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Crisis in Darfur Volume I Issue II ! Spring 2012 36 Crisis in Darfur: Mass Murder and the Political Inconvenience of Genocide in the Modern World Tyler Jones Indiana University Genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass killings, ethnocide, and democide: call it what you will, the humanitarian crisis in the Darfur is one of the worst on record with more than 1.8 million people displaced through attacks by government-endorsed militias and Sudanese armed forces. 1 The International community is obligated to act to halt the Genocide in Darfur but has failed to uphold their promise of: “Never again.” This paper will contend that the world has identified the genocide in Darfur but refuses to acknowledge it because of the burden the acknowledgement would bring economically and politically. This paper will reinforce this argument with the following methodology: an examination of the obligations of all UN members via treaties, a general history and exposition of the evidence of Genocide in Darfur, an examination of the restraints which limit a country’s ability to intervene, and lastly updates on current aid and involvement in Darfur. The history of laws concerning Genocide is recent, in part due to the only recent observance of Genocide as a crime. It was only after World War II, after the Holocaust, after one of the most climactic acts of human depravity ever undertaken in history, when any legal body in the world had considered making laws that would hold individuals committing Genocide responsible. It was through years of argument and legal debate that international lawyers, like Raphael Lemkin who famously coined the term “Genocide,” successfully convinced the UN to hold the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide on December 9, 1948, and eventually adopt the entire convention by all signatory countries on January 12, 1951. 2 To understand why foreign governments are arguing about intervention and their specific obligations, we must identify the passages of the United Nation Convention on 1 Scott Straus, “Darfur and the Genocide Debate,” Foreign Affairs 84, No.1 (2005), p. 123 2 United Nations,“United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Error.aspx?messageKey=SSIS#Participants.

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  • Crisis%in%Darfur%

    !Volume!I!Issue!II!! !Spring!2012! ! 36!

    Crisis in Darfur: Mass Murder and the Political Inconvenience of Genocide in the Modern World!

    Tyler Jones Indiana University

    Genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass killings, ethnocide, and democide: call it what

    you will, the humanitarian crisis in the Darfur is one of the worst on record with more

    than 1.8 million people displaced through attacks by government-endorsed militias and

    Sudanese armed forces.1 The International community is obligated to act to halt the

    Genocide in Darfur but has failed to uphold their promise of: “Never again.” This paper

    will contend that the world has identified the genocide in Darfur but refuses to

    acknowledge it because of the burden the acknowledgement would bring economically

    and politically. This paper will reinforce this argument with the following methodology:

    an examination of the obligations of all UN members via treaties, a general history and

    exposition of the evidence of Genocide in Darfur, an examination of the restraints which

    limit a country’s ability to intervene, and lastly updates on current aid and involvement

    in Darfur.

    The history of laws concerning Genocide is recent, in part due to the only recent

    observance of Genocide as a crime. It was only after World War II, after the Holocaust,

    after one of the most climactic acts of human depravity ever undertaken in history,

    when any legal body in the world had considered making laws that would hold

    individuals committing Genocide responsible. It was through years of argument and

    legal debate that international lawyers, like Raphael Lemkin who famously coined the

    term “Genocide,” successfully convinced the UN to hold the Convention on the

    Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide on December 9, 1948, and

    eventually adopt the entire convention by all signatory countries on January 12, 1951.2

    To understand why foreign governments are arguing about intervention and their

    specific obligations, we must identify the passages of the United Nation Convention on

    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1 Scott Straus, “Darfur and the Genocide Debate,” Foreign Affairs 84, No.1 (2005), p. 123 2 United Nations,“United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Error.aspx?messageKey=SSIS#Participants.

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    !Volume!I!Issue!II!! !Spring!2012! ! 37!

    the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which legally hold signatories

    accountable to act in the occurrence of genocide. Article 1 of the treaty reads, “The

    Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in

    time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to

    punish.”3 The first clause is direct and ambiguous about the duties of treaty members.

    It states that members must actively seek to discourage genocidal actions, and to hold

    perpetrators accountable for it. The clause is vague though. It does not give any sense

    of how to undertake these actions or on what scale to undertake them.4 Even more, it

    comes into conflict with the Sovereignty Clause in the UN Charter, which states that

    members must respect the choices and decisions of other governments to rule, in the

    best manner those governments see fit. These conflicts have come up in past debates of

    intervention in cases like Rwanda and Somalia. Either way, the UN does establish that

    nations must try to stop genocide, if they cannot prevent it.

