Research methodology

1.1 A brief overview of the Research Project

Ordinarily law makes no provisions for a situation which is considered instinctively natural

for human beings. If some individuals create some situations, which usually human beings do not

create, the society has a tendency to look down upon them as being uncommon or unnatural and

this attitude is reflected in the laws. Whether those acts bring any particular harm or not the

society shows its disapproval by declaring such acts as proscribed ones. This becomes evident

when one examines the penal codes.1 This project deals with the offences of Hurt and Grievous

Hurt and is titled ‘Difference between the Hurt and Grievous Hurt’. Both of these are offences

under the Indian Penal Code 1860.

1.2 Chapterisation and the Aim of Each Chapter

This project has been divided into five chapters. The first chapter is the introduction to the

project and gives a general idea about the project as well as the scope and limitations, the method

of research. The second chapter deals with the offence of Hurt and discusses Section 319 of the

IPC. The researcher has briefly touched upon bigamy as a matrimonial offence and has subjected

it to analysis by examining judgments of various courts in this regard. The various lacunae in the

law have also been emphasized.

The third chapter deals with the offence of Grievous hurt at length. It examines Section 320

and also how adultery becomes a ground for divorce. Case laws have also been discussed at

appropriate places to examine the application of this law. The fourth chapter deals with a

comparative analysis of the offences of Hurt and Grievous Hurt and studies the obvious as well

as subtle differences between the two. The fifth chapter deals with the latest development in the

evolution of law i.e the bill which recommends addition of s.326A and 326B, dealing with

offence of acid attacks and subsequent punishment. The last chapter is the conclusion and it also

discusses the recommendations of various law commissions for amending these laws to make

them more effective. Some other solutions have also been discussed in this chapter.

1 K N Chandrasekharan Pillai , “COMMENT ON RATHINAM V. UNION OF INDIA” (1995) SCC (Jour) 1

1

1.3 Scope, Limitations and Method of Research

The researcher has tried to widen the scope of her research by delving into the historical

evolution of these laws. Also, the researcher has tried to add a practical aspect the project by

discussing it with lawyers and experts in the field of criminal law. Even though the scope of this

study was very vast, due to the paucity of space, the researcher has restricted her discussion of

these offences to India.

This research is basically doctrinal as the researcher has relied on secondary sources of

information like books, journals, commentaries and bare acts. The researcher also studied a

number of articles in order to formulate a firm opinion about these topics. A lot of ideas that

have been put forth in this research paper are from the researcher’s own understanding of the

topic and from what he has learnt in the various classes on Criminal Law. The researcher has put

in sincere efforts to make this research project as informative as possible and a potential source

of learning.

2

Chapter:1

Case Analysis

In the case of Virsa Singh v. state the appeal made was Appeal by special leave from the

judgment and order dated November 21, 1956, of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Appeal No.

326 of 1956 arising out of the judgment and order dated June 26, 1956, of the Court of the

Sessions Judge at Ferozepore in Sessions Case No. 8 of 1956. Jai Gopal Sethi and R. L. Kohli,

for the appellant. N. S. Bindra and T. M. Sen, for the respondent. 1958. March 11. The Judgment

of the Court was delivered by-

BOSE J.-The appellant Virsa Singh has been sentenced to imprisonment for life under s. 302 of

the Indian Penal Code for the murder of one Khem Singh. He was granted special leave to appeal

by this Court but the leave is limited to " the question that on the finding accepted by the Punjab

High Court what offence is made out as having been committed by the petitioner."

The appellant was tried with five others under sss. 302/49, 324/149 and 323/149 Indian Penal

Code. He was also charged individually under s. 302.

The other, were acquitted of the murder charge by the first Court but were convicted under ss.

326, 324 and 323 read with s. 149, Indian Penal Code. On appeal to the High Court they were all

acquitted.

The appellant was convicted by the first Court under s. 302 and his conviction and sentence were

upheld by the High Court.

There was only one injury on Khem Singh and both Courts are agreed that the appellant caused

it. It was caused as the result of a spear thrust and the doctor who examined Khem Singh, while

he was still alive, said that it was " a punctured wound 2" x 1/2" transverse in direction on the

left side of the abdominal wall in the lower part of the iliac region just above the inguinal canal.

He also said that

" Three coils of intestines were coming out of the wound." The incident occurred about 8 p. m.

on July 13, 1955. Khem Singh died about 5 p. m. the following day. The doctor who conducted

the postmortem described the injury as-

3

" an oblique incised stitched wound 21/2" on the lower part of left side of belly, 13" above the

left inguinal ligament. The injury was through the whole thickness of the abdominal wall.

Peritonitis was present and there was digested food in that cavity. Flakes of pus were sticking

round the small intestines and there were six cuts......... at various places, and digested food was

flowing out from three cuts." The doctor said that the injury was sufficient to cause death in the

ordinary course of nature.

The researcher in his Project will try to find out the difference between Hurt and Grievous hurt .

and will try to cure the ambiguity between the two.

Chapter 2:

4

Rational, Scope and Components of Grievous hurt

The following kinds of hurt only are designated as "grievous"2

First. - Emasculation.

‘Emasculation’- the term ‘emasculation’ means the depriving a person of masculine vigor,

castration. Injury to the scrotum would render a man impotent. A person emasculating

himself cannot be convicted under this section3. A person causing grievous hurt to himself

does not come within the purview of this section.

Secondly. - Permanent privation of the sight of either eye.

Losing eye-sight – where as many as twenty four persons lost there yes-sight permanently

in consequence of arrack distributed by the accused after mixing methyl alcohol in it , the

hurt has to be regarded as grievous hurt because of what has been stated in the clause 24.

Thirdly- Permanent Privation of the hearing of either ear

Fourthly. - Privation of any member or joint.

Fifthly. -Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint.

Sixthly. - Permanent disfiguration of the head or face.

‘Disfiguration’ – the word ‘disfigure’ in this section means to do a man some external

injury which detracts from his personal appearance, but does not weaken him as the cutting

off a man’s nose or ears.5

Seventhly. - Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth.

‘Fractured or dislocation of a bone’ – fracture in common parlance means breaking through.

2 As defined under section 320 of Indian Penal Code, 18603 Madho Singh (1878) PR No. 22 of 18784 Chandrasenan E K AIR 1995 SC 10665 Law Commissioners 1st report, section 373

5

It is however not necessary that in order that there should be a fracture, the entire depth of

bone should be broken. When any portion of the bone is broken off and there is a cleft or

rupture, there is fracture.6

Eighthly. - Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the

space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.

