crossroads and conflict: security and foreign influences in the caucasus: an azeri perspective

Crossroads and Conflict: Security andForeign Influences in the Caucasus:

An Azeri Perspective

ELKHAN E. NURIYEV

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, regional conflicts in theCaucasus have threatened to deny Western access to the vital oiland gas reserves the world will need in the twenty-first century. Attimes, these violent conflicts have blocked the transit routes to theWest for Caspian and Central Asian oil and gas. Consequently,current conflicts in the Caucasus are affecting oil politics andtransit routes to the world market. Furthermore, ethnic tensionsand complex conflicts have elevated any other security threatslurking on the horizon. Long-term stability in the Caucasus is,hence, crucial not only to nation-building efforts, but also toregional and international security.

INTRODUCTION

In the final years of the Soviet Union, the Caucasus gained widerecognition as the location of disputed territories and armed conflicts.The region's chronic instability was viewed by the world as a morass ofethnic conflicts and bloody power struggles. Despite the idea that theNagorno-Karabakh conflict triggered a chain of destabilizing events thatled to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and accelerated theliberation of the former Soviet republics, in fact it was a distraction forthe countries of the Caucasus and central Asia. It distorted the strugglefor sovereignty and independence from Moscow and totalitarian ruleinto a bloody war over patches of territory, and started a chain of warsand conflicts all over the territory of the former Soviet Union. Thus,democratic processes, market economy efforts and constructive politicaland social developments were obstructed by the ethnic and territorialconflicts in the region.1

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the newlyindependent states of the Caucasus, including Armenia, Azerbaijan andGeorgia, have searched for ways to provide for the development of amarket economy, political stability and regional security.

Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol.1, No.3 (September 2001) pp.153-164PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

154 SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES

In the post-Soviet era, as the leaders and foreign policy elites inMoscow examine the real power situation in the international arena, thesignificance of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) territory(the so-called 'near abroad') becomes abundantly clear to them.

The former satellite states in eastern Europe are scrambling tobecome part of the Western economic, democratic and security systems.Western Europe and the United States have maintained their strongstrategic ties, emanating from their membership in the European Unionand NATO.2

The only remaining region in which Russia wants to strengthen itsstrategic significance as a great power is its immediate neighbourhood,the geopolitical setting of the CIS. The Kremlin knows full well that thesecurity of Russia is inextricably linked to political developments in theformer Soviet territories. In order to emerge as a great power, Russiawants to concentrate on building closer strategic ties with the formerSoviet republics. Russia insists that the newly independent states shouldnot only retain but also strengthen security arrangements with Moscow.The main purpose of these arrangements is to make sure that these statesdo not develop security relations with NATO, Western democracies andespecially the United States.

There are currently many serious concerns about broader strategicissues in the Caucasus, including oil and pipeline politics in the CaspianBasin, the military and political situation in Chechnya, the ongoingconflicts in the geopolitical setting of the Caucasus, the role of theRussian military, Russia's strategic relations with Iran, and, of course,increasing US and NATO engagements in this area of the world.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Caucasus has emerged as a pivotalgeostrategic area, in which the United States, Russia, Iran, Turkey andmany other outside countries are competing for influence and power.

What is going on in the Caucasus? What are the difficulties andproblems on the way to regional cooperation in the Caucasus and theCaspian Basin? What political future lies in store for this former Sovietterritory? Will it be a region of peace, trust and cooperation, or a zoneof chronic conflicts, rivalry and suspicion?

These questions are closely interrelated. The answers to them willdetermine the fate of these nascent states for the next several decades. Iraise them because the ongoing geopolitical game remains a seriouschallenge for great and regional powers, as well as for the newlyindependent states and the many other countries within the post-SovietCaucasus region and in the southern tier as a whole.

SECURITY AND FOREIGN INFLUENCES IN THE CAUCASUS 155

HISTORICAL GEOPOLITICAL IMPORTANCE

The Caucasus region, with its more than 50 indigenous peoples andlanguages and controversial boundaries, has been resisting thehegemonic expansions within one of the most puzzling and anarchic'games' in history. Consequently, the policies of 'Russification','Ottomanism' and 'Persian expansion' have only been temporarilysuccessful and have left the region prone to instability owing to endlessrivalries. The region has traditionally been volatile because ofcompetition between Russia and Persia, China or Great Britain. Duringthe First World War, after the collapse of the Russian Empire, the desireto control Baku's oilfields caused fierce competition among German,Turkish and British forces. During the Second World War, the oilfieldswere a strategic objective in Nazi Germany's campaign against the SovietUnion.3

Azerbaijan, as part of the Caucasus region and central Asia, has overmany centuries been a kind of arena for confrontation, and was theobject of disputes and wars between many powers, especially the threeregional powers: Iran, Turkey and Russia. Western players have alwayshad an interest in the region; they came to the region for a short periodof time and left it.