    There are two more important clauses. Article 4 states, “Persons committing

    genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be punished, whether

    they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.”5 This

    clause allows for easier prosecution of genocide, because it is directed at prosecuting

    individuals and not so much the organization, party, or country.6 This can allow for, at

    the very least, the legal detainment of the leaders of the mass killings. It is much easier

    militarily and financially to catch a few leaders than to stop an entire nation. Arguably

    the most debated clause is Article 8, which states, “Any Contracting Party (member of

    the UN) may call upon the competent organs (the UN itself or other nations) of the

    United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they

    consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of

    the other acts enumerated in Article 3.”7 Article 8, could be used to completely undo the

    work of Article 1 because of its use of the word “may.” This suggests that countries may

    so choose if they wish to participate in the actions of fighting and preventing genocide.

    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3 United Nations, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948, p.1. 4 Jack Bielasiak, in class 9.14.2011. !5 United Nations, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948, p.1. 6 Jack Bielasiak, in class 9.16.2011. 7 United Nations, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948, p.2.

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    As Professor Bielasiak states, “it suggests that the clause, itself, is voluntary.”8 The

    danger is that it implies that a state could wait for others to act, possibly costing more

    lives, if the state is not at a politically convenient point to act on, prevent, or punish

    genocide. All these articles will be important to understanding why countries are

    obligated to help in Darfur, and understanding their logic in why they are or are not

    helping.

    The evidence for genocide in Darfur is abundant. Khartoum has always had a

    weak, but definite grip on Sudan and her people. Historic marginalization of the

    outskirts of the country, mainly the traditionally blacker and African areas, has taken

    place ever since British colonial occupation in the late 19th- early 20th centuries.9 This

    marginalization has come despite Darfurians and many black Sudanese being Muslim

    and having, “years of intermarriage [which has] narrowed obvious physical differences

    between ‘Arabs’ and black ‘Africans.’”10 Successive Sudanese governments, comprised

    mainly of Arabs, continued these policies adding their own personal loathing of Africans

    or “Abids,” meaning slaves.11 Since Rwanda’s independence from Belgium in 1962,

    numerous governments and attempted coups have taken place, until 1989 when the

    National Islamic Front (NIF), a radical, pro-Islamic sect came into power via a coup

    d’état. Along with new president Omar Al-Bashir, the NIF brought its own racialized

    goals into the mix in Khartoum: A Pan-Arab dream of a “unified Arab state” in the

    region of the Sahara Desert.12 Miller describes policy change as soon as the NIF took

    power,

    “The Arab supremacists who wanted the region to evolve into a unified

    Arab state began their efforts to either forcibly move or destroy

    populations incompatible with their goals in order to change the ethnic

    composition of the area. This ideology, to which the elites in Khartoum

    subscribed, was indeed part of the region’s politics.”13

    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!8 Jack Bielasiak, in class 9.16.2011.!9 Molly J. Miller, “The Crisis in Darfur.” P.115-6. 10 Straus, p. 126. 11 Miller, P.116-8. 12 Ibid. p.118-9. 13 Ibid. p.119.!

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    For these raids and attacks on innocents and rebels alike, Khartoum used a combination

    of government endorsed militias, known as Janjaweed, and their own military. The

    Janjaweed originated as early as 1986 when President al-Dahab institutionalized

    aggressive militaristic attitudes of local Arab tribes against the Sudan People’s

    Liberation army (SPLA) by endorsing the historic raiders and later arming them.14 The

    leader of the Janjaweed, Musa Hilal, “was deliberately recruited for his brutality by

    Khartoum and continues to receive substantial resources from Khartoum…”15 It seems

    quite clear that persecution of non-Arab Sudanese has historically been a focus for

    Khartoum.

    Evidence abounds of the atrocities committed in Darfur, not only from past

    injustices as mentioned above but in the evolving, genocidal actions of the present.

    President Al-Bashir has used raids, by the SPLA rebels, to largely justify the military and

    Janjaweed attacks on villages.16 Aiding Khartoum primarily in the 1980’s, Muammar

    Qaddafi, the dictator of Libya, supplied Khartoum and Arab tribesman with weapons.