‘Any hurt which endangers life’ – these words donot apply to cases in which life was not

merely endangered but actually taken away.7 The line between culpable homicide not

amounting to murder and grievous hurt is a very thin and subtle one. In the first case the

injuries must be such as are likely to cause death; in the other the injuries must be such as

endangers life.8

Twenty days bodily pain – “ after a long consideration we have determined to give the

name of grievous bodily hurt to all hurt which cause the sufferer to be in pain, diseased or

unable to pursue his ordinary avocation, during the space of twenty days. It appears to us

that the length of time during which the sufferer is in pain, diseased or unable to pursue his

ordinary avocation, though a defective criterion, which may, we think. With propriety be

employed not merely in cases where violence has been used, but in cases where hurt has

been caused without assault, in apportioning the punishment, we take into consideration

both the extent of the hurt and the intention of the offender.”9

Rational behind the section– the authors of the code observe10: “we have found it very difficult

to draw a line between those bodily hurts which are serious and those which are slight. To draw

such a line between with perfect accuracy is absolutely impossible; but it as far better that such a

line should be drawn, though rudely, than that offences some of which approach in enormity to

murder, while others are little more than frolics which a good natures man would hardly recent,

should be classed together.

6 Labh Singh Crim. Appeal No. 141 of 19567 Marimuthu AIR 1924 Mad 418 Government of Bombay v. Abdul Wahab AIR 1946 Bombay 389 ibid10 Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, Law of Crimes, A commentary on the Indian Penal Code, 1860, 26th Edition, Bharat Law House, 2007, New Delhi.p.- 1851

6

Some hurts which are not, like those kinds of hurt which are mentioned in condition 1 to

7, distinguished by a broad and obvious line from slight hurts, may nevertheless be most serious.

A wound, for example, which neither emasculates the sufferer, nor blinds him, nor destroys his

hearing, nor deprives him of a member or a joint, nor breaks his bones, nor dislocate them, may

yet cause intense pain, prolonged disease, lasting injury to constitution. It is evidently desirable

that law should make a distinction between such a wound, mad scratch which he headed by just

sticking plaster. A beating, again , which does not maim the sufferer or break his bones may be

so cruel as to bring him to point of death. Such a beating, it is clear, ought not to be confounded

with a bruise, which requires only to be bathed with vinegar, and of which the traces disappear in

a day.”

Scope – like in section 319, this section is also in the nature of definite clause. Section 319

defines hurt, whereas section 320 defines ‘grievous hurt’

To make out the offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, there must be some specific hurt,

voluntarily inflicted, and coming within the eight kinds enumerated in this section. 11When a

person forcibly thrust lathi into the rectum of another person and causes serious injuries, he was

held guilty of causing grievous hurt.12 Injuries inflicted with the help of burning firewood cannot

be considered as grievous hurt as they donot come within the specific items of the injuries

mentioned in the definition of grievous hurt; nor do they endanger life.13

Chapter 3:

Difference between Hurt and Grievous hurt11 Budri Roy (1875) 23 WR (Cr) 6512 Sital AIR 1935 Oudh 46813 Sham Behera AIR 1953 Ori 308

7

Section 321 - Voluntarily causing hurt.-- Whoever does any act with the intention of

thereby causing hurt to any person, or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt

to any person, and does thereby cause hurt to any person, is said "voluntarily to cause hurt".

Section 322 – Whoever voluntarily causes hurt, if the hurt with the intention to cause or knows

himself to be likely to cause is grievous hurt, and if the hurt which he causes is grievous hurt, is

said "voluntarily to cause grievous hurt".

Explanation. - A person is not said voluntarily to cause grievous hurt except when he both causes

grievous hurt and intends or knows himself to be likely to cause grievous hurt. But he is said

voluntarily to cause grievous hurt, if intending or knowing himself to be likely to cause grievous

hurt of one kind; he actually causes grievous hurt of another kind.

The provisions of this section are very precise and incapable of misconstruction. A

magistrate dealing with charges of voluntarily causing grievous hurt must consider and decide

not only whether grievous hurt has been caused but if it has been caused voluntarily or himself

knew to be likely to cause grievous hurt. If he intended or knew himself to be likely to cause

only simple hurt , he cannot be convicted under section 325. Section 321 and the explanation to

section 322 make it clear that either the ingredient of intention or that of knowledge, must be

essentially present in order to constitute the offence of hurt.14 Such a knowledge can be inferred

from t he part of body chosen for inflicting violence and the severity of that violence as shown

by the injuries on the body of the victim.15 The means by which the injury was caused is not the

true criterion. The answer really depends on the nature of the injury caused and the manner in

which the blows were administered, whether by fists and slaps or by a weapon.16

Difference between punishments for ‘hurt’ and ‘grievous hurt’

14 Devasahayam, in re (1962) 1 MLJ 16115 Gangda 1975 Cri LJ 1445 (Raj)16 Ramban Mahton AIR 1958 Pat 452

8

Section 323. Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt

Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be

punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year,

or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.

When the injury is not serious and there was no intention to cause death or grievous hurt,

nor did the accused have knowledge that it was likely to cause grievous hurt or death, he is guilty

of causing hurt and not death, even though death is caused.17 Where the accused was one of the

persons who assaulted the deceased with a stick but there was no proof that the fatal blow or

grievous injury was caused by him, it was held, that the accused could only be convicted under

section 323.18

Where evidence gave no clue as to on which part of the body of deceased the accused has

struck and prosecution also could not establish that the death of deceased was caused by striking

on some vital body , the accused could only be convicted under section 323.19

Section 325. Punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt

“Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt,

shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to

seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

The prosecution must prove :

(i) That the accused caused hurt of any kind described in section 320

(ii) That the accused intended, or knew that he was likely, to cause grievous hurt of any

kind described;

(iii) That the accused did so voluntarily

17 Ramakrishna Panicker AIR 1959 Ker 37218 Babu Bika Jadhav 1996 Cri LJ 3952 (Bom)19 Bikash Chand Mondal 1984 Cri LJ 1191 (Cal)

9

Where there is no evidence to indicate as to which of the accused persons actually caused

grievous hurt none of them could be convicted under section 325. It may be presumed that each

of them intended to cause grievous hurt but such a presumption alone is not sufficient to

establish the offence of causing grievous hurt unless it is further shown that the accused actually

caused grievous hurt.20

The prosecution does not have to prove hurt under s.319 in order to prove grievous hurt

under s.320 as they have to prove homicide under s.299 and then move on to s.300 in order to

prove murder. Section 320 has very clearly laid down hurt which are to be classified as grievous

hurt and the eighthly clause is the only one in which some interpretation and misuse is possible.