Analysis of the history of the region reveals an extremely complicatedand problematic historical and political inheritance that has made theCaucasus one of the most unstable world regions, even during the age ofthe great empires. Control over the energy resources and export routesout of the Eurasian hinterland is quickly becoming one of the centralissues in post-Cold War politics. Similar to the 'Great Game' of the latenineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which pitted British interestsagainst those of the Russian Empire and the German Reich, a newgeopolitical game in the Transcaucasus and Eurasia has emerged after thecollapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This new version of the 'GreatGame' differs from the original nineteenth century version betweenRussia and Great Britain in that this version has more players, includingRussia, Iran, Turkey and the Western democracies. Today's struggleinvolves oil and geopolitics as well as many state and non-state actors.Consequently, the region is again in a very complicated situation, as itwas in the early twentieth century, and, most importantly, the region isnow in a geopolitical shambles, owing to the unstable transition periodthat followed the breakup of the USSR and to its abundant, unexploitednatural resources.4

In fact, the collapse of the Soviet Union has created a uniqueopportunity for the countries of the Caucasus - Armenia, Azerbaijan and


Georgia - to play a new and significant role as independent forcesbetween the dominant Eurasian power in the north, Russia, and the rivalpowers in the south, Turkey and Iran. With the disintegration of theSoviet Union and the founding of the new independent states in theregion, the three most powerful countries - Russia, Iran and Turkey -gained vast opportunities for cooperation and partnership with theirnew neighbours. At the same time, they faced new challenges as severalarmed conflicts erupted in the region. Inevitably these affected regionalpowers and the geopolitical situation in the CIS.

Regional conflicts in the Caucasus threaten to deny Western access tothe vital oil and gas reserves the world will need in the twenty-firstcentury. At times, these violent conflicts have blocked the transit routesto the West for Caspian and central Asian oil and gas. Consequently,regional conflicts in the geopolitical setting of the CIS are affecting oilpolitics and transit routes to the world market. Moreover, the ongoingconflicts prevent the Caucasian states from engaging in mutuallybeneficial processes of interaction and economic cooperation.

History has now given the countries of the Caucasus a chance to actas a bridge between north and south and as a major transportation andcommunication link between east and west. Whether these countries willsucceed as an independent force will depend heavily on the capabilitiesand ingenuity of their leaders. Success will also depend on the role thatRussia, Turkey and Iran will play. If these powerful neighbours pursueconstructive policies toward the region and contribute to itsdevelopment, the countries of the Caucasus will have a good chance ofsuccess. If, however, traditional hegemonic policies predominate, theregion may succumb again to domination by its powerful neighbours.

AN OVERVIEW OF COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN THE CAUCASUS

Ethnic conflicts, humanitarian crisis, instability, porous boundaries andregional disintegration are serious problems in which the Caucasianstates are becoming more and more involved. Many nations in theCaucasus region are still trapped in terrible conflicts and have not foundlasting peace and stability. These conflicts, which until recently havedevastated the Caucasus, have taken a heavy toll in terms of human lives.Many refugees still live in squalid conditions, and there is thereforegrowing pressure to address the problem. In addition to the above, theongoing conflict in Chechnya, which is still an acute problem and asource of instability for Russia and, generally speaking, the southernborder region of the Russian Federation, increasingly resembles Lebanonor former Yugoslavia, complete with hostages, refugees and vendettas.


On the other hand, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is one of themost serious conflicts in the CIS space. Armenian forces, along with theforces of the self-styled 'Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh', continue tooccupy 20 per cent of Azerbaijani territory. A fragile ceasefire halted thefighting in 199A.5 Since then, the peace process has continued. However,the conflict remains unresolved and peace talks are deadlocked. Thereare one million Azerbaijani refugees and internally displaced persons(IDPs) who cannot return to their homes. Ethnic Azeris from the part ofAzerbaijan controlled by Armenian forces are prevented from returningto their homes by a heavily militarized ruling structure. This increasinglycomplicates the peace process and results in a situation of no war, yet nopeace in the conflicting area.

