VENUE/JURISDICTIONCase 1Agustin v. PamintuanFacts:Petitioner Victor Agustin was charged with 4 separate Informations of libel by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio. He was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to all the charges. On September 10, 2001, he then filed a Motion to Quash the Informations on the sole ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged. He pointed out that the said Informations did not contain any allegation that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City or that the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published in a newspaper of general circulation in Baguio City. Private complainant opposed the motion alleging that he was a bona fide resident and acting general manager of Baguio Country Club.                 The RTC issued an order denying the MTQ and the motion for reconsideration of the Order. Petitioner then brought the case to the CA. The CA rendered a decision dismissing the petition and the motion for reconsideration of the decision for lack of merit. Thus, petitioner filed a motion for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court.The petitioner contented that in the absence of any allegations in the Informations that the private respondent was actually residing in Baguio City, or that the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published in Baguio as mandated by Article 360 of the RPC, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged. He asserted that the amendments of the Informations would be improper, considering that the defects of the Informations were not of form but of substance.The OSG maintained that the failure of the Informations to allege that the private respondent is a resident of Baguio City is not a jurisdictional defect. It asserted that the averment in the Informations that the crimes charged were committed within the jurisdiction of the trial court in Baguio City, taken in conjunction

with the other allegations therein are sufficient to vest jurisdiction over the subject cases in the RTC of Baguio City.

Issue:Whether the RTC of Baguio City has jurisdiction over the offenses charged in the four Informations.

Ruling:                The SC granted the petition, holding that the RTC of Baguio has no jurisdiction.                The SC held that venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or Information, and the offense must have been committed or any of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Article 360 of the RPC provides that the criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.                In the case at bar, the Informations did not allege that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City at the time of the commission of the offenses, or that the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published in Baguio City. It cannot even be inferred from the allegation 'the offended party was the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club and of good standing and reputation in the community that the private complainant was actually residing in Baguio City. Case 2Macasaet v. PeopleFacts:

1

Petitioners were charged with the crime of libel before the RTC of Quezon City. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the libel case on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the offense charged. According to petitioners, as the information discloses that the residence of private respondent was in Marikina, the RTC of Quezon City did not have jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Article 360 of the RPC. The public prosecutor argued that the RTC of QC had jurisdiction over the case. He maintained that during the time material to this case, the complainant was a resident of both QC and Marikina as shown in his Reply-Affidavit filed during his preliminary investigation of the case. The petitioners contended that the complaint-affidavit executed by complainant and the information filed before the court state that complainant’s residence is in Marikina, thus the dismissal of the case is warranted for the rule is that jurisdiction is determined solely by the allegations contained in the complaint or information. The trial court rendered an Order dismissing the case due to lack of jurisdiction and it held that the editorial box of Abante is in Manila and that the address of complainant is in Marikina as provided in the information.The complainant then filed a motion for reconsideration insisting that at the time the alleged libelous article was published, he was actually residing in QC. According to him, he mistakenly stated that he was a resident of Marikina at the time of publication but he rectified the error by his supplemental affidavit which indicated QC as his actual residence at the time of publication of the defamatory article. However, the motion for reconsideration was denied.Respondents file a notice of appeal to the Court of appeals. The CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA, hence this petition before the Supreme Court.

Issue:Whether the RTC of QC had jurisdiction.

Ruling:The RTC of QC had no jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.                 In libel cases, the criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.                In the case at bar, private respondent was a private citizen at the time of the publication of the alleged libelous article, hence, he could only file his libel suit in the City of Manila where Abante was first published or in the province or city where he actually resided at the time the purported libelous article was printed.A perusal, however, of the information involved in this case easily reveals that the allegations contained therein are utterly insufficient to vest jurisdiction on the RTC of Quezon City.  Other than perfunctorily stating “Quezon City” at the beginning of the information, the assistant city prosecutor who prepared the information did not bother to indicate whether the jurisdiction of RTC Quezon City was invoked either because Abante was printed in that place or private respondent was a resident of said city at the time the claimed libelous article came out.  As these matters deal with the fundamental issue of the court’s jurisdiction, Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates that either one of these statements must be alleged in the information itself and the absence of both from the very face of the information renders the latter fatally defective.  Sadly for private respondent, the information filed before the trial court falls way short of this requirement.  The assistant city prosecutor’s failure to properly

2

lay the basis for invoking the jurisdiction of the RTC, Quezon City, effectively denied said court of the power to take cognizance of this case.

Case 3 Campamano vs Datuin Facts:  Seishin International Corporation, represented by its president-herein petitioner David B. Campanano, Jr. filed against respondent. An Information for violation ofB.P. Blg. 22. respondent was convicted of Estafa by the Regional Trial Court, of Pasig City by Decision of May 3, 1999. Meanwhile, sometime in July 15, 2003when he vacated his office,  found the cash voucher evidencing his cash payment of the two (2)  road rollers, Sakai brand, which he purchased from Mr. Yasonobu Hirota, representing Seishin International Corporation, in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos.  The cash voucher was dated June 28, 1993, and it was signed by respondent and Mr. Hirota.  Claiming that the complaint of Seishin International Corporation against him was false, unfounded and malicious respondent filed a complaint for Incriminating Against Innocent Persons, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon city against petitioner and a certain Yasunobu Hirota.In filing the complaint for Estafa - fully knowing that it was baseless and without factual or legal basis, according to respondent   Mr. Campanano, Jr. and Mr. Hirota should be criminally liable for the crime of Incriminating Innocent Persons punishable under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code.By Resolution of January 20, 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed respondent's complaint for incriminating innocent person It appearing that the case of estafa was filed in Pasig City , and the testimony given by respondent David Campano, Jr. was also made in Pasig City , this office has no jurisdiction on the above-entitled complainant.

   Issue:whether  the City prosecutor of Quezon City has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the respondent

 Held:It is doctrinal that in criminal cases, venue is an essential element of jurisdiction; and that the jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.The complaint-affidavit for incriminating innocent person filed by respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on August 28, 2003 does not allege that the crime charged or any of its essential ingredients was committed in Quezon City . The only reference to Quezon City in the complaint-affidavit is that it is where respondent resides. Respondent's complaint-affidavit was thus properly dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City for lack of jurisdiction The Court of Appeals' conclusion-basis of its reversal of the DOJ Resolutions that since petitioner's November 20, 2003 Counter-Affidavit to respondent's complaint for incriminating innocent person was executed in Quezon City, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City had acquired jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of the case is thus erroneous. In any event, the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not make out a clear probable cause of incriminating innocent person under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code. the petition is  Granted.  The Court of Appeals Decision of December 9, 2005 is Reversed and set aside.  The complaint of respondent for Incriminating Innocent Person filed against petitioner David Campamano, Jr. is Dismissed

Complaint/Information

3

Case 4LUIS MARCOS P. LAURELvs. HON. ZEUS C. ABROGAR,

Facts:Petitioner is one of the accused in Criminal action filed

with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 150. The Amended Information charged the accused with theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Defer Arraignment, on the ground that the factual allegations in the Amended Information do not constitute the felony of theft. The trial court denied the Motion to Quash the Amended Information, as well petitioners subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner then went to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC. The CA then, directed the RTC to issue an order grating the motion of the petitioner to quash the Amended Information, holding that Amended Information does not contain material allegations charging petitioner with theft of personal property since international long distance calls and the business of providing telecommunication or telephone services are not personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. 

Respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Refer the Case to the Supreme Court En Banc. It maintains that the Amended Information charging petitioner with theft is valid and sufficient; that it states the names of all the accused who were specifically charged with the crime of theft of PLDTs international calls and business of providing telecommunication or telephone service in Makati City by conducting ISR or International Simple Resale; that it identifies the international calls and business of providing telecommunication or telephone service of PLDT as the personal properties which were unlawfully taken by the accused; and that it satisfies the test of sufficiency as it enabled a person of common understanding to know the charge against him and the court to render judgment properly. 

According to the OSG, prosecution under Republic Act (RA) No. 8484 or the Access Device Regulations Act of 1998and RA 8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 does not preclude prosecution under the Revised Penal Code for the crime of theft. The latter embraces unauthorized appropriation or use of PLDTs international calls, service and business, for personal profit or gain, to the prejudice of PLDT as owner thereof. On the other hand, the special laws punish the surreptitious and advanced technical means employed to illegally obtain the subject service and business. Even assuming that the correct indictment should have been under RA 8484, the quashal of the information would still not be proper. The charge of theft as alleged in the Information should be taken in relation to RA 8484 because it is the elements, and not the designation of the crime, that control. 

Issue: whether the information should be quashed for being insufficient.

RulingThe SC resolved to grant the Motion for Reconsideration

but remanded the case to the trial court for proper clarification of the Amended Information. 