The only catch in this section is the intention part. Although intention can be inferred from the

way in which the injury was caused, but it takes a little more for the prosecution to prove

grievous hurt because the defense would always like to bring the injury from s.320 to s.319

because the punishment and fine imposed in much less. An illustration in this respect can be that

if a person slaps another person and he falls down, hitting his head on the ground which results

in his death. This is only a case of simple hurt as the person had only slapped and in ordinary

course of things it would not lead to death. Now let us consider another case, a boxer ‘punches’ a

person in his stomach twice. The person falls down, heads hits the ground and he dies. In this

case it is very clearly evident from the circumstances that the intention was to cause to grievous

hurt as he was a ‘boxer’ and he ‘punched’ twice. It can safely inferred that the boxer ‘knew’ if

not ‘intended’ that if he ‘punches’ a person twice in his stomach, it will cause grievous hurt if not

death.

Although there is a huge fundamental difference the offence of hurt and grievous hurt,

but in practice, they are not that minutely followed in practical application. Going by the

language of the section 319, there is no clear cut definition of hurt whereas on the contrary

section 320 has defined which categories of hurt fall under grievous hurt.

Chapter 4:

Latest development

20 Dipa AIR 1947 All 408

10

Insertion of new section 326A – throwing or using of acid in any form on the body of

another person – notwithstanding contained in s.324 or 326 of the code, whoever does any act of

throwing acid or using acid in any form on the other person with the intention of or with the

knowledge that he is likely to cause such person permanent or partial damage or deformity

disfiguration or disability to any part of the body of such person shall be punished with

imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than TEN years but which

may extend to life and shall also be liable to fine which shall be minimum of Rs. 2 lakhs and

may extend to Rs. 5 lakhs

The offense shall be cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable.

Justification: although the offences relating to acid throwing is covered under s.320 and 326 of

the IPC but keeping in view the extreme heinous nature of the act and the fact that under s. 326

the offence can be punished with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either

description for a term which may extend to ten years, it is proposed in the bill that at least the

minimum punishment be not less than 10 years and extend to life imprisonment.

Further using acid with intention or knowledge is a punishable offense irrespective of the nature

and extend of injury. Therefore there is no need for categorization of various forms of disability.

Insertion of new section 326 B – Attempt to throw or use acid in any form on the other person-

whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that , if he

by that act caused permanent or partial damage or deformity, disfiguration or disability to any

part of the body of such person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a

term which shall not be less than 7 years and shall also be liable to a minimum of Rs. 1 lakh21

Case Analysis 1 : Rambaran Mahton v. The State22 AIR 1958 Pat 452

This case came as an appeal from the decision of the Additional Sessions Judge, Patna,

dated 22nd December, 1956, convicting the appellant under Section 325, I. P. C. and sentencing

him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years. The charge initially against the appellant

was of murder under Section 302, I. P. C. but the learned Additional Sessions Judge found that

21 ncw.nic.in/AnnualReports/200708/Eng/Annexure5.pd22 AIR 1958 Pat 452

11

the charge of murder had not been established. In his opinion the offence the appellant

committed was grievous hurt under Section 325, and he sentenced him accordingly.

This incident was the development of a domestic feud between the two full brothers over

almost a trifle and which resulted in the death of one of them took place at 6 P. M. on 29th May,

1956, in village Soh within the Bihar Police Station. Nokhali, the deceased, was the elder brother

of the appellant, Rambaran Mahton. Both of them were separate in mess and cultivation.

Important question is what offence is disclosed by the evidence produced by the prosecution.

The counsel for the petitioners contended that the existence of grievous hurt is not by itself

adequate to complete the offence under Section 325 I. P. C. His contention is that apart from the

grievous hurt, there must be on the part of the accused either intention to cause grievous hurt or

likely knowledge to cause it. He did not dispute that some of the injuries on the deceased were

grievous. He urged, however, that the necessary knowledge or intention to cause grievous hurt

was lacking in this case.

The Judge entirely agreed with the counsel for the petitioner so far as the general

proposition of law enunciated by him is concerned. Section 320 I. P. C. described "grievous

hurt". Section 325 provides for punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt. What is meant

by the expression "voluntarily to cause hurt," is laid down in Section321 I. P. C. It provides that

whoever does any act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any person, or with the

knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt to any person, and does thereby cause hurt to

any person, is said "voluntarily to cause hurt" what will in law amount to voluntarily causing

grievous hurt is described in Section 322 I. P. C. It is in the following terms :

"Whoever voluntarily causes hurt, if the hurt which he intends to cause or knows himself to be

likely to cause is grievous hurt, and if the hurt which he causes is grievous hurt, is said,

voluntarily to cause grievous hurt.

Explanation: A person is not said voluntarily to cause grievous hurt except when he both causes

grievous hurt and intends or knows himself to be likely to cause grievous hurt. But he is said

voluntarily to cause grievous hurt, if intending or knowing himself to be likely to cause grievous

hurt of one kind, he actually causes grievous hurt of another kind. "

12

The appellant largely relied upon Explanation to Section 322, and his contention was that in this

case it cannot be said that grievous hurt was in contemplation of the accused. Explanation to

Section 322 really unfolds the significance of the expression "voluntarily to cause grievous hurt."

It states in clear terms that the offence of grievous hurt is not caused unless the offender both

causes grievous hurt and intends or knows himself to be likely to cause grievous hurt.

It will appear from Section 325 read with Section 322 I. P. C. that the essential

ingredients of the offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, are three in number : (1) grievous

hurt as described in Section 320 must first be caused. If the hurt actually caused is simple, a

person cannot be held guilty of voluntarily causing grievous hurt even if it was in his

contemplation; (2) the offender intended, or knew himself, to be likely to cause, grievous hurt. If

he intended or knew himself to be likely to cause only simple hurt, he cannot be convicted for

the offence under Section 325 even if the resultant hurt was grievous. In other words, to

constitute the offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, there must be complete

correspondence between the result and the intention or the knowledge of the accused (3) the hurt

was caused voluntarily.