Azerbaijan, an oil-rich republic, also remains very concerned aboutRussian-Armenian military cooperation. The Azerbaijanis fear that theArmenians are preparing to attack them with support from Russia.Recent arms transfers played a crucial role in Armenia's seizure of largeareas of Azerbaijan, resulting in a million refugees, more than from anyother armed conflict in Europe since the Second World War. Thetremendous imbalance created by the illegal arms shipments is anextremely destabilizing development that actually threatens not onlyAzerbaijan but other neighbouring countries as well.

Nevertheless, during the recent meeting in Yalta, Ukraine, bothArmenian President Robert Kocharian and Azerbaijani President HeidarAliyev confirmed that they had agreed to continue the dialogue to try tohammer a final peace settlement to the long-lasting Karabakh conflict.While reiterating their commitment to peace, both presidents repeatedlysaid that they should settle the conflict peacefully through mutualcompromises.'

Meanwhile, competition between the West and Russia over mediationof the conflict creates serious geopolitical difficulties for the stability anddevelopment of the region. Russia, as the successor to the USSR, is keento maintain its economic and political influence on the former republics.The conflicts in the southern tier, in Chechnya, between Azerbaijan andArmenia, in Georgia and in Tajikistan, have all been influenced or directlyexacerbated by Moscow and the Russian army.7 For that reason, it is quiteclear that behind the calls for peaceful resolution, theArmenian-Azerbaijani conflict remains part of Russia's ruthless attemptto keep the Caucasus weak, unstable and divided - and to prevent an oilroute from materializing. All Moscow wants is to dominate in the regionand always keep the Caucasus in its own sphere of influence. Thus,solutions to the conflicts depend not only on the warring parties but alsoon whether the great powers can resolve conflict between themselves. It


would be a mistake to believe that the Kremlin will work closely with theUnited States, OSCE and the UN to settle conflicts in order to bring aboutlasting peace and stability in the region, which is absolutely essential forthe Caucasus region. The recent events in Chechnya, as well as themilitary and political situation in the Caucasus, clearly attest to this fact.In short, there are many serious obstacles to the long-term stability anddevelopment of the Caucasian states.8

We still have no answer on one important question: whether theWestern democracies and regional powers can work closely to create abalanced interplay of international competition in the Caucasus region.The resolution of the ongoing conflicts will depend on how successfullythe international community absorbs the lessons of the recent war informer Yugoslavia and the conflict in the Middle East, and creates theexternal conditions necessary for conflict resolution in the Caucasus,provided that the leaders and people of these countries refer, not to thepast or present, but to their common future.

CASPIAN OIL AND FOREIGN INFLUENCES IN THE CAUCASUS

Any discussion of conflict resolution in the Caucasus would be remiss ifit did not discuss oil developments in the Caspian Basin and this newsource of energy supply in the twenty-first century. Since the dissolutionof the USSR, hydrocarbon resources - specifically, oil and gas reserves -have been identified as perhaps the most important source of economicrevival for the Newly Independent States (NIS). This has been especiallytrue for Azerbaijan, whose population is dwarfed by its massive energyreserves. In the past several years, a series of events on the energy fronthas contributed to a palpable shift in Azerbaijan's prospects for realizingsubstantial energy revenues in the near future as well as in its respectivestrategic orientation.9

The transportation of Caspian energy resources to internationalmarkets is one of the most controversial and pressing issues in the globaleconomic integration process. The region's vast oil and gas reserves havecaught the attention of Russia, the United States and many otherpowerful countries, which are all competing for influence in theCaucasus and central Asia. These struggles force leaders and policy-makers in the Transcaucasus and central Asia to consider the positions ofgreat powers while crafting their foreign policies. The current strugglefor energy resources in the Caspian Basin is a complex of security,geopolitical and economic variables.

At present, the key question for many oil businesses and politicians is,what is the real future of pipeline politics in Azerbaijan, the Caucasus