Petitioner’s acts constitute theft of respondent PLDTs business and service, committed by means of the unlawful use of the latter’s facilities. In this regard, the Amended Information inaccurately describes the offense by making it appear that what petitioner took were the international long distance telephone calls, rather than respondent PLDTs business. Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone service are personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and the act of engaging in ISR is an act of subtraction penalized under said article. However, the Amended Information describes the thing taken as, international long distance calls, and only later mentions stealing the business from PLDT as the manner by which the gain was derived by the accused. In order to

4

correct this inaccuracy of description, this case must be remanded to the trial court and the prosecution is directed to amend the Amended Information, to clearly state that the property subject of the theft are the services and business of respondent PLDT. Parenthetically, this amendment is not necessitated by a mistake in charging the proper offense, which would have called for the dismissal of the information under Rule 110, Section 14 and Rule 119, Section 19 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. To be sure, the crime is properly designated as one of theft. The purpose of the amendment is simply to ensure that the accused is fully and sufficiently appraised of the nature and cause of the charge against him, and thus guaranteed of his rights under the Constitution. 

case 5NOTAN LUMBOS, complainant, vs.JUDGE MARIE ELLENGRID S.L.BALIGUAT, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, General Santos City, respondent. Facts Administrative complaint was filed against Judge Marie Ellengrid S.L. Baliguat , MTCC, Branch 1, General Santos City. Complainant alleges that:  instead of dismissing the case for patent lack of jurisdiction, respondent judge conducted the Preliminary Investigation without prior application for the issuance of warrant of arrest; with the object of issuing a warrant of arrest against all accused, respondent propounded a series of suggestive rather than searching questions and  merely tried to confirm her preconceived presumption of guilt of all accused via suggestive questions; respondent issued an Order for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against complainant and his co-accused without giving them a fair chance to file their respective counter-affidavits.  Respondent claims that: the conduct of the Preliminary Investigation and the subsequent issuance of the warrant of arrest are well within the authority given in the Sections 84 and 86, R.

A. No. 5412 (City Charter of General Santos City); there was no usurpation of authority of an RTC Judge when she issued the assailed warrant of arrest as she has authority to do so under the City Charter; there was no grave abuse of discretion when she held in abeyance the resolution of the prayer for the lifting of the warrant of arrest because the primary reason why it was withheld was the complainant's failure to submit a counter-affidavit. Issue Whether or not the acts committed by the respondent judge constitute gross ignorance of the law, abuse of authority, dereliction of duty, and oppression warranting dismissal from judicial service and disbarment.

 Ruling: Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.9 And prior to the issuance of A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC10 which took effect on October 3, 2005, among the officers authorized by Sec. 2, Rule 11211 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure to conduct preliminary investigation are the city prosecutors and judges of the MTC and MCTC. The Charter of General Santos City, specifically Sec. 84,12 authorizes the city court to conduct preliminary investigations for any offense without regard to the limits of punishment and may release or commit and bind over any person charged with such offense to secure his appearance before the proper court.Under Sec. 6(b), Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, without waiting for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may issue a warrant of arrest if he finds after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause

5

exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody not to frustrate the ends of justice. Wherefore, Administrative case against Judge Baliguat is DISMISSED. In line with A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC, withdrawing the power to conduct preliminary investigation from judges of the first level courts, she is ADVISED to refer criminal cases for preliminary investigation to the Office of City Prosecutor for appropriate action.

SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINTCase 6Catiis vs. CA anent to SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINTG.R. NO. 153979February 6, 2006 Facts: Petitioner filed a letter-complaint dated May 28, 2001 against private respondents Reynaldo A. Patacsil, Enrico D. Lopez, Luzviminda A. Portuguez and a certain Margielyn Tafalla before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, for violation of Art. 315, No. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689 (syndicated estafa) and other related offenses. Private respondents, except for Tafalla, filed their joint counter-affidavits denying the charges against them. On October 10, 2001, Assistant City Prosecutor Alessandro D. Jurado issued a Resolution finding the existence of a probable cause for syndicated Estafa against private respondents and Tafalla with no bail recommended. The Resolution was approved by City Prosecutor Claro A. Arellano. An Information was filed on the same day by Prosecutor Jurado against private respondents and Tafalla before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and raffled off to the sala of Honorable Judge Lucas Bersamin. That on or about the 3rd week of January 2000 or subsequent thereto in Quezon City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and

confederating together and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another in a syndicated manner consisting of five (5) or more persons through corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and/or unregistered foreign entities with intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, with intent to gain and by means of fraud and deceit, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud REGINO SY CATIIS and several other persons in the following manner, to wit: by falsely or fraudulently pretending or representing, in a transaction or series of transactions, which they made with the Complainant and the public in general to the effect that they were in a legitimate business of foreign exchange trading successively or simultaneously operating under the following name and style of Asia Profits Philippines, Incorporation, Winggold Management Philippines Incorporated, Belkin Management Consultancy, Inc. and/or Belkin Profits Limited or other unregistered foreign entities induced and succeeded in inducing complainant and several other persons to give and deliver and in fact, the latter and said persons gave and delivered to said accused the amount of at least US$ 123,461.14 or its equivalent in Philippine Pesos on the strength of said manifestations and representations, the accused knowing fully well that the above-named corporations registered with the SEC and/or those unregistered foreign entities are not licensed nor authorized to engage in foreign exchange trading corporations and that such manifestations and representations to transact in foreign exchange were false and fraudulent that resulted to the damage and prejudice of the complainant and other persons and that the defraudation pertains to funds solicited from the public in general by such corporations/associations. On November 7, 2001, Judge Lucas P. Bersamin issued an Order finding probable cause against all the accused and approved the recommendation of the City Prosecutor that the charge be non-bailable. The corresponding warrants of arrest were issued.

6

 A return on the warrant of arrest was made by PO3 Joselito M. Coronel, PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, Camp Crame, Quezon City, with the information that except for Margielyn Tafalla, who remained at large, all other accused were already detained at the Makati City Jail.On November 12, 2001, a notice of hearing was issued by Judge Bersamin setting the case for arraignment on November 20, 2001. Private respondents on the same day filed an urgent motion to fix bail.On November 20, 2001, private respondents, when arraigned, entered pleas of not guilty. The Prosecution was required to file their comment/opposition on private respondents’ motion to fix bail which they did through the Private Prosecutor with the conformity of Assistant City Prosecutor Arthur O. Malabaguio.On December 18, 2001, Judge Bersamin issued an Order reconsidering his earlier Order of November 7, 2001 by declaring that the offense charged is bailable. In finding that the accused are entitled to bail.

 Issue: Whether Judge Bersamin is correct in finding that the crime charged is bailable despite that the imposable penalty ranges from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua?

Held: The Court held that since the crime charged was not committed by a syndicate as defined under the law, the penalty of life imprisonment to death cannot be imposed on private respondents. Judge Bersamin is correct when he ruled that private respondents could only be punished with reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua in case of conviction since the amount of the fraud exceeds P100,000.00.  The Court further held that Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, provide:

 Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. Sec. 9. Cause of the accusations. — The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment. Clearly, it is now a requirement that the aggravating as well as the qualifying circumstances be expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or information. Otherwise, they cannot be considered by the trial court in their judgment, even, if they are subsequently proved during trial. A reading of the Information shows that there was no allegation of any aggravating circumstance, thus Judge Bersamin is correct when he found that the lesser penalty, i.e., reclusion temporal, is imposable in case of conviction.

Case 7JOHN ERIC LONEY VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 152644             February 10, 2006 Facts:                 Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation ("Marcopper"), a corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque. Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, at the base of the pit ran a

7

drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnel’s end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the rivers.                 On August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque with violation of Article 91(B), sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Water Code of the Philippines (P.D. 1067), Section 8 of the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (P.D. 984), Section 108 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (R.A. 7942), and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage to Property. Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the ground that the Informations were "duplicitous" as the Department of Justice charged more than one offense for a single act.

 Issue:                Whether or not there is duplicity of charges made against petitioner?

 Ruling:             There is no duplicity of charges in the present case. Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one offense, as Section 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. In short, there is duplicity of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense. Petitioner’s contention that they should be charged with one offense only for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property because all the charges filed against them "proceed from and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings" has no merit because this Court had ruled that a single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the

accused for more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense.” Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present. On petitioners’ claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them. Case 8Title: Andaya vs. People of the Philippines

Facts: Complainant Armed Forces and Police Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) is a non-stock and non-profit association authorized to engage in savings and loan transactions. In 1986, petitioner Noe S. Andaya was elected as president and general manager of AFPSLAI. During his term, he sought to increase the capitalization of AFPSLAI to boost its lending capacity to its members. Consequently, on June 1, 1988, the Board of Trustees of AFPSLAI passed and approved Resolution No. RS-88-006-048 setting up a Finder’s Fee Program whereby any officer, member or employee, except investment counselors, of AFPSLAI who could solicit an investment of not less than P100,000.00 would be entitled to a finder’s fee equivalent to one percent of the amount solicited.