When the act that he did in the process of causing hurt is such as any person of ordinary

prudence knows it likely to cause grievous hurt, he may safely be taken to have intended

grievous hurt, or at least to have contemplated grievous hurt as likely to occur. If the act was

such that nothing more than simple hurt could reasonably be thought likely to ensue from it, then

although grievous hurt may unexpectedly have ensued, the offender can be convicted of simple

hurt, only assuming that grievous hurt was not in his contemplation.

This is quite obvious on the plain reading of Section 322 along with Section 325 I. P. C.

Bearing in mind these underlying principles, the question is whether the appellant in this case

intended to cause or had the knowledge of the likelihood of causing grievous hurt. Appellant

contended that at the time of the occurrence the appellant was admittedly without any weapon,

and assuming the entire prosecution case to be correct, he assaulted him, only with fists and slaps

and therefore, the appellant could not possibly have known that the consequence of his act was

grievous hurt23.

23 Law Commission of India, FORTY-SECOND REPORT: THE INDIAN PENAL CODE”, 1971, P. 49.

13

The Judge did not agree with appellant on this point. The means by which the injury was

caused is not the true criterion. If it were, so howsoever, grievous an injury may be, the

provisions of Section 325 will not be attracted if no weapon was used in causing it. The answer

really depends upon the nature of the injury caused and the manner in which the blows were

administered, whether by fists and slaps or by a weapon.

What was found in this case is that Nokhali had been dashed to the ground. He was

wholly undefended. While he was lying on the ground, the appellant sat on his stomach and

administered him fists and slaps. He had sustained no injuries, not even a scratch. If the absence

of injuries on the person of the appellant is indicative of anything it is this that Nokhali was

completely in his grip, totally, unable either to strike him in self-defense or extricate himself

from his hold. While Nokhali was lying in such a helpless condition, the appellant, assaulted him

recklessly with fists and slaps on every part of his body. This is not all. It appears that the blows

must have been given with more than usual force. As will appear from the opinion, of the doctor,

three of his ribs were fractured and the spleen was ruptured. It is true that the spleen was in

enlarged condition, as stated by the doctor, and it is likely, that even slight force might have

resulted in the rupture of the spleen.

But there is absolutely no explanation so far as the fracture of the ribs is concerned.

These injuries could not have been caused unless blows were given to him with great force.

There will absolutely no justification for the appellant to strike him with strong fists and slaps

when he neither retaliated nor tried to defend himself. If in such circumstances a person

belabours a man with fists and slaps, it is I think obvious, as it will be obvious to everybody of

ordinary prudence, that grievous hurt would ensue.

There could have been no intention on the part of the appellant to cause grievous hurt to

his elder brother, but it cannot be doubted that the way in which he assaulted his brother, he

should have known that he was likely thereby to cause grievous hurt to him. In my opinion, the

offence that was caused in this case was grievous hurt, as contemplated by Section 325, I. P. C..24

Lastly, Counsel for the appellant contended that even if the offence came within the

purview of Section 325 the sentence of five years was in the circumstances of the case, too 24 K.I. Vibhute, (ed.), PSA PILLAI’S CRIMINAL LAW, 10th ed. 2011, p. 153.

14

severe. It is common ground that plot 849 which was the venue of the occurrence did not belong

to the deceased but that it had been allotted exclusively to his mother who was admittedly

residing with the appellant. The respondent had no business to go to plot 849 where the

appellants along with his mother and sisters were carrying on irrigation work peacefully. Further,

after Nokhali became senseless, he did not forsake him and leave the place. He stayed on to tend

him. The evidence shows that he gave him water to drink and also sprinkled water upon his body

in order to bring him to his senses. It is indicative of the fact that remorse eventually

overpowered him when passion subsided, and the humane in him triumphed.

The learned Additional Sessions Judge took into consideration these special features of

the case and for that reason held him guilty not of murder but of causing grievous hurt. These

very circumstances also call for a lenient consideration of his case. They show that the appellant

beat his brother under great provocation given by the deceased himself and in the heat of the

moment.

Judgment of the High Court-Having regard to the relationship between the parties and also the

fact that this unfortunate incident occurred on the spur of the moment due to provocation given

by the deceased himself and also considering the fact that there was absolutely no intention on

the part of the appellant either to kill him or to cause him such bodily injury as was likely to

cause his death. The ends of justice will be sufficiently met if he is awarded one year's rigorous

imprisonment. Therefore, the sentence from five years' rigorous imprisonment was decreased to

one year's rigorous imprisonment

Chapter 5-

Culpable homicide and Murder

Culpable homicide—Meaning.—The Penal Code has first defined culpable homicide simpliciter

(section 299, l.P.C.) termed as manslaughter under English law which is the genus, and then

15

murder (section 300, I.P.C.) which is a species of culpable homicide. The residuary of culpable

homicide after the special characteristics of murder have been removed from it, is culpable

homicide not amounting to murder (Section 300, Exceptions I to 5).

Culpable homicide may broadly be classified into two classes:—

(i) Culpable homicide amounting to murder ( section 300), and

(ii) culpable homicide not amounting to murder2 (section 300, Exceptions 1 to 5).

For the purpose of fixing punishment proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the

Code has recognized three degrees of culpable homicide, These are:—

(i) Culpable homicide of the first degree, which is the gravest form of culpable homicide and is

termed ‘murder’. It is defined in section 300 and punishable under section 302 with death or

imprisonment for life to either of which fine may be added25.

(ii) Culpable homicide of the second degree (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) as

defined in section 300. Exceptions 1 to 5 and section 299, clauses (i) and (ii) is punishable under

section 304 (First part) with imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description for a

term which may extend to 10 years, to either of which fine may be added.

(iii) Culpable homicide of the third degree, which is defined in section 299, clause (iii)

and is punishable under the latter part of section 304 with fine only or with

imprisonment up to a limit of ten years or with both.

Essential ingredients of Culpable Homicide :-

(a) Causing of death,

(b) by doing an act,

(c) the act of causing death must be done:—

(i) with the intention of causing death,

(ii) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or

(iii) with the knowledge that such act is likely to cause death.