    Qaddafi also called for “Arabization” and the supremacy of Arab traditions, customs,

    and the suppression of non-Arab religions and cultures. Qaddafi, like the NIF, dreamed

    of a pan-Arab super state across the Sahara Desert.17 Studying the violence that has

    occurred because of support from Khartoum and Qaddafi, the United States State

    Department created the Atrocities Documentation Survey (ADS) in 2004, which sought

    to study and understand the violence. The survey produced numerous results. Of the

    displaced Darfurians, the vast majority (~70-80%) of people surveyed said that racial

    epithets were used during attacks on their villages. The main tribes that made up the

    victims were the Zaghawa, Fur, Masalit and Jebal tribes. The respondents described

    their attackers as mainly a mix of Sudanese troops and Janjaweed. Violence involved a

    number of components from bombings, to shootings, to rape and arson.18 As early as

    2003, many US satellite images reported that “around 574 villages had been burned

    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!14 Miller, p.118. 15 Eric Reeves, “Watching Genocide, doing nothing: the final betrayal of Darfur.” p.7. 16 Miller, P.120. 17 John Hagan et al., “The collective dynamics of racial dehumanization and genocidal victimization in Darfur,” American Sociological Review 73, no. 1 (2008), p.880-881,!18 Hagan, p.883-885.

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    down and another 157 damaged…”19 Straus also reported on the methodology of the

    attackers and the strategies they used,

    “Testimony, recorded at different times and locations, consistently shows

    that the attackers single out men to kill. Women, children, and the elderly

    are not spared, however. Eyewitnesses report that the attackers

    sometimes murder children. For women, the primary threat is rape;

    sexual violence has been widespread in this conflict.”20

    More evidence of Genocide can be found in scholarly articles: Remco van de Pas, of the

    British Medical Journal, reported that about 100,000 displaced people at a Kalma camp

    run by the African Union and the United Nations, who had received just enough aid to

    survive.21 This is a clear example of the removal of conditions for these people to survive

    in, by the Sudanese government and a violation of the UN Convention on Genocide

    Article 2c. In 2006 Peter Moszynski, of the British Medical Journal, noted that African

    Union peacekeeping forces had been spread so thin that more troops were desperately

    needed. He also warned that much of the Darfur aid groups were in danger and by

    extension the Darfurian refugees, if the troops were not sent.22 The consistent theme

    through all of these articles and reports identify the government and militias as the

    primary perpetrators. They identify these troops as targeting non-Arab civilians, killing

    specifically the men and many others. The burning of villages conjures up images of

    Stalinist practices of destroying even the memories of peoples deemed “enemies of the

    state.” The killing of children and women revives images of Nazi troops, who were

    ordered to slaughter women and children in many ghettos and work camps. Even

    persecution over perceived differences in appearance (as previously discussed- there

    were not many in Darfur because of centuries of intermarrying) conjures up images of

    the Rwandan Genocide and of Hutus identifying seemingly different-looking Tutsis. It

    is obvious from the evidence that not only does this violence classify as genocide, as Eric

    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!19 Straus, p. 127. 20 Ibid p.127. 21 Remcon van de Pas, “Darfur-dependent population at risk,” British Medical Journal 333, no. 7573 (2006), p.846-7. 22 Peter Morszynski, “Troops are need in Darfur,” British Medical Journal 333, no. 7567 (2006), p.514.!

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    Reeves believes, but also Darfur shares key aspects of other genocides, which many

    countries have previously recognized. A country would have to be in full denial to refute

    this clear evidence. Despite the nature of the violence, many countries have been

    hesitant to call the violence in Darfur genocide. However, economic investment in the

    region appears to play a role in what position countries take in the debate on genocide in

    Darfur.