In a letter dated September 1991, the Central Bank wrote Gen. Lisandro C. Abadia, then Chairman of the Board of Trustees, regarding the precarious financial position of AFPSLAI due to its alleged flawed management. As a result, Gen. Abadia requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an

8

investigation on alleged irregularities in the operations of AFPSLAI which led to the filing of several criminal cases against petitioner, one of which is the instant case based on the alleged fraudulent implementation of the Finder’s Fee Program.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should be acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence?

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner by granting the petition and acquit the petitioner based on reasonable doubt. The facts alleged in the information are sufficient to constitute the crime of falsification of private document. Specifically, the allegations in the information can be broken down into the three aforestated essential elements of this offense as follows: (1) petitioner caused it to appear in Disbursement Voucher No. 58380 that Diosdado Guillas was entitled to a finder’s fee from AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00 when in truth and in fact no finder’s fee was due to him; (2) the falsification was committed on Disbursement Voucher No. 58380; and (3) the falsification caused damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00.

The first element of the offense charged in the information was proven by the prosecution. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, namely, Diosdado Guilas and Judy Balangue, as well as the presentation of Disbursement Voucher No. 58380 established that petitioner caused the preparation of the voucher in the name of Guilas despite knowledge that Guilas was not entitled to the finder’s fee. Significantly, petitioner admitted his participation in falsifying the voucher when he testified that he authorized the release of the voucher in the name of Guilas upon the request of Ernesto Hernandez. While petitioner did not personally prepare the voucher, he could be considered a principal by induction, had his conviction been proper, since he was the president and general manager of AFPSLAI at the time so that his

employees merely followed his instructions in preparing the falsified voucher.

The second element of the offense charged in the information, i.e., the falsification was committed in Disbursement Voucher No. 58380, a private document, is likewise present. It appears that the public prosecutor erroneously characterized the disbursement voucher as a commercial document so that he designated the offense as estafa through falsification of commercial document in the preamble of the information. However, as correctly ruled by the trial court, the subject voucher is a private document only; it is not a commercial document because it is not a document used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions nor is it defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce or other commercial law.

While the first and second elements of the offense charged in the information were satisfactorily established by the prosecution, it is the third element which is decisive in the instant case. In the information, it was alleged that petitioner caused damage in the amount of P21,000.00 to AFPSLAI because he caused it to appear in the disbursement voucher that Diosdado Guilas was entitled to a P21,000.00 finder’s fee when in truth and in fact AFPSLAI owed no such sum to him. However, contrary to these allegations in the information, petitioner was able to prove that AFPSLAI owed a finder’s fee in the amount of P21,000.00 although not to Guilas but to Ernesto Hernandez.

It was positively shown that Hernandez was able to solicit a P2,100,000.00 worth of investment for AFPSLAI from Rosario Mercader which entitled him to a finder’s fee equivalent to one percent of the amount solicited (i.e., P21,000.00) under the Finder’s Fee Program. The documentary evidence consisting of the Certificate of Capital Contribution Monthly No. 52178 which was presented by the prosecution categorically stated that Rosario

9

Mercader deposited P2,100,000.00 worth of investment in AFPSLAI. In fact, Rosario Mercader was no longer presented as a defense witness in view of the stipulation by the prosecution on the fact that Mercader was a depositor of AFPSLAI and that Hernandez was the one who convinced her to make such deposit. Moreover, the defense showed that the disbursement voucher was merely placed in the name of Guilas upon the request of Hernandez so that he would have a lower tax base. Thus, after Guilas received the P21,000.00 from AFPSLAI, he gave the money to petitioner who in turn surrendered the amount to Hernandez.

In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It has the duty to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for the said crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. However, in the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove the third essential element of the crime charged in the information. Thus, petitioner should be acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence.

Case 9People vs. Malngan Facts: On January 2, 2001, Edna, one hired as a housemaid by Roberto Separa Sr. was accused of setting fire the house of his employer resulted in the destruction of his employer’s house and the death of six persons including his employer Roberto Separa Sr., some seven adjoining residential houses,were also razed by fire. On January 9, 2001, an information was filed before the RTC of Manila, charging the accused-appellant with the crime of Arson with multiple homicide. The RTC as well as the Court of Appeals finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of

Arson with multiple homicide. The accused-appellant asserts that the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to prove her guilt, that she is charged with crime not defined and penalized by law.

Issue: Whether or not the accused-appelant is liable of the crime of arson with multiple homicide and whether or not the crime charged is not defined and penalized by law.

Held: What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. As stated in the body of information, accused-appellant was charged with having intentionally burned the house. Consequently, if proved at the trial, she may be convicted, and sentenced accordingly, of the crime of simple arson. Such is the case not withstanding the error in the designation of the offense in the information, the information remains effective insofar as it states the facts constituting the crime alleged therein. 

Case 10 Jumaquio vs. Villarosa Facts: The undersigned Prosecutor II accuses Resty Jumaquio, with the crime of grave threats in relation to RA 7610 and also accuses with the crime of physical injuries. That on or about August 2, 2003, the said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously threaten the minor, a 13 year old boy, and that on the same date the said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, box and hit the minors, 13 years old and 17 years old, thereby causing physical injuries to the

10

latter, which required medical treatment for a period of three to five days, to their damage and prejudice.That the above acts of the accused debases, degrades and demeans the dignity of the complaint and impairs their normal growth and development.

Issue:Whether or not the several crimes charged with the accused-appellant should be dismissed on the grounds of could not be considered a crime and could not even be complexed.

Held:As correctly argued by the City Prosecutor, the questioned information separately charged two distinct offense of child abuse committed through the use of threatening words and child abuse through the infliction of physical injuries.Petitioner is not in jeopardy of being convicted of grave threats and child abuse in the first case and slight physical injuries and child abuse in the second. In the first information, petitioner charged with child abuse uttering debasing, demeaning and degrading words to the minor. In the second, he is charged with child abuse by inflicting physical injuries. What controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited therein. Moreover, an information is not duplicitous if it charges several related acts, all of which constitute a single offense, although the acts may in themselves be distinct offenses. 

Amendment 

Case 11 Rafael Gonzales vs. Hon. Tranquil P. Salvador, Glen Dale, Et al.G.R. No. 168340, December 5, 2006 Facts:

Rafael Gonzales filed a complaint of libel against Glen Dale a.k.a. Rene Martel arising from the latter’s column “Bizz ‘N’ Fizz” in Today newspaper. Finding that there is probable cause, the Prosecutor filed information before the said court. Petition for Review the prosecutor’s resolution was raised before the DOJ but was denied. Thus, Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition were raised before the CA but was denied. Hence, respondent was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the libel charges.Respondent filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged because there is no allegation in the information that petitioner resides in Makati or that the libelous article was first published in Makati, hence, the court has no jurisdiction to try the case.The Motion to Quash was granted. Upon petitioner’s motion, the trial court granted and directed the public prosecutor with 10 days within which to file amended information. It was opposed by respondent on the ground that defective information may only be amended before a motion to quash is granted, and that once quashed, the information can no longer be amended. Respondent was favored by the trial court. On appeal with the CA, the same was denied. Hence, this recourse was filed before the highest court.

 Issue: Whether or not amendment to information can be allowed subsequent to a grant of a Motion to Quash. Holding:Not all defects in an information can be cured by amendment. In this case, the amendment of the information to vest jurisdiction upon a court is not permissible. Sec. 4 of Rule 117 applies if the trial court finds that there is a defect in the information and the defect can be cured by amendment, in which case the court shall order the prosecution to amend the information. Once the court has granted the motion to quash the information and such order

11

became final and executory, then, there is nothing more to amend. The trial court has the discretion to order the filing of another information and if warranted, must be contained in the same order granting the motion to quash. In this case, the petitioner failed to assert the propriety of amending the information within the reglementary period, thus, the order quashing the information became final and executory. Furthermore, the petition of Gonzales is denied.  Case 12 Eduardo G. Ricarze vs. CA, Caltex Phils. Inc., PCIBankG.R. No. 160451, February 9, 2007 Facts:Eduardo Ricarze (employed as a collector-messenger of City Service Corporation) is assigned to collect checks payable to Caltex. He opened a bank account in the name of Dante Gutierrez, a regular customer of Caltex, forged the signatures on the dorsal portions of the stolen check and deposited it in that same bank account. He was charged by the officers of Caltex with estafa through falsification of commercial documents. In the original information filed by the prosecutor, Caltex appeared to be the offended party because the prosecutor was not informed that PCIBank credited certain amount to Caltex. After arraignment and plea, PCIBank appeared as the complainant. Ricarze averred that the information can no longer be amended because he had already been arraigned under the original information, and that doing so would place him in double jeopardy. On one hand, PCIBank contended that PCIBank had re-credited the amount to Caltex to the extent of the indemnity, hence, the PCIBank had been subrogated to the rights and interests of Caltex as private complainant. 

 Issue: 

Whether or not an information can be amended even after the accused had been arraigned and entered his plea.