25 Law Commission of India, FORTY-SECOND REPORT: THE INDIAN PENAL CODE”, 1971, P. 97.

16

(b) Thus though an act may cause death, it will not amount to culpable homicide unless the

above conditions are satisfied.’

A). Causing death.—In order to hold a person liable under the impugned section there must be

causing of death of a human being as defined under Section 46. ( The word "death" denotes the

death of a human being unless the contrary appears from the context). The causing of death of a

child in the mother’s womb is not homicide as stated in Explanation 3 The causing of the death

of child in the mother's womb is not homicide26. But it may amount to culpable homicide to

cause the death of a living child, if any part of that child has been brought forth, though the child

may not have breathed or been completely born. appended to section 299, I.P.C. But the person

would not be set free. He would be punishable for causing miscarriage either under section 312

or 315, I.P.C depending on the gravity of the injury. The act of causing death amounts to

culpable homicide if any part of that child has been brought forth, though the child may not have

breathed or been completely born. The clause ‘though the child may not have breathed’ suggests

that a child may be born alive, though it may not breath (respire), or it may respire so

imperfectly that it may be difficult to obtain clear proof that respiration has taken place.

Causing of death must be of a living human being which means a living man, woman,

child and at least partially an infant under delivery or just delivered27.

Death caused of person other than intended.—To attract the provisions of this section it suffices

if the death of a human being is caused whether the person was intended to be killed or not. For

instance, A counsels B to poison his mother. B accordingly obtains poison from A and gives it to

his mother in a roasted apple. The mother gives the apple to a child of B, not knowing it contains

poison, and the child eats it and dies. The act of A amounts to murder by B, though he never

intended to kill the child (section 301, 1.P.C.). Similarly, illustration (a) to section 299 says that a

person can be guilty of culpable homicide by causing the death of a person whose death he did

not intend.

B). By doing an Act.—Death may be caused by a hundred and one means, such as by

poisoning, drowning, striking, beating and so on and so forth. As explained under26 K.I.Vibhute, P.S.A PILLAI’S CRIMINAL LAW, 10th ed. 2009, p. 162.27 K.I.Vibhute, P.S.A PILLAI’S CRIMINAL LAW, 10th ed. 2009, p. 155.

17

section 32, I.P.C. the word ‘act’ has been given a wider meaning in the Code inasmuch

as it includes not only an act of commission, but illegal omissions as well. Hence, death

may also be caused by neglect of duty, such as a parent not supplying food and medical

care to his child, a husband starving his wife,’ that results in the voluntary causing of

the child’s and wife’s death. For instances, where a Life Guard on Swimming poll, not

following his duty and that’s caused death of person.

Intention—. The intension means expectation of consequence in question. Intention is a

question of fact which is to be gathered from the acts of the parties (viz. nature of theweapon

used, the part of the body on which the blow was given, the force and numberof blows, etc.). The

legal maxim is that everyone must be presumed to intend the normal consequences of his

act. Intention does not imply assume the, existence f some previous design, it means an actual

intention, the existing intention of the moment. Thus a deliberate firing by a loaded gun at once

leads to inference that the intention was to cause death. The existence of intention is not to be

inferred unless death follows as a natural and probable consequence from the act An intention

also includes foresight of certainty. A consequence is deemed to be intended though it is not

desired when it is foreseen as substantially certain. Intention of causing death is not the intention

of causing the ‘death of any particular person. Illustration (a) to this section shows that a person

can be guilty of culpable homicide of a person whose death he did not intend28 .

With the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death-It means an

intention to cause a particular injury, which injury is, or turns out to be, one likely to cause death.

Thus, where bodily injury sufficient to cause death is actually caused, it is immaterial to go into

the question of whether the accused had intention to cause death. The connection between the

‘act’ and the death caused by the act must he direct and distinct; and though not immediate it

must not be too remote. If the connection between the act and death is obscure or if it is obscured

by concurrent causes, ‘or if it is broken by the intervention of the subsequentcauses, or if the

time gap between the act and the death is too long, the above condition is not fulfilled.The

difference between the two expressions ‘intention of causing death’ and ‘intention of causing

such bodily injury as is likely to cause death’ is a difference of degrees in criminality. The latter

is a lower degree of criminality than the former. But as, in both the cases, the object is the same, 28 K.I.Vibhute, P.S.A PILLAI’S CRIMINAL LAW, 10th ed. 2009, p. 159.

18

the law does not make any distinction in punishment. The expression ‘intention to cause such

bodily injury as is likely to cause death’ merely means an intention to cause a particular injury,

which injury is, or turns out to be. one likely to cause death. It is not the death itself which is

intended, nor the effect of injury. It is not necessary that the consequences., of the injury are

foreseen.

With the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death-Knowledge in comparison to

intention is strong word-and imports a certainty and not means a probability. Knowledge is an

awareness of the consequences of the act. A person who voluntarily inflicts injury such as to

endanger life must always, except in the most extraordinary circumstances, be taken toknow that

he is likely to cause death (e.g. when the accused fired his gun in the air to scare away the

opposite party and in the act one stray pellet caused gunshot wound to a person killing him). The

word ‘knowledge’ includes all cases ofrash acts by which death is caused, for rashness’ imports a

knowledge of the likely result of an act which the actor does in spite of the risk. in some cases,

gross negligence may amount to knowledge29. For example, where The accused kills a person by

hitting him under the belief that he was hitting at a ghost.

Section 300. Murder

Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the

death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or-

2ndly:- If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be

likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or-

3rdly:- If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and thebodily injury

intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature tocause death, or-

4thly:- If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in

all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act

without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.

Clause (1) Intention of Causing Death:-As of Culpable homicide

29 K.I.Vibhute, P.S.A PILLAI’S CRIMINAL LAW, 10th ed. 2009, p. 158.

19

Clause 2—With the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender know be likely to

cause death.—In case of an offence falling under this clause the mental attitude of the accused is

two-fold. First, there is intention to cause bodily harm and secondly, there is the subjective

knowledge that death ,will be the likely consequence of the intended injury30. Here the offender

knows that bodily injury intended to be inflicted is likely to cause death of the person. It applies

to those special cases where the person injured is in such a condition or state of health that his

death would be likely to be caused by an injury which would not ordinarily cause the death of a

person in sound health and where the person inflicting the injuryknows that owing to such

condition or state of health, he is likely to cause the death of the person injured. A case would

fall under this clause if the offender, having knowledge that a person was suffering from some

disease or was of unsound health, causes hurt to him which may not have been sufficient in the

ordinary course of nature to cause death had the deceased been of sound health, but which with

the special knowledge of the diseased condition of the deceased, his assailant must have known

to be likely to cause his death. Here knowledge on the part of the offender imports certainty and

not merely a probability.