    Sudan itself took the official position that the militias it had armed were fighting

    and killing the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (Jem)

    rebels, who had begun the conflict by attacking Sudanese troops. 23 Sudan also feared

    that its rights as a state (via the UN state sovereignty clause) could possibly be violated

    because of what they saw as fabricated facts. Other nations like China and Russia

    strongly oppose the UN’s continual prying into the Sudanese government’s actions

    because they, China and Russia, have dealt violently with separatist rebel movements in

    the past; the Chechens were put down in Russia and the Uighurs were put down in

    China. Political controversy stems from every angle as both sides, the Sudanese and the

    pro-trial side, have legitimate legal positions, backed by UN laws that contradict each

    other. As mentioned earlier, the UN Convention on Genocide is ambiguous as to how

    exactly a perpetrator of Genocide would be punished, if that perpetrator was an active

    government administrator or a state itself, without violating the UN charter section on

    state sovereignty. The Sudanese government, like it or not, has a completely valid

    argument because if they are indeed aiming towards keeping control in their country,

    fighting rebels as they claim they are, then the world community has no international

    legal privilege or right to intervene in Sudan. Indeed, if signatories of the UN were to

    invade Sudan and physically stop the violence, then what little standing and authority

    the UN would have would die instantly, as its own charter, its founding text, would be

    violated so brazenly. Thus, not only is the UN legally frozen in its place because of the

    legal contradictions created between the UN charter and the UN convention on

    Genocide, but the signatory nations, and by all extent the only muscle of the UN, are as

    equally legally frozen as well. Despite legal ambiguities in international law, there are

    also economic incentives for nations to support Sudan. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!23 “Q and A: Sudan’s Darfur Conflict,” BBC News. January 23, 2012. Web. 4/26/2012. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3496731.stm.

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    The economy of Sudan today is based around agricultural production (cotton,

    livestock, sugar) and, most importantly, oil. Once debt-ridden and on the verge of

    having their IMF (International Monetary Fund) membership revoked, Sudan now uses

    oil profits to fund their ongoing military ambitions.24 Oil was first discovered in Sudan

    in 1979, primarily in the South. 25 American companies had not been invested in Sudan

    since 1966 because it was identified in the Anti-Terrorism Act (along with Iraq, Iran,

    Syria, Cuba, North Korea and Libya). With the Americans gone, mainly Middle-Eastern

    and European countries and companies began drilling in Sudan.26 The main drilling

    consortium is the Greater Nile Petroleum Oil Corporation (GNPOC), which is a

    multinational firm combining several companies’ resources. The four countries which

    are invested in the huge GNPOC firm the most are: China (the National Oil company

    owned by the state) at 40%, Petronas Carigali (State Oil firm of Malaysia) at 30%, the

    Canadian-centered Talisman Energy at 25%, and the National Oil company of Sudan at

    5%.27 Along with these four main investors, numerous other countries have invested in

    Sudanese Oil including: France, Belgium, Sweden, Austria, and Qatar.28 These oil

    investments create a conflict of interests between economic practicality and global,

    moral obligations.

    Oil is a multibillion-dollar industry, enriching those who find it and sell it. For

    the countries that drill in Sudan, there is great incentive to preserve Sudan’s status as a

    non-genocidal country. This is because if Sudan were marked with this stigma, not only

    would these corporations, and in some cases countries, be breaking the UN treaty on

    Genocide (by supporting it through funding), but Sudan might get hampered with heavy

    trade barriers, making oil drilling much more costly and burdensome. Not to mention

    that public outcry at home would be much stronger to stop drilling and by extension

    supporting genocide. Talisman has already had numerous protests against it for being

    in Humanitarian disaster zones like Sudan anyway.29 Also, any military action is

    expensive, and a sudden military burden, because of a UN treaty, may not be a tab

    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!24 Cleophas Lado, “Political Economy of the Oil Industry in the Sudan Problem or Resource in Development,” Erdkunde, Bd. 56, H. 2. (2002), p.159 25 Ibid. p. 160.!26 Ibid, p. 161. 27 Ibid. p.161. 28 Ibid. p. 161.!29 Lado, p.162.

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    countries are desirous to foot. Needless to say, these countries would suffer

    economically and would be at a great political inconvenience, if much of the oil from

    Sudan disappeared and they were obligated to enter into expensive military actions, all

    because of a genocide classification.

