely unknown oralready scorned men and women than in thesermons and pronouncements of the acceptedreligious leaders around us. But fear holds usback from exploring these possibilities furtherand the “cults” in our midst remain just acuriosity. This fear of the unknown and thedifferent is natural and understandable, but itis also exaggerated and in the long run detri-mental to both our own spiritual developmentand that of our societies.

We know about “cults” largely by what themedia tells us, and their views have been overwhelmingly negative (see Van Driel andRichardson 1988; Pfeifer 1992). Mirroringthe norms of conventional society, and theinterests of the powers behind it, the mediahave preferred to be sensationalistic in their treatment of new religious movements,earning dollars by exploiting our fascinationand stoking our fears (see Beckford 1999, andthe first chapter of this book). Much of thisbook is dedicated to correcting this misper-ception – not from a desire to prejudge thespecific merits or faults of any new religiousmovements, but from a belief in letting the

Introduction: The Book and the Subject

1

INTRODUCTION

record of reliable research speak for itself.Others will disagree with my choice of readings (see Beit-Hallahmi 2001; Zablocki2001), and hence my conclusions. The sweep-ing public stigmatization and often outrightcondemnation of new religions is based largelyon ignorance, and more often than not thisignorance poses a greater threat to our socialwell-being. I have tried as a social scientist toselect the best literature available on the topicfrom many of the most knowledgeable anddistinguished scholars in the field. This selec-tion is limited by the need to use materials thatare well written and readily understood by students and non-specialists. Some of thereadings have been edited as well, to shortenthem and make them even more accessible(the omitted material is indicated by ellipses).Likewise, I have tried to select readings thataddress most of the major issues raised by thesocial scientific study of new religious move-ments: their nature, how they come intobeing, the social and historical context of theirinterpretation, the processes by which peopleconvert to them, the rewards and dangers ofjoining them, and some sense of their futureas social organizations as well as the factorsthat may determine their relative success orfailure. This has meant that more space thanperhaps is fair is dedicated to debates over con-troversial issues, most specifically the accusa-tion that converts to new religious movementsare “brainwashed,” the perplexing incidents of mass violence in which a few groups havebeen involved, and the occurrence of sexualdeviance and abuse in some situations. Butthese issues have been the focal points ofpublic awareness of “cults,” and hence muchof the scholarly activity as well.

The study of new religious movements hasbeen conditioned by the problematic charac-ter of the subject matter. Soon after the spreadof numerous new and unusual religions in theUnited States in the late 1960s, groups ofunhappy parents of young adults who hadconverted to various “cults” joined forces with some professionals (e.g., lawyers, psy-chologists, psychiatrists, and social workers),disgruntled ex-members of new religions, and some representatives of other religions

(ministers, priests, and rabbis) to create anorganized opposition to new religious move-ments. This “anti-cult movement” tried tohave the authorities impose various formalpublic sanctions on new religions, but theyfailed. They did succeed, however, in winningthe propaganda war that was waged for publicopinion, creating a staunch distrust of thesegroups in the general populace (see Bromleyand Shupe 1993, 1994). In the process, thevery word “cult” took on a pejorative conno-tation, leaving social scientists looking for aless prejudicial alternative. From the manysuggestions offered, the phrase “new religiousmovements” has stuck. But it is far from ideal,since some new religious movements are nolonger so new, some never were movements,and the religious status of some is a matter ofdispute (see Wilson 1992; Richardson 1993;Bednarowski 1995; Dawson 1998: 1–12).The label “cult” is still a technical term in the scholarship on religion, like the terms“church” or “sect.” But when used in thisbook it will be accompanied by scare quotes(i.e., “cults”) in acknowledgment of its recentproblematic history. In most instances theterm new religious movements will be used,and in line with current academic practice itwill be abbreviated to NRMs.

The significance of the social scientific studyof “cults,” however, transcends the publicstruggles over their legitimacy. Scholars of reli-gion have shown a disproportionate interest inanalyzing NRMs because they offer a specialopportunity to witness the very birth pangs,growth struggles, and often death throws ofreligions. They provide immediate access todata about the most basic aspects of religiouslife that may be instrumental to understand-ing the rise and spread of the great religioustraditions of the past (see Stark 1996). Mostnotably, as the chapters in this reader display,the study of NRMs has vastly improved our grasp of the nature and complexity of the processes of recruitment and conversion(see chapters 7, 8, 9, 10, 11), as well as theprocesses of religious innovation and groupformation, religious change, and the structureand development of religious institutions (seechapters 4, 6, 16). Likewise it has prompted

2

INTRODUCTION

startling advances in our appreciation of newerconcerns, like the gendered character of religious preferences and experiences (seechapters 14, 15) and the origins and nature ofreligious violence (see chapters 12, 13).

NRMs make the investigation of these basicissues easier for a number of reasons: (1) theyoffer researchers smaller and more manage-able forums for research; (2) they provide anopportunity to acquire a first-hand familiaritywith the earliest implementation of religiousideas, plans, and policies, free of the interpre-tive impact of tradition; and (3), they are likelyto present researchers with more extremetypes of behavior that are easier to detect andmeasure, and then extrapolate to less extremeinstances (as psychiatrists do, for example, inseeking to understand the inner workings ofthe mind).

Of course, it is difficult to appreciate any of this or properly understand the readings inthis book without some additional knowledgeof various actual NRMs Those lacking in some background knowledge of at least a fewgroups should read this book in conjunctionwith some of the many fine descriptive studiesavailable on the history, beliefs, and practicesof such NRMs as the Church of Scientology,the Unification Church, the InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness, SokaGakkai, neo-paganism, the New Age move-ment, and the Children of God/The Family(e.g., Wallis 1977; Barker 1984; Rochford1985; Wilson and Dobbelaere 1994; Brown1997; Berger 1999; Bainbridge 2002). Alter-natively, one should at least turn to one of the good collections of descriptive essays onthese and many other groups (e.g., Ellwoodand Partin 1988; Miller 1995; or Chryssides1999). For a more comprehensive and sys-tematic overview of the results of the socialscientific study of NRMs readers may also wishto consult books like Thomas Robbins’s Cults,Converts and Charisma (1988) or Lorne L.Dawson’s Comprehending Cults: The Sociologyof New Religious Movements (1998).

References

Bainbridge, William Sims 2002: The EndtimeFamily: Children of God. Albany: State Universityof New York Press.

Barker, Eileen 1984: The Making of a Moonie:Choice or Brainwashing? Oxford: Blackwell.

Beckford, James A. 1999: The Mass Media andNew Religious Movements. In B. Wilson and J.Cresswell (eds.), New Religious Movements: Chal-lenge and Response. London: Routledge, 103–19.

Bednarowski, Mary Farrell 1995: The Church ofScientology: Lightning Rod for Cultural Bound-ary Conflicts. In T. Miller (ed.), America’s Alter-native Religions. Albany: State University of NewYork Press, 385–92.

Beit-Hallahmi, Benjamin 2001: ‘O Truant Muse’:Collaborationism and Research Integrity. In B.Zablocki and T. Robbins (eds.), Misunderstand-ing Cults: Searching for Objectivity in a Contro-versial Field. Toronto: University of TorontoPress, 35–70.

Berger, Helen A. 1999: A Community of Witches:Contemporary Neo-Paganism and Witchcraft inthe United States. Columbia: University of SouthCarolina Press.

Bromley, David G. and Anson D. Shupe, Jr. 1993:Organized Opposition to New Religious Move-ments. In D. G. Bromley and J. K. Hadden(eds.), The Handbook on Cults and Sects inAmerica, Part A (Religion and the Social Order,vol. 3). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 177–98.

Bromley, David G. and Anson D. Shupe, Jr. 1994:The Modern North American Anti-Cult Move-ment, 1971–1991: A Twenty Year Retrospective.In A. Shupe and D. G. Bromley (eds.), Anti-CultMovements in Cross Cultural Perspective. NewYork: Garland, 3–31.