Holding: The Supreme Court held that the amendment in the name of the complainant is of form. The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in one form as in the other. In this case, the amendment made which does not change the nature of the crime alleged does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. As provided by the Rules of Court, after the entry of the plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. In the case at bar, the amendment is allowed because it is settled that the same does not prejudice the rights of Ricarze. In addition, it was held that in case of offenses against property, the designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or information can be properly identified.

Case 13PACOY VS. CAJIGALG.R. NO. 157472September 28, 2007 FACTS: On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against Petitioner Jose M. Pacoy. Upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide. However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another Order directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to

12

Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder.  Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word “Homicide” and instead wrote the word “Murder” in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information. The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original Information for Homicide. Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. In his Motion to Inhibit, he alleged that the respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an arbitrary, capricious and partial manner in mandating the amendment of the charge from Homicide to Murder in disregard of the provisions of the law and existing jurisprudence. The respondent judge denied the Motion to Inhibit and granted the Motion for Reconsideration. In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge found that a close scrutiny of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code shows that “disregard of rank” is merely a generic mitigating circumstance which should not elevate the classification of the crime of homicide to murder. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion and exceeds his jurisdiction in ordering the amendment of the information from homicide to murder. HELD:  The petition is not meritorious. The change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution. Under Section 14, Rule 110 - Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in

substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that the only change made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of the Information, with the crossing out of word “Homicide” and its replacement by the word “Murder.” There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption and preamble from “Homicide” to “Murder” as purely formal. Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which the accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused. The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made; and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information. Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the amended Information are identical with those of the original Information for Homicide, there could not be any effect on the prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there be any possible prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner. While the respondent judge erroneously thought that “disrespect on account of rank” qualified the crime to murder, as the same was only a generic aggravating circumstance, we do not find that he committed any grave abuse of discretion in ordering the amendment of the Information after petitioner had already pleaded

13

not guilty to the charge of Homicide, since the amendment made was only formal and did not adversely affect any substantial right of petitioner. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge.

Prosecution of OffensesCase 14CHUA VS. PADILLOG.R. 163797April 24. 2007 FACTS: Rodrigo Padillo and Marietta Padillo, respondents, are the owners of Padillo Lending Investor engaged in the money lending business. Their niece, Marissa Padillo-Chua, served as the firm’s manager. Marissa is married to Wilson Chua, brother of Renita Chua, herein petitioners. Sometime in September 1999, a post-audit was conducted. It was found that Marissa was engaged in illegal activities. Some of the borrowers whose loan applications she recommended for approval were fictitious and their signatures on the checks were spurious, the cash amounts received were turned over to Marissa or her husband Wilson for deposit in their personal accounts. To facilitate encashment, Marissa would sign the check to signify to the bank that she personally knew the alternative payee. The total amount embezzled reached P7 million. Respondents filed complaints against petitioners with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Forthwith, the City Prosecutor filed an Information for estafa against Marissa, Wilson, and Renita Chua. 

Believing that a more serious offense should have been charged against petitioners, respondents interposed an appeal to the Secretary of Justice. The Secretary of Justice found that the participation of Wilson Chua in the commission of the crime was not clearly established by the evidence. As to Renita Chua, the Secretary of Justice found no proof of conspiracy between her and Marissa. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied with finality by the Secretary of Justice. Respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. They alleged that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion. They prayed that the Court of Appeals order the Prosecutor to withdraw the Information and instead, file several Informations against petitioners. The Court of Appeals rendered  its Decision dismissing the petition, holding that there was no conspiracy among the petitioners. Respondents seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration and then the Court of Appeals reverses itself. The Court of Appeals found that it overlooked certain facts and circumstances which, if considered, would establish probable cause against Wilson and Renita. The Court of Appeals identified these facts to be: (1) Marissa’s consistent practice of depositing checks with altered names of payees to the respective accounts of Wilson Chua and Renita Chua; (2) considering that Wilson and Marissa are husband and wife, it can be inferred that one knows the transactions of the other; and (3) Wilson had full knowledge of the unlawful activities of Marissa. . This is supported by the affidavit of Ernesto Alcantara. ISSUE: Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in compelling the Secretary of Justice to include in the Information Wilson and Renita. 

14

HELD: The Court of Appeals did not err in directing the City Prosecutor to include Wilson and Renita Chua in the Information for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents. Section 5, Rule 110 of the 200 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, partly provides that "All criminal actions either commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor." The rationale for this rule is that since a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State, it necessarily follows that a representative of the State shall direct and control the prosecution thereof.. However, that the public prosecutor’s exercise of his discretionary powers is not absolute. One of the exceptions is that the Court of Appeals may review the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on a petition for certiorari on the ground that he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. As found by the Court of Appeals, the Secretary of Justice either overlooked or patently ignored the following circumstances: (1) Marissa’s practice of depositing checks, with altered names of payees, in the respective accounts of Wilson and Renita Chua; (2) the fact that Wilson and Marissa are husband and wife makes it difficult to believe that one has no idea of the transactions entered into by the other; and (3) the affidavit of Ernesto Alcantara confirming that Wilson had knowledge of Marissa’s illegal activities. WHEREFORE, the petition is denied and the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Prosecution of Civil Action Arising from crimesCase 15Quinto Vs. Andres453 SCRA 511Facts:

The son of the petitioner died by drowning as the former assented to the invitation of the respondents to go fishing inside a concrete culvert. The NBI filed information for homicide and prosecution had presented its witnesses. The trail court had acquitted the respondents on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and held the respondents not liable for damages because of the absence of preponderant evidence. The CA affirmed.

Issue: Whether or not the extinction of respondent’s criminal liability carries with it the extinction of their civil liability.

Held: The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the civil action that the act or omission from where the civil liability may arise does not exist. In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial court and the CA, the prosecution failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which the civil liability of the respondents rest, i.e. that the petitioner has a cause of action against the respondents for damages.

Case 16Tupaz IV Vs. Court of Appeals475 SCRA

Facts: Petitioners signed trust receipts in favor of respondent BPI for the letters of credit issued by the latter to the former. When petitioners did not comply with their undertaking under the trust

15

receipts after the respondents several demands, the latter charged the former with estafa under trust Receipt Law. The trial court acquitted the petitioners for the crime of estafa based on reasonable doubt. However, it found petitioners civilly liable under the trust receipt. The CA affirmed.

Issue: Whether or not the acquittal of the petitioners operates to extinguished their civil liability.

Held: The rule is that where the civil action is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal- where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is requires in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature xxx and where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted.

Case 17SAMSON CHING, Petitioner, vs. CLARITA NICDAO and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents I. Facts of the Case                                Clarita Nicdao was accused of BP22 by Samson Ching. Eleven (11) Informations were filed with the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Province of Bataan, which, except as to the amounts and check numbers. At about the same time, fourteen (14) other criminal complaints, also for violation of BP 22, were filed against respondent Nicdao by Emma Nuguid, said to be the common law spouse of petitioner Ching. Another witness presented by the prosecution was Imelda Yandoc, an employee of HSLB. On direct-examination,15 she testified that she worked as a checking

account bookkeeper/teller of the bank. stated anew that respondent Nicdao’s checks bounced on October 7, 1997 for being "DAIF" and her account was closed the following day, on October 8, 1997.                        The defense proffered the testimonies of respondent Nicdao, Melanie Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao. On direct-examination,17 respondent Nicdao stated that she only dealt with Nuguid. She vehemently denied the allegation that she had borrowed money from both petitioner Ching and Nuguid in the total amount of P22,950,000.00.                        On December 8, 1998, the MCTC rendered judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443 convicting respondent Nicdao of eleven (11) counts of violation of BP 22. The MCTC gave credence to petitioner Ching’s testimony that respondent Nicdao borrowed money from him in the total amount of P20,950,000.00.                        On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5, in separate Decisions both dated May 10, 1999, affirmed in toto the decisions of the MCTC convicting respondent Nicdao of eleven (11) and fourteen (14) counts of violation of BP 22 in Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443 and 9458-9471, respectively.                        On November 22, 1999, the CA (13th Division) rendered the assailed Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 acquitting respondent Nicdao of the eleven (11) counts of violation of BP 22 filed against her by petitioner Ching.The Decision of the CA became final and executor. III-Issue           Repondent Nicdao’s acquittal by the CA,does the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction and authority to resolve and rule on her civil liability, under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which, prior to its amendment III-Held by SC