and in Eurasia? The Western participants in Azerbaijani and Kazakhstanipipeline projects frequently raise an interesting, yet sensitive question:will Russia dominate the development of Eurasian oil and its exports inan alliance with the radical regime of Iran, or will Russia be an equal andfair player in the region, together with Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,Georgia, Turkmenistan and possibly, in the future, Iran? Another issuehas gained the attention of the major US companies working inAzerbaijan under the oil consortia, namely, which route across theCaucasus can ensure a reliable flow of oil to world petroleum markets?The question of the routes and relative centrality of various existing andfuture oil pipelines for transporting Caspian oil has thus emerged as oneof the hottest issues in the Caucasus and central Asia. Azerbaijan lookslike first big winner in the Caspian oil race. Since the Azerbaijanigovernment faces some geopolitical obstacles, and considering thatsecurity issues are crucial in the region, Baku has proposed that a systemof several pipelines be used in the region. In other words, it is muchbetter to have an alternative not dependent on one single route.International consortium AIOC (Azerbaijan International OperatingCompany) started oil exports on 12 November 1997 through the firstpipeline, from Baku to Novorossiysk on Russia's Black Sea coast, andwithin a year through the second pipeline, from Baku to Supsa on theGeorgian Black Sea coast, both totalling 10 million tonnes a year. Thethird pipeline is a 1,080-mile pipeline designed to carry Caspian Sea oilfrom Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey's Mediterranean port ofCeyhan. The pipeline, estimated to cost $2.4 bn, could be finished asearly as 2004. Russia, meanwhile, has lobbied heavily for theBaku-Novorossiysk pipeline that comes through its territory to carryboth Caspian Sea oil and Kazakh oil from Tengiz, where the US oilcompany Chevron has a prominent stake.10

Because of its geopolitical location, abundant natural resources andpolitical circumstances, Azerbaijan will be at the very centre ofinternational politics and diplomacy for years to come. All of itsneighbours maintain a strong interest in what happens to Azerbaijan.Russia claims the Caucasus as her legitimate sphere of influence, and hasconcerns about security on her southern border, the possible spread ofIslamic fundamentalism (that is, Iranian influence), and the potentialalliance of Turkey with the new secular Islamic states in the region.Finally, Russia is deeply suspicious and resentful of US 'encroachments'that promote democracy and development in the 'near abroad'. Russiaalso has economic interests and claims regarding the energy resources ofthe Caspian Basin. Needless to say, Russia would like to see pipelinestransport these resources to or through Russia. Much of what happens


in Russia will have a significant impact on Azerbaijan as well as on theCaucasus and on the whole NIS, but which way will Russia go?

Today, Russia benefits from the state of 'frozen instability' in theCaucasus, which hinders the development of viable and lucrativeexporting routes for the oil consortia in the area. Moscow has gonebeyond words in establishing its power in the Caucasus. Russia is activelypursuing a policy of military basing in the region in order to place itselfin a position of exclusive control over all future pipelines in theCaucasus.11

Clearly, Russia has important interests and will continue to play anactive role in the region. Throughout its history, Russia has tended tocompare itself to other nations and compete with other powerfulcountries, both in the east and the west. It seems that this tendency is stillpart of Russian policy-making. Russia is trying to restore its hegemony,and is actively, yet subtly, competing for influence over its neighbours.Russia's fate currently depends upon how its internal politics play outand shape its future. Russia is presently at a crossroads, and has to makea historic choice as to whether it will seek to become a Europeandemocracy or a huge empire again. In any case, and despite which ofthese outcomes occur, it can be said with certainty that the RussianFederation wants to ensure its economic and political influence in theNIS. Russian politicians know well that the natural resources of theCaspian Sea and Azerbaijan make it a geopolitically important region.Ignoring Russian interests will have dire consequences for Azerbaijan, forRussia could easily manipulate ethnic factions within Azerbaijan and useits leverage over Armenia to start a war between Armenia andAzerbaijan. Russia might also join forces with Iran to impede naturalresource development in Azerbaijan.

Turkey is another important regional player, since much of theCaspian oil will have to go through the Bosporus Straits. Turkey wantsthe pipeline to go through the Transcaucasus to its port of Ceyhan.Although it has strong linguistic and cultural ties to the Caucasus andcentral Asia, and it sees Azerbaijan and the central Asian countries asnatural allies in a loose confederation of secular Muslim republics,Turkey will have less impact in the region than other powers. Turkey isgrappling with its own internal economic and political problems.Nevertheless, its geopolitical position gives Turkey a significantadvantage over other players in the region. The lure of the oil potentialin the region and the need for transportation to Western markets provideadded incentive for involvement. However, Turkey's influence in boththe Caucasus and central Asia is limited by its inability to provide thesignificant support needed by the newly independent states.