Brown, Michael F. 1997: The Channeling Zone:American Spirituality in an Anxious Age. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Chryssides, George D. 1999: Exploring New Religions. London: Cassell.

Dawson, Lorne L. 1998: Comprehending Cults: TheSociology of New Religious Movements. Toronto:Oxford University Press.

Ellwood, Robert S. and Harry B. Partin 1988: Reli-gious and Spiritual Groups in Modern America,2nd edn. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Miller, Timothy (ed.) 1995: America’s AlternativeReligions. Albany: State University of New YorkPress.

Pfeifer, Jeffrey E. 1992: The Psychological Framingof Cults: Schematic Representations and Cult

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INTRODUCTION

Evaluations. Journal of Applied Social Psychology22 (7): 513–44.

Richardson, James T. 1993: Definitions of Cult:From Sociological–Technical to Popular–Nega-tive. Review of Religious Research 34 (4): 348–56.

Robbins, Thomas 1988: Cults, Converts andCharisma. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Rochford, E. Burke, Jr. 1985: Hare Krishna inAmerica. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Univer-sity Press.

Stark, Rodney 1996: The Rise of Christianity: ASociologist Reconsiders History. Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press.

Van Driel, Barend and James T. Richardson 1988:Print Media Coverage of New Religious Movements: A Longitudinal Study. Journal ofCommunication 38 (3): 37–61.

Wallis, Roy 1977: The Road to Total Freedom: ASociological Analysis of Scientology. New York:Columbia University Press.

Wilson, Bryan R. 1992: Scientology: A SecularizedReligion. In B. R. Wilson, The Social Dimensionsof Sectarianism: Sects and New ReligiousMovements in Contemporary Society. Oxford:Clarendon Press, 267–88.

Wilson, Bryan R. and Karel Dobbelaere 1994: ATime to Chant: The Soka Gakkai Buddhists inBritain. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Zablocki, Benjamin 2001: Towards a Demystifiedand Disinterested Scientific Theory of Brain-washing. In B. Zablocki and T. Robbins (eds.),Misunderstanding Cults: Searching For Objectivityin a Controversial Field. Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 159–214.

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5

In reading the essays in this book you willlearn that “cults” or new religious movementscan and should be studied like any othersocial, cultural, and historical phenomena.Scholars have been accumulating reliable dataand developing theories to explain the newreligions in our midst and their activities formore than forty years (see Dawson 1998).Many mysteries remain and there is much leftto study, but the gaps in our knowledge arethe product of limited time, resources, andopportunities. There is nothing intrinsicallybeyond the pale of comprehension or threat-ening about “cults” as a subject of inquiry. Tothe contrary, as stressed by James Beckford inchapter 2, we must learn to accept that mostNRMs differ very little in their nature andoperation, and in their moral and social fail-ings, from more conventional or mainstreamreligions (e.g., the Catholic Church orMethodists). Yet the controversy surrounding“cults” makes the study of NRMs unlike thestudy of these other conventional religions,and most other fields of social scientificresearch.

The study of NRMs was sparked in part bythe emergence of “cults” as a social problemin the late twentieth-century societies of themodern West. Families were angered whentheir adult sons and daughters left thembehind, and abandoned the conventionalcareer paths they were pursuing, to joinintense religious groups of unfamiliar origins

and orientations. As families and other con-cerned people began to press the authoritiesto take action against the new religions – torestrict their activities or suppress them alto-gether – many scholars of religion saw theneed to replace public prejudice or simply fearwith a more reliable understanding of thesegroups and their members. Why were peopleconverting to these new and often strange religions? What were these groups trying toaccomplish? What was life in them like? Werethey potentially dangerous to society or theindividuals in them? In seeking to answer theseand many other related questions the sociolo-gists, psychologists, and religious studiesscholars who dared to study these groupsfound themselves embroiled in often heateddisputes with other claimants to “the truth.”They also found themselves struggling toovercome the stigma associated with studyingsuch reviled groups, amongst their colleaguesand the public.

Our first reading, Eileen Barker’s “The Scientific Study of Religion? You Must BeJoking!” clarifies the field of contention inwhich scholars of NRMs must operate. Cultsoften find their way into the news, and whenthey do there are commonly several differentparties seeking to influence the reaction of thepublic. Barker, a leading sociologist of religionfrom England, compares and contrasts theassumptions, objectives, and biases of the dif-ferent groups trying to shape our understand-

I

The Study of New Religious Movements

THE STUDY OF NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

ing of “cults”: the NRMs themselves, sociol-ogists of religion, the organized representa-tives of the anti-cult movement, the media,therapists, and representatives of the legalsystem (the police, lawyers, and judges).Sometimes the interests of some of thesegroups converge (e.g., when journalists turnto the anti-cult movement for sensationalisticcomments on an NRM), more often they clash(e.g., when the courts want clear and simpleanswers to complex questions from sociolo-gists acting as witnesses in legal disputes). Anyscholar seeking to succeed in the field must beprepared to cope with the frustration and hos-tility stemming from this clash of interests andinformation. While the organized oppositionto “cults” will seek to undermine the credi-bility of the scholar because of any positivepronouncements made about NRMs, the cultswill be trying to co-opt the scholar and use thesame pronouncements as propaganda for theircause. To maintain even the appearance ofobjectivity in such circumstances requires afine balancing act.

Likewise any student seeking to understandNRMs must recognize that the viewsexpressed about “cults” will tend to vary sys-tematically according to the personal, andeven more the professional or vocational,interests of the persons providing the infor-mation. As almost all of the players in the fieldof contention employ information selectivelyto suit their purposes, special caution must beexercised to sort the wheat of reliable data andinsights from the all-too abundant chaff ofhearsay, innuendo, and ridicule.

As indicated in Philip Jenkins’s fine discus-sion of the controversies surrounding NRMsin nineteenth-century America, in chapter 5 ofthis book, the clash of views over the legiti-macy of new religions is not new. Throughoutthe ages the defenders of the status quo havefeared and attacked the proponents of reli-gious innovation. In our second reading, “TheContinuum Between ‘Cults’ and ‘Normal’Religion,” another leading British sociologist

of religion, James Beckford, argues that thepeculiar intensity and scope of today’s cultcontroversy stems in part from several charac-teristics of life in advanced industrial societies.The extremity of religious commitment dis-played by members of contemporary NRMs isperceived as an affront to the sensibilities ofmodern, rationalized, commodified, and sec-ularized societies. And the clash of sensibilitiesis accentuated by the sweeping changes inmodern means of communication that placethe NRMs under an unprecedented measureof scrutiny. In support of the argument Beckford suggests that the intolerancedirected at NRMs is largely the result of “skir-mishes along a shifting frontier” of points ofconflict between the new religions and“various non-religious conditions imposed bystate authorities.” In other words, the differ-ence between a “normal” and “abnormal”religion often has little to do with any intrin-sically religious differences. NRMs must beunderstood, then, in terms of the broaderchanges affecting their social context. They areproducts of, and responses to, the new socialpressures to which we are all exposed in latemodernity, as well as the age-old spiritual aspi-rations of humanity (see Dawson 2001).

Students learning about NRMs need tokeep both social contexts of contention inmind when reading and studying the literaturein the field: consider who is providing theinformation and why, and recognize that thecontroversy surrounding NRMs is not somuch a clash of strange versus familiar ideas,as a clash of visions of how we should live, andhow our societies should be structured.

References

Dawson, Lorne L.1998: Comprehending Cults: TheSociology of New Religious Movements. Toronto:Oxford University Press.

—— 2001: The Cultural Significance of New Religious Movements: The Case of Soka Gakkai.Sociology of Religion 62 (3): 337–64.