Clause 3.”Injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause. death”.— Where a man

intentionally inflicts bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, he

would be liable for murder. If the probability of death ‘is very great then the requirement of third

clauseare satisfied and the fact that a particular individual may because of specially ski1led

treatment or being in possession of a particularly strong constitution have survived an injury,

which would prove fatal to the majority of persons subjected to it, is not enough to prove that

such an injury is not “sufficient in the ordinary course of nature” to cause death.

Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab31

Facts: The appellant was allegedly guilty of the murder of one Khem Singh. There was only one

injury on his person, which was a result of a spear thrust. The doctor said that the injury was

sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

30 K.I. Vibhute, (ed.), PSA PILLAI’S CRIMINAL LAW, 10th ed. 2011, p. 101.

31 AIR 1958 SC 465

20

Medical Report: The injury was a punctured wound 2- x transverse in direction on the left side

of the abdominal wall in the lower part of the iliac region just above the inguinal canal. Three

coils of intestine were also coming out.The appellant was convicted by the first court under

section 302 IPC and his conviction was upheld by the High Court. He was granted special leave

to the Supreme Court on the following:

Issue: On the finding of High Court what offence is made out as having been committed by the

petitioner The court gave a four-point test which prosecution must observe and prove in order to

bring the case under this section:

i) First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present;

ii) Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations.

iii) Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodilyinjury,

that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kindof injury was

intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiryproceeds further and,

iv) Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of thethree

elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.This part of

the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do withthe intention of the

offender. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden

is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under s. 300, thirdly32. This four point

test is applied in many such subsequent cases . It is mainly after this judgment that clear

guidelines were provided for the application of this section. These observations of Vivian Bose,

J. have become locus classicus. Under clause thirdly of Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide is

murder, if both the following conditions are satisfied: i.e. (a) that the act which causes death is

done with the intention of causing death or is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury;

and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to

cause death. It

must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which,

in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death, viz. that the injury found

to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted33.

32 K.D.Gaur, TEXTBOOK ON THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 4th ed. 2008, p. 162.

33 Y.V Chandrachud, Ratanlal & Dheerajlal, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 30th ed. 2008, p. 124.

21

The intent requirement

The ingredient 'intention' in that Clause is very important and that gives a clue in a given case

whether offence involved is murder or not . Supreme Court also discussed the intent element

required for this section in great detail. The argument that prosecution must prove an intention to

inflict only that kind of injury that was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature

was found to be fallacious by the court. It was argued that the intention that the section requires

must be related, not only to the bodily injury inflicted, but also to the clause, "and the bodily

injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.? Court

totally disagreed with such an argument calling it to be a fallacious argument. According to the

rule laid down in Virsa Singh's case, even if the intention of accused was limited to the infliction

of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and did not extend to

the intention of causing death, the offence would be murder.

Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out this point. The court read the clause 3

of section 300 of IPC disjunctively and separating intentionbeing read as linked to the second

part in the following way::- If there is an intention toinflict an injury that is sufficient to cause

death in the ordinary course of nature, then the intention is to kill and in that event, the "thirdly"

would be unnecessary because the act would fall under the first part of the section, namely - "If

the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death.34"

In our opinion, the two clauses are disjunctive and separate. The first is subjective to the

offender: "If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person." It must, of

course, first be found that bodily injury was caused and the nature of the injury must be

established. These are purely objective facts and leave no room for inference or deduction and to

that extent the enquiry is objective; but when it comes to the question of intention, that is

subjective to the offender and it must be proved that he had an intention to cause the bodily

injury that is found to be present.

34 Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, Law of Crimes, A commentary on the Indian Penal Code, 1860, 26 th Edition, Bharat Law House, 2007, New Delhi, pp- 1851

22

Once that is found, the enquiry shifts to the next clause - "and the bodily injury intended to be

inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death." The first part of this is

descriptive of the earlier part of the section.

So the crux is that what needs to be proved is not that the accused had an intention to inflict the

injury that was sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature but that he had an intention

to cause the same bodily injury that is found to be present on the body of the deceased. Then it is

the later part of the enquiry which is objective in nature to find out that whether the injury was

sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or not. Thus, intention is only linked up

and is restricted to the causing of the bodily injury and not to the knowledge or intention of

causing such bodily injury that is sufficient to cause bodily injury that is sufficient to cause death

in ordinary course of nature. What needs to be proved is that the accused had an intention to

cause the same bodily injury found to be present on the person of deceased which was later

found to be sufficient to cause death. Such a principle is based on broad lines of common sense

because if intention is considered to be of causing an injury which is sufficient to cause death;

then any person could always plead that he never had an intention to cause such a injury and it

would have been very difficult to prove him wrong35.

Once these four elements are established by the prosecution the offence is murder under s. 300,

thirdly. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there

was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary

course of nature. It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will

be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be

proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of

purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

No one has a license to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the

ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of

that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or

reasonably deduced that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional.

35 K.I. Vibhute, (ed.), PSA PILLAI’S CRIMINAL LAW, 10th ed. 2011, p. 169.

23

Clause 4—Knowledge of imminently dangerous act.—This clause comprehends generally the

commission of imminently dangerous acts which must in all probability cause death or cause

such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. When such an act is done with the knowledge that

death might be the probable result and without any excuse for including the risk of causing death

or injury as is likely to cause death, the offence is murder, This clause applies to cases of

dangerous action without an intention to cause specific bodily injury to any person,e.g., furious

driving or firing at a target near the public road36.’ However, the act done must be accompanied

with the knowledge that the act was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause

(i) death, or (ii) such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Further, the accused must have

committed the act without any excuse for incurring the risk of (a) causing death or (b) such

injury as is likely to cause death. Thus a man who strikes another in the throat with a knife, must

be taken to know that he is doing an act imminently dangerous to the life of the person at whom

he strikes and that a probable result of his act will be to cause that person’s death.