    Unhindered by the political inconvenience of Sudanese Oil, the United States

    House of Representatives voted to label the Darfurian violence as “genocide” in July

    2004, based off of numerous US reports and other sources. Thus the US was the first

    nation to ever enact article VIII of the UN Convention on Genocide, forcing the UN to

    enter into discussion about Sudan. Then US Secretary of State Collin Powell

    acknowledged that his determination of “genocide” came from the feedback of the ADS

    reports. As expected though, a variety of nations fought back, refusing to acknowledge

    the violence in Darfur as genocide. Canadian, British, European Union and Chinese

    officials all sidestepped the word “genocide.” 30 This can surely be related to heavy levels

    of investment in Sudanese oil, especially by Canada (25%) and China (40%), and the

    huge political inconvenience of these charges. Even UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan

    seemed reluctant to label Sudan as genocide. His feelings came not out of

    inconvenience, but of maintaining the stability of the UN. Annan knew that if he issued

    any strong bill calling for the military neutralization of Khartoum, it would be quickly

    vetoed and rejected (the veto party being led by China and Russia). This would not only

    undermine his authority, but the legitimacy of the UN Genocide Convention. In

    September 2004, Kofi passed a weak bill, (an attempt at a happy medium) barely

    approved by China, which called for a small five man commission to investigate the

    charges against Sudan. It also quietly threatened economic sanctions, and it called for

    the African Union to monitor a cease-fire between the Sudanese government and (at

    that time, before the creation of South Sudan) the Southern Sudanese Rebels.31 Looking

    back on the “Commission of Inquiry (COI)” Eric Reeves explains his disgust with the

    purposeful sabotage of the entire investigation:

    “An inquiry was obligatory. At the same time, Annan knew perfectly well

    that a finding of genocide by the COI would destroy the credibility of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!30 Ibid. p. 131.!31 Lado, 130.

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    Security Council. For China and Russia would have been no less willing to

    exercise their veto power in protecting Khartoum after such a finding than

    they were before. The spectacle of the Security Council remaining

    paralyzed… was too much for Annan, and this ensured in advance that no

    such determination would emerge. Massive crimes against humanity, war

    crimes, and other violations of international law were all fine, as was

    finding of ‘possible’ genocide- but not a decisive genocide

    determination…”32

    Kofi did what he thought was right, by attempting to preserve the integrity of the

    council. At the same time, Eric Reeves would go on to show that Annan personally put

    weak investigators on the case, along with strict rules for them and scarce resources. A

    determination of partial or “possible genocide” was all but predetermined.33 Although it

    was against UN policy to speak about the report, Reeves reports that many UN officials

    attempted to hint at the truth. This is evident in the example of Jan Egeland, head of

    UN humanitarian operations, who stated that the violence in Darfur is “ethnic cleansing

    of the worst sort.”34 Interestingly, the US already considered their obligations of the UN

    Conventions on Genocide filled. Collin Powell believed that, by simply researching and

    determining that genocide was happening, the United States had already fulfilled its

    contractual obligations in the UN Convention on Genocide.35 Powell also cited the US’s

    numerous aid forces in Sudan and other pressures that Washington had placed on

    Khartoum. Reeves and other sources all cast doubt on the US’s “action” against the

    genocide in Darfur, most noting that because Washington was wrapped up in two

    expensive wars/occupations, of Afghanistan and Iraq, military action against Khartoum

    would have been incredibly politically and fiscally inconvenient.

    There have been efforts to help the refugees of the violence who have settled in

    between the Sudan-Chad border. Numerous aid foundations, including the World

    Health Organization (WHO), the International Committee of the Red Cross, the United

    Nations, numerous countries, and numerous other organizations have become involved !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!32 Reeves, p.8. 33 Ibid, p.8.!34 Ibid, p.8. 35 Straus, p. 131.

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    in Darfur, to alleviate the burden of the refugees. Each of these entities has provided

    these refugees with some of their only lifelines of survival.36 But even for these

    organizations, the situation in Darfur appears bleak. The African Union forces are

    weakening and even contracting their areas of protection, allowing many aid workers to

    go unprotected from the militias.37 Violence is even making its way into eastern Chad,

    where many refugees have fled. Eric Reeves is crushed by the idea that so many key

    political players know what is going on in Darfur, yet remain politically indifferent. The

    inaction in Darfur manifests images of the Rwandan genocide, when so many countries

    knew about the crisis and yet chose to do nothing about it or to justify the violence as

    tribal violence. In his article about the international response to Darfur, Nsongurua J.