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7

Most of us who have been involved in thestudy of NRMs during the past quarter of acentury or so have enjoyed learning much ofinterest for the study of religion in general.But several of us have also been bruised andconfused, a few of us quite sorely, because ofthe threat that we have presented to others byour claims to have a more “scientific” – or atleast a more balanced, objective, and accurate– or, at very least, a less biased, subjective, andwrong – understanding of the movementsthan they have.

This has led to a certain amount of navelcontemplation about how we might justify ourresearch. Are we “doing” a scientific study ofreligion? What is a scientific study of religion?To what extent and why might we claim thatwe “know better” than some others, includ-ing even those who provide the raw data ofour research? And, just as importantly, onwhat matters must we be wary to acknowledge“that whereof we may not speak” – not, thatis, as persons claiming to speak as social scientists? . . .

Coming as I do from the London School ofEconomics, it is not surprising that I havebeen profoundly influenced by the work ofKarl Popper, and if I were forced to select asingle criterion that distinguishes a scientificfrom a pseudo-scientific enterprise, I wouldchose to start with empirical refutability(Popper 1963: 37; 1972: ch 1). But, that said,one needs to continue (as, indeed, Popper

did) by adding a great number of qualifica-tions, especially where the study of society isconcerned. Differences between the naturaland social sciences that are of relevance in thispaper are (a) ontological – concerned with thenature of social reality; (b) epistemological –concerned with how we gain our knowledgeof social reality; and (c) ethical and political –how we evaluate our own and others’ con-struction of reality – and what we do about it.

Primary and SecondaryConstructions of Social Reality

For the sake of the argument, an analytical dis-tinction needs to be made between primaryand secondary constructions of reality. Theformer comprise the basic data of socialscience; the latter are accounts of the former.The primary construction of an NRM is theproduct of direct and indirect interactionsbetween the members of the movement and,to some extent, between members and the restof society.

Secondary constructions are depictions ofthe movement that are offered in the publicarena by sociologists and others, including themovement itself, about the movement. Sec-ondary constructions are, thus, more con-scious than primary constructions, althoughpart of the process of the latter may be quite conscious, and the former are by no means

CHAPTER ONE

The Scientific Study of Religion? You Must Be Joking!

EILEEN BARKER

7

THE STUDY OF NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

always consciously thought through. Itshould, however, be recognized that the dis-tinction between primary and secondary con-structions becomes blurred when one is takinga wider reality into account. Thus, if (as in thispaper) we are concerned with “the cultscene,” secondary constructions, includingthose of the sociologist, make a difference andmust be considered as part of the primary con-structions of that social reality.

The concept of social reality is fraught withtensions and paradox. It appeals to bothrealism and idealism insofar as it is an objec-tive reality, the existence of which no individ-ual members of a social group can wish awayany more than they can wish away the exis-tence of a brick wall. At the same time, socialreality exists only as ideas in people’s heads; if no one took it into account (positively ornegatively, consciously or unconsciously), itwould not exist (Berger and Luckmann 1966).Put another way, although social reality existsindependently of the volition of any particularindividual, it can exist only insofar as individ-ual human minds are continually recognizingit and acting as the media through which areprocessed the cultural ideas and meanings, andthe roles and expectations that arise from andresult in its existence.

This means that, pace Wuthnow (1987), ifas social scientists we want to understand whatis going on, we have no option but to use our-selves as “a medium.” A robot cannot dosocial science; it is not capable of Verstehen. Itcannot further our understanding beyond thevery important ways that logic can further our understanding of what we already know.We need to have some knowledge about themeanings that situations have for individuals.We need to be able to understand how a sit-uation can be perceived.

Of course, others will not perceive it in thesame way as we do – no two people will perceive a situation in exactly the same way – none of us ever has the exact sameunderstanding or perception as anyone else.But – and this is just as important – our per-ceptions are more or less shared. If they werenot shared at all, we would have no society(and no possibility of a social science); and if

they were totally shared, again we would haveno society, for there would be no dynamic –no force for change, negotiation, or adjust-ment to external circumstances.

But these differences between individualperceptions of social reality are not random.The variation will depend upon such factors aspeople’s innate characteristics, their past expe-riences, hopes, fears, interests, assumptions,values, and expectations and the social posi-tion from which they view the reality that confronts them. A new convert will view theNRM from one perspective, seasoned leadersfrom a different perspective; member’s per-ceptions will differ from nonmembers’; anddifferent groups of nonmembers will perceivethe NRM in the light of their own particularinterests.

Not only will people perceive the movementfrom different perspectives, they will alsodescribe and, perhaps, explain the movementin different ways. Consciously or uncon-sciously, they will select from among the features presented to them. Again, what isincluded and what excluded in the process ofcreating their secondary constructions will not be random, but significantly influencedaccording to their intersts.

The interests of some personally or profes-sionally motivated secondary constructors may lead them to take matters further than apassive reception of their perception. Some,wanting to reinforce an image that has alreadybeen delineated, will place themselves in aposition that will protect it from disconfirma-tion and/or supply confirming evidences.Others, wanting to test their secondary con-struction according to the Popperian criterion,will systematically try to refute their hypothe-ses. To do this they may actively engage inresearch which involves as close a scrutiny aspossible of the primary construction.

Making a Difference

When I was a student, it was part of the con-ventional wisdom of the methodology whichwe were taught that social scientists should beclinically detached observers who noted what

8

THE STUDY OF NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

was going on but did not allow their observa-tions to affect the data. Such a position is tosome extent possible when the scientist isobserving through a one-way glass, watchinga covertly shot film, or reading diaries or otherwritten materials. But for a number of reasonsdiscussed elsewhere (Barker 1987), I andothers have come to believe that such anapproach is not only difficult but method-ologically inappropriate for the kind ofresearch that is needed for an acceptable sec-ondary construction of NRMs. There is someinformation that one can acquire only bybecoming part of the data and, thus, playinga role in the ongoing social construction ofreality. I would even go so far as to say that toremain physically distanced from the data canbe methodologically reprehensible – an abrogation of one’s responsibility as a socialscientist.

But as we step outside the Ivory Tower ofacademia and become part of the process thatwe are researching, we are, of course, placingour pristine purity in jeopardy. Most social scientists who have worked “in the field” areaware of the impact that they might have andtake this into account when they come toanalyze their data. To what extent does theinvolvement enhance or diminish our “scien-tific” study of religion? Before addressing thisquestion, let me give some examples to illus-trate the variety of ways in which I personallyhave become conscious that my research was“making a difference.”

First of all, just being there can make a dif-ference. When I began studying the Unifica-tion Church in the early 1970s, it was arelatively closed community with strongboundaries distinguishing “them” from “us.”To have someone living in the communitywho was not part of “us” threatened andweakened the boundary and, thus, the beliefsand actions associated with a strong-group situation (Douglas 1970). The very fact that anormally impermeable boundary can be per-meated by an outsider affects the group andits members in a number of concrete ways. Forexample, one girl left, not because I advisedher to do so but, she said, because my anom-alous existence as someone who could live

both within and without led her to realize thatshe did not have to make the stark choicebetween either a godly or a satanic lifestyle;there could be a middle way which wouldallow her to pursue an alternative way ofserving God without having to deny all thatwas good about her Unification experience.

At the same time, it is possible that othersstayed in the movement, at least for slightlylonger than they might otherwise have done,because of the existence of a “professionalstranger” (Barker 1987). My presence meantthere was someone who would neither reportback to the leadership, nor go to the media,but on whom they could off-load their anxi-eties and frustrations.