Iran, another historic player in the 'Great Game', has economic andideological interests throughout the Caucasus and central Asia. Iran is ina geostrategically sensitive and significant position between central Asia,the Indian Ocean, the Transcaucasus and Turkey. Iran sees itself in acompetitive position with Turkey. Iran also has great concerns aboutwhat happens in Azerbaijan and in the Caspian Basin region. A strong,politically independent, secular, pro-Western and pro-AmericanAzerbaijan is not in Iran's interest. Iran's territorial integrity couldindeed be threatened if the 20 million Azeris living in Iran find adeveloped Azerbaijan increasingly attractive. Yet by developing its energyresources and emerging as a strong petroleum-producing country,Azerbaijan will enter into competition with Iran. Azerbaijani ties with theUS, Turkey and Israel will decrease Iran's influence in the region;nevertheless, Azerbaijan must make a concerted effort not to isolate Iran,lest Iran and Russia cultivate a strategic alliance that could threatenAzerbaijan's status as an independent republic. Isolation could also bringabout enhanced rapprochement between Iran and Armenia, which hasalready been taking place in the last few years. Because of the dangerinherent in such a policy, Azerbaijan should pursue cooperation withIran.

The United States is the final important player in the region, despiteits remoteness. Questions related to oil supplies, gas reserves and thesecurity of energy supplies are of vital national, economic andgeostrategic interest to the US. Azerbaijan is, therefore, an importantcountry, and the southern tier of the NIS a crucial geopolitical location.While Russian companies will be able to bid on contracts, the West wantsto ensure that the Caucasus and central Asia remain independent,secular, Muslim countries. It is the tensions between the US and Russia,and the US and Iran, that are forcing political alignments in theCaucasus.

The United States has become more active in the Caucasus andcentral Asia over the past several years. Azerbaijan considers the UnitedStates one of its main partners in the international system, and has firmlyaligned itself with the West. There is a growing chorus of support in theUS to cement the alliance, since political and economic relations betweenthe US and Azerbaijan are important not only for the parties involved butalso from the regional security standpoint.12 Baku believes that USobjectives in the region will promote political and economicindependence and ensure that Caspian oil does not come under the solecontrol of Russia. Moreover, Azerbaijan's ability to survive as anindependent state, and to build democratic institutions, will largelydepend upon the presence of the West and the support of the US


for Azerbaijan. The United States should therefore reinforce support forthe independence of Azerbaijan, and this support should be at the verycentre of US strategy toward the Caucasus region.

The United States' recent activity in Azerbaijan has focused onstrengthening regional economic mechanisms, developing east-westenergy and transportation processes, and supporting conflict resolutionefforts. However, I believe that there is little understanding on the partof the United States of the various reasons for conflict in the region.Although the US is one of the biggest players in the region, it is still quiteuninformed about basic issues within the Caucasus and in thegeopolitical setting of the CIS. The United States is attempting to play amore assertive role in the resolution of the armed conflicts, but it has adifficult task, since Russia considers the Caucasus to be within its sphereof influence. Although the Clinton administration made the resolution ofthe Nagorno-Karabakh conflict a top foreign policy priority, US policytowards Russia's behaviour in the Caucasus is still vague. Russia does notwant to see the United States as a major arbitrator in the region. Russiadoes not want to leave the Caucasus, and therefore is manipulating manyof the conflicts in the Caucasus to prevent the states in the region frommoving out of Russia's orbit. A weak, unstable and divided Caucasus iscurrently in Russia's interest, and Moscow wants to prove to the worldcommunity that the nations in this region are not capable of self-rule.

Although Russia's reasonable interests are completely understandableand should, of course, be respected, the United States needs to ensure freeand fair access for all interested parties to the oilfields of the Caucasus andcentral Asia. The United States should strongly support security, free-market reforms and democracy in the Caucasus. The United States shouldstart thinking of how to secure its priorities in order to maintain peace,long-term stability and security in the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin. Itis in the interest of the United States to support its allies in the Caucasus.In light of the Russian efforts to snuff out democratic forces and controlthe Caspian Sea's lucrative oil reserves, the United States needs to devise anew strategy about how to protect its own interests in the region, a strategywhich will undoubtedly allow it to protect its vital future multi-billion-dollar investments in energy resources.

CONCLUSION

Political instability is very bad for business. The ongoing uncertaintyabout regional stability and peace is indeed something to be consideredvery carefully by all countries involved in the pipeline debate and NATOexpansion. Security issues are becoming very crucial in the region,


particularly the security for the planned Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline routeand the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. Furthermore, both these routes maybe impossible to build without the United States playing somegeopolitical role. Such US involvement in the region's economy willdeter Russia and Iran from dominating their smaller pro-Westernneighbours. There might be extensive US and NATO intervention in theregion and opposing blocs may emerge as a result. In this respect, manywill be concerned about Russia's reaction if unilateral policies arepursued or multilateral policies are enacted that exclude or attempt tomarginalize Russia. This will be a very difficult, but perhaps notimpossible, task for the United States.