16

The petition is denied for lack of merit.Notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s acquittal, petitioner Ching is entitled to appeal the civil aspect of the case within the reglementary periodIt is axiomatic that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."34 Under the pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court, the civil action is generally impliedly instituted with the criminal action. At the time of petitioner Ching’s filing of the Informations against respondent Nicdao, Section 1,35 Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, quoted earlier, provided in part:SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.A painstaking review of the case leads to the conclusion that respondent Nicdao’s acquittal likewise carried with it the extinction of the action to enforce her civil liability. There is simply no basis to hold respondent Nicdao civilly liable to petitioner Ching.First, the CA’s acquittal of respondent Nicdao is not merely based on reasonable doubt. Rather, it is based on the finding that she did not commit the act penalized under BP 22. In particular, the CA found that the P20,000,000.00 check was a stolen check which was never issued nor delivered by respondent Nicdao to petitioner Ching. As such, according to the CA, petitioner Ching "did not acquire any right or interest over Check No. 002524 and cannot assert any cause of action founded on said check,"41 and that respondent Nicdao "has no obligation to make good the stolen check and cannot, therefore, be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22."42With respect to the ten (10) other checks, the CA established that the loans secured by these checks had already been extinguished

after full payment had been made by respondent Nicdao. In this connection, the second element for the crime under BP 22, i.e., "that the check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account or for value," is not present.Second, in acquitting respondent Nicdao, the CA did not adjudge her to be civilly liable to petitioner Ching. In fact, the CA explicitly stated that she had already fully paid her obligations. The CA computed the payments made by respondent Nicdao vis-à-vis her loan obligations in this manner:Clearly, adding the payments recorded at the back of the cigarette cartons by Emma Nuguid in her own handwriting totaling P5,780,000.00 and the P1,200,000.00 demand draft received by Emma Nuguid, it would appear that petitioner [respondent herein] had already made payments in the total amount of P6,980,000.00 for her loan obligation of only P2,100,000.00 (P950,000.00 in the case at bar and P1,150,000.00 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23054).43On the other hand, its finding relative to the P20,000,000.00 check that it was a stolen check necessarily absolved respondent Nicdao of any civil liability thereon as well.Third, while petitioner Ching attempts to show that respondent Nicdao’s liability did not arise from or was not based upon the criminal act of which she was acquitted (ex delicto) but from her loan obligations to him (ex contractu), however, petitioner Ching miserably failed to prove by preponderant evidence the existence of these unpaid loan obligations. Significantly, it can be inferred from the following findings of the CA in its decision acquitting respondent Nicdao that the act or omission from which her civil liability may arise did not exist. On the P20,000,000.00 check, the CA found as follows:True, indeed, the missing pre-signed and undated check no. 002524 surfaced in the possession of complainant Ching who, in cahoots with his paramour Emma Nuguid, filled up the blank check with his name as payee and in the fantastic amount of P20,000,000.00, dated it October 6, 1997, and presented it to the bank on October 7, 1997, along with the other checks, for

17

payment. Therefore, the inference that the check was stolen is anchored on competent circumstantial evidence. The fact already established is that Emma Nuguid , previous owner of the store, had access to said store. Moreover, the possession of a thing that was stolen , absent a credible reason, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that the person in possession of the stolen article is presumed to be guilty of taking the stolen article (People v. Zafra, 237 SCRA 664). Therefore. CA decision is affirmed and petitioners appeal is deny for lack of merit.

Case 18

CRUZ v. MINAG.R. No. 154207, 27 April 2007 Case Summary: On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz, filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court a formal entry of Appearance as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz is the complaining witness. On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC, a Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. On June 5, 2002 however, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the crime of Grave Threats carries with it civil liability 

Decision of the case: Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable except in instances when no actual damage results from the offense, such as espionage, violation o neutrality, flight t an enemy country, and crimes against popular representation. The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waves the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from grave Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect. WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution and order of the RTC, branch 116, Pasay City are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.

Preliminary Investigation

Case 19CELSA P. ACUÑA, Petitioner, versus DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON, PEDRO PASCUA and RONNIE TURLA, (Angeles City National Trade School), Respondents.2005 Jan 31

18

G.R. No. 144692CARPIO The Case This is a petition for certiorari of the Resolution dated 4 April 2000  and the Order dated 19 June 2000 of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.  The 4 April 2000 Resolution dismissed for lack of probable cause the complaint for perjury of petitioner Celsa P. Acuña against respondents Pedro Pascua and Ronnie Turla.  The 19 June 2000 Order denied the motion for reconsideration. FACTS: Petitioner Celsa P. Acuña  (“petitioner”) is a former teacher of the Angeles City National Trade School (“ACNTS”) in Angeles City, Pampanga.   Respondent Pedro Pascua (“respondent Pascua”) was ACNTS’ Officer-In-Charge while respondent Ronnie Turla (“respondent Turla”) was a member of its faculty. On 13 July 1998, a certain Erlinda Yabut (“Yabut”), another ACNTS teacher, together with other school personnel, requested a dialogue with respondent Pascua on some unspecified matter.  Respondent Pascua agreed to the request and the meeting took place on 16 July 1998.  Respondent Turla attended the meeting upon respondent Pascua’s directive. Petitioner, whom Yabut apparently invited, also attended the meeting. As an offshoot to an incident during the 16 July 1998 meeting, petitioner charged respondent Pascua with misconduct (“OMB-ADM-1-99-0387”) and with violation of Article 131 (perjury) of the Revised Penal Code (“OMB 1-99-903”) before the Office of the Ombudsman (“Ombudsman”). 

Contending that private respondents perjured themselves in their sworn statements in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387, petitioner charged private respondents with perjury (“OMB 1-99-2467”) before the office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon (“public respondent”). Petitioner alleged that private respondents were liable for perjury because: (1) the complaint she and Yabut filed against respondent Pascua before the Civil Service Commission, later endorsed to the DECS, was not “the same” as her complaint in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 and (2) it was Yabut and not respondent Pascua who called the 16 July 1998 meeting. Private respondents denied the charge against them and sought the dismissal of the complaint.  Public respondent found no evidence to indict respondents for perjury, hence, dismissed the complaint.  Petitioner sought reconsideration but public respondent denied her motion in the 19 June 2000 Order.  Hence, petitioner filed the petition before the Supreme Court contending that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing her complaint for lack of probable cause. ISSUE: Whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint in OMB 1-99-2467 for lack of probable cause.  HELD: The Public Respondent did not Gravely Abuse His Discretion in Dismissing OMB 1-99-2467 for lack of probable cause It is the Court’s policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his constitutionally mandated prosecutory powers.  The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and

19

prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.  The Court, in the present case, found no reason to deviate from this long-standing policy. Probable cause, as used in preliminary investigations, is defined as the “existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.”  Case 20 JIMMY ANG, Petitioner,  versus ELEANOR R. LUCERO, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, and THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF MAKATI CITY, Respondents.2005 Jan 21G.R. No. 143169CARPIO The Case This petition for review assails the 29 October 1999 Decision[2] and 25 April 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44778.  The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Jimmy Ang and affirmed the

Resolutions issued by former Secretary of Justice Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. FACTS: The record shows that complainant [Lucero], an American citizen, is a businesswoman and a native of Pangasinan.  On August 8, 1989, she entered into a memorandum of agreement with E. Ganzon, Inc. for the purchase of Condominium Unit 1512, Makati Cinema Square Tower located along Pasong Tamo, Makati for P2,417,655.00.  As she is a resident of Guam, she appointed by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney,[3] Graciano P. Catenza, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact on November 20, 1990 to manage and administer all her businesses and properties in the Philippines, including the condominium unit.  Catenza, however, delegated his authority to the respondent. Respondent/complainant filed against petitioner a criminal complaint for estafa through failsification of public documents for falsifying a letter of authorization dated 6 July 1992 and to make it  appear that she authorized petitioner to register the condominium unit in his name and the Deed of Assignment dated June 22, 1992 to make it appear that she transferred the ownership of the condominium unit.  Through the use of the aforementioned fictitious documents, her title was cancelled and in lieu thereof, condominium Certificate of Title No. 23578 was issued in the name of respondent by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City which title he used as a collateral to secure a loan in the amount of P2,000,000.00 from the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC).  When she learned of the fraudulent transfer, she executed an affidavit of adverse claim and annotated it on the title on March 21, 1994.  The day after the thirty-day effectivity period of the adverse claim lapsed, respondent, to add insult to injury, immediately secured an additional loan in the amount of P700,000.00 with the same bank (RCBC) using the same property as collateral even after the transport business he was managing for the complainant had