Asking questions (in formal interviews,general discussions, or through questionnaire)that no one else has previously asked can leadto an unexpected “raising of consciousness.”In the words of one respondent, “It made metake out and look at some of the things I’dbeen keeping in the pending tray.” Some-times, I was told, the result was a deeperunderstanding of the theology, but on otheroccasions the consequence was a growing irritation or suspicion of the leadership. Occa-sionally a change would be brought about asthe result of a group interview offeringmembers the opportunity to discuss openlymatters about which they normally kept silent.I gather that a number of fairly radical changeswere introduced to an American ISKCONTemple following a day I had spent with agroup of female devotees who had not previ-ously shared their feelings of how they weretreated by the male hierarchy.

As my research into NRMs progressed, Ifound myself affecting the situation more consciously. First, I was being asked tomediate between members of movements andtheir parents, who also formed part of mydata. The fact that I could explain the per-spective of the movement to nonmembers(and that of nonmembers to members) meantthat there was frequently an increased com-munication and, sometimes, accommodationto the others’ points of view as they eachreached an increased understanding of how“the other side” saw things.

9

THE STUDY OF NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

Then “making a difference” became notmerely a result of face-to-face interaction withthose individuals who formed part of my data.Publishing books and papers, appearing as awitness in court cases, and making statementsin various media about my conception of theNRMs meant that my findings were being pre-sented to a wider audience. Like other schol-ars, I was offering an alternative perspectivethat questioned many of the existing sec-ondary constructions and their taken-for-granted assumptions. I was affecting the datanot only as part of a methodological proce-dure, but also as part of a political action.

Once the results of my research becamepublic it became increasingly obvious that theywere not to go unchallenged. I had initiallycontacted the anti-cult movement (ACM)with the somewhat naive belief that, as wewere both interested in finding out aboutNRMs, we might exchange information thatcould be helpful to us both. My overtureswere not merely rejected, the anti-cultistsstarted to launch a full-scale ad hominemattack on anything I said or wrote in public;having gone to the NRMs for a significant,though by no means complete part of myresearch, I was clearly “on the other side.” Tothe astonishment and/or amusement ofanyone who knew me, I found myself beinglabeled a Moonie, a Scientologist, a funda-mentalist Christian, or a cult lover – or, by themore benign, an innocent who was beingdeceived by the movements. What I said wasrarely questioned – except, curiously enough,for statements for which I had incontrovert-ible evidence. The first major bone of con-tention was the membership figures that Ipublicized, both to the annoyance of the Uni-fication Church (who did not want either theirmembers or the general public to be aware ofthe very high turnover rates) and to the furyof those members of the ACM who were (andin some cases still are) insistent that the move-ments use irresistible and irreversible mindcontrol techniques – which would, of course,imply that Unification membership was in thehundreds of thousands if not in the millions,rather than the rather paltry hundreds that Iwas reporting.

The shift from a methodological to a morepolitico-ethical involvement in the “cultscene” became even more marked when Ireached the conclusion that a considerableamount of unnecessary suffering and unhap-pinsee might be avoided were social scientificconstructions of NRMs to compete morerobustly in the marketplace. My “Road toDamascus” was an ACM Family SupportGroup meeting at which an ex-member,whom I happened to know as a thoughtfuland honest woman, had been invited to tellher story. It soon became evident that thingswere not going according to plan. She wasresisting the pressure that was being put onher to say how she had suffered, how she hadbeen deceived, and how she had been underthe influence of mind control. It was sug-gested that she had not really left the move-ment and that she was determined to deceivethe assembled company. Trying to pour oil ontroubled waters, someone asked if she hadanything to say that would help the assembledparents. A woman then stood up and shouted“We don’t want to hear this; it’s just deceitand lies. It’s not helpful at all. We don’t wantto hear any more.” At that point I stoppedtaking notes. Something more, it seemed,needed to be done.

With the support of the British governmentand mainstream churches, I set up a charitycalled INFORM (Information Network Focuson Religious Movements) with the aim of providing information that was as objective,balanced, and up to date as possible. In theseven years that have ensued, thousands of relatives and friends of NRM members, ex-members, the media, local and national gov-ernment, police, social welfare workers, prisonchaplains, schools, universities and colleges,traditional religions, and NRMs themselveshave contacted the office (located at theLondon School of Economics) for informa-tion and help (Barker 1989a).

I did not consider the founding ofINFORM to be part of my research, althoughit has certainly resulted in my learning a greatdeal more about the “cult scene.” Rather, theaim was to use professional knowledge to challenge alternative secondary constructions.

10

THE STUDY OF NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

It was not to fight for The Truth in any ideo-logical sense but, minimally, to contest untruestatements about NRMs (whether they origi-nate from an NRM or anyone else) . . .

Although INFORM does not see itself as anadvice center, it points out the likely conse-quences of a variety of actions, ranging fromjoining a new religion to trying to abductsomeone from one; it has also been instru-mental in mediating between members andtheir families, and while it certainly does nothave a magic wand with which it can solve all problems, the reliability of INFORM’sinformation and its knowledge of the socialprocesses involved in their relationships withthe outside world has meant that it has beenable to relate to the NRMs in such a way thatmany of them are willing to cooperate in suchmatters as putting parents back in touch withtheir children, or refunding money obtainedunder duress . . .

It would have been ingenuous to assumethat there would not be opposition to an orga-nization such as INFORM. What was unex-pected, however, was the virulence with whichit has been attacked by a few NRMs, theACM, some sections of the media, and a smallnumber of individuals with opposing interests.By the late 1980s, it appeared that British anti-cultists were directing more of their resourcesto trying to discredit us rather than the newreligions . . .

The battles continue of course, and whilewe are making a difference, other people’s sec-ondary constructions are also making a differ-ence to “the cult scene” and to us. But beforegiving further consideration to the method-ological, ethical, and political implications ofsuch involvement, let us turn to the market-place and compare the secondary constructs ofsocial science with the competition.

Table 1.1 summarizes some basic differ-ences between six ideal types of secondaryconstructors: sociologists and others involvedin the scientific study of religion, members ofthe new religions themselves, the anti-cultmovement, the media, the legal profession,and therapists (the first four constructors areanalyzed in greater detail in Barker 1993a).The types were chosen on the grounds that it

is they who feature most prominently in thecompetiton with social scientists, but the tablecould be extended to include the police, thesocial services, clergy, theologians, education-alists, and any number of other categories ofconstructors . . .

The sociology of religion

Obviously the particular aims of those con-cerned with the scientific study of religion willdiffer from person to person, but most wouldagree that they wish to present as accurate,objective, and unbiased an account as possi-ble. They will want to describe, understand,and explain social groupings and such phe-nomena as the power structures, communica-tion networks, and belief systems that enablemembers to do (or prevent them from doing)things that they could not (or could) do inother social situations. Social scientists willalso want to explore and account for the rangeof different perceptions held by individualactors and to assess the consequences of suchdifferences. The nature of social reality meansthat the regularities of social science are rela-tive to social space and time in a way that thelaws of nature seldom are. Nonetheless, soci-ological constructions do contain empiricallyrefutable statements, and it is part of the logicof science that the methods and results of its research should be available for publicscrutiny: “Our great instrument for progressis criticism” (Popper 1973: 34).

There are those who believe that the task ofscience is to find out the truth, the wholetruth, and nothing but the truth. I disagree.No one ever tells the whole truth; no one evercould. All secondary constructions consist ofboth more and less than the primary con-struction. Although looking for nothing butthe truth in the sense that we are committedto accuracy and eliminating falsehoods fromboth our own and others’ constructions, socialscientists select what will go into our con-structions, excluding some aspects that othersinclude, and including further aspects thatothers exclude.