Difference B/W Culpable Homicide and Murder:-

 According to Sir James Stephen the definition of culpable homicide and murder are the weakest

part of the Code, as they are defined in forms closely resembling each other and at times it

becomes difficult to distinguish between the two, ‘as the causing of death’ is common to both.

Further, there must necessarily be criminal intention or knowledge in both culpable homicide and

murder. However, the difference between culpable homicide and murder is real though very fine

and based upon a very subtle distinction of the intention and knowledge involved in these crimes.

The true difference lies in the degree, there being the greater intention or knowledge of the fatal

consequences in the one case than the other. The four cases describing the offence under section

300, I.P.C. attempt to explain this difference.

In the scheme of the IPC culpable homicide is genus and 'murder' its specie. All 'murder' is

'culpable homicide' but not vice-versa. Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide' sans 'special

characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. For the purpose of

fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, the IPC practically

recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide37. The first is, what may be called, 'culpable 36 .K. Sarvaria, (ed.), R.A. NELSON’S INDIAN PENAL CODE, Vol.1, 9th ed. 2003, p. 669.37 S.K. Sarvaria, (ed.), R.A. NELSON’S INDIAN PENAL CODE, Vol.1, 9th ed. 2003, p. 668.

24

homicide of the first degree'. This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in

Section 300 as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second

degree'. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is 'culpable

homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment

provided for it is, also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable

homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304. The academic

distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' has always vexed

the Courts. The confusion is caused, if Courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the

terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute

abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions

seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300,

following

comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the

two offences.

Culpable Homicide section 299 Murder Section 300

.With the intention of causing death; With the intention of causing death

. with the intention of causing bodily injury

as is likely to cause death .

With the intention of causing such bodily

injury as the offender knows to be likely to

cause the death of the person to whom the

harm is caused;

----------- If it is done with the intention of causing

bodily injury to any personand the bodily

injury intended to beinflicted is sufficient in

the ordinarycourse of nature to cause death, or

with the knowledge that the act is likely to

cause death

If the person committing the act knows that it

is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all

probability, cause death or such bodily injury

25

as is likely to cause death, and commits such

act without

C. Reg Versus govinda38:-

(i) Death caused intentionally: Murder: Clause (a) to section 299 I.P.C. and

clause (1) to section 300, LP.C. show that where there is an intention to kill,

the offence is always murder. [Illustration (a) to section 300(1).

(ii) Injury caused resulting in death knowing the peculiar conditions of the victim

— Murder: Clause (2) to section 300: The essence of clause (2) to section

300, I.P.C. is found in theitalicized words. The offence is murder, if the

offender knows that the particular person injured is likely, either from

peculiarity of constitution, or immature age or other special circumstances

could be killed by an injury which would not ordinarily cause death. As given

in Illustration (b) to section 300, where A knowingly with intention of causing

death strikes Z, who is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to

cause his death, and Z dies in consequence of the blow, A is guilty of murder,

although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of

nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health.

(iii) Risk to human life resulting in Death (a)if death likely result—Culpable homicide (b)

if t—Murder: Clause (c) to section 299, I.P.C. and clause (4) to section

300, I.P.C.: Clause (c) to section 299, I.P.C. and clause (4) to section 300, I.P.C. is

intended to apply to cases in which there is no intention to cause death, nevertheless

death has resulted. In such a case whether the offence is culpable homicide or murder

depends upon degree of risk to human life. If death is a likely result, it is culpable

homicide [Illustration (b) to 299]; if it is the most probable result, it is murder

[Illustration (d) to 3001. For example, death caused as a result of furious driving will

be culpable homicide; whereas death caused as a result of firing at a mark near a

public road would be a case of murder under section 300, I.P.C.

38 (1877) ILR 1 Bom 342

26

Abdul waheed khan V/s state of Andhra Pradesh39

(iv) Injury likely to cause death—Culpable homicide: and Injury sufficient in the ordinary

course of nature to cause death—Murder clause (b) to section 299 and

clause (iii)to section 300: It is on a comparison of clause (b) to section 299 and clause

(iii) to section 300 that the decision of doubtful cases like the present must generally

depend. It is culpable homicide if the bodily injury intended is likely to cause death; it

is murder, if such injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

The word ‘likely’ means ‘probably’. When the chances of the happening of a thing

are fifty-fifty, it may be said that the thing may ‘probably happen’; when the chances

of its happening are almost certain, it is said that it will ‘most probably happen’.

Sufficiency is the high probability of death in the ordinary course of nature and when

this exists and death ensues and the causing of such injury is intended, the offence is

murder. Sometimes the nature of the weapon used, sometimes the part of the body on

which the injury is caused, and sometimes both are relevant. The determining factor

is the international injury which must be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary

course of nature. If the intended injury cannot be said to be sufficient in the ordinary

course of nature to cause death, that is to say, the probability of death is not so high,

the offence does not fall within the definition of murder but Culpable homicide

not amounting to murder or something less.( Virsa Singh V/s state of Punjab) and

(jagriti Devi V/s State of Himachal Pardesh 40)

(v) Distinction between section 299(c) and section 300 clause (4); Relate to the Degree

of knowledge of the consequences.—The Code contemplates in clause (c) to section

299, I.P.C. and clause (4) to section 300, I.P.C. as to when an act is culpable homicide

and murder by reason of the act being done with the knowledge described in the

respective clauses. The knowledge used in clause (c) to section 299, I.P.C., and clause

(4) to section 300, I.P.C. refers to personal knowledge. The difference between the

two clauses relate to the words: (i) ‘likely to cause death’ in section 299 clause (c);

and (ii) ‘must in all probability cause death.’ (under section 300, clause (4). The

fourth clause to section 300 contemplates the doing of an imminently dangerous act

in general and not the doing of any bodily harm to any particular individual. It is 39 (2002 (7) SCC 175)40 [2009] INSC 1140

27

designed to provide for rarest of rare cases wherein the accused puts, in jeopardy lives

of many persons as envisaged in illustration (d) to section 300, I.P.C. and the like.