The Caucasus, with its large natural resources and a huge market ofmore than 200 million people, could develop into a region of peace andprosperity. It could also become a huge area of economic, social andpolitical instability, which would negatively affect the future of thisregion and the world. Therefore, the Western democracies and regionalpowers should work much more closely to create a balanced interplay ofinternational competition in the Caucasus and in Eurasia as a whole."

Compromise must replace competition in the pipeline interests;otherwise a more provoked Caucasus will bring poverty and bloodshedto everyone in the region, with no clear winner. Conflict resolution inthe Caucasus will depend on how successfully great powers seek to endthe competition for primacy and control in the region. The great powersshould foster cooperation instead of maintaining competition in theregion. The Caucasus, too, should choose conciliation overconfrontation. All parties should think of what can be done to preventhistory from repeating itself. We are talking here about the future of theregion and the character of the new century's international relations. Weare talking here about the ongoing geopolitical game, which is quicklybecoming a paramount challenge for great powers' policy making for thetwenty-first century.14

In the last decade, Russia and the United States have experienced thebreakdown of a bipolar system. As these two great powers approach thetwenty-first century, they are faced with new geopolitical challenges in amultipolar world. With political changes brought by the end of the ColdWar, the need for the United States and Russia to work together isgreater than ever before. It is therefore vital that both Russia and theUnited States, along with their friends and allies, make significantcontributions to reducing geopolitical tensions, resolving regionalconflicts and building a lasting world peace.

Now is the time for clearer and faster policy solutions. The UnitedStates, Russia and other key players should make the appropriatedecisions without delay. Tomorrow may be too late.


NOTES

This is an earlier version of the article which is based on a presentation at the HalkiInternational Seminar 2000, organized by the Hellenic Foundation for European andForeign Policy (ELIAMEP), in Halki, Greece, 6-13 September 2000. For a more detailedanalysis of this issue, see Nuriyev, Elkhan E. (2000), 'The Post-Soviet Caucasus Within NewGeopolitical Framework: Towards Conflict or Peace?', working paper 3, ArbeitsstelleFriedensforschung Bonn (AFB), Bonn.

1. Nuriyev, Elkhan E. (1997a): Sovremennaya Mezhdunarodnaya Politika: Problemy iVoprosy, Baku, Azerbaijan: Western University Press, pp.47-78 (in Russian).

2. 'Itogi' broadcast, NTV Russian television network, 4 Oct. 1998.3. Nuriyev, Elkhan E. (1997b): 'Geopolitics and Regional Conflicts in the Caucasus',

Conference paper presented at International Eurasian Congress on Environment andPeace, Giresun, Turkey, 2-9 August 1997.

4. Ibid.5. Tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan escalated in 1988 and full-scale war broke

out in 1992. The 1994 truce ended the war, which was the first serious ethnic conflicton former Soviet territory, and in which over 20,000 people were killed.

6. Armenpress, 22 Aug. 2000.7. Jones, Scott (2000): 'Introduction', in Gary K. Bertsch, Cassady B. Craft, Scott A.

Jones and Michael Beck (eds.), Crossroads and Conflict: Security and Foreign Policy inthe Caucasus and Central Asia, New York: Routledge, p. 14.

8. Nuriyev, Elkhan E. (2000): 'Conflicts, Caspian Oil, and NATO: Major Pieces of theCaucasus Puzzle', in ibid., p.145.

9. Nuriyev, Elkhan E. (1999): 'The Ongoing Geopolitical Game in the Caucasus and theCaspian Basin: Towards War or Peace?', Public Lecture at the Monterey Institute ofInternational Studies, Monterey, CA, 18 Feb. 1999.

10. Associated Press, 1 Sept. 2000.11. Nuriyev (1997b).12. Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Counselor, Center for Strategic and International

Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC, 20 Dec. 1996.13. Nuriyev, Elkhan E. (1998): 'The Caucasus Region and the New Geopolitics of Great

Powers: The Struggle for Caspian Oil', Public lecture at the Kennan Institute forAdvanced Russian Studies, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,Washington, DC, 6 Oct. 1998.

14. Nuriyev (1999).

crossroads and conflict: security and foreign influences in the caucasus: an azeri perspective

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