Not only do social scientists include andexclude for methodological reasons, but also,

11

Tab

le 1

.1C

ompe

ting

logi

cs in

sec

onda

ry c

onst

ruct

ions

of

real

ity

Inte

rest

Dat

aD

ata

Seco

ndar

yan

d/or

sele

cted

for

syst

emat

ical

lyM

ode

ofR

elat

ions

hip

cons

truc

tors

aim

Met

hod

incl

usio

nex

clud

edco

mm

unic

atio

nw

ith

SoR

Soci

olog

yU

nbia

sed

and

Com

pari

son;

Indi

vidu

al a

ndN

on-e

mpi

rica

lSc

hola

rly

Eff

ect

ofof

Rel

igio

nob

ject

ive

met

hodo

logi

cal

soci

al le

vels

;ev

alua

tion;

publ

icat

ions

;m

etho

ds o

fso

ciol

ogic

alag

nost

icis

m;

cont

rol g

roup

s;tr

ansc

ende

nt

thro

ugh

othe

rre

sear

ch;

desc

ript

ion,

inte

rvie

w;

wid

er c

onte

xtva

riab

les;

seco

ndar

yef

fect

of

use

unde

rsta

ndin

gqu

estio

nnai

re;

defin

ition

alco

nstr

ucts

mad

e of

and

expl

anat

ion

obse

rvat

ion

esse

ntia

lism

rese

arch

NR

Ms

Prim

ary

Sele

ctiv

eG

ood

beha

vior

;B

ad s

kele

tons

;L

itera

ture

;C

ontr

ol o

f co

nstr

uctio

n;re

flect

ion

esot

eric

gno

ses

witn

essi

ngac

cess

;go

od P

R,

on p

rim

ary

supe

rnat

ural

use

posi

tive

prom

ote

belie

fsco

nstr

uctio

ncl

aim

sev

iden

ce

AC

MW

arn;

Ex-

mem

bers

;A

troc

ity t

ales

Goo

d be

havi

or;

Lob

byin

g;U

se n

egat

ive

expo

se;

pare

nts;

new

slet

ters

;da

ta;

cont

rol;

med

ia (

may

ch

ange

s fo

r th

em

edia

atta

ck w

hen

dest

roy

be c

ircu

lar)

bett

erpo

sitiv

e da

ta

Med

iaG

ood

stor

y;In

terv

iew

Top

ical

;E

very

day;

New

spap

ers,

Pref

erre

d us

ege

t/ke

ep

whe

re e

asy

rele

vant

;“n

orm

al”;

mag

azin

es,

of A

CM

read

ers,

acce

ss a

nd/

orse

nsat

iona

lun

exce

ptio

nabl

eT

V, r

adio

;w

here

view

ers,

su

bjec

tla

rge

publ

ic;

com

plem

enta

ry

and/

orw

illin

g to

sh

ort

shel

f-in

tere

sts;

liste

ners

talk

;lif

e;So

R u

sed

mor

ein

vest

igat

ive

diffi

cult

toif

new

, pi

thy,

jour

nalis

m;

chec

k or

sexy

and

/or

pres

s re

leas

esqu

estio

nse

nsat

iona

l

Law

“Jus

tice”

Adv

ersa

rial

;E

vide

nce

Mid

dle

grou

nd,

Leg

alIm

part

ial e

xper

tac

cord

ing

toco

nfro

ntat

iona

l;pr

esen

ted

byno

t m

akin

gju

dgm

ents

or w

hore

the

law

of

the

posi

tive

vsth

e tw

opo

sitiv

e or

neg

ativ

eco

mm

on la

w;

witn

ess?

land

;ne

gativ

eop

posi

ngpo

int;

med

ia r

epor

tsw

inni

ngsi

des;

wha

t de

emed

case

for

expe

rtir

rele

vant

to

the

indi

vidu

alw

itnes

ses;

case

;le

gal

inad

mis

sibl

e ev

iden

ce

prec

eden

t

The

rapy

Hel

p cl

ient

Lis

ten,

acc

ept,

Indi

vidu

al’s

Oth

er v

ersi

ons

ofD

irec

t to

clie

nt;

Com

petit

ion

to g

et b

ette

ran

d/or

perc

eptio

n;re

ality

cour

ts;

over

impo

rtan

cean

d to

cop

eco

nstr

uct

prag

mat

icm

edia

;of

“w

hole

” an

dw

ith “

real

ity”

clie

nt’s

cons

truc

tspr

ofes

sion

alpr

ofes

sion

alve

rsio

n of

care

rsex

pert

ise

real

ity

THE STUDY OF NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

perhaps paradoxically, because it is only bydoing this that an understanding of theprimary construction may be transmitted toothers. An example I sometimes use to illus-trate the importance of not replicating theoriginal too precisely is that of an actor playinga bore. The actor is successful in communi-cating something of the essence of being abore only insofar as he is not boring. Similarly,in order to communicate something of theessence of an NRM, social scientists have to“interpret” or “translate” the primary con-structions so that their audience can under-stand what may have been incomprehensiblewhen they were looking at the movementitself. Raëlians can tell their parents what itmeans to them to be a Raëlian, but the parentsmay be incapable of hearing what is being said.There would be absolutely on point in thesociologist’s merely reproducing what theRaëlian says and does – this has to be put in awider context; both more and less has to beoffered to the parent – less, in that we do nottell the parent things that seem irrelevant (thatthey clean their teeth every morning) – more,in that we add information that relates whatthey believe and do to the understanding ofthe parent. For this we need to know not onlywhat Raëlians believe and do, but also whatthe parent can understand. We are not beingselective in the sense that we are beinguntruthful or keeping back truths; we are rep-resenting rather than presenting.

Thus, the constructs of social scienceexclude details that do not seem to be of partic-ular interest. Part of what we decide is of interest will depend upon what we and ourpotential audience consider useful knowledge– either because we believe it will further ourgeneral understanding of social behavior, orbecause we believe that it could be of practi-cal use in implementing our own or society’sinterests.

Next, the constructs of social scienceexclude theological judgments. The sociology of religion is concerned with who believeswhat under what circumstances, how beliefsbecome part of the cultural milieu and areused to interpret people’s experiences, andwhat the consequences of holding particular

beliefs may be; but it can neither deny norconfirm ideological beliefs. Social scientistsqua social scientists have to remain method-ologically agnostic. The epistemology of anempirical science has no way of knowingwhether God, gods, the Devil, angels, evilspirits, or the Holy Spirit have been acting asindependent variables; and miracles, by defin-ition, are beyond the purview of science.

Then, social scientists stipulate what theymean by particular concepts or use ideal types(Weber 1947: 92) for the purposes of a par-ticular study, but they cannot claim that thesedefinitions are either true or false, merely thatthey are more or less useful. Of course, con-cepts are “given” (data) in the sense that theyare part of primary constructions and ouraccounts will report what people mean by con-cepts such as “religion.” We also note that different groups use, negotiate, or manipulatedefinitions to further their own interests(Barker 1994; Douglas 1966) . . .

Most social scientists would agree that theyought to try to exclude their own subjectiveevaluations from the actual collection andanalysis of data. . . . Of course, as any method-ology book will testify, there are many ways inwhich our values do enter the research andskew the outcome: we cannot interpret thereality that we are studying except by usingour own subjective perception; concepts canbe value laden; we may be working with unexamined assumptions which have implica-tion for our perception; and so on. But we dotry to be aware of and counter such obstaclesby various techniques so as to producedescriptions that are as objective as possible inthe sense that they are concerned with theobject of our study rather than our own orothers’ subjective beliefs.