This clause is usually invoked in those cases where there is no intention to cause

death of any particular person, but the act is done with such callousness towards the

result and the risk taken is such that it may be stated that the person knows that the

act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death, or

such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. For example, where death is

caused by firing a loaded gun into a crowd[vide lllustratiod7], or by

poisoning a well from which people are accustomed to draw water, or by

opening the grid of a bridge just as a railway passenger train is about to pass

over it. In such and like cases, the imminently dangerous act, the extreme

depravity of mind regardless ness of sanctity of human life, and property that

place the crime upon the same level as the taking of life by intention.( William

Slaney case) Knowledge v. Intention:- The distinction between knowledge and

intention.41

Knowledge in the context of Section 299 would, inter alia, mean consciousness

or realization or understanding. The distinction between the terms 'knowledge'

and 'intention' again is a difference of degrees. An inference of knowledge that it

is likely to cause death must be arrived at keeping in view the fact situation

obtaining in each case. The accused must be aware of the consequences of his

act. Knowledge denotes a bare state of conscious awareness of certain facts in

which the human mind might itself remain supine or inactive whereas intention

connotes a conscious state in which mental faculties are roused into activity and

summed up into action for the deliberate purpose of being directed towards a

particular and specific end which the human mind conceives and perceives

before itself. 'intention' is different from 'motive' or 'ignorance' or' negligence'.

It is the 'knowledge' or 'intention' with which the act is done that makes

difference, in arriving at a conclusion whether the offence is culpable homicide

or murder. Therefore, it is necessary to know the meaning of these expressions

41 K.I. Vibhute, (ed.), PSA PILLAI’S CRIMINAL LAW, 10th ed. 2011, p. 153.

28

as used in these provisions. The 'intention' and 'knowledge' of the accused are

subjective and invisible states of mind and their existence has to be gathered

Where murder is caused by a single blow

In the case of Jai Prakash, the Court referred to the decisions of this Court in the cases of

Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab, (1981), Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab (1981), Gurmail Singh

v. State of Punjab (1982), Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab (1983), Tholan v. State of Tamil Nadu

(1984), the court observed that42 :

In all these cases, injury by a single blow was found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of

nature to cause death. The Supreme Court took into consideration the circumstances such as

sudden quarrel, grappling etc. as mentioned above only to assess the state of mind namely

whether the accused had the necessary intention to cause that particular injury i.e. to say that he

desired expressly that such injury only should be the result. It is held in all these cases that there

was no such intention to cause that particular injury as in those circumstances, the accused could

have been barely aware i.e. only had knowledge of the consequences. These circumstances under

which the appellant happened to inflict the injury it is felt or at least a doubt arose that all his

mental faculties could not have been roused as to form an intention to achieve the particular

result.

In the case of Mahesh Balmiki alias Munna v. State of M.P. (1999), accused gave a single fatal

blow with knife on the chest on the left side of the sternum between the costal joint of the 6th

and 7th ribs, fracturing both the ribs and track of the wound going through the sternum,

pericardium, anterior and posterior after passing the ribs and thereafter entering the liver and

perforating a portion of stomach. There, conviction under Section 302 of the Penal Code was

upheld by the High Court and when appeal was brought to Supreme Court by Special Leave,

while confirming the conviction under Section 302, court observed:

"Adverting to the contention of a single blow, it may be pointed out that there is no principle that

in all cases of a single blow Section 302 IPC is not attracted. A single blow may, in some cases,

entail conviction under Section 302 IPC, in some cases under Section 304 IPC and in some other 42 INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860.

29

cases under Section 326 IPC. The question with regard to the nature of offence has to be

determined on the facts and in the circumstances of each case. The nature of the injury, whether

it is on the vital or non-vital part of the body, the weapon used, the circumstances in which the

injury in caused and the manner in which the injury is inflicted are all relevant factors which may

go to determine the required intention or knowledge of the offender and the offence committed

by him.43"

ConclusionSection 321 and explanation of section 322 make it clear that either the ingredients of

intention or that of knowledge must be essentially present in order to constitute the offence of

hurt.44 During the quarrel the accused dragged the victim by holding his hand, whereby the

victim fell down and sustained leg injuries. It appeared as if the victim was drunk and the

accused dragged him with no intention to assault. It could be inferred that the accused did not

intend to cause grievous hurt, but grievous hurt ensued unexpectedly. Therefore, conviction

under section 325 was liable to be set aside.45

After the judgment in Virsa Singh's case, the situation became very clear. Determining the

intention becomes important in determining, whether the act is murder or not. Determination of

intention becomes difficult where a single blow has caused murder. But it is not a rule that,

where it is caused by a single blow there cannot be any intention to cause murder and would fall

43 K.I. Vibhute, (ed.), PSA PILLAI’S CRIMINAL LAW, 10th ed. 2011, p. 153.

44 Devasahayam, in rem (1962) 1 MLJ45 Dalapati Majhi 1982 Cri LJ 134

30

under culpable homicide. Courts while determining the required intention give due caution to the

circumstances in which the incident occurred.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books:

1. RA Nelson, INDIAN PENAL CODE, 9th ed., Vol 3, Butterworth Lexis Nexis.

2. Basu’s INDIAN PENAL CODE, 10th ed., Ashoke Law House , New Delhi.

3. Dr Hari Singh Gour’s , PENAL LAW OF INDIA , 11 th ed. ,Vol 3 , Law publishers India

Pvt Ltd.

4. KD Gaur, THE TEXT BOOK ON INDIAN PENAL CODE, 4 th ed., Universal Law

Publication House.

5. KD Gaur, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 5th ed. , Lexis Nexis Butterworth.

31

6. Alan Reed & Ben Fitzpatrick , CRIMINAL LAW , 4th ed. , Sweet and Maxwell. P 377

7. KI Vibhute, PSA PILLAI’S CRIMINAL LAW , 10th edn. Lexis nexis Butterworths.

8. RP Kataria and SKA Naqvi , COMMENTARY ON THE INDIA PENAL CODE, 1st ed. , Vol

2 , Orient Publishing Company.

9. Justice M.L Singhal & Sabiha , AN ANALYTICAL AND EXHAUSTIVE COMMENTARY

ON THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 , 2nd ed. Vol 2 , Premier Publishing Company.

10. J S Sarkar , INDIAN PENAL CODE , Vol 2 , Kamal Law House Calcutta.

11. Editor VR Manohar, RATANLAL AND DHIRAJLAL THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 32nd

ed. 2010 , Lexis nexis Butterworths.

12. Bryan A Garnar, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 9th ed., Thomson Reuters.

12. JS Honrby, OXFORD ADVANCED LEARNER’S DICTIONARY, 7th ed., Oxford

University Press.

32