    Udombana suggests,

    “Since peacekeeping appears to be the most that the global community can

    offer Darfur, the Security Council must summon the courage to deploy

    decisively. Time is of the essence in peacekeeping. Rapid deployment

    could determine not only the success of a mission, but also the ability to

    prevent massive loss of innocent lives. It is indefensible to delay

    deployment until Khartoum, the seat of perfidy and [the] engine room of

    terror, is pacified. Although deployment of [UN forces] will not

    necessarily end the crisis in Darfur, it could mark the beginning of a

    renewed effort to get the peace process back on track.”38

    As he notes, it may be too much to expect the international community to fulfill their

    military role in Darfur, and so it falls on the shoulders of the UN to protect these people.

    He is not asking for a military takedown of the Sudanese government, just a strong,

    reliable force to protect the refugees while peace is in the works.

    There is one more window of opportunity for the international community to at

    least impede the genocidal efforts of Khartoum. Because of Article IV of the UN

    Genocide Convention, individuals may be brought up on charges of Genocide, regardless

    of what the state is doing. This gives the world a chance to use Article IV to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!36 Straus, p.127. 37 Reeves, p.9.!38 Nsongurua J. Udombana, “Still playing Dice with Lives: Darfur and the Security Council Resolution 1706,” The Third World Quarterly, 28, No. 1 (2007), p.109.

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    simultaneously take down the leadership in Khartoum and possibly maintain their

    economic investments. The “ringleaders” are Musa Hilal, the leader of the Janjaweed,

    and the President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, mainly because they are the faces of their

    sector of genocide. Hilal is already notorious around the world for his actions, and

    numerous war crime charges and humanitarian accusations have come against him via

    the International Criminal Court. President Bashir was recently (2009-10) issued an

    arrest warrant by the ICC, wherein he was to turn himself in for the crimes of genocide

    and various other things.39 Of course, Khartoum would not willingly give up two of the

    most important leaders to their “Arabization” goals, so it falls upon the international

    community to put pressure on Sudan. Although it is a long shot, this is a “middle-

    ground” of sorts, wherein full military pressure would not be needed and economic

    investments could possibly remain unhindered by any stigma or national label of

    “genocide.”

    Some might argue that Darfur is not genocide because it has not been labeled as

    such by the international community. They might say that if it were genocide, the

    countries would be legally bound to stop it. Since there is no action, we can determine

    that countries see no evidence of genocide. To respond to this, we have proof of all

    forms of genocide, as discussed in Professor Bielasiak’s class: direct (killings, murder),

    indirect (withholding of necessities for the conditions of life) and auxiliary (purposeful

    efforts to stop reproduction, or to contaminate the ethnicity through rape/ sexual

    assaults) forces. 40 Secondly, nations have many reasons, primarily economic, which

    keep them from fully reporting genocide. Therefore, countries may very well see

    genocide happening, but whether they decide to act on it, and admit what they are

    seeing is genocide, is a completely different story. Many can even justify their inaction

    through article VIII of the UN Convention on Genocide, although this has not been

    used, yet. We cannot use the international response as a basis for genocide’s definition

    because there were many genocides, which were not responded to quickly, or at all (e.g.

    Nazi Germany, USSR “Great Terror,” Rwanda, Armenia). Therefore we must base our

    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!39 “International Legal Materials: Arrest warrant for Pres. Omar Al Bashir,” American Society of International Law, 48, No. 3 (2009), pp. 466-469. 40 Jack Bielasiak in class, 9.14.2011.!

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    definitions of genocide solely on the evidence, and not on what response is given by the

    international community on the subject.

    The world has become preoccupied. The consequences of another unheeded

    Genocide are far from the minds of nations. Instead, they are preoccupied with

    economic development, the current recession and other current socio-political

    occurrences to worry about the consequences of Genocide. They have used the

    ambiguity of the UN treaty on Genocide to justify limited action (USA) and inaction.

    Some countries are so concerned with promoting their financial wealth and limiting

    debt that they have refused to even acknowledge the Genocide in Darfur. As I have

    shown, entities who are preoccupied with practical interests or restraints, be them

    economic (China), political (USA), or fights for continued relevance (Kofi Annan & the

    UN), are tempted away from their moral duties. Ultimately we stand in the midst of

    another Armenia, another Rwanda. The world has placed self-interest before moral

    obligation and thus, the world has failed the people of Darfur.

    !