But social science not only excludes ideo-logical, definitional, and evaluative concerns, itincludes interests that extend beyond any NRMunder study. Study of the primary constructionthrough interview, questionnaire, participantobservation, and the examination of writtenmaterial needs to be supplemented with datafrom further sources, all of which may be nec-essary, but none sufficient for the kind ofpicture that the sociologist needs to construct

14

THE STUDY OF NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

(Barker 1984: 124–33). We may want to checkwhere individual members are “coming from”by speaking to people who have known themboth before and after their conversion. Ex-members comprise an invaluable source offurther information and for checking the verac-ity of what members are reporting. It does,however, have to be remembered that no singlemember (past or present) is likely to knoweverything that is going on in the movement.The sociological construction of an NRMrequires, moreover, information about yetothers who have no relationship whatsoeverwith the movement. This is because a funda-mental component of science is the compara-tive method, which, by putting the NRM in awider frame of reference, brings balance intothe equation. In order to able to understandand test “what variable varies with what,” theprimary construction has to be compared withother primary constructions, using controlgroups (although this has become distressinglyrare in monographs) and techniques such as the statistical manipulation of data about thepopulation as a whole to test for correlations.Such tools of the trade serve, minimally, to eliminate some mistakes that we might otherwise make.

The new religions

NRMs have an interest in gaining newmembers and, perhaps, political and financialor legal advantage by presenting a secondaryconstruction of their own primary reality inthe public domain. As with most organiza-tions, one would expect the movement toselect those aspects that show it in a favorablelight and be less forthcoming about skeletonsin the cupboard. Unlike the social scientist,the NRM will draw on nonempirical revela-tions to describe and explain at least part of itsconstruction of reality (that, for example, Godis responsible for revelations and conversions,and/or that evil forces are responsible forthings that go wrong); and it will, of course,be anxious to proclaim the truth of its theological teachings – unless there are eso-teric gnoses, in which case these will be keptsecret.

Clearly, there is a sense in which an NRMhas privileged access to its own reality – but itis also possible to argue that the very fact oftheir involvement means that members areunable or unwilling to see what is going onwith the same detachment as some outsiders(Wilson 1970: ix–xiii). There are, however,members of NRMs such as Mickler (1980,1992) and Jules-Rosette (1975) who, as socialscientists, have done excellent work on theirown NRMs.

The Anti-cult Movement (ACM)

The ACM includes a wide variety of organi-zations with members as diverse as anxiousparents, ex-members, professional deprogram-mers, and “exit counselors.” In some ways, theACM can be seen as a mirror image of theNRM. Both tend to want a clear, unambigu-ous division between “us” and “them”; butwhile the NRM will select only good aspects,the ACM selects only bad aspects. Most ACMpronouncements tend to be about “destruc-tive cults,” lumping all NRMs together asthough they were a single entity, the sins ofone being visited on all. Any evidence or argu-ment that could complicate or disprove theirnegative construction (or reform that may beintroduced) is more likely to be ignored or dismissed than denied.

As lobbyists, anti-cultists have to be proac-tive not only in promoting their constructionsbut also in denying or dismissing other con-structions and denigrating the constructors.Sociological secondary constructions mayappear more threatening to the ACM thanthose of the NRMs, the latter being morelikely to agree with the ACM where there areclear boundaries; they can, furthermore, begoaded into reinforcing the anti-cult positionby responding to it in an unambiguously negative fashion, exacerbating the process of“deviance amplification” and, thereby, justify-ing further accusations by the ACM.

Social scientists, members of the media, thelegal profession, and therapists have a profes-sional interest in their secondary construc-tions’ achieving their relevant aims, but theydo not usually expect to gain much more from

15

THE STUDY OF NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

their work in the area of NRMs than theywould by doing their work well in any otherarea. When we turn to the ACM and NRMs,however, we find that most of the rank and filemembership do their work either on a purelyvoluntary basis or with little more than livingexpenses because they believe, sometimesquite passionately, that what they are doing isright – they have a mission to fight evil.

There are, however, also “charismaticleaders” in the NRMs and “leading experts”in the ACM, both of whom may reap enor-mous financial benefits from having their con-structions of reality accepted. Stories aboutthe wealth controlled by Sun Myung Moon,L. Ron Hubbard, or Bhagwan Rajneesh (with his 97 Rolls Royces and collection of Rolexwatches) are common enough. What is lesswell known is the vast amount of money atstake in the fostering of the brainwashing or mind control thesis in ACM secondary constructions. On the one hand, “depro-grammers” and, to a somewhat lesser extent,“exit counselors” can charge tens of thousandsof dollars for their services; on the other hand,“expert witnesses” have charged enormousfees for giving evidence about brainwashing incourt cases . . .

The sharp “them/us” perspective of theACM is reflected in the fact that it frequentlyoperates under a cloak of secrecy. Not only theNRMs, but also social scientists may be deniedaccess to allegedly open meetings and refusedrequests for information or evidence thatcould corroborate assertions made in ACMconstructions of reality. One anti-cultist whorepeatedly claims that NRMs use hypnosis torecruit members refuses to tell me whichmovements he is talking about on the groundsthat he does not trust me because I am “onthe other side.” Other information that is pre-sumably nonconfidential and which one mighthave though the ACM would want widely dis-seminated is jealously guarded. The secrecy is,of course, perfectly understandable when itconcerns the planning of an illegal kidnappingand deprogramming.

Given its aims, the ACM does not lay stresson either objectivity or balance in its sec-ondary constructions of reality – in fact,

members will frequently admit quite openlythat they consider a balanced presentation ofthe facts counterproductive . . .

As a matter of principle, anti-cultists arelikely to refuse to have direct contact with the primary construction itself as a source ofinformation. This is justified by the premisethat cults are, almost by definition, bound topractice deception and are probably danger-ous. Data for ACM stories tend, therefore, tobe collected from anxious parents, disillu-sioned exmembers, and negative mediareports. Often there is a circularity involved in that the anxious parents have been alertedto the negative aspects of their child’s move-ment by anti-cult “atrocity tales” (Shupe andBromley 1980); the ex-members have beentaught by deprogrammers or exit counselorsto believe that they were brainwashed and thattheir whole experience is to be interpreted innegative terms (Lewis 1986; Solomon 1981;Wright 1987); and the media frequently gettheir stories from the ACM which then usesthe fact that the story has appeared in print asproof that it has been independently verified.There have been cases where the media haveincluded rebuttals to a story supplied to themby the ACM, which has then innocently askedwhy the question was raised in the first place,suggesting that there is no smoke without afire – even when they themselves had kindledthe fire . . .

The media

The overriding interest of the mass media is toget a good story that will keep the loyalty ofreaders, viewers, and/or listeners and, if pos-sible, to gain new audiences. They are unlikelyto be interested in presenting an everydaystory of how “ordinary” life in an NRM canbe, or even of the rewards that it offers con-tented members – unless it can expose theseas fraudulent, fantastic, or sensational. Themedia are nearly always working to a tightdeadline – very tight compared to the monthsor years that scholars may spend on theirresearch. They are also limited in the amountof time or space that they have to present theirstory. Only rarely will the electronic media

16

THE STUDY OF NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

concentrate on a single topic for more thanthirty minutes and only rarely do the printedmedia allocate mote than a few hundredwords.

Pressure of space and time means thatmembers of the media collect their data fromsources selected for accessibility and the pro-vision of good quotes. “The grieving mother”or “The man who risked prison to save a help-less victim from the clutches of a bizarre cult”are far more valuable informants than “Themother whose devotee son visits her on aregular basis,” “The Moonie who passed hisexams with good marks” – or, indeed, the aca-demic who is full of long-winded qualifica-tions. Many (though by no means all) of themedia tend, moreover, to be remarkably reluc-tant to ask members of NRMs for their ownversions of reality, and to dismiss press releasesfrom the movements far more readily thanthey dismiss the information handed out bythe ACM. This may seem somewhat surpris-ing to anyone who has researched NRMs andlearned what extraordinary statements theythemselves are capable of producing; yet onnumerous occasions when I have offered togive journalists a contact number for one ofthe movements, they have dismissed the offer,saying either that they would not get the truthor that their editors would expect them to usea more reliable source.