20

ceased operation already.  Respondent failed to act on complainant’s demands for accounting and for the reconveyance to her of Condominium Unit No. 1512. The NBI found the signature on the Deed of Assignment and Lucero’s sample signatures to have been written by “one and the same person.” However, the NBI found the signature on the Authorization Letter a “traced forgery.” A preliminary investigation was conducted finding probable cause against Ang.  Prosecutor Bautista recommended the filing of two (2) informations, (1) for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (c) of the Revised Penal Code[7] and (2) for estafa through falsification of public document.    Ang moved for a reinvestigation.  Prosecutor Wilfredo Ong of the CPO Makati reconsidered Prosecutor Bautista’s resolution of 17 April 1995 and dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.  Lucero appealed the dismissal of the complaint to the Department of Justice and the resolution was reversed.  Petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and TRO was filed.  The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for certiorari and affirming the resolutions of the Secretary of Justice.  Hence, petitioner before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the findings of the Secretary of Justice of probable cause for estafa valid? HELD: Ang’s contentions are untenable.            In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed

and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. It does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.  As implied by the words themselves, “probable cause” is concerned with probability, not absolute or moral certainty. The complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt.  A preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence. In this case, Ang calls on this Court to assume the function of a public prosecutor.  Ang’s arguments are essentially evidentiary matters that must be presented and heard during the trial. Whether Lucero granted Ang the authority to sell and mortgage the Property is a question which requires an examination of the parties’ evidence. In this case, Ang admitted typing the Deed of Assignment over Lucero’s signature in blank. Thereafter, Ang used the Deed of Assignment to transfer the ownership of the Property from Lucero to him.  Lucero claims that she was prejudiced by virtue of the Deed of Assignment.  However, whether Ang took advantage of Lucero’s signature is a question that should be presented and resolved during the trial.   There is also probable cause that Ang committed estafa by falsification of public document. The Deed of Assignment is a public document since it is notarized.  Lucero claims that the Deed of Assignment was falsified because she was out of the country when it was executed.  Moreover, though the signature in the Deed of Assignment appears to be her signature, it was not Lucero’s intention to transfer the Property to Ang. Case 21. TORRES VS AGUINALDO

21

Facts:Torres, the petitioner, was charged for the falsification of public documents by forging the Deed of Absolute Sale of property of the Spouses Edgardo and Nelia Aguinaldo. They alleged that the title to their properties covered by TCT No. T-93596,T-87764-65 were transferred without their knowledge and consent in the name of Torres.Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause and recommended the filing of an information against Torres. Torres moved for reconsideration but was denied. On appeal DOJ reversed the findings and ordered withdrawal of the information. Information was withdrawn and petitioner has not been arraigned. Aguinaldo filed petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeal which was granted.

Issue:Whether or not evidence of a respondent in a criminal case should be considered during the preliminary investigation in determining if probable cause exists to indict him for the crime charged.

Held:Preliminary investigation is executive in character. It does not

contemplate a judicial function. It is essentially an inquisitorial

proceeding, and often, the only means of ascertaining who may be

reasonably charged with a crime. It is not a trial on the merits and

has no purpose except to determine whether a crime has been

committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the

accused is guilty thereof. 'It does not place the person against

whom it is taken in jeopardy.

Generally, preliminary investigation falls under the authority of

the prosecutor. It is well to note that Section 3, Rule 112 of the

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure not only requires the

submission of the complaint and the affidavits of the complainant

and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents, but also

directs the respondent to submit his counter-affidavit and that of

his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his

defense. Section 4 thereof also mandates the investigating

prosecutor to certify under oath in the information that the

accused was informed of the complaint and the evidence against

him, and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting

evidence.

 

Case 22Romualdez vs Marcelo470 SCRA 763

Facts : 

A warrant of arrest was issued on February 28, 1989, but this was not served because of petitioner’s exile from the country.  On October 21, 1991, he filed through counsel a Motion to Recall Warrants of Arrest, alleging that the preliminary investigation conducted by Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) was invalid for lack of jurisdiction.Due to his non-compliance with these terms, the Sandiganbayan denied on

22

January 24, 1992 petitioner’s motion to recall the warrant of arrest.  Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Sandiganbayan denied on April 24, 1992In a Decision dated May 16, 1995, this Court declared invalid the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG for lack of jurisdiction.  However, it held that the invalidity or absence of a preliminary investigation did not affect the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or impair the validity of the informations.

Issue:

Whether or not the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss the preliminary investigation?

Ruling:

 No.  The Supreme Court ruled, that the Ombudsman is the proper authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the alleged offenses committed by petitioner.  Pursuant thereto, there is no need for a new complaint to be filed by PCGG because the Ombudsman, on its own, may conduct a preliminary investigation of offenses committed by public officers.  Moreover, the denial of his motion to dismiss was concomitant with Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman disallowing a motion to dismiss except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 

Case 23Matalam vs Sandiganbayan455 SCRA 737Facts :

An information 15 November 2004 was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Datu Guimid Matalam, Habib

A. Bajunaid, Ansari M. Lawi, Muslimin Unga and Naimah Unte with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, for their alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of Kasan I. Ayunan, Abdul E. Zailon, Esmael A. Ebrahim, Annabelle Zailon, Pendatun Mambatawan, Hyria Mastura and Faizal I. Hadil. After the reinvestigation, the public prosecutor filed a “Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information Deleting the Names of Other Accused Except Datu Guimid Matalam to which petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to the Motion to Admit the Alleged Amended Information Against the Accused Guimid P. Matalam Thereafter, the public prosecutor filed his Reply to which petitioner filed a Rejoinder.In his Motion to Dismiss, petitioner alleged that the amended information charges an entirely new cause of action.  The corpus delicti of the amended information is no longer his alleged refusal to pay the backwages ordered by the Civil Service Commission, but the alleged willful, unlawful and illegal dismissal from the service of the complaining witnesses.  He insists that the amended information charging a separate and entirely different offense cannot be admitted because there would be a serious violation of due process of law.  He claims he is entitled to a preliminary investigation since he was not informed that he is being charged for the alleged dismissal of the complaining witnesses and that he was not given the opportunity to explain.Petitioner argues that the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 12 January 2004 and 03 November 2004 admitting the Amended Information charging a new offense without conducting a preliminary investigation were issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Issue :

23

whether or not petitioner was deprived of due process of law when the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Information without conducting another or new preliminary investigation?

Ruling :

The amendment was indeed substantial. The recital of facts constituting the offense charged was definitely altered.  In the original information, the prohibited act allegedly committed by petitioner was the illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of the private complainants, while in the amended information, it is the illegal dismissal from the service of the private complainants.  However, it cannot be denied that the alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay monetary claims is related to, and arose from, the alleged illegal dismissal from the service of the private complainants.Thus, before or after a plea, a substantial amendment in an information entitles an accused to another preliminary investigation.However, if the amended information contains a charge related to or is included in the original information, a new preliminary investigation is not required.

Case 24DR. BENITA F. OSORIO, petitioner,VersusHON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, G.R. No. 156652 Promulgated October 13, 2005 Facts:          This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the 13 December 2002 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67511 dated December 13, 2002 which affirmed in toto the 12 January 2001 Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas in, as well as the order dated 17 July 2001 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, suspending the

petitioner from her position as principal of Dr. Cecilio Putong National High School (formerly Bohol National High School).         The petition originated from a letter complaint from Beatriz L. Tenorio to the Ombudsman alleging that the petitioner committed the following acts:1.      Failure to  account for the rentals of the school facilities; 2.      Non-remittance to the school trust funds of money from the sale of old newspapers to the school and appropriation of the said amount to herself; 3.      Ready-made bidding with supplier of school-needed materials; 4.      Double mandatory collection supposedly for the  Boy and Girl Scouts of the Philippines, from all students of Bohol National High School and non-remittance of all the contributions to BSP and GSP; 5.      Treatment of money from the school canteen as her personal money; 6.      Conspiracy with treasure hunters in digging under the main ground of the school building for Yamashita treasures; 7.      Falsification of travel document to claim bigger representation allowances; and 8.      Other improper acts.            Acting on the complaint, the Office of the Ombudsman-Manila, on 29 January 1998, requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an investigation to verify the alleged anomalies at the Dr. Cecilio Putong National High School. In the course of that investigation, the NBI found:

24

 a) that petitioner Osorio authorized the sale of newspapers, but did not remit the proceeds thereof to the school; andb) that she issued a memorandum through which students were charged more than the allowable fees for their membership with Boy and Girl Scouts of the Philippines.            On 17 February 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman-Manila requested audit specialists from the COA to conduct a thorough investigation on the alleged anomalies at the Dr. Cecilio Putong National High School.           After evaluating the report of the COA auditors, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas was convinced that allegations no. 1 to no. 4 were duly substantiated while the rest of the allegations were not.  It found prima facie case of five (5) counts of Malversation of Public Funds against petitioner on the proceeds of the sale of the school’s old newspapers on five occasions.            On 17 December 1998, the investigating auditors submitted a sworn affidavit. In an order dated 27 January 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas issued an order placing petitioner and Mr. Nestor Robles under preventive suspension. On 05 February 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas ordered petitioner and Mr. Nestor Robles to file their respective counter-affidavits to the complaint. Later, on 15 March 1999, petitioner and co-respondent Robles submitted their respective counter-affidavits, denying participation in the alleged irregularities.           In a resolution dated 12 January 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas found probable cause against petitioner for five (5) counts of Malversation of Public Funds and five (5) counts of violations of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended. 