Unlike social scientists, the media are underno obligation to introduce comparisons toassess the relative rates of negative incidents.Thus, when reporting a tragedy or some kindof malpractice, they note in the headline thatthe victim or the perpetrator was a cultist, butare unlikely to mention it anywhere in thereport if he or she were a Methodist. Theresult is that even if such tragedies and mal-practices are relatively infrequent they wouldstill be more visible and, thereby, become dis-proportionately associated with the NRMs inthe public mind.

Not only does the logic of the aims andinterests of the media result in their seldombeing able to go into the kind of depth orensure the kind of balance that social sciencewould demand, their social position meansthat the secondary constructions that they

create are both powerful (due do their wide-spread circulation and interest-appeal) andextremely difficult to check or correct. Com-plaints and apologies can be made, but theyrarely attract as much attention as the originalstory. Usually it is difficult to track down thestory for a second look; a transient televisionreport or a story in a newspaper or magazinelong since thrown away leaves an impressionbut not something that can be scrutinized,and there are seldom references that can befollowed up. Even with more balanced pro-grams and articles, it is the more sensational-ist images that are likely to stick in the mind.It is only those programs and stories selectedby the ACM for quotation that are likely to bepreserved for recycling.

The law

The primary interest of the law as representedby a judge and, sometimes, jury, is to ensurethat justice is carried out according to the lawof the land. No attempt is made to present acomplete or balanced picture of a primaryconstruction, but only to point to thoseaspects that could be of relevance to the case.Indeed, some information (such as previousconvictions) that might be pertinent for amore general understanding are ruled out ofcourt as inadmissible evidence. As far as thedefense and the prosecution are concerned,their specific interest is to win the case for theirclients. Each side will attempt to construct apicture of reality that is advantageous to itsown position and disadvantageous to otherside. Although is might be argued that, adjudicating between two opposing sides, thejudge (or jury) would be able to reach amiddle position, there is no guarantee that amiddle position is a true position. To beginwith, we may ask, middle of what? It is thecourt that has set the goal posts and the trueposition might or might not be somewhere(anywhere) between them.

The law does make use of “expert wit-nesses” who usually present their credentialsas representatives of the scientific community,so one might, prima facie, expect the expertwitness to produce a secondary construction

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of reality that corresponds to that of the socialscientist, but in fact this is not necessarily thecase. One reason is that lawyers will invitethose witnesses who are known to hold viewsthat support their client’s case, but a morefundamental reason is that it is the court thatdecides what questions will and will not beasked and, thus, answered.

In short, the adversarial procedure is toargue for and against opposing versions ofreality, either or both of which may be grosslydistorted versions of a primary construction.This might not matter if the procedure wereused only for the purposes of the court. Butthere is plenty of evidence that decisions onone matter are frequently used by others to“prove” a version of reality that may have littlerelevance, even to what came up in the case(Barker 1989b: 197–201).

Therapists

Like defense lawyers, therapists and counselorshave an interest in helping their client. Butinstead of needing to establish their client’sversion of reality to score a public victory overan opposing version, they may need to helpthe client to construct privately a new reality that he or she can live with and feelgood about. Practices do, of course, vary enormously – many therapists will try to help the client to reach a clearer understanding ofthe primary construction in which the client isor was a participant – but it will be a practicalconstruction that has the client at its center,rather than a balanced appraisal of the groupas a whole. In fact, therapists who have beeninterested enough in NRMs to attend theINFORM counseling seminars will, when aparticular client is referred to them, ask not tobe given background information such as adetailed account of the movement in question.This is because they feel that it might interferewith their relationship with the client – itwould be a kind of betrayal to hear a point ofview other than that of the client.

Let me be quite clear, this is not a criticismof these therapists who play an effective rolein their clients’ recovery from difficult experi-ences. It is merely to point out that they have

a different aim from social scientists and will,therefore, use different methods and employdifferent kinds of knowledge; the secondaryconstruction of the therapist can be differentfrom but complementary to that of the socialscientist. Conflicts between the two construc-tors emerge, however, when counselors andtherapists claim to know what a particularmovement – or NRMs in general – are likethrough their client-focused work. This islikely to arise when therapists give evidence asexpert witnesses in court or present theirstories to the media and/or at public meet-ings. Again, there would be no conflict if thestories were confined to descriptions of waysin which people might be helped rather thanclaims being made that these are proven accu-rate, balanced portrayals of the primary con-struction as they come from a “professional”source. They are, of course, from a profes-sional source, but, as with the court, the profession is not one that aims primarily toconstruct an accurate and balanced account.

Two of the main situations in which coun-selors and therapists have crossed swords withsociologists are (a) over the so-called brain-washing or mind-control thesis (see above)and (b) over allegations of ritual satanic abuse.Studies in the latter area have revealed a con-siderable body of evidence showing that ther-apists may not only help clients to construct asecondary version of reality, but some con-struct a version of reality themselves, and thenput considerable pressure on the client toaccept it (Mulhern 1984; Richardson et al.1991; but see also Houston 1993: 9).

Beyond the Ivory Tower

Although social science cannot claim to be as“scientific” as the natural sciences, it isunquestionably more scientific than its com-petitors. The logic of its approach is infinitelysuperior for producing balanced and accurateaccounts of NRMs than is that of any of its competitors. Undifferentiated relativism, asespoused by some of the exponents of decon-structionism and postmodernism, seems to meto be just plain silly. The rules of science (even

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loosely characterized as in this paper) are notmerely a language game; they are an assuranceof a minimal, albeit limited, epistemologicalstatus. We would be crazy to argue that any-thing goes – some things are patently false, andempirical observation can demonstrate this toanyone with their faculties in good workingorder. Assuredly, some statements (moral eval-uations and claims about the supernatural) are not empirically testable and it would beequally crazy to believe that we could prove ordisprove them to someone holding a differentopinion. But such statements are not withinthe purview of social science. I am not sug-gesting that social science holds a monopolyon The Truth. Far from it. But I am suggest-ing that the methods of social science (itsopenness to criticism and empirical testingand, above all, its use of the comparativemethod) ought to ensure that it produces amore balanced and more useful account thanthat of its competitors for seeing the waythings are and the way things might be – notfor deciding how they ought to be, but forimplementing decisions about how they oughtto be.

Should social scientists get involved with theuse to which their secondary constructions areput and, thereby, become part of the primaryconstruction of the wider “cult scene” notmerely for methodological reasons (as dis-cussed earlier), but for ethical or political pur-poses? Is such involvement compatible with,inimical to, or a question of indifference forthe scientific study of religion? What if, in thecourse of our research, we frequently comeacross misunderstandings, misinformation,and/or gross distortions that appear to causeunnecessary suffering and are related to asubject that we have been investigating bymethods that we believe to be superior tothose that have given rise to the errors? Whatif we find that there are people who, claiminga professional expertise, maintain that theyhave arrived at certain conclusion using thescientific method, yet they provide no testableevidence, and we suspect that the scientificmethod not only does not, but could not,produce such conclusions? Should we not . . .fight ignorance, exploitation, and prejudice or

at least correct inaccurate statements in ourown field? Or do we just publish our misgiv-ings . . . on the chance that someone elsemight read what we have written and use it tochallenge the alternative versions?

I know of nothing in the scientific enterprisethat suggests social scientists ought to champion their versions of reality in the marketplace. At the same time, I know ofnothing intrinsic to science that would pro-scribe such involvement. Indeed, those of uswho have felt drawn to use the secondary con-structs of the social scientific study of religionare, rightly or wrongly, of the opinion that wehave as much right as anyone (and more relevant knowledge than many) not only topromote the social scientific perspective, but also to question others’ secondary con-structions when we consider them to be eitherinaccurate or biased.

But life is not that simple. As we stepoutside the relative protection of the IvoryTower, we can find ourselves being affected byour competitors. I have already intimated that,while our presence is welcomed by some, itposes a threat to others. But it poses a threatto us too – not just the unpleasantness of theways we are sometimes attacked, but a moreinsidious threat to the very meta-values andmethods that can give us the edge over ourcompetitors.