           The Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in its order dated 17 July 2001.  Issues: 1.      Whether the Court of Appeals is correct in ruling that the Honorable Office of the Ombudsman did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it opted not to conduct a clarificatory hearing in the case of the petitioner. 2.      Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the other issues raised by the petitioner on certiorari are purely questions of evidence and not of law.  Decision:           On the first issue raised by petitioner, she bewails respondent court’s ruling decreeing that a clarificatory hearing in the instant criminal case is optional on the part of the investigating prosecutor. Petitioner believes that without a clarificatory hearing, it is impossible for the investigating prosecutor to resolve numerous irreconcilable issues and arrive at a lawful indictment.             Section 1 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:             Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.              The foregoing provision sets forth the purpose of preliminary investigation which is to determine whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof.       Subsection (e) of Section 3 and of the same rule provides:

25

           (e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or a witness.  The parties can be present at the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-examine.  They may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned.  It is the call of the investigating prosecutor, in the exercise of his sound discretion, whether to conduct a clarificatory hearing or not.  If he believes that the evidence before him is sufficient to support a finding of probable cause, he may not hold a clarificatory hearing. As held in Webb v. De Leon:  . . . The decision to call witnesses for clarificatory questions is addressed to the sound discretion of the investigator and the investigator alone.  If the evidence on hand already yields a probable cause, the investigator need not hold a clarificatory hearing.             The consistent and general policy of the Court is not to interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.            The instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67511 dated 13 December 2002 affirming in toto the resolution dated 12 January 2001 and the order dated 17 July 2001 issued by the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas is AFFIRMED. Case 25G.R. No. 147932             January 25, 2006

LAILA G. DE OCAMPO, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, MAGDALENA B. DACARRA, and ERLINDA P. ORAYAN, Respondents.The FactsThe present case arose from a sworn statement of respondent Magdalena B. Dacarra ("Magdalena") executed before the Women’s Desk of the CPD Police Station in Batasan Hills, Quezon City on 10 December 1999 stating that on 4 December 1999, her nine-year-old son Ronald complained of dizziness upon arriving home at about six in the evening and then vomited. When asked what happened, Ronald replied that petitioner, who was Ronald’s teacher, banged his head against that of his classmate Lorendo Orayan ("Lorendo"). Magdalena inspected Ronald’s head and saw a woundless contusion. Due to Ronald’s continued vomiting, Magdalena brought him to a quack doctor (arbularyo) on 5 December 1999. The following morning, Magdalena brought Ronald to the East Avenue Medical Center where he underwent an x-ray. The attending physician informed Magdalena that Ronald’s head had a fracture. Blood oozed out of Ronald’s nose before he died on 9 December 1999.Lorendo also executed a sworn statement narrating how petitioner banged his head against Ronald’s.The Inquest Proceedings which will be the primary defence citation of the petitioner stated that: Evidence warrants the release of the respondent for further investigation of the charges against her. The case is not proper for inquest as the incident complained of. Further, the evidence insufficient to support the charge for homicide against the respondent. There is no concrete evidence to show proof that the alleged banging of the heads of the two minor victims could be the actual and proximate cause of the death of the minor. There is no certainty, therefore, that respondent’s alleged wrongdoing contributed or caused the death of said victim.Subsequently, the case was referred for preliminary investigation. During the said preliminary investigation, Lorendo’s mom alleged

26

that she was bribed by the petitioner and presented said bribe money. Also 2 other witnesses swore they saw petitioner banging the heads of the minors as well as physically abusing them.Her counter argument contained:-          The findings of the inquest proceedings-          Petitioner assailed the omission in Magdalena’s sworn statement about Ronald’s head injury due to a vehicular accident in November 1997.-          Petitioner also alleged that the witnesses have immature perception.-          Petitioner further asserted that the causes of death stated in Ronald’s Death Certificate are hearsay and inadmissible in the preliminary investigation.The investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner for the offenses charged. Petitioner filed a petition for review with the DOJ.The DOJ Secretary denied the petition for review. The DOJ Secretary held that there was no bias in complainants’ favor when the investigating prosecutor did not conduct a clarificatory hearing and unilaterally procured the autopsy report as nothing precluded her from doing so.The DOJ Secretary rejected petitioner’s claim that she is innocent as held by the inquest prosecutor. The inquest prosecutor did not dismiss the case. She merely recommended petitioner’s release for further investigation since the case was not proper for inquest and the evidence was then insufficient.

Issues:1. Whether petitioner was denied due process during the preliminary investigation; and2. Whether there is probable cause against petitioner for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 and for violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610.

Ruling:Absence of a clarificatory hearingThe Court rejects petitioner’s contention that she was denied due process when the investigating prosecutor did not conduct a clarificatory hearing. A clarificatory hearing is not indispensable during preliminary investigation. Rather than being mandatory, a clarificatory hearing is optional on the part of the investigating officer as evidenced by the use of the term "may" in Section 3(e) of Rule 112:(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. xxx15 (emphasis supplied)In this case, the investigating prosecutor no longer conducted hearings after petitioner submitted her counter-affidavit. This simply means that at that point the investigating prosecutor believed that there were no more matters for clarification. It is only in petitioner’s mind that some "crucial points" still exist and need clarification. In any event, petitioner can raise these "important" matters during the trial proper.Petitioner was not deprived of due process since both parties were accorded equal rights in arguing their case and presenting their respective evidence during the preliminary investigation. Due process is merely an opportunity to be heard.Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on the merits. Its sole purpose is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether the respondent isprobably guilty of the crime. It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence.There is probable cause for the offenses charged against petitioner. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty

27

of the crime. In effect, petitioner admits the occurrence of the head-banging incident but denies committing it.Petition is denied and the Resolutions affirmed.

Arrest

Case 26People of the Philippines Vs German Agojo As alleged in the complaint, accused appellant German Luna was apprehended on August 24, 1999 in Poblacion, Tanauan,  Batangas for violation of PD 1866 and RA 6425.Concomitantly, the police team headed by Major Ablang secured an entrapment operation against the accused appellant through a buy-bust. A civilian informant, under the name of Rodolfo Alonzo was able to purchase 206.32 grams of shabu which was positively identified by a chemist from the PNP crime laboratory in camp Vicente Lim.In light of the foregoing decision of the RTC, the accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the charge of RA 6425, however, he was acquitted for the charge of violation of PD 1866 for lack of sufficient evidence.

Issues:1. Whether or not appellant’s guilt was proven beyond  reasonable doubt2. Whether or not appellant was framed up by the buy first team violation of

Held                In the case at bench, violation of RA 6425 was evidently proven by the prosecution through the testimony of Alonzo on the sale of illegal drugs and the identification of appellant as the seller is clear and

straightforward.                                                                                                      More so, the buy bust team witnessed the sale of shabu and it was duly accorded the immediacy between the time of commission of the offense and the time of the arrest.                Further review of the record reveals that the second instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (B)  were met in this case in which the offense has just been committed and the person marking the arrest  has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.                As regards to the issue of framed up, the buy bust team has proven beyond reasonable doubt that the accused appellant accepted payment for the contraband. It was also proven that the VHS tape containing drugs were examined in PNP crime laboratory and positively tested for shabu. Thus, there was no evidence that such an attempt to frame him up was made in this case.     Case 27People of the Phil. Vs Cesar Givera On May 2, 1993 Cesar Givera together with Epifanio Geralde and Arturo Geralde were charged with the same offense at the RTC of Q.C. Branch 104 and were sentenced to the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Eusebio Gardon.In due course, a decision was rendered and the three were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of P100, 000 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of the suit. Although said defendants filed appealed the judgement but the decision of the court was affirmed with modification.Prescinding to prove the fact and cause of death of Eusebio Gardon, the prosecution presented in evidence the testimony medico legal office P/ Maj Florante Baltazar wherein the

28

testimony shows that the victim sustained one fatal stab wound possibly caused by a single bladed weapon.Collorarily the daughter of the victim, Milagroso Gardon and another witness Melinda Delfin testified against the accused and it is noteworthy that they knew accused appellant and the other assailants and that in fact some of them are related to witnesses.Issue:Whether or not the presence of reasonable doubt the court a quo has committed an error in convicting the accused appellant of the crime charged.Held:                The court finds the petition devoid of meritFirst and foremost:                It is clearly apparent that the prosecution presented evidence and testimonies of witnesses were quoted as spontaneous, detailed and arid consistent. Markworthy to note that the accused – appellant are even related by affinity to the deceased and residing within the vicinity where the crime was committed , and therefore, no reason to doubt their identification by the prosecution witness.                Secondly, forthwith with the allegations of conspiracy, the evidence convincingly and unequivocally shows a coordinated action by the group in the execution of the crime.  Nonetheless evident premeditation and treachery cannot be appreciated in this case for the very reason that the victim is not totally oblivious of the impending attack by all the group of the accused appellant. Suffice to say that the victim had very opportunity to escape from the attack because he had been forewarned by his daughter of the danger posed by the group of the accused appellant.                     Thirdly, his arrest by virtue of a warrant of arrest was deemed waived because he failed to move for the question of the information before the trial court when he entered a plea of not guilty and participated in the trial. The law provides that a warrant of arrest remains enforceable until it is executed, recalled, or quashed.

                Lastly the testimony of the medico legal officer was inadmissible for failure of the adverse party to cross examine the officer. Case 28G.R. No. 117952-53      February 14, 2001PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO DE GUZMAN y PEREZ, accused-appellant.Facts:Appellant in this case was under surveillance for illegal possession of dangerous drugs by the police. The policemen however did not arrest him immediately but waited for him to be caught in flagrante delicto for selling shabu and possessing unlicensed gun and a magazine. The offenders were brought to the police station for questioning and detention. The police officers were without warrants of arrest or search warrants at the time of the arrests and seizure of evidence. As the operation was conducted largely during night-time, the police officers were unable to secure the necessary warrants for fear of leaving the place of surveillance. Accused-appellant was arraigned on February 22, 1993 with the assistance of his counsel de officio. He pleaded "not guilty" to both charges. The RTC of Cavite convicted Danilo de Guzman for violation of RA 6425, Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and Unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition. Accused-appellant assails his conviction and raised the issue that the trial court committed a patent reversible error in not finding that the evidence so far presented was obtained in an illegal search before the Supreme Court. Accused-appellant contended that his arrest and the search conducted incidental to his arrest were illegal as the surrounding circumstances of the arrest were not within the purview of the allowable warrantless arrests under Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Issue:

29

Whether the arrest was illegal

Ruling:The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court

and found that the contention of the accused untenable. A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the police officers' manner of conducting the accused-appellant's arrest was not tainted with any constitutional infirmity. Despite word from their fellow officer, SPO1 Cuevas, that he saw accused-appellant sniff "shabu", they resisted the first impulse to storm the rented cottage which could have caused them to seriously disregard constitutional safeguards. Instead, the police officers waited for the needed opening to validly arrest the accused. Rule 113, Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court provides that:Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; x x xIn the case at bar, accused-appellant was caught by the police officers in flagrante delicto while carrying a firearm without the necessary permit or license. Clearly, it was in violation of P.D. No. 1866, Section 1, at the time of the arrest.Furthermore, accused-appellant in this case is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest upon his failure to move for quashal of the information against him prior to his arraignment and entry of plea. Any irregularity .was therefore cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial court's jurisdiction.

Case 29People of the Philippines versus Molina FACTS: Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information regarding the presence of an allegedmarijuana pusher in Davao City. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver,

accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As toaccused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the arrest.Moreover, the names and addressesof the accused-appellants came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested. In the morning of August 8,1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma-a, Davao City. He called forassistance at the PNP proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by.At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, a “trisikad” carrying the accused-appellants passed by.At that instance, SPO1Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. The police officers then ordered the “trisikad” to stop. SPO1Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to open the bag. Molina replied, “Boss, if possible we will settle this.” SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, accused-appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers. Accused-appellants contended that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. ISSUE: Whether or not the marijuana is in admissible evidence for having been seized in violation of appellants constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures? HELD: The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable fashion. The Constitution provides: SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects againstunreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant orwarrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under

30

oathor affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched andthe persons or things to be seized. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in thefollowing instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation ofcustoms laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonablesearches and seizures;ii[24] and (6) stop and frisk situations.As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest.The Rules of Court, however,recognizes permissible warrantless arrests.Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a)when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense(arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based onpersonal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit);and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is servingfinal judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from oneconfinement to another (arrest of escaped prisoners). In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indicationthat would justify their arrest.In holding a bag on board atrisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing,attempting to commit or have committed a crime. The response of Molina that “Boss, if possible we will settle this” is anequivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante delicto arrest.Note thatwere it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to thearresting officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. SPO1

Paguidopon onlylearned Mula’s name and address after the arrest. It is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized accused-appellant Mula.It is worthy to note that, before the arrest, he was able to see Mula in person only once, pinpointed to him by his informer whilethey were on the side of the road.These circumstances could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at accused-appellant Mula, considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle when SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him.Withrespect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he had never seen him before the arrest.The Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules.Hence, thesearch conducted on their person was likewise illegal.Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not beadmitted as evidence.WHERE FORE accused are ACQUITTED

Case  30People of the philippines versus GalvezFACTS: At around 11:30 in the evening of May 9, 1998 the accused Manuel Galvez together with unidentified companions attack, assault, and stab with a bladed weapon Romen Castro, which injuries eventually caused the latter’s death at a local fair inside the DM Compound in Heroes del 98, Caloocan City. Several witnesses identified Manuel Galvez as the assailant, SPO1 Alberto Lizarondo then went to Manuel Galvez  invite him to the victim’s house for clarification however the relatives denied Manuel Galvez as the assailant therefore the SPO1 Alberto Lizarondo release him, Although allegedly released, he was later forced by a barangay tanod Arturo Saligumba  to board a taxi and go to the police headquarters in Sangandaan, Caloocan City where SPO2 Vivencio Gamboa, investigator of the Station Investigation Division of the Caloocan City police told him that he was a suspect in the killing of Romen Castro and he pleaded not guilty. He was not shown a warrant when he was arrested nor was he interviewed by the policemen at the headquarters. Later that same

31

day, SPO1 Alberto Lizarondo said he saw Galvez in the police station and SPO1 Lizarondo asked why Galvez was there, but the relatives of the victim and the other witnesses told him that the reason they said nothing when he asked them to identify Galvez was because of fear. ISSUE: Whether or Not the arrest executed on Manuel Galvez was illegal arrest HELD:  Accused-appellants arrest was illegal. Arturo Saligumba admitted that he arrested Galvez on the basis solely of what Reynaldo Castro had told him and not because he saw accused-appellant commit the crime charged against him. Indeed, the prosecution admitted that there was no warrant of arrest issued against accused-appellant when the latter was taken into custody. Considering that accused-appellant was not committing a crime at the time he was arrested nor did the arresting officer have any personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant committed a crime, his arrest without a warrant cannot be justified. By entering a plea of not guilty and participating actively in the trial, however, accused-appellant Galvez waived his right to raise the issue of the illegality of his arrest. It is now settled that objection to a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. The fact that the arrest was illegal does not render the subsequent proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts point to the culpability of the accused. The decision of the RTC of Caloocan City was affirmed with modification, finding accused-appellant Manuel Galvez guilty of murder and sentencing him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Case 31G.R. No. 121877 September 12, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ERLINDA GONZALES Y EVANGELISTA, accused-appellant.QUISUMBING, J.:Facts of the Case:Appellant Erlinda Gonzales y Evangelista was convicted violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No. 6425) and sentenced her to life imprisonment. The prosecution presented two witnesses, namely, PO1 Reggie Pedroso and Angela Baldevieso, forensic chemist of the PNP. In addition, the prosecution presented the following object and documentary evidence: (1) ten bundles of dried marijuana leaves or fruiting tops, weighing 9.560 kilograms. (2) Physical Sciences Report No. D-087-93 issued by Angela Baldevieso, PNP forensic chemist and (3) black traveling bag. On the other hand, the defense presented appellant herself and Isaac Lamera, the trisikad driver. PO1 Reggie Pedroso narrated that the Chief of Police of Dueñas, Iloilo received information that a woman with long hair, wearing maong pants and jacket, and Ray Ban sunglasses would be transporting marijuana along the national highway. According to the tipped information, the woman would bring a black traveling bag and would ride a trisikad. A mobile patrol in the poblacion of Dueñas and along the national highway was conducted and they passed by a woman who fitted the informer’s description. She was standing along the national highway holding a black traveling bag in a trisikad. They alighted from their car and asked her who owns the traveling bag. The woman denied ownership of the bag but trisikaddriver, later identified as Isaac Lamera, the latter pointed to the woman as the owner of the said bag. Hence both were arrested. 

32

Appellant denied her involvement in the drug transport. Lamera, the trisikad driver, also testified that he had no involvement too. The court found for the prosecution, disbelieved the defense, and convicted appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Sec. 4, Art. II of R.A. 6425 as amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and the costs.  Issues of the Case:(1) WON the testimonies of prosecution witnesses credible and sufficient to prove appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.(2) WON appellant’s warrantless arrest legal, thereby making the bricks of marijuana leaves allegedly seized from her admissible in evidence. Ruling of the Court:On the first issue, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the positive testimony of the apprehending policeman outweighs appellant’s negative testimony. Furthermore the testimony of Lamera, the trisikad driver on the witness stand materially contradicts his sworn statements . A witness who makes two sworn statements which are contradictory to his testimony in court impeaches his own credibility.  On the second issue,basic is the rule that no arrest, search or seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Nevertheless, the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain legal and judicial exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a

lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.Moreover, a lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances:(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 39, finding appellant ERLINDA GONZALES Y EVANGELISTA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal transport of marijuana is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and the costs.

33