What I want to explore for the rest of thispaper are some ways in which the very fact thatwe become actors in a competitive marketmeans that we come under pressure to incor-porate some of our competitors’ interests andmethods into our own practices. We are indanger of letting our competitors define ouragenda.

The means by which the different secondaryconstructors sell their wares is of crucial significance for their success or failure, and thefirst hurdle social scientists face is how to setup a stall in a good position in the market-place. When social scientists have completedtheir research they are quite likely to publishthe results in scholarly books or journals whichmay sit on dusty shelves with few save othersocial scientists being aware of their existence.. . . [These writings] might give rise to

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internal debates, but if we are not heard byoutsiders not only may we be missing somevaluable feedback, we are also likely to beexcluding ourselves from making any differ-ence to “the cult scene.”

We may need to be more conscious than isour wont that what we present should comeacross as being of relevance for the audience wewant to reach. I am not suggesting that wefudge our results so that they are acceptable. Onthe contrary, I am suggesting that, like the actorplaying a bore, we need to present our resultsso that they are understandable and heard,whether or not they are welcomed – especially,perhaps, if we suspect that they are not goingto be welcomed . . . to those who with no par-ticular axe to grind, are interested in accurateand balanced accounts of NRMs. But how canwe make our construction available withoutjeopardizing the integrity of our account?

Playing their game

The most obvious way to disseminate ourversion is to cooperate with the mass media,and there are plenty of producers and jour-nalists who are willing, even eager, to use ourinformation. But, as we have seen, their mainobjective is to have a gripping story. How dowe collaborate? On their terms or ours? Thereis a limit to the number of “on the one hand. . . on the other hands”, ‘howevers”, or“nonetheless’s” that they can accommodate.How much of a price must we be prepared topay? Do we hope, as with the abstract to anarticle, that the absence of qualification ismade up for by the wide and clear dissemina-tion of the main points?

What about our being misquoted? We learnthrough hard experience which are the moreunreliable media – and it is nearly always thosewho are getting our story second or thirdhand; few (though some) members of themedia deliberately misrepresent their infor-mants. There are, however, some who dodeliberately mislead us to “set us up to put usdown.” We have no control over the editingof what we say – and others say about us. Evenin a live broadcast it can be extremely difficultto get across one’s actual position if misrepre-

sented or suddenly attacked for something wehave never done. We can protest, but most ofus tend to be so taken aback that we find our-selves unable to think up an effective response– until we are off-air. Apart form beingextremely frustrating and unpleasant, suchexperiences can make one wonder whetheragreeing to take part in any program is notsimply counterproductive.

But such behavior is the exception ratherthan the rule (and antagonistic programs oftenelicit more letters of support than protest).What is more to the point here is that we donot react to the pressures of media interests orthe competition of ACM interests by allowingourselves to slip into facile generalizations forthe sake of a good sound bite, that we do notmake cheap jokes at the expense of someoneelse’s beliefs, that we do not pass judgmentsabout which are the “good” and which the“bad” cults – which is not to say that wecannot report that in movement X they carryout child sacrifice, in Y they have weekly sexorgies, and in Z they pray to little green menin flying saucers – so long, of course, that what we say is true and we make it clear that the other 99.9 percent of NRMs do notdo such things. The media usually give us an opportunity to put things in contextthrough comparisons, although I have beenasked not to quote Luke 14 :26, as it resultsin so many angry denials that Jesus ever saidsuch a thing.

Our relationship with the courts is in somerespects like that with the media. It is theywho are largely in control of both the contentand the context of what is transmitted. It isthey who ask the questions. If we do not bowto their interests, they will ignore us and, inall likelihood, turn to our competitors. If ourunbiased perspective results in our givingresponses in court that are helpful to one side on one occasion but damaging on another occasion, lawyers brand us as “unreli-able” or “whore witnesses.” There can betemptation to say just what the side that callsus (pays us) wants us to say, collaborating inthe suppression of relative information or dis-torting with sophistry the position of theother side.

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Taking sides or sitting on the fence?

A more subtle problem arises when, trying toappear balanced, we become unbalanced.Broad-minded and liberal media often ask usto give an objective and balanced point of viewin the middle – which usually means halfwaybetween an NRM and the ACM. But, as wasintimated when discussing legal constructions,to give a balanced account is not necessarily tobe in the middle. Science is not summing twoextreme positions and dividing by two. Some-times one “side” is right – but to say so maybe seen, even by ourselves, as “taking sides.”Indeed, a question that is constantly posed byboth competitors and potential buyers is“whose side are you on?” The social scientist’sanswer might be “the side of accuracy andbalance,” but we find ourselves being pushedand pulled in a number of directions. Some ofus hold back information because we fear thatwe might be taken to court and, even if wefeel confident that we could eventually vindi-cate what we say, it could still cost us a lot oftime and money. Sometimes it is the produceror publisher who does not dare risk a courtcase and we do not want the hassle of findinga bolder (or perhaps more foolhardy) pro-ducer or publisher.

While codes of ethics have been produced byprofessional organizations (the British Socio-logical Association has such a code), there aregray areas where our personal feelings mayincline us one way rather than another. We maynot want to betray confidences about individ-ual informants. This is normally not too greata problem as we can usually find some way topreserve a person’s anonymity while incorpo-rating the information if it is of importance. ButI have given information to the police or otherauthorities, such as the Charity Commissionersor the social services, or, occasionally, to themore reputable media when I have learned ofcriminal or anti-social activities. Has this beena betrayal of trust? Would not telling not be abetrayal of another kind of trust? I believe thatany citizens in a democratic country, be theysocial scientists or not, have a duty to othermembers of society not to allow criminal orharmful behavior to go unquestioned, but it is

not always easy to see how widely one shoulddisseminate this information. One may want toalert the public to potential problems, but onealso needs to be aware that, irresponsibly used,such information might lead to greaterdamage. Evangelical countercultists alertingthe public to the dangers of ritual satanic abusehave provided us with a salutary warning(Richardson et al. 1991).

The NRMs we study are likely to want us totake their side – several of them have actuallyapproached social scientists because theybelieved that, even if we do not do a “white-wash,” we shall at least be fairer to them thanmost other constructors (Barker 1984: 151995: 176). To a greater or lesser extent, wehave been subjected to “love-bombing,” hintsof eternal damnation and/or emotional black-mail. Such techniques tend to be counter-suggestive for seasoned researchers, anddespite the fact that some NRMs many try toconvert us, we are unlikely to start promotingtheir beliefs, proclaiming Moon the messiah orBerg an Endtime prophet. Nonetheless, thevery fact that they give us time, that we accepttheir hospitality (be it a cup of tea or anexpenses-paid conference), might make us feelbeholden to them. But then, we might feelequally or more beholden to their parents andothers whom we also meet in the course of ourinvestigations – and, perhaps, to society as awhole. Certainly, the fact that we are fellowhuman beings means that as we get to knowthose whom we are studying as individuals wemay make friends (or, conversely, may generateantagonisms). We may come to feel protectiveand when we see them attacked unfairly cometo their defense. There is nothing wrong in thisif we are merely introducing into the scene anaccurate and balanced version of the NRMreality, but what would be reprehensibleaccording to the canons of science is if, feelingbound by friendship or loyalty to “our” NRM,we promote what we know from our researchto be a biased version of the truth.

More frequently, I suspect, we have heldback information for the scientifically ques-tionable reason that we felt that the way infor-mation would be used would be unacceptableto us. Here I am referring less to a “pull” from

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the NRM than to a “push” from the ACM orsections of the media. We have learned fromexperience that the negative aspects we reportwill be taken out of context and added to thelist of “bad things that cults do,” while themore positive aspects will be ignored or takenas proof that we have been deceived or bo